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Situating Space Between the Social and the Political:

The Space of Judith Butler’s ‘Performativity’ in Context

“…we should remember that it is the ‘inter’ – the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the *in between* space – that carries the burden of the meaning of culture. It makes it possible to begin envisaging national, anti-nationalist histories of the ‘people’. And by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerges as the others of ourselves.”[[1]](#footnote-1)

Introduction:

 The conceptualizations of space and time that hold together the basic units of any theory are often take for granted. At minimum such mistakes result in limited understanding of the political possibilities of different spaces; at most, and more commonly, they completely erase marginal spaces and actions within them. In this paper I am interested in the possibilities of political praxis within overlooked spaces, such as everyday practices in spaces such as walks home, parks, bars, stores, bars, etc.. To investigate these practices, I apply Doreen Massey’s theory of space to Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, assessing space and time in Butler’s argument to show the distinctive nature of precarious politics within the social sphere. However, an understanding of practice theory at large is necessary to move into this inquiry. I therefore begin by introducing the foundations of practice theory, a transdisciplinary field that looks to the social, affective, and political importance of everyday practices in co-constituting subjects and their relations to the world around them. Specifically, I look at the conversation between Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau, mapping out the similarities and differences between their understanding of practice. Moving from this debate, the theory of practice is left incomplete in undertheorizing practice accessible to the marginalized. I turn to position Butler within practice theory and elaborate on how they highlight the precarious in the everyday.[[2]](#footnote-2) In the final part I put Butler in conversation with Massey to pull out the essential spatial components of Butler’s theory. I conclude with the larger implications of recognizing a space between the political and the social; one of the most important being increased understanding of precarious political practices.

 What is at stake in this paper is the political openness of the future, being able to move forward without a structured utopia to aim for. While ideal or utopian politics can give hope they can also constrain practices of resistance. Practices of resistance are often not subsumed under typical notions of politics. If those who are enacting resistant practice are in a highly precarious position (due to a myriad of things such as economic position, gender, race, sexuality, etc.) there is an increased constraint on action. This is primarily due to traditional political practices being a mode of relationality imbricated in power and for the powerful. In my own research I have found myself turning to the social and cultural for models and examples of resistance. There is a greater possibility for precarious individuals to politically engage in these spaces due to the relatively less defined or rigid borders. I am not arguing that all that is social is political or resistant. I am also not arguing all who are precarious exist in a way that all their practices are political. I am arguing in this paper that the space between the social and political, a third space of sorts, is a space of radical potential.

 Political theory’s struggle around the conceptualization of time and space is part of a larger problem, the problem of binaries and dualisms. Common binaries, or dichotomies, that are utilized within political theory beyond time/space are material/ideational, agent/structure, object/subject, private/public, mind/body, male/female, thesis/antithesis, et cetera. When investigating the proliferation of binaries and the boundaries that structure them within political theory, the investigation is endless. While this paper is focused in on the specific concerns around spatialization, other binaries are rooted in the same logic and therefore implicated in the argument at play. Making distinctions, even dualistic distinctions, is useful for assessing our peers, practices and spaces, however, rigid understandings of distinctions do more harm than good in the study of the politics of today. As political theory developed from the mid 20th century into the 21st century it became clear that these binaries failed to address lived reality, and never really had addressed lived reality. Various branches of social and human theory shifted to questioning structural binaries, particularly branches of scholarship within the post-structural movement. In this paper I focus on practice theory which seeks to explain the relationship between agents and structures in more dynamic and fluid ways. Practice theorists recognize relationality is not simply between individuals — but between individuals, ideas, the material world, and space. This demands a dissolution of the agent-structure binary. It also starts to dissolve the boundaries within previously taken for granted binaries, leaving practice theory to be a particularly fruitful field for assessing political practices that are not captured by previous political theory scholarship.

As mentioned before practice theory is a transdisciplinary field, in which a diverse collection of scholars can be considered a part of. Some of the scholars that can be considered part of this community include Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau, Jacques Derrida, Saidiya Hartman, and Stuart Hall.[[3]](#footnote-3) This paper centers Judith Butler’s theory of practice, performativity. Like the other theorists named above Butler challenges the previous structure of political theory and the dualisms that strengthen this structure. Butler is centered because their understanding of performativity is a practice theory that centers the precarious. Explicating the spatial components of Butler’s theory opens space to understand both the impact of practices on precarious individuals and the possibility of precarious practices. To be able to explicate the spatial I turn to Massey’s framework of space. She moves beyond the structural emphasis on space over time while also anchoring the post-structural spatial chaos; Massey holds the tension between these two different poles expanding what can be recognized. Massey’s framework calls attention to the third space in Butler’s theory, a space between the social and the political in our society.

 Once a third space between the social and the political is accessible, scholars can turn to acknowledge and address political practice that occurs here. Spatializing practice in a third space avoids fetishizing precarious practices by recognizing a spectrum of practices, from those reinforcing dominant structures to innocuous practices to insurgent practices. Increasing the awareness of different practices will not only foster the potential for radical politics but also defend them from the encroachment and cooption by neoliberal political systems. Hannah Arendt found the social, a realm that rose out of the distinction between the private and the public, concerning as the social space was where Arendt found the birth and rise of fascism.[[4]](#footnote-4) Walter Benjamin found the social to have radical potential for Marxist politics and practices, particularly within culture.[[5]](#footnote-5) The spatial assessment of Butler’s theory of practice allows both scholars to be correct, as the third space is a more intentional but more open conception of social politics where the precarious individuals can utilize culture for a more equitable world and fight against the increased disparity and desperation in our 21st century reality.

Pt. 1: Practice Theory – transdisciplinary relational theory

Practice theory’s transdisciplinary focus is helpful, if not necessary, to access politics as it draws out the fact politics are not easily bounded. This may be due to the fact that practice as an object of analysis, gets to the constituted nature and relations between agents and structures, bridging the immaterial and material aspects of social relations. It is apparent that a field focused on interstitial actions and practice would have to reach across fields or even beyond fields. David McCourt describes practice theory as “less a single theory than broad set of approaches brought into IR from philosophy and social theory that display certain family resemblances.”[[6]](#footnote-6) While McCourt is speaking to International Relations scholarship, his definition of practice theory is shared among others. However, it suffers from a narrow understanding of what makes up a theory and/or field of study. Theory can be understood as an analysis or reflection on the conditions under which humanity has come to exist and continues to exist. More narrowly, as understood within the critical tradition, it addresses a specific condition of humanity with the aim to further emancipate those within that condition.[[7]](#footnote-7) Practice theory indeed has all these qualities. Practice theorists focus on the condition of everyday practices; the ways in which the practical, habitual, and embodied matter for the construction of a subject and its relations with other subjects and the material world. Why some scholars may hesitate to call it a field, such as McCourt, may be due to the broad range of methodological praxis. Individual scholars within practice theory look to a wide range of material from: surveys (Pierre Bourdieu), to historical accounts (Saidiya Hartman), to visual assessment (Stuart Hall), to hermeneutics (Jacques Derrida), among much more. This produces a challenge to find cohesion within the methods and questions of practice theory. However, cohesion appears in the shared assumption of these scholars: in the face of a complex reality, complex structures, and complex agents, the space and practice of the everyday matters.

Pierre Bourdieu, the founder of practice theory, helped to address the tension between agency and structured reality. His work on embodied everyday practice helped scholars theorize the constitution of social structures and individuals simultaneously. Bourdieu, first and foremost, understood the importance of the fields and spaces that individuals live within. These fields include economic, social, and political, which are overlapped and entangled, shifting, and influencing each other. In his well-known work *Distinction* Bourdieu assessed the way in which the field of economics influences the fields of politics and culture and vice versa. Bourdieu described fields as an objectified history or structure, objectified meaning here all the possibilities and impossibilities of a specific thing. These objective histories and structures are the regularities of the individuals in a specific field that are formed through a long, slow process of consensus building.[[8]](#footnote-8) Bourdieu illustrates this by way of games, in which, there is a slow accumulation of seemingly arbitrary rules. Within games there is an active acknowledgment of the arbitrary nature of the field in which the players choose to come together in. [[9]](#footnote-9) Most individuals within political or social fields are not consciously aware of the fields they are within and the arbitrary aspects of these fields. A specific example of fields is the Korean death game show “Squid Games” where the master of the game explicitly draws a parallel between the games that the players play (and collectively consent to the rules of), and their outside lived reality of living with a capitalist system.[[10]](#footnote-10) Part of the logic of the squid games is to “even the playing field” contra reality of a capitalist system, where each individual is at the intersection of various fields that create inequities within the larger shared field of “society” whether local or global.

Bourdieu clearly questioned the assumptions of structural theory, while also laying out the foundations of practice theory. He pulled together the field and the agents within the field complicating the relationship between them. Bourdieu argued that the embodiment of the rules/demands, material world, and space of fields in the agent is what solidifies and defines the structures. [[11]](#footnote-11) Bourdieu pulls all these aspects together in his concept habitus, which is the embodied social structure of any one individual, which is primarily made up of two different components, *doxa* and bodily *hexis*.[[12]](#footnote-12) The *doxa* is the perceptions and beliefs about the world that any one individual takes for granted.[[13]](#footnote-13) One example Bourdieu looked at was the political practices of individuals of different classes in France. He found the specific class (defined by an individual’s overall amount of capital, which is made up of cultural and economic capital) correlated to specific political practices, such as voting either left or right.[[14]](#footnote-14) The bodily *hexis* is the way that the doxa and other external components of a social structure are physically embodied in an individual. Bourdieu describes the bodily *hexis* as “political mythology realized… turned into a permanent disposition…”[[15]](#footnote-15) Individuals and their physical disposition are constituted through the embodiment of the field and practices of the field. When considering this all together we have a basic understanding of the habitus. Bourdieu himself summarizes habitus as, “an objective relationship between two objectives, enables an intelligible and necessary relation to be established between practices and a situation, the meaning of which is produced by the habitus through categories of perception and appreciation that are themselves produced by an observable social condition.”[[16]](#footnote-16) The perception of possibilities and impossibilities for any one individual is based on their everyday practices and dispositions which is structured by the fields they live in. Bourdieu is not arguing that all individuals do a mental assessment of this. He argues the opposite is true. Individuals go about their daily lives, performing their daily practices, and embodying their personal histories and fields without much conscious thought about it.

Part of what is profound about the habitus is the way in which it allows an understanding of the co-constitution of structure and agent. Individuals are constituted and exist within their habitus unknowingly; but the individuals also constitute the structure for Bourdieu by upkeeping it and transforming it through everyday practice. As Bourdieu put it, “the habitus is not only a structuring structure, but also a structured structure.”[[17]](#footnote-17) Some scholars have criticized Bourdieu for maintaining the dualism between structure and agent, therefore leaving the agent agentless and in an unending cycle. However, as Anthony King points out, Bourdieu does address this concern through two different registers, both rooted in his conception of practice. The first, while everyone is constructed by the fields they are within, individuals may choose to renegotiate the fields through their daily practices. Examples of this would be changing from taking your own car to work every day to taking public transportation; or, instead of consuming news from newspapers and newscasts turning to social media such as tik tok or twitter. These small shifts start to shift the habitus.[[18]](#footnote-18) The criticism above could counter that Bourdieu is reifying the structure-agent system as his assessment of the habitus seems to require an “outside of structure” viewpoint. Bourdieu disagrees, arguing while most individuals are unaware of their habitus, when one person encounters another person both people’s habitus are called into question. It is not an external perspective for Bourdieu that allows individuals to become minimally aware of their habitus but relationality, as relationality shows the arbitrariness of our everyday lives.

A point of tension in Bourdieu’s theory of practice and resistance is his conceptualization of those he calls dominated.[[19]](#footnote-19) All people live within some assortment of fields, abiding by the rules and expectations of these fields. All people influence the fields they are in, a part of the constitution of the structure; however, Bourdieu argues those with the most amount of capital layout the rules for the rest of the people in the structure. While he recognizes individuals in lower stratum can politically mobilize and use their everyday practice to challenge the greater social structure, he finds this to be limited. He argues that “the effects of political mobilization itself do not easily counterbalance the effects of the inevitable dependence of self-esteem on occupational status and income, signs of social value previously legitimated by actions of the educational market.”[[20]](#footnote-20) What Bourdieu is recognizing here is that those who live in dominated positions, for him those with a low amount of capital(cultural and/or economic), can become politically engaged but they are often politically stunted or limited by their habitus. Bourdieu further argues that to engage politics effectively, one must work through the educational system on some level. He argued this exacerbates limits on political agency for the dominated as education is foremost a means of solidifying classes and the domination relations. Instead, Bourdieu found the potential for resistance in the consciously questioning the structure that arbitrarily valued certain cultures, objects, and spaces over others.

A significant consequence of Bourdieu’s conception of resistance is the dominated must depend on a representative agency due to the above limitations on their political practices. For a structure to be upended, those with capital must represent the concerns for all, particularly the dominated, as those with greatest capital are assumed to have the greatest capacity to challenge the arbitrary make-up of any specific structure. Bourdieu seems to lean into a sort of vanguard politics for political change. However, those with the greatest capital are also inherently those in the dominating positions. Further, as Michel de Certeau points out, this is based on a limited understanding of practice. Bourdieu’s conception of practice leans on the necessity to take up currently valued practices within recognized spaces. One cannot help but to question the effectiveness of Bourdieu’s prescription. While furthering fields of social sciences more broadly by laying the foundations of practice theory, Bourdieu seems to fall short in how to move forward considering marginalized individuals and communities.

Michel de Certeau, a French Jesuit and scholar, offered some ways to move forward by expanding the categories of practice. He, like Bourdieu, was an interdisciplinary scholar, studying in fields from cultural theory, to history, to psychoanalysis, to theology.[[21]](#footnote-21) Certeau’s conception of space, and the importance of it within historical and cultural theory, tied his wide-ranging scholarship together. Within the United States, he was first and foremost understood as a cultural theorist, his most definitive book being *The Practice of Everyday Life,* where he outlined his understanding of the structure of society, the concept-city, and how “the fragmentation of the social fabric today lends a *political* dimension to the problem of the subject.”[[22]](#footnote-22) Like Bourdieu, Certeau found subjecthood to be constituted by the structure, the space that individuals exist within. Also, like Bourdieu he found that the structure individuals live in are made up of the intersection of different modes of existence. These two scholars start to diverge in their specific understanding of the constitution of structures and practices. While they both understand structures to be constituted by the practices of each individual Bourdieu had given a general understanding of practice while Certeau argued there are two distinct forms of practice, the tactical and strategic.

In the opening pages of “Walking the City*”* Certeau navigates the reader through New York City from the perspective of the World Trade Center. He takes the reader across the top of the buildings, bridges, and structures to the horizon where the Atlantic encloses the view. While Certeau opens with this broad, almost panoptic, view of the city, he hints that smaller, every day, combative practices make-up the cohesive concept of “New York City.[[23]](#footnote-23)” He mocks the larger view of the city, viewing this objective and removed viewpoint, as being of Icarus’s view before his wings melt and he falls into the sea. The everyday, that Icarus and others attempt to step out of us, is made up of tactical and strategic practices fighting over which understandings of space are to define the place of New York City. For Certeau the use of “the city” stands in for other “proper” places, such as a city (Denver, Seoul, or Abuja), a nation (The USA, Korea, or Nigeria), or a continent (North America, Asia, or Africa). One could push it to include any space that scholars or other individuals try to subsume under one name (Academia, Townhall, etc.). Certeau centers a specific conceptualization of space in his analysis the concept-city. The concept-city reflects the ideal political stage; a collective of diverse individuals who come together to debate and argue over the nature of politics and the human condition, ultimately coming to rational and legitimate agreement. The concept-city is defined by three characteristics: (1) it is the production of a self-contained, closed space, and (2) it is the production of a self-contained time, a synchronic system. Both these steps characteristics cement in the third and final characteristic, (3), “the creation of a *universal* and anonymous *subject* which is the city itself…”[[24]](#footnote-24) For Certeau, the concept-city, is comparable to the larger social structure within Bourdieu’s theory that is made up of a generally stable arrangement of multiple fields (social, economic, political). Certeau mocks the concept-city, and all proper places that follow the same logic, as “the dominant theme in political legends,” explicitly calling out Hobbes’ state among other configurations of the city (i.e., Athens).[[25]](#footnote-25)

The Hobbesian political legend, “leviathan,” assumes a community, a state, that is self-knowledgeable and has absolute authority over itself. In Certeau’s understanding, the leviathan is a universal subject with its own time and space. Certeau expands his argument that the concept-city is where, "administration is combined with a process of elimination in this place organized by ‘speculative’ and classificatory operations."[[26]](#footnote-26) Classification is crucial in distinguishing that which is productive for the make-up of the concept-city and that which is not. Once a practice is distinguished as not being productive (unauthorized, deviant, insurgent), as being pollution, the structure assimilates productive aspects of this practice and eliminates what cannot fit into its specific framework. Thinking about the practice of townhalls, clear guidelines and rules allow for the construction of an ideally equitable and equal political space. While these guidelines and rules are often positive in nature, outlining what should happen to construct the ideal space, they also hold negative aspects of what should not be allowed into the space. Important to this process is that these are constantly negotiated by new members who may not know the implied components. With acceptance of everything that falls in line with the rules and guidelines, there is also a "rejection of everything that is not capable of being dealt with in this way."[[27]](#footnote-27) This rejection is to remove any blind spots or inefficiencies, move the concept-city closer to a reality.

Certeau aligns with Bourdieu in understanding the importance of practice for maintaining organized systems. These sort of organizing practices, Certeau calls strategic practice. He sums up his notion of the strategic as, “the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city a scientific institution, [a nation-state]) can be isolated from an environment… a place that can be circumscribed as *proper(propre)*.”[[28]](#footnote-28) These are the practices that constitute and maintain proper places. The strategic has three components that correspond to the needs of the concept city: (1) there is a disciplining of time by place, (2) space is divided to allow for a panoptic place, and (3) the power to make the unreadable spaces readable[[29]](#footnote-29). Certeau illustrates this by way of a game. The player acts strategically when they know the rules and space of a game well enough to navigate any opponent they are playing and take actions that still lead to success. Certeau is elaborating the assessment of game play Bourdieu referenced. Another form of urban strategic practice is the placement and use of boundaries in creating order within certain limit, i.e., perfect planned cities like Irvine, California versus cities like Las Angeles, California.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Practices that are not captured by the strategic is where Certeau parts from Bourdieu, who depends on strategic practice to disrupt the dominating structure, whether the concept-city or otherwise. Certeau’s arguments are aligned with Bourdieu’s argument that the general structure that individuals live in is a collection of situations and practice that normalize into *habitus*. The structure can be disrupted or change through social mobility and education but that depends on some level of recognized practice, in other words strategic here. Certeau assesses Bourdieu’s case studies of marriage ceremonies; arguing that Bourdieu’s conception of practice is “dominated by what [Certeau] shall call *an economy of the proper place…*”[[31]](#footnote-31) In the end Bourdieu’s theory is limited as it forecloses anything that falls outside of this economy and is dependent on the logic of the proper place. In other words, Bourdieu has limited himself in his conceptualization of practices by trying to usurp the power present in structures.

Certeau, working to move forward from where Bourdieu has left us, theorizes a second form of practice that he finds to be the root for real change to occur, tactical practice. He described the tactic as “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus… Thus the space of the tactic is the space of the other.”[[32]](#footnote-32) The tactic enters when the individual interfaces with the strategic use of space and then changes it to be their own, or it is when an individual, “must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power.”[[33]](#footnote-33) The tactic is a use of space by "the weak," or those on the margins, as it allows those excluded from active roles in the use of space to turn the forces around them to their means and ends. The true tension between Certeau and Bourdieu in the understanding of tactical practice is the strategic is dependent and organized by power and the tactical is determined by the *absence of* power.[[34]](#footnote-34) Certeau looks to two examples, the poet who uses a word in a way that it was not meant for and a walker who makes their own path using components of the city in ways they were not meant for. He argues that if the strategic is understood as a victory of space over time, then the tactic is a practice that depends on time.[[35]](#footnote-35) Whatever the tactical does win in its struggle with the strategic it loses it in the movement of time; its successes are ephemeral. One can think to Antonio Negri’s distinction of constituent power and constituted power. Constituent power, the blood of revolutions and revolutionary movements, is always transitory. The moment it starts to stabilize to make up the structure of a society, it starts to transition into constituted power.

Certeau and Bourdieu agree the constitution of a subject is apparent in the way individuals embody their everyday practices and their interactions with the world around them. In other words, both scholars looked at how subjecthood forms through an entanglement of individuals, material, and space. Certeau explained how the individual comes into being as a subject in not just being represented by the “text” (or the structure) but utilizing the text, making plausible different places. This is to say that Certeau finds subjects constituted through both the spaces they live within and their actions, both the structure and their practice. This starting definition sits neatly with Bourdieu’s understanding of agents and the co-constitution of structure and agent. However, through Certeau’s dual practice, he takes subject constitution a step further. Subjects are formed through the embodiment of both strategic and tactical practice. This can be seen in his understanding of delinquency. Social delinquency is only possible in taking the system literally and wandering from these boundaries. Those who embody the essence of the tactical displace the strategic, which without the tactical could not exist. When describing the delinquent Certeau argues that “its specific mark is to live not on the margins but in the interstices of the codes that it undoes and displaces…”[[36]](#footnote-36) Instead of the city of political legends, the concept-city, only erasing the possibility of tactical practice, the tactical practitioners eat at the concept-city, taking its rationality literally and as a bounce board. This is more emancipatory than Bourdieu’s assumption that those who are dominated simply live in the structure set by those with capital. Instead, we find increased space for the weak, the dominated, the delinquent.

There is one unresolved tension in Certeau’s theory: his maintenance of a binary system (weak/strong, tactic/strategic, time/space) and his intention to expand practice. Certeau is more dependent on binary logic then anything within Bourdieu’s theory. As discussed earlier, binary logics structure and limit the different parts of the binary (This will also be expanded in Butler’s theory). This limit is true for Certeau’s binary categories of the tactical and strategic, especially in the relationship he draws between these two categories and time and space. The quote that most clearly lies this out is his opening description of tactical practice:

I call a “tactic,” on the other hand, a calculus which cannot count on a “proper” (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as visible totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily… The “proper” is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time… the weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them.[[37]](#footnote-37)

What is seen is the excerpt is the close alignment of the tactic with the weak, other, time. On the other hand, the reader is left with an alignment of the strategic with the strong, self/non-other, space. Leaving such a binary erases the multiplicity that exists and the various positions of the multiplicity. Even further, Certeau does much to center space and its present potential. However, in his conception of practice, space lies in a false tension with time. Doreen Massey critiques Certeau for failing to question the foundational juxtaposition of space and time which limits space to being a representation. Certeau leaves space to be a fragmentary representation, as a cut out of time. If time is the dimension of change, space is depoliticized as the dimension of a singular moment.

Granting that both Certeau’s and Bourdieu’s theories of practice have room to grow, these two scholars are foundational to the understanding of practice theory. This quick recount of the debate between them is helpful to understanding what practice theory is and its influence on many disciplines, including political science. Political Science has toggled between theories that centered the agent or the structure pushing for solutions that allow understanding of both. Practice theory allowed scholars to assess both the constitution of the structure and the agent. It also helped to develop an understanding of how individuals in their everyday lives were constituted as agential subjects or struggled to be constituted. As practice theory continued to develop it also pressed on the previous conceptualizations of power and how power, and the way relations of power manifested in individuals’ daily lives space (with a large debt to Foucault for this movement). Practice theory today is seen to be further broken down into different theories such as field theory (Pierre Bourdieu, Jurgen Habermas) and Actor-Network Theory (Michel Callon, Bruno Latour).

Turning to Butler, I will show how the foundations of practice theory requires reconceptualizing the individuals who have been marginalized, dominated, or weakened throughout history. This is particularly important as often practice theory, “equates intelligibility with success and therefore ‘incompetent’ practices remain unintelligible.”[[38]](#footnote-38) Bourdieu’s contribution of practice does not escape the presence of the dominated being unintelligible as the dominating or powerful either define the practice of others or often absorb the practice of others. Certeau’s theory also falls into a similar snare, as he undertheorizes tactical practices accumulation, even if these practices are ephemeral. A consequence of such a trend in practice theory is the erasure of bodies and acts that are deemed irrelevant or failure. However, the erasure can be combated when these practice theorists, and the field at large are put into dialogue with Butler and the perspective of the other. Butler offers a more complicated, though less explicit, conception of the importance of precarious spatiality in practice theory. Their focus on the precarious and the space they inhabit reinforces the possibility within for radical change in the present as introduced by Certeau and Bourdieu. Conceptualizing the future as radically open holds both the potential for greater emancipation *and/or* greater enchainment.

**Pt. 2: Butler’s Position within Practice Theory**

 Butler is an essential addition to practice theory as their conception of practice, when put in dialogue with theorists like Certeau or Bourdieu, fosters a more open future. Practice theory broadly, focuses on the condition of everyday practices; the ways in which the practical, habitual, and embodied are critical for the construction of a subject and its relations with other subjects and the material world. Practice theorists are often labeled post-structural because they attempt to move beyond the agent-structure dichotomy to the connective tissue between these two things. Moving to the interstitial is productive to access events that are not captured by the agent or the structure. A hesitant reader may see practice theory still falling into the old debates of agent-structure by either giving primacy to how an individual/agent engages with the structure or how the structure influences the subjecthood of the individual/agent. While structural theories were influential for practice theory, practice theory stands apart in its explicitly relational and pluralistic orientation. Bourdieu’s theory provides an excellent example where relationality and habitus work together to form subjecthood.[[39]](#footnote-39) Certeau also focuses on relations and pluralism in his theorization of the tactical and strategic. His dualistic practice allowed a more explicit assessment of the way in which physical space and locations are part of individual’s everyday practices. Butler furthers both theorists’ arguments thorough an explication of precarious individuals and their practice. Their theory of performativity productively narrows practice theory to highlight a relationality where subjecthood is contingent on a minimal self-reflexivity that centers external relations.

 Judith Butler is one of the leading gender/queer theorists in political theory, challenging the borders of political theory scholarship, demanding that scholars critically examine ontological and epistemological assumptions taken for granted. After Michel de Certeau and Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler formulated their own theory of practice centered around performativity, specifically the performativity of gender. They wrote scholarship that sat with and pushed on the previous practice scholars as early as the 1980s. In Butler’s seminal work, *Gender Troubles,* they assess the way in which gender produces certain practices and how in turn those practices continue to reinforce understandings of gender. As they progressed forward in their academic career, they carried with them their early theories of practice and performativity. Lauren Wilcox broadly argues that Butler's "work entails a distinctive approach toward power, practice, embodiment, and 'the subject', which makes questions of gender and desire central to the question of what it means to become a subject in the first place."[[40]](#footnote-40) Butler themself, when reviewing their earlier work, describes how it "asks, how do non-normative sexual practices call into question the stability of gender as a category of analysis?”[[41]](#footnote-41) Asking how subjects are stabilized in relational practice forced scholars to grapple with how they understood subjecthood, individuality, and the relations these concepts had with world experience. Butler not only addressed the tension between agents and structures throughout their theory of performativity, but also encompassed the larger concerns about the detriment of dichotomous thinking.

 One of the primary starting places for Butler is investigating the limitations of any theoretical system dependent on discrete variables, particularly binary systems. Butler begins *Gender Trouble* with an assessment of the construction of binary logics –subject/object, self/other, masculine/female. They look at how structures of power depend on a binary logic. The relationship between each side of the binary would at first show that power is simply wielded for the dominant side against the other, or simply fuels the tension between the two sides. This view is short sighted, missing how power lies in the configuration of the binary itself. Butler offers an alternative, arguing, “power [appears] to operate in the production of that very binary frame for thinking…”[[42]](#footnote-42) The definition of either side of the binary (understood as discrete concepts) act as borders. Centering power’s production of binary systems and power’s imbrication in the definition of each side highlights the everyday experience of power. The most basic aspects of individuals’ identities and practices are entangled in the power structure and the individuals’ identities and practices embody power relations. The different binary categories function as mechanisms of discipline; or as Butler shows in their assessment of Luce Irigaray’s theory grammar of gender, the discrete concepts make up a grammar of subjectivity. Grammar here stands as the whole structure of specific power relations, the basic components, the components definitions, their relationship to other components and the general rules of action.[[43]](#footnote-43) Butler states that Irigaray allows us to view “the substantive grammar of gender, which assumes men and women as well as their attributes of masculine and feminine, is an example of a binary that effectively asks the univocal and hegemonic discourse of the masculine…”[[44]](#footnote-44) The discourse assumes the subject is a heterosexual, masculine male and the subject is in a relationship to others as objects here. These assumptions constitute the structure and the individual’s embodiment of the basic concepts that are used to label them, which ultimately is a means of discipling.

Certeau’s conception of the strategic is a helpful comparison to Butler’s binary grammar whereby the specific binary logic disciplines and orders. Recall Certeau defined strategic practice as “the calculus of force-relationships…when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated… can be circumscribed as *proper(propre)*.”[[45]](#footnote-45) The ‘subject of will and power’ is reflected in the dominant ideology that Butler understands to produce a binary system. This dominant discourse normalizes the discrete terms and the relationship between them, reinforcing current power relations. This typically looks like the individuals in a position of power, the masculinized-white male, solidifying their position as ‘the proper’ position, i.e., man as subject. The ‘calculus of force-relationships’ is reflected in Butler’s understanding of the constitution of different practices and subjectivities. Grammar defines and disciplines individuals fostering and/or limiting subjectivity and the agency of different subject positions. In Butler’s work, they focus on how gender has influenced the concept of “subjecthood.” The male as subject became defined as such against the other, leaving the other as an object (or at least a denigrated subject). Butler highlights this dynamic, arguing “hence, one is one’s gender to the extent that one is not the other gender, a formulation that presuppose and enforces the restriction of gender within that binary pair.”[[46]](#footnote-46) The other is generally unintelligible to the subject, seen in systems of knowledge production such as formal education or politics.[[47]](#footnote-47) While Butler’s argument is focused on gender here, it is important to note that this grammar assessment can be applied to other oppressive structures of logic, such as racism, capitalism, or imperialism. Butler’s later expansion on precarity helps to address this.

 Butler describes the functioning of power and gender in constituting both structures and agents. Understanding the close relationship of power and discourse, Butler turns to ask what discursive practices allow for binary systems to be plausible and how discourse marks one of the components of a binary as “real” or “authentic.”[[48]](#footnote-48) By moving the question back to the discourse before the binary, Butler assesses the genesis of relations between dualistic thinking and power and practice. The relations between dualistic thinking and power are cemented in everyday practice. Butler’s conceptualization of practice is more accessible to individuals that are not recognized (whether due to being othered or not captured by the binary at all) as practice is more than power relations. Instead of arguing how othered individuals’ practice can be made intelligible, Butler pushes on what intelligibility denotes. The continued theoretical separation of the mind and body, even within feminist literature (classically, Beauvoir, 1949), upholds the gender hierarchy as it upholds the logic of binary structures. To work towards emancipation, scholars who maintain the binary emphasize making intelligible the other in the binary: object, female, and body. Butler finds it more productive to wed the mind and body in practice, which they conceptualize as performativity. When one performs it is a subconscious (sometimes conscious) action embodying the larger system. In their assessment of the way in which gender is constituted and constitutes, Butler argues, “in this sense, *gender* is not a noun, but neither is a set of free-floating attributes, for we have seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced…”[[49]](#footnote-49) Butler’s performativity is in line with Bourdieu’s conception of habitus and Certeau’s dual practices. The important divergence is how Butler’s performativity allows greater potential for individuals considered dominated, weak, or other to have agency.

The reader should note here that Butler does not believe individuals are ever fully constituted; instead, they note that all people are constantly in a state of becoming. This may be part of the reason that those who are in generally stable, dominant positions are actively (though often subconsciously) protective of the system and their position within it. They feel they have the most to lose. Butler goes as far as to rebuke those who try to become perfect and completely constituted; “if any of us ‘become’ a normative ideal once and for all, we have then overcome all striving, all inconsistency, all complexity, that is, lost some crucial dimension of what is to be living.”[[50]](#footnote-50) The fact that one is never fully constituted allows the opportunity to push upon the system and shift the definition of constitution. Going further, individuals who push and challenge the system, precarious or otherwise, are those who foster the complexity of living fully. This innately complicates the judgments of complete/incomplete, success/failure, as the yardstick is unstable and constantly moving.

Butler pushes on the competent/incompetent, success/failure distinctions made in practice scholarship, by questioning the form of agency present in performativity. They ask the reader, “can “construction” in such a case be reduced to a form of choice?"[[51]](#footnote-51) The question of conscious choice in action and subject constitution is of particular concern for Butler as they find practice theories often look to traditional dualistic understandings of subconscious and consciousness, freewill and determinism.[[52]](#footnote-52) For Butler, the mind and body, immaterial and material, freewill and the determined are intrinsically fused. Notions of agency that depend on distinct variables fail to capture the reality of bodily practices. Butler explains how within their theory of performativity the “meaning of construction appears to founder on the conventional philosophical polarity between freewill and determinism.”[[53]](#footnote-53) Butler is not arguing that agency is completely erased; they just find it deeply regulated. They instead argue that “there is an agency which is understood as the process of rendering such possibilities determinate. These possibilities are necessarily constrained by historical conventions.”[[54]](#footnote-54) The merging of possibility and constraint reflects the general understanding practice is constituted and constrained by historical discourse and knowledge. While the world does influence individuals, Butler does not find agency lost. Specifically, Butler explicates how performativity holds these two juxtaposed dynamics in a productive tension.

 Performativity pulls together the different constitutive sides of a binary structure while dissolving the binary logic. Through performativity as practice, Butler acknowledges the strength and stability of power-relations at present without completely foreclosing agency for precarious individuals. Very generally, performativity can be defined as “both the processes of being acted on and the conditions and possibilities for acting, and that we cannot understand its operation without both of these dimensions.”[[55]](#footnote-55) Butler further describes performativity as, “the essence or identity that [practices] otherwise purport to express are *fabrications* manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Performativity is a complicated practice that is reflexive (whether consciously or subconsciously) towards a historical discourse or knowledge of a naturalized form of subjecthood and/or identity. To highlight the tension in performativity between agency and constraint, Butler uses the concept of essence, as compared to subject. Essence draws out the fabricated nature of identities in its vague reference of completeness. With the concept of essence in conversation of identity Butler leaves the process of becoming a subject radically open, as the essence of something is never the complete thing itself. Leaving open the purpose of performativity allows individuals, whose practices and/or identities were not previously legible, to access agency and constitute themselves as agents in this opening. Another component of performativity is the reiteration of practice. Butler states “… performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration.”[[57]](#footnote-57) The subject and structure are constantly referencing each other for constitution. This requires that practice repeat to be accessible for reference moving forward, in other words practice becomes ritualized with a particular meaning that supports reflexivity.

Butler puts performativity in direct conversation with Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and explicates how the theories diverge. Bourdieu’s understanding of practice centralizes the role capital plays within different fields to form classes. This is important as while every person has a place in Bourdieu’s field, those with more capital lay out the rules for those with less capital. Butler generally agrees with Bourdieu’s assessment. Nonetheless, Butler is concerned about how rigid capital power-relations are in Bourdieu’s theory, finding him to undertheorize when capital fails to constitute individuals. Conceptualizing relations so rigidly constricts dominated or precarious individuals, leaving little room for bottom-up systemic change. As such Butler argues that, “if that constitution fails, a resistance meets interpellation at the moment it exerts its demand; the something exceeds the interpellation, and this excess is lived as the outside of intelligibility.”[[58]](#footnote-58) Bourdieu in his theory of habitus does not allow for such excess, finding the position of the dominated to be too constrained by the present; or as Butler states, “Bourdieu inadvertently forecloses the possibility of an agency that emerges from the margins of power.”[[59]](#footnote-59) Butler finds that the precarious, positioned at the margins of power relations, foster the possibility of there being excess. The excess that results from the failure of being legible and being outside the logic of the system can foster new potentials for the future and engage in politics in alternative ways. Precarity and performativity, particularly within dualistic/binary systems, allow for alternatives in systems moving beyond concerns of legibility/illegibility.

Butler clearly diverges from Bourdieu's theory of habitus by expanding the possibility of a field changing in moments of crisis, or failed constitution. In *Gender Troubles,* Butler begins their study of practice with the fact that failures lead to violent, sometimes deadly, punishments from others. They find the political agency of the precarious undertheorized in Bourdieu’s theory. Butler confronts Bourdieu for not recognizing “failed” practice as a space of radical potential.[[60]](#footnote-60) For Butler, failed or (in)competent practice is *the* space of possibility and change, what they call *“stylized repetition of acts.*”[[61]](#footnote-61) When an individual acts in an unrecognized way they are punished with the hope that they do not repeat the action. This coerces individuals into reiterating accepted acts embodied in performativity. However, Butler wants to look at the choices that fall out of this scheme, to the moments in which individuals choose to repeat a punishable action. What occurs when individuals repeat this action is the formation of a *stylized repetition of acts*. While anyone can take part in *stylized repetition of acts*, those who are legible and those who are illegible, this practice is particularly important for the illegible. The illegible, while unable to escape the constraint and domination of a system, can produce an excess that opens the possibility for more beyond the system. This more includes space, agency, and subject constitution.

All individuals must work for agency within their everyday reality, a historically constraining system. This is especially apparent in Butler’s value of the material body and embodiment. Like the other scholars covered in this paper, Butler does not think subjectivity can be conceptualized or constructed through practice alone. They are explicit in the need to consider the materiality of the body and the world around the individual. Performativity is not only an act of the body, a practice of the body *becoming*; but, in some regard, performativity is also a practice of *being*. The difference between *becoming* and *being* is temporal, that of future and present. Performativity highlights the fact that having a truly open future is contingent on having an open present. Lauren Wilcox recognizes that “for Butler, gender is something one becomes, but never fully is as gender only exists through a repetition of acts, one can never fully or completely embody this norm.”[[62]](#footnote-62) This is true for all individuals no matter their positionality. Identity, agency, and subjecthood are only experienced through practice. Subjecthood is embodied through performativity. This means that the material and immaterial pieces of identity are entangled with each other.[[63]](#footnote-63) Performativity is the ritual practice that creates and reinforces the meanings of the body, the meanings of action of the body, and ultimately the meaning of subjecthood. While performativity can be an embodiment of the constraints, Butler shows how performativity can also create rips and ripples in systems by those who have been traditionally dominated.

While Precarity is not a part of Butler’s original conceptualization of performativity and practice, it is a key subsequent addition. Centering precarity, Butler investigates the consequences of practices and performance that are deemed failures because they fall outside of naturalized or historicized practices. Precarity is a further extension of this system of punishment. Butler defines precarity as a “condition of maximized vulnerability and exposure for populations exposed to arbitrary state violence [and other forms of non-state violence].”[[64]](#footnote-64) The exposure to non-state violence is still within precarity as presently having life defined by non-state violence is result of the state refusing to protect or redress the precarious from all forms of violence.[[65]](#footnote-65) This is deeply tied into the logic of individual responsibility that is threaded throughout the current world system of neoliberalism. Butler expands on how precarity is fostered and, “usually induced and reproduced by governmental and economic institutions, this process acclimatizes populations over time to insecurity and hopelessness…”[[66]](#footnote-66) Ritualized performances get solidified into political and economic structures. The solidified structures cement individuals in positions of precarity paralleling consequences of binary logic discussed above. The consequences of precarity are cemented in the performativity of the precarious (embodying insecurity and hopelessness) and those who benefit from other being put in a position of precarity (the dominating and so forth). Note that Butler finds all individuals to be precarious, just to different degrees. A well-off hedge fund manager faces precarity in the instability of the capitalist system, but this is a more secure precarity then those with less capital. Butler clarifies this by arguing that precarity, “is a social and economic condition, but not an identity (indeed, it cuts across these categories [woman, queer, transgender, poor, differently abled, stateless, religion, and racial] and produces potential alliances among those who do not recognize that they belong to one another).”[[67]](#footnote-67) The fact that precarity is a condition allows individuals to access a collective ground for political action without erasing the plurality of their identities. This is particularly important for coalitional work and allyship across different groups. Precarity understood as a condition of insecurity differentially distributed works alongside and in support of theories of intersectionality, critical race theory, and broader queer theory.

A consequence of precarity is that individuals are lumped together by their perceived level of precarity, deeply tied to identity traits that are deemed as failures of performance [gender, native status, race, sexuality, ableness, et cetera]. Assemblages of individuals are systemically punished for traits that have been denaturalized or othered, compiling the personal punishment individuals experience. The identity-based punishment gets continually naturalized and normalized to the degree that, not only are the structures taken as natural, but their unequal impacts are also considered natural. Performativity is the embodiment of ritualized action, for both those in positions of security and insecurity. Insecurity comes from the ritualized and embodied practice of exclusion and marks both the excluder and the excluded Precarity and performativity are tied together because, “[t]he normative force of performativity – its power to establish what qualifies as ‘being’ – works not only through reiteration, but through exclusion as well. And in the case of bodies, those exclusions haunt signification as its abject borders or as that which is strictly foreclosed: the unlivable, the nonnarrativizable, the traumatic.”[[68]](#footnote-68) Uncritical and unthoughtful performances by individuals within power structures cement and perpetuate defining others as embodying failure. Individuals who are othered experience their existence as nonnarrativizable and traumatic, influencing individuals’ political, economic, or most social engagement.

Centering precarity in performance is imperative for a couple reasons. First, centering precarity is imperative as it explicitly highlights how the politics of everyday practice sustains the status quo and/or fosters change. Precarity is the expression of a condition that is sustained in taken for granted relations of politics, economics, and culture that have been cemented in place. The second reason precarity is imperative is it allows for understanding the ways in which the structure itself is a manifestation of power relations that demand the exclusion of some subset of individuals. Centering precarious individuals allows for their own stances and experiences to lead the conversation on restructuring any given system. This is in line with Bourdieu’s understanding of social fields and Certeau’s understanding of the city space. The potential for structures to shift increases in these scholars’ theories when put into dialogue with Butler’s argument of precarity and performance. They make explicit that the normative point of practice:

The point is not to accept such a double bind, but to strive for modes of life in which performative acts struggle against precarity, a struggle that seeks to open a future in which we might live in new social modes of existence, sometimes on the critical edge of recognizable and sometimes in the limelight of the dominant media – but in either case, or in the spectrum between there is a collective acting without a preestablished collective subject: rather, the “we” is enacted by the assembly of bodies, plural, persisting, acting and laying claim to a public sphere by which one has been abandoned.[[69]](#footnote-69)

Bourdieu laid down the foundations of practice theory by showing just how individuals are constituted by their everyday environments and practices. He showed how practice and the shared environment are ordered and organized by those with high social and economic capital. In other words, he helped to show how subjects were not only constituted by the structure but also how the structure was constituted by the subjects within it. Bourdieu made the necessary breakthrough from structuralism to practice theory. Certeau furthered practice theory by creating even more nuance and complexity concerning what practices could be categorized as breaking order or sustaining order, and the consequences of these practices. He explicitly tied practice with the spatial components of individuals experience, deepening the understanding of how practice was an entanglement of internal and external ideas, material, and processes. Butler leaves us with the much-needed normative thrust of practice theory, performances that struggle against precarity. Butler does not mean we, as a collective, simply need to change the conditions of precarious individuals; we must seek out other ways of formulating the reality in which “we” live to allow for a fuller and more complex society.

 Butler is not arguing for an expansion of the current political system to include and recognize the practice of particularly precarious individuals; instead, they are arguing for a foundational shift in the understanding of politics. To merely attempt to expand the idea of *legitimate* or *legible* political practice upholds the binary logic. Butler argues that if merely “forms of recognition are extended, the region of the unrecognizable is preserved and expanded accordingly.”[[70]](#footnote-70) The attempt to expand recognition should not stop. However, conceptualizing structural change as merely expanding the structure also expands precarity and positioning people at the margins. Butler states what is at stake in thinking about the practice of the marginalized, the *precarious*, is understanding “whether the destitute are outside of politics and power or are in fact living out a specific form of political destitution along with specific forms of political agency and resistance that expose the policing of the boundaries of the sphere of appearance itself.”[[71]](#footnote-71) Here Butler is looking to the way in which precarious individuals practices are not fully realized in binary logic whether that as practices of the ‘weak’, ‘tactical’, ‘dominated’. The practice of the precarious cannot be fully realized as practices to become the ‘strong’, strategic’, or ‘dominate.’ Precarious individuals’ practices are not merely, if usually at all, set on reversing the relations of power. What Butler is outlining is that precarious practice and dissolve the binary logic, and therefore can currently be best conceptualized as lying between binaries, such as between the social and the political.

**Pt. 3: Assessment of Space in Butler’s Work**

 In this final section I will use Doreen Massey’s conceptualization of political space to assess spatialization within Butler’s theory of performativity-as-practice. Practice theory helped to bring scholars attention to everyday practices’ constitution of subjects. Specifically, scholars gained a better understanding of how the relations of power are utilized within a structure to constitute agents, as well as how power constitutes the structure itself. Judith Butler builds on practice theory foundations, explicitly noting how they parallel Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, where a repetitive practice becomes ritualized and normalized, constituting the acting individuals. Certeau helped to expand Bourdieu’s practice specifically to include two forms of practice, the tactical and the strategic. While it may seem like a small move to name to the practices that disrupt the ritual, it helped to conceptualize a duality of practices, which provided more agency to those labeled weak or marginalized. Butler’s theory challenges Certeau’s dualistic theory. Butler argues that even when radically reorienting the way in which agency is practiced and considered, if the larger structural understanding remains unquestioned, agency is still constrained.

To avoid falling into the same trap, Butler focuses on performativity, moving the assessment from whether certain ritualized practices are either legible or illegible to an assessment of how practices may dissolve the distinction between legibility and illegibility. More specifically, Butler focuses on practices by individuals in precarious positions, and individuals whose practice challenges precarity. They note that centering performativity is important because, “the performative is not only a ritual practice: it is one of the influential rituals by which subjects are formed and reformed.”[[72]](#footnote-72) If the entanglement of subjects with the world around them is taken seriously, Butler’s theory can be used to assess the formation and reformation of the space performance occurs within. To bridge the spatial question here and Butler’s theory, the paper turns here to Doreen Massey’s conceptualization of space.

 Doreen Massey was a geographer in the late 20th century and at the turn of the 21st century, whose work complicates the separation of fields of scholarship, writing on subjects from culture to science, to economics, to politics and more. Even given the diverse content and subjects of her writing, there is a consistent theoretical thrust throughout Massey’s career. That is the re-politicization of space through a more nuanced conceptualization of the relationship of space and time and how individuals engage with them. This can be seen in her early work on location theory, which focuses on where and why economic activity occurs.[[73]](#footnote-73) While Massey was sympathetic to the practice turn and its general impulse to complicate the simplistic agent-structure debate, she found such scholarship limited due to the under-theorization of the relationship between space and time within practice. Specifically, she was concerned about how scholars fetishized spaces in which practice occurred, such as the local versus global, or that of politics versus the social. Instead, Massey wanted to draw attention to the constitutive relationship between these different practices and spaces. While the bulk of her critiques were focused on structuralism and neoliberalism, she argued that “attention to implicit conceptualizations of space is crucial also in practices of resistance and building alternatives.”[[74]](#footnote-74) As an example, practice theorists are engaging with the conception of space explicitly and productively; moving beyond structuralists and neoliberal scholars, as practice theorists start breaking down the historical baggage of spatial concepts.

It is important to take a few steps back and note that Massey appreciated that the structuralist movement started to break the conventional conceptualization of space within politics. Conventionally, politics was considered the dimension of time and change, undergirding history. Structuralists flipped the script and centered space in the theory of politics, looking to the ways in which the spatial lay the foundations of structures, including political structures. However, Massey went on to argue that “in their eagerness to do this (to argue against an assumed dominance of temporality) they equated their a-temporal structures with space… space was conceived (or perhaps this is too active a verb – it was simply *assumed*) to be the absolute negation of time.”[[75]](#footnote-75) Space is left to be equal to representation and the unchanged, which Massey argues depoliticizes space. Part of her theory of why this occurred was while flipping the script of time-space relations, structuralists maintained the assumed properties of each concept.

Massy turned to assess how post-structural scholars, including practice theorists, reoriented social sciences, and humanities by challenging the prior reducibility of space or time. Post-structuralists expanded on the lessons of structuralism, arguing against the idea that time or space could be truly represented. While post-structural scholarship took steps in the right direction, Massey argued that much of post-structuralism went too far, contributing to the death of political space. She finds post-structuralism and “postmodern times as being particularly characterized by the importance of spatiality, interprets it in terms of an unnerving multiplicity: space is chaotic depthlessness.”[[76]](#footnote-76) Massey’s own theory attempts to address the gap between the a-temporal/stagnate conception of space and the multiplicity/depthless chaos. Her framework helps to show both the concrete, singular spatial components alongside the depthless, multiplicity. While space cannot be represented, a theory about the way it is engaged and entangled in everyday practice is possible.

 Massey does not just critique previous scholars’ understanding of space, time, or space-time; she also supplies an alternative spatial-temporal framework. Her framework centers plurality and multiplicity of space and time, therefore she believes neither space or time are representable or reducible to a representation. Massey understood the fact that geographical and spatial conceptualizations frame and structure individuals understanding of politics. As she built her framework, she had the explicit goal of trying to open space to open politics. To do so Massey explicated four different components to her spatial framework. The first part of this theoretical framework is pushing scholars from a 2-D/3-D notion of reality to a 4-D notion of reality. [[77]](#footnote-77) Scholars rarely make their notion of dimensions explicit in their work, but it underlies all scholarship. A 4-dimensional framework would allow scholars to recognize the temporality of space and the spatiality of time. Any serious theory or study of one dimension must inherently also address the other dimension. One can think about Kurt Vonnegut’s aliens in *Slaughterhouse-Five,* the Tralfamadorians. As beings that experience and understand life as four dimensions, they look at time as humans look at mountains.[[78]](#footnote-78) Mountains stretch beyond sight can see but to humans appear permanent. A human can walk from one location on a mountain range to another that interests them. The Tralfamadorians view time in this same manner. At any one time an individual is in an entanglement of past, present, and future; just as at any moment an individual is in is an entanglement of multiple uses of space. This cannot by physically conceptualized and Massey is not arguing as much. What is true is that individuals as all other living beings experience living in four dimensions and this must be at least superficially understood in our conceptualization of space in theories of relations, including politics.

 The second part of Massey’s framework is highlighting the entangled multiplicity of time and space. Massey argued scholars must understand that “space [is] constructed out of interrelations, as simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations and interactions of all spatial scales, from the most local level to the most global.”[[79]](#footnote-79) "Place" and/or "space" do not have one identity, a nation-state does not have one identity, a city does not have one identity, nor does a local neighborhood have one identity. Individuals socially constitute space on various scales, but their social relations are also spatially constituted. One does not have to look far for an example. The Corona Virus highlights the constitutive relation between the social and space. Individuals that have generally accepted a global world were forced to become more household oriented, often for the first time in their lives. The further jump to a removed and atomistic world has traumatized many individuals. Even in an age of technology and social media, where the conception of contact is expanded and ever more complicated, being forced out of the shared space of the everyday into a more constricted concept will have long lasting impacts. Also, in the reverse the demand for social relations and in person relationality, forced folks to reconceptualize and reconstitute the spaces around us, turning parking lots and roads into sitting space and parks into ever more social spaces. At first, Massey’s first two qualifications may imply that space is a depthless, entangled chaos of all places and relations. However, Massey finds this line of argument just as depoliticizing as artificially drawn boundaries. She argues one must hold the reality of chaos while also moving beyond it.

 The third part of Massey’s framework is the coexistence of order and chaos in all spaces; even though using this duality/dichotomy is reductive.[[80]](#footnote-80) Massey has a greater problem with dualistic and binary structured theories, but this is discussed in more detail below. The order in this specific dichotomy enters in because the spatial location of some phenomena is caused and therefore explainable, as is a set of spatial phenomena that constitute a system (moving train cars from one depot to the next or the UC campuses or even international trade networks). Elements of chaos enter when the location of two phenomena (or set of phenomena) by happenchance are physically next to each other. Chaos and order can be seen in Theo Kindynis’s description of architectural glitches in the urban landscape, “where, as the city is continually retrofitted, renovated and reconfigured, the stacked superimposition of successive (infra)structural elements traps the intervening space… between the rigidly rectilinear places of late capitalism.”[[81]](#footnote-81) What Kidynis is pointing to is the way that cities continue to evolve you find pockets of chaos(or the tactical as Kidynis focuses on, such as graffiti) in evolving cities. These pockets of chaos sit in the interstices of order and structure in cities, as air is in dough. The reader can think back to Certeau’s concept-city which continually reconstitutes and reappropriates itself in the name of order. This reconstitution inevitably folds in elements of chaos, so even though the concept-city aims to eliminate the possibility of tactical practice in ends up leaving the space for the tactical. Even the most perfect-plan community cannot escape this reality, nor can the most chaotic space.

 The last part is for social science and humanities scholars to take seriously the notion that physicists have stumbled upon “Space-time.” This is particularly important to research as Massey states, "spatial form can alter the future course of the very histories which have produced it."[[82]](#footnote-82) Space nor time are separate, self-contained systems; arguments that depend on either space or time being a discrete variable remains ignorant to the world's complexity. What Massey is arguing here is that when thinking of history as a linear line that can be tracked through space, or space as having a single history obscures the larger part of reality. Producers of knowledge that perpetuate the reductive understanding of space and time make it to where the politics of the everyday practice is unthinkable. To begin time as a discrete and linear dimension, leaves history to be understood as linear, and almost deterministic. Space then is usually considered a discrete, cut-out of case studies from the trajectory of history. Thus, if you shift the spatial and temporal understanding as Butler suggests, you shift the structure of history and politics.

Butler in their assessment of the role social media can play in social movements starts to recognize the complex relationship between space and time. They detail how the physical practice of using a phone effect both the space of the movement (and those enacting it) and the time frame of it. “Not only must someone’s hand tap and send, but someone’s body is on the line if that tapping and sending gets traced. In other words, location is hardly overcome through the use of media that potentially transmits globally. And it his conjuncture of street and media constitutes a very contemporary version of the public sphere then bodies on the line have to be thought of both here now and then transported and stationary, with the very different political consequences following from those two modalities of space and time.”[[83]](#footnote-83) What is particularly important in Butler’s beginning assessment of space-time is the way in which understanding this complexity draws awareness to the risk of the practitioners by being both part of the location that the movement is occurring but also in online, nonphysical spaces which increases the specific individuals precarity. The temporal enters in how the location is wrapped up in a specific notion of time but with the social media this time frame is stretched out infinitely with the expansion of the location. This is but one example of a scholar taking seriously the relationship between space and time.

 Massey’s reconceptualization of space is more productive in thinking about space as a dynamic multiplicity where multiple uses of space knit together in a way that truly engages the collective. This is where Massey’s concerns around basic dualistic thinking comes in. Some may argue, as I have previously done, that Massey is simply recognizing the interdependence and entanglement of dominating and the dominated, or in Certeau’s conception of practice the strategic and tactical. However, this argument would be shorting Massey’s theory and contribution. Her ultimate achievement is in dissolving binaries such arguments are dependent on. Massey herself argues that “this is a change in the angle of vision away from a modernist version (one temporality, no space) but not towards a postmodern one (all space, no time); rather towards the entanglements and configurations of multiple trajectories, multiple histories.”[[84]](#footnote-84) Dualistic systems and those within them can only perceive the different sides of the dichotomy, that which is legible to the system. The reality is that a multiplicity of histories, trajectories, spaces, and actions makes up structures. Massey took more seriously the diversity of what makes up the illegible practices (and legible), instead of considering them a monolith. Massey furthers this by arguing “If space is genuinely the sphere of multiplicity, if it is a realm of multiple trajectories, then there will be multiple too of imaginations, theorisations, understandings, and meanings...”[[85]](#footnote-85) Here Massey set up a conceptualization of space that is able to overlap and lay between previous theoretical distinctions of space, such as political space and social space.

 Recall how Butler conceived that power relations made up the structure and logic of binaries and dualisms themselves. Their goal in looking at this is to stress how individuals put in precarious positions within a structure exhibit a range or practices that fall outside of the legible/illegible framework. Those who use, even if redefining, legibility/illegibility still only view the practices within this framework. Butler’s challenge of dualism sits in alignment with Massey’s critique of the taken for granted relationship of space and time or the cohesiveness of either category. Butler argues that “…insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of women has effectively refused the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of “women” are constructed.”[[86]](#footnote-86) The reader does not even need to look far for an array of the spatial, as Massey sees this making up the everyday world. Massey’s challenge that space (or time) can be coherent or one unity starts to help the reader understand the space in which the diversity of identities can be practiced. More explicitly, Butler argues that space and location are always disputed from the beginning, particularly spaces deemed to be public. There is no space that can be taken a priori, space is constituted by those practicing in it at the moment of practice. They caution that when considering public movements that those who are public are often already recognized and able to access the public. Butler themself explains the continuously contested nature of “public spaces,” as “it would be easier to say that these demonstrations or, indeed, these movements, are characterized by bodies that come together to make a claim in public space, but that formulation presumes that public space is given, that is already public and recognized as such. We miss something of the point of these public demonstrations if we fail to see that the very character of the space is being disputed, and even fought over, when these crowds gather.”[[87]](#footnote-87) Butler is not only drawing attention to the fact that the spaces are fraught and disputed but also to the fact that the viewer should always question whose space is it and who is able to take place in this space.

 It is necessary to reconceptualize the relationship between subjecthood, the body and space. Massey’s concept of space imagines the room necessary for Butler’s theory of performativity, especially that of performativity by the precarious such as the *stylized repetition of acts*. Making the spatial more explicit in Butler’s theory of performativity also helps to foster the sight to seeing practices that fall outside of the dominant power relations. Space currently sits in a sublimated position, leaving the impact of various practice vague. This leaves Butler’s theory with an ambiguous relationship to the future, other spaces, and the possibility of change. Massey argues that when you travel, “you are not just travelling *through* space or across it, you are altering it a little. Space and place emerge through active material practices.”[[88]](#footnote-88) Practice influences space and space influences practice and both influence the constitution of subjects. Butler agrees, critiquing original embodiment scholarship for uncritically perpetuating the binary between mind and body, arguing that embodiment philosophy tended to signify “‘the’ body as a mode of incarnation and, hence, to preserve external and dualistic relationship between signifying immateriality and the materially of the body itself.”[[89]](#footnote-89) For Butler reconceptualizing the relationship between subjects, their practices, and space, would demand asking what effect individuals in precarious positions have on shared space.

 Within Massey’s reconceptualization of space, materiality takes on a whole other dynamic. Reductive understandings of materiality look at the objects around humans as inert forms of capital and tools. However, Massey’s conceptualization of materiality aligns with recent active understandings of the material world. The material is an entanglement of objects, individuals, and the surrounding world. In the realm of structured politics this complicated entanglement of humanity, practice, materiality, and space is recognized even if under the surface. The reader can think about various scholars that look to politics as a culmination of humanity, where coming together, in full equality, and engaging in political practice not only constructs the public space but also subjects in the public space. Butler pushes beyond this conceptualization of practice and space and materiality, arguing “As much as we must insist on there being material conditions for public assembly and public speech, we have also to ask how it is that assembly and speech reconfigure the materiality of public space and produce, or reproduce, the public character of that material environment.”[[90]](#footnote-90) Politics has been a space of entangled materiality and practice that has fostered shared places such as the publicly recognized public spheres or assemblies. However, Butler recognizes that these spaces do not constitute all politics; in turn they ask how this also exists outside of this domain of politics and what recognizing the fact that practice, materiality, and space are entangled. Butler continues their argument saying, “And when crowds move outside the square, to the side street or the back alley, to the neighborhoods where streets are not yet paved, then something more happens.”[[91]](#footnote-91) Places outside of the public sphere, outside public assembly, outside of the general notion of politics as radically open, producing and utilizing excess to imagine what the future may look like.

Butler has provided a revamped conceptualization of practice in their conception of performativity through centering the precarious. Underlying their theory of performativity is a complex conceptualize of space and time that helps liberate the future. Scholars must be more aware of their own spatial and temporal assumptions. What is at stake is the democratic engagement, “a new time and space for the popular will, not a single identical will, not a unitary will, but one that is characterized as alliance of distinct and adjacent bodies whose action and whose inaction demand a different future.”[[92]](#footnote-92) Butler is demanding that we have an understanding of space and time *and* practice that is able to hold the reality of multiple practices, multiple spaces, and multiple timelines. Further if scholars and individuals are more readily aware of the multiplicity of reality, the way they engage relationship to others starts to change. As individuals become more aware of the complexity of their relations to others increases their awareness of the chaos and order that makes up the spaces of everyday life. Butler has an understanding of practice that engages chaos and order for a more open future by challenging the power operating in the binary structures of subject/object, mind/body, time/space, et cetera. “In wresting that power, a new space is created, a new “between” bodies, as it were, that lays claim to existing space through the action of bodies as it were, there lays claim to existing space through the action of a new alliance, and those bodies are seized and animated by those existing spaces in the very acts by which they reclaim and resignify their meanings.”[[93]](#footnote-93)

No one knows exactly what this new future will look or what resignification is to occur. This is both exciting and terrifying as the unknown can either lead to hope or despair. As we become increasingly aware of the ways in which performativity changes ourselves, space time and the materiality of the world, we become increasingly aware that practice will change our conception of what is political. Butler argues that we will come to understand “politics is not defined as taking place exclusively in the public sphere, distinct from the private one, but it crosses those lines again and again, bringing attention to the way that politics is already in the home, or on the street, or in the neighborhood…”[[94]](#footnote-94) Performativity bridges both public and private and fosters a new space. The bridge acts as a third space between the public and private, between the political and the social.[[95]](#footnote-95) Within this interstitial, third space practices foster change in the dominant ideal of politics and all that lies outside of it. As this starts to crack the systems of which power currently operates through, the cracks are utilized as space by those othered, contributing to increased agency for those in precarious positions.

 Applying Massey’s spatial framework to Butler’s theory of practice shows how when the spatial is pulled from its sublimated position and made explicit it allows for a fresh look on the future. Butler’s theory depends on space being fluid especially as an in-between space, a space between politics and the social, is necessary for excess to not be erased. The place and space that is constituted out of precarious practice therefore cannot be subsumed under political spaces as we know it, nor can it be separate of it. As discussed above Butler is not arguing for an expansion of the current political system to include and recognize the practice of particularly precarious folks; instead, they are arguing for an expansion of what political practice is. A way to do this is being explicit about the third space of the political and the social. Butler in their conception of performativity and Massey in her conception of the spatial push for alternative theoretical frameworks that allow for greater possibility of a radically open future.

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1. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture.* London, Routledge, 2004, 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Judith Butler’s pronouns are they/them/their and will be referred to as such going forward in this paper. As according to the *Chicago Manual of Style* 17th ed., “Like singular *you*, singular *they* takes a plural verb.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Karl Marx, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Kratochwil, and their antecedent scholars are more examples. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hanna Pitkin, *The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Walter Benjamin, “The Author as Producer” in Selected Writings Vol. 2, Part 1. 1927 – 1930. Edited by Michael W. Jennings et al. (The Belknap Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. David M. McCourt, “Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism.” *International studies quarterly* 60, no. 3 (2016): 478. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice,* Translated by John Viertel*,* Boston: Beacon Press, 1973: 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice.* Translated by Richard Nice*.* Stanford, Californi: Stanford University Press, 1990: 66-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The reader can think about the difference in rules between chess and checkers and the willingness to abide by these rules within game play. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. SPOILER ALERT: Part of the rules is that the players will play the games by the rules and that all players are given the same information at the same time. After one of the players is caught cheating the system to gain pre-emptive knowledge of the games to be played the next day the game master kills him and strings him up as a warning to the other players. He explicitly explains to all the players that the games they are taking part have equaled the playing field in a way that lived reality in capitalist system can never allow. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice,* 58 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice,* 68-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Such beliefs and perceptions are the foundation of everyday practices, found in the way that one eats, to the way one commutes, to what one watches, to the way one political participates in the world around them. The *doxa* is the specific everyday ways in which individuals comply to the demands of the world around them. These practices take on the importance of shaping the habitus and, therefore, the individual. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.* Translated by Richard Nice. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984: 437-438 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice Theory,* 70.

This is to say the *hexis* is the way in which practice is embodied in each individual. The reader can think about the way in which an individual carries themselves, the clothes they wear, their facial expressions and so forth. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Bourdieu, *Distinction,* 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Bourdieu more extensively addresses shifts in the habitus in the concept “Hysteresis” which is a dislocation of habitus. That being said Bourdieu is still criticized for undertheorizing the change that his theory of habitus is dependent on, allowing his theory to appear deterministic. (Hardy, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The different scholars in this paper, use different terms to talk about similar marginalized groups. Bourdieu calls marginalized individuals dominated, Certeau uses the term weak, and Butler uses the term precarious. In this paper I am assessing the theoretical conception around these terms and not the terminology itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Bourdieu, *Distinction,* 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Inigo Bocken, “Michel de Certeau,” *Literary and Critical Theory*, Oxford University Press, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* trans. Steven Rendall (California: University of California Press, 1988), xxiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 91 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 94-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Certeau does not believe that the strategic encompasses all practice nor that it can succeed in perfectly ordering spaces. Instead, the practices that are deemed to be deviant within the systems, such as the concept-city, have outlived the disciplining processes and are continually practiced. The unauthorized practices find more and more footholds, challenging the rationality underpinning the concept-city. In other words, Certeau argues the concept-city may be slowly decaying. Scholars whose arguments and theories reinforce the structure, such as Hobbes and other enlightenment thinkers (or those who extend their work) seem to falter with the fall of the concept-city. Certeau finds this scholarship depends on arguing modernity and reality is in constant states of "catastrophe", encouraging panic, and hoping to increase the need for their rationalistic responses (Certeau, 96). Certeau combats this and moves away from the discourse of the concept-city, of the enlightenment rational outline of governance, arguing instead the decay of the concept-city fertilizes a growing ecosystem of everyday practices. What the concept-city and its builders consider pollution, are the everyday tactical practices. These individual and plural practices and uses of space outpace the governing structures, making the concept-city a more complex and diverse "city". [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life, 37.* [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 38, 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, *International Practices,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Bourdieu himself comments on his move away from structuralism in *The Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Lauren Wilcox, “Practicing Gender, Queering Theory.” *Review of international studies* 43, no. 5 (2017): 792. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Wilcox, “Practicing Gender, Queering Theory,” 790. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,* 2nd ed. New York; Routledge, 2006, xxx. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative.* New York: Routledge, 1997: *138.* [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Butler, *Gender Trouble,* 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. An excellent source on the specific concern of epistemological injustice, particularly in regard to the legibility or intelligibility of other subjects is José Medina’s *The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination*. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Butler, *Gender Trouble,* 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Butler, *Gender Trouble,* 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Judith Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly*, Harvard University Press, 2015, 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Butler, *Gendered Trouble,* 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Butler, *Gendered Trouble,* 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Butler, *Gendered Trouble,* 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.” *Theatre Journal* 40, no. 4 (1988): 521 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Butler, *Gender Trouble,* 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Butler, *Gendered Trouble,* xv. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Butler, *Excitable Speech, 155.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, *156.* [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Wilcox, “Practicing Gender, Queering Theory”: 798. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Butler critiques phenomenology for often being “concerned to distinguish between the various physiological and biological causalities that structure bodily existence and the *meanings* that embodied existence assumes in the context of lived experience.” (Butler, 1988, 520) Phenomenology was a critical step towards scholars understanding the everyday experience of politics and power. However, performativity steps even further, to show how the everyday is now just experienced but a part of the individual experiencing it. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Achille Mbembe’s work on necropolitics, though focused on a different context, is a thorough explanation of state refusal to protect. His argument is an extension of Michel Foucault’s biopolitics and Giorgio Agamben’s bare life. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex*," New York: Routledge, 1993, 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, *160.* [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. "Location theory." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, November 18, 2014. https://www.britannica.com/topic/location-theory. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Doreen Massey, *For Space*, London, SAGE, 2005: 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Massey, *For Space,* 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994: 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender,* 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Kurt Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse-Five*, 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender,* 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Theo Kindynis, “Excavating Ghosts: Urban Exploration as Graffiti Archaeology” Journal of Crime Media Culture, 15(1), 2017, 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Massey, *For Space*, 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Massey, *For Space,* 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Butler, *Gender trouble,* 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 70-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Massey, *For Space,* 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly,* 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. This is third-space as conceptualized by Homi Bhabha in *Location of Culture* which will be address at further length and more detail in the larger project. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)