Reacting to Threat: Government Repression of Minorities
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Roz Yazdanmehr

Introduction

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran increasing levels of government repression of the Baha'i people in Iran— the largest religious minority in the country— have taken the form of arbitrary imprisonment and execution, widespread government sponsored anti-Baha'i propaganda, vandalism of Baha'i-owned businesses, and the barring of access to higher education (BIC 2014). These discriminatory practices are disproportionately focused on the members of the Baha'i minority relative to other religious minorities in the country, namely Jews and Christians (Congressional Record 2000). This variance presents an interesting puzzle: why are the Baha'i's repressed more than other religious minorities in Iran? Widely described as Iran's largest human rights violation, there are news articles describing the existence of this repression, but scant research exists on the causes of government repression in Iran despite the fact that the country receives much media attention for its poor human rights record (Congressional Record 2000). This is likely in part due to the lack of hard data surrounding the Baha'i and actions taken against them.

Meaningful knowledge about state repression against the Baha'i requires a comparative examination; as such, I seek to examine government repression with a broader scope—the international level— in order to observe meaningful variation. I address the research question "Why do governments oppress minorities?" , or more specifically "What causes the level of government oppression of a minority to rise?" . The latter will act as my primary research question throughout the study, and I will conduct a linear regression analysis in a large N study. My core theory surrounds the concept of threat. Threat can have many faces and come in a variety of forms, which I will discuss further in a later section. I hypothesize that in their endeavour to maintain order, power, and access to resources, governments, especially non-democratic governments, oppress those groups in society that they perceive as a threat to these goals. In short, I prognosticate a positive and significant correlation between the existence

and salience of threat posed by a minority and the level of government repression they will face. I operationalize threat with eight variables: separatism, group organization, group concentration, rebellion, kindred group support, foreign state support, non-state actor support, and economic competition.

As this paper is fundamentally a study of intergroup behaviour and conflict, I start by turning to existing theories of intergroup behaviour before discussing my own core theory. Theories based on fundamental clashes of cultures or religions are not particularly convincing because, as researcher Daniel N. Posner has stated, "there are far more cultural cleavages in the world than there are conflicts" (2004). Similarly, theories that hold that conflict occurs naturally from group formation or that there is a tendency towards hierarchy and repressive domination in human societies are not fulfilling as there are many examples of plural societies where oppression and conflict do not occur. Therefore, intergroup conflict is not automatic.

The knowledge produced from this study will either shed light on the Baha'i case by finding meaningful causation that is directly relevant to the case, or it will reveal that the explanatory factors that may more commonly explain government oppression of minorities do not explain the oppression of Baha'i's in Iran and that more research must be done. The indicator of threat that I anticipate will best explain Baha'i repression is group concentration. It is possible that the Iranian government perceives the Baha'i minority to be a threat due to its urban concentration, which is a proxy for higher potential capacity to organize and threaten state power, should the minority choose to do so, compared to widely dispersed minorities.

Conceptual Framework

As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has stated, in understanding threat and its implications "our starting point is the realization that any leader worth her salt wants as much power as she can get, and to keep it for as long as possible" (2011). Both autocrats and democrats fight to

stay in power, albeit in different ways. Leaders seek power and seek to maintain it not only for its own sake, but as a means to an end. Power increases one's access to resources such as social status, monetary allocations, political influence and technological equipment. It is also necessary to be able to promote or defend a cause or objective (Davenport 1995). Thus, in the pursuit of these interests the leader will form a coalition of essential supporters. The leader, specifically in non-democratic regimes, will put the needs and desires of this coalition before the needs of the people as without this coalition he will lose access to the resources required to maintain and secure his interests (Bueno de Mesquita 2011).

A threat is an action or the potential for action that may affect the continuity of one's access to material resources, power, societal dominance, continued existence, or another interest in a way that is undesirable to the recipient (Bueno de Mesquita 2011). This may mean an entire loss or a weakening of the order, structure, or condition that the recipient benefits from. Though competition for resources and power is perhaps the most tangible basis for perceived threat, threats in general are based on some sources of distress or unhappiness, and may even be based on concern for protecting certain cultural symbols of the dominant group. To this end, it is life satisfaction and perceptions of whether personal conditions have improved or become worse and whether they will improve or become worse in the future that threat and the response to threat is based on (McLaren 2003).

In practice, a threat to the government or dominant group can be active, arising from an action that is occurring. In these cases the threat may come from mass political behaviour directed against the state, its policies and its practices, in the form of rebellion, militant group organizations, or armed conflict (Bueno de Mesquita 2011). Scholars tend to agree that violent strategies of dissent usually entail the greatest and most obvious threats to the political system (Davenport 1995). There are also latent or potential threats, which consist of the capability of a minority group to act against the state or the existence of an incentive for a minority group to act

against the state. The former means that if a minority group were to decide to threaten the state it has the demographic, material, or influential means to do so. Examples include whether the minority group is armed, if the minority group is geographically concentrated, and if the minority has the ability to organize and mobilize , or whether the minority is in economic competition with the dominant group in society. Another latent threat is if an incentive to act against the state exists, such as if there is a history of conflict with the state or a history of separatist efforts. Especially when combined, latent threats can be significant causes of concern for a regime or dominant group but these threats are less potent because they are hypothetical and do not require immediate action to subdue. While most of the above threats represent potential or existing internal threats to the dominant group, threats can also arise from external support for the minority group from kindred groups, foreign states, or non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations. Whether these actions pose latent or active threats depends on the type of support offered, which can range from humanitarian aid, to political support and military support.

In an effort to regulate threat and reduce the possibility that unfavourable outcomes might take place, governments often use political repression to neutralize opponents or increase the costs of mobilizing in the first place (Stein 2001). This may be in the form of censorship, political or economic oppression, reducing the group's rights, imprisonment, and even execution or war (Davenport 1995). As Duvall and Shamir suggest, "the repressive character of the government (i.e., the likelihood that repression would be applied) is greater accordingly as the government perceives more situations as threats, or when it views threats as more seriously threatening, and hence is disposed to respond more coercively" (1980). As such, the extremity of repression tactics utilized is positively correlated with the enormity of the threat.

Democratic regimes tend to respond to threat differently, choosing to fight at the ballot box to stay in power. When the presence of democracy increases within a nation-state, the

likelihood of threats from conflict, however conceived, being perceived by the government and repression being applied is decreased because they enjoy relatively high levels of "diffuse support", and are perceived by their population as more legitimate than in non-democratic countries (Easton 1975). Additionally, liberal democracies are expected to fundamentally accept the right of citizens and minority groups to express dissent through acceptable means, such as protest. Although we expect democracies to be less likely to resort to force to contain the threats posed by minorities the dataset utilized by this study has recorded cases of government repression of minorities in democratic countries. As such it is clear that government repression exists in democracies as well as non-democracies. In this study I will include all regime types and their government's oppression of minority groups.

The Cause of Government Oppression of Minorities: Five Views

This study examines why governments oppress minorities, whether that involves limiting their access to public participation, economic resources, or basic human rights. To answer this question there are several existing theories regarding intergroup conflict. This literature review is divided into five theoretical camps: Primordialism, Realistic Conflict Theory, Instrumentalism, Social Identity Theory, and Social Dominance Theory. These theories focus on dominant or in-groups more generally, rather than examining governments; however, they are useful to my research question, where the non-democratic government represents the in-group, and often the dominant group, and the oppressed minority the out-group. As each of these theoretical camps offers certain strengths and weaknesses I will conclude with my own core theory and hypotheses.

Primordialism

Primordialist theories hold that ethnic ties are inherent in human beings, and that we have deep natural connections that link us to some people and result in natural divisions with others (Geertz 1973; Connor 1992; Shils 1957). These connections and divisions are inflexible and innate. The sense of shared blood and kinship that is the core of national consciousness does not extend beyond the nation or those considered part of one's ethnic group. In effect, the compassion which typically accompanies a sense of shared blood and kinship lacks in the relations between groups. The emotional depth of ethnic identity means that "the passions lie at either extreme of the hate-love continuum" (Connor 1992).

Often categorized as a primordialist theory is the clash of cultures proposition, which suggests that more pronounced cultural differences between groups leads to greater conflict (Smith 1965). Cultural groups are described as objective givens with rigid boundary lines, which form closed socio-cultural units. Because of the rigid nature of cultural groups, conflict occurs in culturally plural societies as a result of the incompatibility of institutions and values between these closed socio-cultural units. Thus, the existence of highly incompatible institutional systems within a society will lead to more intergroup conflict than between institutional systems that are less dissimilar. As such, plural societies are "defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict" (Smith 1965). The clash of cultures proposition furthers that, because a society requires a "community of values", a society with wide cultural differences can only be held together through the subordination of the subdominant group(s) with the most incompatible institutional systems by the dominant group.

The primordialist approach takes ethnicity and culture as a fixed characteristic of individuals and groups, whether rooted in biological traits or formulated through history and practice, now beyond the ability to alter. But social theorists such as Steve Fenton (2003) observe that ethnic identities are "socially moulded, as well as being grounded in place, language and shared historic experience". Additionally, scholars such as Donald Horowitz

(1985) argue that the formation of distinct ethnic groups may depend on the environment and factors such as relative size, territorial boundaries, and distance from other groups. Cultures have most often not formed in isolation from each other, or at least have adapted and incorporated elements of each other at a point in time. As these factors can change, so too can the defining lines of ethnicity. Finally, as noted by Daniel N. Posner (2004), there are many examples of ethnically plural societies where conflict does not occur; as such, it has been argued that primordialist theories do not possess significant explanatory power and have been largely disregarded by scholars. The widespread rejection of primordialist theories as explanations for intergroup hostility has meant that numerous alternative theories have emerged.

Realistic Conflict Theory

In contrast to the primordialist approach, Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) holds that cultural, physical, and personality differences are not necessary for and hence cannot be the only causes of the emergence of intergroup conflict. Instead, intergroup relations are characterized by properties that transcend characteristics of any one group. RCT's main proposition is that "the perception that one group's gain is another's loss translates into perceptions of group threat, which in turn causes prejudice against the out group…[and] use of group boundary markers and discriminatory behaviours" in an effort to secure one's interests in a zero-sum environment (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Thus, according to RCT, intergroup hostility is produced by the existence of conflicting goals or competitive activities (Sherif 1988; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez Guede 2010; Brief et al. 2005). Real or perceived threats can surround competition over limited resources, economic interests, political advantage, military consideration, or social status, although proponents of RCT generally emphasize the first (Jackson 1993).

Some RCT scholars suggest that the effects of competition on intergroup behaviour can be extended to contexts where competition results from decisions taken by institutional authorities rather than taken by groups. Additionally, it has been suggested that when competition increases the ingroup's resources, attitudes towards the out-group become more positive and the in-group demonstrates more generous behaviours (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez Guede 2010). In contrast, when competition prejudices the in-group's interests the in-group responds to the threatening situation by displaying negative attitudes toward, and behaviours against the out-group . Others have suggested that geographic proximity to out-groups introduces competition for resources and perceived or real threat, and therefore causes discrimination in intergroup relations as racial diversity increases in the environment examined (Brief et al. 2005).

Some proponents of Social Identity Theory (SIT) argue that RCT is "deceptively simple", but RCT has received strong empirical support (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Additionally, research carried out with the "minimal group paradigm" devised by SIT shows that a conflict of interests between groups is not necessary to promote discriminatory behaviours between groups. But, as I discuss below, some aspects of SIT are still unclear or are challenging to test. Brief et al. (2005) suggest that SIT can be understood not to replace RCT, but to supplement it and that in fact, the two are complementary, with the former providing a cognitive aspect of the explanation of how intergroup conflict can arise and the latter a more tangible and empirical one. Importantly, research in RCT has demonstrated that the existence of two groups in competition with each other is a *sufficient* condition of intergroup hostility and that these hostilities arise as a function of intergroup behaviours and not interpersonal behaviours.

Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism borrows certain fundamental principles of RCT. Instrumentalism holds that ethnicity is neither inherent in human nature nor intrinsically valuable, but instead masks a deeper core of interests which are typically either economic or political (Glazer & Moynihan 1975; Bates 1974; Steinberg 1981). Instrumentalism also holds that intergroup conflict arises as a result of competition, typically over resources, or a perceived threat to the prosperity or well-being of the in-group. However, its core principle and where instrumentalism diverges from RCT is that it places agency in the hands of ethnic elites, who it says strategically manipulate ethnicity and forge competitive conflict for personal benefit (Steinberg 1981).

Instrumentalism furthers that elites use their cultural or ethnic groups as tools of mobilization in their competition for power and resources because they find them more effective than social classes, given the existing structure of states where most constituencies tend to be dominated by the members of one ethnic group (Smith 2001). Additionally, because ethnic groups are composed of individuals from all "occupations, socioeconomic backgrounds, lifestyles, and positions in the life cycle, the appeal of common ethnicity can generate unified support where other issues would be divisive" (Bates 1974). For these reasons an ethnic appeal is an attractive and effective weapon in the competition for political power or economic influence. As a result, in the competition for power politicians will stimulate the formation of competitively aligned ethnic groups. As such, "ethnic conflicts have become one form in which interest conflicts between and within states are pursued" and ethnicity, though a powerful political tool, is not fundamentally different from other political affiliations (Glazer & Moynihan 1975).

Critics of instrumentalism have countered that ethnicity is not something that can be decided upon by individuals at will like other political affiliations, but is instead embedded within larger society (Lake & Rothchild 1996). They point to the inherently social nature of all ethnicities. Others question the argument for why elites might choose ethnicity as a means to

power or extracting resources from the government over mobilization based on economic and ideological identities. Finally, while it is understandable for an individual to join an ethnic movement when it is close to capturing power, it is unclear why rational people would take such risks if there is a possibility that ethnic mobilization would lead to violence from another group or punitive action by the state unless there is a unique quality of ethnicity that resonates with the masses more than other political affiliations (Varshney 2009) Instead, they suggest that there must be "selective incentives" (Olson 1965).

Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) emerged largely in response to what was seen as a shortcoming of Realistic Conflict Theory, arguing that it "gives very little prominence to identification with the in-group" and that the development of in-group identification is "seen as an epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict" (Tajfel &Turner 1979). SIT argues that incompatible interests are not necessary for the in-group to behave in a discriminatory fashion against the out-group because there is a tendency towards in-group bias, even if based on trivial categorization or minimum group paradigms (Tajfel &Turner 1979; Horowitz 1985; Hogg & Abrams 2006). What produces discrimination is simple division into categories. Positive social identity is based on favourable comparisons with relevant out-groups so that the in-group might be seen as positively differentiated. Pressures to evaluate one's group positively leads groups to differentiate themselves from each other, often through discrimination, with the aim to maintain or achieve superiority (Tajfel &Turner 1979).

Some scholars have added that successful intergroup discrimination enhances social identity and thus elevates self-esteem and that depressed or threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination because of a need for self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams 1988). Others have argued within SIT that ethnic cleavages are the principal line of political division around

which in-group favouritism forms and groups express hostility towards each other. This is because the idea of common ancestry means that ethnic groups think in terms of family resemblance, and "bring into play concepts of mutual obligation and antipathy to outsiders that are applicable to family relations" (Horowitz 1985). SIT stands as one of social psychology's preeminent theories, but some theorists suggest that the endurance of some of its principles are still unclear.

Although SIT argues for an in-group bias, some studies suggest that dominant groups will tend to display higher levels of in-group favouritism than subordinate groups will, who instead often reinforce negative stereotypes and show out-group favouritism (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Other studies show that two or more groups that perceive themselves to hold similar norms or equivalent status show more intergroup attraction rather than differentiation and less bias than dissimilar groups. Additionally, studies have found that intergroup similarity does seem to provide increased intergroup differentiation as predicted by SIT but that this is not necessarily accompanied by hostility or discrimination (Brown 2000). Finally, empirical support for the Self-Esteem Hypothesis has been mixed. It has been argued that positive correlations between discrimination and post-test self-esteem could imply that people with high pre-test self-esteem simply tend to discriminate more than others or that people who engage in high levels of discrimination tend to possess low self-esteem for some other reason (Rubin & Hewstone 1998).

Social Dominance Theory

SIT has deeply inspired and influenced the development of Social Dominance Theory (SDT). SDT as a theory of intergroup relations focuses on the maintenance and stability of group-based social hierarchies. SDT argues that all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto 1999; Trounson et al. 2015). The

dominant group is characterized by its possession of a disproportionately large share of "positive social value, or all those material and symbolic things for which people strive", such as power, wealth, food, and wealth (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). SDT furthers that most forms of group conflict and oppression are manifestations of a human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies.

Subordinates are not merely objects of oppression but actually participate in their own oppression, as most group-based social hierarchies remain stable. SDT states that dominant groups will tend to display higher levels of in-group favouritism than subordinate groups will, who instead often reinforce negative stereotypes and show out-group favouritism (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). All of these features of group-based social hierarchy are said to be maintained through legitimizing myths (attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes) that provide justification for the social practices that distribute social value within a system. The determining factor in one's acceptance of legitimizing myths is their *social dominance orientation* (SDO), which is the extent to which an individual desires that his in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups. Some researchers have found that individuals with high SDO's are more likely to dehumanize, or perceive others as less than human, than those with low SDO (Trounson et al. 2015).

SDT has built upon SIT's finding of in-group favouritism in minimally defined groups, and in the absence of a prior history of conflict or conflict of material interests. Where SDT finds SIT to fall short is illustrated in SDT's argument that SIT does not clearly account for individual differences in the degree of discrimination and prejudice against the other (Sidanius et al. 2004). Thus, SDT studies both the group and individual levels to understand intergroup conflict.

Additionally, SIT expects people to evaluate their in-groups more favourably on dimensions that are tied directly to differences in group status. However, according to SDT out-group favouritism is not uncommon. SDT has been criticized for being "just another exercise in biological determinism", namely because of its emphasis on the ubiquity of group-based

dominance in human societies, instability of egalitarian societies, and the inevitability of group

dominance (Sidanius et al. 2004). Further, some critics have accused SDT of providing moral

and intellectual legitimacy for continued social inequality (Jost & Major 2001).

Core Theory

As discussed, each of these five theoretical camps offers certain strengths and

weaknesses, but a common underlying thread is that groups behave in a discriminatory manner

when there is a threat or potential threat by the out-group towards some aspect of the in-group

or the group's interests (or in the case of instrumentalism, an elite's own interests). In

primordialist theories the absence of familial ties and the compassion that accompanies them

means that the sense of security against harm or foul intention from another individual

associated with that bond does not exist. This replacement of compassion with insecurity

contributes to a hostile outlook towards the out-group. With RCT it is clear that the existence of

competition over limited resources constitutes a threat to the in-group's access to these

resources by the out-group. It is this threat to their interests that the in-group responds to by

discriminating against the out-group in an effort to secure their access to the resources. Similar

principles apply to instrumentalism, only that now the threat is to an individual's interest, an elite,

and the threat comes from other elites whose goals overlap, causing competition.

According to SIT, because positive social identity is based on comparison and is

necessarily relative, the threat which must be suppressed is that the in-group will be negatively

differentiated from the out-group should the out-group thrive in a particular way. It is this inherent

comparison that exists between groups where threat arises from. Thus, the in-group will

discriminate against the out-group in a effort to reduce this possibility and to maintain or achieve

superiority. Finally, with SDT it is a threat to the stability of the natural hierarchical structure of

human societies that requires legitimizing myths to aid in the oppression of subordinate groups

by the dominant group. Oppression, which may even include dehumanization, is merely a manifestation of the maintenance of such social practices that protect the natural distribution of social value within a system from the threat of its disintegration.

This common theme of threat is often overlooked by the camps discussed or assumed and taken as a given. This theme is central to my core theory, which expects that governments, as an in-group themselves or representing a dominant in-group in society, employ oppressive policies or actions as a reaction towards the out-group, in this case minority, from which they perceive a threat. The threat may be a threat to their domination over political power, access to material resources, personal or collective safety, positive social identity, or the endurance of their cultural values, among many other threats. As threat increases, so too does the level of government repression.

As discussed, there is a large array of actions or potentials for action that may pose a threat to the dominant group, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fashion an exhaustive list. In order to narrow the scope of the conceptual independent variable of threat I will examine and operationalize threats posed by whether there is a history of or there is existing separatist activity, the extent to which the minority is armed and actively rebellious, if the minority group is geographically concentrated, and if the minority is organized and able to mobilize, whether the minority receives external support from kindred groups, foreign states, or non-state actors, and whether the minority is in economic competition with the state over access to resources. I hypothesize a positive correlation between threat and its operationalization through the above variables and the level of repression executed by the government towards the minority group. Specific hypotheses are as follows:

- As acts of rebellion intensify in a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.
- As foreign state support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As non-state actor support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As kindred group support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As the group concentration of a minority increases so too does government repression of the minority.

- As unemployment, and in effect economic competition, increases so too does government repression of minorities.

- As separatist activity intensifies, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As group organization intensifies, so too does government repression of the minority.

Data and Methods

In order to test the hypotheses I have put forth I will conduct a large N study using a regression analysis and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset founded by Ted Robert Gurr. The MAR project is a "university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups". Ethnopolitical groups recorded contain at least 100,000 members or constitute one percent of a country's population. Historically, the focus of the MAR project has been "minorities at risk." The project defines a "minority at risk" as an ethnopolitical group that collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à- vis other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests. As such, the MAR project does not restrict data to groups under 50% of the total country population, but instead adopts the definition of "social minority", including groups that may constitute the majority of the population but are subordinated and dominated by another group in society. As the concepts of threat, dominance, and in-group/ out- group relations are not bound to population numbers I will uphold this definition and include

groups that represent social minorities in my examination. Minority groups tested in my study will come from the 282 ethnopolitical groups currently tracked by the MAR project.

Operationalization and Variables

The MAR dataset contains several measures that will aid in measuring the independent variables. While some of these measures are perfect fits for the variables they are paired with, some others are the best available fits. The "Separatism index" (SEPX) will represent the independent variable "history of or existing separatist activity". The measure ranges on a zero to three point scale. The Separatism index measures a latent threat, the potential of pattern formation and the incentive to continue or resurrect former efforts, but at the highest end of the scale it also encompasses active threat, measuring active separatist movements. I will use the "Rebellion" measure (REB) to examine the extent to which the minority is armed and actively rebellious. The measure ranges on a zero to seven point scale. "Rebellion" measures active threat. I will use the "Group spatial distribution" (GROUPCON) to examine group geographic concentration. The measure ranges on a zero to three point scale. Group spatial distribution measures latent threat, specifically the capacity for a minority to act against the state should it choose to do so. Inherent in this measure is also relative population size, as larger populations in a region can pose a logistic threat. The logic follows that the higher the group concentration in one region the more easily members of the minority can bind together and meet, and the more man-power they have to mobilize.

I will examine group organization levels through the "Group organization for joint political action" (GOJPA) measure, which ranges on a zero to five point scale. Group organization for joint political action mainly measures latent threat, again the capacity for a minority to act against the state should it choose to do so, according to how organized the minority is and in what form. Finally, I will utilize the unemployment measure as a percentage of the total labour

market (wdi_unemp) from the Quality of Government dataset in order to examine economic competition. Rising unemployment contributes to economic competition between not only individuals, but also the groups with which individuals self-identify. (Note that in order to examine a potential interaction between unemployment and regime type, specifically whether a country is a democracy or not, I will use the regime type measure from the Quality of Government dataset (ht_regtype) and recode the variable to a binary variable where democracy equal zero and all other regime types are coded to one).

While the former variables constitute internal threats, in an effort to recognize that not all threats are home-grown, the following variables will constitute external threats. I will use the Kindred Support (KINSUP) measure to examine kindred group support for a minority, Foreign State Support (STASUP) measure to examine the existence and extent of foreign state and state-led actor support for the minority. Finally, I will use the Non-state Actor Support (NSASUP) measure to examine support from non-governmental organizations, prominent individuals and religious organizations. Each of these measures is binary yes or no and is a conglomeration of military, political, and material support. These variables measure both latent and active threats depending on the form of support offered, namely that military and political support represent active threat while others represent latent.

The dependent variable, government repression, must also be operationalized. Thankfully government repression is less conceptual than threat and a "Government repression" measure (REPGENCIV) measuring government repression of group civilian populations exists within the dataset. This measure is one used by the MAR project itself to measure government repression of "minorities at risk", and ranges on a zero to five point scale. As mentioned earlier, government repression can range from "softer" tactics such as censorship and economic discrimination to violent coercion. Theoretically, the severity of the repression will depend on the severity of the threat. Appropriately, the Government repression measure available ranges from

non-violent to violent forms of oppression. In examining government repression, naturally surveillance and violent coercion are not equal and should not be treated as such. More coercive methods are more telling than less coercive methods and will fundamentally be the most important when examining the effects of the independent variables.

The dataset contains several "measures of distinctiveness" that may be controlled in order to control for group characteristics or in-group biases used as explanatory factors in some other theories. Measures of distinctiveness are measured through comparison of the minority to the dominant group. They include language, which ranges from linguistic assimilation with the dominant group to the minority group speaking primarily one language, different from the dominant group. It also includes measures for belief, which examines whether the minority practices the same religion as the dominant group, a different sect, or a different religion entirely, and race, which ranges from the minority group having no physical differences in appearance to the dominant group to being of "different racial stock [with] little or no intermixture". Finally, I will be assessing the statistical significance of independent variables using a 95% confidence interval, represented by p values below 0.05 in the bivariate analyses and a minimum of two asterisks in the multivariate regression.

Univariate analysis

The dependent variable Government repression contains six categories in ascending order of more coercive, severe policies of repression. This graph depicting the distribution of government repression of the 284 minorities of groups identified by MAR to be "minorities at risk" suggests that the vast majority of countries with "minorities at risk" have no reported cases of minority repression. While to be expected to some degree, after all, not all minorities are oppressed by the government, the large skew towards none reported may also be due to false reporting, especially in non-democratic states. The bar also may be exaggerated due to MAR's inclusion of minorities groups that benefit from discrimination, which is known as positive discrimination. The total number of cases logged into the dataset under the variable government repression is 852. Of these, 584 report no government oppression. Of the 268 cases reporting some level of repression, the data generally reports a heavier distribution towards higher levels of repression as demonstrated by the bar graph[1].

In examining how government repression of minorities has changed over time, upon first glance, it doesn't appear to have changed by much. When looking more closely at a series of bar graphs that span the three years logged by the dataset we can observe that some of the bars have increased and decreased slightly over time. This can be confirmed by examining data

[1] A table reports that the Surveillance category level contains 12 observations, Harassment/containment includes 52, Nonviolent coercion contained 39, Violent coercion, short of killing contains 65, and Violent coercion, killing includes 78. 22 observations are not available.

tables of each year[2]. Within the span of three years No basis for judgment has decreased by

four cases, None reported has increased by eight cases, Harassment has decreased by five

cases, Non-violent coercion has decreased by three cases, and Violent coercion, short of killing

has increased by four cases. The increase of cases in the Violent coercion, short of killing

category suggests that cases of oppression have moved from the less extreme levels of

oppression towards more severe policies of repression, thus we observe a minimal increase in

violent strategies of government repression over time. However, as the changes between years

is relatively minimal in the context of a large N study this study will not include time-series

analyses.

Bivariate analyses

In this section I will examine the relationship between each independent variable and

government repression using the appropriate statistical tests, namely the chi squared test for

seven out of eight variables, and the one way ANOVA test for the final variable, economic

competition. I will also conduct bivariate regressions but will ultimately weigh the statistical tests

over the bivariate regressions to determine if a statistically significant relationship exists.

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[2] See appendix for yearly tables.

	Separatism	Group Organization	Group Concentration	Rebellion	Kindred Support	State Support	Non-state Actor Support	Economic Competition
Chisquare/ ANOVA	1.4363e-06	2.2e-16	3.93e-05	2.2e-16	0.5729	3.236e-14	3.822e-13	0.03883
Bivariate Regression	0.001008	2.2e-16	0.2001	2.2e-16	0.009123	4.124e-15	1.149e-13	0.3136
Adjusted R2	0.01608	0.157	0.001988	0.299	0.007095	0.07192	0.06426	2.509e-05

Separatism

A bar graph illustrates that, while most cases of government oppression are oriented towards non-separatist minorities, government repression of minorities visibly increases with the existence of active separatism in the past 25 years. In these instances, we specifically see a drastic increase in violent coercion and killing. Both the chi squared test and bivariate regression report a statistically significant relationship between separatism and government repression. Examining each category level reveals a statistically significant relationship between a minimal separatist effort and government repression and between separatist movements in the past 25 years and government repression, but not between a separatist movement that occurred in the past 50 years but not past 25 years and government repression[3]. Ultimately, the importance is in the significance of the relationship between separatist movements in the past 25 years and government repression, as it is at this level that we see active threat, which theoretically induces a more intense and immediate response than latent threat.[4]

The significance of the positive relationship between recent separatist activity and government repression is indicated by the low p value and the positive coefficient regression estimate which indicates an increase in government repression with the existence of recent separatist activity in comparison to government repression of groups with no separatist activity. This significance aids in confirming the hypothesis that separatism, specifically active separatism, increases government repression at the bivariate level.

Group organization

A bar graph illustrates that government repression increases drastically with increasing group organization, specifically the fomentation of militant organizations to represent group

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[3] Bivariate regression model tables on individual independent variables available upon request.

[4] The Minimal category level is measured using a complicated and unclear index (AUTLOST>0 but no separatist (independence/revanchist) or autonomy movements in past 50 years). For this reason for the purposes of the bivariate and multivariate regressions I will largely be focussing on the significance of the other two levels as indicators of whether this variable has a significant effect on government repression.

interests. While the Militant only category reports the overall highest levels of oppression, the Mainly militant category reports higher violent coercion and killing. This is not hard to rationalize, as this category includes both militant and non-militant organizations, and is specifically measuring proportions of each not quantities. Thus, it is possible that the quantities of militant organizations are higher but the proportions overall are lower.

A chi squared test and bivariate regression both report a statistically significant relationship between group organization and government repression. Each category level reports a positive coefficient estimate, indicating a positive relationship. Examining each level reveals a statistically significant relationship between Mainly militant group organization and government repression and between Militant only group organization and government repression. Thus, it is specifically the levels with a high level of militancy that demonstrate a significant positive relationship with government oppression. This is not altogether surprising, because, as discussed earlier in the discussion of threat, scholars tend to agree that violent strategies of dissent usually entail the greatest and most obvious threats to the political system. At this stage, we will accept the hypothesis that as minority group organization intensifies government repression increases by recognizing that it is the development of militant organizations specifically that increases government repression.

Group Concentration

Although it appears that the highest total amount of government repression is found in widely dispersed minorities with low geographic concentration, a bar graph suggests that violent coercion and killing steadily increases with the increasing geographic concentration of a minority, with the highest levels of violent coercion and killing found when the minority is concentrated in one region. It is not yet clear, however, whether this relationship is statistically significant. A chi squared test reports a statistically significant relationship between group

organization and government repression. We can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between group concentration and government repression. However, a bivariate regression reports that overall the effect of group concentration on government repression is not statistically significant. I will examine this variable further at the multivariate level to determine its effect on government repression. At this stage it is important to recognize that this variable does posses a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable.

Rebellion

With the exception of Local rebellions, a bar graph appears to suggest that as rebellion increases so too does government repression, although the violent coercion dips before rising again at 6+ events and again at Large-scale guerrilla[5]. This may be due to the fact that the categories that come before each, Sporadic terrorism and Intermediate guerrilla, have a significantly higher number of observations, where 6+ events and Large-scale guerrilla have far fewer. Where there are large disparities in observations it can make an accurate comparison difficult and error is likely to be higher.

A chi squared test and bivariate regression report a statistically significant relationship between rebellion and government repression, with positive coefficients at almost every level, indicating that as rebellion rises so too does government repression. Examining each level reveals a statistically significant relationship between small-scale guerrilla activity, intermediate guerrilla activity, large-scale guerrilla activity, and civil war and government repression. Essentially, we see that as acts of rebellion intensify government repression increases. As rebellion represents both an active threat and violent strategy of dissent, this strong correlation is unsurprising because these forms of threat, which are perceived to be the greatest and most

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[5] Local rebellions only contains two observations. They are the Uzbeks in Afghanistan and the Adzhars in Georgia. These two cases happen to not experience government repression. Such a small sample size makes this category level measurement highly unreliable and thus I will largely overlook it.

immediate, generally invoke the strongest response. At this level we can confirm the hypothesis that as acts of rebellion committed by a minority increase and intensify, so too does government repression of that minority.

Kindred Support

Kindred support is divided into three sub variables which are combined into one overall variable, but which individually provide a more specific picture. These are Kindred group material, non-military, support (KINMATSUP), Kindred group political support (KINPOLSUP), and Kindred group military support (KINMILSUP). I will examine the overall measure of kindred support (KINSUP) in the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses, but will briefly look at the sub variables.

The bar graph suggests that the existence of kindred support for the minority increases all types of government repression, but particularly increases violent coercion and killing. While a chi squared test does not report a statistically significant relationship between kindred support and government repression, a bivariate regression reports that overall the effect of kindred support on government repression is statistically significant. As I am weighing the chi squared test over the bivariate regression at this stage I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between kindred support and government repression.

A table demonstrates the breakdown of the kindred support variable into material, political, and military support. The significance

	Material	Political	Military
Chisquare	0.04442	0.7737	1.342e-06
Bivariate Regression	0.1117	0.4047	9681e-06

found in the bivariate regression is likely due to the significance of the military support. The significance of this sub variable is consistent with the understanding held by scholars that coercive threat warrants the largest response as it constitutes an active threat. I will examine the

kindred support variable again at the multivariate level to determine if the variable has a significant effect on government repression.

Foreign state and state-led actor (IGOs) support

Foreign state support is divided into three sub variables which are combined into one overall variable, but which individually provide a more specific picture. These are State material, non-military, support (STAMATSUP), State political support (STAPOLSUP), and State military support (STAMILSUP). I will use the overall measure of state support (STASUP) in the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses, but will briefly look at the subvariables.

The bar graph suggests that the existence of foreign state support for the minority significantly increases all types of government repression, and particularly multiplies violent coercion and killing. A chi squared test and bivariate regression both report very low p values. A statistically significant relationship exists between foreign state support and government repression, indicating that overall foreign state support towards a minority has a strong positive effect on government repression of that minority, as demonstrated by the positive coefficient estimate. This coefficient indicates that a one point increase of state support is the equivalent of a 0.98381 point change in government repression. At this level we can confirm the hypothesis that as foreign state support for a minority increases, so too does government repression of that minority.

A table demonstrates the breakdown of the foreign state support variable into material, political, and military support. All three levels

	Material	Political	Military
Chisquare	1.905e-09	5.08e-14	0.0007532
Bivariate Regression	3.044e-11	1.432e-11	0.001104

of foreign state support, which include both active and latent threats, have a significant positive effect on government repression.

Non-state Actor Support

Non-state actor support is divided into three sub variables which are combined into one overall variable, but which individually provide a more specific picture. These are Non-state actor material, non-military, support (NSAMATSUP), Non-state actor political support (NSAPOLSUP), and Non-state actor military support (NSAMILSUP). I will use the overall measure of non-state actor support (NSASUP) in the bivariate and multivariate regression analysis, but will briefly look at the subvariables.

Similar to kindred support and foreign state support, the existence of non-state actor support for the minority significantly increases all types of government repression, and particularly multiplies violent coercion and killing. A chi squared test and bivariate regression report a statistically significant relationship between non-state actor support of a minority and government repression. This effect is positive as indicated by the positive coefficient estimate for the Yes category level, which indicates that a one point increase of non-state actor support is the equivalent of a 1.0158 point change in government repression. At this stage we can accept the hypothesis that as non-state actor support of a minority increases so too does government repression of that minority.

A table demonstrates the breakdown of the non-state actor support variable into

	Material	Political	Military
Chisquare	2.014e-11	0.1083	8.722e-07
Bivariate Regression	1.4999e-10	0.01796	4.825e-07

material, political, and military support. Non-state actor material and military support confidently increase government repression of the receiving minority. Material support constitutes a latent threat, while military support an active one.

Economic competition

When looking at the box plot it is challenging to see if there is any relationship between unemployment and government repression as the means across category levels appear to be

quite similar. It is interesting to note that there appear to be several outliers in most of the category levels. A oneway ANOVA test reports a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. However, the bivariate regression reports that the effect of unemployment on government repression is not statistically significant. This discrepancy may be due to an interaction between unemployment and another variable, or a condition that must included in order to understand unemployment's true effect on government repression. At this stage we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between economic competition and government repression, but I will reexamine this variable at the multivariate level to determine what this relationship looks like.

Multivariate regression

At this stage I will examine the combined effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable and their individual effects when controlling for other variables, whether independent variables that were significant at the bivariate level remain so, whether there are influential outliers skewing the data, and whether there are interaction terms.

In this combined chart model one includes all original independent variables: separatism, group organization, group concentration, rebellion, kindred support, foreign state support, non-state actor support, and economic competition (unemployment)[6]. Model two is a robust regression of the original variables, removing influential outliers[7]. Model three includes the variables from model one with the addition of three control variables: race, language, and belief. These variables have often been used to explain intergroup hostility in prevalent relevant theories. Model four includes the original independent variables with the addition of an

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[6] I have run diagnostic tests on the model, the model does not exhibit multicollinearity. See appendix.

[7] Diagnostic plots and standardized residuals tests highlight cases 2, 294, 364, 523, and 564 as outliers. However, an influence plot indicates that only case 2 (Pashtuns in Afghanistan, 2004) and case 364 (Hmong in Laos, 2004) are influential outliers. The Pashtuns are represented by mainly militant organizations, receive foreign state support and non-state actor support, and engage in intermediate guerrilla activity. The Hmong are concentrated in one region, actively engage in separatist movements and are represented by only militant organizations. Neither are reported to experience government repression, as one may have predicted. See appendix.

interaction between unemployment and regime type, coded as democracy (0) and non-democracy (1). Model five includes the original variables, the control variables and the interaction term, all combined into one model[8].

	Dependent variable:				
			repgenciv.numeric		
	OLS	robust linear		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rebellion: Sporadic Terrorism	0.803*** (0.207)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.798*** (0.206)	0.906*** (0.204)	0.838*** (0.205)
Rebellion: 6+ events	0.337 (0.558)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.182 (0.537)	0.500 (0.549)	0.317 (0.533)
Rebellion: Local Rebellions	-0.005 (1.040)	0.001 (0.005)	0.482 (1.402)	0.014 (1.008)	0.383 (1.388)
Rebellion: Small-scale Guerrilla	2.902*** (0.569)	4.987*** (0.003)	3.170*** (0.552)	2.897*** (0.557)	3.154*** (0.547)
Rebellion: Intermediate Guerrilla	4.352*** (0.450)	4.999*** (0.002)	4.215*** (0.438)	4.366*** (0.441)	4.254*** (0.434)
Rebellion: Large-scale Guerrilla	2.615*** (0.439)	4.001*** (0.002)	2.770*** (0.427)	2.815*** (0.435)	2.893*** (0.427)
Rebellion: Civil War	4.620*** (1.451)	4.999*** (0.007)	4.702*** (1.400)	4.308*** (1.422)	4.601*** (1.386)
Non-State Actor Support: Yes	0.380*** (0.143)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.296** (0.145)	0.473*** (0.144)	0.362** (0.146)
Foreign State Support: Yes	0.442*** (0.131)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.315** (0.135)	0.366*** (0.130)	0.274** (0.134)
Kindred Support: Yes	0.168 (0.179)	0.001 (0.001)	0.188 (0.173)	0.197 (0.175)	0.223 (0.172)
Group Organization: Umbrella	0.482 (0.396)	0.001 (0.002)	0.044 (0.384)	0.470 (0.387)	0.085 (0.380)
Group Organization: One or more conventional	0.194 (0.370)	0.001 (0.002)	0.048 (0.357)	0.253 (0.363)	0.113 (0.354)
Group Organization: Mainly conventional	0.406 (0.392)	0.001 (0.002)	0.251 (0.379)	0.436 (0.385)	0.308 (0.376)
Group Organization: Mainly Militant	-0.296 (0.454)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.453 (0.441)	-0.257 (0.445)	-0.391 (0.437)
Group Organization: Militant Only	0.800 (0.580)	0.794*** (0.003)	0.918 (0.562)	0.559 (0.570)	0.726 (0.558)
Group Concentration: Minority in One Region	-0.405* (0.216)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.456** (0.220)	-0.333 (0.213)	-0.420* (0.219)
Group Concentration: Majority in one region	-0.800*** (0.217)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.577** (0.225)	-0.818*** (0.213)	-0.626*** (0.223)
Group Concentration: Concentrated in one region	-0.607*** (0.192)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.617*** (0.194)	-0.594*** (0.188)	-0.608*** (0.192)
Separatism: Minimal	-0.505** (0.209)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.322 (0.212)	-0.440** (0.205)	-0.253 (0.211)
Separatism: At least 5 in 50 but not 25	-0.570 (0.513)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.388 (0.497)	-0.436 (0.505)	-0.252 (0.495)
Separatism: Past 25	-0.257* (0.145)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.218 (0.149)	-0.222 (0.143)	-0.203 (0.148)
Unemployment	0.018** (0.009)	0.0001** (0.00004)	0.021** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.011)
Race: Physically distinguishable subtype			0.613*** (0.167)		0.569*** (0.166)
Race: Different racial stock with intermixture			-0.110 (0.164)		0.010 (0.165)
Race: Different racial stock no intermixture			0.153 (0.216)		0.147 (0.214)
Language: At least one different from majority group			0.271* (0.159)		0.247 (0.162)
Language: Different from majority group			0.091 (0.213)		0.068 (0.212)
Belief: Different sect within same religion			-0.152 (0.180)		-0.086 (0.179)
Belief: Different religion			0.092 (0.134)		0.036 (0.131)
Non-Democracy				1.051*** (0.202)	0.790*** (0.209)
UnemploymentXNon-Democracy				-0.094*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.020)
Observations	638	638	604	638	604
R2	0.314		0.375	0.345	0.390
Adjusted R2	0.290		0.343	0.319	0.357
Residual Std. Error	1.414 (df = 615)	0.006 (df = 615)	1.352 (df = 574)	1.384 (df = 613)	1.337 (df = 572)
F Statistic	12.001*** (df = 22; 615)		11.854*** (df = 29; 574)	13.429*** (df = 24; 613)	11.795*** (df = 31; 572)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

At the bivariate level rebellion, group organization, separatism, foreign state support, and non-state actor support were reported as having a statistically significant effect on government repression of minorities in both the bivariate regressions and statistical tests. When controlling for other variables multivariate regression in the first model confirms that rebellion, foreign state support, and non-state actor support each have a statistically significant effect on government repression of minorities. Each of the five models returns high statistical significance on these variables as indicated by the minimum of two asterisks. Positive coefficients and effects plot

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[8] Note that I have also run logit models for each model. Results were similar to the regular linear regression models.

slopes indicate a strong positive relationship between these variables and government repression[9].

Thus we can accept the relevant alternative hypotheses and conclude as follows:

- As acts of rebellion increase in a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As foreign state support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

- As non-state actor support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

    Once influential outliers are removed in model two, multivariate regression also confirms that separatism and group organization have a statistically significant effect on government repression of minorities. As was found in the bivariate level, the "Minimal" and "Past 25" category levels of the separatism variable are significant predictors[10]. Past 25 represents active threat, but the Minimal category which indicates that there was a minimal level of separatism prior to the last 50 years, does not. This category level constitutes latent threat, and thus this variable demonstrates how both latent and active threats can be perceived and responded to similarly[11]. However, it is important to note that, now that other variables are controlled for, the negative coefficient estimates reported by the multivariate regression suggest that as separatism increases government repression declines, whereas in the bivariate analysis Past 25 was reported to increase government repression. An effects plot visually demonstrates how Past 25 and other category levels depress government repression in comparison to groups with no separatist activity. However, in examining the bar graph at the bivariate level we can see that

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[9] See appendix for effects plots not displayed.

[10] Note that a chi squared test indicates that Separatism and Group Organization possess a statistically significant relationship, but as the model does not exhibit multicollinearity and the overall adjusted R2 value of the model increases with the addition of each of these variables I have chosen to keep both in the model.

[11] Interesting to note is that the "Minimal" category level of the separatism variable is statistically significant in model one, model two and model four, but loses its significance at the introduction of the control variables race, language, and belief in models three and five. It is likely that one or a combination of these control variables has a relationship with the separatism variable. A chi squared test reports a statistically significant relationship between separatism and language.

violent coercion and killing significantly increases as separatism intensifies. Ultimately, what we are observing is that when separatist activity intensifies, overall levels of government repression decline. This includes methods of repression like surveillance and harassment. However, violent coercion and killing increases significantly. This discrepancy must be dealt with theoretically by recognizing that the increase in the most coercive form of government repression is the key indicator of the relationship. Ultimately, less coercive modes of repression, such as surveillance, should not be treated as equal to more coercive methods when examining the independent variables. At this stage we can deduce that intensifying separatist activity depresses overall levels of repression but increases violent coercion and killing[12]. However more research needs to be done in order to make conclusive remarks about this variable.

With group organization we find that once other variables are controlled for only the "Militant only" category level has a statistically significant and positive effect on government repression of minorities. An effects plot visually demonstrates the positive effect of Militant only,

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[12] See footnote 13 for a potential explanation of this relationship using logical reasoning.

especially when compared to other category levels. As discussed at the bivariate level, scholars tend to agree that violent strategies of dissent usually entail the greatest and most obvious threats to the political system[13].

We can now accept the relevant alternative hypothesis and conclude as follows:

- As group organization intensifies, so too does government repression of the relevant minority.

Group concentration, specifically the levels with higher concentrations of the minority, has become statistically significant across all models. This confirms the statistically significant report of the chi squared test. Similar to separatism, the coefficient estimates report and an effects plot demonstrates an overall negative relationship between group concentration and government repression, but in examining the bar graph at the bivariate level we can see that violent coercion and killing significantly increases as group concentration increases. Thus, the relationship is that as minorities become more geographically concentrated overall government repression declines, but violent coercion and killing multiplies.

groupcon.factor effect plot

Again, this discrepancy must be dealt with theoretically by recognizing that the increase in the most coercive form of government repression is the key indicator of the relationship, and again,

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[13]Because of the limitations of the effects plot the increase in violent coercion and killing in the level Mainly militant is not well represented.

less coercive modes of repression, such as surveillance, should not be treated as equal to more coercive methods when examining the independent variables. At this stage we can deduce that increasing concentration depresses overall levels of repression but increases violent coercion and killing[14]. More research needs to be done in order to make conclusive remarks about this variable.

Kindred group support, which was not reported to have a statistically significant relationship with government repression by the chi squared test, is found insignificant across all models. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that increased overall kindred group support leads to increased government repression, although we know from the bivariate analyses that kindred military support does lead to increased government repression.

Unemployment has become statistically significant across all models. At the bivariate level unemployment was reported to have a statistically significant relationship with government repression by the one way ANOVA test but was not reported to have a significant effect on the dependent variable in the bivariate regression, which signalled a potential conditional effect. This indicates that as unemployment, and in effect economic competition, rises government


repression of minorities intensifies. With the introduction of the interaction between unemployment and regime type in model four unemployment becomes even more significant, but an underlying relationship reveals itself. As the effects plot of the interaction illustrates, in democracies (0) as unemployment

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[14] A potential explanation for this relationship is that when minority groups are widely dispersed it is harder for them to organize, which makes them less of an immediate threat. In this case it makes more sense for governments to engage in surveillance and harassment rather than violent coercion and killing. However, in the cases where groups are concentrated they pose a more real threat but are more easy to violently oppress. Also surveillance and harassment require far fewer resources and commitment than violent coercion and killing, which may explain why a government might prefer the former method in instances where more coercive methods are not seen as immediately necessary. Similar logic applies to the Separatism variable.

increases government repression of minorities also increases, but in non-democracies (1) the opposite is true. The statistically significant negative coefficient of the interaction term helps to confirm that in non-democracies as unemployment rises government repression of minorities subsides.

Model one, which includes the original independent variables, returns an adjusted R2 value of 0.29, meaning that this combination of variables explains 29% of the variation in government oppression of minorities. In model three the control variables race, language, and belief are introduced. The adjusted R2 of this model is 0.343, meaning that this combination of variables explains over 34% of the variation in government oppression of minorities. It is important to note that while these control variables did increase the adjusted R2 by about 5% it is clear that the existence of differences in race, language, and religion between the dominant and minority group in society do not largely explain the phenomenon of government repression and its variation across cases, but rather that they explain a small portion of the variation. In fact, alone the combination of these three variables explains about 7% of variation across cases and of these three variables only race is found to be statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval, and at only one level[15]. These variables are seemingly overstated in competing theories of intergroup conflict and hostility.

BELIEF*GROUPCON effect plot

However, it is important to note that with the introduction of these control variables the Primarily urban, minority in one region category level of Group concentration has become significant. Examining the

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
[15] See Appendix for regression model.

interaction between Group concentration and Belief reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between the "Different sect within same religion as majority" level of Belief and the "Primarily urban or minority in one region" level of Group Concentration as reflected by a statically significant positive coefficient estimate and positive slope of the effects plot for that category level of Belief when compared to other levels. This means that in cases where a minority belongs to a different sect primarily urban concentration increases government repression of that minority compared to minorities that are widely dispersed.

The introduction of the unemployment-regime type interaction term to the original variables in model four increases the explained variance by about 3%, as seen in the increase from the adjusted R2 of 0.29 in model one to 0.319 in model four. The inclusion of all original variables, the interaction term, and the control variables in model five brings up the adjusted R2 to 0.357, an increase of 6.7 points from model one[16]. Almost 36% of variance in government repression across cases is explained by model five. Of these models the most ideal for the purposes of this study overall would be a combination of model two, the robust regression of model one, which would remove influential outliers that are skewing the data, with the addition of the interaction term. This model would demonstrate existing relationships most accurately.[17]

With this knowledge we can now return to the Baha'i's of Iran to examine their case more closely and determine causal factors. The Baha'i people are primarily concentrated in urban areas or are the minority in a region, and have not engaged in any level of separatist activity or rebellion. They are not reported to receive any foreign state or non-state actor support of any kind, whether that being material, military, or political. Finally, they are represented by umbrella organizations, the least threatening and coercive of all levels, and do not exhibit a

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[16] Besides the Minimal category of Separatism in model three, there is no major loss of statistical significance of an independent variable between the models (although Foreign State Support and Non-state Actor Support slightly lose significance reflected in the loss of one asterisk in model three). This is due to the introduction of the control variables race, language, and belief which may posses a relationship with the former variables.

[17] Model four, which includes the interaction term and the original variables explains 32% of variance. With the outliers removed this value would rise (as we can see, two independent variables became statistically significant in the multivariate regression) and the relationships revealed would be truer. Unfortunately a robust regression will not return an adjusted R2 value so I cannot examine exactly how much variance this ideal model would explain.

particularly alarming level of unemployment at about 11%. These features would seemingly predict the absence of government repression of this particular minority, but instead what we find is that the Baha'i's experience repression, specifically nonviolent coercion, under the hands of the Iranian government.

With the introduction of the variables race, language, and belief in model three, the concentration of a minority in urban areas or as the minority in a region becomes statistically significant as a predictor of government repression. Of these variables the only one where the Baha'i's differ from the majority population is Belief, where it falls into the Different religion category level. The bivariate bar graph shows that violent coercion increases as group concentration increases, but it does not show an increase in nonviolent coercion, which the Baha'i's experience. Additionally, the interaction between Belief and Group concentration does not apply to the Baha'i[18]. Ultimately, these models and combinations of variables have not been able to explain government repression of Baha'i's in Iran.

Conclusion

Through quantitative analyses on a large N sample of almost 300 minority groups the above analysis has been able to confidently confirm five of the eight hypotheses proposed. These are as follows:

- As acts of rebellion intensify in a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.
- As foreign state support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.
- As non-state actor support increases for a minority, so too does government repression of the minority.

---

[18] Anecdotal data I have collected from informal interviews suggests that the Islamic Regime of Iran wrongly perceives the Baha'i religion as a heretical sect of Islam. As the logic surrounding threat pertains to threat that is perceived by the in-group, if the government perceives the Baha'i religion as a sect it is possible that the interaction between Belief and Group concentration is an explanatory factor for the repression of this minority group. However, there is not enough evidence at this point to make such a conclusion.

- As unemployment, and in effect economic competition, increases so too does government repression of minorities (conditional based on regime type).
- As group organization intensifies, so too does government repression of the relevant minority.

Statistically significant positive regression coefficients and effects plot slopes in the case of these variables confirm the alternative hypotheses associated with each. As each of these variables is an operationalization of the conceptual variable of threat, we can determine that five out of eight indicators of threat have a statistically significant positive relationship with government repression. It is also clear that it is not solely militancy or active threats that incite government repression. Foreign state material and political support, non-state actor material support, and economic competition, all of which constitute latent threats, also lead to increased levels of government repression.

Hypotheses that require further testing in order to produce conclusive results are:

- As separatist activity intensifies, so too does government repression of the relevant minority.
- As the group concentration of a minority increases so too does government repression of the minority.

As discussed, "threat" may be a threat to a government's domination over political power, access to material resources, personal or collective safety, positive social identity, or the endurance of their cultural values, among many other threats. I hypothesized that groups behave in a discriminatory manner when there is a threat or potential threat by the out-group towards some aspect of the in-group or the group's interests. I have been able to demonstrate that governments, as an in-group themselves or representing a dominant in-group in society, employ oppressive policies or actions as a reaction towards the out-group, in this case minority, from which they perceive a threat.

However, it is important to note that the combination of variables examined account for 32% of the variance in government repression of minorities across cases. While this is a large

improvement from the 7% that differences in race, language, and belief alone account for, there is still a large amount of variation that this study has not been able to explain. Ultimately, the study of intergroup conflict in the form of government repression of minorities still requires much theoretical and analytical examination, but this study has contributed to the ongoing discourse.

In regards to the Baha'i I have not been able to determine the causal factors explaining their widespread repression as none of the variables with significant effects on government repression were shown to be relevant to their case. In the midst of the increasing recognition of calls against the persecution of Iranian Baha'i's by international institutions, specifically the United Nations through the General Assembly, in reports by the Secretary General, and a number of Special Rapporteurs (UN Statements, Baha'i World News Service), despite its best efforts, this study leaves the Baha'i question unanswered and open for further future study.

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Appendix

```
REPGENCIV 2004
        No basis for judgment                    None reported
                9                                      190
             Surveillance                  Harassment/containment
                4                                      20
    Nonviolent coercion Violent coercion, short of killing
               15                                      20
    Violent coercion, killing                         Sum
               26                                      284


REPGENCIV 2005
        No basis for judgment                    None reported
                8                                      196
             Surveillance                  Harassment/containment
                4                                      17
    Nonviolent coercion Violent coercion, short of killing
               12                                      21
    Violent coercion, killing                         Sum
               26                                      284


REPGENCIV 2006
        No basis for judgment                    None reported
                5                                      198
             Surveillance                  Harassment/containment
                4                                      15
    Nonviolent coercion Violent coercion, short of killing
               12                                      24
    Violent coercion, killing                         Sum
               26                                      284
```

Yearly tables of government repression

> vif(model1MAR)

```
                 GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df))
reb.factor      2.891561  7      1.078793
nsasup.factor   1.294545  1      1.137781
stasup.factor   1.312874  1      1.145807
kinsup.factor   1.157581  1      1.075909
gojpa.factor    3.436636  5      1.131393
groupcon.factor 1.488014  3
1.068484
sepx.factor     1.980800  3      1.120659
wdi_unemp       1.070069  1
1.034441
```

In testing for multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor reports no values over ten, indicating that multicollinearity it not severely affecting the model.

```
> influencePlot(model1MAR)
     StudRes       Hat      CookD
2   -3.760214 0.08928008
0.05900464
364  3.222291 0.12247725
0.06206155
600      NaN 1.00000000
NaN
```


Diagnostic tests and influence plot

Remaining effects plots

```
> summary(lm(repgenciv.numeric~race.factor+lang.factor+belief.factor, data=MARcomplete))

Call:
lm(formula = repgenciv.numeric ~ race.factor + lang.factor +
    belief.factor, data = MARcomplete)

Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max
-1.8997 -0.9325 -0.5936  0.2250  4.5644

Coefficients:
                                                                            Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept)                                                                  1.51647    0.15053
race.factorPhysically distinguishable subtype of some racial stock          0.80096    0.17444
race.factorDifferent racial stock from the dominant group with substantial intermixture -0.33890    0.17936
race.factorDifferent racial stock, little or no intermixture                 0.03322    0.24296
lang.factorGroup speaks multiple language, at least one different from majority group  0.41603    0.16674
lang.factorGroup speaks primarily one language, different from majority group  0.03878    0.21707
belief.factorDifferent sect within same religion as majority                -0.06063    0.19882
belief.factorDifferent religion                                              0.16624    0.14880
                                                                            t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)                                                                  10.074  < 2e-16 ***
race.factorPhysically distinguishable subtype of some racial stock           4.591 5.27e-06 ***
race.factorDifferent racial stock from the dominant group with substantial intermixture -1.889   0.0593 .
race.factorDifferent racial stock, little or no intermixture                 0.137   0.8913
lang.factorGroup speaks multiple language, at least one different from majority group   2.495   0.0128 *
lang.factorGroup speaks primarily one language, different from majority group  0.179   0.8583
belief.factorDifferent sect within same religion as majority                -0.408   0.6833
belief.factorDifferent religion                                              1.117   0.2643
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.635 on 662 degrees of freedom
  (53 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.0816,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.07189
F-statistic: 8.403 on 7 and 662 DF,  p-value: 7.294e-10
```

Multivariate regression for race, language, and belief