

Tools Outside of Diplomacy: How Authoritarian Regimes Extend Control Overseas

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Abstract

In this paper, the author is interested in investigating how authoritarian states exert political influence over emigrants. This paper achieves two objectives. First, the author uses Optical Character Recognition to construct a new data set on foreign lobbying and evaluates theories from previous foreign lobbying studies. Second, the author argues that states use lobbying for purposes not attainable under the domain of regular diplomacy. Specifically, the author demonstrates that authoritarian states strategically adjust the amount of media relations lobbying in response to fluctuating emigration flow into the U.S.

1 Introduction

Why do states lobby in the United States? The United States is one of the most restrictive democracies to foreign lobbying. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 requires all foreign agents who are engaging in political activities in the U.S. to publicly disclose their activities. Diplomacy is an act that rewards discretion and values privacy. If states are able to communicate with the United States through diplomatic channels and accomplish most of their objectives with direct negotiation, under which circumstances would they be willing to spend money on lobbying the U.S. Congress?

Previous literature suggests that foreign lobbying is utilized for trade purposes (Gwande et al 2006; Stoyanov 2009). Studies in the past found that foreign business lobbying is as effective at lowering trade tariffs as domestic companies are (Skonieczny 2017; Blanga-Gubbay et al 2021). Empirical evidence, however, has been unable to isolate the effect of foreign lobbying since it is challenging to separate domestic and foreign lobbying using the existing data sets. In this paper, I present a new foreign lobbying data set based on the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Using Optical Character Recognition and neural networks modeling, I am able to identify foreign agents that have engaged in political activities in the U.S. and present a systematic image of how they utilize lobbying to achieve their strategic goals.

I argue that states use lobbying as a tool for purposes outside of the regular domain of diplomacy. In this paper, I test the hypothesis that states spend efforts on maintaining media relations within the United States in order to reach out to

its foreign diasporas. I find that autocratic states are more likely to spend more on lobbying for media relations when its emigration flow toward the U.S. increases, but this result is less salient for democracies. This paper is one of the first efforts to delve into the details of foreign lobbying and understand state motives behind these activities. Its results reveal the need to compartmentalize different types of lobby spending and identify various incentives that drive them. This research makes two major contributions. First, it presents a new comprehensive data set on foreign lobbying that distinguishes between state and non-state agents. Second, the paper demonstrates that states use lobbying as a calculated strategy that complements their larger foreign policy goals.

2 Foreign Lobbying

The majority of studies on foreign lobbying focus on such activities in the United States. The primary reason is the availability of empirical data and concentration of political interests. In the past, research on foreign lobbying has largely been centered on foreign aid and trade, as Congress exerts more control in those territories. Some literature has suggested that foreign parties casts as much influence as domestic coalitions in lowering trade barriers (Gwande et al 2006; Stoyanov 2009; Skonieczny 2017; Blanga-Gubbay et al 2021). Building on the "Quid pro quo" model of lobbying first put forth by Grossman and Helpman (1994), studies up until now have demonstrated that the effectiveness of policy outcomes does not seem to depend on the origin of lobbying. Rather, policy-makers rely on ideological alignment and political interest

to decide whether or not to support the proposed policy (Curran and Eckhardt 2017). Empirical evidence suggests that foreign actors have been successful in efforts to lower tariffs, increase the amount of U.S. FDI, and even promote legislation (Montes-Rojas 2012; Kee et al 2016; Skonieczny 2017).

On the other hand, foreign lobbying for U.S. aid paints a slightly different picture. Even though logic and intuition would suggest that aid should be given to poorer countries, a glimpse at U.S. aid distribution in the past would challenge that notion. One of the pieces to unravel the puzzle, proposed by scholars of international relations, is ethnic lobbying. According to the theoretical model of ethnic lobbying proposed by Lahiri and Raimondos (2000), lobbying activities by ethnic groups in donor countries are important in the government aid allocation process. Since then, there are a number of studies that help to establish empirical basis for the significance of ethnic lobbying in the United States (Guerlain 2011; Haglund and McNeil-Hay 2011; Mistry 2013; Zarifian 2014). The most prominent example of such endeavors is Israel, who receives a disproportionately large amount of aid from the U.S. despite being a relatively rich country in the region.

Foreign lobbying studies outside of the United States tend to focus on weak democracies' susceptibility to foreign influence. Mason et al (2018) argues that upstream polluters of rain and water resources can lobby downstream countries, who are more effected by the pollution, for imposing lower tariffs and pursuing less environmental protection policies for their own benefits. Aidt and Hwang (2014) outlines the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying and contends that foreign lobbying actually provide a voice for previously unrepresented social groups.

Empirical progress of foreign lobbying analysis has been stagnating because the data collection process proves to be problematic. This paper presents a new comprehensive dataset from the Foreign Agents Registration Act database that contains financial details and lobbying activities of all foreign agents in the United States from 2004 to 2019. This dataset distinguishes state and non-state actors and documents how much they spend on lobbying each year, type of lobbying activities and the agencies they employ. This is an ongoing data collection process that would eventually hope to include all documents released by FARA since 1953.

This dataset offers new insights into what falls under the categorization of U.S. foreign lobbying. Because of FARA requirements, the types of political activity that is subject to FARA disclosure are more varied than we may have previously assumed. It is common for foreign entities to be consulted by U.S. lobbying forms on specific federal regulations. It is also conceivable that foreign agents may be interested in disseminating newspapers, TV programs, or pamphlets of their own language and culture within the U.S. These activities are all supposedly under FARA jurisdiction and have to be performed and reported by U.S. lobbying firms. Therefore, this dataset offers us a variety of expansion into understanding political activities conducted by foreign agents within the U.S. and how they may have influenced diplomatic relations through different means.

Given this information, we can assume that states would be required to register with FARA for reasons that fall outside of common assumptions of lobbying. One specific area contained in this dataset that have previously been overlooked is media communications. Documented in the FARA files, Media Relations include services

such as satellite TV services of their native language, newspaper distribution, and operational of other news services of their country of origin. These media channels can be used for two purposes. One, they could be employed to target foreign audiences in order to promote the image of the designated foreign state. However, they could also be designed to reach emigrants in the U.S. and foster a link through media with their home country.

Scholars have long documented the effects of immigration to their home country. On the one hand, emigrants often bring economic prosperity to their home country through various means. Not only are emigrants relied on for remittances as an important source of income for their families, diaspora communities can cast a positive influence towards directing more foreign investments and aid towards their home country (LeBlang 2010; Singer 2010; Bermeo and Leblang 2015). Developing states also rely on western educated emigrants for technological expertise and knowledge transfer in strengthening the countries' military and economic capabilities (Chen 1995). On the other hand, flows of population can prove to be a source of political instability for authoritarian regimes (Miller and Peters 2018). Even though this issue warrants legitimate concern, academic evidence explaining this mechanism is ambiguous. Gift and Krcmaric (2017) argues that western education is the catalyst for leaders to democratize while Agostinelli (2016) indicates the relationship to be more elusive especially for Middle Eastern leaders. Moreover, Fan et al (2020) conducts a survey experiment showing that anti-Chinese sentiments actually induce Chinese students in the United States to support its home regime more adamantly than before, suggesting that immigrant attitude towards their host and home country

is at least partly shaped by their personal experience.

Despite ambiguity on the impact and transmission of democratic values, authoritarian states are still likely to be highly alert about such possibilities (Corrales and Westhoff 2006). Censorship of western information has been an important priority for these regimes. China and Russia has led the world in media and social platform supervision. There are many evidence to suggest that these regimes maintain a highly intricate and selective control over internet access of their citizens, especially with China's Great Fire Wall (Lorentzen 2014; Chen and Xu 2017; Roberts 2020). Therefore, monitoring emigrants or former emigrants must be a priority for these governments. Their concern is not unwarranted. The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was partly due to democratic ideological influx resulting from the reopening of Chinese economy to the world (Mason and Clements 2002). Thus, the dilemma facing these regimes are balancing between attracting financial interests from emigrants or highly educated human capital and restricting ideological shift of the public brought by transnational capital flow.

In the past, there has been few explanations of how authoritarian states deal with this kind of threat. Most research points to the internet restrictions and regulations imposed by authoritarian regimes at different strategic levels and times (Yang 2009; Rod and Weidmann 2015). With this dataset, I am able to demonstrate that one of the possible solutions employed by authoritarian states is media relations lobbying. I argue that authoritarian states spend money on deploying their own TV programs, newspapers and other entertainment venues in the U.S. in order to attract continued emigrant support outside of their sovereign jurisdiction. This is an export of cultural

and political message to counteract the possible ideological transition brought on by a democratic political environment.

3 The Dataset

The dataset is composed with Congress reports and agent filing database provided by the Foreign Agents Registration Act. I obtained the list of all past and present agents from the database, including Exhibit AB forms they submitted with their registration. Exhibit AB forms allows us to extract information on the agents regarding their ownership status. Each agent is required to identify themselves as either Government of a foreign country, Foreign political party, Foreign or domestic organization including partnership, corporation, association, committee, voluntary group, or other, or Individual. The agent is then required to further select whether or not they are supervised, owned, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in part by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal. I categorize each agent into government or non-government affiliated based on their these identifications.¹I use optical character recognition (OCR) to read all Exhibit AB forms in pdf format in order to identify the boxes that were checked by the agents. Since many of the Exhibit AB forms are hand-written and scanned, the OCR accuracy for capturing whether the boxes are marked is poor. I also hand-coded the ones that are not identified by the machine learning process. The total number of agents included in the dataset is 4124. If the agent is listed as a foreign government or foreign political

¹See Appendix B for example

party or if any of the boxes are checked for being affiliated with the government as previously noted, then they are recorded as government affiliated.

It is important to note that this method of categorization would include state owned corporations, which can lobby the United States for purely profit-driven endeavors. However, it is hard to exclude them since state owned companies are more likely to be in industries that have a strategic interest to the nation. Lobbying efforts coming from these actors can be a genuine reflection of state-led trade ambitions in the United States. Moreover, some states may be prone to disguise their true intentions under names of these corporations. For example, Vnesheconombank, a State Development Corporation in Russia, is a foreign agent registered with the U.S. lobbying firm Geopolitical Solutions LLC. In the Exhibit AB form, this agent is listed as a non-profit state corporation, controlled, supervised and financed by the Russian Government. The service provided by the registrant includes "potential meetings with U.S. government officials and members of the media regarding potential new sanctions legislation".² Even though the details of the lobbying arrangements is outside of the scope of this paper, it is hard to exclude the probability that information obtained by Vnesheconombank is shared with the Russian Government for purposes of strategic planning.

After obtaining their affiliation status, each agent is subsequently assigned a unique identifier. I then used OCR to again read all the FARA reports to Congress from 2003 to 2019. The reports document information regarding each agent, regis-

²Exhibit AB form provided by Geopolitical Solutions LLC d/b/a Geopols for Vnesheconombank, State Development Corporation.

trant, service type and bi-annual lobbying contribution. The agent from the FARA reports are finally matched with their registration forms using the unique identifier. Therefore, each entry in the data set includes the affiliation status of each agent, the service they required and the amount they paid for this service.

Figure 1 displays the total amount of money spent on lobbying from foreign entities in million of dollars from the year 2004 to 2019. As shown in the figure, both state and non-state actors have invested large sums of money into lobbying the U.S.. Over the years, the amount contributed by non-state actors have fluctuated while over 130 states have been relatively consistent in the endeavor. Therefore, it is conceivable to argue that there are certain benefits of lobbying that states deemed irreplaceable.

Figure 2 shows the breakdown of state lobbying purposes. Since there are over fifty types of lobbying services, I have ranked and included ten most commonly requested activities in both government and non-government affiliated groups. This distinction is drawn based on information requested in the registration forms. It seems like lobbying in general is the most heavily invested area for all agents, and public relations closely follow as second. Although many campaigns can be loosely labelled as public relations, this category is largely associated with promoting positive image of the client state inside of the U.S..³ The other subjects include promotion of tourism, media relations, U.S. policy consultant, trade, and legal advises.⁴ The

³For example, in the 2019 FARA Report to Congress page 13, the firm IPG DXTRA,Inc is hired by the state of Bahamas for the service of public relations. The activities stated "The registrant provided public relations and strategic communications services on behalf of the foreign principal in the United States."

⁴See Appendix A for example

variety of purposes suggests that states have more objectives for lobbying than previous literature have suggested. In particular, it is important to note that government and non-government agents can be interested in different types of lobbying services. Not surprisingly, non-government actors are more likely to be promoting tourism, investment and trade, while states are prone to other types. These diverse categories illustrate the need to dive deeper into how lobbying serves the policy goals of both state and non-state actors separately.

I first want to test the relationship between foreign lobbying and trade using the new dataset. According to the literature, states should be more incentivized to lobby the United States if they have more bilateral trade or receive more aid from the U.S. The only other large scale quantitative study that provides support for this theory to my knowledge is Monte-Rojas (2013), which argues that foreign lobbying can play an integral part in the U.S. allocation of foreign aid. Their dataset consist of FARA Congress Reports from 1997-2009. Since the unit of analysis is on the country-year level, they aggregated all expenses of the given country during those years. My study differs from Monte-Rojas (2013) by distinguishing foreign agents between government and non-government affiliation. As expected, corporations and states have varying lobbying objectives, dis-aggregating them could potentially eliminate some of the confounding variables in the analysis.

This is the estimation strategy for our preliminary hypothesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 ForeignLobby_{it} = & TradeFlow_{it-1} + ForeignAid_{it-1} + GDP_{it-1} + ForeignLobby_{it-1} + \\
 & RegimeType_{it-1} + AllianceStatus_{it-1} + RelationshipwiththeU.S._{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned}$$




Figure 1: Foreign Lobbying in the U.S. by Year




Figure 2: Foreign State Lobbying in the U.S. by Service

where $ForeignLobby_{it}$ is the aggregate amount of Foreign Lobbying spent by either government or non-government entities of a country at year t . The main explanatory variable is $TradeFlow_{it-1}$, each country's export to the United States in the previous year. Our hypothesis is that if the country has more export towards the U.S., they would spend more on lobbying. The other important explanatory variable is $ForeignAid_{it-1}$, which is the amount of foreign aid received by the country from the U.S.. This data is obtained from the Foreign Assistance Database made available by the U.S. government, note that the value used in the model is the aid received, not pledged.⁵

The other confounding variables include total GDP in the previous year, the amount of lobby spent previous year, regime type of the given country at the given year, alliance status with the United States and Relationship with the U.S. in the previous year. GDP data is collected from the World Bank database and regime type categories follow the Polity Project from the Center for Systematic Peace. The alliance status variable is a binary variable aggregating all types of alliances with the U.S. obtained from the Correlates of War dataset. Lastly, relationship with the U.S. is calculated by averaging the intensity score variable from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataverse. This event dataverse is composed by an algorithm that catalog interactions between socio-political actors reported by over thirty news agencies everyday. Each event is then assigned an intensity score, characterizing the nature of the interaction. The score is on a -10 to 10 scale, with -10 being the most

⁵We also used aid pledged as an explanatory variable for robustness check, and the result is similar.

violently negative. For example, a public statement containing pessimistic/optimistic comments regarding the United States by the Canadian government would be assigned an intensity score 0 whereas a reduction of relations between two states would be an event of score -5.⁶ I use the yearly average intensity score as a proxy for the state’s relationship with the United States, thus $RelationshipwiththeU.S._{it-1}$ represents the annual average intensity score between the United States and any other given country during the previous year.

Table 1 is the summary statistics of the foreign lobbying dataset.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Foreign Lobbying (total)	2256	354708.6	1428409.096	0	0	209506.815	21230000
Foreign Lobbying (State Only)	2347	363198.136	2279279.478	0	0	120000	38638348
Foreign Lobbying (Non-State Only)	2347	231071.136	877815.627	0	0	91568.365	1.3e+07
Obligated Foreign Aid	1807	258350362.268	951519083.969	-14525167	2614563.5	140315353	13418283535
Obligated Foreign Aid (Constant)	1807	299047489.976	1113799644.184	-16976735	3095821.5	157636372.5	15376198932
Distributed Foreign Aid	1824	230872672.593	851132089.342	-24268891	2426801.5	124222696.25	11448984353
Distributed Foreign Aid (Constant)	1824	266158896.364	988052248.334	-24739667	2797114.25	144544425.25	13119551449
Import from U.S.	1781	17939.409	55184.768	0	145.416	10754.301	538514.159
Export to U.S.	1781	11283.852	33645.26	0.727	234.216	7551.62	312816.95
Polity2	1671	4.215	6.343	-10	-1	10	10
GDP	1955	416198556922.889	1045106046370.68	47564520.391	11487570915.638	301079800890.55	13894817549380.3
U.S. to State Relation (lag)	2097	1.31	1.853	-10	0.706	2.34	8
State to U.S. Relation (lag)	2106	1.238	1.675	-10	0.582	2.212	10
Alliance	2347	0.202	0.401	0	0	0	1
NATO	2347	0.152	0.359	0	0	0	1

The confounding variables included in the analysis should be significant to both state and non-state lobby albeit at different degrees. First, countries with a higher

⁶Details and examples of how the CAMEO code is composed can be found in the CAMEO.CDB.09b5.pdf under the ICEWS dataverse in Harvard Dataverse

GDP level have more resources to spend on lobbying the United States. Moreover, firms in these countries are also more likely to have a larger trade flow with the largest economic market in the world, thus driving them to spend more on lobbying. Second, we might expect U.S. allies to lobby less since they are more likely to have a better established diplomatic channel with the state department. Their diplomatic staff are more likely to cooperate and coordinate on international affairs and thus establish a better personal and professional relationship with each other. Repeated interactions allow statesmen to read signals from each other accurately and cultivate higher levels of trust (Hall and Yarhi-Milio 2012; Dermendzhiev 2014). As a result, the executive branch can prove to be a much quicker and more efficient channel to solve foreign policy concerns. A similar argument can be made for democracies. Since democracies are more likely to be allies of the U.S. in the first place, their combined effect might be significant in the model. However, we should also point out that both state and non-state actors in democracies can be more familiar with the institution of lobbying. There is a wealth of literature on European lobbying and how they shape politics of both the European Union and individual European nations (Coen 1992; Marshall 2010; Greenwood and Dreger 2013; Klüver et al 2015). Thus, we might expect to see firms in democracies to be more comfortable in employing lobbyist to advocate for their interests.

Third, relationship with the United States can possibly also be a determining factor in impacting whether or not foreign actors decide to lobby more. It is conceivable that changing relations with the United States may prompt states to increase or reduce their lobbying efforts. For example, when Trump pulled the U.S. out of

the Iran Nuclear deal, we observe a significant drop in lobbying from Iran. In 2017, Iran contributed \$123,294 in lobbying while in 2019 the total amount was only \$4,500. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that state's lobbying efforts are reflective of U.S. attitudes towards them. However, the literature of bureaucratic politics on the other hand offers a different explanation. Since foreign policy on a daily basis is as much of a routine exercise dictated by bureaucratic procedures as it is a personal diplomacy between top leaders, altering budget allocation for foreign lobby may experience a delay in the bureaucratic traffic and thus not as reactive to U.S. responses (Art 1973; Drezner 2000; Greenstock 2013).

Table 2 is the result table from OLS panel data regression. The result does not necessarily concur with previous literature. To our surprise, export to the U.S. is not significantly correlated with either state or non-state lobby. U.S. foreign aid is only significant in the base model for non-state lobby. There are several explanations for this result. First, since this is panel data and we have aggregated all state and non-state actors of the same country. it is plausible that not all actors alter their behavior unilaterally when the relevant factors change. Firms in different industries might have diverging interests that lead them to behave differently and thus the effect is not reflected in a panel study. Second, lobbying decisions are sometimes not made in a responsive manner. These actors could be more interested in a long-term relationship with the U.S. and thus only respond to alarming changes in these factors. Third, as the bureaucratic literature suggests, the budget allocation towards foreign lobbying is more about routine bureaucracy rather than calculated strategic choice. Moreover, the only variable that remained a strong indicator for lobbying is how much

they lobbied in the previous year, which provides strong support for the bureaucratic politics theory. Actors tend to lobby more intensively when they have lobbied more last year, indicating that both states and firms are less impacted by short term changes in trade or aid but rather seek to institute a long term lobbying campaign with the U.S.. Fourth, since foreign actors are only permitted to lobby through U.S. agents, there could be a delay in communications because of the international nature of the transaction. Unlike domestic clients who can easily track their progress through measuring public opinions and direct contact with the Congress, foreign clients have less means to measure their results.

Lastly, GDP is negatively correlated with state lobby but positively correlated with non-state lobby, indicating that states with a smaller economy tend to lobby the U.S. more extensively while non-state actors in larger economies spend more on lobbying the U.S.. The result becomes insignificant we apply country and year fixed effect to the model.

4 Media Relations Lobbying

I argue that states use lobbying under the purpose of media relations in order to target this concern. Figure 3 shows the trend of media relations lobby and immigration flow to the U.S. from 2006 to 2019. Autocratic countries spend significantly more money on media relations after 2010 and has retained a high level of spending, whereas democratic lobbying on media relations peaked around 2011 and has declined since. The pattern of media relations lobby and immigration seems to correspond with each

Table 2: OLS Regression Results for State and non-State Lobby

	State Lobby		Non-state Lobby	
	Base	FE	Base	FE
Export to U.S.	0.039 (0.028)	-0.039 (0.086)	0.027 (0.030)	0.047 (0.073)
U.S. Aid	0.027 (0.028)	0.080 (0.083)	0.051* (0.061)	0.054 (0.070)
GDP	-0.040*** (0.042)	0.143 (0.110)	0.020* (0.009)	0.079 (0.093)
Previous Lobby	0.642*** (0.022)	0.198*** (0.027)		
Previous Lobby			0.654*** (0.098)	0.453*** (0.026)
U.S. Relations	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.021)	0.017 (0.015)	0.020 (0.018)
Foreign Policy to U.S.	0.014 (0.014)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.017)
Alliance	0.055 (0.061)	-0.093 (0.094)	-0.004 (0.033)	-0.126 (0.080)
Regime Type	0.003 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.015)	0.0004 (0.004)	0.016 (0.012)
Constant	0.965*** (1.029)	-3.985 (2.583)	-0.521** (0.232)	-2.205 (2.192)
Country Fixed Effect		✓		✓
Year Fixed Effect		✓		✓
Observations	1,335	1,335	1,335	1,335
R ²	0.419	0.608	0.469	0.556
Adjusted R ²	0.415	0.556	0.466	0.497
Residual Std. Error	0.855 (df = 1326)	0.745 (df = 1177)	0.652 (df = 1326)	0.633 (df = 1177)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All variables are standardized.

other for autocracies. When there are more immigrants, these states tend to spend more on media relations. Connection between these variables for democracies are less obvious. It is nevertheless important to note that the U.S. experience considerably more immigrants from democracies than it does from autocracies. However, autocracies spend just as much if not more on media relations within the U.S..

The figure gives us an initial look into the relationship between media relations lobby and immigration flow. We then proceed to conduct an empirical test to investigate whether autocratic lobby on media relations is sensitive to changes in immigration flow from those countries. We use the following estimation procedure.




Figure 3: Media Relations Lobby and Immigration by Type of Regime

$$\begin{aligned}
&MediaRelationsLobby_{it} = Immigration_{it-1} + RegimeType_{it-1} \\
&+ Immigration * RegimeType_{it-1} + TradeFlow_{it-1} + ForeignAid_{it-1} \\
&+ GDP_{it-1} + MediaRelationsLobby_{it-1} + AllianceStatus_{it-1} + \\
&RelationshipwiththeU.S._{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

We will retain all of the covariates from the previous analysis, but in this model we are most interested in the interaction effect of immigration flow and regime type on media relations lobby. We theorize that the amount spent on media relations lobby would increase as more emigrants go to the U.S. and the effect would be more salient on autocratic states. We obtain immigration flow data from Migration Data Hub, gathered from U.S. census. They define a foreign born person as "people residing in the United States at the time of the population survey who were not U.S. citizens at birth."⁷ Therefore, the data includes naturalized U.S. citizens, permanent residents, work or visa holders, refugees or asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants.

Table 3 displays the OLS regression results. When immigration flow and regime type are evaluated independently, they both have a significant impact on media relations lobbying in the country and year fixed effect model. As demonstrated in the previous plot, when immigration flow increases, we also observe more lobbying on media relations. Furthermore, autocracies are more likely to spend more on media relations specifically. However, when we test the interaction effect between immigration and regime type, the coefficient becomes negative. Since coefficient for interaction ef-

⁷More details refer to <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/MT>

fect can be difficult to interpret at face value, Figure 4 demonstrates predicted change of media relations lobby as immigration flow and polity score changes. All variables in the plot are standardized, with 0 as their mean. The plot only shows polity score -7,3 and 7 for demonstration purposes. As shown in the plot, when a country is autocratic, it is more likely to spend more on media relations lobbying when its emigration flow to the U.S. increases. The effect on democracies are exactly the opposite.

Moreover, previous amount spent on media relations is also positively associated with this year's lobbying. Countries with smaller economies are more likely to spend more on lobbying for media relations purposes. Similarly, countries that trade less with the U.S. lobby more. This result could partly be attributed to the fact that countries who are major economic partners with the U.S. spend more on lobbying for economic affairs rather than media relations. Furthermore, citizens of larger economies could be less inclined to emigrate to the U.S. permanently since there are lucrative opportunities for career development at home. Therefore, these states are less worried about citizens not returning or being influenced. Lastly, how do we know autocracies are not developing their soft power and promoting public relations campaign in the U.S. in order to enhance its image among the U.S. public instead of targeting immigrants? In order to test the robustness of my results, I also regress the effect of immigration and regime type on other types of state lobbying (public relations). We obtained no significant result public relations lobby, indicating that government target media relations spending strategically in response to immigration flow. The result tables are included in Appendix C.




Figure 4: Predicted Change of Media Relations Lobby by Interaction Effect

Table 3: OLS Regression Results for Media Relations Lobbying

State Lobbying on Media Relations		
	Based Model	Fixed Effect
Immigration	0.141 (0.134)	1.906*** (0.731)
Regime Type	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.045* (0.027)
Immigration:Regime	-0.00002 (0.015)	-0.239*** (0.078)
Previous Lobby	0.727*** (0.023)	0.643*** (0.027)
GDP	-0.0001 (0.016)	-0.295* (0.166)
Export to U.S.	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.547*** (0.134)
U.S. Aid	-0.001 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.090)
U.S. Foreign Policy Attitude	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.043 (0.028)
Foreign Policy Attitude towards to U.S.	0.035* (0.020)	0.038 (0.024)
Alliance	0.086 (0.055)	-10.377 (25.036)
Constant	0.009 (0.401)	
Country Fixed Effect		✓
Year Fixed Effect		✓
Observations	721	721
R ²	0.607	0.648
Adjusted R ²	0.601	0.596
Residual Std. Error	0.661 (df = 710)	0.666 (df = 627)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we show that foreign lobbying is a tactical tool employed by states when diplomatic means are not available to achieve certain foreign policy goals. Autocratic states would increase its spending on media relations lobbying in response

to increasing emigration level towards the United States in order to retain support within the diaspora communities. On the other hand, this effort is less emphasized by democracies. This research demonstrates the benefits of breaking aspects of foreign lobbying into separate fields and identify state motives behind different services. Thus, it is perhaps less fruitful to view foreign lobby as an unifying activity that serves singular purposes. The new data set developed in this paper enables future scholars to conduct more nuanced research on foreign lobbying and its influence.

There are several caveats pertain to the research procedure. First, the accuracy rate of the identification of state and non-state actors are not perfect. Since some of the Exhibit AB forms are handwritten and scanned, there are smudges and specks that lead to ambiguity in the identification process. As this is an ongoing data collection project, I intend to improve on the accuracy rate by manually single out and check vague documents that could cause potential errors. Second, the theory on media relations lobbying could be strengthened by adding a structural topic modeling procedure in order to show that states are targeting the immigrant communities within the United States and not for other purposes. Third, it would help us to better gauge the effects of these lobbying programs if we can conduct a survey to gather immigrant sentiment towards their home country when and if they are exposed to media outlets from home. The feedback loop from former expats could help states to determine whether or not to continue spending on similar efforts and shift to more effective programs such as public funded study abroad opportunities or priorities job listings for expats.

6 Appendix

6.1 Appendix A: Example for types of lobbying services

ARUBA

Aruba Tourism Authority #2987

400 Plaza Drive
Suite 101
Secaucus, NJ 07094

Government of Aruba

Nature of Services: Promotion of Tourism

The registrant disseminated informational material to travel wholesalers, retail travel agencies, charter companies, the press, airlines, and cruise ship companies. The registrant also organized and conducted seminars and answered travel related inquiries on behalf of the foreign principal. In addition, the registrant participated in travel shows and coordinated marketing efforts with hotels and other tourism related organizations.

\$1,711,636.48 for the six month period ending December 31, 2019

Zeno Group, Inc. #6652

130 East Randolph Street
Chicago, IL 60601

Aruba Tourism Authority (ATA)

Nature of Services: Promotion of Tourism

The registrant planned events and performed various media relations activities on behalf of the foreign principal to promote tourism to Aruba.

\$501,902.00 for the six month period ending September 30, 2019

CYPRUS

Karv Communications, Inc. #6162

122 East 42nd Street
Suite 2005
New York, NY 10168

Association of Cyprus Banks (ACB) (via Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP) (t)

Nature of Services: Media Relations

The registrant provided public relations guidance and outreach aimed at educating the general public, influencers, and the United States media about the Cyprus banking system.

\$46,365.00 for the six month period ending October 31, 2019

Manatos & Manatos (through the National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes - CEH) #6683

1100 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Government of the Republic of Cyprus

Nature of Services: U.S. Policy Consultant

The registrant convenes discussions among leading Cypriot and Greek-Americans and advises Cypriot officials with respect to United States Policy. The registrant also engages with United States policymakers regarding the interests in the Cypriot-American community, including security, trade and other issues.

Finances: None Reported

6.2 Appendix B: Exhibit AB form Example

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 OMB No. 1124-0006; Expires May 31, 2020

U.S. Department of Justice
 Washington, DC 20530

Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

INSTRUCTIONS. Furnish this exhibit for EACH foreign principal listed in an initial statement and for EACH additional foreign principal acquired subsequently. The filing of this document requires the payment of a filing fee as set forth in Rule (d)(1), 28 C.F.R. § 5.5(d)(1). Compliance is accomplished by filing an electronic Exhibit A form at <https://www.fara.gov>.

Privacy Act Statement. The filing of this document is required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, for the purposes of registration under the Act and public disclosure. Provision of the information requested is mandatory, and failure to provide this information is subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions established in Section 8 of the Act. Every registration statement, short form registration statement, supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment, copy of informational materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination, inspection and copying during the posted business hours of the FARA Unit in Washington, DC. Statements are also available online at the FARA Unit's webpage: <https://www.fara.gov>. One copy of every such document, other than informational materials, is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, and copies of any and all documents are routinely made available to other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi-annual report to Congress on the administration of the Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent. This report is available to the public in print and online at: <https://www.fara.gov>.

Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average .22 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief, FARA Unit, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. Name of Registrant Mr. Carman Marc Miller	2. Registration Number 6741
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3. Primary Address of Registrant
 1318 Notre-Dame Ouest, Montreal, Quebec, CA H3C 1K7

4. Name of Foreign Principal Liberal Party of Canada	5. Address of Foreign Principal 350 Albert Street, Suite 920 Ottawa, Ontario, CA K1P6M8
6. Country/Region Represented CANADA	

7. Indicate whether the foreign principal is one of the following:

Government of a foreign country¹

Foreign political party

Foreign or domestic organization: If either, check one of the following:

<input type="checkbox"/> Partnership	<input type="checkbox"/> Committee
<input type="checkbox"/> Corporation	<input type="checkbox"/> Voluntary group
<input type="checkbox"/> Association	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>specify</i>) _____

Individual-State nationality _____

8. If the foreign principal is a foreign government, state:

a) Branch or agency represented by the registrant

b) Name and title of official with whom registrant engages

¹ "Government of a foreign country," as defined in Section 1(e) of the Act, includes any person or group of persons exercising sovereign de facto or de jure political jurisdiction over any country, other than the United States, or over any part of such country, and includes any subdivision of any such group and any group or agency to which such sovereign de facto or de jure authority or functions are directly or indirectly delegated. Such term shall include any faction or body of insurgents within a country assuming to exercise governmental authority whether such faction or body of insurgents has or has not been recognized by the United States.

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FORM NSD-3
 Revised 06/19

9. If the foreign principal is a foreign political party, state:

a) Name and title of official with whom registrant engages

Christina Topp, Senior Director, Fundraising Liberal Party of Cana

b) Aim, mission or objective of engagement

The mission of the Liberal Party of Canada is to represent Canadians in Canada's Parliament in order to have Liberal values and principles embodied in the governance of Canada..

10. If the foreign principal is not a foreign government or a foreign political party:

a) State the nature of the business or activity of this foreign principal.

b) Is this foreign principal:

Supervised by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

Owned by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

Directed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

Controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

Financed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

Subsidized in part by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes No

11. Explain fully all items answered "Yes" in Item 10(b).

12. If the foreign principal is an organization and is not owned or controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party or other foreign principal, state who owns and controls it.

6.3 Appendix C: Robustness Checks

Table 4: OLS Regression Result for Foreign Lobbying on Public Relations

	Public Relations Lobby	
	(1)	(2)
Immigrantion	0.314 (0.394)	2.407 (1.787)
Regime Type	-0.021*** (0.008)	-0.040 (0.032)
Immigration:Regime	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.106 (0.102)
Previous Lobby	0.522*** (0.024)	0.383*** (0.028)
GDP	0.023 (0.025)	-0.405* (0.233)
Export to U.S.	-0.060 (0.046)	-0.241 (0.188)
U.S. Aid	-0.042 (0.045)	0.027 (0.123)
U.S. Foreign Policy Attitude	0.028 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.044)
Foreign Policy Attitude towards U.S.	0.025 (0.032)	0.013 (0.039)
Alliance	0.019 (0.079)	-50.996 (37.068)
Constant	-0.254 (0.606)	
Country Fixed Effect		✓
Year Fixed Effect		✓
Observations	1,209	1,209
R ²	0.300	0.367
Adjusted R ²	0.294	0.314
Residual Std. Error	1.195 (df = 1198)	1.180 (df = 1115)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All variables are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

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