

Abstracts

African American candidates have usually struggled to win statewide elections, but they often perform relatively well in some localities, while doing badly in others. Drawing on unique time-series cross-section data collected in the State of Illinois, we examine how racial and socio-economic contexts determine support for black candidates in statewide elections. We show that African American candidates tend to do better in counties that are both racially diverse and highly educated, as well as communities that have witnessed a growing inflow of highly educated residents. Only in communities where a high level of racial diversity interacts with highly educated environment, do residents seem to become more willing to embrace black statewide candidates. Our findings may help shed light on the enduring question of what the future of a diversifying society holds.

Key words: black candidates, voting, the effect of racial diversity, contact hypothesis, racial threat hypothesis

The election of the first black president should not obscure the fact that African American candidates have usually struggled to win statewide elections. Black candidates in statewide elections often perform relatively well in some localities, but do badly in others. We intend to examine why support for black candidates varies across localities. Perhaps, it is not difficult to imagine that the characteristics of localities are responsible for fluctuations in the level of support for black candidates. The idea that local characteristics produce contextual influences on voting behavior is uncomplicated. But it is complicated to ascertain what contextual characteristics matter and *how* contexts determine support for black candidates in statewide elections.

Starting with Key's (1949) seminal work, racial environment— largely understood as the racial composition of a locality—has been identified as a primary contextual characteristic responsible for voting behavior (Carsey 1995; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Given the centrality of race in American politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989), it should not come as a surprise that race engenders a contextual influence. However, the two most well-established and influential hypotheses—the racial threat and contact hypotheses—generate two seemingly conflicting expectations on the contextual effects of race. According to the racial threat hypothesis (Blalock 1967), increased black density threatens the socio-economic status and political power of long-time, non-Hispanic white residents, thereby intensifying racial tension and polarization. Non-Hispanic whites living in racially heterogeneous areas thus are expected to become more hostile to blacks and their interests, and not to mention, black candidates (Key 1949; Glaser 1994; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).

On the other hand, the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) leads us to expect racial understanding, tolerance, and co-operation to increase as individuals interact and sustain a relationship with people from different racial groups in a racially heterogeneous area. In other words, racial diversity tends to alleviate racial prejudice, tension, and antagonism (Welch et al. 2001). Residents in racially diverse communities would thus be more likely to support black interests and black candidates.

Although the two lines of thought on the contextual effects of race have produced apparently conflicting expectations and findings, the two hypotheses may not necessarily be incompatible, but rather complementary (Ha 2010; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000). Recent research reveals that changes in racial context over time, rather than racial context at a given time, can be politically more consequential (Hopkins 2009, 2010) and racial context tends to interact with socioeconomic contexts to influence political attitudes and behavior (Brandon and Jones 2005; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). This offers insight into how to reconcile the two hypotheses. To begin with, the two hypotheses may not be valid for all circumstances. The suitability of the two hypotheses may be contingent on circumstances created independently and jointly by racial and socio economic contexts and changes in racial and socioeconomic contexts over time.

Building on this emerging insight, we examine how racial and socioeconomic contexts along with *changing* racial and socioeconomic contexts interact to affect the evolution of voting patterns in statewide elections involving black candidates. Our focus is on the extent to which changes in racial and socioeconomic environments over time, as well as racial and socioeconomic contexts at a given time, both independently and jointly, influence local

communities' willingness to support a black candidate running in a statewide election. Drawing on unique time-series cross-section data collected in the State of Illinois, we show that support for black candidates is particularly pronounced in communities with an increasing inflow of college graduates and communities that are both racially diverse and highly educated. Our findings may help shed light on the enduring question of what the future of a diversifying society holds.

We chose Illinois because the state has had the largest number of, both successful and unsuccessful, African American candidates for key statewide offices in the nation (Franke-Ruta 2004) and as indicated in the Almanac of American Politics "its mixture of blacks and whites and Hispanics, immigrants and pioneers, city-dwellers and suburbanites and farmers, the affluent and the impoverished, heavy industry and high-technology, long made it a rough proxy for the nation" (Barone and Cohen 2009, 483). As such, it provides a unique venue for testing hypotheses concerning the success and failure of black statewide candidates, a primary justification for single state case studies (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002).

The Conflicting Effects of Racial Context

While the number of black elected officials has increased dramatically since the 1960s, these gains are more common in local and congressional elections with majority-minority electorates. With a few recent exceptions, including Barack Obama in his Illinois U.S. Senate election, black candidates find it difficult to win top offices (Jeffries and Jones 2006; Frederick and Jeffries 2009). Although, in Illinois, black candidates have won ten statewide general election campaigns, two account for most of these wins. Roland Burris was elected Comptroller three times beginning in 1978 and moved up to Attorney General in 1990. Jesse White won the

office of Secretary of State in 1998, the first of his four terms. Barack Obama and Carol Moseley Braun also were elected to the U.S. Senate in 1992 and 2004 respectively, although Moseley Braun lost in 1998. On the other hand, four other black candidates—Cecil Partee, Earlean Collins, Robin Kelly, and David Miller—won primaries, but lost their statewide election bids. Burris also lost primary bids for governor and U.S. Senate. The quality of candidates and their campaigns may in part account for the success and failure of black candidates in statewide elections. However, we begin with the observation that support for black candidates in statewide elections varies across places.

"Location, Location, Location"—the age-old mantra for real estate professionals—seems to be applicable to social science research that has long highlighted the importance of place, or context, in determining attitudes and behavior. In particular, with few exceptions (Voss 1996), research has demonstrated that our social environments in general and racial contexts in particular shape how we react to people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds (Key 1949; Quillian 1996; Welch et al. 2001). The direction of contextual influence, however, appears to be paradoxical (Oliver 2010). At the heart of the paradox is the question of whether racial diversity increases or decreases racial prejudice, animosity, and tension. Depending on the answer to that question, the likelihood that racially heterogeneous localities would opt for black candidates can be expected to increase or decrease.

According to the racial threat hypothesis, the relationship between the level of black density and that of racial antagonism would be positive. Most fundamentally, it is built on the idea that people tend to categorize individuals into social groups on the basis of race and ethnicity, distinguish in-groups from out-groups along racial lines, and be favorable toward in-

group members, while being antagonistic toward out-group members (Tajfel 1974, 1982; Tajifel and Turner 1979). Racial diversity is deemed to accelerate and amplify this process, since it heightens the possibility of competition between racial groups not only for jobs and local resources, but also for status and power (Quillian 1996). As they feel threatened by the presence of a large number of black residents in local areas, white residents would become hostile to blacks and their interests (Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996).

The racial threat hypothesis has been supported by mounting evidence demonstrating that racial diversity tends to breed racial tension and conflict (Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Quillian 1996). In particular, (non-Hispanic) white residents in racially heterogeneous communities have been found to be more likely than their counterparts living in racially homogeneous communities to exhibit hostility to blacks and black leaders (Glaser 1994; Key 1949). The racial threat hypothesis thus predicts that higher black percentages would coincide with higher levels of racial animosity, which results in lower levels of support for black candidates (Glaser 1994; Key 1949).

The contact hypothesis tells a different story. According to the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), people living in racially diverse communities have more opportunities for both formal and informal contact with individuals of different ethnic and racial backgrounds as neighbors and members of schools, churches, and clubs (Welch, et al. 2001). As they sustain interaction with individuals of different backgrounds, people tend to not only exhibit more racial understanding and tolerance, but also become open to and even willing to adopt the political attitudes that individuals from a different racial group residing in the same neighborhood espouse (Carsey 1995). Rather than creating racial animosity and conflict, racial

diversity promotes positive racial attitudes, while reducing racial prejudice. All else being equal, people—in particular, non-Hispanic whites—living in racially heterogeneous communities would thus be more likely than those who live in racially homogeneous communities to support black candidates.

The conflicting expectations from the two hypotheses can be perplexing, but reconcilable. The key to resolving the apparent paradox seems to be the recognition that other contextual factors may influence the nature of the relationship between racial diversity and racial hostility. Recent research points to the possibility that race-based contextual influence can be either positive (as the racial threat hypothesis predicts) or negative (as the contact hypothesis predicts) depending on the spatial setting. In other words, the undercurrents of intergroup relations may work differently at different levels of geography (Ha 2010; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000). For example, according to Oliver (2010), at the metropolitan level a higher level of racial diversity leads to racial intolerance and resentment particularly among non-Hispanic whites. Interestingly enough, however, at the neighborhood level where people frequently interact with one another as neighbors, living among people of different backgrounds is associated with more racial tolerance and less racial antagonism (Oliver 2010).

examines whether people living in racially homogeneous neighborhoods isolated from other more racially integrated neighborhoods within a racially diverse metropolitan area tend to exhibit negative racial attitudes, while those who reside in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods tend to develop positive racial attitudes (Carsey 1995; Ha 2010; Oliver 2010). But the idea that different levels of geography interact with racial context does not capture the

entire dynamics of the relationship between racial context and political attitudes. For one, both the racial threat and the contact hypotheses are essentially static and time bound in that they are largely silent about to what extent, if any, the influence of racial context varies over time (Hopkins 2009, 2010). For another, race-based contextual influence may not be fully determined in isolation from other socioeconomic environmental characteristics (Branton and Jones 2005; Gay 2004; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). For example, some research suggests that white Democrats are more likely to vote for a black Democratic candidate than for a comparable white candidate, while white Republicans are less likely to do so (Highton 2004).

Changing Racial and Socio-Economic Contexts and Support for Black Candidates

To ascertain the effect of racial environment on political attitudes and behavior, we need to move beyond examining the role that racial diversity at a given time plays without considering changes in diversity. Race-based contextual influences may not be limited to the effect of racial diversity at a given time, but encompass the impact of temporal changes in diversity. For example, racial considerations might become salient in the minds of individuals as they search for a place to live. People would probably not move into a neighborhood whose demographic composition at the time of their home search is intolerable to them (Massey and Denton 1993). Once people moved into a local area knowing its existing racial diversity, however, its demographic characteristics in general and racial characteristics in particular would soon be woven into the fabric of their daily lives. Levels of racial diversity would become routine and thus hardly grab the attention of residents in the community.

But as Hopkins (2010, 43) points out, "at the local level, sudden demographic changes might undermine long-time residents' expectations about the community and capture their

attention in ways that levels of diversity do not." In fact, recent studies indicate that it is often changes in the demographics of a community rather than its baseline demographic characteristics that would "lead residents to reassess their loyalty to the community, their expected returns when they sell their home, and their long-term expectations for staying there" (Hopkins 2009, 163). Changes in the demographic composition of a community might loom as large as, or even larger than, the baseline of racial diversity when the community selects its representatives.

Inflows of people from different racial groups could potentially encourage intergroup contact, thereby promoting racial tolerance (Pettigrew 1998). As Hopkins (2010, 43) maintains, however, "the historical record is quite consistent in showing negative responses to the sudden arrival of an out-group." The arrival of a growing number of out-group members would be met with anxiety and apprehension. As the racial threat hypothesis predicts, heightened racial tension and hostility would also follow (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998). We thus hypothesize that as communities experience a rapid increase in the number of African American residents, their willingness to support black candidates will decrease (Hypothesis 1).

According to Oliver and Mendelberg (2000, 576), "socio-economic environments may foster distinct racial *norms*, particularly when socio-economic status is measured by education [italics original]." For non-Hispanic whites, "highly educated settings may encourage greater racial tolerance" (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, 576). For African Americans, living in higher status neighborhoods and particularly among highly educated African Americans tend to crystalize perceptions of linked fate—a concept referring to "the degree to which African Americans believe that their own self-interests are linked to the interests of the race" (Dawson

1994, 77).¹ The effects of highly educated settings would become more prominent as communities attract a rapidly increasing number of highly educated individuals as their residents. In increasingly better educated communities, white residents (thanks to their enhanced racial tolerance) and black residents (thanks to their heightened perceptions of linked fate) would be more receptive to black candidates. It then follows that *the communities into which highly educated individuals have increasingly moved are more likely to support African American candidates* (Hypothesis 2).

Race-based contextual influences cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration their interactions with other contextual factors. It has already been documented that the effect of racial diversity on political behavior is conditional on socioeconomic environments (Branton and Jones 2005; Gay 2004; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). We again pay close attention to the possibility that racial context would work together with educational context. Florida (2002a, 8) argues that a creative class of highly educated workers is emerging, whose "economic function is to create new ideas, new technology, and/or creative content." Highly educated workers, the heart of the creative class, *value diversity* and dynamic industries, such as high technology, and often cluster geographically in areas that appeal to their values (Florida 2002b). As Florida and Gates (2002, 32) put it, "diversity of human capital is a key component of the ability to attract and retain high-tech industry."

Racial diversity may not become the source of racial hostility and conflict, but serve as a positive stimulus for well-educated workers. As highly educated individuals have more

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¹ According to Dawson (1994, 81-2), "the *more* education one had, the more likely one was to believe that blacks were economically subordinate to whites, and consequently, the more likely one was to believe that one's fate was linked to that of the race [italics original]." On the other hand, "when an individual's neighbors are mostly of low socioeconomic status, that individual may be more likely to downplay racial group membership as a determinant of his or her own life chances" (Gay 2004, 549).

opportunities to interact with people of different racial backgrounds while living in racially diverse settings, openness to diversity would help boost their racial understanding and tolerance. In sum, racial contact may increase racial acceptance and support for black candidates in racially diverse and highly educated settings.

On the other hand, residents in low-status settings are often exposed to "a daily dose of petty crime, concentrated physical decay and social disorder, ..., and public drug consumption," leading to "a constellation of negative psychological states," such as "feelings of anxiety and fear, alienation from neighbors, lack of trust in others, and suspicion toward out-groups in general" (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, 576). Non-Hispanic white residents in those communities also might feel more vulnerable to black political and economic gains (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). In sum, economic stress and status anxiety tend to trigger suspicion and generate hostility toward out-groups in general and African Americans in particular (Gay 2004; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). As a result, racial diversity might breed racial prejudice, tension, and conflict and therefore hostility to black candidates in less educated communities. Drawing on the interaction of racial and educational contexts, we can then hypothesize that *support for African American candidates increases in communities that are both racially diverse and highly educated* (Hypothesis 3).

Data and Measures

Examining contextual influences requires the use of longitudinal data, because cross-sectional data are not well suited to rule out endogeneity (Hopkins 2009).² Longitudinal data

² To the extent that people choose to live in a neighborhood with residents they find compatible, contextual characteristics might have little bearing on individual attitudes. The issue of endogeneity, therefore, needs to be addressed in order to ascertain contextual influences.

are also needed to determine the effect of changes in racial and socio-economic environments on voting behavior. To test the aforementioned hypotheses, we thus use time-series cross-section (TSCS) data collected at the county level in the State of Illinois over a period of 34 years from 1976 (when Cecil Partee ran for state attorney general) to 2010 (when three black candidates—Robin Kelly, David Miller, and Jesse White—ran for statewide offices).

Counties provide useful units of analysis, as counties are both "politically relevant subdivisions" and "contextually relevant environments to their inhabitants" (Seabrook 2009). Many classic works of political science have sought to understand the racial dynamics of state and regional politics by using county-level data (Key 1949). More recently, other works have used county or parish level data, either alone, or in combination with other data sources, to assess the racial dynamics of statewide elections (Bejarano and Segura 2007; Giles and Buckner 1993).

The dependent variable in the analysis is the percentage voting for the black candidate by county in the State of Illinois. Three primary contextual variables are included as independent variables: the percentage of residents who are black, the percentage of residents who hold a bachelor's degree, and county per capita income³. These variables reflect those in prior research using county level data to assess the impact of racial voting patterns (Bejarano and Segura 2007).

³ County per capita income is in 2010 constant dollars

For controls, we include the percentage of the county Democratic vote for president or governor in the respective election.⁴ We also include a binary variable to distinguish incumbents from non-incumbents, since incumbents usually receive higher support. In addition, we use another binary variable to distinguish running for U.S. Senate since it is a higher profile election than the others. Finally, we use binary variables for the individual candidates with Obama as the reference category. These candidate variables are meant to provide measures of candidate quality or characteristics, relative to Obama. The descriptive statistics for key variables are provided in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Results

estimate three TSCS models using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method, while using panel-corrected standard errors. We first look at the effects of racial and socioeconomic contexts on support for black candidates without considering the hypothesized relationships. Interestingly enough, Table 2 reveals that the density of black residents is insignificant in accounting for the percentage of the county vote for black candidates. Racially heterogeneous communities seem to be no more or less likely to support black statewide candidates, which supports neither the racial threat hypothesis nor the contact hypothesis.

[Table 2 about here]

⁴ The party data for 1986 combine the results for the Democratic Party and the Illinois Solidarity party. The Democratic gubernatorial nominee, Adlai Stevenson III was forced to run on the Solidarity party ticket after Lyndon LaRouche-backed candidates won some races in the Democratic primary that year.

⁵ For panel corrected standard errors, we use the xtpcse command in STATA 12

Equally interesting is the finding that the effects of socio-economic environments determined by both education and per capita income on the vote are insignificant as well.

Given that higher levels of education tend to go hand in hand with higher levels of racial tolerance among non-Hispanic whites and higher levels of perceptions of linked-fates among blacks at the individual level, it is generally expected that the percentage of residents with a bachelor's degree tends to increase communities' willingness to support black candidates. But these preliminary findings are not consistent with such an expectation. That per capita income turns out to have no significant impact on the vote share of black candidates seems to indicate that there is little difference between residents in high income areas and those in low income areas in their willingness to support black candidates. It is a too early, however, to draw any definite conclusions from these preliminary findings. We certainly need to examine how racial and socio-economic contexts along with changes in demographic environment influence the communities' willingness to support black statewide candidates.

There is a strong relationship between top of the ticket Democratic vote and that for black candidates, indicating that black candidates are not losing the party support that their white counterparts enjoy. The results also show that black candidates enjoy an incumbency advantage. When black candidates are compared to Obama, we find that all the other black candidates were significantly worse in terms of their vote getting prowess and relative effectiveness as candidates. The negative effect of the Senate binary variable reveals that black candidates generally did worse when they ran for the U.S. Senate than they did for other statewide offices, which seems to indicate that black candidates tend to invite more scrutiny, fairly or unfairly, when they run for higher profile races.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 presents two more elaborated models. One model includes the change variables (change in % black, change in % bachelors, and change in per capita income) and the other more fully specified model includes these change variables along with interactions between racial diversity and socioeconomic contexts. The relationship between changes in racial diversity (i.e., increases in the proportion of residents who are black) over time and support for black candidates turns out to be insignificant, which does not support Hypothesis 1. The effect of racial diversity at a given time is also muted. Overall, the data do not provide support for the racial threat hypothesis. On the other hand, as will be discussed below, the contact hypothesis is supported in certain situations.

The findings also show that the more quickly counties increase in the number of residents with a bachelor's degree (*change in % bachelors*), the more likely they are to embrace black candidates, holding all else constant. Thus, as hypothesized, rapidly increasing highly educated counties are more likely than their counterparts to vote for black candidates, which provides support for Hypothesis 2. Table 3 also reveals that the percentage of college educated residents at a given time turns out to have a negative and significant (in the fully specified model) effect on the vote shares of black candidates. This points to the possibility that education alone may not boost communities' readiness to support black candidates. It also suggests that the effect of education at a given time depend on the context and should be understood in conjunction with other contextual factors—in particular, racial context.

We are surprised to find that changes in per capita income over time are negatively related to the vote shares of black candidates, while the effect of per capita income at a given

time remains insignificant. Why are communities less likely to become enthusiastic about and more likely to become hostile to black candidates, as their income (rapidly) rises? Perhaps, part of the answer is that black Democratic candidates are often stereotyped extreme liberals who are more concerned about distributive justice than economic growth. For those who live in, and have moved into, economically booming communities, preserving their newly found wealth may increasingly loom large and any government policies that have the potential to dampen economic growth may be readily deemed as a threat. Residents in economically booming communities thus tend to become more hesitant to support candidates who they think would champion policies promoting economic equality rather than economic growth. They probably do not want to gamble on black Democratic candidates who are rightly or wrongly considered as single-hearted advocates of the liberal agenda.

Most revealingly, Table 3 demonstrates that race-based contextual influence is conditioned on educational context. The electoral fortunes of black candidates tend to increase in racially heterogeneous and highly educated communities, which supports Hypothesis 3. It is important to note that the effect of the proportion of residents who hold a bachelor's degree turns out to be negative in the full model. This indicates that black candidates would not be favored in highly educated communities with little racial diversity. Without having the opportunity to meet and forge relationships with African Americans, even communities with a disproportionately large number of highly educated residents may not be ready to embrace black candidates. Racial diversity or highly educated context by itself does not seem to promote communities' readiness to embrace black candidates. On the other hand, the educational achievement of residents tends to foster communities' willingness to vote for black

candidates, if it meets with racial diversity. Results from the estimation of the full model show that as expected, highly diverse and highly educated communities are more likely to vote for black candidates.

Conclusion

As the U.S. population diversifies, and racial attitudes evolve, the number of minority candidates running for statewide office is likely to expand. Looking at statewide black candidates in Illinois, we have found that their success depends in part on the extent that they are able to capture the Democratic vote that all statewide candidates running on the party ticket garner. Nevertheless, black candidates do not appear to enjoy quite the same level of party support that comparable white candidates do. The aggregate analysis shows that African American candidates tend to do better in counties that are both racially diverse *and* highly educated, as well as communities that have witnessed a growing inflow of highly educated residents.

Our study has demonstrated that racial context interacts with educational context to influence voting behavior. It is particularly interesting to find that highly educated context alone tends to dampen, rather than promote, communities' willingness to vote for black candidates. When racial diversity meets with a highly educated environment in a community, however, racial understanding and acceptance tends to flourish. In such a setting, non-Hispanic whites seem to become more racially tolerant and develop a positive attitude toward blacks thanks to having the opportunity to forge a relationship with (highly educated) African American neighbors (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). For blacks, living among highly educated African Americans seem to foster notions of linked fate (Dawson 1994; Gay 2004).

White and black residents living in racially diverse and highly educated contexts, then, are more willing to embrace black candidates, though for different reasons.

Our data do not support the racial threat hypothesis. No evidence is found to support the view that increasingly racially diverse communities are less likely to vote for black candidates. We also find that the contact hypothesis is not applicable for all settings. It has become obvious that the effects of racial and socioeconomic contexts on voting behavior cannot be fully understood in isolation from each other. Contact with people of different racial backgrounds does not necessarily lead to higher levels of support for black candidates. Only when a high level of racial diversity interacts with highly educated environment, as the contact hypothesis predicts, do communities become more willing to embrace black statewide candidates. Our study indicates that black candidates will continue to do well in counties that are increasing in their education levels as well as in their racial diversity. Unfortunately, however, black candidates will struggle in communities that are not increasing both educationally and racially.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
% Vote for Black				
Candidate	48.68	13.03	14.5	81.1
% Black	3.9	6.42	0	34.88
Per Capita Income (PCI)	22,330.87	3,920.49	12,929.2	41,642.7
% Bachelor	13.88	6.89	4.08	45.3
Democratic Vote for President or Governor	41.67	10.79	16.5	86.7
% Change Black	0.157	0.394	-2.2	3.72
% Change Bachelors	0.871	0.592	-1.68	5.12
% Change Income	296.3	503	-1,299.49	1,585.8
Incumbent*	0.33	0.472	0	1
Senate**	0.25	0.433	0	1

^{*}There were 408 incumbent county years and 816 non-incumbent county years.

^{**}There were 306 incumbent county years and 918 non-incumbent county years.

Table 2: The Effects of Racial and Socio-Economic Contexts on Voting for Black Candidates

Independent Variable	% Support for Black Candidates	
% Black	0.047 (0.048)	
% Bachelor	0.01 (0.06)	
Per Capita Income (PCI)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	
Control Variables		
Incumbency	5.44* (2.48)	
Democratic Vote for President or Governor	0.703** (0.073)	
Partee	-40.49** (5.86)	
Burris	-22.18** (5.06)	
Moseley-Braun	-11.14* (4.3)	
Collins	-23.55** (5.82)	
White	-17.05** (4.34)	
Kelly	-20.04** (3.97)	
Senate	-13.79* (5.82)	
Constant	45. 87** (6.55)	
R ²	0.77	
Number of cases	1,224	

Note: Panel Corrected Standard errors are in parentheses.

^{*} p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed.

Table 3: The Effects of Changes in Diversity and Interactions between Racial and Socioeconomic Contexts

Independent Variable	Change Model	Full Model with Interactions
% Black	0.042 (0.051)	-0.0603 (0.17)
% Bachelor	-0.103 (0.069)	-0.595* (0.269)
Per Capita Income (PCI)	-0.00014 (0.00015)	-0.00037 (0.00023)
Change Variables		
Changes in Black	0.588 (0.466)	0.765 (0.475)
Changes in Bachelors	2.215** (0.741)	2.462**(0.749)
Changes in Per Capital Income	-0.0047** (0.0016)	-0.0048** (0.0016)
Interaction Variables		
Black x Bachelors		0.0229* (0.0095)
Black x Income		0.000009 (0.000012)
Bachelors x Income		0.000003 (0.000012)
Bachelors & Income		0.000013 (0.000008)
Control Variables		
Incumbency	3.66 (2.01)	3.61 (1.99)
Democratic Vote for President	0.662** (0.072)	0.627** (0.0726)
or Governor		
Partee	-37.69** (4.76)	-38.15** (4.71)
Burris	-21.31** (4.03)	-21.51** (3.98)
Moseley-Braun	-7.28* (3.61)	-7.49** (3.58)
Collins	-21.4** (4.61)	-21.66** (4.56)
White	-17.91** (3.41)	-17.53** (3.39)
Kelly	-20.13** (3.13)	-20.48** (3.098)
Senate	-14.89** (4.55)	-14.47** (4.51)
Carrieri	40.26** (5.57)	FC 0.4** (7.2F)
Constant	48.26** (5.57)	56.84** (7.35)
R ²	0.789	0.794
Number of cases	1,224	1,224

Note: Panel Corrected Standard Errors are in parentheses.

^{*} p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed.