**BRITAIN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONALITIES DURING AND AFTER WWI**

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During World War I the British government made a number of public pledges and secret agreements regarding the postwar settlement of the Middle East. Expediency rather than postwar policy informed these actions. Thus, an agreement with Sharif Husayn of Mecca promised him an Arab kingdom in return of a revolt against the Ottoman Empire with the goal of taking the Ottomans out of the war. This would open up the passage to the Black Sea, facilitate military assistance to Russia and increase the pressure against Germany on the Eastern Front. The Balfour Declarations aimed at rallying Zionist support to the war effort by increasing Zionist pressure on the U.S. government to accelerate the mobilization of troops and to keep the revolutionary government of Russia in the war. The British government also hoped that a National Home for the Jews will keep the French out of Palestine after the war.[[1]](#footnote-1) In response to French insistence to clarify spheres of postwar colonial influence in the Middle East the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the region into British, French and Russian areas of control and influence. The mass desertion of Russian soldiers from the Caucasus front after the Russian revolutions led to British public pledges to Armenians to liberate them from Ottoman rule and recognize “their separate national condition” in order to encourage them to resist the advance of the Ottoman armies towards oil-rich Baku.[[2]](#footnote-2)

These treaties, pledges and commitments were undertaken solely for the purpose of winning the war—it did not matter that the Sykes-Picot Agreement contradicted promises made to Sharif Husayn. Lloyd George made clear to the War Cabinet that his public pledges should be regarded “as a war move [rather] than a peace move.[[3]](#footnote-3) He lectured the Allied Supreme Council at Versailles in February 1918 that “Nobody was bound by a speech.” [[4]](#footnote-4) Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in a memorandum in March 1918 agreed with the Prime Minister. He argued that Britain was under legal obligation to honor written agreements but not speeches like the ones made on behalf of Armenians.[[5]](#footnote-5) But throughout 1917 and first quarter of 1918, in view of German and Ottoman advances, Britain was willing to overlook even written agreements. The Ottoman Government was offered to keep Constantinople and give autonomy, rather than independence, to Mesopotamia as an incentive for withdrawing from the war. Lloyd George even toyed with the idea of ceding Baku and making other territorial concessions in the Caucasus to accomplish this goal.[[6]](#footnote-6) This would have left the Armenians of Transcuacaia at the mercy of the Ottoman Government.

At the end of the war British wartime pledges and agreements and President Wilson’s 14 points generated high hopes and expectations among Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. These hopes were dashed in short order. The Armenians were the first to experience disappointment with Allied—and particularly British—postwar policy. They were jubilant when British forces occupied the key strategic points between Baku and Baum following the signing of the armistice with the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians called themselves the “Little Ally”, and expected to be seated at the Paris Peace Conference and see the establishment of a “Great Armenia” by uniting their ancestral lands in Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia, and the Mountainous Karabagh, which was under Azerbaijan’s control, to their tiny Transcaucasian republic. The same cannot be said of Georgians and Azerbaijanis. The Georgians had maintained good relations with Germany during the war and the Azerbaijanis had assisted the Ottoman offensive into the Caucasus. But the British government had not formulated a Transcaucasian policy. The troops were there to ensure Ottoman compliance with the armistice terms, defend India, and help defeat the Bolshevik regime in Moscow by assisting the anti-Bolshevik Russian military elements in Southern Russia and Volga region.[[7]](#footnote-7) The British commanders were told not be involved in local territorial disputes —the Peace Conference would resolve these and decide the future of Transcaucasian republics.

At the Eastern Committee meeting of 2 December 1918, Lord (George Nathaniel) Curzon, the Chair, raised the question of British wartime pledges to Armenians. He was for the creation of a greater Armenia under the mandate of a Western nation. This would redeem Britain’s wartime pledges. However, such a mandate for Armenia should be taken either by the United States or France, thus freeing Britain from her obligations.[[8]](#footnote-8) Two weeks later, referring to Armenians as well as Georgians and Azerbaijanis, Foreign Secretary Balfour made it clear that he did not want to squander “money and men in civilizing a few people who do not want to be civilized.”[[9]](#footnote-9) This was an argument which was repeated *ad infinitum* by both political and military leaders to justify the government’s decision not to honor pledges, written agreements or treaties which did not enhance or protect imperial interests.

In the summer of 1919 British forces began their evacuation of Transcaucasia. There was a growing demand at home for the quick demobilization of the troops. While in the French Senate a cynic ascribe Britain’s refusal to take the mandate for Armenia to the fact that Armenia had no of oil wells, oil did not play a defining role in shaping Britain’s Transcaucasian policy. Growing unrest in Egypt, Iraq and Ireland and the demobilization of the troops dictated the British withdrawal in spite of Baku’s rich oil resources. There were other sources to address the oil needs of the British fleets. In December 1918 Lloyd George had received the French Prime Minister George Clemenceau’s agreement to cede Mosul (with its anticipated potential oil reserves) to the British administration in Mesopotamia. Moreover, Britain had already a major stake in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.[[10]](#footnote-10) In the spring of 1919 General Anton Denikin’s Volunteer Army was advancing against Bolshevik forces in South Russia making the need for British forces to guard his rear less critical. The postwar British economy was in no condition to address the demands of an extended empire. This major economic factor would foreshadow the gradual dissolution of the British Empire in the next fifty years. The English economy could no longer support its imperial ambitions. As Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of Imperial General Staff stated, “…in no single theatre [of war] are we strong enough.”[[11]](#footnote-11) There will be no British mandate or *de jure* recognition for Armenia or the other Transcaucasian republics. Only after Denikin’s defeat the British government granted *de facto* recognition and military support to these republics in a belated and vain attempt to prevent the Bolshevik conquest of the region.[[12]](#footnote-12)

The contradictions between Wilson’s 14 Points and Allied wartime pledges with the stark realities of the immediate postwar British and Allied policies led to disillusionment and sense of betrayal in the Transcaucasian republics which were facing Russian threats to their independence. A confidential Foreign Office report pointed out that Britain’s Transuacasian policy and decision to withdraw its troops: “caused violent dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Daghestan, and seriously affected the confidence of their people in the word and good faith of His Majesty’s Government […] their nearest interests counted for little, their future for nothing, when weighed by Great Britain against her own immediate convenience. She was charged, indeed, with having broken faith with the republics. “[[13]](#footnote-13) In September 1919 the organ of the Georgian Socialist Democratic Party *Ertoba*  warned the Armenians about the futility of relying on British goodwill and reminded them of the advice given to boatmen: “Pray to God, but keep on rowing.”[[14]](#footnote-14) The Armenian press accused the British of reneging on their promises and disregarding the rights and dignity of Transcaucasian people. This duplicitous behavior, the Armenian press claimed, was typical of perfidious Albion. A Foreign Office report points out that the Bolshevik propaganda fully exploited the growing demoralization within the Armenian republic and exploited it by pointing “to the folly of relying upon any external aid” except that of the Soviet regime and its new ally, Turkey.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Disappointment, anger, and growing antagonism to Britain was not confined to Transcaucasia. The leaders of the Arab revolt were equally disappointed in postwar British policy. Appropriately, Zackary Karabell labeled the interwar period in the Middle East “Hope and Despair.”[[16]](#footnote-16) Caught between conflicting promises to the French and Arabs the British government chose to honor commitments to France rather than Arabs. National security and imperial interests dictated this choice. General Edmund Allenby was irate that the Paris Peace Conference was reneging on the promises made to Sharif Husayn and reviving the Sykes-Picot Agreement “in the worst form” by cutting up the Middle East into British and French spheres of control. He predicted trouble for the French and British in the future as these decisions were being taken without consultation with the local population and against their wishes. The Arabs were “bitterly opposed to the division of [Greater] Syria”. He believed that Britain was committing “a greievous [*sic*] error in deceiving the Arabs” and warned that this “breach of faith will probably result in serious outbreaks” against the British and Zionists.[[17]](#footnote-17) Upon reading this telegram a member of Henry Wilson’s staff noted that he was sorry that the British politicians had made “impossible commitments” to people with divergent goals in the Middle East and thus gotten Britain involved “in such dirty business.” But he concluded: “we should not let our sorrow to interfere with Imperial interests.” Both Henry Wilson and Foreign Secretary Balfour agreed that France could hurt British interests more than the Arabs.[[18]](#footnote-18) The entreaties and supplications of Armenian, Assyrian, Arab and other Transcaucasian and Middle Eastern nationalities were of no avail. Referring to the pleas of Prince Faisal at the Paris Peace Conference for honoring promises made to his father, Sharif Husayn, and his reminders to all concerned of the Arab assistance to the Allied war effort, a historian concludes: “The lamb was pleading with the wolves and offering them not very much in return.”[[19]](#footnote-19) This also applies to the fate of Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Kurdish and other delegations from the Middle East to the Peace Conference.

While President Wilson’s Fourteen Points talked about the right of national self-determination, the wishes of Middle Eastern nationalities were not taken into consideration when the Allies and the League of Nations determined the postwar political status of the region. The Resolution of the General Syrian Congress at Damascus on 2 July 1919 demanded the political independence of Greater Syria as well as the rejection of mandates and a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This document was submitted to the American King-Crane Commission which was dispatched to discover the wishes of local national groups.[[20]](#footnote-20) England, France and Italy refused to appoint their representatives to the Commission. They had their own plans for the region and were not interested in the wishes of the local populations. Balfour and Churchill dismissed the idea of consulting them. Churchill insisted on implementing the Zionist agenda in Palestine knowing well that 90% of the inhabitants of Palestine and British officers posted there opposed it.[[21]](#footnote-21) The Foreign Office in an early draft of the Turkish treaty tried to keep the façade that decisions regarding Palestine were in accordance with the wishes of the local population. Upon reading this Edwin Montague, the Secretary of State for India wrote to Curzon: “We are not contemplating thinking of the wishes of the people of Syria or the people of Turkey. We are contemplating our own convenience and prosperity, and why on earth [do] we express this Pharisaical respect for the wishes of the people in Palestine…?”[[22]](#footnote-22) The Under Secretary of State for foreign Affairs Lord Robert Cecil noted in his diary that even Balfour was exasperated by the behavior of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson at the Peace Conference when dealing with the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Their attitude, for Balfour, was “marked by a levity approaching to insanity” as they were making territorial decisions “with little regard to any racial or indeed any other considerations except the pure political convenience of the European Powers, as if they were making a jig-saw puzzle.[[23]](#footnote-23)

 National security and imperial interests were the primary motivations informing British policy. These trumped all other consideration. Moreover, British political and military leaders did not consider Middle Easterners as equals or even civilzed. Major General William M. Thomson, the commander of the British expeditionary force which landed in Baku from Persia following the armistice, considered the Transcaucasian republics the creation and puppets of Germany and Turkey. He did not take their claims to independence seriously and regarded this region to be a legitimate part of Russia.[[24]](#footnote-24) General George Milne, in charge of military operations in Transcaucasia, did not believe that the local republics deserved Britain’s attention. Their leaders were dishonest, illiterate or—worse—Bolsheviks. They would need the ministration of a civilizing power for at least two generations to be able to govern themselves. The world will not miss much if these people killed each other. They were not worth the life of a single British private. “The Georgians are merely disguised Bolsheviks led by men who overthrew Kerensky and were friends of Lenin. The Armenians are what the Armenians have always been, a despicable race. The best are the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, though they are really uncivilized.”[[25]](#footnote-25) Major Edward M. Noel, the British intelligent officer in Kurdistan, considered the Armenians to be “timid, avaricious and deceitful.”[[26]](#footnote-26) Total disregard for local sensibilities was also displayed by some British officers. On their way to their barracks from a dinner given in their honor by the mayor of Batum, they sang the Russian Imperial national anthem at the top of their voices—a blatant insult to the Georgian government.[[27]](#footnote-27)

In London, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was equally dismissive of Middle Eastern nationalities. He believed that autocracy—preferably the Russian kind—was more suitable for Transcaucasia than democracy. After all, the people there were all uncivilized brutes. He went on: “as regards brutality and bestiality I do not suppose there is a tissue paper [of difference] between Greeks, Bulgars, Turks, Armenians and Kurds, and even Boches.”[[28]](#footnote-28) While he included the Turks in his category of “brutes”, in British military circles there was sympathy for them as people who had a tradition of military prowess and self-government. Henry Wilson saw the Turks as “very valuable” assets to Britain’s Eastern Empire.[[29]](#footnote-29) The Turk was “a soldier and a very good soldier.”[[30]](#footnote-30) The myth of the brave and “clean fighting Turk” was very much alive in certain sectors of the War Office.[[31]](#footnote-31) Turks had a long tradition of governing and were not corrupted by Western influences which had transformed the Armenians, Greeks and Jews living in the Ottoman Empire into greedy and cowardly “Levantines.” The Arabs, Armenians and Jews had no tradition of self-rule and could not be trusted to govern themselves. Sir Mark Sykes, who was an acting adviser in the Foreign Office on Arabian and Palestinian affairs, believed that the Arabs lacked political skills and the Armenians were a greedy and an “abominable race”; they made the Jews look better in comparison.[[32]](#footnote-32)

This condescension was not confined to the people of Transcaucasia. It applied to all inhabitants of the British-occupied parts of the Middle East. Lt. General Sir Walter N. Congreve, who succeeded General Allenby as commander of British forces in Palestine and Egypt, wrote from Cairo that he equally disliked Moslem Arabs, Jews and Christians in Syria and Palestine: “they are all alike, a beastly people, the whole lot of them are not worth one Englishman.” Sir Henry Wilson replied: “I quite agree with you that the whole lot, Arabs, Jews, Christians, Syrians, Levantines, Greeks, etc. are not worth one Englishman.”[[33]](#footnote-33) He and General Allenby shared the same opinion. The Zionists were not averse to playing the race card either. To make their case to the Peace Conference they used similar racial categorizations: “The Jews, they said, were not only far wealthier, more modern, and more energetic than the ‘present population’ [Arabs living in Palestine], but they were also more intelligent and civilized.” Weizmann wrote to Balfour that Arabs could not be trusted: they were treacherous and blackmailers.[[34]](#footnote-34)

This attitude, with some exceptions, reflected the general British sense of superiority of Westerners—particularly of British—and their civilization over the peoples of the “Orient”. The general opinion held that the “Orientals” (Indians, Armenians, Jews, Arabs, etc.) were culturally inferior, accustomed to absolute rule (thus incapable of self-government), irrational, shifty, unreliable, violent—inferior to the average Englishman or European and very much in need of British tutorship and supervision. During the Paris Peace Conference General George Milne wrote to Lloyd George that the Italian delegation wanted to discuss the independence of Arabia. He stated that he refused their request because there was a major discrepancy between the Italian delegation’s and British definition of the term “independence.” The Italians meant that the rulers of independent Arabia should be able to enter into any relationship with any country they please. However “what we mean by it is that Arabia while being independent herself should be kept out of the sphere of European political intrigue and within the British sphere of influence: in other words, that her independent native rulers should have no foreign treaties except with us.”[[35]](#footnote-35) This was the spirit which informed the unequal treaties imposed by Britain which granted “independence” to Iraq and Egypt in the interwar period but guaranteed British political influence and military presence in these countries.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Events following the postwar redrawing of the map of the Middle East proved General Allenby right. Britain and France were confronted with nationalist rebellions in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. [[37]](#footnote-37) As importantly, Britain was caught in the cross-fire of the growing conflict between Zionists and Palestinian nationalists during the interwar period. Diverse intellectual, political and religious leaders trying to define the nature of the Arab “nation” in the postwar years, whether advocates of Greater Syria (Antun Sa’adeh), Pan-Arabism (Michel ‘Aflaq) or an Islamic state (Hasan al-Banna), agreed on two points. They advocated the end of Western mandates and political/military domination or influence. They also opposed the Zionist agenda of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine.[[38]](#footnote-38) This partly explains the anti-Western dimension of Arab national movements. Moreover, the on-going conflict between the Zionists (later the state of Israel) and Arab Palestinians and their Arab “brothers” has dominated the international relations of the Middle East since WWI.

This sense of condescension was reinforced by the popularity of the social-Darwinian construct of a hierarchy regarding the relative fitness and level of advancement of different races, nations and civilizations. It was taken for granted that Western nations and the Western Civilization were ranked at the top of this hierarchy.[[39]](#footnote-39) Lord Curzon, the former Viceroy of India and Foreign Secretary in 1919, saw the British Empire as “the greatest instrument for good the world had seen.” Joseph Chamberlain, the former Colonial Secretary, considered the British “a great governing race.”[[40]](#footnote-40) Winston Churchill, while claiming he could relate to educated Indians and Turks as equals, believed that white people were more capable and efficient than blacks and is quoted as saying: “I hate people with slit eyes & pig-tails”.[[41]](#footnote-41)

However, there is no compelling evidence indicating that British Orientalism dictated foreign policy. The British press and politicians constantly reminded their publics about the “terrible” or “unspeakable” Turks in the Nineteenth Century. This might have helped sell newspapers, raise funds for the victims of Bulgarian and Armenian massacres, and propel politicians like Gladstone to office. But it did not change the centuries-old British policy of maintaining the integrity of the bulk of the Ottoman Empire in order to keep Russia out of the warm waters of the Mediterranean.[[42]](#footnote-42) Neither did the genocide of Armenians during WWI by the Young Turk Government of the Ottoman Empire prevent the British Government from coming to terms with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. British wartime and postwar policy decisions were exclusively made on the basis of imperial interests. One can conclude that the “Orientalist” mindset allowed policy-makers to rationalize--at least to themselves--the broken pledges and agreements with Middle Eastern nationalities. One is left with the impression that a gentleman’s word was good so long as it was given to another gentleman—not when it involved people who were considered inferior, uncivilized, shifty, unreliable and incapable of governing themselves or joining the family of nation states.

1. Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization. Collected* *Essays* (I.B. Tauris, London & New York, 2006) p. 279. For more on Anglo-French colonial rivalry see Chapter 10,

pp. 179-290. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Artin H Arslanian, “British Wartime Pledges, The Armenian Case” *Journal of Contemporary History*,

Vol. 13 (1978), 517-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 3. War Cabinet Minutes 313(3), 3 January 1918, Public Record Office, London, CAB. 23/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. As quoted in V. H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918* (Oxford, 1971) p.285. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. CAB. 24/5, G.203, “Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others”. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. War Cabinet Minutes 435(8), 24 June 1918, CAB. 23/6. For a detailed discussion of British peace overtures to the Ottoman Empire see Rothwell, op.cit., 174-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For a detailed discussion of the British occupation of Transcaucasia and support to anti-Bolshevik armies see Artin H. Arslanian and Robert L. Nichols, “Nationalism and the Russian Civil War: The Case of Volunteer Army-Armenian Relations, 1918-20,” *Soviet Studies,* No. 4, October 1979, pp.559-573. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. CAB. 27/36, Minutes and verbatim notes, Eastern Committee 40th meeting, 2 December 1918. The Eastern Committee was entrusted by the War Cabinet with the formulation of Tanscaucasian policy. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Ibid*., Minutes and verbatim notes, Eastern Committee 43rd meeting, 16 December 1918. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. A.N. Wilson, After the Victorians: The Decline of Britain in the World (Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005) p.215 and Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1963) pp.50-51, 98-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. As quoted in Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Service and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (University of California Press, Berkley, 2008) p.46. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For further analysis of Britain’s Transcaucasian policy see Artin H. Arslanian, “Britain and Transcaucasian Nationalism During the Russian Civil War,” in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social* *Change. Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia* (Michigan Slavic Publications, Ann Arbor, 1983) pp. 293-304. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Foreign Office [F.O.] 371/7729, “Outline of Events in Transcaucasia from the beginning of the Russian Revolution in the summer of 1917 to April 1921,” 31 May 1922. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The editorial of *Ertoba* as reprinted in *Nor Ashkatavor* (Tiflis), 14 September 1919, no. 191 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Foreign Office “Outline of Events in Transcaucasia….” *op.cit.,* 31 May 1922. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Peace Be Upon You: Fourteen Centuries of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Conflict and cooperation* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007) pp. 244-267. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Allenby “secret” telegram to Sir Henry Wilson, 3 June 1919. British Museum, The Wilson Papers, Numbered Correspondence, Allenby File 33D. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Elizabeth Monroe, *op. cit*., p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ussama Makdisi*, Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820-2001* (Public Affairs, New York, 2010) p.134. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. For the Resolution of the Syrian Congress and report of the King-Crane Commission see Akram Fouad Khater, Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Boston, 2004) pp. 158-167. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Louis, *op. cit*., pp. 269-271. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Montagu ‘private’ to Curzon, 28 August 1919, India Office Library, The Papers of the Hon. Edwin Samuel Montagu, L/P&S/10/851, P. 4995/19 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. British Museum, London, The Cecil Papers, Add. MSS. 51131, entry of 13 May 1919 in his diary (pp. 153-4). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See General Thomson’s proclamation of 17 November 1918 to the Azerbaijani government in F.O. 371/3667, 58/11067/19. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Milne “private” to Henry Wilson, 22 January 1919, Wilson Papers, File 37, no. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Quoted in Christopher de Bellaigue, *Rebel Land: Unraveling the Riddle of History in a Turkish Town (*The Penguin Press, New York, 2010) p. 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Imperial War Museum, London, Major D. Bresford-Ash, unpublished war memoir, 76/188/1. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Henry Wilson to General C. Sackville-West, 8 October 1919, Wilson Papers, File 12E, no.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Ibid*. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. General C. Sackville-West “secret and personal” to Henry Wilson, 3 October 1919, Wilson Papers, File 12E, no. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Elizabeth Monroe, *op. cit*., p.26 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. As quoted in Elie Kedouri, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921* (London, 1956) p.69. See also Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintance*s (London, 1961) p. 135, and Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent* (New York, 1961) pp.2-11, 287, 377. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Lt. General Sir W. N. Congreve to Henry Wilson, 1 April 1920, Wilson Papers, DS/Misc/80, File 52A, no. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Makdisi, *op. cit*, p. 135 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Milne to Lloyd George, 16 May 1919 with a copy enclosed in Sanderson to Henry Wilson, Wilson Papers, Numbered Correspondence, Milne File 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Wilson*, op. cit*., pp.272-273, Monroe, *op. cit*., pp. 71-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For postwar Syrian developments see Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab* *Nationalism* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See Khater, op. cit., pp.125-141. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. In addition to Edward Said’s seminar *Orientalism,* see Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) pp.183-188 and David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 123-128. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. As quoted in Karl E. Meyer, *The Dust of Empire: The Race for the Mastery in the Asian Heartland* (Century Foundation, New York, 2003) p.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Richard Toye, *Churcill’s Empire*, *TheWorld that Made Him and the World that He Made* (Henry Holt, New York, 2010) p, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. See Patrick Brantlinder “Terrible Turks: Victorian Xenophobia and the Ottoman Empire,” in Marlene Tromp, Maria K. Bachman and Heidi Kaufman (eds.), *Fear, Loathing and Victorian Xenophobia* (Ohio University Press, Columbus, 2013) pp. 208-230. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)