**Justice for Millionaires?**

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[*This is an extract from what will eventually be a longer paper. In this part, we set up the problem that we intend to address and then focus exclusively on what we call* the entitlement claim*.*]

Consider the following scenario:

*Gadget*: Alex and Blair invent and sell a gadget. Each inventor contributes equally to the production process. Blair proposes a 3:2 division of the profits. Alex resists.

In the above scenario, and based on the limited information provided, a provisional case can be made for the following three claims:

1. *The injustice claim*: the distribution proposed by Blair is unjust.

2. *The entitlement claim*: the proposed distribution is unjust because Alex is morally entitled to a larger share of the profits.

3. *The support claim*: given that Alex is entitled to a larger share of the profits, we have a pro tanto reason to support Alex’s endeavour to secure an equal distribution of profits.

While the set of claims 1 through 3 appears initially plausible, one’s commitment to that set might be challenged if we introduce some extra details. For example, suppose that the profits generated in *Gadget* amount to £500 million. Enacting Blair’s proposal means giving Alex ‘only’ £200 million. This is £100 million less than what Blair receives, but we may nevertheless be uncertain what exactly we should make of this fact. Do we want to say that Alex is entitled to more? Do we want to say that, if Alex does not receive a larger share of the profits, then Alex is a victim of injustice? If we *do* want to say this, do we also want to say that we have reasons to support Alex’s endeavour to acquire a larger share? In short, are we sure that we still endorse claims 1 through 3?

It would be unsurprising to discover that our commitment to these claims becomes less robust in light of the additional details provided in the previous paragraph. We may be reluctant to endorse such claims given that Alex is already receiving an inordinately large amount of money; we may feel doubtful that Alex could plausibly stake a moral claim to a larger sum. Such misgivings will surely be felt by anyone with any sympathy for conceptions of justice that are broadly liberal egalitarian or social-democratic in nature.

But now let us introduce a further detail. Suppose that Alex is female, while Blair is male, and suppose that the two inventors live in a society in which women are systemically disadvantaged relative to men. Should this prompt us to revise any of the judgements that we have made so far? While our concern for Alex is perhaps reduced by the discovery that she stands to become a multi-millionaire, perhaps it is revived to some degree by the discovery that she also occupies a socially subordinate position in a hierarchical society. Indeed, our concerns are perhaps rekindled by the very same liberal egalitarian or social-democratic commitments by which they were previously assuaged.

The hypothetical scenario described above, in which formulating judgments about justice is complicated by considerations relating to wealth and gender, reflects pressing conundrums with which we are confronted with increasing frequency in the real world. In July 2017, the BBC published a list detailing the salaries of their top earners. It revealed a significant pay gap between their male and female presenters. Only a third of those on the list were women. Furthermore, it revealed substantial pay differences between similarly placed men and women. For example, despite both joining the BBC in the 1980’s, and despite both being lead presenters on similar programmes, Huw Edwards’s salary is approximately £200,000 higher than that of Fiona Bruce.[[1]](#footnote-1) Pay inequality of this kind is not unique to the UK, nor is it unique to the television industry. The Hollywood actor, Jennifer Lawrence, and the tennis star, Serena Williams, have both been involved in highly publicized salary disputes. Both have drawn attention to the fact that these differences track seemingly arbitrary criteria such as gender and race.[[2]](#footnote-2) These are cases of *Millionaire Inequality*.

Moreover, when such cases are discussed in the media, they are standardly followed by a call to action. In a letter addressed to the Director-General of the BBC, Tony Hall, Fiona Bruce and her fellow female top earners write: “You have said that you will "sort" the gender pay gap by 2020, but the BBC has known about the pay disparity for years. We all want to go on the record to call upon you to act now”.[[3]](#footnote-3) Similarly, on Black Women’s Equal Pay Day, Serena Williams authored an essay stating that: “We need to push this issue to the front of conversations so that employers across the U.S. can truly understand that all male and female employees must be compensated equally. Not close. Not almost the same. Equally”.[[4]](#footnote-4) Statements like these are usually met with broad public support and widespread criticism of the relevant institutions.

Stated more precisely, these statements might be understood as more general versions of the three claims enumerated above, to wit:

1. *The support claim:*we should support the campaign for higher pay for females involved in cases of Millionaire Inequality.

We should endorse the support claim because of:

1. *The injustice claim:* females involved in cases of Millionaire are victims of injustice.

We should endorse the injustice claim because of:

1. *The entitlement claim:*females involved in cases of Millionaire Inequality are morally entitled to higher pay.

Together, these three claims constitute what we shall call *the standard view*.

Our aim in this paper is to reject the standard view, and to offer an alternative, more compelling, perspective. In this extract, we argue that the entitlement claim is false. Our hope is that our arguments will help to shed light on a range of socially and politically significant cases that have captured the attention of the public, while being neglected by political philosophers.

In the first section of the paper, which we present here, we set out the entitlement claim and consider a prominent argument in its defence: the fairness argument. We then discuss two objections: the market demand objection and the excess objection. We conclude that, whilst the market demand objection fails, the excess objection successfully impugns the fairness argument.

1. **The Entitlement Claim**

**1.1 Defending the Entitlement Claim**

The entitlement claim is the founding claim upon which the standard view rests. It holds that females involved in case of Millionaire Inequality are morally entitled to higher pay. We might try to defend this conviction on different grounds, but the most plausible ones (and the ones that seem to be invoked in the quotes above) are based on *fairness*.More specifically, they are grounded in the idea that it is unfair for one set of individuals to receive less favourable terms of employment than another set of individuals simply in virtue of factors that are *morally arbitrary*.

Morally arbitrary factors have been characterized in two related but distinct ways. A factor has been said to be morally arbitrary (i) if it fails to track individual choice and responsibility, and (ii) if it fails to track any consideration that could plausibly be regarded as a determinant of one’s general entitlements or prospects.[[5]](#footnote-5) When it comes to explicating the unfairness of granting less favourable treatment to members of a particular gender or race, the second notion of moral arbitrariness seems more appropriate than the first. To see this, imagine a science-fiction scenario in which we are able to choose our gender before entering society. There are good reasons why one might choose to be female even if one knows that society is structured in a manner that burdens women with socioeconomic disadvantages. (One may, for example, wish to avail oneself of the opportunity, afforded by female reproductive capacities, to play a more central and intimate role in the creation of life.) But one’s choice to be female does not deprive one of justice-based resources with which to criticize the inegalitarian nature of one’s society. It remains the case that there is no good reason why socioeconomic disadvantages should attach to that choice. One’s gender remains morally arbitrary in the second sense distinguished above.

As a property that is morally arbitrary in this sense, one’s gender contrasts with a number of other considerations that might plausibly be regarded as morally relevant (relevant, that is, to the distribution of goods governed by principles of justice). Perhaps it is *prima facie* plausible to think that someone who performs an especially valuable or arduous job should be entitled to higher pay than someone who occupies a less important or burdensome position. But it is not at all plausible to think that someone should be entitled to higher or lower pay simply by virtue of their gender.

The distinction between morally arbitrary and morally relevant factors has the potential to explain what is objectionable about a variety of putatively unjust practices, including those that appear unjust for considerations relating to gender and race. It is for this reason that the distinction seems to provide a strong foundation for the entitlement claim. In appealing to the distinction between morally arbitrary and morally relevant considerations, one casts cases of Millionaire Inequality as similar to the following case:

*Butter Factory*: A large French butter factory employs only males at a monthly salary of €1,500. Following a vote by the board of directors, the factory changes its policy and starts employing females as well. However, they are paid at a lower rate of €1,000 per month. Two employees, Alain and Beatrice, perform their duties with equal talent, cutting butter at identical levels of thickness, consistency, and precision. Beatrice’s lower pay in comparison to Alain is attributable solely to the difference in gender – that is, Beatrice is paid less than Alain *because* she is a female butter-cutter.

Plausibly, Beatrice is morally entitled to higher pay. Moreover, this is because the existing pay discrepancy is unfair, since it reflects only morally arbitrary differences. Many who are sympathetic to the verdict that Beatrice is morally entitled to a higher salary will feel inclined to draw the same conclusion in the cases with which we began – namely, that female millionaires are likewise entitled to higher pay because the pay discrepancy in their case is *unfair*, reflecting only morally arbitrary factors. This appeal to unfairness in remuneration is the *fairness argument*, and constitutes the normative foundation of the entitlement claim.

Is *Butter Factory* relevantly similar to the celebrity cases with which we began? In the remainder of this section, we explore two reasons for thinking that the cases are disanalogous. These two objections are built around familiar notions of market demand and excess wealth. We argue that the first of these objections fails, but that the second succeeds.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**1.2 The Market Demand Objection**

The fairness argument assumes that male and female employees make relevantly identical contributions. Thus, for example, the contribution of female BBC presenters is thought to be relevantly identical to that of male presenters – just as it is the case for Alain and Beatrice. However, on closer inspection, one may question the assumption that they are in fact making relevantly identical contributions.

The contribution may differ in two closely related ways.[[7]](#footnote-7) First, even if the contributions of male and female employees seem relevantly identical at first blush, closer examination may reveal subtle differences between them. For example, male tennis players typically exhibit higher levels of strength, stamina, and speed than their female counterparts and, thus, male and female tennis players in fact provide spectators with somewhat different goods. Second, even when this is not the case, differences may still emerge simply in virtue of variations in others’ reactions. For example, let’s suppose that audiences tend to prefer watching male news presenters to equally talented female ones. The point is not that male news presenters are typically more talented than female news presenters, in any technical sense of that claim. Rather, it is possible that both sets of actors perform identically well, but audiences still happen to respond more positively to male news presenters than female ones.

Put in more technical terms, we might say that there can be variations in the *goods* that the relevant employees produce, as well as variations in others’ *reactions* to identical goods. In practice, it is often difficult to discern whether either or both of these are going on in any given case. This is both because this task is an epistemically complex one, and because the line between these is blurry, even at the conceptual level. Arguably, the celebrity cases with which we introduced this paper involve elements of both.

These conclusions are important for two reasons. First, they cast doubt on the fairness argument’s claim that the discrepancy in pay between male and female stars reflects only morally arbitrary factors, such as gender or race. Instead, these inequalities are better understood as tracking differences in the goods produced by male and female celebrities and/or variations in consumer reactions to those goods.

Second, we might appeal to these remarks in order to defend the gender and race pay gap. This view holds that it is justifiable to pay female celebrities less than their male counterparts when and because this reflects the lower level of market demand for their services. This is the view of the prominent political philosopher, and occasional tennis player, Novak Djokovic, who has claimed that tennis players’ salaries should reflect “who attracts more attention, spectators and who sells more tickets”.[[8]](#footnote-8) Because there is different demand for their services, the difference in pay is not morally arbitrary and, so, females in cases of Millionaire Inequality are not entitled to more. We can call this the *market demand objection* to the fairness argument.

**1.3 Considering the Market Demand Objection**

Political philosophers disagree about whether and why differences in the level of market demand for employees’ services can justify pay inequalities. For example, proponents of some forms of radical egalitarianism believe that the fact that an individual’s services are in high demand never justifies paying her more than someone whose service are in low demand.[[9]](#footnote-9) Those drawn to this view will be unpersuaded by the market demand objection, believing that the misfortune of not having talents that are in great demand is as morally arbitrary as gender, race, etc. However, since this rejection of market mechanisms is controversial, we instead pursue a different avenue in this paper.

The market demand objection adopts an unscrutinizing attitude towards consumers’ preferences and the inequalities that they generate. In particular, it fails to recognize that these preferences may have been generated under unjust or otherwise problematic circumstances, and that, when this is the case, they lack the authenticity necessary for them to play the justificatory role for which they are used. To see this, consider the following case:

*Pernicious prejudice:* Catherine and Dimitri are both bakers in a small Russian town. They both produce a range of baked goods. However, Catherine belongs to a cultural majority while Dimitri belongs to a cultural minority. The minority, to which Dimitri belongs, is subject to extreme and widespread prejudice. Consequently, the market demand for Catherine’s services is significantly higher than it is for Dimitri’s, on whose goods the townspeople place a much lower value.

In this case, the reasoning behind the market demand objection seems to entail that there is no unfairness in the inequality between Catherine and Dimitri. That is, because the income discrepancy is due only to differences in market demand, it should not be deemed unfair. It seems obvious, however, that this conclusion is deeply implausible, and that others’ animus towards him cannot justify Dimitri’s disadvantage.[[10]](#footnote-10) This highlights a deeper problem with the market demand objection – namely, that it takes market demand, and the preferences upon which it relies, at face value.

The world in which we live, of course, is not identical to *Pernicious Prejudice* in that most people do not hold (as) strong explicitly racist or sexist attitudes as in the hypothetical small Russian town. But racism and sexism still exist – even if they take more subtle forms. Some of this begins with the fact that people are affected by powerful cognitive biases concerning both gender and race, which influence their beliefs and actions in fundamental ways.[[11]](#footnote-11) Several recent studies indicate that the wage gap is to an important extent not due to differences in contribution or bargaining power, but to sexist biases and stereotyping. In particular, women are subject to discrimination based on age and appearance to a much greater extent than men (especially, but not exclusively, in performing industries like acting), and are therefore less likely to be considered for higher-paying, leading roles (including in movies).[[12]](#footnote-12)

More generally, unjust gender- and race-related social norms play a significant role in shaping our preferences and expectations about goods and services.[[13]](#footnote-13) Social norms determining which roles people with certain racial backgrounds or genders are expected to fulfil in organisations unjustly disadvantage some such groups – most notably, women and black people.[[14]](#footnote-14) This is important because, even if people’s preferences are not themselves explicitly sexist or racist, they are nonetheless often still a *product* of background sexism and racism. Thus, even if cases of Millionaire Inequality differ from *Pernicious Prejudice* in important ways, they are relevantly similar in so far as the circumstances under which market demand is formed are unjust or otherwise problematic. The lower wage paid to women is not due to demand differences based on innocuous preferences, à la preferring The Beatles over The Rolling Stones.[[15]](#footnote-15) Rather, the difference in demand reflects a systematic and unjust set of gendered dispositions and expectations, e.g. in the form of gendered age discrimination, which means that the age periods in which women can play certain roles are significantly shorter.

The point is not to say that differences in market demand can justify wage inequalities *only if* the preferences that they reflect are fully rational and the product of careful consideration. This would be too restrictive a view, and it would exclude most, if not all, actual preferences. Rather, the point is that there are certain factors that corrode the authenticity of people’s preferences to a degree that undermines their capacity to serve as a basis for the market demand objection.[[16]](#footnote-16) And such factors, we claim, are currently present and so, undermine the market demand objection.

**1.4 The Excess Objection**

We now turn to a more powerful objection to the fairness argument and, thus, to the claim that female millionaires are entitled to higher pay. As proponents of the *excess objection*, we can concede that there is unfairness in *Butter Factory*, but we hold that there is no identical unfairness in cases of Millionaire Inequality. More specifically, we deny that female millionaires are morally entitled to higher pay, and we do so on the grounds that they already have too much. On any plausible theory of distributive justice, these female millionaires (like their male counterparts) have more than their just share, and they are certainly not morally entitled to more. In a just society, the excess wealth of the super-rich would be taxed away. The higher rewards demanded by female millionaires would, if paid, be immediately expropriated by the state. Moreover, in the absence of just tax-and-transfer arrangements, the super-rich have a moral obligation voluntarily to relinquish a significant share of their fortunes (e.g. by donating to charity). All plausible theories of distributive justice yield the conclusion that the excess wealth of the super-rich should be regarded as morally analogous to stolen loot. The fact that stolen loot is distributed unequally does not provide those who receive less with a just claim to more.

There are a variety of familiar reasons for believing that inordinately large accumulations of wealth among private individuals have no place in a just society.[[17]](#footnote-17) Some egalitarians argue that it is simply unfair for some people to have so much more than others, given that luck inevitably plays a prominent role in determining who gets what. Others explain the injustice of large inequalities by referring to the pernicious effects that they engender. They argue that large economic inequalities often translate into inequalities of power, and that the better-off are often able to dominate or control the lives of the less advantaged in objectionable ways. Furthermore, they contend that large disparities of wealth can undermine the fairness of certain political procedures, and impede the creation of genuinely equal opportunities in education and on the job market.

Admittedly, one of the most influential objections to inequality arguably has little force as a complaint against the holdings of those who are extremely rich. According to this objection, inequality is problematic partly because it produces stigmatizing differences of status. As Thomas Scanlon writes: “when the mode of life enjoyed by some people sets the norm for a society, those who are much worse off will feel inferiority and shame at the way they must live”.[[18]](#footnote-18) But this objection tells most decisively against the inequality between the lower- and middle-classes; it is less effective as on objection to inequality between the rich and the rest. This is because it is the middle-classes that set the norm for society, not the upper-classes. While it is plausible to think that stigma may attach to an inability to achieve the standard of living enjoyed by those on an average income, it does not seem likely that one would feel inferiority or shame simply because, unlike the super-rich, one cannot, say, afford a private jet. As Scanlon states:

Whatever reasons there may be for objecting to this growth in inequalities in our societies … the idea that the extreme wealth and incomes of the 1% occasions feelings of injured status and loss of self-respect among the rest of us, in the 99%, seems to me not one of those reasons. Judging, first, from my own experience, I certainly don’t feel any shame at the fact that I can’t go out in public living in the style to which Donald Trump and others seem to have become accustomed.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Nevertheless, that we cannot appeal to this particular objection is far from fatal to our aims. As we shall now demonstrate, what is arguably the most powerful and straightforward objection to inequality can easily and effectively be mobilized to serve our ends. This objection is that large inequalities represent a failed opportunity to rectify severe disadvantage. This objection focuses on *absolute* deprivation, and makes no reference to the idea that it is necessarily bad for some to fare worse than others in merely *comparative* terms. As Scanlon writes:

In some cases our reason for favoring the elimination of inequalities is at base a humanitarian concern – a concern, for example, to alleviate suffering. If some people are living under terrible conditions, while others are very well off indeed, then a transfer of resources from the better to the worse off, if it can be accomplished without other bad effects, is desirable as a way of alleviating suffering without creating new hardships of comparable severity.

It is no secret that in our world there are not merely “some”, but a great many people living under terrible conditions. Each year, eighteen million people die from poverty-related causes, and over half of those who lose their lives are infants.[[20]](#footnote-20) In the poorest parts of the world, 1.4 billion people survive each day on no more than what could be purchased in the United States for $1.25.[[21]](#footnote-21) Moreover, those involved in movements like “effective altruism” have drawn our attention to the fact that these kinds of deprivations can be ameliorated at little cost. For example, Peter Singer points out that a donation of $250 could provide rehydration therapy to a child who would otherwise die from diarrhoea.[[22]](#footnote-22)

It is these well-known facts about the extreme poverty that disfigures our world, and about the ease with which it can be mitigated, that make the extravagant fortunes of the super-rich so instinctively repellent. It is also such facts that provide the strongest support for our claim that these fortunes should be seen as analogous to stolen loot. Given the crushing burdens borne by the world’s poorest people, the super-wealthy can have no moral claim to the enormous wealth that they have amassed. Like thieves in possession of stolen goods, the rich must relinquish their holdings.

Let us spell out the implications of this analogy for our present purposes. Suppose that you and I have robbed a bank. Suppose that we contribute equally to the planning and execution of the raid, but that our boss gives to me two thirds of the loot, and to you only one third. This may seem intuitively unfair, but a moment’s reflection should also reveal that you have no just claim to a larger share. The fact that I have a larger portion of the loot simply means that I have acquired more of something to which neither of us has any rightful claim; that my share of unjustly held goods is larger than your share of unjustly held goods has no implications whatsoever for your own entitlements. Similarly, from the fact that male millionaires have received higher pay than their female counterparts, we cannot infer that the latter ought to be paid more. Female millionaires have simply received less of a good to which they have no claim.

According to one understanding of the concept of fairness, it is possible for a distribution to be more or less fair while simultaneously being unjust. On this view, whereas justice requires the *full* satisfaction of stringent claims, fairness requires the *proportionate* satisfaction of such claims.[[23]](#footnote-23) Suppose that you and I each have a stringent, and equally weighty, claim to four units of medicine, but that only six units of medicine are forthcoming. Suppose that we are each given three units.[[24]](#footnote-24) This distribution is unjust, because neither of our claims is fully satisfied, but it is also fair, because each of our claims is satisfied proportionately. But notice that what makes a fair distribution possible in this case is the fact that the claims being advanced are claims to a good *to which we are each morally entitled*. If this condition were not satisfied – if we were *not* entitled to the good in question – then the possibility of a fair distribution would not arise. The fact that a distribution satisfies *unjust* claims proportionately does not render that distribution fair. As the claims made by millionaires to high pay are unjust, this understanding of fairness yields the conclusion that we should not regard a distribution that satisfies those claims proportionately (e.g. by paying male and female millionaires equally) as fairer than a distribution that satisfies those claims disproportionately.

1. Jamie Grierson, ‘Who Earns What Among BBC’s Top Talent’, *The Guardian*, 19th July 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jul/19/who-earns-what-among-bbcs-top-talent. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Jennifer Lawrence, ‘Why Do I Make Less Than My Male Co-Stars?’, *Lenny Letter*, 14th October 2015, available athttp://www.lennyletter.com/work/a147/jennifer-lawrence-why-do-i-make-less-than-my-male-costars; and Serena Williams, ‘How Black Women Can Close the Pay Gap’, *Fortune*, 31st July 2017, available at http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/serena-williams-black-women-equal-pay. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. ‘Female BBC Starts’ Letter to Tony Hall Demanding Equal Pay in Full’, *The Telegraph*, 22nd July 2017, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/22/female-bbc-stars-letter-demanding-equal-pay-tony-hall-full. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Williams, ‘How Black Women Can Close the Pay Gap’. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Those who characterize morally arbitrary factors as those that fail to track individual choice also often believe that individual choice is the one consideration that ought to affect one’s life prospects (though they need not think that one should always have to bear the consequences that happen to attach to a particular choice under particular circumstances). Those who characterize morally arbitrary factors as those that fail to track any considerations that should affect one’s life prospects might accept that certain factors not attributable to choice (such as the distribution of natural talent) can justly influence people’s prospects, and therefore count as non-arbitrary. On the different conceptions of moral arbitrariness present in the literature, see Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and Justice”, in Thomas Christiano and John Christman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 396-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Unfortunately, we lack the space in this paper to consider a third objection, which emphasizes the fact that, though these female celebrities are economically disadvantaged in comparison with their male counterparts, there are other respects in which they may be advantaged (e.g. greater life-expectancy). Perhaps the presence of these advantages casts doubt of the fairness argument. For discussion of the appeal and limits of this kind of reasoning, see Paula Casal, ‘Distributive Justice and Female Longevity’, *Law, Ethics and Philosophy*, 3 (2015), 90-106, esp. 99-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. These two grounds parallel Alan Wertheimer’s distinction between *technical qualifications* and *reaction qualifications*. See his ‘Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences’, *Ethics*, 94 (1983), 99-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. BBC News, ‘Novak Djokovic Questions Equal Prize Money in Tennis’, 21st March 2016, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-35859791. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Perhaps this is the view of G. A. Cohen. We say ‘perhaps’ since Cohen’s view on this issue is surprisingly difficult to concern. This is because, for the most part, Cohen is concerned with what ‘justice’ requires, and not with the more interesting matter of which inequalities are justifiable all things considered. See his *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue*, 161-162, for discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Elizabeth Anderson’s discussion of such biases in ‘Moral Bias and Corrective Practices: A Pragmatist Perspective’, *Proceeding and Addresses of the APA,* 89(2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See, for example, Deborah Dean, ‘Age, Gender and Performer Employment in Europe’, The International Federation of Actors (FIA) report on *Changing Gender Portrayal* 2008; Sin et al., ‘What Drives the Gender Wage Gap? Examining the roles of sorting, productivity differences, and discrimination’, *Motu Working Paper 15-17*, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 2017; Trade Union Congress, ‘Age Immaterial: Women over 50 in the Workplace’, chapter 8, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. For example, see Sally Haslanger’s convincing account of the pervasive influence of social norms and *schemas* in her *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Sally Haslanger’s illuminating ‘On Being Objective and Being Objectified’ in Louise M. Anthony and Charlotte E. Witt (eds.), *A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity* (Oxford: Westview, 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Even if this preference set reflects the objectively correct ranking! [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For discussion of the aspect of this that concerns reaction qualifications, see Andrew Mason, ‘Appearance, Discrimination, and Reaction Qualifications’, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 25 (2017), 48-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. For helpful taxonomies of arguments against inequality see Martin O’Neil, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 36 (2008), esp. pp. 121-3; T. M. Scanlon, ‘The Diversity of Objections to Inequality’ in Mathew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), *The Ideal of Equality* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Scanlon, ‘Diversity of Objections’, p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. T. M. Scanlon, “When Does Inequality Matter? Lecture 2: Equal Status”, *2013 Uehiro Lectures* (available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyZC72QMmcU). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Thomas Pogge, *Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 11-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Peter Singer, *The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty* (London: Picador, 2009), pp. 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid., pp. 88-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner, *On Trade Justice: A Philosophical Plea for a Global New Deal* (Unpublished Manuscript). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. We must also suppose that three units of medicine are better than none. For example, it is not the case that at least four units are needed before the medicine becomes effective. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)