Anti-Black Prejudice in Asian American Public Opinion

Matthew Tokeshi[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Abstract**

Despite the growing size and political relevance of the Asian American population, existing research provides limited insight into how anti-black prejudice shapes Asian American public opinion. Using the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) and conducting additional tests on the 2014 CCES – two surveys that include large samples of Asian Americans, measures of anti-black prejudice, and questions about explicitly and implicitly racial policy attitudes – I find that Asian Americans are more racially sympathetic and more liberal on racial policies than whites. However, associations between prejudice and racial policy attitudes remain significant for Asian Americans, though they are generally weaker than comparable associations for whites. The results suggest that racial resentment will continue to shape American public opinion even as demographic forecasts show the United States becoming a majority-minority nation by the 2040s.

**Key words:** Asian Americans, public opinion, racial prejudice

A lawsuit accusing Harvard of systematically discriminating against Asian American applicants and a proposal to increase the number of African American and Latino students in New York City’s elite public high schools are two high-profile examples of interracial conflict in American politics. Commentators noted the ambivalence among Asian American communities, with some defending Harvard and New York City’s efforts to preserve diverse student bodies and others arguing that such efforts unfairly disadvantage Asian American students (Douthat 2018; Eligon 2018; Kang 2019). Journalistic explorations of Asian American opinion on affirmative action and other racially inflected issues typically overlook the role of group animosity – that Asian American opinion on issues like welfare, economic redistribution, and affirmative action is significantly influenced by resentment toward African Americans. This oversight is curious in light of the amount of attention racial prejudice has received in political science research. A large body of research has shown that anti-black prejudice is a central determinant of whites’ opposition to affirmative action, a host of other explicitly and implicitly racial policies, and African American candidates (Gilens 1999; Hutchings 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tesler and Sears 2010).

While studies have long focused on the role of racial animosity in shaping public opinion, existing research focuses mostly on what white Americans think about African Americans. A few studies have examined anti-black prejudice among Latinos (Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Segura and Valenzuela 2010), but very little is known about the contours and consequences of Asian American prejudice. This is a critical omission for at least two reasons. First, Asian Americans are the fastest growing racial or ethnic group in the United States, increasing 72% from 11.9 million in 2000 to 20.4 million in 2015 compared to a 60% Latino growth rate over the same period (López, Ruiz, and Patten 2017). Asian Americans account for at least 10 percent of the citizen voting age population in six states (Ramakrishnan, Wong, Lee, and Lee 2016). These numbers are likely to grow as the Asian American share of the U.S. population increases from about 6 percent today to a projected 14 percent by 2065, surpassing African Americans as the nation’s third largest racial/ethnic group after whites and Latinos (Cohn 2015). It is essential to better understand the foundations of public opinion for a group whose political power is on the rise. Second, as demographers expect racial minorities to surpass whites as a majority of the U.S. population some time in the 2040s (Craig and Richeson 2014), cooperation and conflict among minority groups is likely to emerge as a key feature of American racial politics as groups jostle for political, economic, and cultural influence. Glimpses into that future are already visible, particularly in American cities like New York over issues like admission to the city’s specialized high schools. A detailed investigation of Asian Americans’ racial attitudes and their political consequences will shed light on racial dynamics that are important to understanding American politics now and in the coming decades.

This paper attempts to bring the role of racial prejudice in shaping Asian American public opinion into full view. In doing so, I advance scholarship on a number of fronts. First, I expand on studies of racial prejudice, which focus almost exclusively on white attitudes toward African Americans. Second, I address a critical gap in studies of Asian American political behavior, which have paid little attention to the prevalence of anti-black prejudice among Asian Americans and its political consequences. Third, I build on studies of black-Asian relations that have focused mostly on coalition-building among elite actors by instead systematically examining the attitudes of ordinary Asian Americans (Aoki and Takeda 2008; Saito 2001). Finally, I build on studies of immigrant political incorporation by focusing on attitudinal differences between foreign-born and U.S.-born Asian Americans, an informative approach for assessing the trajectory of Asian American politics and electoral politics more broadly. The results suggest that anti-black prejudice is a central determinant of the political attitudes of foreign-born and U.S.-born Asians, a finding that has significant implications for politics in an increasingly multiracial United States.

**Previous Literature**

Much of what is known about Asian American anti-black prejudice is derived from media coverage of conflict between Asian American and African American communities. For example, tension between African American and Korean communities in Los Angeles and New York in the 1990s attracted widespread attention (Kim 2000). Intergroup conflict continues today as demonstrated by incidents such as the 2016 conviction of a Chinese American New York City police officer for the shooting of an unarmed black man and a 2018 brawl between Asian American workers and African American customers in a Brooklyn nail salon and the protests that followed (Leland, Alfaro, and Robertson 2018; Rojas 2016). Coverage of these events typically focus on the views of Asian American community organizations, protesters, and people on both sides of the issue. While such coverage is illuminating, its key limitation is that the representativeness of the views expressed by elite actors and “persons in the street” is unknown.

The growth of survey data on Asian Americans over the last two decades offers the potential to overcome this limitation. Research based on the emergence of reliable opinion data has shed light on the acquisition of partisanship (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Raychaudhuri 2018) and the determinants of political participation for Asian Americans (Aoki and Nakanishi 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, and Junn 2011). The racial attitudes of Asian Americans, however, have attracted less attention from survey researchers. In one of the earliest systematic studies of Asian American racial attitudes, Lee (2000) found that Asian Americans preferred whites over blacks as marriage partners, friends, and neighbors, but the political consequences of these racial considerations were not examined. Ramakrishnan, Wong, Lee, and Junn (2009) used data from the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) to determine whether race-based considerations predicted Asian American opposition to Barack Obama in the primary and general elections of 2008. However, the NAAS did not include what is widely considered to be the focal construct for measuring anti-black prejudice: the racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Instead, Ramakrishnan et al. (2009, 225) measured anti-black sentiment based on Asian Americans’ perceived political commonality with blacks compared to Latinos and whites, a move that the authors admit “does not allow us to test specifically for the influence of anti-Black prejudice, per se, on Asian American vote choice.” This paper addresses this gap in the literature by bringing racial resentment into the study of Asian American public opinion and voting behavior.

**Theoretical Expectations**

The assessment of racial resentment’s magnitude and political impact among Asian Americans will be compared to whites throughout the paper. Whites are an appropriate benchmark because their prejudice has historically been the most politically consequential and perhaps therefore the most carefully examined and well understood (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Starting with its magnitude, will Asian Americans exhibit as much racial resentment as whites? There is reason to believe they might. Through the media, whites and U.S.-born Asians are exposed to the same negative depictions of African Americans (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999). Though foreign-born Asians are not socialized in the same environment, many come from societies that have their own strong notions of racial hierarchy (e.g., Dikötter 2015; Wyatt 2009). On the other hand, it is possible that anti-black sentiment is tempered by Asian Americans’ own experiences with discrimination and prejudice (Takaki 1993). Such experiences may heighten their awareness of racism in America and lead to perceptions of commonality with other people of color in their racial outlook – that is, a more racially sympathetic outlook than that of whites.

In addition to its prevalence, we are also interested in the political consequences of racial resentment. How central is it to the political thinking of Asian Americans? A long line of research shows that public opinion is “group-centric,” meaning that people form their opinions on policy based on their attitudes toward the social groups that appear to benefit or suffer as a result of a policy (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Converse 1964; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Price and Hsu 1992). The same is true of citizens’ opinions of political candidates. They are shaped by evaluations of the social groups the candidate appears to stand with or against (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). Although most of this research is on white Americans, research in psychology and comparative politics suggests that group-centric cognition is a general human tendency (Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kam 2010; Lieberman 2009; Sumner 1906; Tajfel 1982). Thus, it would be surprising if Asian Americans are somehow immune to this tendency.

Compared to the central role of racial resentment in shaping the political views of whites, however, it is possible that racial resentment is a weaker force in Asian American public opinion. Political scientists often think of core political predispositions like racial resentment or party identification as the most deeply held and politically influential attitudes measured in public opinion research (Gerber and Green 1998; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993). Since these predispositions are often the result of early childhood socialization for many Americans, it is no surprise that they form the basis of political decision making later in life (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Sears and Valentino 1997). But for a group composed largely of relatively recent immigrants, we have reason to question whether these predispositions are formed in the same manner and therefore have the same influence over other political attitudes and behaviors. Existing research suggests that racial resentment is less stable for Asian American college students compared to white students (Sears, Haley, and Henry 2008), and that party attachments are much weaker for immigrant-based groups such as Asians or Latinos than for whites (Hajnal and Lee 2011). It is also possible that the connection between racial resentment and social policy is less clear for Asian Americans who are still learning the terrain of American politics. Here, we may see important variation between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans. U.S.-born Asians may have a better grasp of the implications of their racial attitudes for their policy views due to the greater level of familiarity with American political culture that comes from being born and socialized in the United States. As a result, racial resentment among U.S.-born Asians may have explanatory power closer to that of whites, while racial resentment among foreign-born Asians may have less.

**Data and Measures**

This study uses data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) conducted in 2018 and conducts additional tests using the 2014 CCES. These Internet-based surveys are ideal for testing the hypotheses outlined earlier because they meet three conditions. First, they contain the racial resentment battery, the widely used and empirically validated measure of anti-black prejudice that is not included in nationally representative surveys of Asian Americans like the NAAS (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2005; Tarman and Sears 2005). Second, the CCES has large samples of Asian Americans (2018 n=1,742 and 2014 n=1,329) unlike the American National Election Studies (ANES). Third, the CCES has an extensive set of questions about explicitly and implicitly racial policy attitudes that I can test for associations with racial resentment. One limitation of the CCES is that all interviews are conducted in English, which means that it is not a nationally representative sample of Asian Americans. However, the CCES samples still contain notable variance across key socioeconomic variables and political attitudes such as ethnicity, region, immigration status, nativity, partisanship, and ideology. A comparison of the CCES Asian American samples and the Asian American adult population as measured by the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) is included in the Appendix.

The key independent variable is anti-black prejudice as measured by the four-item racial resentment battery. It was designed to measure “symbolic racism,” a concept developed to measure anti-black sentiment by asking people to agree or disagree with statements such as, “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors” or “Generations of slavery and discrimination make it difficult to for blacks to work their way out of the lower class” (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996).[[2]](#footnote-2) Responses to these assertions are summed and then divided by the number of questions (four) to generate an overall racial resentment score that ranges from the most racially sympathetic score of 0 to the most racially resentful score of 1. The 2018 CCES contains all four items, while the 2014 CCES only contains two: the “Irish” and “Generations of slavery” items. The racial resentment score for the 2014 CCES is calculated the same way – summing responses to the two questions and dividing by two instead of four because there are only two items. The resulting score is on the 0-1 scale so that comparability with the 2018 CCES is preserved.

The dependent variables are questions on a range of issues that are explicitly or implicitly connected to race. The explicitly racial questions on the 2018 CCES use a five-point scale to measure agreement with two statements: “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin” and “Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.” The implicitly racial questions in 2018 measure support for policies that do not explicitly mention race, but are widely understood in racial terms: welfare, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), gun rights, and taxes (Gilens 1999; Tesler 2012; Filindra and Kaplan 2015; Sears and Citrin 1985). Opinion on welfare, the ACA, and taxes are measured using single questions, while opinion on gun rights is tapped using a three-item battery.[[3]](#footnote-3) In addition, I include 2018 CCES items measuring vote choice in the 2016 presidential election and approval of President Trump.


The explicitly racial item on the 2014 CCES measures support for affirmative action in employment and college admissions. The implicitly racial items in 2014 measure views on the ACA, gun rights, taxes, and the Tea Party (Parker and Barreto 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Views on gun rights are measured using a five-item battery, while opinions on the ACA, taxes, and the Tea Party are measured using single questions. Vote choice in the 2012 presidential election and approval of President Obama are also included from the 2014 CCES. To aid comparability across questions, all variables are coded 0-1 ranging from the most liberal response (0) to the most conservative response (1).

**Findings**

I start by showing the sample means for racial resentment scores on the 2018 CCES. Figure 1 shows the mean racial resentment score for U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans compared to whites, Latinos, and African Americans. It is important to note that the 2018 CCES sample appears to be more racially liberal than ANES samples. For example, Tesler and Sears’ (2010, 97) analysis of the 2008 ANES found mean racial resentment scores of 0.65 for whites, 0.60 for Latinos, and 0.48 for African Americans. Analysis of the 2018 CCES reveals mean racial resentment scores of 0.55 for whites, 0.49 for Latinos, and 0.29 for African Americans. However, this racially sympathetic shift is consistent with research showing similar liberal shifts in the racial attitudes of whites, Latinos, and African Americans since the 2016 election (Englehardt 2019; Jardina 2019; Pew 2017).

Though this trend is notable, the more relevant comparisons for testing the hypotheses set forth in the previous section are the ones between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans and between Asian Americans and other groups, particularly whites. Figure 1 reveals a notable difference between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians. The mean racial resentment score is 0.39 for U.S.-born Asians and 0.52 for foreign-born Asians, a large and statistically significant difference (p<.01).[[4]](#footnote-4) Both U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians exhibited statistically lower levels of racial resentment than whites (p<.01 for U.S.-born Asians vs. whites comparison, p=.01 for foreign-born Asians vs. whites comparison). The general pattern, consistent with other investigations of prejudice across racial groups (e.g., Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Lee 2000; Tesler and Sears 2010), finds whites and blacks at opposing ends of the racial resentment spectrum, with U.S.-born Asians, foreign-born Asians and Latinos falling somewhere in


Figure 1: Racial resentment by race and ethnicity (CCES 2018). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



between.

Next, I turn to opinion on explicitly and implicitly racial issues across groups. As Figure 2 shows, the pattern observed in Figure 1 of U.S.-born Asians being more liberal than foreign-born Asians repeats for most of the racial policy items. U.S.-born Asians are more likely to agree that whites are advantaged, less likely to agree that racial problems are rare, less in favor of repealing the ACA and eliminating state income taxes, less likely to have voted for Trump in

Figure 2: Opinions on racial policy and vote choice by race and ethnicity (CCES 2018). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



2016, and less approving of Trump’s performance as president than their foreign-born counterparts (all differences statistically significant at .01 level, two-tailed tests). Only for welfare spending (p=.62) and gun rights (p=.39) did U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians have no meaningful differences of opinion.

Comparing Asians to other racial groups in Figure 2, U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians often fall between whites and blacks with foreign-born Asians usually falling closer to whites. Foreign-born Asians are actually more conservative than whites on eliminating state income taxes (p<.01); exhibit no differences from whites on the belief that racial problems are rare (p=.71); and are closer to whites than blacks on repealing the ACA, voting for Trump in 2016 and approving his performance as president. Meanwhile, U.S.-born Asians fall between whites and blacks for five of the eight measures – belief that whites have advantages and that racial problems are rare, welfare spending, 2016 vote, and Trump approval. There is no meaningful difference between U.S.-born Asians and blacks in their ACA and gun rights opinions (p=.14 and .38, respectively), while U.S.-born Asians are the most liberal group on income taxes (p<.01 compared to whites, the next most liberal group).

Now that we are familiar with the prevalence of racial resentment and the distribution of opinion across racial issues, I turn to tests of racial resentment’s effects on racial issue opinion. To assess racial resentment’s effects, I estimate a series of regression models predicting issue opinion or vote choice as a function of racial resentment. Controls are included for the effects of partisanship and ideology, two ostensibly non-racial predispositions that are also likely to influence opinion, as well as the demographic characteristics of age, gender, education, and income.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Table 1 shows the multivariate regression coefficients corresponding to the relationship between racial resentment and each issue opinion for U.S.-born Asians, foreign-born Asians, and whites (see Appendix Tables 3-10 for the complete list of coefficient estimates). As Table 1 shows, racial resentment is a significant predictor of all issue opinions for U.S.-born Asians and

Table 1: Impact of racial resentment on racial policy opinions and vote choice, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Disagree – White Have Advantages  (OLS) | 0.38  (0.04) | 0.40  (0.05) | 0.71  (0.00) |
| Racial Problems Rare  (OLS) | 0.45  (0.04) | 0.29  (0.05) | 0.38  (0.00) |
| Decrease Welfare Spending  (OLS) | 0.33  (0.04) | 0.25  (0.04) | 0.35  (0.00) |
| Repeal ACA  (logistic) | 2.39  (0.48) | 2.24  (0.43) | 2.85  (0.06) |
| Gun Rights  (OLS) | 0.15  (0.04) | 0.11  (0.04) | 0.26  (0.00) |
| No State Income Taxes  (logistic) | 2.29  (0.37) | 0.47ns  (0.36) | 1.96  (0.05) |
| 2016 – Voted for Trump  (logistic) | 4.68  (0.99) | 3.07  (0.89) | 4.90  (0.13) |
| Trump Approval  (OLS) | 0.43  (0.04) | 0.34  (0.05) | 0.41  (0.00) |

Entries are ordinary least squares or logistic regression coefficients as noted. All

coefficients are significant at p<.01 level except where noted by ns. Each equation also

included measures of party identification, ideology, age, gender, education, and income.

All variables are coded 0-1. See Appendix for complete results.

whites and all but one issue opinion (no state income taxes) for foreign-born Asians. Thus, racial resentment shapes opinion on racial issues for all three groups even after accounting for the influence of plausible non-racial explanations. Consistent with previous research, the effects of racial resentment are stronger for the explicitly racial items than the implicitly racial items across the three groups (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Racial resentment’s correlation with Trump evaluation is similar in magnitude to its correlation with the explicitly racial items.


Despite these similarities across groups, there are also important differences. Comparing U.S.-born to foreign-born Asians, racial resentment’s effects are stronger for U.S.-born Asians for seven out of the eight issues. Results are less clear cut when comparing U.S.-born Asians to whites, although racial resentment is a stronger predictor for whites for a majority (five out of eight) of the issues tested. Finally, white opinion is more strongly associated with racial resentment on every issue compared to foreign-born Asians, and in many cases, substantially more so. Taken together, these results are consistent with expectations outlined earlier: racial resentment has the strongest influence on the political thinking of whites. It is a somewhat weaker but still visible force in shaping the views of U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians.

*Results of 2014 Analysis*

The 2014 CCES offers another test of the 2018 results. With respect to the magnitude of racial resentment across groups, recall that previous research suggests that 2016 was an inflection point for racial attitudes, with average levels of racial resentment moving in a liberal direction after 2016 among whites, blacks, and Latinos. Thus, if the same liberalizing trend is captured by the CCES, we would not expect a replication of the 2018 results. We would expect to see higher levels of racial resentment in 2014 compared to 2018. The results presented in Figure 3 confirm that expectation. Mean racial resentment scores were 0.57 for U.S.-born Asians, 0.58 for foreign-born Asians, 0.66 for whites, 0.36 for blacks, and 0.59 for Latinos. These scores are much closer to pre-2016 ANES estimates for whites, blacks, and Latinos, lending further support to 2016 being a turning point. It appears that the same liberal shift occurred among Asian Americans, particularly U.S.-born Asians. In 2014, mean racial resentment levels were not statistically different between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians (p=.48). By 2018, a large and statistically significant gap of 0.13 on the racial resentment scale opened between the two groups, driven mostly by a 0.18 liberal shift among U.S.-born Asians.

Although the magnitude of racial resentment changed between 2014 and 2018, there was a notable replication of 2018 results that speaks directly to this study’s hypotheses. In 2014, both U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians exhibited meaningfully less racial resentment than whites in

Figure 3: Racial resentment by race and ethnicity (CCES 2014). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.




2014 (p<.01 for both), just as they did in 2018. Also, the same general pattern of whites and blacks at opposing ends of the racial resentment spectrum with Latinos and U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians falling somewhere in between is repeated in 2014.

Turning to issue opinions, the explicitly racial issue tapped in the 2014 CCES is affirmative action in employment and college admissions. Three of the implicitly racial issues are the same from 2018: ACA repeal, gun rights, and taxes. However, the wording for the ACA repeal questions are slightly different; the gun rights battery contains five items in 2014 instead of three in 2018; and the 2014 taxes question asks whether the respondent prefers raising taxes or cutting spending to balance a hypothetical state budget deficit (see Appendix for exact wording). The fourth implicitly racial issue in the 2014 CCES is opinion of the Tea Party. Although these differences prevent direct comparison with 2018, the 2014 data still allow us to see if the basic descriptive patterns of 2018 hold.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of opinions across racial groups. One similarity with 2018 is that U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians generally fall somewhere between whites and blacks, a pattern that is most clearly seen for the explicitly racial issue (affirmative action) and the items pertaining most directly to President Obama (2012 vote, Obama disapproval, and ACA repeal). One difference is that the opinion gap between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians that appeared in the 2018 CCES data generally does not appear in the 2014 CCES data. There are no meaningful differences between them for five of the seven items: affirmative action, the ACA, guns, taxes, and 2012 vote for Romney. Foreign-born Asians have a slightly more positive view of the Tea Party (0.43 for foreign-born vs. 0.39 for U.S.-born, p=.04), while U.S.-born Asians were slightly more disapproving of President Obama (0.48 for U.S.-born vs. 0.44 for foreign-born, p=.02).

Does the U.S.-foreign-born gap appear in 2018 because the U.S.-born became more liberal (as we saw earlier with racial resentment), the foreign-born became more conservative, or both? To explore this, I examine the most similarly worded question across the two years: ACA repeal.[[6]](#footnote-6) Foreign-born Asians are roughly as supportive of ACA repeal in 2018 as they were in

Figure 4: Opinions on racial policy and vote choice by race and ethnicity (CCES 2018). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



2014 (0.43 in 2014 vs. 0.40 in 2018, p=.23), while U.S.-born Asians are significantly less supportive of ACA repeal in 2018 (0.23 in 2014 vs. 0.40 in 2014, p<.01). This suggests that the gap is driven by a liberal shift among the U.S.-born, though this conclusion should not be overstated without examining several identically worded questions.

Finally, I turn to the relationship between racial resentment and racial issue opinion. Table 2 shows the strength of those relationships controlling for the same set of variables that were accounted for in the 2018 models (see Appendix Tables 12-18 for the complete list of coefficient estimates).[[7]](#footnote-7) The results show important similarities with 2018. First, racial resentment is a statistically significant predictor of every issue opinion for all three groups. Second, racial resentment’s effect is stronger for the explicitly racial issue of affirmative action than it is for the four implicitly racial issues. Consistent with existing research, evaluations of President Obama are less racially charged than evaluations of President Trump (compare with Table 1), particularly among U.S.-born Asians and whites (Hopkins forthcoming; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). Third, racial resentment’s effects are generally stronger for whites than for either Asian group. On only one of the seven issues tested is the association with racial resentment stronger for U.S.-born or foreign-born Asians than it is for whites. Differences between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians are less stark than in 2018, but racial resentment’s effects are stronger for U.S.-born Asians for a majority (four out of the seven) of the issues tested. In sum, the results reflect the same general pattern observed in 2018: racial resentment most strongly shapes the political thinking of whites, though it also does so for U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians to a lesser, though still appreciable, degree.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this paper has been to shed light on the magnitude and political impact of

Table 2: Impact of racial resentment on racial policy opinions and vote choice, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Oppose Affirmative Action  (OLS) | 0.46  (0.05) | 0.44  (0.06) | 0.57  (0.00) |
| Repeal ACA  (logistic) | 2.17  (0.45) | 2.05  (0.45) | 2.68  (0.06) |
| Gun Rights  (OLS) | 0.19  (0.05) | 0.10  (0.05) | 0.23  (0.01) |
| Spending Cuts Over Tax Raises  (OLS) | 0.20  (0.03) | 0.26  (0.04) | 0.26  (0.00) |
| Positive View of Tea Party  (OLS) | 0.21  (0.04) | 0.25  (0.05) | 0.25  (0.00) |
| 2012 Voted for Romney  (logistic) | 2.55  (0.92) | 4.64  (1.16) | 3.15  (0.10) |
| Disapprove Obama  (OLS) | 0.31  (0.05) | 0.29  (0.06) | 0.30  (0.01) |

Entries are ordinary least squares or logistic regression coefficients as noted. All

coefficients are significant at p<.01 level. Each equation also included measures of

party identification, ideology, age, gender, education, and income. All variables are

coded 0-1. See Appendix for complete results.

anti-black prejudice among Asian Americans. On the first question of magnitude, the findings suggest that both foreign-born and U.S.-born Asian Americans score lower on the racial resentment scale and are generally more liberal on racial issues than whites. U.S.-born Asian Americans grew considerably more liberal between 2014 and 2018, opening a gap between them and foreign-born Asian Americans that was not evident in 2014. On the second question of political impact, racial resentment is a potent force in shaping the racial policy attitudes of U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans. It is a somewhat weaker force than it is for whites, but it is still prominent even after accounting for other plausible influences on racial policy attitudes.

These findings have implications for the future of American politics as Asian Americans become a larger share of the American electorate. One optimistic interpretation of the results is that racial animosity is less widespread and less influential among Asian Americans compared to whites, and so the prevalence of racial animosity and its impact on policy views and vote choice will be lower as the Asian American population increases and the white population decreases. The comparatively liberal racial outlook held by Asian Americans, particularly U.S.-born Asians in 2018, suggest an ethnic resilience that speaks to longstanding debates on the incorporation of immigrants into American society. Canonical assimilation theory suggests that immigrant groups generally come to resemble the native-born majority and lose their ethnic distinctiveness the longer they reside in the United States (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). Asian Americans are sometimes thought of as the “model minority,” a paradigmatic example of a group whose high socioeconomic attainment and presence in mainstream institutions has blurred boundaries between themselves and the native-born white majority (Nee and Holbrow 2013). With respect to their political and racial attitudes, however, the evidence presented in this paper does not suggest that Asian Americans are increasingly resembling whites. This finding is in line with recent scholarship on Asian American partisanship that finds Asian Americans holding more liberal political views than whites despite having similar income levels (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017).

On the other hand, anti-black sentiment remained a critical determinant of Asian American opinions on just about every question examined. This is a testament to the resilience of “group-centrism” in public opinion (Converse 1964). Racial resentment’s effects were somewhat stronger among the U.S.-born than the foreign-born, indicating that its effects are unlikely to dissipate as the U.S.-born children of today’s immigrants become adults. Thus, the rapid demographic changes that are creating a more ethnically diverse United States may not bring about a less racialized politics.

The findings suggest that Asian Americans occupy a familiar third position in contemporary American racial politics somewhere between white and black (Ancheta 1998; Matsuda 1993; Okihiro 1994). As the United States becomes a majority-minority nation, where will Asian Americans fit in a racially re-ordered society? Part of the answer likely depends on how popular conceptions of white identity change in the coming decades. Scholars have documented the processes by which previously “non-white” groups such as the Irish became “white,” arguing that the boundary of whiteness has historically been permeable (Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998). However, if popular notions of whiteness change in ways that define being white as being U.S.-born, English-speaking, Christian, and phenotypically European, as recent research suggests (Jardina 2019), then Asian Americans are unlikely to adopt racial and political attitudes similar to those of whites.

Another important unknown is whether Asian Americans will identify with or perceive common interests with other communities of color. I noted earlier that competition among minority groups for political, economic, and cultural power is likely to become a more prominent feature of American politics in the coming years. My findings suggest that there is a strong link between anti-black prejudice and Asian American views on racial issues, and that such linkages are likely to be exploited by politicians and other opinion leaders who stand to gain by stoking resentment of African Americans. These political dynamics are likely to work against the development of a strongly liberal Asian American racial politics in spite of the liberal turn observed in 2018.

Of course, it is impossible to know exactly what the future will hold. But one clear conclusion to draw from this paper is that future work on Asian American political behavior should take racial resentment into account. Just as earlier studies of white Americans showed, it is a powerful force in shaping Asian American opinion.

**Appendix**

Table 1: Comparison of Asian Americans in CCES samples to Asian American population according to the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2018 CCES | 2014 CCES | 2017 ACS |
| Ethnicity | Chinese 23%  Indian 16%  Filipino 14%  Japanese 11%  Vietnamese 9%  Korean 9%  Other 19% | Did not include ethnicity information | Chinese 24%  Indian 22%  Filipino 16%  Vietnamese 10%  Korean 8%  Japanese 4%  Other 15% |
| Sex | Male 44%  Female 56% | Male 45%  Female 55% | Male 47%  Female 53% |
| Educational attainment | Less than HS 2%  HS or equivalent 14%  Some college or associate’s degree 22%  Bachelor’s degree 37%  Graduate degree 25% | Less than HS 2%  HS or equivalent 13%  Some college or associate’s degree 25%  Bachelor’s degree 40%  Graduate degree 20% | Less than HS 13%  HS or equivalent 15%  Some college or associate’s degree 18%  Bachelor’s degree 30%  Graduate degree 24% |
| Census region | West 41%  South 24%  Northeast 21%  Midwest 14% | West 44%  South 23%  Northeast 20%  Midwest 13% | West 45%  South 23%  Northeast 21%  Midwest 12% |
| Age | 18-34 58%  35-54 33%  55-74 8%  75 and older 1% | 18-34 65%  35-54 21%  55-74 13%  75 and older 2% | 18-34 33%  35-54 37%  55-74 23%  75 and older 6% |
| Nativity | U.S.-born 53%  Foreign-born 47% | U.S.-born 49%  Foreign-born 51% | U.S.-born 22%  Foreign-born 78% |
| Citizenship status | U.S.-born 53%  Naturalized U.S. citizen 32%  Not a U.S. citizen 15% | U.S.-born 49%  Naturalized U.S. citizen 35%  Not a U.S. citizen 17% | U.S.-born 22%  Naturalized U.S. citizen 46%  Not a U.S. citizen 31% |
| Family income last year | Less than $30k 16%  $30k-$59,999 26%  $60k-$99,999 28%  $100k or more 30% | Less than $30k 19%  $30k-$59,999 29%  $60k-$99,999 27%  $100k or more 24% | Less than $30k 13%  $30k-$59,999 17%  $60k-$99,999 21%  $100k or more 49% |

Note: The ACS percentages are calculated using the Asian American adult population (defined as 18 years and older) as the denominator whenever possible in order to preserve comparability with adult participants in the CCES. The exceptions are: educational attainment (adults 25 and older), family income (householders), and ethnicity (entire population since age breakdowns by ethnicity were unavailable). Totals sometimes add up to more or less than 100% due to rounding.

Table 2: Impact of racial resentment on racial policy opinions and vote choice, CCES 2018, no controls

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Disagree – White Have Advantages  (OLS) | 0.50  (0.03) | 0.51  (0.04) | 0.87  (0.00) |
| Racial Problems Rare  (OLS) | 0.52  (0.03) | 0.39  (0.04) | 0.52  (0.00) |
| Decrease Welfare Spending  (OLS) | 0.51  (0.03) | 0.39  (0.04) | 0.54  (0.00) |
| Repeal ACA  (logistic) | 4.28  (0.41) | 3.19  (0.38) | 5.13  (0.05) |
| Gun Rights  (OLS) | 0.34  (0.03) | 0.24  (0.04) | 0.53  (0.00) |
| No State Income Taxes  (logistic) | 2.52  (0.30) | 0.96  (0.31) | 2.71  (0.04) |
| 2016 – Voted for Trump  (logistic) | 6.87  (0.72) | 4.77  (0.62) | 7.76  (0.08) |
| Trump Approval  (OLS) | 0.71  (0.03) | 0.68  (0.05) | 0.99  (0.00) |

Entries are ordinary least squares or logistic regression coefficients as noted. All

coefficients are significant at p<.01 level. Each equation includes no other predictors. All

variables are coded 0-1.

Table 3: (OLS) Predictors of disagreement that white people have advantages, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.38\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.40\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.71\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.14\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.08^  (0.04) | 0.09\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.08^  (0.04) | 0.15\*\*  (0.06) | 0.13\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00  (0.00) | 0.00  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.02  (0.02) | 0.00  (0.02) | 0.00^  (0.00) |
| Education | -0.06^  (0.03) | -0.08^  (0.04) | -0.04\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Income | -0.04  (0.04) | -0.06  (0.05) | -0.03\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.04  (0.03) | 0.03  (0.05) | 0.00  (0.01) |
| N | 724 | 660 | 38,400 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.33 | 0.22 | 0.59 |

^p<0.1, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 4: (OLS) Predictors of agreement that racial problems are rare, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.45\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.29\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.38\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.07^  (0.04) | 0.07  (0.05) | 0.10\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.10\*  (0.05) | 0.18\*\*  (0.06) | 0.14\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00\*\*  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.01  (0.02) | 0.05\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Education | -0.03  (0.03) | -0.07^  (0.04) | 0.03\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Income | 0.05  (0.04) | -0.04  (0.06) | 0.04\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.06^  (0.04) | 0.17\*\*  (0.05) | 0.02\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 718 | 630 | 37,148 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.29 | 0.14 | 0.35 |

^p<0.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 5: (OLS) Predictors of preference to decrease welfare spending, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.14\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.12\*\*  (0.04) | 0.11\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Ideology | 0.14\*\*  (0.05) | 0.16\*\*  (0.05) | 0.22\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00\*\*  (0.00) | 0.00\*  (0.00) | 0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.03\*  (0.02) | 0.00  (0.02) | 0.00  (0.00) |
| Education | 0.06^  (0.03) | 0.06  (0.04) | 0.04\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Income | 0.12\*\*  (0.04) | 0.13\*\*  (0.05) | 0.21\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.03  (0.04) | 0.02  (0.04) | 0.06\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 725 | 661 | 38,332 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.32 | 0.21 | 0.42 |

^p<0.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 6: (Logistic) Predictors of preference to repeal ACA, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 2.39\*\*\*  (0.48) | 2.24\*\*\*  (0.43) | 2.85\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Partisanship | 2.01\*\*\*  (0.41) | 1.02\*\*  (0.34) | 2.36\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Ideology | 2.38\*\*\*  (0.59) | 1.73\*\*\*  (0.50) | 2.29\*\*\*  (0.08) |
| Age | 0.00  (0.01) | -0.00  (0.01) | -0.00  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.10  (0.22) | -0.26  (0.18) | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.03) |
| Education | -0.28  (0.41) | -0.71\*  (0.33) | -0.32\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Income | -0.15  (0.54) | 0.12  (0.44) | 0.10  (0.08) |
| (intercept) | -4.21\*\*\*  (0.48) | -2.13\*\*\*  (0.42) | -4.40\*\*\*  (0.07) |
| N | 726 | 659 | 38,384 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 7: (OLS) Predictors of support for gun rights, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.15\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.11\*\*  (0.04) | 0.26\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.16\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.10\*\*  (0.04) | 0.17\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.18\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.19\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.06\*\*\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*\*  (0.02) | 0.13\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.06  (0.03) | 0.05\*\*  (0.00) |
| Income | -0.06  (0.04) | -0.05  (0.04) | -0.02\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | -0.01  (0.03) | 0.04  (0.04) | -0.07\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 718 | 658 | 37,977 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.39 |

\*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 8: (Logistic) Predictors of support for eliminating state income taxes, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 2.29\*\*\*  (0.37) | 0.47  (0.36) | 1.96\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Partisanship | 0.12  (0.34) | 0.52^  (0.32) | 0.26\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Ideology | 0.44  (0.44) | 0.40  (0.43) | 0.82\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Age | 0.00  (0.01) | 0.00  (0.01) | 0.00\*  (0.00) |
| Male | -0.15  (0.17) | 0.16  (0.16) | 0.10\*\*\*  (0.02) |
| Education | -0.11  (0.31) | -0.34  (0.30) | -0.27\*\*\*  (0.04) |
| Income | -0.59  (0.40) | 0.31  (0.39) | 0.09  (0.06) |
| (intercept) | -1.24\*\*\*  (0.33) | -0.50  (0.36) | -1.90\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| N | 726 | 661 | 38,389 |

^p<0.1, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 9: (Logistic) Predictors of support for Trump in 2016, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 4.68\*\*\*  (0.99) | 3.07\*\*\*  (0.89) | 4.90\*\*\*  (0.13) |
| Partisanship | 5.77\*\*\*  (0.81) | 6.13\*\*\*  (0.82) | 6.38  (0.11) |
| Ideology | 3.72\*\*\*  (1.07) | 0.83  (1.05) | 3.99\*\*\*  (0.16) |
| Age | -0.00  (0.02) | 0.01  (0.01) | -0.00\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.30  (0.45) | 0.25  (0.40) | 0.21\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Education | -1.97\*  (0.95) | 0.67  (0.80) | -0.35\*\*  (0.11) |
| Income | -1.19  (1.09) | -1.44  (1.07) | -0.16  (0.15) |
| (intercept) | -6.32\*\*\*  (1.11) | -6.07\*\*\*  (1.13) | -7.40\*\*\*  (0.16) |
| N | 457 | 321 | 29,366 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 10: (OLS) Predictors of Trump approval, CCES 2018

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.43\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.34\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.41\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.48\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.53\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.56\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.04  (0.05) | 0.17\*\*  (0.06) | 0.24\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00  (0.00) | 0.00  (0.00) | 0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.01  (0.02) | 0.01  (0.02) | 0.02\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | 0.00  (0.03) | -0.01  (0.04) | -0.01\*  (0.00) |
| Income | -0.06  (0.04) | -0.07  (0.05) | 0.02\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | -0.12\*\*\*  (0.04) | -0.14\*\*  (0.05) | -0.24\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 726 | 661 | 38,409 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.51 | 0.43 | 0.70 |

\*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 11: Impact of racial resentment on racial policy opinions and vote choice, CCES 2014, no controls

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Oppose Affirmative Action  (OLS) | 0.56  (0.05) | 0.57  (0.05) | 0.69  (0.00) |
| Repeal ACA  (logistic) | 2.95  (0.40) | 2.86  (0.41) | 4.37  (0.05) |
| Gun Rights  (OLS) | 0.33  (0.04) | 0.19  (0.04) | 0.46  (0.01) |
| Spending Cuts Over Tax Raises  (OLS) | 0.26  (0.03) | 0.34  (0.03) | 0.42  (0.00) |
| Positive View of Tea Party  (OLS) | 0.34  (0.04) | 0.36  (0.05) | 0.63  (0.00) |
| 2012 Voted for Romney  (logistic) | 3.74  (0.57) | 6.15  (0.84) | 5.05  (0.06) |
| Disapprove Obama  (OLS) | 0.56  (0.05) | 0.54  (0.06) | 0.72  (0.01) |

Entries are ordinary least squares or logistic regression coefficients as noted. All

coefficients are significant at p<.01 level. Each equation includes no other predictors.

All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 12: (OLS) Predictors of opposition to affirmative action, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.46\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.44\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.57\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Partisanship | 0.15\*\*  (0.05) | 0.07  (0.05) | 0.11\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Ideology | 0.05  (0.07) | 0.20\*\*  (0.07) | 0.14\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) | 0.00\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.06\*  (0.03) | -0.00  (0.03) | 0.02\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | -0.01  (0.05) | -0.05  (0.05) | 0.01  (0.00) |
| Income | 0.13\*  (0.06) | 0.11^  (0.07) | 0.05\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.08  (0.05) | 0.11\*  (0.05) | 0.15\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 534 | 560 | 35,995 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.24 | 0.17 | 0.48 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 13: (Logistic) Predictors of preference to repeal ACA, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 2.17\*\*\*  (0.45) | 2.05\*\*\*  (0.45) | 2.68\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Partisanship | 1.64\*\*\*  (0.40) | 1.84\*\*\*  (0.36) | 2.84\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Ideology | 1.69\*\*  (0.59) | 0.68  (0.51) | 2.58\*\*\*  (0.08) |
| Age | 0.01  (0.01) | -0.00  (0.01) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.06  (0.21) | -0.14  (0.19) | 0.02  (0.03) |
| Education | 0.45  (0.40) | -0.59^  (0.34) | -0.31\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Income | -0.91^  (0.51) | 0.82^  (0.49) | -0.09  (0.08) |
| (intercept) | -3.30\*\*\*  (0.47) | -2.44\*\*\*  (0.42) | -3.81\*\*\*  (0.07) |
| N | 532 | 556 | 35,890 |

^p<0.1, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 14: (OLS) Predictors of support for gun rights, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.19\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.10\*  (0.05) | 0.23\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.24\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.13\*\*  (0.04) | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.07  (0.06) | 0.16\*\*  (0.05) | 0.27\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.10\*\*\*  (0.02) | 0.05\*  (0.02) | 0.13\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | -0.06  (0.04) | -0.07^  (0.04) | 0.07\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Income | 0.01  (0.05) | 0.06  (0.05) | -0.04\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.07  (0.05) | 0.12\*\*  (0.04) | 0.00  (0.01) |
| N | 523 | 558 | 35,413 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.36 |

^p<0.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 15: (OLS) Predictors of preference for spending cuts over tax raises to balance budget, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.26\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.26\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Partisanship | 0.13\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.12\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.09\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Ideology | 0.10\*  (0.04) | 0.09\*  (0.04) | 0.22\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.00  (0.02) | 0.00  (0.02) | 0.01\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | 0.06\*  (0.03) | -0.01  (0.03) | 0.02\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Income | 0.01  (0.04) | 0.08^  (0.04) | 0.05\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.24\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 532 | 556 | 35,935 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.34 |

^p<0.1, \*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 16: (OLS) Predictors of positive view of Tea Party, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.21\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Partisanship | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.19\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.30\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Ideology | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.27\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.42\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | -0.00\*\*  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | -0.05\*  (0.02) | -0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.02\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Education | -0.15\*\*\*  (0.04) | -0.09\*  (0.04) | -0.02  (0.00) |
| Income | -0.05  (0.05) | -0.03  (0.05) | -0.05\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | 0.29\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.27\*\*\*  (0.04) | -0.04\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 534 | 561 | 36,079 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.55 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 17: (Logistic) Predictors of vote for Romney in 2012, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 2.55\*\*  (0.92) | 4.64\*\*\*  (1.16) | 3.15\*\*\*  (0.10) |
| Partisanship | 6.26\*\*\*  (0.84) | 5.06\*\*\*  (0.91) | 6.42\*\*\*  (0.10) |
| Ideology | 4.68\*\*\*  (1.20) | 3.55\*  (1.40) | 4.62\*\*\*  (0.15) |
| Age | 0.02  (0.01) | 0.03^  (0.02) | 0.01\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | -0.39  (0.47) | -0.71  (0.51) | 0.06  (0.05) |
| Education | -0.59  (0.95) | 0.26  (0.94) | 0.22\*  (0.09) |
| Income | -0.63  (1.10) | -1.08  (1.16) | -0.08  (0.13) |
| (intercept) | -7.63\*\*\*  (1.25) | -9.01\*\*\*  (1.54) | -8.33\*\*\*  (0.16) |
| N | 316 | 235 | 27,699 |

^p<0.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Table 18: (OLS) Predictors of disapproval of Obama, CCES 2014

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Asian-U.S. | Asian-foreign | White |
|  | b  (SE) | b  (SE) | b  (SE) |
| Racial Resentment | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.29\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.30\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Partisanship | 0.50\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.43\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.54\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.13^  (0.07) | 0.23\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.21\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00^  (0.00) | 0.00  (0.00) | -0.00\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Male | 0.02  (0.03) | -0.02  (0.03) | 0.01^  (0.00) |
| Education | 0.09^  (0.05) | -0.04  (0.04) | -0.02\*\*\*  (0.00) |
| Income | -0.01  (0.06) | 0.05  (0.06) | -0.03\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| (intercept) | -0.06  (0.05) | 0.01  (0.05) | 0.12\*\*\*  (0.01) |
| N | 534 | 561 | 36,054 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.39 | 0.31 | 0.59 |

^p<0.1, \*\*\*p<.001, all two-tailed tests.

Question Wording

*Racial resentment battery (2018)*

The scale was constructed from responses to the following items: 1) “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] 2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] 3) “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] 4) “It’s really a matter of not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] Coded from 0 (least resentful) to 1 (most resentful).

*Partisanship* (2018)

The scale was constructed using two branched questions: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a…?” [Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, Not sure] [If R considers self a Democrat/Republican] “Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat/Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?” [strong, not very strong] [If R is Independent, Other, or Not sure] “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? [Democratic, Republican] Coded as a seven-category variable from the two branching questions ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican).

*Ideology* (2018)

“In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?” [Very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative]. Coded as a five-category variable ranging from 0 (very liberal) to 1 (very conservative).

*Age* (2018)

“In what year were you born” [R provides year]. Respondent’s age is calculated by subtracting birth year from 2018.

*Male* (2018)

“Are you…” [male, female]. Coded as a dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (female) or 1 (male).

*Education* (2018)

“What is the highest level of education you have completed” [no HS, high school graduate, some college, 2-year, 4-year, post-grade] A five-category variable created by collapsing “some college” and “2-year” responses into one category. Ranges from 0 (no HS) to 1 (post-grad).

*Income* (2018)

“Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s income?” [less than $10,000; $10,000-$19,999, $20,000-$29,999; $30,000-$39,999; $40,000-$49,999; $50,000-$59,999; $60,000-$69,999; $70,000-$79,999; $80,000-$99,999; $100,000-$119,999; $120,000-$149,999; $150,000-$199,999; $200,000-$249,999; $250,000-$349,999; $350,000-$499,999; $500,000 or more] A sixteen-category variable ranging from 0 (less than $10,000) to 1 ($500,000 or more)

*Race* (2018)

“What racial or ethnic group best describes you?” [white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Mixed, Other, Middle Eastern]

*Hispanic* (2018)

“Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?” [yes, no]

*Asian heritage* (2018)

“From which country or region do you trace your heritage or ancestry? (Check all that apply)” [No Country in Particular, United States, China, Japan, India, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Pakistan, Hmong, Cambodia, Thailand, Other, I am not of Asian heritage]

*Nativity and citizenship status* (2018)

“Which of these statements best describes you?” [I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen; I am an immigrant to the USA and not a citizen of the USA; I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant; My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant; My parents, grandparents, and I were all born in the USA]

*White advantage* (2018)

“Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] A five-category variable ranging from 0 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree)

*Racial problems rare* (2018)

“Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] A five-category variable ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree)

*Welfare* (2018)

“State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. How would you like your legislature to spend money in each of the five areas below? Welfare.” [greatly increase, slightly increase, maintain, slightly decrease, greatly decrease]. A five-category variable ranging from 0 (greatly increase) to 1 (greatly decrease).

*Repeal ACA* (2018)

“Thinking now about health care policy, would you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Repeal the entire Affordable Care Act.” [support, oppose] A dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (oppose) or 1 (support).

*Gun rights* (2018)

The scale was constructed from responses to the following items: “On the issue of gun regulation, are you for or against each of the following proposals?” 1) “Background checks for all sales, including gun shows and over the Internet” [for, against]; 2) “Ban assault rifles” [for, against]; 3) “Make it easier for people to obtain a concealed-carry gun permit” [for, against]. Coded from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative).

*No state income taxes* (2018)

“If your state put the following questions for a vote on the ballot, would you vote FOR or AGAINST? Eliminate and prohibit all income taxes in your state.” [for, against]. A dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (against) or 1 (for).

*2016 – voted for Trump* (2018)

“In the election for U.S. President, who did you vote for?” [Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Someone else, I did not cast a vote for president, I don’t recall] Coded as a dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (Hillary Clinton) or 1 (Donald Trump).

*Trump approval* (2018)

“Do you approve or disapprove of the way each is doing their job…President Trump.” [strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, strongly disapprove]. A four-category variable ranging from 0 (strongly disapprove) to 1 (strongly approve).

*Racial resentment battery* (2014)

The scale was constructed from responses to the following items: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” 1) “The Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] 2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree] Coded from 0 (least resentful) to 1 (most resentful).

*Partisanship* (2014) – Identical to 2018.

*Ideology* (2014)

“Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?” [very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative] A five-category variable ranging from 0 (very liberal) to 1 (very conservative).

*Age* (2014)

“In what year were you born” [R provides year]. Respondent’s age is calculated by subtracting birth year from 2014.

*Male* (2014)

“Are you male or female?” [male, female]. Coded as a dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (female) or 1 (male).

*Education* (2014) — Identical to 2018.

*Income* (2014) — Identical to 2018.

*Race* (2014) — Identical to 2018.

*Hispanic* (2014) — Identical to 2018.

*Nativity and citizenship status* (2014)

“Which of these statements best describes you?” [Immigrant citizen; Immigrant non-citizen; First generation; Second generation; Third generation]

*Affirmative action* (2014)

“Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action?” [strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]. A four-category variable ranging from 0 (strongly support) to 1 (strongly oppose).

*Repeal ACA* (2014)

“Would you vote to repeal the Affordable Care Act if you were in Congress today?” [yes, no]. A dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (no) or 1 (yes).

*Gun rights* (2014)

The scale was constructed from responses to the following items: “On the issue of gun regulation, are you for or against each of the following…” 1) “Background Checks” [for, against]; 2) “Prohibit state and local government from publishing the names and addresses of all gun owners” [for, against]; 3) “Ban high-capacity magazines for guns” [for, against]; 4) “Ban assault rifles” [for, against]; 5) “Make it easier for people to obtain concealed weapons permits” [for, against]. Coded from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative).

*Taxes vs. spending* (2014)

“If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 100% tax increases (and no spending cuts) to 100% spending cuts (and no tax increases). The point in the middle means that the budget should be balanced with equal amounts of spending cuts and tax increases. If you are not sure, or don’t know, please check the ‘not sure’ box.” [R selects point on 0 to 100 scale with 0 representing all from tax increases and 100 representing all from spending cuts]. A 101-category variable ranging from 0 to 100.

*Tea Party opinion* (2014)

“What is your view of the Tea Party movement; would you say it is very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative, or don’t you know enough about the Tea Party movement to say?” [very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, very negative, don’t know enough to say] A five-category variable created by converting “don’t know enough to say” responses to the “neutral” category. Ranges from 0 (very negative) to 1 (very positive).

*2012—voted for Romney* (2014)

“For whom did you vote for president in 2012?” [Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Someone Else, Did not vote, Don’t recall]. A dummy variable taking on a value of 0 (Barack Obama) or 1 (Mitt Romney).

*Obama disapproval* (2014)

“Do you approve of the way each is doing their job…President Obama.” [strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, strongly disapprove]. A four-category variable ranging from 0 (strongly approve) to 1 (strongly disapprove).

**References**

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ancheta, Angelo. 1998. *Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Aoki, Andrew, and Don T. Nakanishi. 2001. “Asian Pacific Americans and the New Minority Politics.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34(3): 605-610.

Aoki, Andrew L., and Okiyoshi Takeda. 2008. *Asian American Politics.* Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. 1990. “American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change.” *Journal of Politics* 52(4): 1124-1154.

Cohn, D’Vera. 2015. “Future Immigration Will Change the Face of America.” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 5 (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-immigration-will-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065/).

Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, 206-261. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014. “On the Precipice of a ‘Majority-Minority’ America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology.” *Psychological Science* 25(6): 1189-1197.

Dikötter, Frank. 2015. *The Discourse of Race in Modern China.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Douthat, Ross. 2018. “The Asian-American Age.” *New York Times,* September 1.

Eligon, John. 2018. “Asian Americans Face Multiple Fronts in Battle Over Affirmative Action.” *New York Times,* June 16.

Englehardt, Andrew M. 2019. “Trumped by Race: Explanations for Race’s Influence on Whites’ Votes in 2016.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 14(3): 313-328.

Entman, Robert M., and Andrew Rojecki. 2000. *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Filindra, Alexandra, and Noah J. Kaplan. 2016. “Racial Resentment and Whites’ Gun Policy Preferences in Contemporary America.” *Political Behavior* 38(2): 255-275.

Gerber, Alan, and Donald Philip Green. 1998. “Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 794-818.

Gilens, Martin. 1999. *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hajnal, Zoltan L., and Taeku Lee. 2011. *Why Americans Don’t Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hopkins, Daniel J. Forthcoming. “The Activation of Prejudice and Presidential Voting: Panel Evidence from the 2016 U.S. Election.” *Political Behavior.*

Hutchings, Vincent L. 2009. “Change or More of the Same? Evaluation Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(5): 917-942.

Ignatiev, Noel. 1995. *How the Irish Became White.* New York: Routledge.

Jacobson, Matthew Frye. 1998. *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, Jay Caspian. 2019. “Where Does Affirmative Action Leave Asian-Americans?” *New York Times,* August 28.

Kim, Claire Jean. 2000. *Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City.* Hew Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Allison Dale-Riddle. 2012. *The End of Race? Obama, 2008, and Racial Politics in America.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Cindy D. Kam. 2010. *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears. 1981. “Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(3): 414-431.

Krupnikov, Yanna, and Spencer Piston. 2016. “The Political Consequences of Latino Prejudice Against Blacks.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(2): 480-509.

Kuo, Alexander, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyungjung Mo. 2016. “Social Exclusion and Political Identity: The Case of Asian American Partisanship.” *Journal of Politics* 79(1): 17-32.

Lee, Taeku. 2000. “Racial Attitudes and the Color Line(s) at the Close of the Twentieth Century.” In *Transforming Race Relations: A Public Policy Report*, ed. Paul M. Ong., 103-158. Los Angeles: LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and UCLA Asian American Studies Center.

Leland, John, Mariana Alfaro, and Aaron Robertson. 2018. “A Nail Salon Brawl Opened a Racial Rift Online. In Brooklyn, the Mood Is Calmer.” *New York Times,* August 7.

Lieberman, Evan S. 2009. *Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped Government Responses to AIDS.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

López, Gustavo, Neil G. Ruiz, and Eileen Patten. 2017. “Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing Population.” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, September 8 (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/).

Matsuda, Mari. 1993. “We Will Not Be Used.” *UCLA Asian American Pacific Islands Law Journal* 1: 79-84.

Nee, Victor, and Hilary Holbrow. 2013. “Why Asian Americans are Becoming Mainstream.” *Daedalus* 142(3): 65-75.

Nelson, Thomas E., and Donald R. Kinder. 1996. “Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion.” *Journal of Politics* 58(4): 1055-1078.

Okihiro, Gary. 1994. *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Parker, Christopher S., and Matt A. Barreto. 2013. *Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pew. 2017. “The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider.” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 5.

Price, Vincent, and Mei-Ling Hsu. 1992. “Public Opinion About AIDS Policies: The Role of Misinformation and Attitudes Toward Homosexuals.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56(1): 29-52.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. 2005. *Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick, Janelle Wong, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn. 2009. “Race-Based Considerations and the Obama Vote.” *DuBois Review* 6(1): 219-238.

Ramakrishnan, Karthick, Janelle Wong, Taeku Lee, and Jennifer Lee. 2016. “Asian American Voices in the 2016 Election: Report on Registered Voters in the Fall 2016 National Asian American Survey.” National Asian American Survey, October 5 (https://naasurvey.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NAAS2016-Oct5-report.pdf).

Raychaudhuri, Tanika. 2018. “The Social Roots of Asian American Partisan Attitudes.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6(3): 389-410.

Rojas, Rick. 2016. “In New York, Thousands Protest Officer Liang’s Conviction.” *New York Times,* February 20.

Saito, Leland T. 2001. “Asian Americans and Multiracial Political Coalitions: New York City’s Chinatown and Redistricting, 1990-1991.” In *Asian Americans and Politics: Perspectives, Experiences, Prospects,* ed. Gordon H. Chang, 383-408. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Sears, David O. 1993. “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory.” In *Explorations in Political Psychology,* ed. Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, 113-149. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sears, David O., and Jack Citrin. 1985. *Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sears, David O., Hillary Haley, and P.J. Henry. 2008. “Cultural Diversity and Sociopolitical Attitudes at College Entry.” In *The Diversity Challenge: Social Identity and Intergroup Relations on the College Campus,* ed. Jim Sidanius, Shana Levin, Colette van Laar, and David O. Sears, 65-99. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Sears, David O., and P.J. Henry. 2005. “Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* vol. 37, ed. Mark P. Zanna, 98-150. New York: Academic Press.

Sears, David O., Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, eds. 2000. *Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sears, David O., and Nicholas A. Valentino. 1997. “Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization.” *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 45-65.

Segura, Gary M., and Ali A. Valenzuela. 2010, “Hope, Tropes, and Dopes: Hispanic and White Racial Animus in the 2008 Election.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40(3): 497-514.

Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2012. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sniderman, Paul M., and Thomas Piazza. 1993. *The Scar of Race.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sumner, William Graham. 1906. *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals.* Boston: Athenaeum Press.

Tajfel, Henri, ed. 1982. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Takaki, Ronald. 1993. *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America.* Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Tarman, Christopher, and David O. Sears. 2005. “The Conceptualization and Measurement of Symbolic Racism.” *Journal of Politics* 67(3): 731-761.

Tesler, Michael. 2012. “The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 690-704.

Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears. 2010. *Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of Post-Racial America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Uhlaner, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and Roderick D. Kiewiet. 1989. “Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s.” *Political Behavior* 11(3): 195-231.

Wong, Janelle, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn. 2011. *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Wyatt, Don J. 2009. *The Blacks of Premodern China.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

1. Matthew Tokeshi is an assistant professor of political science at Williams College, Schapiro Hall Room 238, 24 Hopkins Hall Drive, Williamstown, MA 01267, [mt13@williams.edu](mailto:mt13@williams.edu).

   I thank Jose Manuel Corichi Gomez for research assistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The other two statements in the racial resentment battery are, “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve,” and “It’s really a matter of not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” The five potential responses to each statement are strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Question wording for all items can be found in the Appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. All significance tests reported in this paper are two-tailed. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Models with racial resentment as the sole predictor are reported in Table 2 of the Appendix. The results do not substantively alter the main conclusions drawn from Table 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The 2014 question asks, “Would you vote to repeal the Affordable Care Act if you were in Congress today?” with answer choices of yes or no. The 2018 question asks, “Thinking now about health care policy, would you support of oppose each of the following proposals? Repeal the entire Affordable Care Act” with answer choices of support or oppose. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Models with racial resentment as the sole predictor are reported in Table 11 of the Appendix. The results do not substantively alter the main conclusions drawn from Table 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)