Version 3.2—3/19/16

When Presidents Talk About Human Rights: Exploring the Nature of and Influences upon Presidential Attention to International Human Rights Problems

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Paper developed for presentation at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego California, March 24-27, 2016.

Abstract: Despite the importance that many scholars attach to public "naming" and "shaming" of human rights violators, research on US human rights policy has not attempted to measure fluctuations in presidential discussion of human rights nor factors influencing presidential rhetorical attention. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting measures of public discussion of human rights by US presidents from the period of 1993 to 2014. Specifically, through content analysis of *The Public Papers of the Presidency,* we code for all direct, non-solicited pubic statements by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama to examine which states presidents direct their statements to, whether such statements are critical or positive in tone, and how much attention varies across presidents and countries. After presenting a portrait of presidential attention to human rights, we then explore four factors that influence the focus and level of attention: the severity of human rights abuses, media coverage of situations, the strength of US economic relationship and the level of US military assistance. Bivariate analysis of presidential human rights rhetoric shows that both severity and media coverage of human rights problems generate presidential attention, but also that presidents are more positive or, at least, neutral about human rights problems when countries have an extensive or important military and economic relationship with the US. To test these factors together, we then use pooled, cross-sectional analysis of 27 nations over 21 years. Our logistic and tobit analysis of all statements and just negative statements about human rights suggest that higher levels of human rights abuses and media attention do indeed increase the likelihood of presidential attention. However, only in the post 9/11 period, do economic and military factors influence attention, but in a surprising direction. We discuss the implications and future directions of this research and conclude by suggesting presidential attention can help offer a fuller picture of US foreign policy concern for human rights.

Note: This paper is currently in draft form and not for citation. Any comments would be welcomed.

Introduction:

Many scholars and activists consider the post September 11 period a difficult one for the promotion of human rights. While the reputation of the United States for promoting human rights declined during the Bush era (Donnelly, 2012; Mertus, 2008), President Obama has not inspired much praise for the level of concern he has directed towards human rights; at most, scholars seem offer faint praise for "muddling through" and for addressing a few issues that Bush ignored (Forsythe, 2011). Among Washingtonian pundits, such as columnists David Ignatius (Washington Post) and Roger Cohen (New York Times), there is some regret that Obama lacks the Wilsonian inspiration of President Bush that, for whatever problems and quagmires that vision led the US into, at least reflected a set of core concerns for democracy and bettering human rights abroad (e.g. Ignatius, 2013; Cohen, 2014). But the notion that Obama is less attentive to human rights in the role of America's chief diplomat assumes that actions are all that matter. Scholars of human rights, however, place a great deal of emphasis on the public naming and shaming of states and their leaders for violating internationally recognized human rights. The role of so-called "naming and shaming" may not be a powerful force against states with no incentive to cooperate, yet they would argue that the improvement of some situations, even the less dramatic, are important to global progress in promoting human rights.

Despite the importance of public discourse about human rights, research on US human rights policy has not attempted to measure fluctuations in presidential discussion of human rights nor factors influencing presidential rhetorical attention. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting measures of public discussion of human rights by US presidents from the period of 1993 to 2014. Specifically, through content analysis of *The Public Papers of the Presidency,* we code for all direct, non-solicited pubic statements by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama to

examine which states presidents direct their statements to, whether such statements are critical or positive in tone, and how much attention varies across presidents and countries.

After making the case that a systematic measure of attention is valuable, this paper presents a portrait of presidential attention to human rights across time and president. The paper then examines four factors that potentially influence the focus and level of attention: the severity of human rights abuses, media coverage of situations, the strength of US economic relationship and the level of US military assistance. Our bivariate analysis of presidential human rights rhetoric shows that both severity and media coverage of human rights problems generate presidential attention, but also that presidents are more positive or, at least, neutral about human rights problems when countries have an extensive or important military and economic relationship with the US. To test these factors together, we then use pooled, cross-sectional analysis of 27 nations over 21 years. Our logistic and tobit analysis of all statements and then of negative statements alone suggest that higher levels of human rights abuses and media attention do indeed increase the likelihood of presidential attention. However, only in the post 9/11 period, do economic and military factors influence attention, but in a surprising direction. We discuss the implications and future directions of this research and conclude by suggesting presidential attention can help offer a fuller picture of US foreign policy concern for human rights.

Presidential Rhetoric as Measure for US Human Rights Concern

There are multiple studies of the course of United States human rights policy (Sikkink, 2007; Harrelsen-Stephens & Calloway, 2009; Mertus, 2008), and these works focus on the range of US policies and actions taken in addressing human rights problems as one of many concerns. Yet judgements about presidential concern tend to be impressionistic and rarely situate the president in the larger policy making process (though, see Forsythe 2011 for one effort). We

contend that there are several reasons why studying presidential rhetorical attention to human rights can be a valuable contribution to our understanding of United States human rights policy over past decades. First, US presidents are uniquely poised to set not only the overall foreign policy agenda, but particularly the importance of human rights. Second, in the absence of strong multilateral institutions to alter a nation's human rights behavior, public discussion of human rights fills an important void of "naming" violators and potentially making an effort to "shame" them in changing behavior. Third, the analysis of presidential rhetoric provides a consistent and highly nuanced measure of human rights concern that avoids the constraints of previous scholarship on US restrictions on economic aid, military assistance or trade due to human rights concerns.

a. Presidents have unique Agenda-Setting power: Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of research on the power of the president's agenda setting ability in the domestic process (e.g, Edwards, 1983; Light, 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). This attention flows from the fact, as John Kingdon noted in his seminal study of the policy process, "no other actor in the political system has quite the capability as the president to set agendas in given policy areas for all who deal with those policies" (Kingdom 2003: 23). Moreover, the president's agenda-setting power and ability to specify alternatives is particularly strong in foreign policy-making, due to deference from other institutions, public uncertainty, and the president's constitutional role as foreign policy leader (Durant & Diehl, 1989; Peake 2001).

While the presidential agenda is, of course, shaped by major international events and crises, the degree of presidential discretion increases as salience decreases. Jeffrey Peake's (2001) study of presidential agenda-setting on both the media and Congress for foreign policy issues found that the president is able to significantly influence the agendas of both groups, although he acknowledged that the president's influence wasn't quite as strong as traditional

models of agenda-setting contend. Importantly, he found that the president is much more effective at agenda-setting when dealing with lower-salience issues like foreign aid and when a president is committed to focused speeches to shape elite views (Peake 2001, 83-84). This suggests that the president has a strong influence on the position of human rights issues on the agenda. In most cases, human rights are not only a lower priority to the public and other policy actors, but the very act of raising human rights is discretionary. An emphasis on human rights is almost never required, even if politically wise to cite; rather citing rights is but one interest among several to consider when discussing relations with other nations or commenting on particular situations.

In sum, scholarly work on both domestic and foreign policy process reinforces the view that the president has a very important influence over the agenda compared to other political actors. Because of the status of the president, his speeches are often highly covered by the media, which broadcasts them to the public in addition to other political actors. Because of this media attention, presidents can directly insert the issues they care about into the national dialogue, making presidential speeches a key tool for shaping the national agenda. The use of human rights rhetoric in these speeches therefore can have a significant impact on what portion of the political agenda is devoted to human rights topics, and is a clear indicator of the executive branch's own agenda. One need only consider the change in foreign policy orientation from the Nixon-Ford to Carter to see the president's power to add human rights to the agenda and reorient policy alternatives, even if the benefits of that human rights focus were debated (Muravchik, 1986).

b. Presidential Rhetoric as "Naming and Shaming": Another reason that presidential rhetoric is worthy of study lies with the importance of "naming and shaming" to promote human rights change. The political strategy of "naming and shaming, in which international actors publicize a country's human rights violations in order to shame them into changing their

practices, is central to many models of positive change of human rights (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Hafner-Burton, 2012; Murdie & Davis, 2012:1). Scholarly literature on the effectiveness of this technique is mixed (Hafner & Burton, 2012), and evidence of its utility in changing state behavior focuses particularly on the ability of nongovernmental networks within targeted nations to build upon public notoriety (Murdie & Davis) or in particular circumstances of ongoing atrocities (Krain, 2012; Murdie & Peksen, 2013). As a central international actor, the strategy of naming and shaming is certainly applicable to presidential rhetoric, and it would be reasonable to think shaming from a US president would carry more weight than a series of NGOs under circumstances where the US has influence.

Of course the policies and positions of the United States can serve to improve or harm human rights advocacy and US efforts to promote change must offer a consistent and unambiguous call for easing repression. In the context of Latin America, for example, authoritarian regimes during the 1970s and 1980s looked to the United States for support when faced with international condemnation for violating the rights of alleged "subversives" and leftist guerillas. Sikkink noted that when the US did send "mixed signals" of concern, regimes in Chile, Argentina and elsewhere felt they could continue their abusive policies; in contrast, when the US was consistent in its public and private criticism, those states generally improved their behavior (2007; see also Cardenas, 2010). Though presidential rhetoric would only be one "signal" among many from the US, it would be the most conspicuous and thus contribute to or undermine ongoing campaigns by transnational advocacy networks.

c. Rhetoric as a Nuanced Measure: With regards to US human rights policy, the concern about when the United States would take strong action led to a series of studies about the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the recipient country's human rights record. Beginning with Lars Schoultz's 1981 analysis of U.S. aid allocation from 1962-1977, which

concluded that the U.S. distributed more aid to Latin American countries with more repressive governments, scholars have analyzed and debated the extent to which human rights violations lead to either the termination or reduction in US foreign assistance, the imposition of trade and lending restrictions, or changes to US arms exports and sales (Schoultz 1981; Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1990; Poe et al, 1994; Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Blanton, 2000; Demeriel-Pegg & Moskowitz, 2009). This literature on the linkage between human rights and bilateral policies has generated a general consensus that human rights is a secondary concern of U.S. policymakers in the allocation of foreign aid, and that it is most impactful at the gate-keeping stage (Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz 2009, 185). The US does appear, especially since the mid-1980s, to be sensitive to severe human rights situations and, thus, states must "pass a threshold of acceptability" (Blanton, 2000) on human rights issues for the U.S. to be willing to offer aid sell them arms. However, after that point of "acceptance," human rights generally has no significant effect on levels of assistance and amount to a secondary concern compared to substantial security interests (Blanton 2000; Poe, et al, 1994).

As valuable as these studies are for understanding the "actions" surrounding U.S. human rights policies, the analysis of aid and arms sales are constrained in a two important ways. The allocation of foreign aid is a highly complex and bureaucratic process, with the responsibility ultimately requiring the cooperation of several congressional committees and Congress as a whole. On top of that, the foreign aid relationships of the United States reflect years of commitment. As a result, there is usually little change in foreign aid from year to year, and the best predictor of a country's foreign aid total is the aid it received a year before (Apodaca & Stohl 1999). Compared to presidential rhetoric, which allows the president to highlight human rights situations soon after they develop, foreign aid is not very reactive due to the significant bureaucratic hurdles necessary to make adjustments in response to human rights abuses. Without

question, a restrictive shift in foreign aid, trade or sales is a much stronger indicator of agenda attention and prominence to a particular human rights situation, and such restrictions, compared with presidential criticism, would likely have more significant consequences. But such opportunities for restrictions are rare. Indeed, the major constraint of the study of assistance, trade and arms exports is that the US has limited number of dyadic relationships. Indeed, many of the most egregious violators of rights do not receive US aid or were sanctioned at an earlier time and so the country is no longer on the decision agenda. Analyzing presidential rhetoric, however, can show the extent to which specific countries remain an ongoing concern of US foreign policy.

The analysis of presidential attention to country-specific human rights problems also allows for documenting instances where, despite very poor human rights records, a president is offering a more positive assessment of particular problems. Whereas virtually all congressional attention to human rights is critical of the regime party, the president's policy, or both, presidents have strong reasons to cite progress in human rights or to suggest situations that are less heinous than advocacy networks or other actors portray. For example, during the early 1980s, it was common for the Reagan Administration to claim that human rights catastrophes in Central America were not the fault of existing governments, but of communist or leftist insurgents who force the regime to defend itself (Sikkink, 2007). Any systematic study of aid restrictions is not able to capture these nuances; in fact, the imposition of a restriction may reflect that the president accepted an unwanted outcome after an intense confrontation between Congress and the White House.

In sum, in comparison to foreign aid allocation, trade or arms sales assistance, presidential rhetoric will demonstrate a range of responses to human rights concerns and can catch smaller shifts in the agenda. Due to the unfortunately large number of human rights abuses

around the world at one time and the secondary importance of human rights to the United States, a measure like rhetoric which captures smaller variation in human rights attention is very valuable. Relying on measures that only indicate larger shifts in the agenda and policy alternatives can cause researchers to miss signals of smaller concern or policy change that some human rights abuses would cause.

U.S. Human Rights Policy & Attention

Systematic studies of the pre-decision phases of US foreign policy are not common. Research on the presidential agenda may include foreign policy areas (e.g., Edwards & Woods, 1999), but only Wood and Peake (1998) and Peake (2000) have attempted to understand the forces that shape the president's foreign policy agenda. Shifting to U.S. attention to human rights, the lone study on rhetorical attention to human rights examined congressional floor speeches about human rights abuses abroad. Cutrone and Fordham (2010) examined the amount of speeches related to human rights from both the House and Senate from 1995-1998. Though finding no statistically significant predictors for human rights speeches in the Senate, they focused principally upon on short, "one-minute" speeches given on the floor of the US House. The authors concluded that the primary reason members brought up human rights concerns was to protect the economic interests of their constituents, as measured through imports and exports sensitivity of a representative's district. House lawmakers were also influenced to address human rights concerns by higher levels of cosmopolitanism within their districts. Notably, while members of Congress were significantly influenced by district-level factors, many members of Congress gave a significant amount of attention to human rights despite the absence of clear motivating factors. That is to say, some lawmakers acted because they had a personal concern or a country or were genuinely committed to human rights principles (Cutrone & Fordham 2010, 652-653).

Although the Cutrone & Fordham study's focus on congressional rhetoric is valuable, it does reflect only the years 1997-1998, in which China continued to dominate House human rights debates. Further, the congressional floor speeches analyzed were often perfunctory and rarely publicized. In sharp contrast, presidential statements, even when relatively brief, are far more likely to be heard foreign policy elites in the US and in targeted countries. Last, presidential rhetoric is more timely and consequential. For all these reasons, such rhetoric has a stronger ability to effect change to the human rights situations.

Causes of Presidential Attention.

To understand how human rights issues may become important enough to merit public comment by presidents, we turn to studies of agenda setting and to policy process in the foreign policy arena. While much of the agenda setting literature takes a "bottom-up" view of agenda setting (e.g., Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976), agenda setting in foreign policy revolves primarily around the perceptions and activities of people in government and organized interests; so the focus here is on the literature with a "top-down" orientation to policy development.

Scholars have pointed to several important features of foreign policy agenda setting process. The first is that crises are much more central to the way the foreign policy agenda is set. Scholars of domestic policy development treat crises as events which assist in getting a problem noticed and creating a policy response. In comparison, Durant and Diehl (1991:184-185) argue that crisis events, as well as foreign actors beyond the control of U.S. policy makers, make the agenda setting process in foreign policy unstable and subject to many more rapid policy changes than portrayed in John Kingdon's classic study of the domestic policy process (2003).

The frequency of international crises and the need for rapid responses are the primary justifications for the second important distinction, one noted earlier, that the president has greater discretion and control over the development of foreign policy. Durant and Diehl point to the

usual sources of presidential power in foreign policy: explicit Constitutional powers; an extensive bureaucracy to carry out overt and covert policies; recognition by other actors that only one leader, the president, should deal with foreign governments; the concomitant muted partisanship in areas of security policy (1991:185-189). In terms of agenda setting, presidential leadership over foreign policy means that the White House and his policy making staff have the predominant role in setting the foreign policy agenda. And, as noted earlier, the degree of discretion over the agenda is greater when events are less salient, giving the president a strong ability to set the agenda of other government actors and the media (Peake, 2001).

So what leads a president to publicly discuss human rights problems? We begin the fact that external events and political conditions are the foundation of the agenda. Presidents will feel the need to address human rights when conditions call for expressions of concern. Hence, our first hypothesis stems from the severity of human rights issues. A poor human rights record requires some response and very serious levels of government repression, especially when that violence poses problems for other US interests, is more likely to provoke critical comments from the president.

> H1: Presidents are more likely to discuss human rights issues of states that commit widespread and severe human rights abuses, and more likely to discuss the government's policies in a critical fashion.

Closely related to the severity of the human rights situation is the role of the media in publicizing events. Peake (2000) and Edwards and Woods (1999) emphasize that media coverage may force a president's hand, requiring her to respond at more critical moments. Hence, we contend the following:

> H2: Presidents are more likely to discuss human rights issues of states, and to discuss them in a negative way, when the human rights issues in those states have been reported in the press.

Given that US consideration of human rights must account for US economic and security interests, we anticipate that higher levels of US military and economic engagement with a country will tend to depress public discussion of human rights. Studies of US allocation of foreign economic and military assistance have demonstrated that important security relationships depress the probability of sanctions or aid restrictions; Apodaca and Stohl, for example, found that human rights had no overall effect on U.S. military aid during the period of 1976 to 1995t (1999, 194-195). The evidence for the impact of economic relationships is mixed. Numerous accounts of US-Chinese policy during the 1990s showed that the pressure to ignore repression, and the rapid end to post- Tiananmen Square sanctions, were due to the desire to expand economic ties with China (Cooper & Li, 2006; Donnelly, 2012). On the other hand, the US Congress is more likely to consider human rights when the US trade relationship with a nation creates pressures on domestic industries (Cuttrone & Forham, 2010). But for US presidents, the balance of pressure is to play down human rights concerns when important economic relationships are also at issue. Thus, we offer the following two hypotheses related to avoiding or downplaying human rights problems.

> H3: The greater the US security relationship with a country, (a) the less likely presidents are to discuss human rights issues, and, when discussed, (b) the less likely they are to discuss situations in a negative way.

> H4: The greater the US economic relationship with a country, (a) the less likely presidents are to discuss human rights issues, and, when discussed, (b) the less likely they are to discuss situations in a negative way.

As our data cross both the pre and post 9/11 period, we have the opportunity to explore whether the attacks of September 11 led Bush and Obama to downplay human rights in public in order to confront security concerns more directly. In practice, human rights watchers and scholars have noted that the US tolerated human rights problems among strategic partners in the war on

terrorism (Carothers, 200; Mertus, 2007). Given the heightened importance of security concerns after 9/11, we hypothesize that:

> H5: In the post 9/11 period, presidents will be significantly less likely to criticize human rights situations in countries where the US has a strong security relationship during the US war on terrorism.

Data & Method

Presidential rhetorical attention to human rights was measured by conducting a content-analysis of speeches available through *The Public Papers of the Presidents*.[1] The content analysis was carried out for a sample of all speeches given by Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama from 1993 to 2014. By capturing speeches between 1993 and 2014, there were a substantial amount of speeches captured from both the post-Cold War era and post-9/11 era, two potentially distinct phases of U.S. foreign policy.

The sample was created using search terms designed to encompass all likely ways a president would speak about issues of human rights, with the goal of capturing as many speeches as possible which contained human rights rhetoric. These speeches include direct addresses to audience, press conferences, speeches overseas and official statements by the White House. Documents categorized as "letter", "message", "proclamation", and "executive order" were excluded since they do not constitute live or personal presidential rhetoric, i.e., words spoken in person by the president or released by the White House in the form of the statement. From press conferences, we included only those references to human rights raised in the president's opening remarks, not those from question and answer sessions in which presidential mentions of human rights would be prompted by reporters or others.

[1] The Public Papers of the Presidents are held at the American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/), which also provides the search index used to identify statements.

We used the search terms "human rights", "democracy promotion", "religious freedom", "torture", "press freedom", "political freedom", "universal values", and "universal rights". Slight variations of these terms were used as well, such as "freedom of the press". Each speech that was found using these search terms was then read individually and coded. While this sample did not capture every single speech involving human rights from this time period, especially if the president did not use the terms used in our searches, it certainly captured the vast majority, enough to create a valid sample.

Beyond the dates and location for each public statement, we coded for following attributes: the type of speech given, the country(s) mentioned, the amount of the speech dedicated to human rights (coded as full, significant, or minor), the specific human right subject of speech, and the tone of the human rights mention (positive, negative, or neutral). [2] Together, these variables capture the key features of the speeches analyzed and create a picture of presidential human rights rhetoric, allowing for a test of our hypotheses. (See Appendix B for examples of the "tone" of human rights statements.)

The Dependent Variables: From this coding process, we created two categories of dependent variables. The first, employed in the part of the descriptive section that contrasts the presidents over time, uses the "speech" as the unit of analysis to create a general, longitudinal picture of presidential human rights attention that shows differences in both the overall amount of attention and the countries which received the most attention. The content analysis generated

[2] Our coding of the speeches is not complete at this time. First, we need to integrate seven references human rights problems found in State-of-the Union addresses—2 on China, 2 on Iraq, 1 on Iran, 1 on Myanmar & 1 on the Arab Spring. Second, future research shall include a measure of lines to track the "amount" of rhetoric. Using lines to complement statements in the future should provide a more precise measure of presidential attention, as the length of a statement can vary greatly from just a sentence to several paragraphs..

767 speeches which contained any kind of human rights statement about a country, a region, the global picture or the objectives and principles US policy itself.[3]

The second category focuses upon statements made about foreign states and is used to create our panel-data. Specifically, we generated two versions of statements about country--a dichotomous (0/1) variable for logistic analysis, as well the total number of statements for each country-year for regression analysis. We also created the same two variables for "negative" coded statements to isolate those statements aimed to criticize and shame nation states. To be included in the panel data of all statements, a country must have been discussed on at five separate occasions during the time span, leaving us with 27 states across the time span (n=596). For countries to be included in the "negative" statement version of the panel data, two instances of "negative" statements had to be made during the time frame—resulting in 18 states and 360 observations.

Importantly, China, Afghanistan and Iraq were not included in the two forms of panel data because they were significant outliers in the data. China and Iraq each received significantly more attention than any other country from 1993-2014, nearly double that of the third and fourth most discussed nations. In the case of China, the country faced its own annual legislative "process" on Permanent Normal Trade status in Congress that demanded some comments by presidents, while Iraq and Afghanistan each involved a large-scale presence of US military personnel during much of this time.[4]

[3] U.S. presidents mentioned the human rights policy and record of the United States 203 times between 1993 and 2014. Of those mentions, only 37 were negative in tone. Compared to presidents' 601 mentions of foreign countries, their attention to America's own actions demonstrates a significant role of presidential human rights rhetoric is to explain and justify America's own actions on human rights.

[4] We excluded Afghanistan, despite the modest number of statements (8), as the country was an outlier in US military assistance due to US military commitments.

Independent Variables: In order to explain fluctuations in the dependent variables within the panel datasets, several independent variables were constructed as well.

Human Rights Abuses: To measure the severity of human rights abuses, we use scores from The Political Terror Scales (PTS) of each country. PTS scores come from coding of annual reports by the State Department and Amnesty International, with scores ranging from 1 (no significant abuses) to 5 (widespread, systematic patterns of severe abuses) (see Gibney et al., 2015). In order to reduce any effect of bias from either report, the average of the two scores was taken as our measure of human rights abuses.[5]

Media: Media attention to a country's human rights was also coded for. A measure of media attention was created by conducting a content analysis of *New York Times* articles between 1993 and 2014. Using the *ProQuest Newspaper* database, all articles which mentioned the country of interest and "human rights" were read, and those which focused mainly on human rights issues in that country were recorded. Of course, presidential attention certainly has an influence on media coverage. So to have the correct temporal ordering between media coverage and statements, we count media articles of the subject country's human rights conditions for a period of six months before each mention in a year (and when statements were before July, we included articles from the previous year that fit the 6 month time frame). For years in which there were no mentions, the total number of related articles focused on the subject country was used as a measure of media attention.

Economic Relationship: Another potential influence on presidential speech about a foreign state is the economic relationship between that state and the United States. Economic ties to a country are a potential competing priority with human rights which could lead the president

[5] Amnesty International did not release PTS scores in 2014, so PTS scores created by Human Rights Watch were used instead of Amnesty scores during that year.

to give attention to a country or avoid addressing its abuses. To measure the strength of the economic relationship, the value of the total dollar amount of the subject country's import and export relationship with the U.S. was taken, using data from U.S. Census Bureau.

Military Assistance: The amount of military assistance the United States gives each country was used as a measure of how important the recipient country is to national security priorities. The United States gives the largest amount of aid to countries that are important to its national security concerns, like Israel, Egypt, Turkey, etc. The yearly statistics for military assistance were collected using the Foreign Aid Explorer tool on the USAID website. (As mentioned above, we excluded the largest recipients of aid, Iraq and Afghanistan, due to US involvement in their wars.)

Summary statistics for all of the variables can be found in Appendix A.

Method: Descriptive Statistics & Panel Data: After a presentation of presidential speeches over time, we test our five hypotheses by first examining bivariate relationships and then turn to pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis of the two sets of panel-data for our multivariate analysis. In each of the panels, we first use logistic regression for measure the impact on the dichotomous dependent variable of "any statement" or "any negative statement." To test for the number of statements and the number of "negative" statements directed at a country in a given year, we employ tobit regression analysis. Tobit regression is appropriate for when the data is censored on the upper or lower bounds. As our data has a large number of "0" statements for countries in each year (72.4% for the "all" statement panel and 77% in the negative statement panel), our data is heavily censored at the lower level.[6] Finally, to explore

[6] Zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) is an alternative technique for data with high levels of 0 values; analysis using ZINB produced results which were largely identical.

the post 9/11 period, we rerun the models for negative statements using only observations from 2002 to 2013.[7]

Results

Presidents Over Time: We begin our analysis by looking at the attention to human rights across the three presidents under consideration. Figure 1 (below) shows the number of speeches, public remarks or public statements given in each year which specifically discussed a human rights situation or US human rights goals and policy. Thus it captures the number of instances the president thought it was necessary to bring up human rights issues that pertain to a particular country, multiple countries, a region or the global situation, or which focus on elements of US human rights policy. As the figure demonstrates, the level of human rights statements by Clinton, W. Bush and Obama varies a good deal from year to year and that 1st term of Clinton administration displayed a marked difference in the number of human rights statements. Each bar also shows percent of the presidential remarks that were coded as positive, neutral or negative, and, as we discuss below, President Clinton's statements were distinctly less negative in his first few years.[8]

When presidents speak about human rights in a public speech or set of remarks, the focus of the speech often does not center upon human rights. Table 1 shows that when presidents address human rights concerns, it is usually in the form a short statement or comment, as few as 1-5 lines, rather than an extensive address. We coded a statement as "brief" if the discussion comprised less than one-quarter of a given speech or remarks, and over 80% could be labeled as

[7] Because US military assistance data to most countries was not available for 2014, we drop the Year 2014 from our bivariate and multivariate analyses.

[8] We coded only the human rights related remarks and did not code other parts of the speech may have included a series of other remarks about countries or US foreign policy.

"brief". However, in almost 20% of the speeches raising human rights, presidents devoted either a significant portion or the full address to human rights. In sum, while presidents only occasionally devoted all or most of their remarks to human rights issues and themes, there were several notable occasions—such as President Obama's speech on democracy and rights in Cairo, Egypt-- where human rights can be classified as quite substantial rhetorical efforts.



Table 1: Amount of Attention to Human Rights, by Speech/Remarks		
Amount Category	**# of Speeches**	**% of Speeches**
Full (about ¾ to all of speech)	55	7.2%
Significant (about ¼ to ½)	94	12.3%
Brief (less than ¼)	618	80.6%
Totals	N=767	100%

Table 2 presents further details on the frequency and "tone" of human rights statements of particular presidents and more clearly shows that recent presidents, not surprisingly, demonstrated a mix of positive, negative and neutral statements. Approximately 47% of all presidential statements were found to be negative and some 24% positive (i.e., suggesting that a

country's actions or its human rights situation was good or improving). Though this may appear to be highly critical, other actors like the US Congress or human rights NGOs tend to be far more consistently critical of human rights situations as both have less reason to couch their concerns in neutral or even complementary language.[9]

	Table 2: Human Rights Statements by Presidential Administration				
President/ Term	**# Statements**	**% Positive**	**% Negative**	**% Neutral**	**% of Total**
Clinton, 1st	74	10.2%	25.6%	60.2%	11.5%
Clinton, 2nd	125	55.5%	31.3%	13.2%	20.0%
Bush, 1st	119	18.5%	58.0%	24.5%	19.8%
Bush, 2nd	129	24.8%	55.0%	20.2%	21.5%
Obama, 1st	110	32.7%	60.0%	6.3%	18.3%
Obama, 2nd (2013-14)	54	38.9%	44.4%	16.7%	9.0%
All Presidents	N=601	24.1%	46.8%	29.1%	100%

From Table 2, we can also get a preliminary "test" of our fifth hypothesis about a change towards a greater emphasis on security during the 9/11 period by looking at the number and the percent of positive and negative mentions by each term of an administration. The Clinton administration discussed human rights far less frequently during his first term (74 times compared to 125 times in his second term), made less negative statements than later presidents (only 26% and 31%) and spoke in positive terms the majority of in his 2nd term (frequently invoking progress in China and elsewhere an). The pattern fits the reality that the 1993-2000 period saw a wave of democratization across Latin American and Easter Europe, as well as high optimism about economic opportunities in Asia. After 9/11, both Bush and Obama were more likely to be critical in their human rights comments than positive. However, the level of negative

[9] One of the basic pillars of NGOs is publicize human rights problems and inappropriate government policies (Haffner Burton & Peske, 2012). Though Congress may be unwilling to criticize a few select states like Israel, earlier research by one of the authors demonstrated that over 60% of congressional hearings from 1970 to 2008 were critical of US policies and foreign governments and sought to publicize particular human rights issues (Rose, 2011).

attention reflects, primarily, criticisms of countries considered hostile to the US (Iran, Syria, Sudan and North Korea, collectively 96% negative), while the level of negativity towards China decreased as its economic importance grew (at least until 2010). Moreover, there were very few mentions of human rights issues, and hardly a negative word, concerning traditional allies of the US like Egypt (only 3 up to 2011, though 8 after the 2012 revolution), Turkey (3, all neutral), Saudi Arabia (3, all positive), Israel (1, neutral) and Pakistan (0).

To see which nations were the principal focus of these presidents, we listed the ten most discussed countries in Table 3 (below). First, it is clear that two nations stand out in the speeches of presidents: China and Iraq. Combined they accounted for 30% of all human rights statement made, but while China was mentioned in 20 out of the 22 years studied, all but one statement (79 out of 80) about Iraq occurred during the Bush Administration. (An interesting difference between President Obama and his two predecessors, is that he did not focus on a single country, while China and Iraq were, respectively, 33% of the human rights statements by Presidents Clinton and Bush.)

Second, we again see a difference between nations where the US has economic and security interests involved. China, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Russia are countries that the US tried to improve, or at least maintain, relations with through most years under study, and our coding shows that 30% or less of the statements about those states were negative.[10] In contrast, presidents spoke far more critically about human rights problems in nations of Iran, Iraq (2002-2003), Cuba, Syria and Sudan that posed challenges to the US. Last, we note that, at this point, the level of human rights violations (average PTS score over the time frame) does not seem to

[10] We note that 59% of their total mentions toward China were neutral, which was only comparable to the 58% of neutral mentions Russia received. The number of statements reflected an effort to bring up human rights problems, but presidents were largely reluctant to directly attack China or Russia over its human rights problems. As both countries are influential, and it's reasonable to assume presidents will opt for remarks that are neutral.

explain why these states made the "top ten." Vietnam and Cuba have only moderately poor human rights problems (average score below 3), while Colombia, which had the highest percent of positive statements, committed very high levels of violations in the context of their civil and anti-narcotic wars.

Table 3: Ten Frequently Mentioned Countries

Country	# of Statements	% Negative Tone	% Positive Tone	Avg PTS Score	Years Mentioned	% of Total Mentions
China^	99	30%	11%	3.89	20	16.5%
Iraq^^	80	51%	26%	4.82	8	13.3%
Myanmar	44	70%	20%	4.34	18	7.3%
Cuba	41	73%	11%	2.93	17	6.8%
Iran	25	100%	0%	3.72	10	4.2%
Syria	24	100%	0%	3.59	8	4.0%
Sudan	19	95%	0%	4.86	9	3.2%
Russia	19	16%	26%	3.98	14	3.2%
Colombia	15	7%	47%	4.59	9	2.5%
Vietnam	15	20%	40%	2.55	8	2.5%

^Obama has been consistently critical of China (92%). ^^Only one statement about Iraq prior to 2002; Bush was critical of Iraq in all 16 public statements in 2002; 65% negative in 2003 & negative only 1 time from 2004-2008. (Obama has not discussed Iraqi government's human rights situation or policy)

Multivariate Analysis: Security, Economic, Violations & Media: We turn now to our panel data to understand what factors lead presidents to make human rights statements about other countries. (We note again that in the multivariate analysis, the unit of analysis has shifted away from the "speech" to "country-year".) A look at the bivariate correlations among the variables in Table 4 provide initial, if tentative, support to our hypotheses about human rights severity, media coverage, economic relationship and security assistance. The level of abuses and media coverage are significantly correlated with more Statements and Negative statements, while Exports-Imports and Military Assistance show significant negative associations. Finally, the

level of trade is associate positive presidential rhetoric, while military assistance has no impact on positive statements.

Table 4: Correlations of Statement Type & Independent Variables (27 Countries, 1993-2014)								
Note: * p <.05 or less	**Statements**	**Negative**	**Neutral**	**Positive**	**HR Abuses**	**Media**	**Military**	**Trade**
All Statements	1							
Negative Statements	0.7938*	1						
Neutral Statements	0.4605*	0.1057*	1					
Positive Statements	0.4471*	-0.0463	0.0484	1				
Human Rights Abuses	0.2509*	0.2451*	0.0671	0.0876*	1			
Media (t-6mos)	0.3863*	0.4676*	0.0585	0.0054	0.2826*	1		
Military Assistance	-0.1309*	-0.2051*	0.0569	0.0319	-0.0985*	-0.0287	1	
Trade	-0.1114*	-0.1871*	-0.009	0.0825*	-0.0257	0.0266	0.5812*	1

To explore whether these relationships remain significant under multivariate analyses, we conducted logit and tobit analysis on two versions panel data. Tables 5 through 7 capture the relative influence of security assistance, level of trade relationship, human rights violations and media coverage on two forms of the dependent variable--the dichotomous variable for presidents making any statement about a country in a given year, and a continuous measure of the number of times president made remarks about country in a given year.

In Table 5 (below), the overall models for both the "threshold" of any human rights statement and for the number of statements per year are statistically significant and explain a modest amount of the total variation in presidential statements about other nations.[11] And in both models hypotheses 1 is supported. Higher levels of human rights abuses are associated with being mentioned ($p<.05$) and the number of statements ($p<.01$). Hypothesis 2, on the role of

[11] For the logit model in Table 4, the pseudo R2 is difficult to interpret. However, using Stata's fitstat command, we can interpret the adjusted count R2 as showing that model improves the correct classification of cases, over merely selecting the modal value of 0, by 31%. The same statistic is provided in Tables 5 & 6.

media attention, is partially supported. Media coverage in the months prior to presidential statements is strongly associated with the number of statements (p<.001), but not with whether a president mentions a country. However, neither hypothesis 3 nor 4, which predicted that stronger military and economic relationships would discourage presidential attention, was supported. The variables for total exports and imports and for the level of military assistance do not diminish the chances of attention (and in fact, the coefficient for military assistance points in the opposite direction).

Table 5: Logit & Tobit Models: Human Rights Statements (1993-2013)

	Logit: Any Statement /Year		**Tobit: Number of Statements /Year**	
Independent Variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Human Rights Abuses (avg score)	.607	.256*	1.120	.406**
Military Assistance (log)	.005	.050	.091	.088
Imports/Exports (log, t-1yr)	-.232	.162	-.200	.163
Media (6 mons prior)	.030	.028	.083	.021***
Constant	-2.002	(1.45)	-6.281	(1.30)***
N	562		551	
Pseudo R^2	.246		.155	
Adjusted Count R^2(Any Statement)	.309			
Log pseudolikelihood	-250.927		-497.665	
LR Chi Square (*d.f.*)	169.43 (23)***		194.01^ (51)***	

** p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, + p < .10 (trend); Year 2014 not included due to unavailability of military assistance data. Robust standard errors. Fixed effects models, for year & country. Panel Data for 28 nations. ^ for model without robust errors & cluster tests for country.*

Given that our dependent variable includes positive, neutral and negative public comments, it may be that weakness of the trade and military assistance variables in both models reflect the mixed messages being sent. It is appropriate to consider only "negative" statements by presidents, as such remarks, in theory, reflect more of an effort by the US to "shame" and not just the "name" the offending country. So, the models in Table 6 restrict the two dependent variables to just negative statements. Since the three presidents never directed any negative

remarks to ten countries that were in the previous panel of data, those countries have been removed along with any observations for 1994 (in which Clinton made no public negative comments). This omissions reduce our sample size considerably (n=367).

The logit and tobit models for negative statements, again, are significant and do explain a higher amount of the variation in presidential statements than before (with a pseudo R^2 of .36 and .26). As in the larger panel analysis, the results again support hypothesis 1 and 2. Media coverage remains highly significant ($p<.001$) for the number of statements made and is positively associated ($p<.10$) with making any statement. And the influence of average human rights scores remains significant in both models ($p<.10$ or $p<.01$). But contrary to our expectations, the size of a country's trade and military assistance relationship does not lead presidents to avoid negative statements; hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 remain unsupported.

Table 6: Logit & Tobit Models: Negative Human Rights Statements (1993-2013)

	Logit: Any Statement/Year		**Tobit: Number of Statements/Year**	
Independent Variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Human Rights Abuses (avg score)	0.770	.398+	1.62	.547**
Military Assistance (log)	0.038	.078	.181	.102
Imports/Exports (log, t-1yr)	-0.167	.172	-.191	.173
Media (6 mons prior)	.082	.046+	.077	.024***
Constant	-3.780	(.810)***	-6.281	(1.30)***
N	347		347	
Pseudo R^2 (Any Statement)	.363		.262	
Adjusted Count (Any Statement)	.418			
Log pseudolikelihood	-183.518		-241.478	
LR Chi Square (*d.f.*)	133.20 (16)***		181.49^ (39)***	

** p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, + p < .10 (trend); Year 1994 dropped, no observations. Robust standard errors. Fixed effects models, for year & country. Panel Data for 18 nations. ^Cluster and robust tests removed.*

The fifth hypothesis proposed is that the post-9/11 period would show a greater reluctance to raise human rights due to security concerns. We can test this proposition by

restricting our analysis of negative statements to the years 2002-2013 and, with that, we expect to find that military assistance significantly decreases the chances of a negative statement and the number of negative statements. In this period, three countries (Haiti, Indonesia and Serbia) faced no negative comments and thus our sample size decreases further to 180 (15 countries over 12 years). Both models in Table 7 (below), however, remain significant and they account for strong amount of the variations, especially in the logistic model of any negative statement (adjusted count R^2 is .50.) The results for our variables are quite surprising. Military assistance is now significant ($p<.01$ in both models), but in a positive direction, meaning that Bush and Obama were more likely to criticize the human rights situation of nations that receive greater assistance. Further, the variable for trade now is associated with a lower probability of presidents making any statement toward a country and with making fewer negative statements ($p<.01$). Greater media coverage remains associated with more critical comments, but the level of abuses is not a significant factor on critical comments.

Table 7: Logit & Tobit Models: Negative Human Rights Statements (2002-2013)

	Logit: Any Negative Statement		**Tobit: Number of Negative Statements**	
Independent Variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Human Rights Abuses (avg score)	-.519	1.019	1.03	.955
Military Assistance (log)	0.372	.145**	.324	.109**
Imports/Exports (log, t-1yr)	-0.639	.261**	-.191	-.556**
Media (6 mons prior)	.123	.068+	.077	.024**
Constant	-3.051	(2.96)	-1.044	(3.26)
N	180		180	
Pseudo R^2 (Any Statement)	.425		.265	
Adjusted Count R^2 (Any Statement)	.500			
Log pseudolikelihood	-65.063		-163.607	
LR Chi Square (*d.f.*)	96.145 (13)***		117.68^ (29)***	

** p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, + p < .10 (trend); Robust standard errors. Fixed effects models, for year & country. Panel Data for 13 nations. ^Cluster and robust tests removed to produce Chi2 statistic.*

The positive association of security assistance is difficult to explain, and we note that an analysis of only Bush from 2002-2008 does not alter the outcome.

Discussion

In this paper, we have introduced a different way to assess the presence of human rights on the US foreign policy agenda by measuring presidential public rhetoric, which we call "attention," and then tested several factors to explore what factors influence whether US presidents will discuss country-specific human rights situations. The inspiration for systematically coding the public statements of presidents comes from the literature on agenda setting in the US policy process, where longitudinal measures of the government's agenda are common and powerful. But unlike many agenda setting studies that look at cases of high profile action, our measure of human rights statements not only includes highly salient cases—China in the 1990s, Iraq in the 2002-2004 period—and mid-level cases like Sudan and Cuba, but also lower-level problems like Vietnam and Haiti. This range of countries, we believe, better captures the breadth of US attention to human rights than traditional studies of restrictions on aid, trade or arms sales.

The results of our models for all presidential statements and of negative (i.e., "critical") statements reveal the influence of outside forces on presidents. States with higher levels of violations are more likely to face public comment, and the media moves issues "up" in salience by requiring presidents to speak more often about situations. However, in contrast to studies on foreign aid and trade restrictions (Apodaca & Stohl, 2000; Demirel-Pegg & Moskowitz, 2009), the strength of US economic and military relationships with a country do not impact whether a president makes public comments across the twenty plus years analyzed. However, in the post 9/11 years, we do see that larger trade relationship discourages human rights, possibly reflecting

that several countries in panel data that are popular targets for criticism already faced trade restrictions (Cuba, Sudan, Myanmar). But we also found that security assistance may bring more attention to human rights; does this mean that presidents feel some pressure to comment on states where the US is "investing" its security dollars? From our data, we cannot discern the cause of this "effect". The role of outside events, level of a country's abuses and media coverage of them, do fit well with Peake's (2000) analysis of the president's foreign agenda, as well as of the foreign policy process (Durant & Diehl, 1989), in which the pressure of outside events requires some level of agenda attention. Overall, the range of countries discussed by presidents in our data tracks well with descriptive understandings of particular US human rights concerns (Donnelly, 2012); in other words, the countries which presidents devoted the most attention reflected nations in which the US had strong reasons for concern or felt compelled to "defend" in order to improve economic ties (China, Vietnam). As such, we believe this measure of human rights attention has utility for scholars seeking a broad view of US human rights concerns.

The models presented here are the initial tests on agenda influences and are underspecified in a couple of potentially important ways. First, given the centrality of NGO networks to research on "naming and shaming," future tests of influences on presidential rhetoric should include the strength of NGOs in particular countries and their connection to US-based human rights NGOs. Incorporating NGOs should also integrate existing data on the dissemination of reports and news releases by prominent NGOs, particularly Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, following the work of (Murdie & Davis, 2012). Moreover, studies by Peake (2000) and (Peake & Wood, 1999) have noted the importance of Congress to influence the president's foreign policy agenda and scholars have long recognized the importance of the US House and Senate in raising human rights issues (Forsythe, 1989; Sikkink, 2007; Cuttrone & Fordham, 2010). Thus, a future iteration of this research will

incorporate measures of congressional bills and hearings as evidence of congressional efforts to influence the agenda. We also must note that the U.S. itself is the "elephant in the room" that our measure has difficulty capturing. Any accusation of US violations target a US president directly, and thus presidents have a strong incentive to avoid discussing violations committed in the US or by US personnel overseas. Such an analysis is worth pursuing separately since the nature of domestic and international pressure are quite distinct from US public rhetoric about other states. Finally, we can expand our data on presidential attention in several ways. It would be valuable to go further back in time to facilitate a comparison of pre and post-Cold War presidential attention. But just as any examination of Congress' agenda must go beyond floor speeches to other actions like hearings and bills, it also will be necessary to add other indicators of presidential concern, particularly executive orders, executive agreements and signing statements. (A preliminary look at these unilateral tools, however, suggests presidents use them sparingly and hence they are not, by themselves, accurate measures of executive branch concern.)

Ultimately, human rights scholars will want to know if "naming and shaming" by a US president has any impact. Thus, a logical next step is to move the measure of attention to the other side of the equation and to assess if presidential rhetoric has any influence upon the regimes targeted. Such an analysis would incorporate both the rhetoric and actions taken by the United States as the combination of words and action are likely to have a greater impact.

Conclusion

Human rights scholars have lamented the relative decline of human rights as a foreign policy priority during the Obama years. However from the standpoint of public attention to human rights, the data on presidential rhetoric does not suggest a decline of interest. Indeed, if anything, President Obama has spoken to a wider focus of human rights concerns and has been

less “obsessed” with any particular country. It may be that the current President is less likely to take forceful action to deal with human rights problems, particularly in terms of intervening with US military forces. But one value in looking at a more systematic measure of human rights attention is that it suggests that a lack of forceful action does not mean neglect. Obama has been no less eager to name and criticize nations with terrible human rights records than the past two presidents. Moreover, to the extent that Obama’s view on the limits of sanctions and force for humanitarian purposes become the standard US position in the future, the presidential use of “words” becomes more meaningful to examine.

Appendix A: Table of Summary Statistics					
Variables	**Mean**	**Std Dev**	**Med.**	**Min**	**Max**
Dependent Variables (Continous)					
All Statements *(n=562)*	0.57	1.32	0	0	12
Negative Statements *(n=347)*	0.32	1.03	0	0	10
Dependent Categorical Variables	***% Mode (0)***				
Any Statements *(n=562)*	72.9			0	1
Any Negative Statements *(n=347)*	77.9			0	1
Independent Variables					
Log Military Assistance (log)*	5.63	4.73	6	0	16.1
Log Trade Relationship (t-1, log)*	6.61	2.97	6.46	0	13.3
PTS Scores	3.38	0.92	3.5	1	5
Media Attention	2.75	5.55	1	0	82
*Notes: * Negative log values recoded to 0 or absolute value.*					

Appendix B: Examples of "tone" from Human Rights Statements

Examples of Positive Mentions

- "Chile is the window through which we see the Americas of tomorrow, a multiparty democracy, a firm commitment to human rights, proven economic reform."- President Clinton, "The President's New Conference with President Eduardo Frei of Chile". February 26, 1997.
- "Our partnership with Timor-Leste is fundamental and enduring. It is based on shared values of democracy, freedom, and human rights. The United States remains steadfast in its support of Timor-Leste's efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and consolidate peace and security in the country". - President Obama, "Statement on the Presidential Election in Timor-Leste". April 23, 2012.

Examples of Negative Mentions

- "Today—today I say this to Mr. Castro: If you are confident your ideas are right, then stop jamming the broadcasts of those whose ideas are different. And until you do, we will look for ways to use new technology from new locations to counter your silencing of the voices of liberty." – President Bush, "Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independent Day". May 18, 2001.
- "But when peaceful democratic movements are suppressed--as they have been in Burma, for example--then the democracies of the world cannot remain silent. For it is unacceptable to gun down peaceful protestors and incarcerate political prisoners, decade after decade."- President Obama, "Remarks to the Indian Parliament in New Delhi". November 8, 2010.

Examples of Neutral Mentions

- "I will reaffirm America's commitment to shed light on the dark events of the past, so that they are never repeated, and to help you implement the peace accords in a way that ensures that the human rights of the Guatemalan people are always respected."- President Clinton, "Remarks on Arrival in Guatemala City, Guatemala". March 9, 1999.
- "And finally, I had a chance to share once again with the President my belief in religious freedom and religious liberty". – President Bush, "Remarks Following a Meeting with President Hu Jintao of China in Sydney". September 6, 2008.

Appendix C: Negative Attention to the Worst Abusers, 1993-2014 & by President								
Country	**Avg PTS Score (all years)**	**Total: Statements**	**PTS Avg 1993-2000**	**Clinton**	**PTS Avg 2001-2008**	**Bush**	**PTS Avg 2008-2014**	**Obama**
Sudan	4.95	18	4.75	0	4.94	15	5.00	3
Afghanistan	4.82	2	4.88	2	4.75	0	4.67	0
DR of Congo	4.82	0	4.75	0	4.81	0	4.92	0
Iraq	4.77	50		1	4.88	49	4.50	0
North Korea	4.67	9	---	0		7	4.29	2
Burundi	4.45	0	4.94	0	4.38	0		0
Colombia	4.41	0	4.95	0	4.69	0		0
Myanmar	4.36	31	4.56	7	4.13	14	4.33	10
Pakistan	4.23	0	---	0	---	0	4.83	0
Somalia	4.23	0	---	0	4.25	0	4.67	0
Others (Top 10 Worst by President)								
Algeria	---	---	4.88	0	---	---	---	---
Angola	---	---	4.69	0				
Eritrea	---	---	---	---	---	---	4.25	0
Israel & Terr.	---	---	---	---	4.44	0	---	---
Russia	---	---	---	---	4.00	2	---	---
Rwanda	---	---	4.69	10	---	---	---	---
Sierra Leone	---	---	4.63	2	---	---	---	---
Syria	---	---	---	---	---	---	4.67	18
Sri Lanka	---	---	---	---	---	---	4.25	0

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