**The Mass Society Paradigm of Democratic Politics**

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Abstract: Democracy flounders and even fails when the will of the people is not being carried out. Of the various democratic theories, only one explains how and why—the Mass Society Paradigm. The paper provides an intellectual history of the paradigm, which has been embraced in political science from sociology by both left- and right-wing scholars yet forgotten for decades. Currently, many scholars are making contributions to the Mass Society Paradigm without being aware of how their mid-level theoretical efforts fit into the macro-level framework. The paper facilitates the consolidation of itsy bitsy studies into a paradigm that gets to the bottom of how to deal with problems of democracy.

Most critiques of democracy could be summed up in a single sentence: The people in modern democracies have little say over what their government does, and their powerlessness is often deliberate. Pseudodemocracy exists, pretending to be true democracy. Procedural democracy is without substance. Paradigmatically, a “mass society” exists when there is a gap between unhappy people and unresponsive government with a lack of intermediate institutions serving as helpful bridges between the two.

 The first task of the present paper task is to clarify the Mass Society Paradigm. Having done so, the intellectual history of the concept of mass society will be developed, including academic efforts to suppress the idea. Today, there are scattered studies of specific problems relating to one or another intermediate institution but a lack of courage or imagination to put the pieces together into a single coherent paradigm in order to address the problem of mass society with a comprehensive view in mind. Accordingly, the paper provides a coherent image of the Mass Society Paradigm.

**The Basic Paradigm of Democracy**

Although elites outside government have little problem in impacting government, ordinary persons are easily overwhelmed by societal problems and often feel unable to seek remedies from government. The basic assumption in a democracy is that politics exists at three basic levels, with important interconnections (Figure 1).

The “people,” first of all, consists of persons of differing social classes, racial or ethnic groups, religious groups, females and males, with varying degrees of education, income, lifestyles as well as differing opinions and preferences. The people in a democracy are considered to be sovereign.

“Government,” secondly, consists of those who have the power to make and enforce decisions affecting the people. Governmental institutions consist of executives, bureaucrats who carry out executive orders, and legislatures. Legislatures in a democracy are supposed to make the laws for executives to implement, though executives can utilize the discretion left by laws to issue implementing orders and regulations while bureaucrats try to maintain dominance in their bailiwicks. Courts are sometimes institutions used to enforce decisions of executives, but they might also restrain executives who deviate from constitutional limits or overreach the authority given to them by legislators.

**government**

**intermediate institutions**

**the people (THE MASSES)**

**Figure 1 Basic Paradigm of Democracy**

 Thirdly, “intermediate institutions” serve the public by listening to what people say, including legitimate demands on government to respond humanely, and provide information to the people. The most common intervening bodies are pressure groups, political parties, and the media. Pressure groups are formed when the people want to go beyond individual demands to express their collective views in specific issue-areas. Political parties exist to aggregate the views of enough individuals, even if not organized into pressure groups, to run candidates in elections so that they can win and subsequently write laws to represent the will of the people, who may in turn re-elect them. The role of the media is both to expose what government (executives, bureaucrats, legislators, courts) does and—through investigative journalism—to reveal problems that may need governmental redress.

 Left out of the simplified diagram is the possibility that the people can directly impact executives and bureaucrats by submitting complaints and petitions outside of intermediate bodies. Also excluded are the ways in which executives and bureaucrats try to influence intermediate institutions and the public by various means, such as by supplying information to sway their images of reality. Yet another complexity is the way in which pressure groups try to mobilize support. Such additions must be included in a more complex diagram of the basic democratic paradigm (cf. Haas 2017a:ch.6, 2017b:ch.7).

 Another possibility is for executives to claim to represent the public without any role for intermediate institutions. Such governance, known as *populism*, is antithetical to democracy (Müller 2016). A populist executive will berate, discount, or ignore intervening institutions in order to neutralize their role as a source of reasonable opposition to absurd policies. When needs expressed by interest groups are ignored by such an executive, then some members of the public will be given preference as legitimate, and the rest will be scapegoated. Executives who attack political parties are in actuality expressing an opposition to collecting diverse interests into coherent policies that achieve compromise. Executives who attack the media are dangerous because they aim to suppress the truth. Such leaders will also attack members of the judiciary saying, “The court has made its decision, now let it enforce it.” Populism easily leads to dictatorship when intermediate institutions cannot stand up to such an executive.1

 The Mass Society Paradigm arose because intermediate institutions often do not work for the benefit of the people and instead serve the interests of elites. Accordingly, there is a need to outline the rise of democracy before explicating the Mass Society Paradigm as a critique of pseudodemocracy.

**Emergence of Democracy**

“Democracy” is about power relations, but many things in the world also have power relations, so the idea of theorizing is what is unique about humans, who have the leisure to ponder alternative visions. In the hunter-gatherer stage of human existence, consisting of small collections of mobile individuals, roles were specialized for survival without a need to theorize.

In the agricultural stage, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1846) imagined from anthropological accounts of Hawai‛i (Engels 1884; Harris 1968; Morgan 1870), role specialization was not power specialization, as everyone knew their place in mutually supportive self-sufficient communities. What happened afterward is that communities grew in size, often because of the influx (and outflux) of settlers, to the extent that there was an awareness of who was organizing interpersonal relations for their own benefit, something called the “dawn of political consciousness” (Elliot and McDonald 1949:Part I). At some point, the people realized that those who exercise power do so for their own benefit and therefore there should be a sphere of nonpolitical life for oneself without being controlled by others.

 Feudalism arose when some in existing communities amassed the wealth to pay loyal and substantial armies so that elites could impose their will on nearby settlers into a system of prescribed roles. Imperial conquest emerged as military elites expanded their domains. Out of the chaos of one such organized community potentially threatening another militarily, Cleisthenes established what was called “democracy” in 507bce in Athens (Clarke and Foweraker 2001:194-201) by having potential soldiers vote, with spears in hand, whether they wanted to go to war. Later, imperial aggregations of power soon swept away democratic ideals, practices, and theories from democratic Athens.

 Resistance to Roman imperial conquest in England by feudal elites brought them together in associations of cooperation against a common enemy. But an assignment of one feudal elite, the monarchy, to a superior status over other elites ultimately resulted either in a threat of civil war or a need for a set of commonly accepted rules of organization. The result in England was a Magna Carta in 1215, which was soon resisted, leading to very disruptive military conflicts, including the civil war of 1642–1651. Thomas Hobbes (1651) then argued that there should be binding contracts, similar to those that allowed trade to be conducted fairly, between the masses and governmental authorities: The people should give up all their power in matters of public conduct to the government in exchange for the promise that their lives would be secure from violence and threats of violence, whether from throne claimants, invaders, or marauders.

 Of course, Hobbesianism minus the idea of the contract was already present in the thoughts of Confucius (551–479bce), whose students wrote them down seventy years after his death. They were collected by Chu Hsi in the form of several books, most notably *The* *Analects* (1315), after multistate China was united by the tenth century so that there would be a body of knowledge required before an applicant was accepted as a bureaucrat in the Chinese state. Even today, China’s leader Xi Jinping considers Confucius his favorite philosopher (Tharoor 2015). In the current age of terrorism, Confucian-Hobbesian insights are being revived in the form of a reassertion of nationalism.

 However, during the period of the European Enlightenment (1685–1815), philosophers rejected the Hobbesian contract between government and the masses due to the all too frequent abuses committed by autocrats, contrary to concepts of human rights that had been developed within major religions (Haas 2014b:Table 2.1) as far back as the Judaic Ten Commandments (c.1230bce). The idea of democracy from Athens was revived and adapted to conditions of a system of states legitimated by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, including a recognition of international law (Bodin 1566, 1576) and the right to justice and security (Grotius 1625). The “social contract” of John Locke (1688) and others contained prohibitions on what government could not do. The people, having negotiated stipulated civil rights protections of life, liberty, and property, considered that they were free to pursue their own destinies with minimal government intrusion in their daily lives. For Immanuel Kant (1795), republics with limitations on executive power should replace arrogant empires.

 The most revolutionary idea was the belief that the source of all political power comes from the masses—that government legitimately operates only with the consent by the governed, not the other way around. The concept of “public opinion,” central to the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), was eloquently characterized by Germaine de Staël (1788) as the “invisible power” of the people (Fontana 2016). But Rousseau could not imagine how democracy could work in countries larger than Swiss cantons.

 The idea of a contract between the people and government implies that the people are empowered to renegotiate the contract to expand their rights. Therefore, there would have to be negotiation bodies selected by the people—representative legislatures to check executive government power, as argued by such theorists as the Baron de Montesquieu (1748).

 Two revolutions then moved the concept of democracy to the front burner. Prior to the 1770s, the masses responded to economic and political constraints by riots when they lacked food due to poor weather conditions (Berce 1974) or resisted their arrogant treatment by such nonconfrontational means as arson, desertion, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, footdragging, pilfering, and sabotage (Scott 1985:xvi).

 What was unique about the American Revolution was that protests over onerous taxes in the Boston Tea Party of 1773 led to a voice intermediate between the people and the British colonial government in 1774—the Continental Congress, with representatives from legislatures in each of thirteen colonies. Soon the colonies were involved in a war for independence. When riots broke out in Paris during 1789, the Estates, which had been established to provide an intermediate voice for the king, was unable to satisfy the needs of the people, so a National Assembly was convened from the Third Estate. But soon France’s revolution was in such disarray that Napoleón Bonaparte embarked on an Hobbesian rescue for the country and gathered support to topple empires. After Napoleón was defeated, France returned to the task of building democratic institutions. Instead of Athenian direct democracy, the new concept was of representative democracy, with legislatures conveying the will of the people to executives.

 Both revolutions resulted in legislative bodies, as designed by de Staël’s lover, Benjamin Constant, in France and James Madison in the United States. But they were composed of persons who considered themselves better than the masses. Political parties, already present in England during the same years, emerged after both revolutions to provide an intermediate voice between legislatures and the people. Even as the right to vote was extended to the masses during the nineteenth century, the problem remained that members of political parties attended to their own interests above those of the people (Michels 1911). The gap was not filled by the media either. Walter Lippmann (1922:15), in pre-Foucaultian candor, described the journalistic role as translating government decisions into stories that the public might understand as “news” by manipulating symbols rather than diffusing ideas for public reaction.

 Democracy, in other words, emerged as an organization theory founded on contractual rights. Capitalism has complicated the picture, however. As technological advances served to create productive machines, capitalists wanted private businesses, which hired the laboring masses, to have the right to be exempt from government interference (Smith 1776; Ricardo 1817) so that they could accumulate capital, expand markets, live in an affluent manner, and enjoy more prosperity. The rights of business have conflicted with the rights of individuals. John Rawls (1971) tried to resolve the contract theory of democratic government, but the primacy of economics has not been dislodged, and mass society is the result.

 Many scholars have varying theoretical formulations of how democracy arose and developed, not necessarily in agreement with what has been said above (cf. Dunn 1992; Dahl 2000; Crick 2002; Cunningham 2002; Shapiro 2003; Held 2006; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009; Keane 2009; Haas 2014a). But the promise of democracy remains unfulfilled today because too much freedom outside government can mean control of government by the wealthy, resulting in frustration leading to exasperation by the masses. The present narrative, accordingly, will skip an analysis of the finer points of democratic theory to identify problems of democracies embedded within the Mass Society Paradigm.

**Development of the Mass Society Paradigm**2

The Mass Society Paradigm was primarily an effort to provide an alternative to the Marxian paradigm, which had failed to predict a proletarian revolution. At the beginning of the twentieth century, democracy was an experiment in a few industrial countries. The main puzzle of democracy, if understood as rule by the people, was how government could ever reflect the will of the people when those with wealth inevitably have more influence over government. Business elites can cause misery to their employees, so the only hope of the masses is that political democracy will have institutions through which they can protest to stop their mistreatment.

 Classical economists David Ricardo (1817) and Adam Smith (1776) had no idea that there might be economic bubbles and downturns. Neither did Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who wrote *The German Ideology* in 1846 as a speculative account of inexorable collapse of economic systems due to their own contradictions. Marx and Engels clearly saw that the rise of industrial capitalism was creating wealth for the few and misery for those whose labor was exploited.

 When Alexis de Tocqueville (1835–1840) visited the United States, he was overjoyed to see that the experiment in representative democracy was working. But he also predicted a politics of mass society in which the wealth acquired by businesses would be used to their benefit. To transport manufactured goods to the market required new infrastructure, and government would be asked to provide the funds. He did not use the term “mass society,” but his expectation was that the masses, relying on civil society, would be outspent by pressures on governments from ruthless millionaires. His fear was definitely realized fifty years later, during the Gilded Age of Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and Cornelius Vanderbilt.

 But the first serious capitalist economic crisis in Europe occurred after poor weather conditions caused a shortage in food supply within at least twenty-several countries during 1845–1847. The unrest was so vast that industries shut down (Berger and Spoerer 2001). When panic erupted throughout Europe, Marx and Engels changed their penchant for philosophical discourse into a campaign to bring about a workers’ revolution, writing an eloquent polemic, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* in 1848, months before riots broke out throughout Europe. They reasoned that capitalist greed could only be overturned when the masses took control of government and thence of capitalist businesses. Trade union organizing would not be enough; a repeat of the French-type revolution was needed.

 More eloquently, Charles Dickens painted the canvass of misery in his novels from *Oliver Twist* (1838) to *Bleak* *House* (1853) and especially to *Hard Times* (1854). Legal reform was stimulated by the satirical representation of the judiciary in *Bleak House* (Oldham 2004). Other novels told businesses and government that they were out of touch with the masses.

 The next major capitalist crisis was the Panic of the 1890s, after the Argentine wheat crop failed, caused an increase in worldwide food prices that the masses could not afford (Hoffmann 1970). The globalized world economy again collapsed: Unemployment shot up to levels not reached again until the 1930s, striking trade unionists were fired upon, and there were hundreds of bank runs. Five million German farmers massively relocated to the United States, where there was plenty of fertile land not yet utilized for farming (Grant 2005). Academics then tried to find a way to address the problem of mass society without calling for revolution. That the masses had been ignored by government led L. Frank Baum to depict how the politics of mass society operated in his allegorical novel *The Wonderful World of Oz* (1900).

 Instead of mass riots, the masses had been empowered by a wide extension of the franchise by the end of the nineteenth century. But votes could not turn the tide. Populism then arose in the United States but was too disorganized to change social policy (Bicha 1976). Machine politics emerged, corruptly paying members of the working class to keep them in office, and the Progressive Movement countered by trying to go over the heads of low income voters with initiatives, referendums, and recalls pushed by advertising in the media (Keane 2009:333-55). Such intermediate institutions as political parties were captured by the wealthy, prompting Roberto Michels (1911) to formulate the “iron law of oligarchy” that no longer represented the masses. The wealthy could ride out the storm by even more worker exploitation (Pareto 1916). And there was an unexpectedly sharp increase in suicides.

 For sociologist Émile Durkheim, the problem was that industrialization attracted single male workers from the rural areas to the towns, where they had no family; their feeling of anomie (alienation) came from neglect by businesses running the factories as well as the lack of support from family members, who were at some distance back home. One result of anomie was suicide (Durkheim 1897). Durkheim’s concern was that human history entailed in­creasing specialization of social roles, such that individuals were isolated from one another, even on the factory floor, as well as from traditional institutions of social integration, such as the church and the family (Durkheim 1893). Whereas Durkheim restricted his focus by using sociological terms to explain social reality alone, other developers of the Mass Society Paradigm half a century later integrated economics, politics, and society into a coherent whole.

 An alternative account has been rendered by sociologist Charles Tilly (1969, 1978), who rejected “break­down” paradigms, including the Mass Society paradigm, because they expect violence to be “a direct response to hard­ship, normlessness, or rapid change” (Tilly, Tilly, Tilly 1975:252). On the contrary, Tilly (1969:ll) traced the migration of discontented rural residents to cities in Europe, where political parties and trade unions formed while police forces emerged to control crime and dissidence. Whereas Durkheim believed that rapid social change destroyed or precluded effective intermediate organiza­tions, Tilly found evidence that trade unions integrated migrants into the new political forms of the modern city during eras of rapid industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization. Tilly pooh-poohed the alienation thesis, arguing that trade unions provided a new sense of community for workers and a vanguard for action, even though many strikers were shot down and never gained political influence (Hunter 1914). But Tilly never developed an explanation for the rise of suicides among the most desperate.

 Then came World War I. Instead of the masses mobilizing for revolution under a vanguard, they fought patriotically for their own countries. The explanation of Lenin (1914[1935]:125) was that capitalists decided “to fool them with nationalism.”

 Sigmund Freud had a different explanation, advancing the Mass Society paradigm to a psychological level. The regimentation required by civilization, such as assembly-line-oriented industrial society, was for him the fundamental source of repression of basic instincts—not just sex but also the killing instinct. For Freud (1915[1964]:281-82), “[C]ivilization is the fruit of renunciation of instinctual satisfaction.” The eagerness for war, according to Freud, was due to an unleashing of repressed instincts—when “primitive” tendencies prevailed over the ability of the human mind to suppress physical urges. Writing to Albert Einstein, Freud (1933[1964]:215) assured that “anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between humans must operate against war.”

 During the war, the United States loaned money to Britain after the French borrowed from the English to pay for the cost of munitions and soldiers. When the war ended, Germany was required to pay reparations to the French, who could then send the money back to Britain, and the capital would flow back to the United States. But devastated Germany could not pay without raising taxes on the masses, and the result was a massive decapitalization of Europe that favored Washington, known as “superimperialism” (Hudson 1972). Afterward there was a boom in reckless Wall Street investment during the 1920s, and the bubble burst in 1929, resulting in skyrocketing unemployment worldwide. Efforts to find blame were later to rely on the Mass Society Paradigm, but economic measures inspired by John Maynard Keynes (1936) and the beginning of the welfare state were the immediate policy responses. Within the United States, a welfare state was created during the 1930s by having those who went back to work rebate a portion of their wages to support the retired and unemployed, but economic recovery was slow.

 Efforts to find the culprits of the Great Depression varied throughout the world. Communist Parties attacked capitalism and gained support. Nationalism, blessed by the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination, was twisted into a we–they categorization of those who were considered patriotic nationals and those classified as alien latecomers who had derived benefits at the expense of “the people,” with Nazi Germany doing so more elaborately than elsewhere in Europe.

 John Keane (2009:esp. 567-78) refers to the period variously as the disintegration of democracy, the graveyard of democracy, and the death of democracy. He joins many observers in blaming hyper-nationalism, unregulated capitalism, multiple breakdowns of coalitions of political parties, bureaucratic rule, the rise of demagogues, the betrayal of democracy by intellectuals, and class exploitation. But the Marxian Paradigm was taboo outside the Soviet Union, leaving the Mass Society Paradigm as a poor substitute, waiting to be developed beyond Durkheim.

 Harold Lasswell (1936) was perhaps the first to sketch an image of the politics of mass society by equating politics with “who gets what, when, and how,” as a methodological challenge to locate the elites running government. Later, he identified six kinds of values that conferred societal dominance beyond income and power,2 and proposed the Agglutinative Hypothesis that anyone high on one value would tend to be high on all (Lasswell 1951a,b; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), a proposition only tested once, albeit on dozens of indigenous cultural groups, refuting the “tribal democracy” thesis (Haas 2014c:ch.6).

 Economic recovery from the Great Depression was slow. Within Europe, the dangerous politics of mass society fueled the rise of Nazism, a continent aflame with warfare by 1940, and a right-wing French political party cooperating with Adolf Hitler’s Germany—the Vichy regime.

 After World War II, a major academic concern in Europe was how to prevent the development of the kind of mass society that led to Adolf Hitler’s popularity—and a German population that did not contest his evil. Within the immediate postwar United States, there was a backlash to New Deal reforms because businesses wanted to take advantage of worldwide American economic dominance, and they had the funds to finance their own kind of politics, which abandoned the goal of zero unemployment and cracked down on trade union organizing (Hibbs 1977; Murray 1984; Abraham 1996). The Cold War dominated policy-making, and Senator Joseph McCarthy decided to expose leftists in the academy, film industry, and trade unions. As a result, some persons were fired, blacklisted, or arrested and put in jail. The television age arose, so most Americans could seek diversion rather than keeping abreast of information by reading newspapers when they came home from work each day.

 Meanwhile, seeking to explain the rise of Adolf Hitler, the main postwar philosophic current in France was existentialism (Camus 1951; Sartre 1945) and much later deconstruction (Derrida 1967) and postmodernism (Lyotard 1979). In Germany, the Enlightenment Project clearly had been wastebasketed when the people voted for Hitler (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). When Theodore Adorno joined some American colleagues, he found to his astonishment that Americans were just as authoritarian as Germans (Adorno et al. 1950).3 Other neo-Marxist scholars of the Frankfurt School who grappled with German support for Hitler were Hannah Arendt (1951), Karl Mannheim (1943), Herbert Marcuse (1964), and Sigmund Neumann (1942, 1946). But philosophical discourse did not have a major impact upon the post-World War II social sciences, which sought data and evidence rather than verbal speculation.

 In 1958, Isaiah Berlin made the important distinction between negative and positive liberty. He claimed that *negative liberty,* involving prohibitions on government, led to alienation. *Positive liberty* was freedom to pursue happiness and meaning in life. The libertarian view, in other words, drew so many red lines that politics was conceived as preventing government from facilitating the public’s quest for the good life. Similarly, the Enlightenment project had conceived policy problems as invitations to find rational solutions. Democracy was not a necessary function of either libertarianism or rationalism but instead required the freedom to pursue one’s own destiny. In short, Berlin argued for pluralism.

 Then along came C. Wright Mills, who taught sociology to the well-to-do in Columbia College. In *The Power Elite* (1956), his main thesis was that “the democratic society of publics is being transformed into a society of masses” (p. 300). Rather than the Durkheimian focus on the erosion of family, Mills had several concerns. One was with the rise of mass media of communication, which he felt were turning “speakers into listeners” (p. 302): “[T]he media have not only filtered into our experience of external realities, they have also . . . provided us with new identities and new aspirations of what we should like to be” (p. 314). He was, of course, echoing the thesis of Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (1944).

 Agreeing with Michels, Mills observed that voluntary associations had become too large to be acces­sible to the individual’s influence, thereby leaving a “gap” between elites and mass (p. 307). Ivy League experts, whose authoritative views emerged from the media before the masses had time to reflect on events, had become “administration from above” over “atom­ized and submissive masses” (pp. 308, 309). Political parties were in bed with corporate elites to the detriment of ordinary people in the United States.

 Consequently, there was no public debate on a wide range of important issues (pp. 335,338). To Mills, the Cold War discourse placed civil rights and other issues onto a political back burner. His main concern was that issues of war and peace as well as macroeconomic decisions for the United States as a whole were being decided undemocratically and that technological advances were making the “instruments of rule quite unsurpassed” (p. 23). For his courage in openly swimming against the tide of complacent pluralism (p. 16n), he was reportedly denied admission to the graduate faculty at Columbia University.

 Mills focused on a disturbing concentration of power, appear­ing to be a Marxist in the heyday of McCarthyism. Yet he dismissed Marx (p. 277), asserting instead that there is an interlocking “triangle of power”: “American government is not . . . a committee of ‘the ruling class.’ It is a network of ‘committees’ [including] . . . the corporate rich . . . , the pro­fessional politician . . . [and] the high military” (p. 170), which President Dwight Eisenhower (1961:1035-40) later identified as the “military industrial complex.” Yet his descrip­tion fully accepted the McCarthyite belief, quoted approvingly from Whittaker Chambers, that there was a “matted forest floor of American upper class, enlightened middle class, liberal and official life” (p. 282).

 Beginning with the definition of Max Weber (1918) that the powerful are “those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it,” Mills (1956:8,9) axiomatized that the powerful are “those who decide” and, thus, those with “access to the com­mand of major institutions.” Political scientist Harold Lasswell (1951a,b), who had defined “influence” as the acquisition of eight types of values,2 had argued that the attainment of a top position on any one value would necessarily lead to gaining top positions on other values—the agglutinative hypothesis (cf. Haas 2014c:ch6). Mills, however, contended that “the elite are not simply those who have the most” in a political struggle. Instead, “they would not “have the most were it not for their positions in the great institutions [that] are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige” (p. 9). In short, control of institutions confers the means “of exercising power, of acquiring and retaining wealth, and of cashing in the higher claims for prestige” (ibidem). If power were dif­fused, then the powerful could not coordinate their actions. A “power elite,” thus, would identify itself by its “psychological similarity and social intermingling, . . . commanding positions and interests . . . [with] explicit coordination” (p. 19). Mills was referring to the secret societies that exist at Ivy League schools which are even more powerful than fraternities and sororities. He wrote before one American president succeeded another fellow member of Skull & Bones at Yale in 2000, a theme portrayed vividly in the film *The Skulls* (2000).

 In the tradition of Pareto (1916), Mills’s empirical analysis began by identifying the richest Americans. He then demonstrated that power elites go to the same schools and continue to interact in later years. The inference was that a social network of the wealthy few in the United States controls the power of the country. His methodology was positionalist: The powerful are those who have certain institutional positions, keep in touch to influence the po­litical process, and thereby secure their power and wealth. He assigned pri­macy to status and wealth, admitting that the “power elite” is “a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account [because]. . . several interests could be realized more easily if they worked together, . . . and accordingly they have done so” (Mills 1956:11,20). But Mills did no interviewing. Instead, for evidence, he traced elites in various “command posts” circulating between roles in business, government, and the military establishment.

 Mills was building on the work of anthropologists who had found democracy absent in the American heartland. In small towns, Republican Party business elites wanted to control what the town did with their tax money. Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd (1929, 1937) so described Muncie, Indiana. Similar studies were conducted at Newburyport, Massachusetts (Warner and Lunt 1945) and Morris, Illinois (Hollingshead 1949; Warner 1949). William Foote Whyte (1943) decided to find out how people lived in the slums of Boston, where sociologists had long concocted the theory of “social disorganization” (Le Bon 1896; Thomas and Znaniecki 1918-1920; cf. Haas 1992:138-41), yet he discovered the opposite—that there was a well-organized social community, which was ignored by those running the city, confirming an earlier study by Frederic Thrasher (1927).

 W. Lloyd Warner and Paul Lunt (1945) explained why small towns had become so undemocratic by clarifying the Durkheim “rapid social change” thesis: They argued that, once upon a time, workers were well respected in American towns, but when absentee landlords bought thriving businesses in those towns, the gap between workers and corporate owners widened to the point that trade unions were needed to restore communication, yet the businesses rejected the voice of workers as a nuisance in their greed for profits.

 The elite–mass gap easier to explain to large cities, where racial segregation and class segregation has persisted. Floyd Hunter (1953) analyzed Atlanta. And E. Digby Baltzell (1958) exposed the patrician-oriented elites of Philadelphia, where upper class dynastic families maintained political control and the economy of the city stagnated, while Boston and New York rewarded individual achievement and thrived.

 Mills (1956:28) conceded that pluralism in the form of group politics, with various interests bidding for a slice of the pie, operated at “middle levels of power,” so he was willing to admit some pluralism with regard to the economic crumbs that fell into small communities of the middle classes. However, his main concern was that ‘[a]t the end of the road there is totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia” (p. 304).

 The next advocate of the Mass Society Paradigm was sociologist William Kornhauser, who suffered a similar fate as Mills in failing to gain promotion in rank due to his leftist views. In *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959), he developed a model of totalitarian rule based on the analysis of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956) that was the antithesis of democratic government. He identified how totalitarian governments created mass societies in which other subcultures, with separate institutions and value systems, were viewed as threats to elite dominance. Totalitarian elites rewarded those who aped their values and punished those who adhered to other value systems until the latter became “atomized” (lacking access to intermediate institu­tions of civil society) and “alienated” (without a Durkheimian sense of community identity).

Similar to Durkheim, Kornhauser found that the same absence of civil society existed in non-totalitarian governments because of rapid industrialization (Figure 2a,b).4 Rapid social change tore the fabric of a once close-knit society as family members moved away from home towns to seek employment, abandoning traditional church affiliations and friendships in the process. Thus, there is an institutional gap between elites and masses as well as an absence of group ties between the masses, both resulting from the antimony between individual identities and physical realities:

Mass society is objectively the atomized society, and subjectively the alienated pop­ulation. Therefore, mass society is a system in which there is high availability of a population for mobilization by elites. People become available for mobilization by elites when they lack or lose an independent group life (ibid., 33).

Whereas Durkheim used the word “anomie,” Kornhauser preferred “the uprooted.” Because of that gap, he argued, elites are able to manipulate nonelites.

**Figure 2. Mass Society Paradigm**

a)

**access to power**

**ideological assimilation**

**TOTALITARIAN**

**ELITES**

**control ideas**

**&**

**RESOURCES**

**no access to power**

**ATOMIZATION**

**lack of identity**

**alienation**

**RICH GET**

**RICHER**

**RICH CONTROL**

**POLITICAL POWER**

**rich control**

**civil society**

**INDUSTRIALISTS**

**GET RICH**

b)

**RAPID INDUS-TRIALIZATION**

**UNDER**

**CAPITALISM**

**unrest**

**among**

**masses**

**MASSES DERIVE**

**NO RESOURCES**

**FROM POLITICS**

**civil society fails to respond**

**to masses**

civil society

**MASSES**

**UPROOTED**

**PHYSICALLY**

**& mentally**

 Kornhauser cited various exemplars in European history, but he was most interested in explaining votes cast for Communist Party candidates in Western Europe immediately after World War II. He linked Communist support to rapid social change, not to a desire for a larger share of the pie by workers. He explained extremist views in terms of social isolation (p. 73). Since social change sometimes cannot be slowed, he noted that there are two ways out of mass society—the aristo­cratic and the democratic (p. 229). The aristocratic view, which Kornhauser attributed to Walter Lippmann (1956), would reserve more power in the hands of elites to maintain coherence in policy. The demo­cratic view of C. Wright Mills would give more power to the masses. Kornhauser then judged both options as being too narrow by them­selves and urged following both strategies.

 Although not a promoter of the Mass Society Paradigm, Gabriel Almond (1956, 1960) made an important contribution by identifying key components of civil society. Adapting the Structural-Functional Paradigm,5 as developed by sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951), Almond specified two basic functions common to all political systems that should be performed by specific structures—inputs and outputs. “Inputs” are political activities that try to impact government institutions. “Outputs” are what comes out of structures of government. For industrial democracies, the inputs in his formulation were performed by specific structures—political socialization (by churches, schools, voluntary organizations), recruitment (groups seeking to fit individuals into political roles), interest articulation (by pressure groups), interest aggregation (political parties representing several pressure groups), and communication (the media), The outputs were rule making (legislatures), rule application (executives), and rule adjudication (courts). The model did not provide a step between inputs and outputs, such as “withinputs,” a term coined by David Easton (1965), who had a similar model without an explicit structural-functional basis. For Almond, developing countries differed from industrial democracies because the various functions were not performed by specific structures; their systems were dysfunctional. Political development, hence, required a rearrangement of structures to perform their “proper” functions.

 As of 1960, Daniel Bell (1961:21) judged the Mass Society Paradigm to be second only to the Marxian Paradigm as the most influential social theories. For that reason, there was an academic backlash to the Mass Society Paradigm. Some observers even felt that intellectuals were turning against democracy (Crozier, Huntington, Watakuni 1975:67).

 Robert Dahl (1958) and two of his students, Nelson Polsby (1963) and Aaron Wildawsky (1964), questioned Hunter’s methodology for finding power structures by asking persons whom they believed were the most powerful in town, interviewing those named, and continuing until the questioning yielded diminishing returns. Polsby attacked the idea that a political elite was subordinate to an upper class, which in turn was at war with lower classes rather than asking whether the lower classes had any influence at all and why that might be the case. Wildawsky embarked on a well-researched study of the college town of Oberlin, Ohio, which sought to validate Dahl’s belief that democracy works best in small communities, though his data proved that the poorer elements of society lacked political influence (Tables 10-13), something that he summarized in the following Social Darwinian words: “people who do not try to influence decisions do not have a direct impact upon them.”

 In contrast with Hunter’s “reputational” approach, which identified potential power (cf. Wolfinger 1960), Dahl had a very novel idea: Discover actual power by asking his students to attend meetings of the New Haven City Council to determine who was trying to influence policy in three issue-areas—nomination by political parties of candidates for office, public education, and urban renewal. Based on the Pressure Group Paradigm of Arthur Bentley (1908) and David Truman (1951),5 his *Who Governs?* (1961) argued that government was a neutral arbiter between competing interests, seeking to determine a compromise that would satisfy all the stakeholders in each policy concern. The process resulted in what he called “polyarchy” (Dahl 1961), a major contribution to democratic theory. He was clearly seeking a political equivalent to the concept of “countervailing power” of John Kenneth Galbraith (1952), a view that systems are self-correcting.

 Yet even Truman (1951:522) conceded that pressure groups were dominated by those with greater income. In his early writing, Dahl (1958, 1961) imagined that notables existing in different Lasswellian power pyramids did not overlap to constitute a power elite, contrary to Hunter and Mills—and Lasswell’s agglutinative hypothesis (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), which inspired a cross-cultural test (Haas 2014c:ch.6). Dahl’s vision was of a United States too vast to have a single elite in charge; he evidently dismissed Eisenhower’s warning and did not live long enough to witness millionaire friends being selected by Donald Trump for positions in his Cabinet. Later, he (1998:ch.14) admitted that market-oriented capitalism harms democracy by creating inequality that favors the rich over the poor in their ability to influence political outcomes: Businesses inherently look to their own interest and do not take the people into account except as consumers of their products.

 In his early writing, Dahl focused on only one aspect of the Mass Society Paradigm—the composition of those who make inputs into the political process. What he missed was to focus on whether the nonelite people, who have needs for government action, benefit from outputs crafted by government. Dahl focused on diverse inputs, including those of African Americans (1961:293-94), but ignored outputs—the distribution of governmental rewards to the groups pressing their case. He did not realize that at least one of the three issues that he studied in New Haven was fundamentally elitist—party selection of those who would be allowed to run for office instead of an open primary.

 Impediments to democracy, according to Dahl (1997:II.ch.37, 1998:ch.1,4) are a constitution that disallows majority rule, elections won by pluralities instead of majorities, economic inequality, undemocratic corporate rule, and bureaucratic rule. In other words, he appeared to have come around to the power elite thesis.

 Dahl had some critics in his earlier formulations: In class, he shrugged his shoulders when asked why urban renewal resulted in the destruction of homes for a freeway that displaced a particular racial group: The influence of Social Darwinism came through very clearly as the explanation for why some have more political influence than others. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) pointed out that he neglected “nondecisions”—that is, the failure of the political system to act despite popular pressure. One of his students, Michael Parenti, wrote a Mills-inspired political science textbook, *Democracy for the Few* (1973), which is now in its ninth edition, with chapters on the corporate state, income inequality, and plutocracy, though he dismissed the idea that there was a monolithic ruling elite (p. 269). Sociologist William Domhoff was so skeptical that he decided to read notes from the New Haven study and do some interviewing of his own. In *Who Really Rules?* (1978), Domhoff reported that Dahl was the victim of a con game by the New Haven elite; there was no polyarchy. And Dahl (1979) was so impressed by Domhoff’s revelations that he changed much of his theory in later years (Dahl 1998). For Claude Burtenshaw (1968:586), the reduction ad absurdum of Dahl’s Pollyanna vision of New Haven as an ideal democratic city came in August 1967, when a race riot broke out in the city for four days.

 Although neither Domhoff nor Parenti connected their insights and research to the Mass Society Paradigm, Dahl evidently “discovered” Kornhauser some twenty-five years later in *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (1985). Analyzing ten democracies that ended up in dictatorships from Italy in 1923 to Uruguay in 1973, Dahl posited five explanations that he considered alternative to the Mass Society Paradigm: (1) young democracies, lasting fewer than 20 years, (2) low voter turnout, (3) prevalence of anti-democratic attitudes, (4) attitudinal polarization, and (5) extreme income inequality. He then wrote, without evidence, that nine of his sample of ten countries met the five conditions. Yet his argument is flawed: Many young democracies last beyond a two-decade duration. Gridlock is associated with voter suppression by corporate elites (Haas, forthcoming). Authoritarian attitudes among the forgotten account for voter support of Donald Trump (MacWilliams 2016). Attitudinal polarization brought down the Fourth Republic of France (Haas, forthcoming). And inequality is the result of corporate control of economics, as has occurred in Singapore (Haas 2014d). Nevertheless, Dahl (1985:46-47) claimed that intermediate institutions were the key to avoiding democracies from failure, and accepted Parenti’s thesis that corporate capitalism jeopardizes democracy by producing economic inequality that violates the need for political equality (p. 60). He also agreed with Parenti that bureaucratic rule is a danger to democracy (p. 97; Parenti 1973[2010]:ch.17), though for Dahl the problem was allowing experts to have too much power, whereas for Parenti bureaucrats can be in bed with the economic elites. One of Dahl’s solutions was to insist that economic enterprises should be internally democratic (1985:91). In short, he unwittingly embraced the wider concept of the Mass Society Paradigm while rejecting the narrower version.

 Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the postmodernist view that the Enlightenment project failed when Hitler carried out his agenda (Habermas and Ben-Habib 1981), philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1981) differed from his neo-Marxist colleagues at Frankfurt, deciding to rescue democratic theory by focusing on the centrality of an expansive civil society, where people can have the freedom to communicate, discuss, and build solidarity apart from dominating institutions. Using Parsonian structural-functionalism as a starting point, he felt that the problem in modern society was that corporate domination, economic imperatives, and the welfare state so penetrated the lives of ordinary people that there was little private space left. Participatory democracy had given way to representative democracy, with pressure groups and political parties so focused on rationalizing public and private life that they were no longer paying attention to the masses. He then recommended public activism as the way to revive a more direct democracy. According to John Rawls, Habermas was “the first major German philosopher since Kant to endorse and conscientiously defend liberalism and constitutional democracy” (Freeman 2017:65). Even so, he was sidetracked by the Structural-Functional approach and missed the opportunity to contribute to the Mass Society Paradigm.

The next scholar to deal with problems of democracy due to an absence of vibrant civil society was political scientist Robert Putnam. In a major study conducted in Italy (Putnam 1994), he found that areas in the north had a long tradition of clubs, guilds, and other organizations, binding the people together, with the result that the economy prospered and politics was democratic. However, southern Italy had no such civil involvement, economically lagged behind the north, and was much less democratic. Without indicating why there was such a divergence.

 Returning to the United States to apply his insight, Putnam to his astonishment found the opposite of what Alexis de Tocqueville (1835–1840) once said was the most important explanation for American democracy—that Americans joined organizations and discussed policy issues without being tripped up with class distinctions to an extent unknown in nineteenth century Europe. Instead, Putnam (1995, 2000) reported, Americans were not participating in bowling leagues any more but instead “bowling alone.” Parents, working at as many as two jobs to survive, did not have time for such pursuits, and they rarely even saw their children after school. Similar to the Durkheimian rapid economic development as the culprit in dislocating people from their rural communities, Putnam (2000:ch.11-12) cited how Americans now commute long distances and arrive home exhausted each day from work, often at odd hours. And, perhaps most important, the generation born of those workers grows up without a sense of the need for social ties to give meaning to life. Lacking a sense of social norms and mutual trust in interpersonal relations, networks of relationships are too thin to give personal satisfaction. Putnam, in short, lamented the development and provided support for the Mass Society Paradigm—but without linking his observations with a century of social theory from the days of Le Bon.

 Yet Russell Dalton (2013:ch.4) has disputed Putnam’s empirical finding about the decline of membership in voluntary organizations, claiming that the public is highly involved in joining pressure groups, signing petitions, and in various unconventional forms of political action. In the second edition of their *To Empower People* (1996), Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus to the contrary observed that civil society flourished in the 1990s.

 Putnam was fascinated by Social Capital Theory.7 As originally defined by defined by Lyda Hanifan (1916:130-31), social capital is “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit that makes possible cooperation that results in mutual support.” In northern Italy, unlike the United States, Putnam found that there was a lot of “bonding and bridging.” Those with similar interests bonded together, while group differences were bridged by participating together in such groups as bowling leagues. As a result, a community of trust existed so that residents could conduct business and attract everyone to shop; meanwhile, public policy was determined by debate without rancor. Bonding without bridging, such as the popularity of the Ku Klux Klan, is destructive of healthy politics.

 In 2003, Putnam teamed up with Lewis Feldstein to edit essays presenting examples of the development of social capital in a “journey around the United States” (p. 1). Yet they apparently did not realize that Alaska and Hawai‛i are two of the fifty states, as they ignored the Gallop Poll finding that they have the happiest, most socially interlinked people in the country (Witters 2015). Social capital formation is a humanistic imperative within the culture of Aloha, where civil society and democracy are strong (Haas 1998, 2011:ch.1, 2012b:ch.2, 2017a:ch.6; 2017c:ch.1).

 In a major critique of Putnam’s application of Social Capital Theory, sociologists Scott L. McLean, David A. Schultz, and Manfred B. Steger (2002) took him to task not only for a non-mainstream variant of the theory but also for failing to see the larger picture of societal forces explaining the decline of social capital resulting from capital accumulation, technological change, and urban planning (Table 1). In the “Introduction” of their edited volume, *Social Capital: Critical Perspectives on Community and Bowling Alon*e, they were particularly critical of the television era as a major source of the erosion of social capital and also blamed pressures of time and money, including the need for women to work in order to provide for families. As a result, Putnam’s thesis to re-invent civil society by bridging alone was viewed as naïve (p. 11). They also criticized his appeal to economic self-interest as important in motivating more bridging, asserting instead that social capital develops through a sense of moral duty with those in communities. In a separate essay, Nicholas Lemann (2015:27) notes that Putnam never precisely defined “social capital.” Moreover, the case of Thailand may refute Putnam’s notion that a high level of social capital ensures a vibrant civil society: Despite a culture that encourages friendliness, people in the Land of Smiles engage in mass protests because they lack a strong civil society (Baker and Pasuk 2014).

 **Table 1 Societal Transformation in the United States**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Pre-World War II Society* | *Twenty-First Century Society* |
| Workers live close to work. | Workers live far from work. |
| Neighborhoods have multiple elements. | Single-use zoning. |
| Businesses locally owned. | Multinationals own local businesses. |
| Religious observance thrives. | Collapse of religious observance. |
| High level of political participation. | Low level of political participation. |
| High level of face-to-face communication. | Use of telephones, television, Internet. |

Source: McLean, Schultz, Steger (2002)

 Putnam’s jargon associated with his version of Social Capital Theory, however, appears instead to draw from the Social Exchange Paradigm of George Homans (1958, 1961).8 According to Homans, individuals are driven by desires buried deep inside their psyches and therefore must organize goal seeking by “satisficing” rather than optimizing. Accordingly, human interaction consists of seeking positive and avoiding negative encounters—that is, building up “social credit” and avoiding “social indebtedness.” Putnam’s Social Capital approach, thus, appears to be a subset of the Rational Choice Paradigm that focuses on the individual level but lacks a direct theoretical connection with the societal level.

 Other critiques of Putnam, implying that he was naïve about contemporary politics, demonstrate his ignorance of the Mass Society Paradigm: Vast economic inequality, resulting in the concentration of political power, has resulted in lower political participation (Fried 2002). Whereas Putnam believes that schools could revitalize social capital, governments have taken such power away from schools (Ehrenberg 2002). The major influence of large corporations contributes to civil indifference (Schultz 2002). Attacks on feminism, immigration, and the welfare state have demoralized the people (Snyder 2002). Civil society groups at the grassroots are overpowered by megacapitalism (Boggs 2002; Schultz 2002) and fail to develop due to poverty (Alex-Assensoh 2002). Trade unions are no longer respected, and management sets up quality control circles to force workers to be competitive and therefore destroys camaraderie (Forman 2002). And globalization has brought neoliberal, market-oriented thinking that prioritizes the imperatives of business (Steger 2002).

 At the turn of the twenty-first century, Putnam was calling out for a more trustful American society. But his plea, *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis* (2015), came on the eve of the 2016 presidential election. Putnam’s remedy was to encourage the development of social capital—having more Americans to join organizations and volunteer, while schools should stress social connectedness. In short, his primary interest is in improving the quality of social life. His projected hypothesis that a society with high social capital will be more democratic is speculative, as the Italy to which he refers favorably has been mired in immobilism since World War II (cf. Cantril 1962).

 But to develop social capital, people must be able to converse in a respectful manner, behavior that has seriously eroded due to the introduction of smartphones and social media (Turkle 2011, 2015). Those who might have interactive conversations over lunch, for example, are now accustomed to placing cellphones between them in a restaurant and interrupting discussion whenever a tweet or telephone message arrives. Even while alone, those with smartphones check activity on them more often than almost any other motion during a day; the addiction, similar to substance abuse, appears to be genetically determined (Ayorech et al. 2017). Smartphones may mobilize protests, which usually involve one-way communication outside normal political channels that ends when protesters go home. On the other hand, the immediacy of receipt of smartcalls can mobilize pressure groups to coordinate action, such as joint filing of lawsuits.

 An alternative to Social Capital Theory is Network Theory,9 which claims that communities overcome mass society politics when people are linked not just to one another but also to the institutions of civil society. Indeed, a recent study tested both approaches, supporting Network Theory and refuting Social Capital Theory (Scholz, Bernardo, Kile 2008; cf. Hero 2007).

 Lacking a connection with the Mass Society Paradigm, Putnam appeared to blame ordinary people for disregarding their responsibilities as citizens—a new twist on what William Ryan once identified as the elite practice of *Blaming the Victim* (1970). Although he acknowledged in *Our Kids* that the rich now live together in an isolated part of his small home town, he stated that “this is a book without upper-class villains.” Putnam may have read, out of context, that Kornhauser assigned responsibility to masses who “nihilistically” fail to take advan­tage of their freedom in pluralistic societies to form intermediate institu­tions for asserting political demands in legitimate institutional channels. But Kornhauser (1959:228,237) actually attributed the “nihilism” to a situation in which elites acquire too much power: The problem at the bottom is created at the top.

 If more citizens were to join organizations, as Putnam suggested, they might as usual encounter the iron law of oligarchy and ultimately let their membership lapse if they even had time to do that. As Michael Walzer (1995) has argued, echoing the “iron law of oligarchy,” participants in civil society tend to be higher in socioeconomic status.

 Social Capital Theory is not a paradigm; applicable at only one level of analysis, exponents do not see a larger horizon. The Mass Society Paradigm, in contrast, applies at several levels of analysis, providing a much larger vision of problems and solutions relevant to the contemporary decline of democracy down the pathway toward de facto authoritarianism. Democracy is in crisis today because many believe that the premise that the people can have their views translated into government action is questioned. By focusing on the larger picture of how individuals impact institutions, as is uniquely presented by the Mass Society Paradigm, democracy can be fully examined to discover traps and solutions. Maladies of democracy can be best understood through the lenses of the paradigm, as discussed next.

**Consequences of the Politics of Mass Society**

The Mass Society Paradigm finds similar phenomena (isomorphisms) at different levels of analysis and provides an understanding of how politics interacts with economic and social reality. The collapse of democracy in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe due to fragile civil society institutions is one example of major democratic floundering (Howard 2003), but there are many more consequences. Moreover, the paradigm is not leftist; such conservatives as sociologist Gustave Le Bon, political scientist Samuel Huntington and economic sociologist Neil Smelser have made major contributions to the paradigm, albeit not explicitly. Middle-of-the-road exponents included Georg Simmel, Robert Ezra Park, and Louis Worth (cf. Sennett 1969). The following are consequences of mass society that the paradigm seeks to explain:

**Civil Strife**. Le Bon (1896) focused on the way in which the industrial age was discrediting traditional sources of authority. The rise of new elites, he felt, was bringing about a generational conflict that left society in a disorganized state, breaking down the sense of community. His culprit was laissez-faire capitalism that disregarded the plight of the masses, leading to demagoguery. Ferdinand Tönnies (1887), similarly, had contrasted the development from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft: Close communities were becoming over-rationalized societies, resulting in much urban conflict.

 During the 1960s, race riots erupted within major American cities. The Mass Society Paradigm’s explanation was that the less fortunate engaged in violence because they lacked access to political power (Skolnick 1969). Indeed, Kristine Eck (2009) found that ethnic mobilization has a 92 percent higher risk of intensification leading to violence than any other type of mobilization. Minorities, in other words, have more access to the streets than to civil society institutions.

 The systematic analysis by Neil Smelser, a colleague of Kornhauser at Berkeley, attributed “hostile outbursts” to inadequate channels for expressing grievances, means of com­munication to spread grievances and mobilize in-groups or out-groups, and accessible objects to attack (1962:227-41). He fin­gered the rapid influx of both Blacks and Whites to cities—what Kornhauser identified generically as “rapid social change”—as leading to labor surpluses that resulted in competition between the races for housing, jobs, and recre­ation facilities (pp. 242-44).

**Deviant Behavior**. Durkheim (1897) sought an explanation for the increase in suicides, identifying the empty social life of those who relocated from home communities to seek work in factories. For Kornhauser (1959:91), those who engage in “extreme personal deviance,” become alcoholics or commit suicide are therefore unavailable to stoke the fires of civil society.

**Economic Stagnation**. For Samuel Huntington, coups and political instability plagued the Third World, so he ar­gued the need for a theory of “political decay” to complement a theory of “political development” (1968:ch.1). He supported the Mass Society Paradigm without explicitly saying so. Huntington insisted that in most countries “social and economic modernization produces political instabil­ity” (p.45) unless there is a prior Hobbesian “concentration of power” (p. 137). He decried simplistic efforts to promote democracy in Third World countries by the mere infusion of de­velopment capital (p. 6). And he opposed the American demand for “free and fair elections” in countries lacking stable political institutions (p. 7).

 Huntington’s causation was recursive: Rapid economic growth produces an unstable civil society, which in turn retards prosperity. He cited many studies finding that development produces rapid changes in aspira­tions and capabilities of the masses, who respond aggressively when elites block both socioeconomic progress and democracy (pp. 19,275; cf. Marsh 1979). And he cited evidence that rapid growth increases income inequality (Huntington 1987; Kuznets 1955; Morawetz 1977; Fields 1980). At early stages of economic growth, he reported, too much political participation is destabilizing (Huntington and Nelson 1976). Yet a later study contradicted Huntington, reporting that lack of civil society frustrates development (cf. Michael 2005).

**Gridlock**. When civil society is arrested, lacking rational discussion, government policies do not keep up with reality. Investigating the environmental movements in four countries, a team of scholars reported that global warming and similar matters are more likely to be addressed in open societies than those with mass society problems (Dryzek et al. 2003). The same is the case in efforts to advance human rights (Haas 1994). But an overload of demands to respect to newly identified societal or global problems, where solutions defy ideological premises, can entail an underload of responses because government is confused about how to respond (Crozier, Huntington, Watakuni 1975:8-9).

**Mass Movements**. According to Kornhauser, Adolf Hitler started a mass movement that evolved into a political party. That he attracted support to the movement in the streets was a sign that his supporters were not involved in civil society (Kornhauser 1959:143). Those who are socially isolated, however, are unlikely to join mass movements (Oberschall 1973; Turner and Killian 1987:300). Mobilization by cellphones and megaphones may pretend to create civil society, but they are usually more effective when they emerge from organized movements: French and Russian mobilizations drove out monarchs, but the French Revolution foundered, while the Russian Revolution gained momentum under the banner of the Communist Party. From Portugal’s Carnation Revolution in 1974 to Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution in 2011, People Power movements toppled dictators in thirty-two countries (Haas 2014c:Table 4.4) because leaders had organizational skills and united the people on behalf of a single objective—establishing democracy (Keane 2009:664).

**Religious Fundamentalism**. Durkheim (1912) suggested that religion might have served as an alternative to civil society, but that option was lost when workers left home to work in cities. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” (1996) claimed that religions provide human identity in a globalized world where borders are permeable. After the Cold War, he observed, the West was trying too hard to foster worldwide democracy in countries that had been ruled in an authoritarian manner. Accordingly, religious institutions were the only organizations available to provide a link between the masses and their governments, creating more likelihood of inter-civilization conflict (cf. Rinehart 2004). Huntington was updating a point made by Kornhauser (1959:179). The same analysis is applicable to First World countries, especially religious fundamentalism in the United States (Smidt, Kellstedt, Guth 2009; Balmer 2010). Riots by Muslims over blasphemous actions by non-Muslims evidently occur only in countries where civil liberties are protected yet fundamentalist groups feel that their beliefs are not respected by governments lacking democratic civil society (Hassner 2011). Terrorism, at least in part, can be explained by the Mass Society Paradigm.

**Revolution**. Chalmers Johnson (1966) has argued that revolution occurs to the ex­tent that the state maintains order by physical force instead of through attitudinal legitimacy. He referred to the “disequilibrated social system” as the seedbed for revolution (ibid., ch.4). For Smelser, “People under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief” (p. 385). What he meant by “strain” was a polarization of society into movements for or against political change (p. 245).

**Scapegoating**. Kornhauser (1959:111) described how totalitarian governments repress civil strife and how elites direct the unrest of the masses concerning restrictions on personal liberties toward internal scapegoats. But rapid social change can also do so in democracies (pp. 147-48). For Smelser (1962:227), scapegoating is possible when there are sharp social cleavages, especially in countries that have maintained racist separation, provided that there is pre-existing group hostility (p. 16).

 Smelser explained how the fear of the rise of Bolshevism, as cultivated by elites, led to the “red scare” of 1919, the roundup of leftists by the American government (p. 244). And, one could add, the era of McCarthyism. When the anti-Communist furor eroded trust in government (Parsons 1955), something that has continued to fall in the United States down a precipice (from 73 percent in 1958 to 19 percent in 2015), especially among those least connected to civil society (Pew 2015).

**War**. Scapegoating of foreign countries is yet another consequence of mass society. Sociologist Hans Speier (1952:276) typologized wars into *absolute wars* (for ideological principles), *instrumental* wars (for profits), and *agonistic wars* (for glory). He then noted that in the twentieth century international conflicts were fought primarily along ideological lines, and he speculated that the reason was because neither profit nor glory can be derived from combat in the modern age. “In the history of capitalism,” he argued, “risks and uncertainties have been unevenly distributed among the different sec­tions of the population” (p. 260). In economic downturns, some classes thus will favor any policy that promises a return to economic normalcy. “Since armament creates employment, it can be presented and popularized . . . as an effective measure against unemployment” (p. 258). Thus, he de­picted a situation in which technological unemployment marginalizes the masses, economic conditions deteriorate, scapegoats are found in other countries, and workers either accept or clamor for war to get back to work. The description clearly fits Germany leading up to World War II (Haas 1968).

**Worldwide Anarchy**. The international system of states now finds parallels within global networks in the private sphere. Those with money can buy their way to gain a measure of control, and no world government can restrain them. Lacking legitimacy, supranational institutions have evoked transnational protests (O’Neill 2004; Koppell 2010). Among those adversely affected by the world “superclass” are indigenous peoples, minor and even middle powers, minorities mistreated within existing states, and Third World countries.

**Conclusion**

The Mass Society Paradigm lingers behind much unrecognized research in the social sciences. One scholar has claimed that only the Marxian Paradigm is more popular within sociology (Bell 1961). Supporting evidence for the Mass Society Paradigm keeps piling up in contemporary studies of American democracy, though political scientists rarely show awareness that they have ever heard of the paradigm.

 Instead, scholarship has tended to be restricted to analysis of such institutions as legislatures, political parties, presidents, and pressure groups. But what is the point of ignoring the larger picture of how they operate to promote or retard democracy? Without paradigmatic considerations, the field is a jigsaw puzzle with isolated studies (cf. Sigelman 2006).

 Within sociology, Gerhard and Jean Lenski and Patrick Nolan (1991:Tables 1.1-1.7) demonstrated that the loss of connectedness was due to the isolation and loneliness associated with urbanization. However, sociologist Richard Hamilton (2001) tried to refute the paradigm, citing public opinion studies demonstrating that Americans are happy, not in despair. Yet he only referred to the anomie proposition, and even then did not cite alcoholism and suicide statistics or the evidence that the alienated masses were outside civil society in Germany until the Hitler Youth and related groups emerged (cf. Allen 1965; Hagtvet 1980). Durkheim never claimed that those measures were true for the urban population as a whole but instead were indicators of a serious malaise that needed to be addressed. The Mass Society Paradigm contains many propositions, and Hamilton did not respond to the main political implication—that people cannot impact government policy.

 Dahl (1985) also sought to refute the Mass Society Paradigm, arguing that the masses were not “uprooted,” citing the latter term from Kornhauser (1959), and that there was no single elite in command of American government, as claimed by Mills (1956). Even if masses are not uprooted or there is no power elite, the Mass Society Paradigm focuses on how ordinary people are neglected by government. The explanation that they are too fazed to assert demands on government is a proposition for testing. And the elite does not have to be as unified as Mills claimed; they can still outmaneuver the masses

 A major challenge in the world today is the unpopularity of democracy within many parts of the world, particularly the Middle East (Lynch 2016). The Arab Spring of 2011 involved young people in the region, empowered by information derived from Internet media, protesting in the streets because of the gap between government and the masses. Protests occurred in countries with few intervening institutions, either because they did not exist, involved too few persons aside from religious movements, or governments considered their pleas as terroristic. Tunisia had intervening institutions and succeeded. There was a coup in Egypt when the political party with the most votes ignored minority views. And groups being fired upon decided to rely on outside patrons while engaging in civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Gerges 2016). Without a grasp of the Mass Society Paradigm, the situation may never be properly understood.

 The current sense of fear and unease about terrorism, when the helplessness felt by the masses is enhanced by the view that governments are ineffective, is nothing new: Terrorism, advocated by anarchists Sergei Nechayev (1869, quoted in Confino 1973) and Mikhail Bakunin (1873) during the waning years of Tsarist Russia (Bakunin 1973) was a factor in bringing down the government’s legitimacy. The incrementalist Provisional Government of February 1917 was viewed as detached from the real needs of the people, who instead jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon of Vladimir Lenin during October.

 Today, elements of the Mass Society Paradigm haunt the world. One casualty may be the goal of European integration. Another may be democracy itself.

**Notes**

1. I am obviously describing what happened after Hitler was elected in Germany but also the first days of Donald Trump as president.

2. Power, respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, skill, well-being, and enlightenment.

3. In a survey of voters in 2016 (MacWilliams 2016), only one variable was robustly related to voting preferences for Donald Trump—a four-point scale identifying authoritarian child-rearing preferences. All others washed out.

4. For a more detailed diagrammatic presentation of the paradigm, including several variants, see Haas (2017a:ch5).

5. For a more extensive exposition of the Pressure Group Paradigm, see Haas (2017a:ch7).

6. For an exposition of the Structural-Functional Paradigm, see Haas (2017a:168-70).

7. For a fuller exposition of Social Capital Theory, see Halpern (2005). Increasing of social capital is the subject of the Social Exchange Paradigm of George Homans (1958, 1961), Peter Blau (1964), and Richard Emerson (1976).

8. For a brief summary of Social Exchange Rationality within the context of the Rational Choice Paradigm, see Haas (2017a:146-47).

9. For an exposition of Network Theory, see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Rainee and Wellman (2012). Network Theory is an application of the Field Paradigm (Haas (2016:ch7).

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