Women Don’t Run?
Representation, Election Aversion, and Gender Differences in Candidate Entry

Kristin Kanthak∗  Jonathan Woon†
University of Pittsburgh       University of Pittsburgh

March 26, 2013‡

Abstract

In order to control for confounding factors that might affect the relative propensities for women and men to enter politics, we take the question of the choice to enter elections to the laboratory. We find evidence that women are election averse while men are not. These differences do not arise from disparities in confidence, risk aversion, or beliefs, but rather from the specific competitive and strategic context of campaigns and elections. The key features of our experimental design involve (1) an objective task that represents policymaking ability, (2) monetary rewards that ensure that all subjects, regardless of gender, face the same incentives to select a representative with the highest task ability, and (3) a comparison of alternative selection mechanisms. In Experiment 1, we find that men and women are equally likely to volunteer when the representative is selected randomly, but that women are less likely to be candidates when the representative is chosen through an election. In Experiment 2, we find that women’s election aversion persists with variations in the electoral environment; it disappears only when campaigns are both more truthful and less costly.

∗Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, kanthak@pitt.edu
†Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, and Faculty, Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, woon@pitt.edu
‡This research is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-1154739. We thank Eric Dickson, Yanna Krupnikov, Sera Linardi, Rose McDermott, and Lise Vesterlund, for helpful comments and discussions. Previous versions were presented at the 2013 Political Representation: Fifty Years after Miller and Stokes Conference at Vanderbilt University, the 2012 Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, the 2012 NYU-CESS Experimental Political Science Conference, the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association meeting, the 2011 American Political Science Association annual meeting, and the 2011 North American Economic Science Association conference.
“I think she’s as qualified as anyone. She was an educated professional woman before she was an actress.” –Joan Christian, a Kentucky voter, on actress Ashley Judd’s potential electoral run against Senator Mitch McConnell

To Miller and Stokes (1963), the job of a representative (or at least the “constituency influence” part of that job) is to translate their constituency’s attitudes to roll call voting behavior. The representative does this via two paths: (1) through the representative’s own attitude (which may be naturally related to the attitudes of the constituency) and (2) the through representative’s perception of the constituency’s attitudes. Undergirding this model is the notion that if the representative fails to make the connection sufficiently closely, then some other candidate, endowed with greater ability to reduce error in attitude-roll call agreement, will challenge him in the next election, and the incumbent will lose. The Miller and Stokes model, then, requires that those who hold office, and those who seek to challenge them, are skilled at, and are incentivized toward, reducing the error in attitude-roll call agreement. Representation is best when the people in office successfully maximize attitude-roll call agreement for fear of an electoral challenger whose maximization abilities are greater and could therefore usurp them.

Yet even a cursory glance at Congress indicates that we are likely not maximizing this type of representation. Given that we have known since Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1963) that voters pay very little attention to roll call voting behavior, let along attitude-roll call agreement, it is a sure bet that most elections are decided on factors other than attitude-roll call agreement. And from there, it is easy to conclude that it is those factors that decide elections – not ability to maximize attitude-roll call agreement, that will be overrepresented in Congress. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of phenomenon is the dearth of women in U.S. legislatures. In fact, women are significantly under-represented in American legislatures, and indeed virtually every legislature in the world, comprising only 18 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives and 24 percent of representatives in U.S. state legislatures. Yet if one assumes that ideological congruence and ability to discern perceptions
of constituent’s ideology are distributed at least roughly evenly across men and women, this
dearth of women indicates a dearth of representatives who could use their abilities to better
manage the relationship between constituents and congressional votes. In the current paper,
we focus on this dearth of women, as well as the implications of this dearth for the abilities
of those elected to represent.

More specifically, we consider the emergence of quality women candidates, the dearth
of which is itself a significant normative problem for democracy. But for the moment, we
set aside those normative concerns specific to women’s representation. Instead, we consider
the dearth of women candidates as a potential threat to attitude-roll call agreement as Miller
and Stokes conceptualize it. One need only to believe that women are at least as good as
men at translating attitudes to roll call votes to be concerned on representation grounds
about the lack of women in Congress. But going even further, the extant literature indicates
that at least in some cases, women may actually be better than their male counterparts. For
example, women candidates tend to be of better quality than men candidates (Lawless and
Pearson 2008) and, if they win, tend also to be better legislators than their male colleagues
(Reingold 2000).

Furthermore, we take the question of candidate emergence to the laboratory, which
allows us both to control for external forces that might affect the willingness of potential
candidates to enter the fray, and also to measure with a great deal of accuracy the qualifi-
cations of potential candidates to better determine how ability affects candidate emergence.
Put simply, we wish to explore the relationship between ability and willingness to run for
office, and how gender might mitigate that relationship. This approach also allows us to
perch on safe methodological ground, since the types of experiments we bring to bear are
well-known and well-studied in experimental economics.

---

1Legislatures with more women enjoy greater legitimacy among the governed (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler
2005), diverse groups in general make better decisions (Page 2007), and groups with more women tend to
work together more effectively (Woolley, et. al. 2010). Women also tend to mitigate the deleterious effects of
ideological preference divergence in legislatures (Kanthak and Krause 2010, 2011). Furthermore, observing
women candidates creates an increased sense of efficacy among girls (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006).
Yet the question of women’s candidate emergence is one that has received much attention in the political science literature. Explanations for the lack of women in political office are myriad, including sexism from voters (Githens and Prestage 1977), sexist stereotypes of women candidates from the media (Kahn 1996; Fox 1997), the deleterious effects of the incumbency advantage for all types of new candidates (Darcy, Welsh, and Clark 1994; Duerst-Lahti 1998), women’s early career choices (CAWP 2001; Clark 1994), or stronger obligations to family (Caroll and Strimling 1983). Although the literature has outlined several “suspects” that might cause the lack of women running for political office, assessing the independent effect of any one of these factors is nearly impossible.

The current project focuses on the lack of women candidates for office, which clearly plays a central role in the lack of women representatives (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). Our reliance on experimental methods allows us to control other factors that determine the relative likelihood of women and men entering politics, to focus more closely on the question of whether or not women and men differ in their willingness to run for office. More specifically, we can control other factors to better focus on one particular “suspect” that is most relevant to the quality of the solution to Miller and Stokes’ attitude-roll call agreement: gender differences in beliefs about one’s own qualifications for running for office. Fox and Lawless (2005) find that a sense of efficacy as a candidate is one of the largest determinants of what they call, “nascent political ambition.” Furthermore, the extant literature points to evidence that women contemplating a run for political office tend to think more about whether they are credible candidates than do men (Fowler and McClure 1989; Kahn 1996; Fox 1997 Fox, Lawless and Feeley 2001), and that women with qualifications similar to those of men are significantly less likely to perceive themselves as qualified to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2004). Indeed, these gender-based differences in considerations creates gender differences in both candidates in and winners of Congressional elections, whereby female candidates have more experience than their male counterparts (Pearson and McGhee 2012) and female Members of Congress outperform their male counterparts in receipt of federal...
funds for their districts (Anzia and Berry 2011).

The extant literature, however, can measure only self-reported reactions to ability or implications of gender-based differences in perceptions of ability. By taking the question to the laboratory, we can directly measure task ability – and, by extension, its effect on decision making – in an environment that is free from external factors that may also create gender-based differences in willingness to run for office. Furthermore, we can directly compare willingness to volunteer to serve as a representative to willingness actually to run in an election to serve as representative. Using these methods, we can address whether or not there exists a distinct phenomenon called election aversion, whereby something about elections themselves dissuades women from entering the fray.

Indeed, our analysis does point to election aversion as a distinct phenomenon. Specifically, we find that both men and women consider task ability in similar ways when deciding whether or not to volunteer to be a representative of a group: Those subjects who are the most able are the most likely to volunteer. Strikingly, however, men are significantly less sensitive to task ability when deciding whether or not to run in an election, rather than to volunteer, to be a representative of a group. And most notably, women in our study do not consider task ability at all when deciding whether or not to run. These findings have important implications both for recruitment of women to run for political office and for the ability of elections to select qualified candidates for political positions. Furthermore, our results point to strategies practitioners might wish to consider when recruiting women candidates. Most notably, our results indicate that attempts to convince women they are qualified to hold office are likely unhelpful. Despite their claims of feeling unqualified, women have a firm understanding of their own qualifications and are able to bring that understanding to bear on the question of whether or not to run at least as well as their male counterparts. Instead, our findings indicate that it is bearing the costs of running for election, coupled with a campaign setting in which low-information voters cannot properly discern women’s qualifications, that precludes women from entering the fray. Women are election averse in a way that is wholly
separate from risk aversion, competition aversion, or other types of gender differences noted in the literature. Furthermore, election aversion resides in the electoral process itself, and so solutions to it require altering the electoral environment. Practitioners, then, should focus their efforts on mitigating the costs of running for women and on assuring that women can accurately communicate their qualifications to voters.

**Candidate Emergence**

Social science research across several disciplines has pointed to behavioral differences in men and women. Women communicate differently (Gilligan 1993), are less likely to engage in negotiation (Babcock and Laschever 2003), show less confidence in their abilities (Furnham and Rawles 1995), and tend to be more risk averse (Croson and Gneezy 2010) and less competitive (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) than their male counterparts. These gender differences may imply that women and men take a different approach to the decision of whether or not to run for office. In other words, women and men may differ systematically over how averse to running for election they are. To better understand how the electoral entry decision-making process may differ on the basis of gender, we decompose the component parts of that decision and propose three factors that contribute to an individual’s decision to run for elective office. We can therefore better understand how each of these factors affects an individual’s level of election aversion. By considering and accounting for each of these factors, we can not only determine whether men and women differ in their choices to run for office, but also investigate which portion of the decision-making process play the strongest role. Furthermore, we can rely on the extant literature on the differences between men and women to guide our theoretical expectations at each stage. We now discuss each of these factors in more detail.

The first factor any prospective candidate must consider is whether or not they want to act on behalf of – or represent – others. That is, at a basic level, individuals may differ in
their willingness to serve. The extant literature would lead us to believe that the reluctance of women to run for public office is not located here. If anything, women are more likely to serve than men. Women are more likely than men to engage in a number of political activities, including attending rallies and meetings (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997) and women perform volunteer service at a much higher rate than men, across age group, level of education, and other demographic characteristics, although slightly more men than women volunteer for civic, political, professional, or international groups (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). Furthermore, we know that although women do more volunteer work than men do, they are less visible (Margolis 1979) and tend to downplay their efforts and abilities in volunteerism (Daniels 1985, 1987; Abrahams 1996; Blackstone 2004). This would lead us to expect that women would be at least as likely to volunteer to represent a group as would men.

Second, a candidate must be willing to run in an election. This factor is conceptually distinct from beliefs about ability or willingness to serve and involves beliefs about one’s likely success in the electoral process, due to need to campaign for votes as well as expectations about how others may judge one’s ability to serve. Our expectations of a gender difference are heightened here, since we expect women to be more averse to running for election than men are. This is largely because running for election requires asking voters to support one’s candidacy. If, as the extant literature tells us, women are less likely to ask for raises or other tangible rewards for their performance (Babcock and Laschever 2010), then they are likely unwilling to ask voters to hire them for the role of their representative. Indeed, women may be wise to be reluctant to ask for such support. Women are both perceived to be less capable (Goldin and Rouse 2000) and are less likely to boast about their abilities than men, but their claims are believed equally, leading to a gender gap in perceived ability (Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). For example, if women feel they want to represent and also feel capable of representing, but they do not enter the election, we can infer that it is something inherent in the election itself (likely, having to ask for support from potential constituents or beliefs
about the likelihood of receiving enough support) that affects the decision not to enter. Notably, this line of thinking implies that women are simply less likely to run for political office in general. If this line of thinking is correct, women simply don’t run, regardless of their perception, or the reality, of their capability of serving.

Third, potential candidates may differ both in their abilities and in how they assess those abilities in relation to others. In other words, candidates and officeholders will vary in their underlying ability to perform the duties of office (whatever those duties may be) and the higher ones actual ability or level of competence is, the more worthwhile and attractive it will be to hold office (both for the representative and for his or constituents). However, individuals also vary in the extent to which they correctly judge their own abilities, with men being generally more overconfident than women (Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and Phillips 1982; Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar 1994). Here, we may expect to see gender differences, with men being more likely to enter because they have greater confidence in their own ability to perform the duties of office. For example, women underestimate their own intelligence, whereas men overestimate theirs (Furnham and Rawles 1995) and men tend to be overconfident about their own skill set (Kling, Hyde, Showers and Buswell 1999). Similarly, despite there being no gender difference, men, in fact, rate their math skills higher than do women (Wigfield, Eccles, and Pintrich 1996). If these differences affect women and men differentially as they consider whether or not to serve, we would expect them to display differing levels of sensitivity to changes in their ability to perform a task.

The extant literature, then, implies that women and men may differ in terms of each of these three factors. We can test each of these implications in the laboratory, where our ability to control the experiment allows us to identify the distinct effects of each of these implications. Furthermore, this approach allows us to consider the effect of ability more finely than much of the extant literature. Reliance on answers to survey questions means that the extant literature finds that women self-report that they think they are not qualified. But our research can allow us to consider what, precisely, are the qualifications women lack.
When they report not feeling qualified, do women mean they are not up to the job the election is filling? If so, that will manifest in an equal unwillingness to volunteer or run for an election to represent the group. On the other hand, do women mean they do not feel they are able to convince others that they are qualified to represent the group? If that is the case, we should see the effect manifest when running for election, but not when volunteering to represent.

**Experiment 1: Volunteers and Candidates**

Our first experiment tests whether differences in the willingness to become a candidate depend on confidence in one’s underlying abilities or whether such differences arise instead from the nature of electoral competition. Three features of the design are central to distinguishing between these factors that may comprise election aversion. First, the experiment revolves around an objective problem-solving task. Performance on the task serves as an observable and objective measure of underlying ability, which we can think of as the laboratory analogue of policy-making ability or ability to maximize attitude-roll call agreement in the sense of Miller and Stokes. Such ability is not normally observable using non-experimental data. Second, we designed the monetary payment scheme so that all members of a group have common incentives to select the highest ability member as their representative. This allows us to control for differences in the value of holding office that are likely to exist between individuals. Third, we compare the decision to enter the pool of potential representatives under two alternative group selection mechanisms: one with an election and one without. Thus, we can carefully assess whether gender differences depend specifically on the prospect of electoral competition or whether they arise from differences in relative confidence in ability.
Design and Procedures

We selected the Five-Minute Addition Task used by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) to study preferences for competition as the task for our experiment. It involves computing the sum of five randomly selected two-digit numbers and doing as many of these sums as possible correctly within five minutes. For our purposes, the Addition Task has several desirable properties. It is specifically void of ideological or political content, which controls for subjects’ knowledge and interest in particular political questions of the day. In this sense, then, it is akin to the problem of maximizing attitude-roll call agreement. It is also a task for which there is heterogeneity between subjects, and that previous research suggests is gender neutral. Figure 1 illustrates the computer interface for the task, which we implemented in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007).

Even though previous studies using the Addition Task demonstrate there are no gender differences in performance, the fact that the task involves doing math problems raises the possibility that stereotype threat (Spencer, Steele and Quinn 1999, Steele and Aronson 1995) may play a role in the decisions we are interested in. That is, negative stereotypes about women’s math abilities might negatively affect the confidence that women...
have in their ability or in the beliefs they hold about how their ability compares to others in their group. We took precautions to guard against this (while also being careful not to specifically cue gender) by informing subjects that the “task has been chosen because there are no differences based on education level, socio-economic status, gender, or race in the ability of people to perform the task well.” Nevertheless, if negative stereotypes are deeply held, they might still adversely influence women’s decisions about representing their group. In our view, this is actually a desirable feature of our experimental design for the simple reason that politics is traditionally viewed as a task that belongs in the masculine domain (Conway, Steurnagel and Ahern). The choice of a math task therefore enhances the external and ecological validity of our study because the presence of negative stereotypes in our experimental context is similar to the real-world political context of choosing to run for office. Furthermore, we can directly test for this stereotype threat because we would expect it to reveal itself as part of confidence in ability to do the job for which a representative is being selected. Because of this, we should see the effects of stereotype threat in both electoral and non-electoral settings.

We conducted our experiments at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Pittsburgh. A total of 130 subjects (65 men and 65 women) participated in Experiment 1. There were ten participants (five men and five women) in each session, which lasted under an hour. All interaction between subjects took place anonymously via a computerized interface. Subjects were assigned ID numbers and were identified in their interactions with other group members only by their ID number. While subjects could observe the gender of the other participants in the session, we randomly assigned them to two groups of five members so that they would know neither which of the other participants were in their group nor its exact gender composition. Experiment 1 involves a within-subject design, so the rules and payoff structure for every session was identical. Each session was divided into three parts, and at the beginning of each part we distributed and

---

3In a post-experiment questionnaire, no respondent guessed that the experiment was about gender.
read the instructions aloud for that part of the experiment. At the end of the experimental session, subjects completed a questionnaire that included demographic questions, one of the three parts was randomly selected for payment (to guard against subjects using one part to hedge against decisions in other parts), and subjects were paid. In addition to their earnings from one of the parts of the experiment, subjects received a $7 show-up fee.

In Part 1, which we designated *Piece Rate*, we introduced the task and paid subjects for their performance. Each subject earns 75 cents for each correct sum if this part is selected for payment and receives feedback only about his or her own individual performance. No subject learns anything about the performance of the other members of the group. The purpose of Part 1 is for subjects to learn their ability in absolute, but not relative terms.

In Part 2, we introduce *Group Representation*. Subjects first decide whether or not they are willing to be selected as the group representative, and then a representative is randomly selected from the set of willing members of each group[^1] We deem such willing members *volunteers* (although we do not use the term in our instructions so as not to induce or activate social desirability, norms, or other-regarding preferences). Subjects then repeat the task and, if Part 2 is selected for payment, are paid 50 cents for each of the representative’s correct answers plus 25 cents for each of their own correct answers. (Although we provide feedback about subjects’ own performance on the task in Part 2, we do not provide feedback about payoffs or the representative’s performance until the end of the experiment so that subjects do not gain any information about relative abilities.) Subjects maximize their payoffs if the highest performer in the group is selected as the representative, and thus group members’ preferences are aligned. As we explain in the next section, the decision to volunteer should primarily depend on subjects’ beliefs about their relative ability and therefore serves as our non-electoral baseline for comparison.

In Part 3, we introduce an *Election* for selecting the group representative, which replaces the random selection mechanism from Part 2. After the election, subjects repeat

[^1]: If no group member is willing, we randomly select one member from all members of the group.
the Addition Task and are paid the same way as in Part 2: They earn 50 cents for each of the representative’s correct answers and 25 cents for each of their own. The incentives for selecting the highest performer are therefore the same as in Part 2. We also include two features of the electoral environment that we believe may affect subjects’ willingness to run for office: a campaign and costs and benefits of running for office.

The campaign works as follows. If there are two or more candidates in a group, each candidate writes a brief text message. This message is the only information that other group members have when they vote. Candidates can write whatever they like, so the message is cheap talk. Moreover, if subjects choose to do so, they can lie about their past performance on the task. Subjects then each cast one vote for a candidate (voting for oneself is permitted) and the representative is selected by plurality rule with ties broken randomly.

The costs and benefits associated with becoming a candidate are as follows. Subjects receive $1 for each vote they receive in the election while incurring a fixed cost of running for office of $2. Introducing these costs and benefits ensures that subjects’ expectations about their electoral performance are relevant to their incentives to run for office. Note that the cost-benefit structure is designed so that there is no net benefit to running if a subject expects to receive two votes (e.g., votes for himself or herself and garners one other vote), a net benefit for receiving three or more votes, and a net cost if a candidate cannot garner at least one other vote. If there is only one candidate, then that candidate automatically becomes the representative and earns a net benefit of 3 dollars from running, but if there are no candidates, a representative is selected at random from all members of the group but does not receive any additional benefit from being selected.\footnote{Our incentive structure ensures that there cannot be a Nash equilibrium in which there are no candidates or in which all group members become candidates.}

**Theoretical Expectations**

Our analysis of the incentives for choosing to be a volunteer or a candidate in the experiment helps to identify potential sources of behavioral differences between men and women within
a common theoretical framework. We begin by considering the decision problem from the perspective of an expected payoff-maximizing individual, which provides a gender-neutral benchmark for behavior. We then discuss how men and women might differ within this framework and discuss observable implications of these differences.

**Volunteers.** An individual’s decision to volunteer or not boils down to a comparison between her own score and the beliefs she holds about other volunteers’ scores. If she is risk neutral, then she will prefer to volunteer if and only if her score, $s_i$, is above the average score of the other volunteers, $v_j$. The intuition is straightforward. Recall that in Part 2, each volunteer is equally likely to be selected as the group’s representative. If her score is above $v_j$, then volunteering raises the expected score of the group’s representative, but if her score is below $v_j$, then volunteering lowers it.

If men and women have the same beliefs about others and if there are no gender differences in performance, then we would also expect there to be no differences in volunteering decisions. If there are no gender differences in beliefs, but men have higher task ability than women, then we would expect men to be more likely to volunteer than women only in the aggregate but for there to be no gender differences in the probability of volunteering when controlling for task ability. We should therefore expect differences only in the probability of entering (when controlling for task ability) when men and women have different beliefs about their ability relative to others. Thus, all else equal, to the extent that men are overconfident in their abilities, and women underconfident, we would expect to observe men volunteering at greater rates than women. However, if men and women are equally confident in their abilities, we would expect the rates of volunteering to be the same.

The above argument appears to depend on the assumption that men and women are both risk neutral. If we allow for risk preferences to vary, the decision to volunteer still takes the form of a cutoff rule: volunteer if and only if $s_i$ is above some cutoff $k$, where $k$ can be

---

6 Implicit in the assumption of expected payoff maximization is risk neutrality. We will consider the implications of risk aversion later in the analysis.

7 See the Appendix for formal analysis.
thought of as the minimum willingness to run and depends on a subject’s risk preferences. Different rates of volunteering might therefore be explained by differences in risk preferences, even when subjects have the same beliefs about others.

Intuition suggests that subjects who are more risk aversion should be less likely to volunteer, but this intuition is wrong. Instead, greater risk aversion should increases the willingness to volunteer. That is, risk aversion lowers the value of the threshold \( k \). To see why, consider a subject whose score is equal to the expected value of other volunteers’ scores. A risk neutral subject would be indifferent between volunteering and not volunteering. A risk averse subject, however, has a strict preference for volunteering because doing so reduces the variance of the representative’s score while leaving the expected value unchanged. Thus, if women are generally more risk averse than men, then they should be more likely to volunteer than men with the same ability and beliefs.

**Candidates.** In Part 3, moving from a random selection mechanism to an election introduces new considerations into the decision calculus. The addition of a campaign stage with costs and benefits of running for office implies that expectations of electoral success should play an important role alongside beliefs and risk preferences. In this sense, differences in willingness to enter in Parts 2 and 3 may capture how election seeking or election averse subjects are. We postulate that such expectations will depend, in large part, on how informative individuals expect the electoral process to be. The informativeness of the election depends, in turn, on the degree of honesty one expects of other group members as well as one’s own aptitude for conveying to others his or her task ability.

To analyze how the informativeness of the election (combined with direct costs and benefits of office-seeking) affects the decision to run, we consider the opposite cases in which elections are either completely uninformative or completely informative. Although extreme, the case of uninformative elections is not entirely unreasonable to the extent that campaigning typically involves strategic incentives for candidates to misrepresent their true abilities. In our experiment, such incentives are present but small since group members have common
incentives to elect the best representative possible. At the other extreme, the election might be completely informative if all group members recognize their shared goals and candidates report their scores honestly because they view the purpose of the election as a way to find the best group member.

In the case where the election is uninformative, we can expect the votes of non-candidates—and thus the results of the election—to be determined randomly. Hence, choosing to run affects the expected quality of the representative in the same way that it does in Part 2 with random selection. Holding ability and beliefs constant, the expected net benefit of running depends on the number of other candidates expected (because the cost is fixed while the expected benefit is decreasing in the number of candidates). Formally, a risk neutral expected payoff-maximizing subject prefers to become a candidate if her score exceeds $c_j + 4n - 6$ where $c_j$ is the average score of the $n$ other candidates. The threshold is increasing in $n$, which implies that all else equal, the willingness to run is decreasing in expectations of greater electoral competition. For example, if $n = 1$, then any subject whose score is below the average by 2 is indifferent between running and not running, and any subject whose score is above this value strictly prefers to run. In contrast, if $n = 3$, however, a subject must have a score at least 6 above the average to be willing to run.

At the other extreme, if elections are perfectly informative, then the highest ability candidate will always be elected. Thus, the relevant belief about the distribution of scores is not whether one’s own score $s_i$ is above or below the mean, but the probability that $s_i$ is the highest score among the pool of candidates. By choosing to become a candidate, individual $i$ effectively sets the minimum score of the representative (i.e., the representative’s score cannot not be below $s_i$ because no candidate with a score below $s_i$ will be elected as the representative). For example, if $s_i$ is the average score, then being a candidate guarantees

---

8The best possible outcome for an election-seeking individual is to win all five votes and earn a net benefit of $3. So, if an individual believes he will win all five votes with certainty and his score is within 6 of the highest score, then he has an incentive to lie to seek votes. However, the fewer votes he expects to receive (e.g., the more intense he expects electoral competition to be), then his score must be closer to what he believes to be the highest score for vote-seeking to be preferable to allowing the best representative to be elected.
that the expected representative’s score will be above average (i.e., average if \( i \) wins and above average if \( i \) loses). Thus, the more informative individuals believe the campaign to be, the more likely they are to run (because it lowers the minimum willingness to run).

In addition, the probability that \( s_i \) is the highest score is decreasing in the number of candidates. This is because with more candidates, repeated draws from same distribution provide more frequent opportunities to draw a higher score. The expected net benefit from choosing to run in terms of the effect on the expected quality of the representative is therefore decreasing in the number of candidates. Thus, the more intense electoral competition is expected to be, the less likely that \( s_i \) is the highest score (because there are more chances to draw a higher score from the same distribution), and the less likely that individual \( i \) is to run.

**Summary.** In establishing a benchmark for what expected payoff- maximizing individuals would do in our experiment, our theoretical analysis generates several key insights about factors that contribute to the decision to volunteer and to run for office. Central to our experimental design is an objective measure of candidate ability, and our analysis verifies that any differences we observe between men and women under the random selection mechanism in Part 2 should be due primarily to differences in their beliefs about the distribution of ability. This allows us to test directly a central component of much of the literature on gender differences in candidate emergence: the notion that women are more likely to think they are unqualified for office. If men underestimate the overall distribution (leading to overconfidence in their abilities) or if women overestimate it (leading to underconfidence), our analysis implies that we would indeed observe gender differences in Part 2.

If candidate entry decisions instead hinge on factors related specifically to electoral competition—such as inhibitions about asking for votes or a lack of confidence in electoral success—rather than on confidence in one’s relative task ability, then we would not expect to see gender differences in Part 2 decisions but instead observe them in Part 3 decisions. Our theoretical analysis identifies two potential reasons for this.
First, gender differences in candidate entry might be due to different beliefs about electoral competition. Individuals are more likely to run if they expect less electoral competition. If men underestimate or women overestimate the degree of electoral competition, then men are more likely to run than women even holding ability constant. This is an explanation that, to our knowledge, is not recognized in the existing literature.

Second, gender differences in elections might arise from differing beliefs about the informativeness of elections. Running for office is less beneficial (both personally and for the group) the more randomness there is in electoral outcomes. Thus, we would expect women to be less likely than men to run if they believed elections were less informative—in other words, if they tend to believe (more than men do) that elections are less about merit and more about strategic posturing, misrepresentation, and vote-seeking.

Results

The results of Experiment One point to dramatic differences in how men and women approach the question of whether or not to volunteer or run for election to represent their groups. These differences point to election aversion acting as a distinct phenomenon, more likely to affect women than men. Figure 2 presents the main results for subjects’ willingness to be the group representative for each of our selection mechanisms. The bars on the left show that men and women are equally likely to volunteer to be the representative when the representative is selected randomly in Part 2. Men and women are both likely to volunteer (77% of men volunteer and 72% of women), and the difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2_{(1)} = 0.37, p = 0.55$). Given the fact that we do not see gender-based differences in the volunteer treatment, our theoretical analysis suggests that we should similarly not expect to see gender-based differences in the election treatment if confidence in ability to do the job is the major factor in determining whether or not subjects are willing to represent their groups.

Yet this is not the case. Rather, there is a substantial gender difference in the will-
Figure 2: Choices to represent

![Bar chart showing choices for volunteer run and run, with male and female percentages.

Figure 3: Combined choices in Parts 2 and 3

![Bar chart showing combined choices for different conditions, with male and female subjects.

Legend:
- Male
- Female
ingness to run for representative when the selection mechanism involves an election. The proportion of men who run in Part 3 (67%) is only slightly less than the proportion who volunteer in Part 2, while the proportion of women who run drops substantially, to fewer than a majority (43%), a difference that is statistically significant ($\chi^2_{(1)} = 7.97, p = 0.005$). Men and women differ dramatically in their willingness to run for office, even without the effect of differing outside forces, such as family obligations, to which the extant literature point. Most significantly given the extant literature, lack of confidence in doing the job cannot explain these gender differences. Women know when they are able in the volunteer treatment, and they can effectively bring that knowledge to bear on the question of whether or not to volunteer. Yet when it comes to elections, women are far less willing than men to enter the fray.

In Figure 3, we provide another perspective by plotting the distribution of subjects’ combined choices in Part 2 and Part 3. The modal behavior for men (60%) is both to volunteer in Part 2 and run in Part 3, which means that most men who volunteer also run. However, the percentage of women who both volunteer and run (37%) is nearly the same as the percentage who volunteer only (35%), which means that women who volunteer are equally likely to run as to not run. The other interesting feature of Figure 3 is that there are few subjects who choose not volunteer in Part 2 but then decide to run in Part 3. This behavior suggests that we were successful in our effects to construct electoral incentives that were not strong enough to induce subjects to enter the election simply for the electoral benefit.

Before examining whether differences in choices lead to differences in the quality of volunteers, candidates, and representatives, we first examine whether there are differences in performance in Part 1 (the Piece Rate version of the task) of the experiment. There are no differences in the average performance of each gender, as shown in Table 1, the mean number of correct sums is 11.64 for men and 10.46 for women, and a t-test shows that the difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.12$). There is, however, an important difference in
the distribution of scores. As the kernel density plots in Figure 4 show, the variance in performance is quite a bit higher for men. There are a few men with very high scores, and women’s scores are clustered more tightly around the mean; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of distributions ($p = 0.04$). Interestingly, our findings differ from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007); in their experiment, distributions of men’s and women’s scores were nearly identical.

Table 1 also presents the average performance of subjects according to whether or not they volunteer in Part 2, whether or not they run in Part 3, and the average performance of subjects who were actually selected as group representatives. In terms of gender differences in performance, we find that men volunteers score higher than women volunteers, men candidates score higher than women candidates, and women non-candidates score higher than men non-candidates. These differences are likely due to the higher variance in the distribution of men’s scores. In both Part 2 and Part 3, the average score of men willing to be the representative is clearly higher than the average score of men who were not so willing. For women, however, the average score of volunteers and candidates is only slightly higher than those of non-volunteers and non-candidates, respectively. These results suggest that women may be less sensitive to their task ability than men when deciding whether to volunteer or run for representative.

To investigate more precisely the relationship between task ability and choice, we estimate a probit model and report the results in Table 2. The dependent variable is the choice of whether or not to enter the potential pool of representatives, and we structure the data so that there are two observations for each subject (one observation for their Part 2 choice and one observation for their Part 3 choice). Structuring the data in this way allows us to estimate the effects of task ability (performance in Part 1) on choices as well as to estimate the “treatment effect” of electoral competition and the interaction between the

---

In other words, the data for the probit analysis has a panel structure where the panel variable is the subject and the time variable is the part of the experiment. Because there are two non-independent observations per subject, we cluster the standard errors by subject.
Figure 4: Task performance (kernel densities)

Table 1: Task performance by gender and decision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piece rate</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-volunteers</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Representative</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>11.43</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-candidates</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Representative</td>
<td>14.79</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(2.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
electoral environment and performance as well as appropriate interactions with gender.

Men’s choices in both Part 2 and Part 3 are sensitive to their task ability, but their decisions depend less on task ability when the selection mechanism is an election than when it involves random selection. The main coefficient for performance is positive and statistically significant, which implies that men are more likely to volunteer the higher their task ability in Part 2. However, the interaction between electoral competition and performance is negative and statistically significant, which means that men are less likely to run for election in Part 3 as a function of task ability than they are to volunteer in Part 2. The sum of this interaction coefficient and the main coefficient for performance remains positive and significant (the combined coefficient is 0.12, the standard error is 0.03, and \( p < 0.01 \)), so it is the case that higher ability men are more likely to run for election.

Of greater interest to us is that the probit results show women to indeed be less sensitive to their task ability than men. The coefficient for the interaction between female and performance is negative and statistically significant, which implies less sensitivity in their choices to volunteer. Nevertheless, the sum of the main coefficient for performance plus the interaction with gender remains significantly greater than 0 (the combined coefficient is 0.20, the standard error is 0.06, and \( p < 0.01 \)), which means that women, like men, are more likely to volunteer in Part 2 the higher their task ability. But the story is different for Part 3—when there is an election. The fact that the coefficient for the interaction between election and performance is negative and statistically significant implies that women are even less sensitive to their task ability when there is an election (just as it implied the same for men). To estimate women’s sensitivity to task ability in Part 3, we must add the main effect of performance and both interactions. The sum of these three coefficients is not significantly different from 0 (the combined coefficient is \(-0.02\), the standard error is (0.05), and \( p = 0.67 \)), which implies that the probability a woman runs for election in Part 3 does not.

\[ 10 \] The coefficients for the indicator variables are not substantively interesting. Even though the coefficient for female is positive and significant, it means only that a woman who scores 0 is significantly more likely to enter than a man who scores 0. We will discuss predicted probabilities below.
Table 2: Probit analysis of choice to represent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance (Piece rate)</td>
<td>0.339** (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election × Performance</td>
<td>-0.220** (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female × Performance</td>
<td>-0.139* (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>1.594** (0.610)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.006 (0.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female × Election</td>
<td>-0.140 (0.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.414** (0.588)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 260
Log-likelihood -136.673
\( \chi^2_{(6)} \) 44.332

† \( p < .10 \), * \( p < .05 \), ** \( p < .01 \); standard errors clustered by subject
not depend on her task ability at all.

To assess the overall probability of volunteering or running for different levels of task ability, we compute the predicted probabilities from the probit model and plot them separately for each gender and selection mechanism in Figure 5. While the order of the predicted probabilities on the right side of the figure reinforces our discussion of sensitivities to task ability, what is striking about the figure is the fact that the overall probability that a woman runs for election is so much lower for many levels of performance. The predicted probability curves intersect near the point where the score is 7, which is roughly the 25th percentile and far below the mean of score of 11. Figure 5 illustrates that while an average ability woman is not much less likely to volunteer as an average ability man, she is substantially less likely to run for election, and the disparity is even greater for high ability women.12

Our theoretical analysis suggests that mean ability may be a critical threshold. Although we do not have subjects’ beliefs about electoral competition or campaign informativeness, it is still useful to draw upon the data we already have to examine whether this is the case. Do above average subjects run for election more often than below average subjects? Figure 6 indicates that this is not the case. In fact, the probability of running is virtually identical to for men below and above the mean ability level. Perhaps more notable is the relationship for women, which is the opposite. Women above the mean in ability are, in fact, less willing to run than are women below the mean.

Of course, these results have strong normative implications for those who might be interested in attracting high-quality candidates to run for office. Are the highest ability subjects even volunteering or running? Figure 7 provides an answer to that question, based on our preliminary analyses. Indeed, that figure points to dramatic differences in institutions

---

11 Note that computing the predicted probabilities takes into account not only the performance coefficients and interactions but also the indicator variables and their interactions.

12 The predicted probabilities of volunteering for a woman whose score is the average, 11, is 0.78 versus 0.90 for a man, a difference of 0.12. The corresponding probabilities of running are 0.43 and 0.68, a difference that more than doubles to 0.25. For a woman with a score of 14, which is above the 75th percentile, the predicted probability that she runs for election is 0.40 vs 0.79 for a man, a substantial difference of 0.39.
and across genders. Highest performing men tend to enter regardless of institution, although random selection is more conducive to entering than election selection. Of course, these results comport with what we would expect given our formal analysis. Some of these high performers may also believe there will be intense electoral competition, thus making them prefer to sit out the election despite their superiority. For women, though, effects are even starker, with only about a third of even the highest performing women choosing to enter the election. In other words, most of the very best performing women forgo running for election, even in the relatively low-cost environment of the lab.

Figure 8 depicts the other side of the same coin. There, we find that elections tend to attract very low performing subjects. In fact, just over half of the very worst male subjects entered the election and just under half of the very worst female subjects entered. In other words, the very worst women were more likely to enter than their very best women colleagues. Clearly, these very low performers are not bowing out of elections to make way for their higher ability counterparts.
Figure 6: Effect of being above mean on choice to represent

Figure 7: Probability the highest performer enters
Figure 8: Probability the lowest performer enters

![Bar chart showing the probability of the lowest performer entering for Men and Women under Volunteer and Election treatments.]

Figure 9: Mean ability of winners

![Bar chart showing the mean ability of selected volunteers and elected candidates for Men and Women.]

- **X-axis**: Number of correct answers
- **Y-axis**: Ability
- **Legend**:
  - Blue: Volunteer treatment
  - Red: Election treatment
  - Dark blue: Mean ability of selected volunteers
  - Pink: Mean ability of elected candidates
And what does all of this imply for the effects of institutions (here, either random choice or elections as selection mechanisms) on the quality of representatives selected? We attempt to answer that question, at least preliminarily, in Figure 9. Again, we observe surprising gender differences. Men election winners are higher quality, on average, than volunteer winners, perhaps indicating that the election mechanism actually “weeds out” weaker candidates to allow better ones to be selected as representatives. Yet the results indicate exactly the opposite effect for women. In fact, random selection of volunteers tend to pick much higher-quality women candidates than do elections. And, notably, our earlier analyses indicates that the weak performance of elections in picking high-quality women candidates is based entirely upon the individual choices to high quality women not to enter elections even in the relatively low cost environment of the lab. Certainly, these results point to the normative importance of answering these questions with the precision that our formal model allows. These results indicate, then, that holding elections may actually decrease attitude-roll call agreement, because the election itself decreases the relationship between ability and willingness to enter, as compared to simple random selection of willing volunteers. This result is strikingly dramatic in women, but we find evidence for it for men as well. If increasing attitude-roll call agreement is the essential purpose of elections and if this agreement requires some sort of ability on the part of the incumbents, then elections may well be abject failures.

But before we make a policy recommendation that we replace democratic elections with random selection mechanisms, we may want to consider carefully what it is about elections that cause men but especially women to be insensitive to their own abilities when deciding to run. Again, we can rely on the use of laboratory experiments to provide us with an opportunity to consider carefully and independently myriad factors that affect the entry decisions of potential candidates. We take advantage of those opportunities in Experiment 2, which provides us with the opportunity to decompose election aversion into its various parts, to determine which are most significant.
Experiment 2: Costless and Truthful Campaigns

To more systematically investigate the potential causes of the substantial gender differences we uncovered in Experiment 1, we devised a second experiment that leverages the many advantages of experimental control, relying on both within and between subject comparisons as well as incentivized measurement procedures. To test whether the prospect of strategic campaigning deters women from becoming candidates, we vary the campaign environment and compare truthful campaigns with the free-form *chat* campaigns used in Experiment 1. To test whether the financial costs of campaigning may be the culprit, we compare volunteer and candidate decisions with and without costs and benefits, holding these incentives constant within sessions. Varying these two factors yields four treatments in a $2 \times 2$ factorial design: chat with costs and benefits ($CCB$), chat without costs and benefits ($CNO$), truth with costs and benefits ($TCB$), and truth without costs and benefits ($TNO$). Note that the design also allows us to assess the interaction between these factors.

In all four treatments, we also add two incentivized measurement tasks. The first is a belief elicitation procedure. Because beliefs about others’ abilities play a crucial role in maximizing expected payoffs, differences in behavior in Experiment 1 might have arisen from unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ beliefs about others. Thus, we elicit beliefs about the distribution of other group members’ scores directly so that we can control for them in the statistical analysis and so that we can test whether such beliefs are sensitive to changes in the campaign environment. The second incentivized measurement task elicits risk preferences. Although the results of Experiment 1 contradict the theoretical prediction that greater risk aversion among women should lead to higher levels of candidate entry, it is nevertheless possible that decisions may be related to risk preferences in unexpected ways. Thus, it is important that we measure risk preferences directly.
Design and Procedures

Many of the basic procedures for Experiment 2 are similar to those for Experiment 1. Part 1 consists of the Addition Task with the individual Piece Rate compensation, Part 2 is Group Representation involving the random selection of the representative from the set of volunteers, and Part 3 involves selecting the representative by Election. Rewards from performance are also identical: 75 cents for each correct answer in Part 1, 50 cents for each of the representative’s correct answers in Parts 2 and 3, and 25 cents from one’s own correct answers in Parts 2 and 3. As before, each session involved an equal number of men and women, randomly divided into groups of 5, who interacted anonymously through networked computers. We did, however, increase the number of subjects from 10 to 20.

In the campaign chat treatments (CCB and CNO), the sequence of actions in the Election stage was identical to that in Experiment 1. Subjects first decided whether to become candidates, candidates then wrote free-form text campaign messages, and group members voted to select the representative. In contrast, candidates cannot send messages in the truthful campaign treatments (TCB and TNO). Instead, the only information that group members have when voting is a candidate’s Part 1 score.

In treatments with costs and benefits (CCB and TCB), the payoff structure differs somewhat from that of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, subjects pay an entry cost of $1 if they are willing to be the representative and earn a reward of $2 if they are both willing and selected as the representative. These costs and benefits apply both to the decision to volunteer and to the decision to become a candidate. Thus, the costs and benefits of being willing to enter the pool of potential representatives are identical in Parts 2 and 3 of the CCB and TCB treatments, which allows for a cleaner within-subject comparison. In the treatments without costs and benefits (CNO and TNO), there are simply no costs or benefits associated with the Part 2 and Part 3 decisions other than the payoffs from task performance. Removing the costs and benefits provides for a cleaner between-subjects comparison to assess the effects of the truthfulness of the campaign environment as well as to assess the effects of
costs and benefits within campaign environments.

In Part 4, which we called Estimation, we elicited subjects’ beliefs about other group members’ performance and entry decisions. We did so by asking subjects to guess the Part 1 scores of the other four members of their group in order (highest, second highest, etc) and rewarding them for their accuracy. Guessing a score exactly earns $10 while other guesses earn $5 divided by the absolute difference between the guess and true score. Thus, payments for guesses are increasing in the accuracy of the guess. The interface for the estimation task is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Estimation task screen

We also asked subjects to guess what the other members’ decisions were in Part 2

---

13 The timing of Part 4 in the experiment was a bit tricky. First, we needed to elicit beliefs before subjects learned anything about other members’ scores (as they would in the truthful campaign treatments). Second, we needed to ensure that the process of estimating others’ scores would not influence or otherwise bias their decisions to become a candidate. That is, to the extent that subjects do not normally estimate the scores of others explicitly, asking them to do so alters their decision-making process. Thus, we interrupted Part 3 of the experiment by announcing and completing the Part 4 estimation task after subjects made their candidate entry decisions and before the election.

14 This incentive structure is used by Gächter and Renner (2010) and Croson (2000). While there is a growing experimental literature on belief elicitation, most experiments elicit probabilities of binary outcomes. In contrast, we needed to elicit beliefs about a multinomial distribution in a way that could be explained relatively simply and without the need to instruct subjects in the meaning of probabilities.
and Part 3 and paid them $5 for each decision guessed correctly. To guard against hedging, if Part 4 was selected for payment, we also randomly selected the guesses corresponding to only one of the other members for payment. For example, a subject who correctly guesses the highest score and both Parts 2 and 3 decisions would earn a maximum of $20 if we selected guesses about the highest scorer for payment. Alternatively, if a subject’s guess about the lowest scorer differs by 10 from the true score and neither guess about the lowest scorer’s Part 2 or Part 3 decisions are correct, then the subject would earn only $0.50 if we selected guesses about the lowest scorer for payment. Our method of belief elicitation provides us with enough information to compute subjects’ beliefs about abilities of the pool of volunteers and about the pool of candidates by combining information about their guesses of Part 1 scores with their guesses about the Part 2 and Part 3 decisions.

In Part 5, we measured risk preferences with an incentivized Lottery Choice task. The choice task we designed is similar to Holt and Laury (2002) except that we tailored the lotteries to correspond exactly to potential payoffs from Part 2 of the experiment (random selection without costs and benefits). We presented subjects with 9 binary choices between a riskier lottery (Option A, corresponding to not volunteering) and a less risky lottery (Option B corresponding to volunteering), as shown in Figure 11. Subjects had to choose A or B for each of the 9 choices. Note the net expected benefit of choosing B over A is decreasing in $x$, with the expected values of A and B equal when $x = 5$. Perfectly risk neutral expected payoff-maximizing subjects will switch from choosing B when $x < 5$ to choosing A when $x > 5$. Because choosing B is less risky, subjects who exhibit greater risk aversion will switch from B to A at higher values of $x$. The number of times a subject chooses B therefore provides a measure of risk aversion.

To construct the payoffs in Figure 11, each row represents a situation in which a subject with a score of 10 knows that two other group members, with scores of $x$ and $x + 10$ respectively, have already decided to volunteer. The rows correspond to integer values of $x$ from 1 to 9. Option A then corresponds to the lottery from not volunteering, while Option B corresponds to the lottery from volunteering. For example, if $x = 1$, then Option A yields payoffs of $1 \times 0.50 + 10 \times 0.25 = 3.00$ and $11 \times 0.50 + 10 \times 0.25 = 8.00$ with equal probability. Option B yields payoffs of $3.00, 7.50, \text{ and } 8.00$ with equal probability, where the middle option is the subject’s own payoff from being selected as the representative and having a score of 10.
Figure 11: Lottery choice task screen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chance</th>
<th>Option A</th>
<th>Option B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 1</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 2</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
<td>$8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 3</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 4</td>
<td>$4.50</td>
<td>$9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 5</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 6</td>
<td>$5.50</td>
<td>$10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 7</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>$11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 8</td>
<td>$6.50</td>
<td>$11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 9</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
<td>$12.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A total of 200 subjects participated in Experiment 2 (thus far) in 10 sessions, 2 of CCB, 2 of CNO, 3 of TCB, and 3 of TNO.\textsuperscript{16}

Results

Consistent with our findings in Experiment 1, we find that there are no gender differences in the rate of volunteering in Part 2 of Experiment 2 when the representative is selected by the random mechanism. Table 3 presents the aggregate rates of volunteering and running for office for each selection mechanism by gender; it shows that 76.0% of men and 68.0% of women volunteer when there are direct costs and benefits associated with volunteering while 85.7% of men and 78.4% of women volunteer when those costs and benefits are removed. Although men volunteer at slightly higher rates than women, the differences are not statistically significant. However, both men and women are more likely to volunteer in the no cost treatments (CNO and TNO), which is consistent with the effect of introducing costs and benefits predicted by expected payoff maximization.

Turning to the Part 3 election decisions, Table 3 shows persistent gender differences in candidate entry in all but one of our election treatments. Men continue to run for office when there is an election at about the same rate that they volunteer when the representative is chosen randomly (between 73.3% and 80.0%), but women’s willingness to run drops to around 50%—to nearly the same level as in Experiment 1—in the CCB, CNO, and TCB treatments. In other words, we continue to find that, in contrast to men, women exhibit a high degree of election aversion.

The only exception to this pattern occurs when we simultaneously guarantee that

\textsuperscript{16}We plan to run a total of 5 sessions of each treatment so that we have 50 men and 50 women per cell of our design. Despite our best efforts to ensure an equal number of men and women participated in each session, there was one session of CNO in which an insufficient number of male subjects showed up, so we ran this session with 9 male subjects and 11 female subjects. We do not believe this affects the results, as there are sufficiently many subjects that participate in each session that they are unlikely to notice the exact gender composition of each session. Furthermore, our post-experiment questionnaire reveals that subjects almost never guess that the experiment has anything to do with gender. Only two subjects in Experiment 1 thought the experiment had anything to do with gender: one guessed that it was about “gender and math” while another thought it had to do with reducing stereotype threat. No subjects in Experiment 2 mentioned gender at all.
Table 3: Decisions in Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pct</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Pct</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer, Cost</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer, No Cost</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Chat + Cost</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Chat + No Cost</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Truth + Cost</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Truth + No Cost</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: p values are for two-tailed difference in proportions tests

Elections truthfully reveal candidates’ abilities and remove the direct costs of entry. In the TNO treatment, 76.6% of women run for office, a rate that is statistically indistinguishable from that of men (80.0%) and comparable to the rate of volunteering. Our findings therefore suggest that removing the strategic elements of campaigning and removing (or reducing) the financial downsides to running for office may both be necessary to eliminate election aversion in women. [DISCUSS THIS POINT MORE LATER OR IN CONCLUSION? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FINDING?]

To assess the extent to which our aggregate findings may be due to differences in normally unobservable beliefs or risk preferences, we next analyze the data from our incentivized measurement tasks. We then use these measures as controls in our regression analysis.

**Beliefs.** Table 4 summarizes the results from our belief elicitation task (Part 4 of the experiment). The first four rows show the mean guesses about other group members’ scores (by rank, as described in the procedures) broken down by the gender of the subject making the guesses. The fifth row shows the mean belief about the average score, which is computed by simply taking the average across a subject’s four guesses. The remainder of
the table summarizes the beliefs held about other group members’ decisions and the mean average scores of others willing to be the representative for each selection mechanism and treatment. The right-most column of the table presents the actual values of each quantity for comparison.

By and large, our results show that men and women hold remarkably similar beliefs about the abilities of others. The mean guesses of the highest other group members are 13.0 for men and 13.1 for women; for the second highest are 10.8 and 10.9; for the third highest are 9.1 and 8.9; for the lowest are 7.4 and 7.1; and for the average are 10.1 and 10.0. Not only are their mean beliefs nearly identical, but they are also quite accurate, especially for the middle scores: compare these guesses to the actual scores of 13.9, 11.0, 8.8, and 6.8, respectively. It is interesting to note that both men and women tend to underestimate the highest score and overestimate the lowest score, suggesting some degree of conservatism in beliefs.

Men and women also form indistinguishable beliefs about the decisions of others to join the pool of candidates. Although subjects of both genders tend to underestimate the number of volunteers and candidates by a slight amount, there are no statistically significant differences between their estimates of the number of other group members willing to be considered for the representative. There are no differences in the implied average scores either, except in the CNO treatment. In general, we also find that beliefs appear to be responsive to our manipulation of the selection mechanism. For example, the mean number of expected volunteers or candidates and their average scores are higher in the treatments without costs and benefits than in the treatments with costs and benefits. This suggests that subjects not only recognize the role that these costs and benefits play in the willingness to represent one’s group but that they recognize that other subjects’ actions will depend on

---

17Although subjects do not guess the averages directly, they are implied by the beliefs we elicited. Individual $i$’s belief about the average score of the (other) volunteers is $\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{4} V_j s_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{4} V_j}$, where $V_j$ is a dummy variable indicating whether $i$ believed that the member with rank $j$ volunteered and $s_j$ is the score that $i$ guessed about $j$. Similarly, the average implied score of (other) candidates is $\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{4} C_j s_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{4} C_j}$, where $C_j$ indicates whether $i$ believed $j$ was a candidate.
Table 4: Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimates</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All treatments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest score</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd highest score</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd highest score</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest score</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average score</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer, Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of volunteers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average volunteer score</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer, No Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of volunteers</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average volunteer score</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Chat + Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidates</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average candidate score</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Chat + No Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidates</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average candidate score</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Truth + Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidates</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average candidate score</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election, Truth + No Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidates</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average candidate score</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: p values are for two-tailed difference in means tests
them as well.

The results of our incentivized belief elicitation task provide direct evidence that women’s election aversion cannot be attributed to underconfidence in their Addition Task ability. This corroborates our claim that the equal rates of volunteering in Part 2 decisions indeed stem primarily from parity in relative confidence in abilities. Of course, there remains some possibility that beliefs might still play a role. Even if men and women have similar beliefs, they might be differentially responsive to those beliefs. We will address this in the regression analysis after we examine whether there are differences in risk preferences in the context of volunteering choices.

Risk Preferences. Recall that we designed our second incentivized measurement task so that subjects faced a series of risky choices with financial incentives identical to the decision to volunteer. Subjects made nine choices in which Option A, the riskier choice, is equivalent to a subject with a score of 10 randomly selecting group members with scores of $x$ and $x + 10$ as the representative, with $x \in \{1, \ldots, 9\}$. Option B, the safer choice, is equivalent to the decision to volunteer, in which there is an equal probability of being selected oneself, selecting the member with a score of $x$, and selecting the member with a score of $x + 10$. This option is less risky because increasing the probability of selecting a middle value reduces the variance in the outcome.

Table 5 shows the percentage of men and women who chose the safer Option B for each of the nine choices. For both men and women, we find that as $x$ increases, the proportion choosing Option B decreases. This pattern is consistent with expected payoff maximization, as the expected net benefits of choosing Option B decrease in $x$, with those benefits being positive for $x < 5$ and negative for $x > 5$. Not surprisingly, the fact that 75% of men and 82% of women choose the safer option when $x = 5$ (when A and B are equal in expected value) suggests that both genders exhibit some degree of risk aversion.

However, we also see that women are more likely to choose the safer option than men for values of $x$ above 6, and all of these gender differences are statistically significant. By
Table 5: Lottery choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choice 1</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 2</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 3</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 4</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 5</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 6</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 7</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 8</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 9</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of safe choices</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: p values are for two-tailed difference in means tests
the time $x = 9$, when the expected benefit of choosing Option A is greatest, the proportion of men who chose Option B drops to 19% while the proportion of women who made the same choice is twice as high, at 42%. Thus, our results strongly suggest that, with respect to the risk involved with entry decisions, women indeed exhibit greater risk aversion than men. Whether or not these differences in risk preferences are responsible for differences in election aversion remains to be seen.

**Regression Analysis.** The purpose of our regression analysis is to investigate more carefully how the decision to enter the pool of potential representatives depends not only on changes in the selection mechanism, but also on task ability, beliefs, and risk preferences. Our strategy is to estimate a series of separate models for men and women and then to conduct a series of Chow tests for the the equality of coefficients across estimates from the gender-specific subsets of data. In other words, what we are interested in is understanding how each factor (electoral environment, task ability, etc) affects the decision and whether different factors are more important for one gender than another.

As we did in the analysis of the Experiment 1 data, we stack the data so that the dependent variable is the *Choice* to represent so that there are two observations for each subject (one for the choice to volunteer and one for the choice to be a representative). Thus, we can estimate both the between- and within-subjects effects within the same model, clustering the standard errors by individual.

The first model specification provides us with baseline estimates of the effects of varying the selection mechanism on the probability of entering while controlling for task ability. The specification includes a subject’s *Score* on the Piece Rate task and set of dummy variables for the electoral environment. The baseline (omitted) case is the decision to volunteer in the CCB treatment. *No Cost* is 1 for the CNO and TNO treatments for both the Part 2 and Part 3 decisions. *Election* is 1 for Part 3 (candidate) decisions. *No Cost Election* is 1 for the Part 3 decision if the treatment is CNO or TNO. *Truth Election* is 1 for the Part 3 decision if the treatment is TCB or TNO.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Score</strong></td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cost</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cost Election</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth Election</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Choices</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Willing</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Willing</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cost x Score</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election x Score</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cost Election x Score</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth Election x Score</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-86.92</td>
<td>-78.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-77.82</td>
<td>-109.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-86.24</td>
<td>-83.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses.
The results for the first model are consistent with our interpretation of the aggregate results. Men and women appear to be equally sensitive to task ability and, when controlling for this ability, women are less likely to run than men. Thus, even when we account for task ability, women appear to be election averse. Although the effect of making elections truthful is positive, it is not statistically significant, which suggests that making elections more truthful is not sufficient to mitigate election aversion. However, the combined effect of truthful elections and the removal of costs and is statistically significant when controlling for task ability\textsuperscript{18}.

In the second specification, we add belief and risk aversion measures to the model. We include the two summary measure of beliefs suggested by our theoretical analysis. *Number Willing* is a measure of the expected competition for representative. It is the number of other group members that a subject expects to be in the pool of potential representatives (the number of volunteers if the observation corresponds to the Part 2 decision and the number of candidates for the Part 3 decision). *Average Willing* is the implied belief about average ability of the pool. It is the average expected volunteer’s score if the number of volunteers is non-zero in Part 2, the average expected candidate’s score if the number of candidates is non-zero in Part 3, or the average group score if the belief about the number of volunteers or candidates is 0. *Safe Choices* is the number of times that the subject chose Option B in the Lottery Choice task; higher numbers of safe choices indicate greater risk aversion.

When we add beliefs and risk measures, the magnitudes of the coefficients for the selection mechanism variables diminish slightly but remain qualitatively similar. For both men and women, removing costs increases both the probability that men and women volunteer and run; it decreases the probability that women run in any electoral environment; and it increases the probability that women run in elections with truthful campaigns. However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant (perhaps due to the small sample size\textsuperscript{18}).

\textsuperscript{18}The combined effect is the sum of the coefficients for *No Cost*, *No Cost Election*, and *Truthful Election*. The sum is 0.76 with a standard error of 0.39, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
we currently have for each treatment and gender).

The estimates for the second specification also show that beliefs affect the decision to enter while risk aversion does not. While the coefficients for *Safe Choices* are negative for both men and women, they are close to zero and neither one is statistically significant. Thus, contrary to what intuition might suggest, the evidence instead demonstrates that risk aversion plays little part in subjects’ decision calculus. In contrast, the coefficients for both belief measures are statistically significant. The coefficients for *Average Willingness* are negative while the coefficients for *Number Willing* are positive. The former is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical analysis: when subjects believe that the pool of volunteers or candidates is of higher quality, they are less likely to enter. It is also worth noting that the magnitudes appear to be similar across gender. (The *F* test, or Chow test, cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal, $\chi^2_{(1)} = 0.4$ and $p = 0.52$.) The direction of the latter coefficients, however, is inconsistent with our theoretical analysis: entry decisions should be negatively related to the number of other group members in the pool because increasing competition reduces the expected benefit from running. Thus, it is somewhat puzzling that we find subjects to be more likely to enter when they think others are more likely to enter as well. We speculate that this might be because *Number Willing* captures beliefs about descriptive social norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990, Gerber and Rogers 2009) or the social desirability of representing others rather than expectations about the intensity of competition. With respect to this factor, we also find sizable gender differences. (The difference is statistically significant, as the Chow test can reject the equality of the coefficients; $\chi^2_{(1)} = 7.57$ and $p < 0.01$.)

In the third specification, we allow subjects’ level of responsiveness to task ability to vary across selection mechanisms and treatments by interacting each of the dummy variables with *Score*. As we found in Experiment 1, there appear to be gender differences in the responsiveness to task ability. For men, all of the coefficients for the interactions are close to zero and none of them are statistically significant. Thus, the relationship between
ability and the probability of entering appears to be the same for men regardless of how the representative is selected. For women, however, responsiveness to task ability does appear to be sensitive to the details of the selection mechanism. In contrast to the results from Experiment 1, moving from the random selection to the election mechanism appears to increase women’s responsiveness to their task ability, as the coefficient for the interaction $Election \times Score$ is positive and statistically significant. But removing costs and benefits from the election treatments appears to restore the relationship between task ability and candidate entry to the same level as the responsiveness of the volunteering decision. (The sum of the interactions $Election \times Score$, $No Cost \times Score$, and $No Cost Election \times Score$ is 0.02 with a standard error of 0.14.)

[MENTION RESULTS OF CHOW TEST. SOME SORT OF SUMMING UP SHOULD GO HERE, TOO]

**Campaigns and Candidate Quality**

- Informativeness of campaigns
- How much candidates misrepresent or exaggerate (use both Exp 1 and Exp 2)
- How exaggeration goes away when there are no costs and benefits (but also discuss how exaggerating isn’t really rational)
- Voters more likely to vote for highest ability candidate in the truthful campaign than with chat (though some still vote for selves)
- Quality of candidates by gender and treatment
- Quality of selected representatives by gender and treatment
Conclusion

Elections exist, according to Miller and Stokes, at least partly to maximize attitude-roll call agreement, to see to it that representatives do what their constituents want them to do. But if this maximization problem is anything but one that is trivially easy, we would expect people – potential candidates – to differ in their ability to perform their task well. Furthermore, we would hope that elections would serve to select those candidates who do perform this task well. But our analysis indicates that this may not be the case. Normatively, we would hope that election aversion would track nicely with task ability: Those worst at the task would be the same people who would be most averse to running for election to perform the task for the group. We find, however, that this is not true.

Instead, election aversion is distributed across people in a way that is much more highly correlated with gender than with task ability. Of course, this has important normative implications for women’s representation which we do not intend to minimize. But even beyond those issues of descriptive representation, fewer women candidates translates directly to lower quality representatives, which may weaken the relationship between attitudes and roll calls, as less qualified representatives attempt to make matches that highly qualified people – who did not even choose to run – would be able to perform much better. The relationship between voters and their representatives requires high quality electoral candidates, but election aversion seems to prevent that from happening.

But getting back to the issue of women specifically, gender-based election aversion may play a significant role in the ability, or lack thereof, of Congress to perform its essential functions. Previous research in behavioral economics and psychology indicates that having more women in a group of decision-makers fundamentally alters how that group performs. Men tend to suffer from a mythical fixed pie bias that causes them to see negotiations as a zero-sum game (Babcock and Laschever 2004, 182) and to be more confrontational in negotiations (Kimmel, et. al 1980), whereas women tend to be more cooperative (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer 1998) and are concerned more with sharing information with those
with whom they have negotiated (Helgesen 1990). These differences in how women and men interact may cause groups with more women to be smarter than groups with fewer women (Woolley, et. al 2010). How might the recent fiscal cliff negotiations worked differently if Congress were peopled with more representatives who saw negotiation as a means to find cooperative solutions to help everyone, rather than opportunities to dominate their foes? Would we remain a nation that is, as President Barack Obama called it in his 2013 State of the Union address, “conducting its business by drifting from one manufactured crisis to the next”?

The current project does not attempt to offer an answer to that question, but it does offer a potential roadmap for finding out. Specifically, our results provide direction for those practitioners who seek to decrease the deleterious effects of election aversion on the emergence of women candidates. Potential candidates do not need convincing that they can do the job – they know when they can, and respond to their own task ability. But they do so only when that response does not require the traditional difficulties that come with running for election. We also point to two of those difficulties: Paying the costs of running for election with no guarantees of a win and getting out the message to voters that women are qualified. In other words, women know they are qualified. What they don’t know is how to convince voters of that. Organizations like Emily’s List, that provide funds for women candidates in the early stages of election, may help mitigate the effects of campaign costs on election aversion. Similarly, organizations should pledge assistance to women candidates in helping to convince others of their qualifications. If women know they will be judged on their true qualifications and they are not worried about costly elections, election aversion disappears. The truth, we find, convinces women to run.

References


**Theoretical Appendix**

Let $s_i$ denote individual $i$’s ability or score. For all $i$, we assume that scores are continuous random variables drawn independently from the same distribution with PDF $f(s)$. Let the probability that $i$ volunteers be $p_i$, and let $v_i$ be an indicator denoting the realization of whether $i$ volunteers for office ($v_i = 1$) or not ($v_i = 0$). We use $s$, $p$, and $v$ (without subscripts) to denote the appropriate vectors, and follow the usual convention that the subscript $-i$ denotes a vector of all other individuals excluding $i$. Note that in our model there are two forms of uncertainty: uncertainty about abilities represented by the distribution $f$ and uncertainty about whether or not others run for office represented by $p$.

Assume that every individual has a Bernoulli utility function $u(x)$ that is increasing and weakly concave, $u'(x) > 0$ and $u''(x) \leq 0$, where $x$ denotes $i$’s monetary payoff. In our experimental setup, $x = s_i + 2r$, where $r$ denotes the score of the selected representative. For convenience, we will let $\mu_i$ denote $i$’s expected utility from the event that another member $j$ is elected with certainty.

$$\mu_i = \int u(s_i + 2s_j)f(s_j)ds_j \quad (1)$$

---

19 The notation in this Appendix might differ from the main text of the paper, as it is from a previous version of the paper and we have not updated it.

20 Technically, $x = \frac{s_i + r}{4}$, but we can omit the denominator since doing so simply amounts to a rescaling of the scores $s_i$. 

48
We begin by assuming that \(i\) is uncertain only about others’ scores but not about who runs. This simplification helps to understand the basic elements of the decision to run for office in our framework as well as the role that risk aversion might play in the decision. Formally, this case corresponds to the assumption that \(p_i \in \{0, 1\}\) for all \(i\) and implies that we can omit notation for \(p_i\) since \(v_i = p_i\). We also assume that \(i\) knows her own score with certainty, which nevertheless still allows \(i\) to be uncertain about her relative ability. Our first insight is that \(i\)’s decision rule boils down to a comparison of her own ability with the distribution of others’ ability.

**Proposition 1.** Given the decisions of other members \(v_{-i}\), member \(i\) prefers to volunteer if and only if she would also prefer being selected as the group’s sole representative with certainty to the selection of any other group member whose ability is unknown.

**Proof.** If \(i\) does not volunteer, her expected utility is

\[
EU_i(v_i = 0) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \neq i} v_j \mu_i = \mu_i \tag{2}
\]

where \(n = \sum_{j \neq i} v_j\) is simply the number of other members who volunteer. If \(i\) instead volunteers, her expected utility is

\[
EU_i(v_i = 1) = \frac{1}{n + 1} \left( u(3s_i) + \sum_{j \neq i} v_j \mu_i \right) = \frac{u(3s_i) + n \mu_i}{n + 1} \tag{3}
\]

Individual \(i\) will prefer to volunteer if \(EU_i(v_i = 1) \geq EU_i(v_i = 0)\). Substituting the right-hand sides of (2) and (3) into the inequality and algebraic manipulation yields

\[
u(3s_i) \geq \mu_i \tag{4}\]

Note that as (2) indicates, it does not actually matter how many other members choose to volunteer. This is because \(i\) knows only that all \(s_j (j \neq i)\) are independently and identically distributed; the number of volunteers does not affect the distribution of outcomes.

If \(i\) is risk neutral, then it is appropriate to substitute expected scores for expected utility in the decision rule \((\mu_i = 3s_i\) and \(EU_i(v_i = 0) = s_i + 2E[s]\)). It then follows that \(i\)’s decision rule amounts to a comparison of her own score with the expected score of the other volunteers.

**Corollary 1.** Given the decisions of other members \(v_{-i}\), if member \(i\) is risk neutral, she prefers to volunteer if her own ability exceeds the expected ability of the other volunteers; that is, \(s_i \geq E[s]\).

In other words, when there is no uncertainty about who volunteers, the decision rule that risk neutral members involves a simple cutoff: members prefer to volunteer if they are
above the average ability of the other volunteers.\footnote{Although Nash equilibrium is an unrealistic benchmark, with complete information about others’ scores, in any Nash equilibrium, only the highest ability members volunteer.}

Although risk aversion changes the exact value of the cutoff, it does not dramatically affect the basic nature of the decision rule. To see why, note that the decision rule in (1) can be rewritten using a multiple of the certainty equivalent, \( c = \frac{1}{3}EU_i(v_i = 0) \): volunteer if \( s_i \geq c \). The cutoff rule for risk neutral preferences described in Corollary 1 is simply a special case of the certainty equivalent form of the cutoff rule with \( c^N = E[s] \). For an increasing utility function representing preferences that exhibit risk aversion, the certainty equivalent is well-known to be lower than under risk neutrality, \( c < c^N \). Thus, \( i \)'s decision rule involves a lower cutoff than that of an otherwise identical agent with risk neutral preferences.

**Corollary 2.** Given ability \( s_i \) and others’ decisions \( v_{-i} \), member \( i \) will volunteer if \( s_i \geq c \) where \( c \leq c^N \). If \( i \)'s preferences exhibit risk aversion, then \( c < c^N \).

To provide a clearer picture of the logic underlying this somewhat counterintuitive result, consider an example in which only the best and worst members volunteer (with abilities \( b_i \) and \( w_i \), respectively) and where \( i \)'s ability is exactly the midpoint between them. If \( i \) is risk neutral, she will be indifferent between volunteering and not volunteering because the expected score of a randomly selected representative remains the same (i.e., her score \( s_i \) equals the cutoff \( \frac{b_i + w_i}{2} \)). If she is risk averse, however, she prefers to volunteer because, even though volunteering leaves the expected score unchanged, it lowers the probability of extreme scores and raises the probability of a moderate score, thereby reducing the variance of the outcomes.

Importantly, our analysis of the effects of risk aversion on the decision to volunteer has two implications for our experiment. First, every group member who believes their ability is above average should choose to volunteer regardless of their degree of risk aversion. Second, below average members will be willing to volunteer if they are sufficiently risk averse; correspondingly, greater risk aversion implies a lower average quality of volunteers.

When we generalize the model to allow each group member to choose non-degenerate probabilities of volunteering, \( p_i \in [0, 1] \), the decision rule described in Proposition 1 continues to hold. The only difference is that the proof is slightly more complicated.

**Proposition 2.** Given the probabilistic volunteering choices of other members, \( p_{-i} \), member \( i \) prefers to volunteer if and only if she would also prefer being selected as the group’s sole representative with certainty to the selection of any other group member whose ability is unknown.

**Proof.** For any realization of volunteering choices, let \( k \) be a random variable that denotes the number of volunteers (other than \( i \)). (Although \( \Pr(k) \) is a function of \( p_{-i} \), its exact form is immaterial to the proof.) Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that for any number of volunteers, \( i \)'s expected utility is \( \mu_i \). We can then write \( i \)'s expected utility from not volunteering as

\[
EU(v_i = 0) = \sum_{k=0}^{4} \Pr(k)\mu_i
\]  

(5)
Since \( \mu_i \) is a constant, the expected utility reduces to \( \mu_i \) as before.

If \( i \) volunteers, her expected utility is

\[
EU(v_i = 1) = \sum_{k=0}^{4} \Pr(k) \left( \frac{u(3s_i) + k\mu_i}{k+1} \right)
\]

(6)

Comparing these two expressions and rearranging the resulting inequality, \( i \) prefers to volunteer if

\[
\sum_{k=0}^{4} \Pr(k) \left( \frac{u(3s_i) - \mu_i}{k+1} \right) \geq 0
\]

(7)

Because \( \Pr(k) \) and \( k+1 \) are always positive, the sign of the sum on the left-hand side of the inequality depends only on the sign of \( u(3s_i) - \mu_i \). Thus, \( i \) prefers to volunteer if and only if \( u(3s_i) - \mu_i \), which is the condition identical to that in Proposition 1.

\( \square \)

### Running for Office

The decision to run for office (in the election treatment) is potentially more complicated. The choice may depend on the overall shape of the distribution \( f(s) \) (not just its mean), beliefs about the number of other candidates who decide to run, and additional considerations stemming from strategic campaigning. To make our initial analysis tractable, we make several simplifying assumptions. We restrict our attention to the case of linear utility, \( u(x) = x \). We also consider two alternative assumptions about the nature of campaigns with two or more candidates. On one extreme, campaigns may be completely uninformative with respect to candidates’ abilities. This would be the case if campaigning involves “babbling” messages. On the other extreme, campaigns may be informative in that group members may be able to learn which candidate has the highest ability. This might be because candidates truthfully reveal their abilities or, even if they exaggerate their abilities, they exaggerate by equal amounts.

In this section, we define the monetary payoff as \( x = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}s_j + \nu - 2 \), where \( \nu \) is the number of votes received by \( i \) in the election. We also let \( r_i \) be an indicator denoting \( i \)'s decision to run (\( r_i = 1 \)) or not (\( r_i = 0 \)). As we did in our initial analysis of volunteering, we restrict our attention to the analysis of \( i \)'s best response to pure strategies of the other players. That is, we analyze \( i \)'s decision as if she knew exactly how many other members volunteered, which we denote by \( k = \sum_{j \neq i} r_j \).

### Running Alone

If there are fewer than two candidates, then it is irrelevant whether or not campaigns are informative because there will be no campaign or election. If no candidates run, then the representative will be selected at random from the entire group (including \( i \)) but will receive no electoral benefits. Thus, \( i \)'s expected utility if there are no candidates is

\[
EU_i(r_i = 0 | k = 0) = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{5}s_i + \frac{4}{5}E[s] \right)
\]

(8)
If $i$ decides to run unopposed, she automatically receives 5 votes and wins for sure. In this case, her expected utility is

$$EU_i(r_i = 1|k = 0) = \frac{3}{4}s_i + 3$$

(9)

Solving for the cutoff rule, she runs for office if

$$s_i \geq E[s] - \frac{15}{2}$$

(10)

The decision to run continues to take the form of a cutoff rule, but the cutoff is well below the average ability. Not surprisingly, if there are no other candidates, the lure of receiving a lump sum of benefits from winning office looms large, drawing in a much poorer set of candidates than does a random selection rule. Only the worst candidates will stay out if they expect no one else to run.\footnote{Except in very unlikely groups where every member’s realized ability turns out to be below the cutoff, there clearly will not be a Nash equilibrium in which no one runs for office.}

### Uninformative Campaigns

If campaigns are uninformative, then we can treat the electoral process as one of purely random selection. We would expect candidates who run to vote for themselves (to ensure themselves a minimum benefit of $\nu = 1$) and for other group members to randomize their votes uniformly over the set of candidates.

If $k = 1$ and $i$ does not run, her expected utility is

$$EU_i(r_i = 0|k = 1) = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}E[s]$$

(11)

If she runs, she will receive $2\frac{1}{2}$ votes on average (one from herself and in expectation receives $\frac{1}{2}$ of the remaining 3 votes). Thus, $i$ expects to win half the time. Her expected utility is therefore

$$EU_i(r_i = 1|k = 1) = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{s_i + E[s]}{2}\right) + \frac{5}{2} - 2$$

(12)

It then follows that $i$ prefers to run if

$$s_i \geq E[s] - 2$$

(13)

As with the decision to run alone, the cutoff for running is below the mean $E[s]$, but it is not as far below because competition with another candidate decreases the expected benefits from winning the spoils of office.

Note that introducing direct costs and benefits of running for office ($\nu$ and the fixed cost of 2) means that an individual’s decision to run can be thought of as comprising two components. One is the effect of running on the quality of the representative that is selected. This is entirely what drives the decision to volunteer in the previous section. When campaigns are uninformative this component of the decision to run is indeed identical to that in the
decision to volunteer. The other is the expected benefits of winning office, which decreases as the number of candidates increases.

**Proposition 3.** If campaigns are uninformative and $i$ is risk neutral, then the minimum ability of members willing to run is increasing in the number of other candidates.

**Proof.** For any $k > 0$, $i$’s expected utility of not running is $\frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}E[s]$. If $i$ runs for office, her expected utility is a function of $k$:

$$EU_i(r_i|k) = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{s_i + kE[s]}{k + 1}\right) + \frac{4 - k}{k + 1} - 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

The fraction $\frac{4 - k}{k + 1}$ is the expected number of votes $i$ will receive from non-candidates.

Setting up and rearranging the inequality implies that the cutoff rule is to prefer running for office if

$$s_i \geq E[s] + 4k - 6$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

and it is apparent that the cutoff is increasing in $k$.  

**Informative Campaigns**

When campaigns are informative, the highest ability candidate will receive all of the votes of non-candidates and win the election. Member $i$’s decision to run for office will depend, to some extent, on the probability of being the highest ability candidate as well as on the distribution of the highest ability candidates. The latter distribution will be conditional on the number of candidates since more candidates implies more chances to select a candidate with very high ability.

Consider the case with one other candidate, $k = 1$. If $i$ does not run, her expected utility is the same as in (11). If she does run for office, her expected utility can be decomposed into the expected utility from winning and the expected utility from losing, each weighted by their respective probabilities, $Pr(\text{win})EU(\text{win}) + Pr(\text{lose})EU(\text{lose})$. With one other candidate $j$, the probability of winning is $Pr(s_i \geq s_j)$, the probability that $s_i$ is higher than a randomly drawn score $s_j$ from $f(s)$. This probability is $F(s_j)$, where $F(\cdot)$ is the CDF of the distribution. Finally, if candidate $j$ wins, the expected score must be conditional on $s_j$ being higher than $s_i$. Taking these facts into consideration, $i$’s expected utility from running against a single candidate $j$ can be written

$$EU_i(v_i = 1|k = 1) = F(s_i)\left(\frac{3}{4}s_i + 2\right) + (1 - F(s_i))\left(\frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}E[s|s \geq s_i] - 1\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

Setting up and rearranging the appropriate inequality, we obtain

$$(6F(s_i) - 2) + F(s_i)s_i + (1 - F(s_i))E[s|s \geq s_i] - E[s] \geq 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

This expression cannot be simplified any further without specifying the functional form of $F(s)$. Nevertheless, we can gain some insight by analyzing the expression and establishing sufficient conditions for $i$ to run.

\footnote{For simplicity, we ignore the possibility of ties for highest ability.}
Note that the first term in parentheses, $6F(s_i) - 2$, represents the expected net benefits accrued directly from the election. This term is positive if $F(s_i) > \frac{1}{3}$. In other words, the potential for winning office provides a strong incentive for running, even for low ability individuals. A member’s ability need only be higher than the lowest third of the distribution (thus needing only a 33% chance of winning) to expect positive direct benefits from running. This alone does not imply, however, that all such members will want to run if it is offset by the effect of lowering the quality of the elected representative.

The remaining terms represent the net effect of $i$’s decision to run on the expected ability of the elected representative. Together, the middle two terms (those weighted by $F(s_i)$ and $1 - F(s_i)$) represent the expected ability of the elected representative; it is a weighted average of $s_i$ and the expected value of all abilities greater than $s_i$. The terms in the weighted average suggests that running for office in an informative campaign environment can be beneficial in two ways. First, by running, $i$ sets the minimum ability for an elected representative. Second, even if $i$ loses the election, she benefits from the fact that a higher ability group member is elected in her place. Whether or not this weighted average exceeds the last term, $E[s]$, then establishes whether running for office raises or lowers the ability of the elected representative. If $f(s)$ is a symmetric distribution, $s_i \geq E[s]$ guarantees that $i$ benefits both from the potential prospective spoils from office as well as from ensuring that the elected representative will be above average. Furthermore, the level of ability for which $i$ is indifferent between the elected representative’s expected ability and the unconditional expected ability must be less than $E[s]$, and from this it follows that the cutoff must also be less than $E[s]$.

**Proposition 4.** If $i$ expects only one other member to run, campaigns are informative, $f(s)$ is symmetric, and $i$ is risk neutral, then (i) above average ability $s_i \geq E[s]$ is a sufficient condition for her to prefer running for office and (ii) the minimum ability for $i$ to prefer running is strictly less than $E[s]$.

Constructing $i$’s expected utility for $k > 1$ proceeds in a similar fashion. Intuitively, because the highest ability candidate is always selected, the more candidates there are (the more draws of the random variable), the higher the expected ability of the representative. For example, if $k = 2$, then either $i$ wins and the representative’s ability is $s_i$ or $i$ loses and the representative’s ability is $\max\{s_1, s_2\}$. This should have the effect of raising both $i$’s expected utility from running and from not running, so it is unclear in general whether this should raise or lower the $i$’s threshold for running. To gain additional insight, it is useful to impose an explicit functional form on $f(s)$, which we do next.

**Numerical Example**

We can compute explicit cutoff values if we make explicit assumptions about the distribution of ability $f(s)$ and agents’ utility functions. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that $s$ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 20. To analyze the possible effects of risk aversion, we compare linear utility $u^l(x) = x$ with negative quadratic utility $u^q(x) = -(x - 15)^2$. Table 7 presents the computed cutoff values for both utility functions across the three scenarios: volunteering (random selection), running with uninformative campaigns, and running with informative campaigns.
Uninformative Campaigns

If \( i \) does not run, then her expected utility is \( E[u(x_j)] \), where \( x_j = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}s_j \), just as in (2). If \( k = 1 \), provided that non-candidates cast their votes randomly, \( i \) is equally likely to receive any number of votes between 1 and 4. Her expected utility is

\[
EU^N(k = 1) = \frac{1}{4}u(x_i + 2) + \frac{1}{4}u(x_i + 1) + \frac{1}{4}E[u(x_j)] + \frac{1}{4}E[u(x_j - 1)]
\]

(18)

where \( x_i = \frac{3}{4}s_i \) and \( x_j = \frac{1}{4}s_i + \frac{1}{2}s_j \).

In general, if there are \( k \) other candidates, we must account for the possible ways in which the remaining group members vote for \( i \). If \( k = 2 \) and assuming a random tie-breaking rule, there is a \( \frac{1}{3} \) probability that \( i \) wins 3 votes, a \( \frac{2}{3} \) chance \( i \) receives 2 votes and wins, a \( \frac{2}{3} \) that \( i \) receives 2 votes and loses, and a \( \frac{4}{9} \) chance that \( i \) receives only 1 vote. If \( k = 3 \) and \( i \) runs, then there is only 1 remaining vote and \( i \) has a \( \frac{1}{4} \) probability of receiving 2 votes and a \( \frac{3}{4} \) probability of receiving only 1 vote (her own). Finally, if \( k = 4 \) and \( i \) runs, she will receive one vote (again, her own) with certainty while her probability of winning is \( \frac{1}{5} \).

\[
EU^N(k = 2) = \frac{1}{9}u(x_i + 1) + \frac{2}{9}u(x_i) + \frac{2}{9}E[u(x_j)] + \frac{4}{9}E[u(x_j - 1)]
\]

(19)

\[
EU^N(k = 3) = \frac{1}{4}u(x_i) + \frac{3}{4}E[u(x_j - 1)]
\]

(20)

\[
EU^N(k = 4) = \frac{1}{5}u(x_i - 1) + \frac{4}{5}E[u(x_j - 1)]
\]

(21)

Informative Campaigns

If campaigns are informative, computing \( i \)'s expected utility involves dividing the support of the joint random variable and integrating over the region where \( i \) wins and where the other \( k \) candidates win. If \( k = 1 \), then the appropriate expressions for not running and running are

\[
EU^A(r = 0|k = 1) = \int_a^b u(x_j - 1)f(s_j)ds_j
\]

(22)

\[
EU^A(r = 1|k = 1) = \int_a^{s_i} u(x_i + 2)f(s_j)ds_j + \int_{s_i}^b u(x_j - 1)f(s_j)ds_j
\]

(23)

where \( a \) and \( b \) are the endpoints of the support of \( f(s) \).

If \( k = 2 \), the expected utility of running is

\[
EU^A(r = 0|k = 2) = 2\int_a^b \int_a^{s_j} u(x_j)f(s_k)f(s_j)ds_kds_j
\]

(24)

where the double integral accounts for values of \( s_j \) for which \( s_j \geq s_k \); that is, we integrate over \( s_k \) from \( a \) to \( s_j \) and then over \( s_j \) from \( a \) to \( b \). Since \( f(s) \) is symmetric, the part of the expected utility due to \( j \) winning is identical to the expected from \( k \) winning, hence we
When \( i \) runs, this is modified to take into account the possibility that \( i \) might win as well:

\[
EU^A(r = 1|k = 2) = \int_a^{s_i} \int_a^{s_i} u(x_i + 1) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_k ds_j \\
+ 2 \int_s^{b} \int_a^{s_j} u(x_j - 1) f(s_k) f(s_j) ds_k ds_j
\]

For \( k > 2 \), the relevant expressions are:

\[
EU^A(r = 0|k = 3) = 3 \int_a^{b} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} u(x_j) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_\ell ds_k ds_j
\]

\[
EU^A(r = 1|k = 3) = \int_a^{s_i} \int_a^{s_i} \int_a^{s_i} u(x_i) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_\ell ds_k ds_j \\
+ 3 \int_s^{b} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} u(x_j - 1) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_\ell ds_k ds_j
\]

\[
EU^A(r = 0|k = 4) = 4 \int_a^{b} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} u(x_j - 1) f(s_m) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_m ds_\ell ds_k ds_j
\]

\[
EU^A(r = 1|k = 4) = \int_a^{s_i} \int_a^{s_i} \int_a^{s_i} u(x_i - 1) f(s_m) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_m ds_\ell ds_k ds_j \\
+ 4 \int_s^{b} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} \int_0^{s_j} u(x_j - 1) f(s_m) f(s_\ell) f(s_k)f(s_j) ds_m ds_\ell ds_k ds_j
\]

Table 7: Comparison of Cutoff Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Volunteering Running for Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uninformative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k )</td>
<td>( u^n(x) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several patterns in the numerical example are noteworthy. The most interesting to us is that the cutoff values for informative campaigns are lower than for uninformative campaigns (holding \( k \) and risk aversion constant). This suggests that for any given ability, an
individual would be more willing to run the more informative they believe the election to be. Second, for both uninformative and informative campaigns, the cutoff value is increasing in the number of other candidates $k$. We showed that this holds generally for the case of a risk neutral agent in an uninformative campaign, and the example suggests that the relationship may hold more generally. Intuitively, increasing the number of candidates should decrease the expected number of votes and the probability of winning. Third, the numerical example suggests that risk aversion implies only small decreases in the numerical cutoff values. In general, as we discussed above, risk aversion implies a greater willingness to run (in order to reduce the variance in outcomes).