

# Comparing the Role of Discrimination in Racial Policy Preferences Across Groups

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February 1, 2018

## Introduction

In 2005, Cara Wong and Grace E. Cho concluded an article on White racial identification with a prescient paragraph: "Another interpretation of our results is that White racial identity is not politically salient, and it may be more sensitive to the political environment than Black identity... If White identity is indeed unstable but easily triggered, the danger is that a demagogue could influence the salience of these identities to promote negative out-group attitudes, link racial identification more strongly to policy preferences, and exacerbate group conflict" (716). Wong and Cho situated their writing as entering a methodological debate--that race and ethnic politics scholarship, in the United States, failed to compare racial attitudes between groups, and examine how well important concepts traveled. Years later, Wong and Cho's exhortations to the political science literature have gone only partially heeded, even as their ominous warning has come to pass. As theoretical debates ossify, the world turns. In 2016, very different scholars traced disparate policy attitudes back to group identity and meaning (Achen and Bartels 2016, Cramer 2016, Gest 2016). In short order, Donald Trump was elected President, successfully-if uneasily-interlacing White grievance politics with a major-party Presidential campaign. The subsequent debates of the unprecedented-ness of Trump indicates a need for a fuller understanding of White identity politics. We argue that the best way to understand White grievance politics is to employ a comparative framework, in which key racial attitudes are compared across racial and ethnic groups. This approach will enable us to better understand the development of shared racial attitudes among Whites and further illuminate how race structures the policy attitudes of racial and ethnic groups more generally.

Scholars who study the relationship between race and policy attitudes have, generally, used different methods to examine people of color than they do for Whites. The connection between White racial dominance in the United States and White racial attitudes is intuitive: this, coupled with the majority-status of American Whites has foregrounded their attitudes,

prejudices, and stereotypes in policy preference research.<sup>1</sup> These constructs, logically, fail to explain the attitudes of people of color, which, in the Race and Ethnic Politics literature, are grounded in group-specific histories of subjugation and exclusion.<sup>2</sup> Below, we argue that this division leaves an important contradiction unresolved: How might we account for group-specific variables, while retaining an ability to make cross-group comparisons in racial policy preferences? And how can this approach enable us to better identify the structural factors that explain group-level differences? We approach this challenge in two ways: first, we present evidence that comparative-relational modeling approaches (see: "Methods and Hypotheses" section) enable us to meaningfully compare the policy preferences of racial and ethnic groups. Second, we utilize perceived group discrimination as our independent variable: perceived group discrimination is a vital predictor of the attitudes of people of color (Dawson 1994; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Chong and Kim 2006; Schildkraut 2011; 2016), and is quite common in Whites (Kluegel and Smith 1982; Schildkraut 2017; Jardina 2014; Gest 2006; Schildkraut 2011; 2016). These two choices allow us to show that group discrimination (and related constructs) structures the attitudes of all respondents—people of color and Whites alike—on the policies most salient to their race/ethnicity's group position (Blumer 1958; Jardina 2014). Ultimately, we find that policy preferences emerge from group concerns, to a similar or greater extent than partisanship, ideology, and socioeconomic factors. In making these assertions, we first review existing literature on discrimination and policy preferences, explore the prevalence and predictors of perceived group discrimination, present a series of hypotheses, present evidence supporting those hypotheses, and connect these findings back to existing literatures and contradictions in political science.

## Discrimination and Policy Preferences

Different schools of social science research identify distinct origins of racial policy preferences. One large body of research focuses primarily on the racial attitudes of the broader American public, and seeks to identify the psychological processes and social factors that explain the formation and change in these attitudes. One strand of this literature emphasizes psychological variables such as stereotypes, authoritarianism, and racial resentment and predominantly examine White racial attitudes (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, Schram, et al. 2009, 401; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Valentino and Sears 2005). Another strand examines time-series shifts in racial attitudes, report mass-level changes in racial attitudes that shift the public together (Kinder and Kam 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1989), often catalyzed by exogenous shifts in the media or communication (Kellstedt 2003; Gilens 1999, 2003; Mendelberg 2001). Theorizing that systematic differences in political attitudes were likely, these scholars add racial dummies for racial minorities to their models of public

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<sup>1</sup>See: Allport 1949; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Gilens 1999; 2003; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Kluegel and Smith 1982; Klinker and Smith 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Lipsitz 2006; Omi and Winant 1986; Parker and Barreto 2013; Peffley, et al. 1997; Sears, et al. 1979; Sears and Henry 2005; Sindanius and Pratto 2001; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Tuch and Hughes 2011; Wilson, et al. 2014, etc; Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2016.

<sup>2</sup>See: Dawson 1994; Garcia Bedolla 2005; Chong and Kim 2006; Daniels 2004; Kim 1999; 2000; Gay 2004; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Miller, et al. 1981; Parenti 1967; Schildkraut 2011, etc.

opinion, implicitly using White public opinion as a baseline. While this methodological approach enables us to determine whether attitudes vary systematically across groups it does not enable us to determine how or why attitudes vary across groups (Lee 2008; Chong and Kim 2006; Masuoka and Junn 2013).

Scholars of race and ethnic politics, conversely, emphasize group-specific dynamics from which racial attitudes crystallize. Experiences of group consciousness occur in responses to inter-group hierarchy, and necessarily draw from disparate histories of subjugation, privilege (Dawson 1994; Garcia Bedolla 2005; Lipsitz 2006; Chong and Rogers 2005; McAdam 1982), exclusion, and welcome (Chong and Kim 2006; Schildkraut 2011; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Daniels 2004; Lee 2008). Although this approach is better able to model the unique histories, characteristics, and contexts of racial groups, it makes it very difficult to make comparisons across groups. Consequently, vital predictors of political attitudes in one racial or ethnic group may not hold for another, or could, in fact, measure something else altogether (Gay, et al. 2015; Sanchez and Vargas 2016; Wong and Cho 2005; McClain, et al. 2009; Kim and Lee 2001; Segura and Rodrigues 2006).

These difficulties appear still starker when we attempt to examine the origins of racial policy preferences in White Americans. Some scholars have emphasized the role of individual-level stereotypes in catalyzing White racial policy preferences; they divide however, over whether these stereotypes are exclusive to Whites (Peffley 1997, Gilens 1999), or significant for other racial groups (Schram, et al. 2009; Wong and Cho 2005, 711-712). Others prioritize the role of "symbolic politics" or racial resentment in structuring White policy attitudes (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000, Kinder and Sanders 1996, Tuch and Hughes 2011; Tesler and Sears 2009; Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005), while others argue that such accounts mask the importance of the role of White racial progressives (Bunyasi 2015). The literature remains divided on the relative importance of these variables, and, furthermore, wants for cross-group comparisons, especially comparisons that transcend the Black-White dichotomy. We maintain that this focus on the individual level obscures the role of group-level processes and experiences in determining variables such as prejudice, or racial attitudes more broadly. Furthermore, such an approach is no longer reflective of a society in which multiple groups compete within a racial hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn 2013).

How might we unite these disparate, yet overlapping, literatures, by highlighting mass-level psychological mechanisms, while also appreciating group-level contexts of dominance and subjugation? In essence, how do we incorporate both individual- and group-level factors to better explain the variation of political attitudes across the American population?

We weave these strands together by following scholars of group position. Group position models were initially developed to explain intergroup conflict, particularly the hostile and intolerant attitudes many Whites held toward African-Americans (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967). Recent work has adapted the theory to explain a broader range of intergroup attitudes in a society in which multiple racial groups compete for power (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Oliver and Wong 1999; Hopkins 2010; Kim 2003; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Unlike other work that emphasizes psychological factors—such as prejudice—group-position scholars argue that individual-level attitudes are driven primarily by larger group-level dynamics. As such, prejudice is less a cause, than an outcome of racial group competition.

Group position scholars argue, similar to the Pluralist tradition, that the best way to analyze American politics, is to focus on how groups compete for power. This line of theorizing argues that individuals come to identify with groups, either through a process of self-identification or ascription (Tajfel and Turner 1979; McClain et al. 2009). An enduring history of discriminatory policies, ongoing racial stereotypes, and a stratified distribution of resources have placed racial groups into a hierarchy that structures intergroup competition (Masuoka and Junn 2013), both between Whites and people of color and between marginalized races/ethnicities (Kim 1999). Groups, in turn, formulate, diffuse, and maintain shared attitudes toward out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Huddy 2001, 2003), as well as, attitudes toward policies that are perceived to be linked to their collective interest (Dawson 1994; Jardina 2014; Sanchez 2006). These collective attitudes are driven by the normative belief in the position the group ought to hold and the resources, access, and privileges to which they are entitled (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Therefore, a shift in group attitudes may be driven by actual or perceived changes in the relative distribution of political, economic, or cultural resources. As such, members of a group will develop collective policy preferences they believe will strengthen the position of the group relative to the position of groups with whom they compete. The frame of group position allows us to consider scholarship sensitive to the psychological legitimations of existing racial hierarchies (Kluegel and Smith 1982; Allport 1949; Conover 1988), the consequences of competition between groups of disparate status within the racial hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn 2013), and the inter-group mechanisms of identification and racialization (Kim 1999).

In casting our lot with scholars of group position, the structure of our analysis begins to take shape. Perceptions of discrimination against the subject's racial or ethnic group sits at the forefront of the above literature, both as a close relative to all of the independent variables considered, and as an important--and, crucially, shared--predictor between people of color and Whites (Chong and Kim 2006; Schildkraut 2017; Kluegel and Smith 1982; Dawson 1994; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Individuals who believe that their race faces higher levels of discrimination are more conscious of their placement in a racial group (but see Tajfel and Turner 1979) as well as the stratified position of their group relative to other groups (Schildkraut 2011; Chong and Kim 2006). As such, we expect that individuals who report higher levels of group discrimination will be more likely to hold similar policy preferences with other members of their racial group. While we posit that perceptions of discrimination should have foremost importance in charting policy outcomes most salient for a respondent's racial or ethnic group, we predict that magnitudes and directions will vary in intuitive ways for each group and issue considered below.

## **Theorizing the Relationship**

We argue that perceived group discrimination emerges from individuals' beliefs in the insecurity and disadvantage of their racial/ethnic group relative to other groups. Therefore, an individual's perception of group discrimination will, in turn, serve as a key predictor of political attitudes for several reasons. First, if an individual perceives their life as structured

by membership in one group, it is efficient for her to allow group concerns to inform her preferences on (potentially complicated) policy issues (Dawson 1994). Second, perceived group-level discrimination is more directly linked to the interests and experiences of the group—which provide intuitive links to policies bearing on group division—more so than individuals’ affect or prejudice toward outgroup members (Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972). Third, *perceived* discrimination expresses feelings of symbolic replacement or exclusion, and thus allows for the fact that perception may not reflect socioeconomic, legal or political reality (Gest 2016). Ultimately, we argue that perceived group discrimination captures *both* individual-level identification and perceptions of structural and symbolic group position. In short, discrimination, in uniting individual’s perception of unjust threats to their race/ethnicity’s position, or the means to maintain their ongoing marginalized position, connects individual-level heterogeneity with macro-level policy consequences.

## The Contours of Perceived Group Discrimination

### Data

We utilize data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (Barreto, et al. 2017). The sample consists of 10,145 respondents contacted by e-mail<sup>3</sup>, and weighted post-stratification within each racial group to "match the adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status." These data provide an excellent opportunity to compare policy preferences, racial attitudes, and experiences/perceptions of racial hierarchy across racial groups. These data, necessarily, bear the problems of online, low response rate, non-probability surveys (Keeter, et al. 2017). However, the benefits of using the CMPS over any other data-set are enormous. First, the data include substantial sub-populations of African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Latin@-Americans. The increased size and diversity of the sample allowing us to more effectively analyze variation within and across racial groups. While this over-sampling necessitates abandoning probability sampling, such methods are necessary to analyze these groups in detail, and are very common in studies of racial attitudes.<sup>4</sup> Next, these data ask respondents across all racial group identical questions about perceptions of discrimination, racial identity, and racial policy. Hence, we can make meaningful comparisons between *all* racial/ethnic groups across multiple dimensions of racial identity and stratification, and across multiple policy issues. Finally, phone-based surveys, face the dual problems of a high level of non-response, and misreporting due to social desirability bias (Berinsky 1999; Zaller and Feldman 1992). The threat of social desirability bias has been found to be particularly

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<sup>3</sup>E-mail addresses for respondents were obtained via the national voter registration database e-mail sample (in the case of registered voters) and a random selection of further addresses "from various online panel vendors" (in the case of non-registered individuals).

<sup>4</sup>See: (AAPOR 2013). For analyses of racial attitudes using over-samples/non-probability samples, see: Hurwitz and Peffley 2005b; Citrin, et al. 2014; Barreto, et al. 2009; Banks and Valentino 2012; Gay 2004; Chong and Kim 2006; Callanan and Rosenberger 2011; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Schildkraut 2011; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Kam 2009, etc.

troublesome regarding questions on sensitive topics such as racial attitudes (Berinsky 1999, 2004; Gilens, Sniderman, and Kuklinsky 1998; Kuklinsky, et al. 1997; Redlawsk, Tolbert and Franco 2010; Krosnick 1999; Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003; Krupnikov, et al. 2016). Online-only surveys minimize non-response on surveys (Gooch and Vavreck 2016), and may also decrease misreporting error resulting from social desirability bias (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2008; Weaver 2012). Ultimately, the disadvantages that come from the non-probability sample we consider here are outweighed by the *advantages* of the nonprobability sample: namely, we are able to apprehend and analyze variation in subgroups that are small in the United States population, but overrepresented here.

## How Much Discrimination Do Respondents Perceive?

Before testing the impact of discrimination on racial and ethnic attitudes toward racialized policies, we describe how perceptions of group discrimination are distributed across the population. Our key explanatory variable is derived from a survey measure that asks respondents' perceptions of contemporary discrimination in American society against their own racial/ethnic groups. The question wording is as follows (asked of all respondents): "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups?" "Whites;" "Blacks;" "Asian Americans;" "Latinos" (Barreto, et al. 2017). The distribution of responses to this question are listed in Table 1.

Figure 1: How Much Discrimination Does Your Racial Group Face: Weighted Percentages

<b>Amount</b>	<b>African-Americans</b>	<b>Asian-Americans</b>	<b>Latin@s</b>	<b>Whites</b>
None	2%	7	3	31
A Little	3	32	16	31
Some	19	52	40	25
A Lot	75	9	41	13

As can be seen, respondents' perceptions of the level of discrimination against their own race or ethnicity seems—roughly—to place Whites at the top of a racial hierarchy, followed by Asian-Americans, Latin@-Americans, and then African-Americans. The relative levels of discrimination reported by each racial group is consistent with prior work (Chong and Kim 2006; Schildkraut 2011). African Americans, as a group, have endured a long history of racial discrimination in this country and, as such are more likely to perceive that their group faces higher level of discrimination. The lower levels of group discrimination reported among Latinos and Asian Americans can be partially explained by their recent immigration status, as well as the increased heterogeneity within each group. What is perhaps most surprising is the amount of discrimination expressed among Whites. Less than a third of Whites (31 percent) reported that their racial group faces no amount of discrimination.

When we consider respondents' perceptions of *each* other group's levels of discrimination (see Figure 2), a distinct pattern emerges. Groups have similar perceptions of relative

discrimination in the contemporary United States. Moreover, each group reports that their group receives slightly more discrimination than others estimate. Nowhere, however, is the disparity as stark as between Whites' perceptions of the discrimination they face, relative to other groups' responses to the same question. It is evident that Whites' perception of their position in society, and the structural factors that support or threaten this position, vary considerably from the perceptions on non-Whites.




Figure 2: Average perceptions of relative discrimination by race/ethnicity.

## Who Perceives Discrimination?

Having demonstrated that perceptions of group discrimination are widely distributed across all of the racial and ethnic groups, we here explore more specifically *who* reports discrimination against their racial or ethnic group in the 2016 CMPS. Our descriptive analysis includes a host of socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables. Since our variable measures racial or ethnic discrimination, we also include a variety of racial attitudes. Due to space constraints, we report only our most general findings here. For a far more detailed discussion, see Appendix II.

Socioeconomic variables are mixed in their ability to predict perceived discrimination across racial groups. Increased income and education correspond with decreased perceived group discrimination in Latin@s; *increased* education correspond with increased perceived discrimination in African-Americans—consistent with literature identifying racial consciousness as a link between education and perceived discrimination (Dawson 1994). However, neither measure significantly correlates with White or Asian-Americans’ perceptions. Uniform relationships emerge when we consider sociotropic perceptions of the economy (Kinder and Kiewit 1981). Respondents from all racial and ethnic groups who perceive that the economy at large is getting worse are more likely to report group discrimination ( $p < .001$ ). This is consistent with our claim that group discrimination is a good measure of group position—it captures macro-level security and insecurity, rather than individual-level advantage and disadvantage.

The relationship between demographic variables and perceptions of discrimination are also not consistent across groups. Age is a significant correlate ( $p < .01$ ) for all respondents of color, but positively so for African-Americans, and negatively so for Latin@- and Asian-Americans. Women of color report more discrimination than men of color ( $p < .05$ ). Contextual variables are extremely erratic predictors, with region holding no clear pattern, and correlations with county-level population density proving highly sensitive to coding and specification of the relationship. Political variables correlate more reliably: as ideologies and partisan affiliations become more liberal and Democratic (respectively), respondents of color perceive significantly more group discrimination. The trend, importantly, moves in precisely the opposite direction for Whites. Trust in government is lower in respondents of color who perceive more group discrimination. However, in all groups, a sense that public officials “care about [them]” is negatively correlated with perceived group discrimination. Finally, for all groups, senses of group identification and status correlate reliably with perceived group discrimination. More perceived discrimination corresponds to diminished senses that a respondent’s race/ethnicity “has a say”, and to increased feelings of shared fate with racial/ethnic fellows. Interestingly, the importance of American identity is a significant correlate with group discrimination for only African-Americans (negative) and Whites (positive). Finally, an individual’s personal experience with discrimination strongly with perceptions of correlate group discrimination. Regardless of one’s race or ethnicity, individuals who report experiencing discrimination are more likely to report that their group faces higher levels of discrimination.  $p < .01$ .

While there seems to be little underlying pattern to perceptions of discrimination against the racial or ethnic groups of our respondents, we draw a few conclusions from these analyses. First, perceived discrimination emerges from different contexts for each group in our sample, rather than from the same source in different proportions. Next, socioeconomic and structural covariates correlate strongly to group discrimination in respondents of color. Those correlations, however, vary in direction across groups. Finally, Whites’ perceptions of discrimination against their own race appear to flow from underlying *ideology*, rather than the structural determinants discussed above.



## Methods and Hypotheses

The principal goal of our analysis is to measure how perceptions of group-level discrimination predict attitudes toward public policy, and how this relationship varies across racial and ethnic groups. To answer these questions we employ a “comparative relational analytical approach” (Masuoka and Junn 2013, 32; See also Lee 2008; Chong and Kim 2006; Kim 2000; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Schildkraut 2011). Since we believe that the impact of perceptions of group discrimination is likely to vary across groups, and that race structures the impact of additional covariates in the model, we model each of the racial and ethnic groups separately. This enables each covariate in the model to take a different regression coefficient in each specification, unlike when race is modeled as a series of dummy variables in regression models.<sup>5</sup>

We argue that perceptions of group discrimination are reflective of an individual’s attachment to a group, as well as their perception of the group’s relative position in the American racial hierarchy. Our prior section yielded two principal findings. First, we find that perceptions of discrimination vary considerably within and across racial groups (see Figure 2). Second, we find that the public’s perception of the amount of discrimination each group faces compared to other groups is reflective of a racial hierarchy in which Whites are at the top, Latinos and Asian-Americans maintain an intermediary position, and Blacks are relegated to the lowest position. These findings are consistent with work that argues that one’s attachment to a group is structured by both individual-level factors—e.g. income and education—as well as the relative position of the group in the social, economic, and/or political hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Kim 2000; Gest 2016; Cramer 2016; Dawson 1994; Chong and Kim 2006).

We similarly expect that perceptions of group discrimination will be a key determinant of public opinion for all of the groups, but it will structure public opinion in unique ways across groups. We predict that the direction and the magnitude of the effect will vary depending on four factors: 1) the level of discrimination an individual feels his/her group faces; 2) the relative position of the group in the social hierarchy; 3) the degree to which the policy is racialized; and 4) the perceived impact the policy will have on securing or increasing the group’s position in America’s racial hierarchy.

From these expectations, we deduce the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1** – We expect that perceptions of group discrimination will be a significant determinant of individual attitudes toward racialized policy, even accounting for other standard predictors. A body of research has demonstrated that personal experiences with discrimination play a pivotal role in strengthening one’s attachment to a group and developing a shared racial identity (Chong and Rogers 2005) and the development of shared attitudes (Schildkraut 2011; Masuoka and Junn 2013). While other scholars find that personal experiences with group discrimination diminish identification with that group (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Garcia-Rios Forthcoming), we maintain that the overwhelming salience of racial identity vis-a-vis racial policy preferences limits the applicability of these findings here. Yet, experienced discrimination may not adequately measure her perception of the group’s relative position

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<sup>5</sup>in which the effect of all other covariates is assumed to be constant for all races/ethnicities in the model

within society, or the disadvantages the group faces. An individual may personally experience discrimination, yet perceive it to be an isolated or rare occurrence. Similarly, one may perceive that their group faces discrimination without ever experiencing it personally. On the other hand, our measure of group discrimination better captures the extent to which one feels that members of one's group face structural impediments. An individual's awareness of the structural disadvantages he/she share with other member of his/her group—as well as the sense of grievance, discontent, and frustration that is likely to result—is more likely to foster a heightened sense of group consciousness (Gurin et al 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005), and catalyze support for policies which redress this unfairness (Chong and Kim 2006; Conover 1988).

**Hypothesis 2-** We expect that the relative position on one's group in the racial hierarchy will structure attitudes toward racialized policies, and that the direction and magnitude of the impact will be contingent upon each policy's bearing on each group's positionality. Whites, who historically have maintained a privileged position atop the racial hierarchy, will perceive of discrimination as a harbinger that their position—and the access and resources it ensures—is threatened (Gest 2016; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Jardina 2014; Lipsitz 2006; Petrow et al. 2017). As such those who perceive a higher level of discrimination will be *more supportive* of policies that disadvantage other “competing” groups and will be *more oppositional* to policies that they feel redistribute scarce resources to other groups. On the other hand, for people of color, perceptions of discrimination are tied to an individual's acceptance of their ascribed racial identification, as well as the marginalization they face as a member of that group. As such, we expect perceived discrimination to operate in the opposite direction for respondents of color, except when the policy being considered pits minority group interests against one another. For example, we expect that perceived group discrimination will catalyze support for social welfare spending in all respondents of color, but that it will not uniformly predict support for immigration policy across all racial minority groups.

**Hypothesis 3** – We expect that perceptions of group discrimination will not be predictive of all attitudes, but rather its predictive power is dependent upon the degree to which the policy area is racialized. The literature on American racial attitudes originally focused on the *most* racialized policies such as *de jure* neighborhood integration (Kellstedt 2003; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995), school integration (Sears, et al. 1979; Bobo 1983), and affirmative action (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). We consider less overtly racialized policies—immigration, voter ID, support for the police, and aid to the poor—for two primary reasons. First, our policy choices represent a more conservative test of our theories. Identifying a role of racial group interest in predicting support for policies less immediately implicated in American racial politics both advances the understanding of those policies, and places higher hurdles for our theory to clear. Second, these issues moved to the forefront of political discourse in the United States in 2016—understanding the contours of support for those policies in and of itself remains instructive. As such, we anticipate that perceptions of group discrimination will be predictive of attitudes toward these policies; however, the magnitude of the effect may not be as strong. Finally, we include attitudes toward infrastructure spending as an example of a non-racialized policy. We expect that perceptions of group discrimination will be a poor predictor of attitudes toward this

policy. Our inclusion of this test evaluates hypotheses that so-called racial conservatism actually captures philosophical preference for small government, rather than racial threat itself (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman, et al. 2000). Perceived discrimination having similar effects on infrastructure preferences and more racialized policies would strongly support this argument.

We test each of these hypotheses by modeling support for the following five policy questions: 1) a path to citizenship; 2) voter identification laws; 3) policing; 4) aid to the poor; and 5) infrastructure spending. Due to the ordinal nature of our dependent variable, we estimate a series of ordered logistic regression models. The key explanatory variable in all of our models is group discrimination. In addition, we include other factors—income, education, gender, ideology, partisanship, political interest, and the perceived state of the economy—that have been found to be predictive of attitudes toward public policies, and may covary with perceptions of discrimination. We include these covariates to more precisely measure the independent effect of perceptions of discrimination on policy preferences, and compare its effect to more traditional determinants. Finally, we included additional policy-specific controls. We follow Kesteven and Leoni (2007) in reporting graphs instead of tables, to aid our readers’ interpretation. The completed table of regression estimates for each policy can be found in Appendix III.

## Results

### A Path to Citizenship

Immigration policy represents an area of central concern in American politics. Immigration law solidifies racial hierarchy, forms a battleground where competing visions of American national identity are articulated (Smith 1993; Schildkraut 2011), accomplishes the racialization of different ethnic groups (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Junn and Masuoka 2008), and catalyzes anxiety about cultural (Sniderman, et al. 2004) and demographic replacement (Jardina 2014). Given this extant scholarship, we hypothesize that even a strict path to citizenship would entail an enhanced group position for Asian-Americans and Latin@-Americans, and a diminished sense of group position for White Americans. In these tests, we specifically expect Asian-Americans and Latin@s to respond to increased discrimination against their racial or ethnic groups with increased support for a path to citizenship, and for White respondents to respond to increased discrimination with decreased support for the path to citizenship.

As can be seen in Figure 3, perceptions of discrimination against their race/ethnicity are predictive of support for a path to citizenship in Asian- and Latin@-American respondents. These coefficients, moreover, exceed those on similarly-coded ordinal variables. Perceptions of discrimination, have no predictive power distinct from zero for African-Americans and White Americans. Due to the difficulty of drawing substantive conclusions from logistic regression coefficients, we also analyze marginal effects of different levels of discrimination (when significant) by race. In short: what, substantively, do the significant coefficients mean here?




Figure 3: Perceptions of discrimination drive support for a path to citizenship in Latin@, Asian-American respondents.

When Asian-Americans perceived increased discrimination against other Asian-Americans, it has a straightforward impact upon their preferences for citizenship law (see Figure 4). They become precipitously more likely to "strongly" support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the United States, without any significant change in their likelihood to merely support that policy. Each increased "unit" of increases the likelihood of respondents strongly supporting condition, as their likelihood of "neutral," "oppose," and "strongly" oppose condition diminishes. Ultimately, perceived discrimination against other Asian-Americans drives the likelihood of support for a more welcoming (albeit in the presence of strict conditions) law for citizenship.

These effects are similar, though even stronger, when we consider—in Figure 5—the impact upon Latin@-American respondents. In the absence of no perceived discrimination against co-ethnics, Latin@-Americans were most likely to simply support a path to citizenship, with no difference between the neutral and strongly support response. Even a modest increase in perceived discrimination drives down the likelihood of any response except strong support, which becomes about 10% more likely to be chosen with every increased unit of discrimination.

Ultimately, perceived discrimination against fellow members of a respondent’s racial group has strong implications for Latin@- and Asian-American respondents. This fits neatly with




Figure 4: Discrimination prompts increased likelihood of strong support for a path to citizenship.

an account of group position driving policy preferences, given both the effect on Latin@- and Asian-Americans, as well as the strong influence of discrimination upon support. What should we make of the null results on African-Americans and Whites? These coefficients are highly sensitive to model specification, as the nearly-significant coefficient on African-American discrimination diminishes in the presence of controls, and the coefficient on perceptions of anti-White discrimination approaches significance in the same model (see: Appendix III, Figure 16). We caution readers against over-interpretation of the null result on anti-White discrimination. The salience of White anxieties about immigration can remain latent unless broader racial/demographic anxieties are primed (Jardina 2014). In brief, we find that senses of group threat closely inform immigration attitudes.

## Voter ID Laws

The racial implications of voter ID laws have been discussed at length in both popular and political science circles. However, support for voter identification laws has been consistently attributed—at least in part—to racial resentment (Wilson and Brewer 2013) and white anxieties about racialized voter fraud (2014). Similar consensus has emerged around Republi-




Figure 5: Latino@s' likelihood of strong support for a path to citizenship nearly doubles in the face of perceived discrimination against co-ethnics.

can party identification and support for these policies, and of elected Republicans' support for these policies (Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014). However, research documenting the impact of voter identification law remains conflicted: while Ansolabehere acknowledges that the laws are disproportionately implemented by poll workers when Blacks vote, he finds null effects on turnout (2009). Other scholars have maintained that voter identification laws inhibit turnout among voters of color, Democrats, and older voters (Hood and Bullock 2008). Such findings are echoed by other scholars who *also* find that younger voters are demobilized (Barreto, et al. 2009; Hajnal, et al. 2016). Such demobilization, however, could be counteracted by voters' being notified about how to attain proper identification (Citrin, et al. 2014), or state implementation of same-day registration (Burden, et al. 2014).

This scholarship provides burgeoning consensus around the role of White racial interests and resentment in catalyzing support for Voter Identification Laws. Voter identification laws remain quite popular in this sample. Respondents were asked whether they would "Strongly agree," "Agree," "Neither agree nor disagree," "Disagree," or "Strongly disagree" with the statement "everyone should be required to obtain and then show a state-issued photo identification in order to vote on election-day" (Barreto, et al. 2017). We hypothesize that voter identification laws will be more popular among whites who experience discrimination, given the connection between support for such laws and white anxieties about Black exercise

of the franchise (Wilson and Brewer 2014). We, however, hypothesize that support for such laws will *not* be connected to perceptions of discrimination among respondents of color, given that voters' belief in the integrity of elections and their voice appear unconnected to the enactment of these laws (Ansolabehere 2009).




Figure 6: Perceived anti-White discrimination comparable to partisanship in predicting Whites' support for voter ID laws

As can be seen in Figure 6, perceptions of discrimination against the racial and ethnic groups of respondents of color are not significant at the  $p \leq .05$  level. White respondents, however, appear to respond to perceived discrimination against other Whites by reporting increased approval of such laws ( $p < .01$ ). What--more substantively--does the perception of discrimination against Whites mean for their attitudes toward voter identification laws?

In the absence of perceived discrimination against Whites, a distinct plurality support voter ID laws (see Figure 7). The predicted probabilities of White respondents supporting such legislation increases by about 5% with each unit increase in perceived group discrimination, with the probability reaching around 60% in the presence of "a lot" of discrimination. Moreover, the predicted probabilities of any other response diminishes at higher levels of discrimination.

Voter ID laws preserve Whites' advantage over people of color in voting (Hajnal, et al. 2017). White anxiety over the solidity of this electoral dominance emerges as the electoral map moves in tentative response to demographic shifts, and Whites begin to be represented by people




Figure 7: While already high, strong support among Whites for strict voter ID laws significantly increases in the presence of perceived anti-White discrimination.

of color (Jardina 2014, Schildkraut 2017; Petrow et al. 2017). Maintaining an electorate Whiter than the population is central to securing group position for Whites. A move to reinforce one site of White dominance follows logically from the threat to group status that perceived anti-White discrimination entails. The influence of this measure, especially when compared to partisanship, is striking. Voter ID laws also have strong partisan implications, yet the effect of discrimination against Whites shapes the contours of support or opposition to these laws at comparable levels. We, finally, hypothesize that the lack of significant effects for respondents of color in our model emerges, not from the absence of a threat to group position posed by voter ID laws, but by the marginal racial salience to respondents. Both the framing of the question and the contours of public debate on the issue present voter ID laws as maintaining the integrity of the ballot box, a goal commendable on its face to respondents to the CMPS.

### Support for the Police

Policing in the United States is obviously and immediately racialized. Policy preferences on issues of criminal justice have been tied to policy entrepreneurship by anti-civil-rights



activists (Weaver 2007) and political-psychological dispositions mapping onto inegalitarianism (Kellstedt 2003) or punitiveness (Enns 2016). Other scholarship prioritizes the media's role in inculcating support for punitive crime policy by stoking modern racism (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000), especially when respondents have no personal experiences with police (Callanan and Rosenberger 2011). Numerous scholars emphasize the role of White anti-Black stereotypes in structuring White support for punitive crime policy when presented with narratives of violent Black crime (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; 2005a; Peffley, et al. 1997). Still other scholars argue that racial/ethnic group-level perceptions of discrimination (in Blacks and to a lesser extent Latin@s) or fairness (in Whites) catalyze criminal justice policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005b; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). While *support* for the police remains sensitive to all of these considerations, it also responds to respondent's personal experiences with the police, and their attitudes about their neighborhood also inform their attitudes toward the police (Schafer, et al. 2003).

Below, we consider whether perceptions of discrimination against a respondent's racial group changes their likelihood of saying that police in their community are doing a "Poor job," "Fair job," "Good job," or "Very good job" (see Appendix I)(Barreto, et al. 2017). Given the close link between racial status or oppression and police practice, we hypothesize that respondents of color who report greater discrimination against their racial or ethnic group will have more negative views of the police, and that White respondents perceiving more anti-White discrimination will respond with support for police, given their role in securing White dominance (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005b; Weitzer and Tuch 2005).

As we show in Figure 8, African-American, Asian-American ( $p < .01$ ), and Latin@ ( $p < .05$ ) respondents are significantly less likely to report satisfaction with policing in their city in the presence of perceived discrimination against their racial and ethnic group. White respondents, on the other hand, become significantly ( $p \leq .05$ ) (see Appendix III, Table 21) more likely to report satisfaction with policing in their community. These effects, are comparable to or larger than the influence of similarly-scaled ordinal variables in the model. What, substantively, do these coefficients mean for respondents' attitudes toward police in their communities?

Perceiving increased discrimination against others of their own racial group corresponded to African-American respondents being significantly more likely to report "fair" or "poor" police work in their communities, and significantly less likely to describe them as doing "good," or "very good" jobs (see Figure 9). These amount to approximately a 10% increase in each positive evaluation, and approximately at 10% decrease in each negative evaluation.

Similar, though less stark, dynamics are present when we consider the marginal effects in Asian-American respondents, as we display in Figure 10. Each level-increase in perceived discrimination against Asian-Americans makes respondents incrementally more likely to label police conduct as fair or poor, and incrementally less likely to identify it as good or very good. While these differences are not statistically significant at each step, in moving from "no" perceived discrimination to "a lot", they are far more pronounced.

Among White respondents, the patterns are far subtler, as we show in Figure 11. Unit increases in perceived discrimination against Whites corresponds with a slight, albeit insignificant, decrease in respondents' likelihood of reporting fair or poor police performance in their




Figure 8: Perceived discrimination significantly impacts all groups' approval of police in their community; however, it drives dissatisfaction in respondents of color and approval in White respondents.




Figure 9: As Black respondents perceive more discrimination against other African-Americans, their likelihood of negatively (positively) appraising police in their community increases (decreases)

communities. Very good and good, then, receive slight, albeit insignificant increases. While none of the potential outcomes of the question showcase a significant effect, the *overall* effect is positive and statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ).

The distribution of similar effects--with different signs and magnitudes--across different racial groups in our sample strongly supports a connection between concerns for group interest and policy preferences. Policing and incarceration policy play a vital role in structuring systems of racial hierarchy in the United States (Weaver 2007; Alexander 2012; Higginbotham 2013; Browne-Marshall 2013). If anxieties about the insecurity of group dominance (stimulated, here, by perceived discrimination) prompt support for institutions which secure that dominance, we would expect Whites to respond with support for the carceral state. And if consciousness of group-level subordination begat opposition to policy practices that solidified that oppression, we would expect to find people of color--to varying extents--expressing dissatisfaction with the implementation of such policy. That we find evidence of both above indicates the importance of racial group position in the development of policy preferences.




Figure 10: When Asian-Americans perceive other Asian-Americans as being discriminated against, the likelihood of positive attitudes toward the work of police in their communities starkly decreases.

## Aid to the Poor

Anti-poverty policy is one of the most racialized policy areas in American governance, a finding repeatedly documented in social science research. White opposition to anti-poverty policy has been tied to anti-Black stereotypes (Soss, et al. 2011), especially those perpetuated in the media (Gilens 1999; 2003). Other scholars emphasize a preference for small government in white respondents that encompasses, but cannot be meaningfully separated from, the racial attitudes cited above (Kellstedt 2003; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Other scholars emphasize the role of racial/ethnic group-level interests in catalyzing policy preferences (Dawson 1994), above all when policies are race-targeted (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Some scholars even emphasize an absence of identification between certain Whites and perceived recipients of government benefits and government itself (Cramer Walsh 2011; Cramer 2016).

Given this theoretical context, we anticipate that White respondents who perceive discrimination against fellow Whites will reject government aid to the poor, due to a misplaced suspicion that the poor are Black (Gilens 1999; 2003) and that to assist the poor would be to dispense unfair advantage (Kluegel and Smith 1982), especially given perceived anti-White discrimination. We, furthermore, anticipate that African-American and Latin@ group interests will undergird support for redistribution (Dawson 1994; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). We argue that Asian-American respondents in this sample recognize their position below Whites




Figure 11: While the effects are more marginal, White respondents are likelier to express support for police in their community when they perceive fellow Whites as experiencing discrimination.

and above Latin@-Americans in the racial hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Kim 1999), and will not respond to discrimination with increased support for aid to the poor.

Our regression analyses clearly indicate that perceived discrimination strongly influences support for redistribution (see Figure 12): the effect is negative for White respondents (significant at  $p < .05$ ), and positive for Latin@ and African-American respondents (significant at  $p < .01$ ). The coefficient on Asian-Americans is not statistically significant. All of these findings conform with our expectations. Furthermore, these effects are comparable to, or stronger than, (similarly scaled) variables like partisanship, ideology, and economic perception.

In order to better substantively interpret the coefficients on these models, we report marginal effects plots. As we can see, as African-Americans perceive increased discrimination against other Blacks, their likelihood of preferring increased anti-poverty spending increases significantly, while their likelihood of preferring steady or decreased spending decreases (significant in the former case)(see Figure 13). The case is quite different when we consider White respondents, whose likelihood of preferring increased aid to the poor decreases, and whose likelihood of selecting all other responses increases (see Figure 14).

Ultimately, all of these findings conform well to our expectations. Black and Latin@ respondents, who perceive their races as disadvantaged by systematic discrimination, support increased federal spending to combat poverty. This effect occurs after ideology, partisanship,




Figure 12: Perceptions of discrimination diminish support for redistribution in Whites; burnish support for Blacks, Latin@s.

and attitudes about the economy are controlled for, suggesting that this effect captures *group interest* above all. We argue that, while White respondents report relatively low amounts of group discrimination, that they point to anxiety about White status. This, in precisely Blumer (1958) and Bobo and Hutchings’ (1996) articulation, should drive White opposition to government intervention in highly racialized areas like poverty. That Asian-Americans exist somewhere between these contrasting effects makes sense, given their position in the midst of American racial hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Kim 1999).

### Infrastructure

One could argue, following Kellstedt (2003), that policy preferences and racial attitudes are too tightly linked to be considered discrete: that policy attitudes are racial attitudes.<sup>6</sup> To account for this possibility, we examine the influence of perceptions of discrimination upon a

<sup>6</sup>Furthermore, the link between partisanship, ideology, and policy preferences is tenuous enough (Treier and Hillygus 2009) that controlling for the former alone could be insufficient to extract their true influences from the latter. Therefore, it could be possible that we have not extracted correlation between party and ideology with perceptions of discrimination.




Figure 13: As Black respondents perceive more discrimination against other African-Americans, their likelihood of supporting increased anti-poverty spending significantly increases, while their likelihood of all other responses decreases.

minimally racialized policy. We would expect, if perceived group discrimination captured a dimension of political ideology outside of the umbrella of "racial attitudes" that perceived group discrimination would have a significant effect on support for a non-racialized policy, like infrastructure. The results of this regression testing this hypothesis are displayed in Figure 15.

As can be seen above, perceptions of discrimination against a respondent's racial group does not prompt a change in infrastructure spending preferences distinct from zero. The absence of any significant effect indicates that perceptions of racial group position do not structure all policy preferences out of whole cloth, but instead structures *racialized* policy preferences. It, furthermore, indicates that we are measuring a dimension of *racial* attitudes, rather than some dimension of political attitudes not captured by ideology or partisanship.

## Specification

Before evaluating the theoretical conclusions of these results, we consider the robustness of the substantive implications we have drawn. Are the significance and magnitude of our findings attributable to our decisions in model specification? Below, we consider to what extent our results shift when we pursue alternative (theoretically grounded) avenues in control




Figure 14: As White respondents perceive more discrimination against fellow Whites, their likelihood of supporting increased anti-poverty spending decreases, and their likelihood of giving all other responses increases.

variable selection and coding of our independent variable.

### Control Variables

In the previous subsections, we specified parsimonious and identical sets of control variables for ease of presentation and interpretation. Are these models robust to more expansive specifications? When analyzing support for a path to citizenship, controlling for a respondents' being a primary English speaker, a respondent's family's number of generations in the United States, and their living in a border state do not eliminate the significance of perceptions of discrimination identified in our model shown above (see Appendices). When controlling for a respondents' citizenship and being registered to vote, only perceptions of discrimination against whites holds significance in our model, as shown above. Finally, including controls for a respondent's concern for crime, their support for Black Lives Matter, and status as a victim of a crime eliminates the significance of Latin@ and White respondents' perceptions of discrimination against their own group (see Appendix III, Figure 18). We, however, do not believe that the significant coefficients in our more parsimonious model are not artifacts of specification. Black Lives Matter's emphasis upon racist violence in policing makes it highly likely that respondents' feelings on the intersection of racial status and policing are






Figure 15: When we consider a policy issue with a less-intuitive bearing on racial group position, the influence of perceived discrimination recedes beyond significance.

intimately linked with attitudes toward the group. Dropping that control variable restores the significance of the coefficient on perceptions of anti-White and anti-Latin@ discrimination ( $p < .05$ ) (see Appendix III, Figure 19), inviting the interpretation that the relationship between perceived group discrimination and support for the police emerges from perceptions of macro level advantage and disadvantage, rather than the respondents individual self-interests pertaining to policing.

### Positionality

In all of the above analyses, we consider absolute perceptions of discrimination against the respondent's race/ethnicity as our independent variable. However, it makes sense to investigate the influence of senses of relative discrimination. The marginal shift from no discrimination to "a little," seems less significant if a respondent views all other races as beset by "a lot" of discrimination, and far more significant if the respondent views no other races as experiencing discrimination. Consequently, we re-specified all our models to better capture *positionality*, here, whether a respondent perceives three, two, one, or zero of the other racial or ethnic groups in our analysis as facing more (less) discrimination.

This change burnishes the significance of many of our variables, while not contradicting the conclusions laid out in the models listed above. Ultimately, our decision to adhere to absolute,

rather than relative, levels of discrimination emerged from the following two considerations. First, increasing the number of categories in our principle independent variable made it more difficult to consider marginal effects, especially given the infrequency of many of the responses (almost none of the African-Americans in the CMPS, for example, reported being less discriminated against than any other nic group). Second, we believe that the levels of absolute discrimination in the CMPS ("none," "a little," etc.) lend themselves more clearly to interpretation by our readers than an attempt at representing perceptions of racial hierarchy numerically.

## Discussion

In the previous pages, we have found evidence that senses of group interests--as measured by perceived discrimination against the entirety of a racial or ethnic group--play a vital role in structuring the policy preferences of group members. These perceptions often outweigh the importance of fundamental explanatory variables in the policy preferences literature. Furthermore, perceived discrimination proves important for all four racial or ethnic groups considered in this study, both validating our method of cross-group comparison and inviting further studies employing that technique. Our measurement of absolute perceived discrimination corresponds well to one of the chief predictors of group threat in the group position literature. Our findings, importantly, are robust to alternative specifications: our theoretical conclusions do not change when we attempt to better capture positionality in our model, or when we re-specify the model to consider the role of one group's discrimination relative to the racial or ethnic group for which the proposed policy would be more salient.

Throughout our study, a number of theoretically significant control variables have proven anything but. Partisanship has proven a weak and insignificant predictor of the policy preferences considered here. In Figure 3: group-level threats to Latin@-Americans predict support for a path to citizenship to a far greater extent than partisanship. The same dynamic holds in Figure 8, where partisanship fails to predict support or opposition to the police in African-American respondents, while perceived anti-Black discrimination is the strongest predictor in that model. Partisan interests may well be group interests, but there are often more salient identities in play. Moreover, partisanship often cross-cuts the effect of perceived group discrimination in our model. Democratic Party ID strongly predicts opposition to strict Voter ID laws; perceived anti-White discrimination has almost the opposite effect.

Similar cleavages emerge in Figure 8, which examines predictors of respondents' appraisals of policing in their communities. Here, economic perception and perceived group discrimination are both significant for African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Latin@-Americans, though the signs on economic perception are all positive and the signs on perceived discrimination are all negative. Economic heterogeneity--even perceived--can contradict the effects of racial or ethnic-group level concerns in much the same way for all respondents of color in our sample. Group discrimination, then, is not a monolithic influence, but instead operates relative to, and at intersection with, other variables that structure life in the U.S.A.. Below, we consider how future research that we believe this study prompts might work to better understand

these tensions.

## Further Research

Throughout this article we treat senses of identification with fellow members of a racial or ethnic group responding to perceived threat as exogenous and constant. However, individuals must make sense of a world in which they must reconcile numerous identities, often bearing privileges, disadvantage, and histories which may directly contradict each other. Which of these identities become salient in the light of perceived racial discrimination? And what social contexts, individual predispositions, or priming effects mediate that salience?

Additionally, this paper presumes a common policy logic of structural group position: one group's access to citizenship, the franchise, or racially disparate police practices comes at the expense of others' position. Might perceived discrimination also structure individuals' responses to policy proposals that map less easily onto this axis? And, moreover, how might the policy preferences of individuals perceiving discrimination differ in their senses of symbolic meaning? Given that very different symbolic, group-level motivations may instantiate policy preferences in groups that appear similar on surveys yet radically different in motivations (Cramer Walsh 2011), what heterogeneities in meaning might our work have overlooked?

Finally, our paper also begins to identify the contours of a White grievance politics structuring policy preferences in White respondents, even given relatively low levels of perceived discrimination against other Whites. In what other aspects of White political life are perceptions of discrimination salient? What experimental methods might be brought to bear in determining why White identity proved so salient in this study, even when class seemed so often insignificant?

## Conclusion

Above, we presented compelling evidence that perceived group discrimination structures racialized policy preferences. Perceived discrimination against a respondent's racial/ethnic group captures feelings of group threat, understandings of group consciousness, and position relative to other groups. These perceptions, moreover, structure attitudes most directly relevant to each race/ethnicity's position in American hierarchy. We present these findings in the midst of anxiety about the role of identity politics in the 2016 Democratic Platform and renewed public awareness of organized, violent white supremacists in the United States, all laid over continuous demographic change. Our findings, then, indicate that to speak of identity politics is to make a false distinction. They, furthermore, show that attempts to explain policy preferences via ideology, partisanship, or structural concern will fall short, leaving the substantial role of group interests unexplained. As the last two years of American politics show us, when the role of those interests is left unexamined, popular and academic observers will be surprised—again—by the power of White grievance politics.

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## Appendices

### I. Survey Questions

#### Discrimination

How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? [Rotate] [C243] Whites [C244] Blacks [C245] Asian Americans [C246] Immigrants [C247] Latinos [C248] Gays and Lesbians [C249] Muslims

1. A Lot
2. Some
3. A Little
4. None At All
5. Don't Know

#### Policy Preferences

[C39] Undocumented immigrants should qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing a background check.

[C44] Everyone should be required to obtain and then show a state-issued photo identification in order to vote on election-day.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

[C287] How good a job are the police doing in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your city? Would you say they are doing a . . .

1. Very Good Job
2. Good Job

3. Fair Job
4. Poor Job

Below is a list of federal government programs. For each one, please indicate whether you would like to see federal spending increased or decreased or stay the same. ... [C338] Aid the the poor ... [C341] Roads, bridges and infrastructure

1. Decrease
2. Increase
3. Stay the Same

## II. Who Perceives Discrimination?

We first examine whether perceptions of discrimination are divided along socio-economic lines. Among Latinos, perceptions of discrimination appear to be strongly associated with class. Latin@ respondents with higher levels of income and education are significantly less likely to report that their group faces discrimination ( $p < .001$ ). On the other hand, African Americans with higher levels of education are more likely to report that members of their group face discrimination ( $p < .001$ ) (May want to include footnote noting that this is consistent with Dawson's Findings on LF). Interestingly, neither income nor education are reliably associated with perceived discrimination for either Whites or Asian Americans. (see Appendix II). This pattern is consistent when we consider the role of employment status; the correlation coefficients are statistically significant for African-American respondents ( $p < .001$ ), and Latin@ respondents ( $p < .05$ ), but point in opposite directions. Moving from not being in the labor market to full-time employment corresponds to *increasing* awareness of discrimination for African-American respondents and *decreasing* perceptions for Latin@ respondents. Once again there is no significant relationship between employment status and perceptions of discrimination among Whites or Asian Americans. The one socioeconomic factor that we find is uniform for members of all of the racial groups is socio-tropic perceptions of the economy (Kinder and Kiewet 1981). Respondents from all racial or ethnic groups who perceive that the economy at large is getting worse are more likely to report discrimination against other members of their racial or ethnic group ( $p < .001$ ). Discrimination, appears far more likely to accompany perceptions about overall advantage or disadvantage, rather than individual level economic security. We contend, furthermore, that this represents further indication of the validity of perceived discrimination against a respondent's racial group as a measurement of their group's position: the measure captures their perceptions of macro-level advantage and disadvantage, rather than the respondent's own socioeconomic position.

The story is similarly mixed when we consider the relationships between demographic variables and perceived discrimination. Age is significantly correlated with all respondents of color's perceived discrimination; however, it is positive for African-American respondents ( $p < .01$ ), and negative for Asian-Americans ( $p < .01$ ) and Latin@s ( $p < .001$ ). A more uniform picture emerges when we consider the relationships between perceived group discrimination and gender. Women of color in our sample report more discrimination than do men of color

( $p < .05$ ). Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find that perceptions of discrimination for Whites or Blacks are more pronounced in the South, nor do we find evidence that Whites expressed a greater level of racial discrimination in the Midwest. Instead, we find that Latin@ respondents expressed a significantly higher level of discrimination in the Pacific West and Mountain West regions and African-American respondents in the Pacific West. Population density plays a more complicated role (see Appendix II: The Role of Population Density). African-Americans living in more populous areas report marginally more discrimination, including when we transform population density to logged population density. The same pattern follows for Asian-American respondents, though with the intercept of the fit line distinctly lower. Perceived discrimination appears almost entirely unrelated to population density for Latin@ respondents. White respondents report the most discrimination in less populous areas, showing the most pronounced relationship of all other groups. Interestingly, White respondents living in the most populous areas begin to perceive other Whites as perceiving increased discrimination, if we fit the plots we consider with a quadratic line.

We find that political variables are strongly associated with perceptions of discrimination. Across all respondents of color, Democrats perceived more discrimination against their racial group than Independents, who perceived more discrimination than Republicans ( $p < .001$ ). The same dynamic occurred in reverse for White respondents: with Republicans and Independents both reporting more than Democrats ( $p < .001$ ). The same trends exist to a lesser extent when we examine political ideology: liberal respondents of color perceive more discrimination against other members of their own racial group than do moderates, who perceive more than conservatives ( $p < .01$  for Latin@s and Asian-Americans). Again, precisely the opposite occurs for White Americans, whose perceptions of discrimination decreases in lockstep with their conservatism ( $p < .001$ ). We do not find evidence that perceptions of discrimination are associated with political interest for any of the racial groups. However, perceptions of discrimination do appear to have an adverse effect on respondents' perceptions of American democracy more generally. Asian Americans ( $p < .01$ , Latin@s, and Blacks ( $p < .01$  who perceived a higher level of group discrimination were less likely to express trust in government. Finally, perception of group discrimination was negatively associated with external political empathy. All respondent who expressed a higher level of discrimination were also more likely to report that public officials did not care about people like them  $p < .01$ .

As we expected, we find that perceptions of discrimination are associated with racial attitudes and other competing identities. Logically, all respondents who perceive more discrimination against their racial or ethnic group report experiencing more discrimination themselves ( $p < .01$ ). This finding suggests that group perceptions are, in fact, rooted in personal experiences. Similarly, we find that perceptions of group discrimination fosters a greater sense of shared fate with others of their race or ethnicity ( $p < .001$ ). While we cannot ascertain the direction of the relationship, empirical work suggests that discrimination precedes identity attachment (cite literature). Perceptions of discrimination also appears to have a strong relationship with perceptions of political voice. Members of all groups who reported higher levels of group discrimination, similarly reported that their racial group rarely has a say in political matters ( $p < .001$ ). Finally, we find evidence that perceptions of discrimination may be associated with one's national identity. Whites, who maintain a privileged position atop the racial hierarchy, are not forced to choose between their racial and national identity (Masuoka

and Junn 2013). In fact, we find that Whites who report discrimination also report a stronger attachment to their American identity. However, for racial minorities these identities are often framed as competing identities. Racial minorities who face racial discrimination—particularly recent immigrants—may feel excluded from the American polity and instead maintain their racial identity. However, we find that perceptions of group discrimination—as opposed to personal experiences of discrimination—does not weaken a respondent’s attachment to his/her American identity, among Latinx or Asian Americans (See also Schildkraut 2009).

Below, we report full, rounded, cross-tabulations of perceived discrimination.

## Crosstabs

Demographic Crosstabs: White Respondents				
Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Discrimination</b>	31	31	25	13
Female	29	30	27	14
Male	32	32	24	12
<b>Age</b>				
18-24	35	38	14	13
25-34	35	30	24	11
35-49	28	33	22	17
50-64	27	31	29	14
65+	33	27	30	11
<b>Education</b>				
No H.S. Diploma	43	24	17	17
H.S. Diploma	28	32	25	15
Some College	28	29	27	17
College Diploma	32	32	28	8
Graduate Degree	35	36	22	7
<b>Income</b>				
Under 30,000	29	29	24	18
30,000-59,999	31	31	23	15
60,000-99,000	32	29	27	12
100,000-149,999	26	38	25	11
150,000+	39	32	21	8
<b>Region</b>				
Pacific West	34	34	21	10
Mountain West	27	34	26	14
Midwest	31	31	27	12
North Atlantic	31	31	25	14
South	30	29	26	15

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson’s  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Demographic Crosstab: African-Americans

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Discrimination</b>				
Female*	2	3	19	75
Male	3	6	22	69
<b>Age**</b>				
18-24	6	6	18	70
25-34	5	7	18	71
35-49	1	4	19	75
50-64	1	3	23	73
65+	2	3	26	69
<b>Education***</b>				
No H.S. Diploma	8	5	16	71
H.S. Diploma	3	5	21	71
Some College	1	3	20	75
College Diploma	1	5	26	69
Graduate Degree	1	2	23	75
<b>Income</b>				
Under 30,000	3	5	19	72
30,000-59,999	3	4	21	72
60,000-99,000	2	3	25	71
100,000-149,999	1	1	29	68
150,000+	2	7	17	74
<b>Region</b>				
Pacific West	1	1	25	73
Mountain West	2	10	26	63
Midwest	3	3	20	74
North Atlantic	3	5	19	72
South	3	5	19	73

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Demographic Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Discrimination</b>				
Female*	7	32	49	13
Male	7	32	52	9
<b>Age**</b>				
18-24	5	30	51	13
25-34	9	35	41	15
35-49	8	25	51	17
50-64	4	35	51	9

Demographic Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
65+	7	36	51	6
<b>Education</b>				
No H.S. Diploma	7	32	46	16
H.S. Diploma	9	34	42	15
Some College	7	26	54	14
College Diploma	6	33	50	11
Graduate Degree	5	35	48	11
<b>Income</b>				
Under 30,000	6	27	49	18
30,000-59,999	7	33	47	13
60,000-99,000	10	29	49	11
100,000-149,999	4	33	53	11
150,000+	6	31	53	10
<b>Region</b>				
Pacific West	5	30	52	13
Mountain West	7	40	41	12
Midwest	9	27	52	12
North Atlantic	4	31	52	13
South	10	36	42	12

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Demographic Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Discrimination</b>	3	16	40	41
Female	2	13	37	48
Male	3	19	44	34
<b>Age***</b>				
18-24	3	19	36	42
25-34	2	13	39	46
35-49	2	16	35	48
50-64	4	17	48	31
65+	3	15	53	29
<b>Education***</b>				
No H.S. Diploma	2	12	33	54
H.S. Diploma	4	17	42	37
Some College	1	19	43	37
College Diploma	4	16	43	38
Graduate Degree	3	13	54	30
<b>Income***</b>				

Demographic Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
Under 30,000	3	15	33	49
30,000-59,999	2	16	42	39
60,000-99,000	3	16	46	35
100,000-149,999	4	21	51	24
150,000+	5	13	44	38
<b>Region*</b>				
Pacific West	2	16	35	47
Mountain West	3	14	37	47
Midwest	3	13	42	41
North Atlantic	3	17	42	39
South	3	16	42	39

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Political Crosstabs: White Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Party ID***</b>				
Republican	26	29	28	17
Independent	21	35	29	15
Democrat	46	29	18	7
<b>Ideology***</b>				
Conservative	21	29	33	17
Moderate	33	30	23	13
Liberal	43	34	16	6
<b>Political Interest</b>				
None At All	25	37	27	11
Not That Much	24	37	27	12
Some	33	32	25	11
Very Much	32	25	24	18
<b>Trust in Gov't**</b>				
Never	27	27	24	22
Sometimes	29	33	26	12
Most of the Time	40	29	25	7
Always	43	8	21	28
<b>Did not Vote</b>	31	30	24	14
<b>Voted</b>	30	31	26	13
<b>Not Registered</b>	31	32	23	14
<b>Registered</b>	30	31	26	13

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*



Political Crosstabs: White Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
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\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Political Crosstabs: African-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Party ID***</b>				
Republican	12	15	29	44
Independent	4	5	21	70
Democrat	2	3	20	75
<b>Ideology***</b>				
Conservative	2	5	23	70
Moderate	2	4	23	71
Liberal	2	3	19	76
<b>Political Interest</b>				
None At All	7	4	16	73
Not That Much	2	4	23	72
Some	3	5	21	71
Very Much	2	3	20	75
<b>Trust in Gov't***</b>				
Never	4	2	9	86
Sometimes	2	3	23	72
Most of the Time	4	8	29	59
Always	6	6	13	75
<b>Did not Vote</b>	6	7	20	68
<b>Voted***</b>	1	3	21	75
<b>Not Registered</b>	6	7	19	68
<b>Registered***</b>	1	3	22	74

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Political Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
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<b>Party ID***</b>				
Republican	7	28	44	22
Independent	3	21	39	37
Democrat	1	10	40	49
<b>Ideology***</b>				
Conservative	4	24	39	32
Moderate	2	16	42	40
Liberal	2	10	41	47

Political Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Political Interest</b>				
None At All	3	17	39	40
Not That Much	3	14	35	47
Some	2	15	43	40
Very Much	4	17	39	41
<b>Trust in Gov't**</b>				
Never	6	13	31	50
Sometimes	2	16	42	40
Most of the Time	2	17	44	37
Always	7	13	31	49
<b>Did not Vote</b>	2	15	36	47
<b>Voted</b>	3	16	46	35
<b>Not Registered***</b>	2	14	36	47
<b>Registered***</b>	3	17	45	35

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Political Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot
<b>Party ID***</b>				
Republican	13	34	45	9
Independent	7	32	47	13
Democrat	3	31	52	14
<b>Ideology***</b>				
Conservative	9	38	48	6
Moderate	7	30	51	12
Liberal	4	33	48	16
<b>Political Interest</b>				
None At All	8	32	47	12
Not That Much	8	35	49	11
Some	6	32	48	14
Very Much	6	30	52	12
<b>Trust in Gov't***</b>				
Never	7	31	36	25
Sometimes	4	32	53	11
Most of the Time	10	33	47	10
Always	18	25	33	24
<b>Did not Vote</b>	7	32	46	15
<b>Voted*</b>	5	31	54	10
<b>Not Registered</b>	8	32	45	15

Political Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Registered**</b>		5	31	54	10

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: White Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Church Attendance**</b>					
Never		37	33	17	13
Hardly Ever		26	32	22	20
Few $\frac{Times}{Year}$		30	26	32	12
Few $\frac{Times}{Month}$		41	28	21	9
Almost Every Week		18	35	39	8
Every Week		30	26	28	17
<b>Employment Status</b>					
Full-Time		30	32	24	14
Part-Time		38	27	20	16
Student		37	38	17	8
Retired		26	29	34	12
Unemployed		38	32	19	10
Homemaker		27	31	27	15
<b>Econ. Perception***</b>					
A Lot Worse		20	26	26	28
A Little Worse		31	34	25	10
The Same		32	31	25	14
A Little Better		31	34	27	8
A Lot Better		45	18	20	17
<b>Officials Care Abt. Me</b>					
Disagree		35	32	24	9
Neither		30	37	23	11
Agree		29	27	27	16

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: African-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Church Attendance</b>					
Never		1	3	19	77

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: African-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
Hardly Ever		2	2	23	73
Few		3	5	21	71
Few		2	6	21	72
Almost Every Week		3	6	24	66
Every Week		2	5	20	72
<b>Employment Status***</b>					
Full-Time		1	3	20	75
Part-Time		1	5	24	71
Student		7	9	19	65
Retired		2	3	25	70
Unemployed		6	6	15	73
Homemaker		2	5	24	70
<b>Econ. Perception***</b>					
A Lot Worse		1	3	11	85
A Little Worse		5	2	21	72
The Same		3	5	24	68
A Little Better		2	6	24	68
A Lot Better		2	5	18	75
<b>Officials Care Abt. Me***</b>					
Disagree		5	9	26	61
Neither		2	5	28	65
Agree		2	2	14	82

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Church Attendance</b>					
Never		3	16	39	41
Hardly Ever		2	14	48	35
Few		3	11	41	45
Few		1	11	41	47
Almost Every Week		3	20	34	43
Every Week		2	21	36	41
<b>Employment Status*</b>					
Full-Time		3	16	42	40
Part-Time		2	17	42	38
Student		4	22	34	41
Retired		4	15	49	33
Unemployed		3	15	41	41

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
Homemaker		2	12	31	55
<b>Econ. Perception***</b>					
A Lot Worse		3	12	30	55
A Little Worse		2	15	39	43
The Same		4	20	43	34
A Little Better		2	16	45	38
A Lot Better		6	11	35	48
<b>Officials Care Abt. Me***</b>					
Disagree		7	19	50	24
Neither		3	16	49	32
Agree		2	15	32	52

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Church Attendance</b>					
Never		8	33	48	12
Hardly Ever		4	34	49	13
Few		5	27	54	14
Few		7	33	47	13
Almost Every Week		12	32	48	8
Every Week		6	36	49	10
<b>Employment Status</b>					
Full-Time		6	31	50	13
Part-Time		4	34	48	13
Student		5	33	47	16
Retired		6	35	54	6
Unemployed		8	31	45	17
Homemaker		12	31	44	13
<b>Econ. Perception***</b>					
A Lot Worse		6	25	44	26
A Little Worse		6	36	46	12
The Same		6	33	50	11
A Little Better		7	32	51	9
A Lot Better		6	25	49	20
<b>Officials Care Abt. Me**</b>					
Disagree		7	42	45	6
Neither		6	33	49	11

Socioeconomic Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
Agree		7	27	50	16

Frequencies Listed As Percentages  
 Significance Based on Pearson's *r*  
 \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: White Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Does Race Have Say***</b>					
Rarely		31	27	22	20
Half the Time		22	34	32	12
Most of the Time		38	31	21	10
<b>Experienced Discrim.**</b>		25	29	27	19
<b>Has Not Experienced</b>		34	32	24	10
<b>Amount of Linked Fate***</b>					
None		32	33	25	10
Not Much		47	36	15	2
Some		27	33	28	12
A Lot		33	19	22	26
<b>Importance of USA Ident.*</b>					
Not At All		40	43	0	17
Not Much		42	28	18	12
Somewhat		37	32	20	11
Very		27	31	28	14

Frequencies Listed As Percentages  
 Significance Based on Pearson's *r*  
 \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: African-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Does Race Have Say***</b>					
Rarely		2	2	14	81
Half the Time		3	5	26	67
Most of the Time		4	10	32	54
<b>Experienced Discrim.***</b>		1	3	17	78
<b>Has Not Experienced</b>		6	6	27	61
<b>Amount of Linked Fate***</b>					
None		5	6	23	66
Not Much		3	6	28	64
Some		2	3	23	72

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: African-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
A Lot		1	3	12	84
<b>Importance of USA Ident.**</b>					
Not At All		6	2	11	81
Not Much		4	6	13	77
Somewhat		4	6	24	67
Very		2	3	21	74

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: Latin@ Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Does Race Have Say***</b>					
Rarely		2	12	37	49
Half the Time		2	20	46	32
Most of the Time		5	18	38	39
<b>Experienced Discrim.***</b>		5	23	45	27
<b>Has Not Experienced</b>		1	10	37	53
<b>Amount of Linked Fate***</b>					
None		4	20	44	33
Not Much		5	23	39	33
Some		2	15	44	40
A Lot		1	6	28	65
<b>Importance of USA Ident.</b>					
Not At All		10	10	24	56
Not Much		2	12	42	44
Somewhat		3	17	41	39
Very		2	16	40	42

Frequencies Listed As Percentages

Significance Based on Pearson's *r*

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Does Race Have Say***</b>					
Rarely		5	29	50	16
Half the Time		6	36	51	8
Most of the Time		13	34	43	10
<b>Experienced Discrim.***</b>		4	22	55	20

Racial Attitude Crosstabs: Asian-American Respondents

Variable	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	
<b>Has Not Experienced</b>		9	42	43	6
<b>Amount of Linked Fate***</b>					
None		8	39	44	9
Not Much		8	40	42	10
Some		6	30	53	12
A Lot		5	14	52	29
<b>Importance of USA Ident.</b>					
Not At All		15	30	30	25
Not Much		5	31	46	19
Somewhat		6	33	51	10
Very		7	31	48	13



Frequencies Listed As Percentages



Significance Based on Pearson's  $r$



\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$





# The Role of Population Density









### III. Model Specification

#### Ordered Logit Models

We exclusively consider ordinal dependent variables in this model, and therefore utilize ordered logit regression models to make our analysis. We, consequently, must adhere to the parallel lines assumption, which dictates that we assume identical coefficients across all outcomes of our dependent variables. We conduct Brant's test for violation of the parallel lines assumption (running unweighted ordinal logit models), and in most cases, we reject the null hypothesis of no violation. Next, we determine whether more conservative ordinal models fit our data better. We conduct Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) tests for ordinal logit, stereotype logit, and multinomial logit models: these do not make the parallel lines assumption. In no cases do AIC or BIC point, together, to stereotype- or multinomial logit models offering less information loss. Substantively, violation of the parallel lines assumption is not of grave concern. So, we report ordered logit results throughout our model.

Policy Area	African-Americans	Asian-Americans	Latin@-Americans	Whites
Infrastructure	.765	.113	.0251	.891
Aid to the Poor	.0536	.0006	.0171	.393
Border Spending	.0000	.0001	.0000	.0077
Education Spending	.0557	.0015	.0184	.0401
Death Penalty Supp.	.0341	.303	.00633	.0140
Path to Citizenship	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Voter ID Law	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0012
Gay Marriage Ban	.0000	.0000	.0107	.0017
Immigration Economics	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Climate Change Response	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0006
Progressive Taxation	.0341	.303	.0063	.0140
Obamacare	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0015
Support for Local Police	.0000	.875	.278	.138
Health Spending	.0733	.0235	.171	.426

## Control Variables




Figure 16: Predicting Support for a Path to Citizenship with More Control Variables




Figure 17: Predicting Support for Voter ID Laws with More Control Variables

## Regression Tables




Figure 18: The Sensitivity of Support for the Police to the Inclusion of Control Variables






Figure 19: Eliminating Control for "Support for Black Lives Matter" Restores the Significance of Discrimination

Table 19: Perceived Discrimination and Support for a Path to Citizenship

	Whites	African Americans	Latinx	Asian Americans
Variable				
Income	0.0189 (0.0260)	-0.0292 (0.0157)	-0.0357 (0.0222)	-0.0340 (0.0187)
Education	-0.157* (0.0709)	0.00341 (0.0545)	-0.0752 (0.0657)	-0.188** (0.0636)
Male	-0.421** (0.149)	-0.0458 (0.0970)	-0.0135 (0.133)	-0.171 (0.116)
Ideology	0.128 (0.0820)	0.0968 (0.0502)	0.0943 (0.0618)	0.201** (0.0664)
Party ID	0.137* (0.0641)	-0.00959 (0.0649)	0.0593 (0.0558)	0.188** (0.0541)
Discusses Politics	0.147 (0.271)	0.427* (0.172)	0.405* (0.194)	0.751** (0.172)
Econ. Condition	0.196** (0.0672)	0.110** (0.0406)	0.0520 (0.0539)	0.0381 (0.0515)
Discrimination	-0.0807 (0.0861)			
Discrimination		0.139 (0.0792)		
Discrimination			0.402** (0.0845)	
Discrimination				0.224** (0.0737)
cut1				
Constant	-2.191** (0.418)	-2.175** (0.374)	-2.113** (0.411)	-1.889** (0.520)
cut2				
Constant	-1.150** (0.407)	-1.402** (0.352)	-1.366** (0.372)	-0.711 (0.479)
cut3				
Constant	-0.349 (0.405)	-0.152 (0.357)	-0.178 (0.365)	0.361 (0.463)
cut4				
Constant	1.716** (0.413)	1.596** (0.357)	1.668** (0.374)	2.377** (0.466)
Observations	922	2474	2300	2305

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 20: Perceived Discrimination and Support for Voter ID

	African Americans	Asian Americans	Latinx	Whites
Variable				
Income	-0.0273 (0.0171)	-0.00848 (0.0183)	-0.0321 (0.0201)	-0.0280 (0.0276)
Education	-0.293** (0.0537)	0.0185 (0.0624)	0.00369 (0.0564)	-0.147 (0.107)
Male	-0.135 (0.0947)	-0.0808 (0.117)	-0.0659 (0.124)	-0.111 (0.170)
Ideology	-0.110* (0.0465)	-0.296** (0.0695)	-0.213** (0.0569)	-0.562** (0.0895)
Party ID	-0.0384 (0.0566)	-0.126* (0.0568)	-0.196** (0.0525)	-0.266** (0.0835)
Discusses Politicalsl	0.253 (0.142)	0.401* (0.167)	0.191 (0.156)	0.283 (0.294)
Econ. Condition	-0.0205 (0.0396)	-0.0646 (0.0493)	-0.0717 (0.0477)	-0.0517 (0.0655)
Discrimination	-0.118 (0.0716)			
Discrimination		0.102 (0.0804)		
Discrimination			-0.0824 (0.0722)	
Discrimination				0.315** (0.0876)
cut1				
Constant	-4.361** (0.329)	-4.972** (0.451)	-4.979** (0.349)	-5.871** (0.545)
cut2				
Constant	-3.319** (0.324)	-3.696** (0.417)	-3.764** (0.333)	-4.998** (0.525)
cut3				
Constant	-2.320** (0.328)	-2.223** (0.419)	-2.616** (0.336)	-3.955** (0.516)
cut4				
Constant	-1.108** (0.327)	-0.459 (0.415)	-1.213** (0.332)	-2.669** (0.503)
Observations	2474	2305	2300	922

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 21: Perceived Discrimination and Support for Police

	African Americans	AsianAmericans	Latinx	Whites
Variable				
Income	0.00564 (0.0146)	0.00184 (0.0186)	0.0146 (0.0246)	0.0265 (0.0232)
Education	0.125* (0.0545)	0.206** (0.0634)	-0.0374 (0.0701)	0.232** (0.0734)
Male	0.00986 (0.103)	0.0375 (0.122)	-0.0844 (0.128)	0.274 (0.149)
ideology	-0.128* (0.0499)	-0.0351 (0.0691)	-0.223** (0.0709)	-0.162 (0.0885)
Party ID	0.0690 (0.0575)	-0.134* (0.0587)	-0.0836 (0.0528)	-0.228** (0.0750)
Discusses Politics	-0.0897 (0.212)	0.167 (0.157)	0.0359 (0.225)	0.535* (0.244)
Econ. Condition	0.295** (0.0445)	0.240** (0.0495)	0.269** (0.0534)	0.209** (0.0689)
Discrimination	-0.399** (0.0800)			
Discrimination		-0.372** (0.0818)		
Discrimination			-0.183* (0.0854)	
Discrimination				0.171* (0.0838)
cut1				
Constant	-1.573** (0.374)	-2.508** (0.372)	-2.951** (0.362)	-1.613** (0.429)
cut2				
Constant	0.427 (0.379)	-0.0813 (0.368)	-0.947** (0.337)	0.364 (0.422)
cut3				
Constant	2.340** (0.399)	2.141** (0.366)	1.136** (0.352)	2.439** (0.435)
Observations	2474	2305	2300	922

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 22: Perceived Discrimination and Anti-Poverty Spending Preferences

		AsianAmericans	Latinx	Whites
Income	-0.0622** (0.0219)	-0.0194 (0.0220)	-0.0918** (0.0229)	-0.0490 (0.0254)
Education	0.0832 (0.0732)	-0.101 (0.0750)	-0.109 (0.0704)	-0.260** (0.0853)
Male	-0.304* (0.137)	-0.162 (0.134)	0.278* (0.140)	-0.233 (0.161)
Ideology	0.134* (0.0613)	0.287** (0.0777)	0.00754 (0.0701)	0.535** (0.0913)
Party ID	-0.00746 (0.0678)	0.239** (0.0655)	0.214** (0.0575)	0.200** (0.0759)
Political Interest	0.723** (0.206)	0.423* (0.188)	0.252 (0.211)	0.642* (0.278)
Econ. Condition	-0.0400 (0.0564)	-0.0213 (0.0549)	-0.00349 (0.0589)	0.0148 (0.0736)
Discrimination	0.400** (0.0974)			
Discrimination		0.0756 (0.0813)		
Discrimination			0.608** (0.0820)	
Discrimination				-0.229* (0.0955)
<hr/>				
cut1				
Constant	-1.532** (0.454)	-0.457 (0.508)	-1.196** (0.385)	-0.800 (0.476)
<hr/>				
cut2				
Constant	0.354 (0.453)	1.291** (0.487)	0.801* (0.353)	1.254** (0.465)
<hr/>				
Observations	2474	2305	2300	922

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 23: Perceived Discrimination and Infrastructure Spending Preferences

	African Americans	AsianAmericans	Latinx	Whites
infrastructure_spending				
Income	0.0309 (0.0195)	0.0735** (0.0208)	0.0253 (0.0290)	0.0629* (0.0270)
Education	0.108 (0.0607)	0.156* (0.0673)	0.0867 (0.0758)	0.244* (0.105)
Male	0.285* (0.113)	0.328* (0.140)	0.581** (0.149)	0.482* (0.196)
Ideology	0.0861 (0.0542)	0.0929 (0.0880)	-0.0655 (0.0711)	-0.0298 (0.106)
Party ID	0.0134 (0.0595)	-0.0640 (0.0677)	0.0396 (0.0591)	0.146 (0.0912)
Discusses Politicsl	0.409* (0.172)	0.314 (0.224)	0.291 (0.218)	0.429 (0.320)
Econ. Condition	0.142** (0.0434)	0.0545 (0.0597)	0.143* (0.0599)	0.0343 (0.0704)
Discrimination	0.0982 (0.0874)			
Discrimination		0.140 (0.0924)		
Discrimination			0.163 (0.0860)	
Discrimination				0.0132 (0.0926)
cut1				
Constant	-1.007** (0.370)	-0.915 (0.506)	-1.427** (0.398)	-0.941 (0.556)
cut2				
Constant	1.215** (0.370)	1.246* (0.495)	1.010** (0.383)	1.448** (0.537)
Observations	2474	2305	2300	922

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$