The Enduring Legacy of Colonialism: A QCA Analysis of Military Interventions in Africa

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Civil wars are the most common form of conflict occurring in the world system currently. The incidents of civil wars has risen since the end of the Cold War for a variety of reasons – mostly through the steady accumulation of conflicts that have not been resolved (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Increasingly, international attention has been drawn to interventions in these conflicts; the recent debates in the United Kingdom and the United States over intervention in the Syrian civil war are particularly high-profile examples. While an increasing amount of academic and lay attention has been directed on military interventions in civil wars over the last twenty years, holes in our understanding of their efficacy remain.

The literature on third-party military interventions with boots on the ground in civil wars lacks consideration for the role that interstate relations could possibly play on the success of those interventions. States rarely choose to intervene militarily in a vacuum, and the relationship between states could possibly condition the choice to intervene, the motives of the intervention and the likelihood of success once intervention is chosen. Relationships between states are usually considered at the outset of an intervention as an explanation for the occurrence of intervention, but systematic study of how they may condition success once intervention is underway is missing.

This study examines the dyadic conditions of military intervention rather than simply structural conditions of the conflict itself. Considerations about effective interventions are policy relevant – *who is best equipped to engage in them*, what sorts of interventions are most effective for attaining success – in a world of increasing intrastate conflict, insecurity and globalized economic concerns. The Correlates of War dataset records 64 internationalized civil wars around the world between 1970 and 2007, quite a significant amount when compared to the number of classic interstate wars in the same period: 51. Interventions are expensive, both in money, lives, and in the political capital of leaders engaging in them, and frequently controversial. If any of the hypothesis stated below are supported it can directly inform concrete decisions about who is best equipped to use interventions to achieve their policy goals and what sorts of policy goals are most achievable through military interventions.

This paper does not purport to explain all military interventions’ success. The field of international military interventions is large; interventions occur on nearly every continent and are initiated by major powers and regional neighbors. The cases selected for analysis include only interventions in independent Africa. The selection of Africa is not arbitrary. Focusing on intervention in Africa facilitates comparison, and involves the majority of the possible universe of cases. Africa contributes a significant percentage of *all* civil wars; it accounts for 23% of civil wars in the Correlates of War, though measurement on the continent only began in 1960 while the first civil war for the dataset is recorded in 1818. Specifically this paper develops models on two datasets: one of all major power interventions into African civil wars to specifically explore the post-colonial success or failure of former colonial powers, and one of all interventions in African civil wars to test the generalizability of conclusions drawn from the first, smaller dataset.

Of particular interest is the construction of the outcome condition. Intervention outcomes is conceptualized in such a way as to take seriously the actual goals and motivations of interveners. Interventions will be evaluated by the intentions of the actors, not our expectations of their moral responsibility. This is a problem in the literature on interventions to date; “As a result of all the research on intervention into civil wars we know next to nothing about the goals of interveners…instead, most of the studies have posited and outcome of interest and by extension assumed the outcome was the goal” (Regan, 2010: 470). The result of all of these “under-articulated goals” (p. 470) is that the conversation on intervention strategy and conflict management is not particularly well suited either to policy makers or to a value-neutral political science.

While proportionally there have been many interventions in civil wars in Africa, from a statistical standpoint military interventions into civil war are not a sufficiently common occurrence, and the issue of model specification so unreliable[[1]](#footnote-1), that the meaningful application of statistical methods is difficult. A variable-oriented approach to intervention studies has resulted in a body of work where outcome measurement is not necessarily valid and where divergent results are often obtained. Methodologically, this study utilizes fsQCA to derive solution equations while overcoming the difficulties inherent to more quantitative approaches, and at an epistemological level it embraces a case-oriented rather than variable-oriented logic to the study of conflict and intervention.

**Theory**

An inquiry into the success of interventions in Africa, following the end of colonization requires both a historically informed and institutionally sensitive approach. The argument advanced here focuses on the historical legacy of institutions in the political sphere as they relate to the creation of “legibility” in intervention dyads. The purpose of the theorizing presented here is to guide an exploration into an area of intervention studies that have not been sufficiently examined to provide ground for concrete deductions. The framework built is meant to be heuristic rather than air-tight.

Millar and Wolchik (1994) make a distinction between the “legacies” of communism and the “aftermath” of communism which is a useful way to structure an understanding of post-colonial states. Legacies are long-lasting inter-generational results of the colonial experience, while aftermaths are the short-run effects of the actual transition process to independence. The legacy of colonialism is a fact that must be directly dealt with in any work that seeks to engage in a historical and institutional manner with African politics and international relations.

Colonial history has not been used as an explanatory variable in conflict literature on third-party military interventions. Colonialism, though neglected, is of particular interest in the study of military interventions. For example, modern humanitarian-oriented interventions are frequently accused of engaging in imperialism, or compared to imperial ventures of the past (Marten, 2004).

Many of the problems of modern interventions are caused, according to some arguments, by lacking precisely the expertise that colonial countries developed and deployed successfully (Stewart and Knaus, 2011). The American intervention in Afghanistan for example, has been plagued by issues arising from a lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge that has made the operating environment especially hostile; “[coalition forces in Afghanistan], by contrast [with the British in India] were so isolated from the reality of Afghan life… that we were hardly even conscious of the depth of our isolation” (Stewart and Knaus, 2011: 25).

The British colonial enterprise in Southeast Asia and India had greater country knowledge as the result of longer terms of service and education tailored to the individual post that an official was going to fill with a focus on history, geography and anthropology.[[2]](#footnote-2) The colonial apparatus had the appropriate practical wisdom, gained through experience, to leverage its power effectively and build sufficient legitimacy to succeed – precisely what recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked (Ibid). Indeed, this knowledge was indispensable for the cooption of indigenous elites to create governance structures in areas were repression could not be exercised by white colonial officers alone.

The divide and conquer strategies that were favored by all colonial services in Africa and elsewhere required the development of area specific knowledge to assist; this should not be read as a normative argument for the virtues of colonialism but rather a suggestion that institutional knowledge and practices derived from a historically fraught situation might better equip these types of institutions for modern interventions. If the old colonial services had all of the expertise that modern forces, like the United States, engaged in intervention lack, could countries with institutional histories of such developments have retained those advantages, at least when intervening in their former colonies?

The literature that focuses specifically on the mechanisms of institutional interaction largely investigates the domestic and the international, intergovernmental organizational level (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006, 2009; Stokke, 2000). Sources of interaction and specifically the causal mechanisms by which international institutions learn from one another are important facets of research (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006, 2009). The domestic pressure that drives the creation of international institutions and regimes is also front and center especially in the creation of security institutions (Velázquez, 2004). Regardless of the substantive area of concern, the literature on international cooperation does not generally involve the areas of specific importance for research focused on civil wars – direct institutional interaction between executive, military, economic and elite institutions.

This theoretical argument develops a conceptualization of institutional interaction that hinges on the amount of “friction” created during the intervention process as a result of “legibility” of institutions to one another. Institutional interaction does not necessarily presuppose cooperation, since states may intervene either for a government or against it.

**Legibility and Post-Colonial Africa**

The primary challenge to the African post-colonial state was the process of state-making, both in the sense of eliminating functional rivals and in creating a legible sphere of action which allowed government officials to operate. To consider an aspect of the military angle specifically, the major failure of operations to remove functional rivals to the state in the domestic arena, is often in a failure of legibility – the inability of the state to “see” the functional rivals because the landscape both physically and culturally obfuscates. Environments that allow insurgents or counter-state violent actors to operate are privileging the vernacular knowledge that states must laboriously and expensively accumulate. On the other hand, standardized, legible communities and landscapes can be governed and pacified with less effort as the state does not have to invest in specific knowledge accumulation of limited generalizable value.

This conceptualization of legibility derives from Scott (1998). Scott’s original application of legibility references the papers undertaken by the state to develop a synoptic vision of its domain to increase the efficiency of its rule. The state acts to assert a legible order within the domestic context against the illegibility of local custom and practice. These result in homogenization, uniformity, grid-making and social simplification (Scott 1998).

Scott positions legibility as the central problem of statecraft; without the ability to convert “complex, illegible and local social practices” into a standard the state can “read”, the state is essentially blind and cannot act effectively (Scott, 1998: 2). He points to examples such as the regulation of land tenure, the development of last names and urban planning as state programs of legibility that replace vernacular, local knowledge with standard, generalizable knowledge. It allows the state to “see” people, places and economic transactions more clearly. This capacity for sight provides the state with knowledge, in this case standardized general knowledge which is usually at a disadvantage against vernacular knowledge in illegible situations or communities.

At its core, legibility is about knowledge derived from visibility, which highlights how much Scott has borrowed from Foucault. Legibility confers the ability to exercise power more easily through visibility which allows the accumulation of knowledge. Institutions of power, for Foucault, inscribe legibility on the individual body through partition, standardization and discourse thereby making the application of power to those bodies more efficient. The creation of power flows from knowledge, and the ability to produce increasing amounts of knowledge are a function of power as a process. Foucault (1977) points, for example, to the organization of the floor of a factory which is designed to assess and view each unit, which is an individual laboring body creating knowledge, but power must already have been exercised to enforce the organization of the factory floor.

Moving from the domestic to the international arena theoretically highlights a recent body of work which applies this Foucauldian-derived concept of legibility to the action of interstate organizations (IOs) as they act on member states (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012; Zanotti, 2006).

Multilateral organizations and international politico-economic structures such as the European Union increasingly endowed themselves with instruments for knowing, assessing, rewarding or punishing the way states governed their population… UN reform plans endeavored to make state institutions and the local phenomena they governed ‘legible and simplified’ [in the example of stabilization operations in Haiti]. The organization’s measuring, counting, recording, coding, law writing and institutional design purported to make a variety of local practices and overlapping jurisdictions administrable through a central state administration and legible for international bureaucracies (Zanotti, 2006).

In this case, international organizations seek to “normalize” states, since normal states reduce risk by being legible to international organizations and other member states. The view that IOs obtain from the international arena and its member states structures the decision-making environment and the range of generic policy options that appear appropriate. The “legibility” of the situation greatly affects the outcome of the action undertaken by the IGO (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).

Essentially, Foucault focuses on inscribing legibility on the individual, while Scott brings legibility to the level of the community – the state makes the practices of local communities and social groupings legible. Individuals can be made legible, the landscape can be made legible and community practices can be made legible. States, or more properly the agents of the state whose identity is created and directed by shared notions of appropriate synoptic knowledge and its application, act on individual citizens within the state’s traditional, domestic sphere to create “legibility”. At an aggregated level, states empower agents through the framework of IOs to act directly on the citizens and institutions of other states to create “legibility” within the international arena as a way to modify risk. States, like all organizations that seek to shape the world and exercise power, are concerned with legibility at all levels.

The combination of the concept of “legibility” and the need for an institutionally sensitive inquiry in post-colonial Africa introduces the concept of “inter-institutional legibility” which focuses on the inherently *dyadic* nature of international relations. States interact with each other through their institutional apparatuses; often these are highly specialized, as for example the United States’ State Department and complex. For the smooth operation of military engagements, both members of the dyad must be mutually intelligible.

Inter-institutional legibility is conceptualized as the ease with which one set of institutions, in this particular case the institutions of the state, can “read” another set of institutions, those institutions of another state member of the relevant dyad, and thereby lower the cost of interaction with them. This includes how little extra investment is necessary to understand procedures, identify power-dynamics and hierarchies, and to navigate the institutional culture. This type of legibility goes beyond the superficial and requires deep knowledge about the actual pathways of governance and power within an institution. Legibility is relational, and occurs in this case between institutions. Legibility must be measured within the dyad. An institution in a vacuum has no legibility, since there is no other institution to read it, and no need of legibility, since there is no other institution to read.

Inter-institutional legibility at independence was high. The existing institutions in both halves of the dyad included, for the most part, the same actors within institutions with experience interacting pre-independence. Legibility in the context of independence from colonialism built on the process of simplification, homogenization and grid-making which occurred as a previous historical event. Indeed, the entire process of colonization, especially the later era, could be read as a process of making local, foreign customs more legible to the state – colonial administrators reordered local hierarchies of power, drew maps, moved populations and instituted education programs in the colonial tongue. The increased legibility of colonial subjects and spaces made the application of power to increase exploitation more effective.

Further development of legibility could be undertaken by the post-colonial state in an act of imitation, but unlike the legibility that Scott discusses, imposition of greater legibility post-independence would be more complicated. The act of intervention could have as a side-effect the imposition of greater legibility and so could a variety of other actions like required structural adjustments, or the maintenance of close international relations within a system of power inequalities. For the most part though, former colonial states have greater restrictions on their ability to impose legibility then the strictly technical ones that face states in Scott’s more limited domestic application of legibility. The former colonial state can cultivate legibility, or keep legibility “fresh” through time, by repeated investment in the dyadic relationship through iterative interaction.

Institutional legibility was developed over the course of the colonial historical experience, climaxing perhaps in the grant of independent institutions at the end of the colonial period. Institutional memory and continued interactions predicated on “special” historical relationships continued the development of legibility over time. It provided the intervening country with important information at a lower cost than may be available to an intervening country that lacks that legibility.

Legibility, in this instance, can work reciprocally within the dyad. Scott (1998) argues that legibility is created by the government to view citizens, and does not consider whether the government could make itself more or less legible to the citizen during the process of heroic simplification of society. Legibility could be reciprocal; the greater investment made by either state strengthens ties that run in both directions.




Figure 1- Basic chart of theoretical framework: How legibility acts on intervention outcome

The basic theoretical framework developed to connect this conceptualization of legitimacy with intervention outcome is illustrated in Figure 1 above. The level of inter-institutional legibility within an intervention dyad, acts on the level of friction, i.e. the cost of the intervention engagement, and the types of goals constructed. The higher the cost and/or the more unrealistic the goals of an intervention, the less likely the intervention will result in success, defined as achieving the intervening state’s goals for the intervention. States which can “see” one another know what is possible, and how to operate the institutional mechanisms that are necessary for the actual process of intervention.



Figure 2 - Inter-Institutional Legibility

The benefits of legibility are felt at the structural and cultural levels, as illustrated in Figure 2 above. The structural benefits are embedded in a “shared logic of appropriateness” that grows from historical institutional interactions and ongoing relations which shape the situational environment and the norms or rules which are applied within it. The cultural benefits of institutional legibility lie in the people that actually operate the institutions and their relationships. Elite networks, where elite is meant as those people who are in policy-important positions, create networks of communication and facilitate the *ability* to communicate on both the tactical and strategic level.

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** *Where institutional interaction within a dyad is high, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.*

**Hypothesis 1a (H1a):** *Where military interaction within a dyad is high, regardless of the level of other institutional interactions, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.*

**Hypothesis 1b (H1b):** *Institutional interaction will be higher in dyads that include a former colonial relationship*.

**Hypothesis 2:** *Where high elite social network density within a dyad exists, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.*

**Hypothesis 2a (H2a):** *Where executive interaction within a dyad is high, regardless of the level of other institutional interactions, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.*

**Hypothesis 2b (H2b):** *Where dyads share a language, regardless of levels of other network relationships, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals*.

**Hypothesis 2c (H2c)**: *Where dyads share a highly salient overlap in their international organizational membership, regardless of levels of other network relationships, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.*

**Hypothesis 2d (H2d)**: *Social network density will be higher in dyads that include a former colonial relationship*

**Fuzzy-Set QCA**

Fuzzy-set analysis applies the set theoretic logic of the dichotomized csQCA in a manner that allows a more fine-grained analysis of set membership. Fuzzy set membership is anchored qualitatively by full membership at one, and full non-membership at zero, with a cross-over anchor at .5. Membership scores are not relative, but related to these anchors by theoretical considerations.

A fuzzy set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been purposefully calibrated to indicate degree of membership in a well-defined set. Such calibration is possible only through the use of theoretical and substantive knowledge, which is essential to the specification of the three qualitative breakpoints (Ragin, 2008: 90).

The average variable utilized in traditional statistical techniques is un-calibrated; these measures show relations and orders between cases but are not directly interpretable against “dependably known standards” (Ragin, 2008: 175). Since QCA employs a set-theoretic approach that more closely aligns with our verbalizations of theories, calibration is set based on distinguishing relevant from irrelevant variation across subsets of a concept. For example, the variation between the GDP of the United States and Sweden may be numerically larger, but if the underlying concept we are concerned with is “wealthy democracies”, the variation is probably irrelevant theoretically and we might assign the two countries the same fuzzy score of 1.

The problem of quantification of the outcome is one of the strongest arguments for qualitative analysis, but it also makes the development of clear-cut seemingly objective criteria for anchoring difficult. However, an understanding of success built on naturalistic language is intuitively satisfying, and can provide, with careful judgment, the necessary anchors. The use of naturalistic language in the anchors is also more useful from a policy conversation standpoint. Policy makers rarely discuss “single-unit changes in X”, or are concerned with minor, non-significant variation.

Anchors for Outcome**:**

Full membership (1) – the reasonable achievement of all important goals as measured at the outset of intervention.

Cross-over Point (.5) – Reasonable achievement of half the goals measured at the outset of intervention.

Full non-membership (0) – No achievement of important goals at the outset of intervention.

*Conditions*

Composite measures of the theoretically interesting conditions are used for two reasons. The first is largely methodological; while QCA does not have a traditional degrees of freedom problem that plagues statistics there is substantial evidence that there is an appropriate ratio between cases and conditions. If there are too few cases and too many contradictions, then QCA methods can create models out of random data. As the models created here include sets as small as 11 cases,[[3]](#footnote-3) the use of more than four conditions creates the “significant possibility of finding non-contradictions” which suggests that models could be generated at random (Marx, 2009: 18). The use of a theory and the application of substantive case knowledge is one check on the concern that models are being created at random; however, best practice also suggests that when cases are limited, conditions should be carefully considered and similarly limited. Therefore, the indicators of interest have been combined to decrease the number of theoretically relevant conditions included in the model.

The second reason for composite measures is more directly related to the research at hand. Preliminary research suggested that single relationship measures are insufficient to capture the multiple facets and complexity of inter-institutional relationships that may be at work in determining intervention success. The theoretical argument for institutional legibility does not rest on a single indicator, either, and strongly suggests that states must interact across multiple, relevant institutions to develop legibility.

The fuzzy membership scores for the shared “logic of appropriateness” and cultural networks are derived from the average of the fuzzy membership scores for the indicators. While it is certainly true that mechanical scoring, like the use of means, should be avoided without theoretical justification, the scores obtained were carefully compared to the cases to ensure fit. The ability to compare case knowledge with developed indicators is a particular benefit of a small N research design and QCA as a method encourages this sort of iterative engagement between evidence and application. Where available, the scores were compared against other accepted measures of relationships.

The “logic of appropriateness” measure is constructed from four (if the intervener was the colonial power) or three fuzzy indicators: the military relationship, the foreign aid relationship, the economic relationship and the amount of time since independence to capture the steady and natural accumulation of change over time (if the intervener was the former colonial power). The cultural network measure is constructed from four fuzzy set indicators: the executive relationship, where the executive was educated, shared linguistics, and the salience of their IGO membership overlap.

The individual indicator calibration with their theoretical justifications and a discussion of validity is provided in Appendix A. For the transparency of the procedure, fsQCA requires careful consideration and reporting of judgments made – in this way it does not, like traditional statistical procedures, assume that numbers are objective or inherently meaningful without justification.

**Analysis**

The first half of the analysis looks at a dataset including just colonial power interventions and the United States covers the period between 1960 and 2013 with a total of 13 interventions in nine civil wars. While all of the interveners are former colonial powers, or the United States, about 61.5% (8) of the interventions are targeted at their former colonies. France, by far, engaged in the most interventions; it accounts for 53.85% (7) of the total. The next most frequent intervener is the United States with 23% (3), of which two are interventions into the Somali conflict begun in 1992, the first under the UNITAF mandate and the second in UNOSOM II. Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom each engaged in a single intervention, though Italy’s intervention is as part of UNOSOM II. Belgium intervened in the DRC in 1978 in tandem, though not necessarily in a coalition with, the French. The United Kingdom’s intervention is in Sierra Leone in 2000 in support of the United Nations’ mission, but not as a part of it.

Unlike csQCA, the conditions in a fuzzy-set analysis are not dichotomized. This requires a different approach to determining set-theoretic relationships than is available with dichotomous conditions and outcomes. Two primary analyses can be undertaken through fsQCA: identification of subset relations, and the fuzzy-truth table.

Subset relations are a manner of evaluating necessity and sufficiency of conditions, by identifying whether those conditions form some subset of the outcome, or whether the outcome forms a subset of those conditions.

The evaluation of sufficiency can be seen as a test of whether the cases displaying the causal conditions form a subset of the cases displaying the outcome… In order to argue that a cause or causal combination is a sufficient for the outcome, the fuzzy membership scores in cause have to be less than or equal to the fuzzy membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2008).

The mechanical application of mathematical formulas to derive sufficiency or necessity are useless without theoretical justification as “neither necessity nor sufficiency exists independently of theories that propose causes” (Ragin, 2008). Two steps are undertaken here to establish sufficiency: first, a basic exploration of the subset relationships between the theoretically interesting conditions and the outcome, before developing a fuzzy-set truth table and subsequent solution equation. The fuzzy-set truth table essentially calculates subset relations and then, like in csQCA, reduces the complexity of the solution equation through Boolean algebra.

In a graphical representation of subset relations, a condition is sufficient for the outcome if the majority of the cases lie in the upper triangle, indicating that membership score in the cause is lower than or equal to membership in the outcome. A numerical consistency and coverage score can also be generated which provides a more precise evaluation than simple visual judgment. The consistency and coverage scores are mechanically the same as those provided in the truth-table equation.

Consistency is the degree to which one set is contained within another set.[[4]](#footnote-4) Higher consistency means that more of the set is contained within the second set; essentially higher consistency points to the closer to sufficiency of the condition. Since fuzzy-sets do not include dichotomized outcome conditions, a case can be more or less contained within the set of “successful interventions”. As a result, consistency scores range on a scale from 0 to 1, where a large penalty is prescribed for “*large* inconsistencies but small penalties for near misses” (Ragin, 2008: 108).

Coverage can be understood in two forms: raw coverage and unique coverage. Raw coverage is the proportion of cases displaying the positive outcome that are covered by the condition or the term in the solution equation. Unique coverage the proportion of cases that are covered by that condition or term in the equation and no other. Often, when consistency goes up, coverage goes down. The more specific the explanation, the fewer cases it can explain. At the most extreme end, this results in unique explanations for each individual case which forecloses on the possibility of generalization.

Figure 4 below represents the subset relationship between intervention success and shared cultural networks.




Figure 4 - Visual representation of the sufficiency of shared cultural networks

Dyads with strong shared cultural networks are a subset of successful intervention with a consistency of .882 and a raw coverage of .696. There is some support for sufficiency here; unsurprisingly however, cultural networks alone cannot explain successful interventions.

There are a number of cases that are contained in the lower triangle. QCA methods are not probabilistic, and unlike statistics, they cannot simply ignore these outlying cases as mathematically acceptable “error”. These contradictory cases will be examined below.

Figure 5 below represents the subset relationship between intervention success and shared “logics of appropriateness”.




Figure 5 - Visual representation of the sufficiency of shared "logic of appropriateness"

The consistency of the subset relationship between success interventions and a shared “logic of appropriateness” is much lower than for shared cultural networks with .794. Scores below .8 display substantial inconsistency and this is the threshold used in the fuzzy-set truth table analysis. This suggests that the composite condition for a shared “logic of appropriateness” is not sufficient. However, the raw coverage score is similar (.684), suggesting that there is substantial overlap between cases covered by these conditions. The consistency is even worse when we consider the condition “colonial intervener”: .750. This initial fsQCA model does not support Hypothesis 1c – that a colonial legacy *alone* increases the likelihood of intervention success.

This cursory consideration of the individual, theoretically interesting conditions highlights the greater explanatory power of shared cultural networks over a shared “logic of appropriateness” when considered individually. Separately, Hypothesis 2 finds greater empirical support from the initial subset relationships than does Hypothesis 1. Further analysis will derive solution equations, and then unpack the various indicators of each composite condition to zoom further in on the causal processes at work on intervention success.

*fsQCA Model*

First, a model was fitted for all of the cases including the conditions: shared cultural networks, shared “logic of appropriateness”, and whether the intervener was the former colonial power. This is the first and most general test of the theoretical framework of institutional legibility developed in the previous chapters as it relates specifically to colonial power interventions.

The fuzzy-set truth table is a representation of multidimensional vector space with 2K rows where K is the number of conditions in the model. “There is a one-to-one correspondence between causal combinations, truth table rows, and vector space” (Ragin, 2008: 104). Since fuzzy-set memberships are not dichotomous, a case is considered a member of the configuration if the membership score in the configuration is greater than .5, it is considered more in than out of the configuration which places the case in that row of the truth table.

Again, the higher consistency score, the greater the degree to which the configuration contains a set which is a subset of the outcome: successful intervention. “It is important to point out, however, that some cases displaying the outcome may be found among configurations with low consistency”; these are conceptually equivalent to the contradictory configurations in csQCA and require the same careful consideration (Ragin, 2008: 109). There are also three logical remainders where there are no observed cases.

The next step is to eliminate empty rows and assign the outcome based on the consistency scores. There is a significant gap between .8124 and .7076, and that is where the threshold is placed. The last column, labelled “Outcome”, represents the dichotomous coding based on the degree to which each case is more in then out of the outcome condition applied to develop the solution equations which will be reported later.

Table 3 - Raw fuzzy truth table

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Shared “logic of appropriateness”** | **Shared cultural networks** | **Colonial Intervener** | **N** | **Raw Consistency** | **Outcome** |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | .9367 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | .7076 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | .9275 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | .3648 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | .8124 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | L |  |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | L |  |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | L |  |

There are eight rows to the truth table with five rows containing observations. Of those, three of the rows have a consistency score high enough to code as a successful intervention. Since the coding of all of the conditions in fsQCA is not dichotomous, and a single case is on a continuum of more/less in or out of the set of “successful interventions” there is not a straight-forward way to assign an outcome useful for minimization. Instead, consistency scores closer to 1 suggest that the group of cases together is “in” the set of “successful interventions” and are coded with a 1 outcome. What this means is that some of these groups coded as 1 may include interventions with a variation of “success”. While this procedure may seem straightforward, it does obscure some interesting contradictions if it is applied mechanically – however, the analysis does not treat these rows as black boxes so variation does not necessarily hinder the validity of the analysis.

There are two rows of the raw truth table which are particularly interesting at this stage in the analysis: row 1 and row 2. Row 1 represents the configuration where all of the conditions are present; that is, these are the cases where we might expect to observe the greatest amount of legibility. Four cases, the largest N for any of the configurations, are covered under this condition with a raw consistency of .9367. This consistency is nearly perfect, suggesting that there are no “contradictions” within the configuration. One of the cases is a full success: the 2011 French intervention in the Cote d’Ivoire election crisis. Three of the cases are more in than out of the set of successful interventions with fuzzy outcome scores of .75; this includes the 1978 Belgian intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), the 2002 French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war and the French intervention in Chad to counter Libyan influence in 1983.

Row 2 illustrates the weakness of ties that are solely institutional in nature, weakening Hypothesis 1, even when they are present in a context of a historic colonial legacy. This conclusion should be considered tentatively, however, especially in light of the cases contained within the configuration. The two cases contained within this configuration have polar opposite outcomes: the first French intervention in Chad in 1968 was a success, while the Italian intervention as part of UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1993 was a failure. This is analogous to a “contradiction” in csQCA. The issue of the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, and the confounding problem of international organizational politics has been briefly dealt with above. Bracketing the issue of Somalia does suggest that institutional relations alone can possibly lead to successful interventions, but the total number of cases to back up this assertion is quite low (N=1), and therefore not particularly convincing even with the small size of the dataset.

The configuration in Row 3, the presence of shared elite cultural networks and a historic colonial relationship without a shared “logic of appropriatness”, has the second highest consistency though it covers fewer cases than Row 1. This cases support Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 2 generally. This includes the most recent French intervention in Mali (2013), and the only British intervention contained in the datasets – their 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone, both of which are later explored through the structured, focused comparative case studies.

The final row (Row 5) before the logical remainders, includes a single case: the French intervention, alongside Belgium, in Zaire (DRC) in 1978. This row in particular highlights the role of shared elite cultural networks – Hypothesis 2. La Francophonie reports that as of 2010[[5]](#footnote-5) 46% of the DRC speaks French. The numbers they reported in 2005 are a little lower, 40% total with 10% proficient, but the proficiency is going to be in the educated, administrative stratum – the elites. Kinshasa is the second largest French speaking city in the world after Paris, a status it has long enjoyed, and in terms of absolute numbers the DRC is the second largest French speaking country in the world, and has been since independence.

On the elite level, French president Giscard d'Estaing cultivated “unusual personal influence over” Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko (Young, 1978: 181). This close elite relationship translated into long-term investment in the relationship with Zaire (DRC) which “which confirmed France’s ability [and intent] totally to replace Belgian influence in her ex-colonies” (Chipman, 1985: 27). In a scenario such as this, it is not difficult to see how institutional interaction would have been of little use; the ultimate consequence of long years of rule under Mobutu was the deinstitutionalization of Zaire and the creation of a “lame leviathan” which would have afforded little opportunity for the creation of meaningful legibility through institutional interaction but which developed an environment ripe for elite ties to shape the dyadic state relations.

Setting aside for the moment the contradiction of the Italian intervention in Somalia and therefore using the outcomes provided in the initial raw truth table above, the truth table reduces to create both a complex and a parsimonious solution

Table 4 - Complex solution equation all cases

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Cultural\*~logic | .405 | .101250 | .895770 |
| Intcolonial\*cultural | .594375 | .290625 | .894638 |
| Solution Coverage | .695628 |
| Solution Consistency | .881654 |

The unique coverage for both of the complex solutions are low as they explain many of the same cases between them.

This is not a surprise as there are nine cases in the dataset which were coded as successes using the truth table displayed above; these overlapping complex solutions, however, point out the different pathways and causal interactions that may be at work even within a single case. Interventions and civil wars, even in isolation, are incredibly complex phenomenon, but when combined the layers of analysis grow nearly exponentially.

The first solution is the presence of shared elite cultural networks combined with the *absence* of corresponding shared institutional connections. The only case uniquely covered under this solution term is the French intervention in the DRC in 1978; the other two cases are also covered under the second term in the equation, but are some of the most recent interventions: the British intervention in Sierra Leone and the French intervention in Mali in 2013. The lack of institutional connection is not an independent fact, but intimately connected to the question of colonialism, in the case of the French intervention in the DRC, and partially the result of the temporal component of the institution measure, in the case of the French intervention in Mali – over time the institutional connection has drifted and not been renewed. The case studies in following chapters will return to this lack of independence on the part of the conditions.[[6]](#footnote-6)

The second term in the solution equation is the presence of a colonial legacy and the presence of shared elite cultural networks. In addition to the British intervention and the French intervention in Mali, which was also covered above, this includes the second French intervention in Chad in 1983, the two French interventions in Cote d’Ivoire, and the sole Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1968. For these cases, the cultural networking is a direct result of the colonial legacy; the shared language, the proprietary relationships with executives, are all related to the special domain created by the former colonial relationship. However, as the solution equation above points out, this can and does occur without the intervention of colonial history in some cases.

When the solution is reduced using Boolean algebra the final parsimonious equation is:

Table 5 - Parsimonious solution equation

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Cultural | .695625 | .695625 | .881654 |
| Solution Coverage | .695625 |
| Solution Consistency | .881654 |

Identifying the role of shared elite cultural networks plays is in line with the earlier QCA finding that executive interaction is important for determining success across interventions in the larger dataset. It also lends support to the concept of “friction” as developed in the previous chapter – shared language, for example, reduces the costs of action. To further develop this, and provide a framework for the ensuing comparative case studies, the individual conditions that make up the composite “shared cultural networks” will be unpacked.

Shared elite cultural networks

The composite condition “shared elite cultural networks” has four constituent elements included, to test Hypothesis 2 and its attendant sub-hypotheses: a measure of the salience of shared IGO membership, drawing on recent international relations network research; a measure of dyadic executive relations, highlighted by the csQCA models developed at the beginning of this chapter; a measure of shared language, informed by American experience on the ground in recent military ventures; and a dichotomous measure of whether the executive was educated in the intervening country, to capture enculturation.

These four conditions may interact with one another, determine each other, or work at cross-purposes. The initial fsQCA suggests that something about this particular condition is important for determining intervention success. Setting aside the other theoretically interesting conditions, there are sufficient cases to ensure reasonable model specification if just these four conditions are included.

Consistently, with or without the inclusion of the problematic multi-lateral intervention in Somalia in 1992, the analysis highlights the role of shared language over and above the other measures of cultural networking. The parsimonious solution equation obtained, including Somalia, is displayed below in Table 6.

Table 6 - Parsimonious solution equation for cultural indicators

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Shared Language | 0.78125 | 0.78125 | 0.892857 |
| Solution Coverage | 0.78125 |
| Solution Consistency | 0.892857 |

Shared “logic of appropriateness”

As a measure of institutional interaction, the composite shared “logic of appropriateness” is composed of three main indicators: a measure of military relationship, a measure of aid relationship, and a measure of the salience of the dyadic trade relationship. The fourth indicator is only included in cases where the intervening state is the former colonial power: time since independence.

When the 1992 multilateral intervention in Somalia is removed from the fsQCA model, the presence of a shared “logic of appropriateness” coupled with a colonial legacy is a pathway to success generated in the intermediate solution equation. This suggests that the absence of the institutional interaction condition in the full model may be the result of particular features of the Somali case, including the extremely deinstitutionalized nature of the utterly collapsed Somali state in 1992. The theory developed in this study does not require that interveners enter the conflict on the side of the existing government for these factors to increase the chance of success[[7]](#footnote-7), but all of the institutions and personnel a state could have invested in developing a relationship with were completely defunct by the launch of the UNOSOM II mission. Military infrastructure was dismantled, aid was decentralized and being syphoned by warlord factions, and there was no way to engage in meaningful trade to reproduce norms. This suggests that unpacking the indicators of shared “logic of appropriateness” could yield conditions of causal importance for other less atypical cases.

Unlike the shared elite cultural networks condition, the parsimonious solution obtained by unpacking the shared “logic of appropriateness” is inconsistent enough to be basically meaningless. The dichotomous indicator of economic relationship salience is the single term in the parsimonious solution but with a consistency of 0.700000. Economic relationships do little on their own to explain intervention success. For interventions by major powers in Africa, especially those that share a colonial legacy with the other member of the intervention dyad, economics are simply not important.

The intermediate solution, Table 7 below, produced by this model is has marginally greater explanatory power.

Table 7 - Intermediate solution equation for logic of appropriateness indicators

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Military \* Economic \* Aid | 0.406250 | 0.406250 | 0.764706 |
| Solution Coverage | 0.406250 |
| Solution Consistency | 0.764706 |

The presence of all of the constituent elements of the shared “logic of appropriateness” composite can be a viable pathway to success with a consistency of 0.764706. This is borderline, but it does indicate that the removal of the chronological element (time since independence) does not increase the explanatory power of the other indicators. The shared logic score trends downward over time as states move further from the point of independence, but the power of those institutional interactions amongst former colonial dyads does not increase if that element is removed. This suggests that Hypothesis 1 does not hold.

**QCA identified indicators**

Unpacking both theoretical composite conditions has yielded an indication about the importance of particular individual measures. The fsQCA analysis suggests that the driving force behind the importance of shared elite cultural networks is the presence of shared language. The language shared is always the language of the intervener, as the colonial powers invested a great deal of energy and effort into spreading their mother tongues, and it is consistently a lingua franca. The role this plays at the elite level, and at the tactical level, will be traced in the case studies.

Early research also pointed to the role of executive relations, one that makes particular sense in light of the unique role of the executive in foreign policy for most states, and the unique personalized role of the executive in African states. The shared language component may be acting on the importance of executive relations, as well; dyads where communication can be more informal, direct or copious because of shared linguistic mediums may gain increased legibility through their executive interactions. Former colonial relationship also plays an interactive role between these other conditions in both models – amongst all interventions, and amongst major power interventions.

Developing a model that is focused specifically on these conditions of importance once again highlights the role of language. Both the complex and parsimonious solutions point to the role of shared language alone and in combination with former colonial relationships. The importance of the combination is undoubtedly an artifact of the American cases included. To control for this issue, this model is run on a larger dataset including all interventions in Africa.[[8]](#footnote-8)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Shared Language\*~Executive Relations | 0.222069 | 0.139655 | 0.848485 |
| ~Colonial legacy \* Salient economic relationship | .068966 | .068966 | 1.000 |
| Colonial Legacy \* Shared Language | .187931 | .105517 | 1.000 |
| Solution Coverage | 0.396552 |
| Solution Consistency | 0.909091 |

Economic relationships are important in the absence of a shared colonial legacy – the coverage is quite low, however, as this is explaining a very small number of cases. This may be capturing a particular class of regional interventions. Shared language is important for two configurations: shared language in the absence of executive relationships, and shared language combined with a shared colonial legacy.

**Conclusions**

Both in the entire universe of cases, all military interventions into African civil wars since 1960, and in the subset of cases specifically looking at colonial power interventions, language stands out consistently in the solution equations. To return to the theoretical framework, shared language is the most direct and obvious indicator of legibility. It directly allows the actor to gather information about the social environment by making the environment intelligible without additional investment. This ought to decrease friction “on-the-ground” at the tactical level by facilitating direct interaction with civilians and other military’s personnel in the conflict environment. The potential effect of language operates at the strategic, operational and tactical level within an intervention - the case studies will explore whether that is the case, or whether one particular level or pathway is determinative.

Executive relations, both their presence and absence, also features prominently in the solutions obtained. In the final analysis, shared language with the *absence* of executive relations is a relatively consistent pathway to intervention success. In the African post-colonial state, historically the executive has been the central institutional, though not highly institutionalized, feature. Foreign policy in the former colonial powers, specifically France and Great Britain, is often the domain of the executive – the case of France, foreign policy especially in Africa is the purview of the President.

Executive relations and language are both markers of legibility, and their relationship to friction is fairly straightforward. They increase the ability to communicate and to act effectively in the field, removing a source of fog – lack of adequate knowledge or experience.

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**Appendix A – Fuzzy-set Calibration and Justification**

*Calibration*

The indicator of military relationship is included in the composite “logic of appropriateness” measure as military interventions are the primary concern of this study, and militaries are the institutions that are most likely to interact directly during an operation. Drawing on the institutional interaction argument around a shared logic of appropriateness built in Chapter 2, a history of interaction lowers the cost of interaction by decreasing friction, military relationships are particularly important for understanding institutional legibility.

The transfer of foreign aid from a donor state to a recipient is a powerful conduit for transmitting institutional norms and structures, which have been hypothesized here to increase legibility. The consensus in the literature is that the provision of aid is often conditioned more by the interests of donor states than by particularly urgent need in the case of recipients (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Younas, 2008). This does not mean that states to not continue to deploy the *motif* of development in conjunction with their provision of foreign aid, or even to suggest that it is completely insincere – rather, development is not the dominate concern for the majority of large aid providers. This would suggest that states which share interests will have higher levels of foreign aid; Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that a country with a long colonial history with the donor country could expect about one standard deviation above the mean in levels of aid.

Aid also creates the conditions for greater legibility through the emphasis placed on “institutional development” and “capacity building”. It is an article of faith that aid efficacy and development generally is tied to solid institutions (Moss, Pettersson, & Walle, 2006). The traditional approach to foreign aid is that aid is supposed to help build state capacity, while a modern approach places the effectiveness of aid directly in relation to the quality of institutions. In this case the quality of institutions, the requisite level of “capacity” and their general “goodness” are all measured from how closely those institutions have come to look like the institutions of Western donor states, and therefore their level of legibility.

The fuzzy-set measure for aid is calibrated based on the historical nature, in this case a comparison of levels across five years where available, of the relationship. High and *stable* levels of aid, in relation to the donor state’s other regional provisions, receives a 1; no aid or negligible amounts of aid receive a 0. The cut-off point of .5 is where the donor state is providing aid but the provision is unstable, trending up or down significantly.

The use of the economic relationship as a measure of a “logic of appropriateness” follows a similar logic to the one outlined above regarding aid. Research has found that levels of trade and foreign direct investment are sensitive to institutional factors that make the environment more predictable and visible to the investor and the state which protects and promotes his investment; Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that “foreign direct investment is influenced by the enforceability of contracts, rule of law, economic liberty” (p. 41), all of which are the result of institutional “capacity” and are the same institutional effects that investors would expect to find when operating in developed, Western states. Where there is greater investment then, there is an expectation of a “shared logic of appropriateness” that includes respect for property rights and the rule of law, but that are provided by institutions that also have a further complex of “logics” they also create.

The fuzzy-set measure is dichotomous as there was insufficient meaningful variation to be captured in this particular set of cases. Fuzzy-set allows for the addition of dichotomous conditions, so this does not present a methodological problem, and unlike in statistics, the reduction of variation does not threaten the validity of the model.

The interaction of executives, especially in Africa where the head of the patrimonial state has traditionally been an authoritarian, charismatic leader (often with his own military experience), is of particular importance to cultural legibility and the reduction of friction at the elite level. Foreign policy and military operations are often the exclusive domain of African executives, and intervening states as well. For example, Africa is within the special purview of the French President. Corollary to the fundamental argument of the importance of executive interaction is the fact of executive education. An indicator has been included for the place where the executive received their education; an education in the intervening state would transmit a host of cultural norms, expectations, and understandings about behavior, interaction and communication.

The executive relationship measure extensive personal interaction. Direct endorsement of the executive by the executive branch of the other state, would receive a 1. The lack of formal diplomatic apparatus would receive a 0, with the cross-over point at .5 to suggest either negative interactions or a general downward trend or recent change. The executive education indicator comes from the Elgie (2012) dataset for Francophone cases and from the Encyclopedia Britannica for non- francophone cases. Where executives got their final, primary level of education in the other member of the dyad, it is a 1. Where there was ongoing education, some of which occurred in the other dyad member it is a .5 (this includes Mobutu because of his continuing training in journalism in Belgium), or where there was contested executives one of which received his training in the other dyad member and one of which did not (this is the final Cote d’Ivoire case where Gbagbo trained in France and Ouattara trained in the US).

The particular importance of linguistics to legibility cannot be overstated; the development of “national languages” at the expense of regional vernaculars was of particular importance to the process of creating legibility internal to a state (Scott, 1998). Shared linguistics operates as an indicator of tactical legibility, the ability to simply interact with the environment to gather intelligence, coordinate and operate.

At the level of foreign policy, Stewart (2011) argues that the diplomatic institutions of states like the United States and Britain have come to institutionally prize abstract managerial and administrative skills over long personnel postings that develop language and country knowledge. The result has been the creation of diplomatic corps full of non-specialists with no incentive to develop language skills which were previously considered crucial to the practice of diplomacy and intervention. The second of T.E. Lawrence’s (1917) Twenty-Seven Articles, which he developed after long experience operating with the Bedouin in Arabia, is quite explicit about the necessity of language and the ability to listen to efficient military operations:

Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours.

In an institutional environment that no longer strongly encourages education in foreign languages, a language shared by the general populace of both the intervening and the target state would allow for the development of this “crucial deep knowledge” and the maintenance of networks between states.

The linguistic information comes from the Alesina et al (2003) linguistic portion of their fractionalization measure which in turn comes from the Encyclopedia Britannica. As there is no way to select years, it is taken for the year available. Since there is no percentage reported because colonial languages are usually second languages, I arrive at a percentage of the population that speak it as a second language by dividing by the population reported in the CIA Factbook. Again, the years do not match exactly so this is a rough percentage; however as this is converted into fuzzy set scores, that is not an empirical problem.

The language anchors are as follows: 1 – if it is an official language and 20% speak it, .5 – if it is an official language OR 10%, 0 – if there is no significant social role for the language. This is dyadic it can be bidirectional, but I assume in the case of colonial relationships that it is the colonial tongue which will be widely shared. This is born out in the empirical data.

Shared engagement in IGO’s opens a space for iterative institutional interaction that can create trust, develop legibility and reduce friction through practice cooperating. A state’s IGO portfolio acts as an instrument for credibly signaling cooperative intent. The positions of states in the global IGO network – and the micro-level changes they effect in order to alter their positions – reveal strategically valuable information about how those states see themselves in the international system and how they relate to others (Kinne, 2013: 673).

The IGO salience score was calculated in a fashion similar to the original economic equation: square root((Dyadic IGO Membership/IGO Membership State A)\*(Dyadic IGO Membership/IGO Membership State B)) and lagged five years.[[9]](#footnote-9) This was transformed into a fuzzy score based on comparison with highly salient dyadic IGO membership overlaps in other areas of the world, and through clustering of the observed values.

*Validity*

Table 1 - The shared "logics of appropriateness" and cultural networks

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unique Intervention ID # | Target | Intervener | War Name | Start Year | Former colonial power? | Shared “Logic of Appropriateness” | Shared elite cultural Networks |
| 44 | Chad | France | First Chad (FROLINAT) Rebellion | 1968 | Yes | 1 | 0.31 |
| 6 | DRC | Belgium | Fourth DRC (Shaba) | 1978 | Yes | 0.81 | 0.75 |
| 7 | DRC | France | Fourth DRC (Shaba) | 1978 | No | 0.33 | 0.63 |
| 11 | Chad | France | Second Chad (Habre Revolt) | 1983 | Yes | 0.63 | 0.81 |
| 14 | Somalia | United States | Second Somalia | 1992 | No | 0.5 | 0.18 |
| 15 | Somalia | United States | Second Somalia | 1993 | No | 0.5 | 0.187 |
| 19 | Somalia | France | Second Somalia | 1993 | No | 0 | 0 |
| 20 | Somalia | Italy | Second Somalia | 1993 | Yes | 0.81 | 0.25 |
| 28 | Sierra Leone | United Kingdom | Second Sierra Leone | 2000 | Yes | 0.19 | 0.69 |
| 39 | Cote d'Ivoire | France | Cote d'Ivoire Military | 2002 | Yes | 0.69 | 1 |
| 41 | Somalia | United States | Third Somalia | 2007 | No | 0.3 | 0 |
| 43 | Cote d'Ivoire | France | CDI Election Crisis | 2011 | Yes | 0.69 | 0.88 |
| 45 | Mali | France | Northern Mali Conflict | 2013 | Yes | 0.44 | 0.625 |

The consistency of the relationship measures with the underlying concept is high. The case of the French intervention into Chad in 1968 (Intervention ID #44) is illustrative. The shared “logic of appropriateness” score of 1, indicates that the Chad/France dyad is an unequivocal member of the set of countries which share mutually legible “logics of appropriateness” in their institutional structures.

Chad gained independence in 1960, so by the 1968 intervention they had a very short history of autonomous political rule. Their institutions were still largely the remnants of their colonial infrastructure and there was little time for significant historical drift to occur. Power remained centralized in the South, where French penetration had been most complete.

Military, aid and economic ties to France remained strong. The dyad did not have an *Assistance Militaire Technique* (AMT) accord signed until 1976. However, “freedom of action is one of the vital principles of France’s Africa policy”, so formal military agreements are not necessarily a measure of French commitment or investment (Chipman, 1985: 28), “The existence of a broad network of military agreements with African states has therefore create an *implied* commitment to African security which is often unaffected by the precise terms of these agreements” [emphasis mine] (Chipman ,1985: 29). While the military relationship between France and Chad was not formalized in an AMT until 1976, it was slightly more than implied in the decades preceding the intervention. In the 1960’s there was a principal base (a base were elements of all three branches of the French armed forces were stationed) at Fort Lamy (Ndjamena), Chad’s capital. France also maintained 156 military advisors in Chad in 1965 (Luckham, 1982).

Chad was hardly France’s primary African economic partner, or greatest beneficiary of French aid largesse, however, the level of aid and trade remained steady and strong throughout the period preceding the intervention. Chad’s position in this regard was less a function of politics than economic realities; Chad was poor and with limited economic/development prospects, unlike Francophone Cote d’Ivoire where much French aid and economic trade was funneled.

While the fuzzy score for shared “logic of appropriateness” is quite high, the cultural network score is significantly lower: .31. This indicates that the dyad of France and Chad are more out than in the set of countries with close cultural network ties. Chad’s cultural landscape is highly regional, split between a sparsely populated northern region where France engaged in little educational investment during the colonial period and a more densely populated southern region where missionary and education penetration was greater.

Around 22.6% of Chadians speak French as a lingua franca. It is also an official language. The actual use of French is difficult to determine; Arabic is also an official language and is more popularly used as a trade language. There is little indication, however, of how widely spoken Arabic is as a first language amongst Chadians either especially considering the extreme linguistic fractionalization of the country. While Arabic is a relatively large minority language in France, speakers are usually economically marginalized recent immigrants rather than government officials.

At the time of the 1968 intervention, Chad was under the dictatorial rule of François (N'Garta) Tombalbaye, who had been educated in Francophone Africa and later served as an elected official in the colonial apparatus who was eventually fired for his nationalist politics. On an executive level, Chad and France were not particularly close. Though Tombalbaye called directly on de Gaulle to intervene, he was intensely suspicious of the man. He also engaged in “cultural revolutionary” Africanizing efforts, including renaming the capital. This rhetoric may have been more about domestic power consolidation than an actual turn away from the colonial legacy for an authentic pre-colonial foundation. This “African” turn has been characterized as “superficial”, but nevertheless colored executive relations (Azevedo, 1998).

IGO salience is also quite low. In 1965 (there was insufficient data for a five year lag as detailed above), France and Chad shared membership in only 16 intergovernmental organizations. That year, France individually belonged to 85 total intergovernmental organizations.

By 1968, Chad, which had never experienced significant wide-spread French cultural penetration outside of particular elite groups in the south, was moving socially away from France. The President was a nationalist that even if only superficially, professed a radical “Africanizing” ideology in a country that was highly culturally fractionalized. Unsurprisingly then, their shared elite cultural networks score is much lower than their shared “logic of appropriateness” score.

There does not appear to be a pattern of relationship between the values in each category. It is possible to have low values in both the shared logic of appropriateness and the shared elite cultural networks, or a high value in just one category, or a high value in both. Figure 3, below, plots the scores against one another for visual comparison. This suggests a certain independence of the composite conditions[[10]](#footnote-10), which suggests that the colonial legacy is not uniform across cases and is highly dependent on historical and cultural processes at work during and after the colonial period.

Figure 1 - Scatterplot of shared "logic of appropriateness" and shared elite cultural networks, identified by intervention ID



1. See for example Sambanis 2004, Mattoon 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Essential modern political science’s much maligned sibling “Area Studies” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. There are 13 coded cases, however the two American interventions in Somalia do not have a membership in any of the conditions or the outcome about .5 and are therefore not included in the truth table analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The software calculates the consistency score, but the equation it employs is: Consistency (Xi≤Yi) = Σ(min(Xi, Yi))/Σ(Xi) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Keep in mind the intervention is in 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This is another reason why standard statistical analysis is not used here, as a fundamental assumption which would be untenable for this study, is that all of the independent variables are varying independently of one another. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Though in the case of the former colonial interventions, all of the states *do* intervene on behalf of the legally recognized government at the time of intervention onset. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The dataset developed for interventions in Africa includes 44 total interventions in 17 individual civil wars, with an average of 2.5 interventions per internationalized civil war from 1960 to 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Kinne (2013) demonstrates that IGO network convergence has a pacific effect on dyads allowing for a five year lag, and reaches its peak after an eight year lag. This suggests that the dyadic impact of IGO salience across relational interactions becomes measurably effective at five years. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The independence of the conditions is not a methodological requirement in QCA to the degree that it is for traditional statistical methods. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)