Talking across diversity: deliberative capital and facilitating discourse quality

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1. Introduction

How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when deliberations unravel? In the former case, I argue, what we see is participants making a series of investments in different desired behaviours and norms. In the latter, participants are unwilling or unable to make these investments and instead make divestments. In this paper, I outline my theory of deliberative capital and posit investments and divestments as key processes in the concept of deliberative capital. I will begin this paper by offering a brief account of deliberative capital, situating it within the literature on social capital and deliberative democracy. I will, then, give an account of investments and divestments that we can expect to see in deliberation as well as the indicators of each of these investments—how they manifest in a deliberative exchange.

I will, then, briefly outline two innovative facilitative treatments that can be utilized at the beginning or during a deliberative process to incentivize investments and discourage divestments. They are simulated representation (getting participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each others’ views for a portion of deliberation) and deliberative worth exercises (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round). I will explain the particular investments and divestments that they can target.

In order to look at whether these facilitative treatments were successful at encouraging particular investments and discouraging divestments, I will rely on coded transcriptions from deliberative experiments which were carried out in November 2015 at the University of British Columbia on whether religious arbitration should be permitted in British Columbia.
I will look at the overall tally of as well as the particular investments and divestments for each deliberative session. Following that, I look at the particular investments and divestments in each session. In doing so, I will be able to see if there are indications that the facilitative treatments are, indeed, able to do what I expected them to do. The analysis of the facilitative treatments is furthered by an examination of the pre and post deliberation questionnaires administered in all of the sessions focusing on participants’ political efficacy and empowerment, personal evaluations of deliberation, opinion change, and knowledge gain.

2. Deliberative Capital

Deliberative capital is the by-product of the investments made by participants during the course of the deliberative process. These investments (explaining one’s reasons, waiting for one’s turn, taking an extra step to understand others, among others) increase deliberative capital which in turn facilitates a better and easier dialogue process for all participants. Deliberative capital is threatened when these investments are replaced by divestments (marginalizing comments, ignoring what others are saying, among others). Deliberative capital is defined and identified by its productive function: producing better and easier conversations. It is valuable precisely because it is a means to an end. Without a sufficient degree of deliberative capital, good deliberation—one that is open, respectful, and constructive) will not come about. I use the word capital\(^1\), with its connotations, to highlight the process of investing with expectation of future

\(^1\) The term ‘capital’ has a long history and many uses. In its traditional usage in economics, capital is an already produced good that can be used in the production of more goods and services and is, thus, one of the factors of production alongside of land, labor, and entrepreneurship. (Hicks 1971, 272). This is a holdings view of capital. However, used more broadly, the term ‘capital’ encompasses other forms of investments and assets including human, academic, social, cultural, public, and spiritual forms of capital. For example, human capital refers to the various skills, knowledge, experiences, and competences of individual(s) as they contribute to the overall productivity of a certain organization or country. The kind that I am interested in is a relational capital - one that exists in the bonds between individuals. Both social and deliberative capital are relational.
returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking) that occurs during a deliberation.

I have to emphasize that the concept of deliberative capital is an original contribution. I rely on the literature on deliberative democracy to identify the particular investments and divestments which are often listed, disconnected from one another, as deliberative standards/norms and soleicisms respectively. It is in the framing of these as investments and divestments that my contribution lies. I argue that such a framing is important because it allows us to see a deliberative engagement as an organic whole which is affected by the particular actions of the participants—whether good or bad.

2.1 Problem of pre-commitment

The concept of deliberative capital has, in part, been developed as a response to this problem of pre-commitment within deliberative democratic theory and practice. Theoretically, deliberation—specially in a multicultural setting with participants from diverse backgrounds and on a potentially divisive issue—requires participants to show up to the table with, at least, a degree of commitment to the norms of deliberation. Participants need to be willing to explain their positions either by expanding on their reasons or feelings. They need to be willing to respect each other, listen to one another, and to take in and respond to one another. And they need to be open to a degree of give-and-take or constructive dialogue.

However, this might not always be the case. It is in response to these questions that I have developed the concept of deliberative capital. The reason why deliberative processes can proceed and conclude successfully—and why such processes are worthwhile—is that during the course of deliberation, participants make a series of investments with the expectation of reciprocity.
These investments, when reciprocated, increase the deliberative capital within a deliberation. They contribute by not only making the atmosphere more positive and constructive but also solidifying the norms of deliberation. The more participants invest, the more it becomes a norm and an expectation that they will do so. In other words, self-interest can be transformed into a norm of reciprocity. These coveted cycles of investments, therefore, are not necessarily dependent on virtuous participants pre-committed to the norms of deliberation. Participants are likely motivated by the desire to have others treat them with an open, explanatory, respectful, and constructive attitude. The concept of capital—with it connotations—is extremely apt at explaining this process of investments with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking).

2.2 Deliberative democratic theory and social capital

While the concept of deliberative capital is original, it is built on and responds to work already done in deliberative democratic theory looking at processes of deliberation in small-scale deliberative engagements as well as the literature on social capital.

I argue that looking at the deliberative process through the lens of deliberative capital highlights the fact of reciprocity at work which is, for the most part, left out of the other works looking at and evaluating the processes of deliberation. Most notably among these is the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Marco R. Steenbergen, André Bächtiger, Markus Holdo.

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2 This is not to say that none of the participants value these norms. My point is that for good deliberation we do not need to rely on the participants being pre-committed. For us to think of ways that we can improve deliberation, we do not need to keep our fingers crossed that the participants are going to be ideal deliberative citizens but only good ones. As Mark Warren argues, “good manners do not even rely on altruism, since individuals rarely get their way through rudeness, while they do well through cooperation” (Warren 2006, 175).

3 The only other utilization of the concept of deliberative capital by Markus Holdo in a 2015 Critical Policy Studies article. While both Holdo and I are concerned with deliberative democratic practices in organized structures (i.e. small-scale deliberative engagements), our approach to the concept is different.
Spördndli, and Jürg Steiner and later amended by Jaramillo and Steiner introducing the concept of Deliberative Transformative Moments (DTM)\(^4\).

Deliberative capital builds on and responds to this limitation of DQI in two ways. First, it emphasizes the fact that investments (adherences to the factors identified in DQI) by participants are made with the expectation of future returns and, when made, are reciprocated by others. Second, it also pays attention the other side of the same coin: when participants make divestments (i.e. interrupt others or make negative statements about them), they reduce the deliberative capital. Just as investments are reciprocated, so are divestments\(^5\). Therefore, these divestments do more than just not contribute to quality of discourse. They reduce it and they can have a snowballing effect on others’ behaviour and quality of deliberation as a whole.

The concept of deliberative capital, as suggested above, is also built on the analytical work done on social capital\(^6\). Social capital has come to be seen as the by-product of the relationships between individuals in a social structure which, in turn, makes actions within that social structure easier, more cooperative, and trusting. Similarly, deliberative capital is the product of the investments made by participants during the course of deliberation and reduced when divestments replace those investments.

\(^4\) For some of the scholarly works using DQI see Lord and Tamvaki 2013, Steiner et al. 2004, and Pedrini 2015, Steffensmeier and Schenck-Hamlin 2008.

\(^5\) Similarly, deliberative capital also responds to and complements the work done by Jennifer Stromer-Galley and her colleagues on analyzing disagreement within deliberation—mainly how it is initiated, what its nature is and how long it lasts (Stromer-Galley et al. 2015, 4). Their analysis is guided by “prior research on expressions of disagreement from Kuo (1994), Pomerantz (1984), and Rendle-Short (2007)” (6). Once again, the reciprocal nature of (poorly expressed) disagreement is not highlighted.

\(^6\) Social capital, briefly, refers to the “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, 248).
Just as social capital is increased through investments in trust and eased (for an individual) by a general assumption that others have a goodwill towards us, deliberation goes forward if and when there is a certain amount of trust and willingness on the part of the participants to make these investments. Social capital depends on the general social norms enforcing (or making desirable) reciprocity.

Deliberative capital comes about through a similar process of self-interest guiding investments which in turn fulfills the expectations of others and creates and obligation on their part to do the same. Their reciprocal investment, then, creates and strengthens deliberative norms. These deliberative norms, then, incentivize further investments - one’s self-interest will not be fulfilled by straying far from the deliberative norms that others adhere to and risk being penalized by other participants.

2.3 Investments in and divestments from deliberative capital

They are instances of adherence to particular deliberative standards of reason-giving, respect, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, sincerity, empathy, and productive dialogue which can be eased by the establishment of rules of deliberation. These standards are not original. They have been, for the most part, identified by scholars of deliberative democracy.

Table 1 does not provide an ethical rationale for why each of these norms or standards is a good thing but rather lists the factors that we should look for in a deliberative engagement as an indication of investments in these standards.

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7 In other words, social and now deliberative capital arguments are linked to the theory of repeated games.
8 Indeed, Grönlund et al. (2015) demonstrate that simple establishment and enforcement (through reminders) of deliberative rules and norms is enough to prevent group polarization and increase tolerance even among people with anti-immigrant attitude.
Divestments in deliberative capital are instances of participant non-adherence to positive deliberative norms and engagement in undesired behaviours. In particular, it is the instances of no justification, biased information sharing or processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action, and unproductive dialogue which can jeopardize deliberative capital. These divestments that are enumerated here are anti-norm behaviour by participants rather than simply a passive withdrawal of support for the process by not engaging in investments. Once again, the literature has, for the most part, noted these undesired behaviours.
—often in disjointed and separate works. **Table 2** details the indicators for each of them—what one needs to look for in a deliberation to see if divestments are taking place.

Due to a lack of space, I have decided against going into detail about each of these investments and divestments. However, in this section, I have discussed the concept of deliberative capital which I have defined as the product of the investments—instances of adherence to the norms of deliberation. Conceptualizing the process of deliberation using the framework of deliberative capital has a number of advantages. For the purpose of this paper, the

<table>
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<th>Divestment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Biased information sharing &amp; processing</td>
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<td>Pushing for false consensus</td>
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<td>Presenting or being swayed by arguments evoking fear</td>
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<td>Logical fallacy</td>
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<td>Cognitive apartheid</td>
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<td>Ignoring what others are saying—changing the flow drastically</td>
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<td>Not taking into account any of the others’ real concerns</td>
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<td>Disrespect</td>
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<td>Ad hominem attacks or hypocrisy</td>
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<td>Cutting others off</td>
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<td>Hermeneutical exclusion</td>
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<td>Using the same term to mean different meanings</td>
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<td>Misunderstandings without resolution</td>
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<td>Rhetorical action</td>
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<td>Dominating speech</td>
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<td>Overconfidence in one’s view</td>
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<td>Repetition of the same idea in the face of challenges</td>
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<td>Silencing of speech acts opposed to it</td>
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<td>Unproductive dialogue</td>
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<td>Rejection of mediating proposals</td>
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<td>Rejection of concessions</td>
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<td>No justification</td>
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most important advantage is that conceptualizing the deliberative process as one of investments and divestments better equips us to envision and devise strategies directed at incentivizing investments and discouraging divestments. In the next section, I will briefly outline and describe two strategies aimed at doing exactly this.

3. Facilitative treatments

How can we get participants in a deliberation to engage in desired behaviours? How can we incentivize their investments in deliberative capital within a deliberative process? I argue that one of the ways that this can be achieved is through the use of carefully designed facilitative treatments. So what are facilitative treatments? Facilitative treatments are mechanisms or exercises that can be utilized during a deliberation either at the start of the deliberation or during the course of the deliberation. They are an extension of an already-existing intervention within the dialogue: facilitation and/or mediation.

The purpose of facilitative treatments is to change the conditions under which the deliberation takes place in order to facilitate participants’ investment in deliberative capital. Such treatments can be employed at the start of the deliberation and built into the structure of the process if the conveners and facilitators suspect that either the topic or the makeup of the deliberation are likely to reduce the capacity of the participants to follow the ground rules and

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9 Most deliberative engagements are facilitated by moderators or facilitators. They act as intervenors in a conflict: “[a]ll participants in the system have reflexive effects on one another, and that intervenor can be affected by the conflict, just as the conflict is affected by the intervenor. The effect of this understanding, then, is to see conflict as much more changeable than before, a systematic, continuous process that can be influenced is subtle and sophisticated ways by changing the orientation of the participants or by adding a third party (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 47). The facilitators are intervenors. They might not be exactly the third party as deliberations include more than two parties and generally more than two sides to the argument. They “are often successful because they do offer opportunities for changing the context of the disputes by suggesting new phrase for defining what is going on” (79).
norms of deliberation. They can also be utilized during the deliberation as an amendment to the process when unanticipated obstacles and challenges to investments in deliberative capital arise.

3.1 Simulated representation

Facilitative treatment of simulated representation can be used to discourage divestments such as cognitive apartheid, rhetorical action, biased information processing, and insufficient attempts at understanding or recognition as well as to encourage investments such as justification, listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

Simulated representation works as follows: after the preliminary round(s) of deliberation, participants are broken down to dyad or triads - preferably made up of those between whom there is deep disagreement as demonstrated by the previous round(s) of deliberation. The participants, then, have to talk in the dyad or triads and listen to one another. They will be instructed to ask each other the following questions: what are your reasons for holding position x? what is the motivation behind your decision to do x? how do you feel about x? They will be told to really attempt to understand the reasons, feelings, and motivations of one another, learn it well and remember it well enough as they would have to present it to the larger group in the next round. After the dialogue in the dyads (and triads) has ended, deliberation will resume.

However, for the next round, instead of each participant presenting and defending their own viewpoints, they will be asked to present and defend views and opinions as if they were the other person with whom they were paired or grouped. This means that A will be asked to present and argue for the positions, reasons, and feeling of B as if they were her own. B, similarly, will be asked to present and defend the views and opinions of A. After that round, deliberation can resume normally. For longer deliberations—taking place over several days/months—the same
method can be utilized several times. I should perhaps emphasize here that under this facilitative treatment, facilitators will be present and tasked with keeping the conversation on track and ensuring that the basic deliberative standards. The logic behind this is simple: in the worst case scenario, facilitator would not require, say, racist views to be repeated and amplified.

The purpose behind this facilitative treatment is, as the name may suggest, to get participants in a deliberation to try to better understand each other and the ways in which they may be defining certain key terms and then to represent those views as if the views were their own. This facilitative treatment works in two parts. First, it can force us to move beyond simply defending our positions and values to teaching them to others. Teaching is a dialogical process and forces us to remain responsive to the other side to ensure that our efforts have been worthwhile. Second, it can force us to move simply beyond listening to others to really hearing them in order to articulate and defend them in the next round. While deliberation can bring different people with divergent backgrounds, feelings, views, and motivations together in one room and arrange a conversation between them, it cannot guarantee that the participants will listen to one another in a manner that would bring a Gadamerian fusion of horizons or, at least, a better understanding between the participants. Put simply, such a treatment is designed to, hopefully, bring about a degree of “cognitive empathy” (Spencer 1995) in the participants.

The rationale behind this particular facilitative treatment comes from engaging with three sets of literature in education, psychology, and deliberative democracy. Role-playing in classrooms as a way to teach students the ability to understand one another as well as the

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10 I am referring to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of a hemeneutical fusion of horizons best explained in his book *Truth and Method*. Gadamer accepts that individuals cannot be separated from their historical, cultural, societal, political, educational (among others) contexts but insists that through a dialogue and a back-and-forth exchange of views and demands for more explanation, individuals can find similarities between these different backgrounds or beliefs (horizons) and reach an understanding (Gadamer 1975).
motivations of different historical, fictional, and imagined characters is widely practiced at different levels of education\textsuperscript{11}. Within psychology literature, perspective-taking and imagined contact has proven to be good technique in changing the stances and cognitive outlooks of people in a more positive way\textsuperscript{12}. Within deliberative democracy, Michael Morrell has showed how empathy exercises can change the perspective of participants to be more inclusive and, yes, empathic\textsuperscript{13}.

3.2 Deliberative worth exercises

The facilitative treatment of deliberative worth exercises can be utilized in order to discourage divestments such as insufficient attempts at respect, understanding, or recognition, cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as to encourage investments such as respect, empathy, listening to and incorporating the views of others, reflection, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

Deliberative worth exercises work as follows: much like all deliberations, participants will be made aware of the ground rules of the deliberation - if they do not draft the rules themselves - at the beginning of the deliberative process. These rules would include simple civility instructions: do not interrupt others, do not personally attack participants, listen to each other respectfully and carefully, give reasons for why you believe something, among others. At the end of each round of deliberations (can be 15 minutes or one whole day), participants will be asked to write down the name of a fellow participant they deem to have been the best deliberator

\textsuperscript{13} See Morrell 2007, 2010, and 2012.
and one sentence explaining why that was the case. They will be reminded of the guide based on which they would decide who best engaged in the deliberation following the rules (i.e. made investments in deliberative capital). This is followed by the facilitator collecting the names and reasons, reading them to the group, and keeping a tally during the deliberative process. While this might seem to be a rather trivial practice, it operates by tapping into real cognitive, psychological, and emotional needs of people and reinforcing the cycle of investment in deliberation, not only for oneself but in the way one deliberates, others’ investments too.

The particular problem that this facilitative treatment can address is the possibility—if not the tendency—of participants forgetting about the norms and rules of deliberation. Utilizing this facilitative treatment means that in addition to, and perhaps instead of, the constantly reminding them, participants become cognizant and internalize these norms. Deliberative worth exercises can be utilized to incentivize good behaviour and help start or continue cycles of investment in deliberative capital. The more participants invest (even if it to be seen as a good deliberator and to save face), the more investments become the norm of the deliberation. Since participants will be made aware of the rules (i.e. different investments they should make) in order to make their evaluations, deliberative worth exercise can bring about investments such as justification, productive conversation, listening to and incorporating the views of others in addition to simple respect and civility. As investments rise, deliberative capital increases and deliberation becomes better, more considered, and more civil.

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14 For instance, “Sarah because she made sure that more quiet people—like me—got a chance to say what wanted to say by asking us directly”.
15 This is similar to the reflection sessions at the end of session of dialogue described by Pearce and Littlejohn: “In most cases, toward the end of the session, participants are asked to reflect on their process. They maybe asked what they have done or refrained from doing to make the conversation go as it did. This gives them an opportunity to identify and acknowledge their specific contributions to the dialogue. A final open-ended question usually elicits allusions to aspects of the dialogue that were specially valued” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 189).
The rationale behind using deliberative worth exercises is based on the insights from both deliberative democratic literature as well as the literature dealing with the notion of face and face-saving actions.

Within deliberative democracy, in particular, Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw (2002) and Bächtiger et al. (2010) discuss the process of delaying actual deliberation—sequencing deliberation—by incorporating “alternative forms of communication [occurring] in earlier stages of communicative processes” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 59). A period of dialogue before deliberation can be seen as way to teach the participants about the norms and rules of deliberation and getting them to internalize those norms and values—similar to deliberative worth exercises.

The literature on face and face-saving highlights the degree to which people generally try to maintain their image. Face-saving can motivate people to act in a way that would protect their face and promote its continuation and acceptance by others as well as oneself. Within a deliberative setting—especially one with explicit ground rules regarding the desired norms and behaviours—participants can be encouraged to engage in face-saving strategies based on the need “for others to acknowledge their friendliness and honesty” and to see them as “‘likeable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘friendly’, ‘agreeable’, ‘cooperative’, ‘alike’, and ‘affiliated’” (Huang 2014, 180).

Before moving forward, there is an important consideration. I do not claim that these facilitative treatments, even if utilized in the best way possible, will lead to perfect deliberation in small-scale deliberative engagements nor do I claim that without them a deliberation will be

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disastrous or futile. What I am saying, however, is that these are among the tools in the facilitation toolbox.

With this in mind, I turn in the next section to discuss an experiment that these two specific facilitative treatments: simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises carried out at the University of British Columbia between undergraduate and graduate students on the topic of whether or not religious arbitration in British Columbia should be allowed.

4. Experiment

This section builds on the theoretical work done in sections 2 and 3. In section 2, I offered a general overview of the explanatory concept of deliberative capital as well as an overview of investments and divestments. In section 3, I briefly outlined two facilitative treatments which can be employed to encourage investments and discourage divestments by discussing the results from deliberative experiments that looked at the efficacy of these treatments.

4.1 Participants and procedure

The participants were all students—both undergraduate and graduate—at the University of British Columbia between the ages of 18 and 38. They were recruited through a number of methods. Overall, 103 students expressed interest in participation. 61 participants expressed secondary interest in the process after more details were given. 54 confirmed their

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17 Methods of recruitment included: 1) Invitation question at the end of the online surveys part of a different study; 2) Advertisement posters put up around the campus; 3) Direct invitation sent to students through different departments as well as professors and instructors who I contacted; 4) Direct invitation sent to members of different student groups at UBC; 5) Advertisements in department newsletters; and 6) Advertisements in social media sites/groups of the different student clubs/organizations. The last two methods of recruitment were only used when the departments or student group presidents asked me to do so.
participation. 40 showed up to the deliberation. The students were divided into three groups for three different sessions of deliberation on three separate days. The first group of participants—14 students—constituted the control group. The second group, made up of 16 students, deliberated while the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth was utilized. The facilitative treatment of simulated representation was used with the third group of students made up of 10 students. Participants were thanked for their participation with $30 and reimbursed for additional costs. This study was approved by BREB prior to recruitment of participants.

A week before each of the deliberation days, participants were sent an information pamphlet on religious arbitration. Participants were also sent the timetable for each day, the list of discussion questions, as well as rules of deliberation. The three deliberative engagements were held at the University of British Columbia. The topic for all of them was whether British Columbia should allow religious arbitration as a method of conflict resolution for some civil cases. All events started at 10 am and ended around 2:15 pm (depending on how long post-deliberation questionnaires took). There were three breaks including a, longer, lunch break. At the start of each of the deliberation days, participants were asked to fill out a pre-deliberation questionnaire. At the end of each day, a post-deliberation questionnaire was administered. All of the sessions were moderated by trained facilitators. In the following sections, I will discuss some

18 My plan was to have 18 participants for each of the deliberative settings. However, as in the case of all deliberative endeavours, not everyone showed up on the day.

19 The demographic makeup of the participants was as follows: gender: 25 female, 14 male, and 1 transgender; status as visible minority: 12 identify as a visible minority, 19 identify as not a visible minority, and 9 did not know; ethnic background: 17 participants identified as white, 13 as East Asian, 3 as South Asian, 2 as West Asian, 2 as Black, 2 as Latin American, 2 as Southeast Asian, and 4 as other; and religiosity: 7 attended religious services frequently, 3 often, 5 moderately, 12 rarely, and 13 noted that they never attended religious services.

20 The deliberations were held on November 1st (control), 7th (deliberative worth), and 8th (simulated representation)—at UBC.

21 BREB refers to UBC's Behavioural Research Ethics Board which is responsible for reviewing behavioural or social sciences/humanities research, or research that may involve the study of patients or health care providers.
of the findings from the studies. I will not go into the detail about the particular procedures of the facilitative treatments as I have already outlined them in section 3.

4.2 Results: processes of deliberation

Figure 1 gives an overall outlook of the deliberation process under control conditions as compared to the ones conducted under the facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation. Relying on the indicators summarized in Table 1 and Table 2, I coded the deliberations.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this figure. The first is that, overall, in all of the deliberative settings, investments outnumber divestments. This means that for the most part, even without particularly designed facilitative treatments, participants follow the norms and rules of deliberation. It is worth keeping in mind that all of the sessions were facilitated. The second conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that both facilitative treatments of deliberative

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22 Audio-recording devices were used at each table on all of the days as a way to record the conversation. A limited number of notes were also taken by facilitators and given to the organizer.

23 I considered not including the coding of speech acts when participants were actually playing the new roles. However, after the second round of coding I decided against this. The main reason is as follows: participants continued making investments and divestments when they were in the role-playing mode. In particular, I wanted to take note of the instances where participants took extra steps to explain and expand on a position that was not expressly discussed between the two during the interview process. I also wanted to take note and include the instances where participants were glib or when they misrepresented what the other side has said. However, I did the analysis for this. However, I did the analysis without the role-playing portion. It did not show a meaningful difference.

24 The deliberative sessions were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants. I transcribed the recordings. A preliminary coding was done manually on the transcription pages. After getting a sense of the codes—from both the theoretical work done in Chapter 3 as well as the preliminary round of coding—I entered a series of “hypothesis codes” into the nVivo program—a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software. As I analyzed the conversation, it became clear that some of the codes were indicators of different factors than the ones I originally assumed prior to looking at the dynamic of deliberation. A final round of coding—or rather checking—was done by turning off the codes and checking to see if I would ascribe the same codes again.
worth and simulated representation seem to be successful in encouraging investments and discouraging divestments\textsuperscript{25}.

**Figure 1** Comparison of deliberation under different facilitative treatments

While **Figure 1** is helpful at giving us an overall look at the deliberation dynamics, it does not allow us to get an idea of who is making the investments and divestments. **Figure 2** summarizes the percentages of investments and divestments by gender in each deliberative session. Looking at this figure, it becomes clear that the percentage of investments for both men and women increased under facilitative treatments. In the control condition, men and women are completely different, with men doing much more divestments and much less investments than women. However, the facilitative treatments wipe out this gender difference. Under facilitative treatments an equal percentage of the speech acts by men and women were investments, and similarly, divestments. While the results are exploratory, it can be said that facilitative treatments are good at discouraging divestments. They have a bigger effect for men because, perhaps, they need these treatments more.

\textsuperscript{25} Under control conditions, 56\% of the speech acts coded were investments compared to 96\% under deliberative worth conditions and 93\% under simulated representation. Comparatively, control conditions produced 44\% divestments compared to 4\% and 7\% under deliberative worth and simulated representation conditions respectively.
Figure 3 summarizes the percentages of investments and divestments by status as a visible minority in each deliberative session. Looking at this figure, it becomes clear that the percentage of investments for both visible minorities and non-visible minorities increased under facilitative treatments.

In the control condition, visible minorities and non-visible minorities are completely different, with non-visible minorities doing slightly more divestments and less investments than visible minorities. However, deliberative worth exercises wipe out this difference altogether. However, non-visible minorities in the simulated representation condition were not quite as positively affected by this treatment as they were under deliberative worth.
What these breakdowns show is that, under control conditions, when broken down, men and non-visible minorities made the most number of divestments. Deliberative worth was particularly capable of targeting these two groups and reducing the divestments made by them. Simulated representation has similar but slightly less effective consequences.

While Figure 1 is helpful at giving us an overall look at the deliberation dynamics and while Figure 2 and Figure 3 breakdown these investments and divestments by gender and one’s status as a visible minority, none of them provide information regarding the particular investments and divestments as well as the number of instances of their occurrence.

In the previous section, I offered a theoretical explanation as to why particular facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation would encourage particular investments and discourage particular divestments. It is, therefore, important to take a closer look at the breakdown of the investments and divestments in each deliberative session to see whether the facilitative treatments were able to do what I theorized them to be able do.

What specific investments and divestments occurred in each session? Figure 4 offers a breakdown of the investments in each of the deliberative sessions as well as the percentage of the speech acts that were codes under each investment category. Figure 5, meanwhile, shows an exploration of the component parts of the divestments.

4.2.1 Deliberative worth

Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in respect (19% compared to 8%), reason-giving (30% compared to 17%), and reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (31% compared to 20%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in effect. There was also a
slightly higher percentage of instances of sincerity (8% compared to 6%) and productive dialogue (4% compared to 3%).

In particular, there were ample instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation by encouraging other participants to participate by either asking others what they thought or attempting to rephrase or repeat what others had said for the group at large\textsuperscript{26}. In order to keep the

\textsuperscript{26} In total, there were 57 instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation under deliberative worth compared to 22 under control conditions.
paper short, I have decided against including examples of all of the investments and divestments from the transcripts. However, from time to time, I will include a few to illustrate my argument.

For example, at one of the tables, the participants were having a discussion regarding the possibility of instituting limitation of religious arbitration through the use of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of the participants, S7P1, was particularly silent in the conversation. This prompted self-facilitation by one of the participants:

“S7P3: What do you think [S7P1]?
S7P1: I’m not too sure.
K7P3: You’re not sure? What do you, what’s, what’s the, what’s the worry that you have?”

Moreover, there were many instances of the participants invoking the pronouns of “we”, “our”, and “us” to refer to the deliberative group. In addition to the investments in respect, there were also many investments in reflection on and incorporation of the views of others. In particular, there were many instances of opinion change. For example, K7P1 who had previously made the argument that women should not be seen as minorities within their religious communities since they freely and consciously choose to be part of that religion, made the following comment in the second round of deliberation:

“K7P1: Yeah, but also, like, when it comes to civil, like, conflicts maybe it’s about, like, child being taken away from the mother. And even though it’s civil but it’s something really really [sentimental to like] the mother. So maybe, like, in these cases, like, arbitration might not be a good idea.
K7P6: Yeah.
K7P1: So even though it isn’t criminal thing, but still.”

Most importantly, there were frequent investments in connecting one’s opinion to that of another, often times, by adding to what someone had previously said. Finally, there were many investments in productive dialogue including mediating proposals.

In addition to the investments, there was a significantly lower percentage of divestments in disrespect (0.6% compared to 18%), rhetorical action (1.3% compared to 10%), and cognitive

27 There were 30 instances of participants using the pronouns of “we”, “us”, and “our” compared to 14 instances in the control group.
28 There were 195 instances of reflection and incorporation compared to 126 in the control group.
29 There were 120 instances of this investment compared to 75 in the control group.
30 There were 21 mediating proposals under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth compared to 10 under control conditions.
apartheid (0.8% compared to 7%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in effect compared to the control group. There was also a slightly lower percentage of instances of biased information sharing and processing (0.32% compared to 4.2%) and hermeneutical exclusion (0.2% compared to 0.9%).

In particular, one of the more troubling divestments in the control condition was that of participant(s) pushing for false consensus. The following is an exchange between two participants after one participant decides to call the other on forcing a consensus by constantly summarizing the conversation as if there was an agreement between all:

“S1P3: Ok, so we all agree.
S1P1: I don’t agree with that.
S1P3: What?
S1P1: [laughs] I think you’re trying to come to consensus too quickly.
S1P3: I thought you said, I thought you said...I mean, I’m just trying to find common…
S1P1:....Yeah, and I think that’s the problem...”

The problem with pushing for false consensus is that inherently it is a sign that participant(s) are not paying attention to the disagreements or points of contention. Indeed, they are processing the information in a way that is biased in favour of what they want to hear.

In addition, there were fewer instances of participants ignoring the real concerns of the participant talking before when participants deliberated while consciously monitoring their own behaviours. The problem of cognitive apartheid whether it manifests itself in ignoring or not responding to the main concerns of the other side or changing the topic drastically, is that it

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31 There were 12 instances of false consensus in the control group compared to only one instance under the deliberative worth treatment.
32 While there were 35 instances of ignoring the real concerns of others under control conditions, there were only 3 instances of the same behaviour under deliberative worth treatment.
antithetical to the essence of deliberation as an exchange of and response to ideas, reasons, and feelings of one another.

The largest block of divestments in the control condition was that of disrespect. While most of those were participants cutting each other off, there were a number of instances of ad hominem attacks—usually in shape of some participant making fun of the others’ concerns by trivializing what the other person has said.

Deliberative worth exercises also helped in cutting back the instances of rhetorical action. In particular, there were no instances of a participant silencing others—by saying something that signals that all other options or disagreements are effectively pointless. For example, consider the exchange below:

“S1P3: To ensure that to a certain extent, a finite extent, I think we, do we all agree that we cannot please everyone? [...] to do so, in a multicultural society? Do we all agree on that? [pauses] I mean, it seems kinda reasonable.
S1P1: well...
S1P3: but I mean, so then,...the question, then, that we should be considering is where we set the bar; how much arbitration can take place?”

In this conversation, S1P3 is responding to the argument by S1P2 that there should be some limits to religious arbitration which may not please religious communities. S1P3 who is in favour of religious arbitration “asks” others if they agree that there is no way to please everyone. He, then, positions that view as the “reasonable” one. He does not wait for others, particularly

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33 In particular, there were 115 instances of disrespect in the control group compared to four under the deliberative worth facilitative treatment.
34 There were a total of five instances of ad hominem attacks under the control conditions compare to the zero in deliberative worth conditions.
35 There were a total number of 66 instances of rhetorical action under control conditions. Under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth, there were eight instances of it.
36 There were 12 instances of silencing under control conditions.
S1P1, to assent to the fact that they all agree and moves on to say that, in effect, since everyone agree with that, they can move on to the next question.

Furthermore, there were also fewer instances of hermeneutical exclusion—participants using the same term to discuss different ideas or running into a misunderstanding without realizing or attempting to fix it—in the deliberation with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth\textsuperscript{37}. Since it requires me to include and discuss a larger passage of the conversation to establish the ways in which hermeneutical exclusion was in place, I have decided against providing an example of hermeneutical exclusion from the deliberations under control conditions.

Deliberative worth exercises were successful at getting the participants to acknowledge the feelings of each other; engage in self-facilitation; express less negativity when disagreeing with each other; show solidarity and respect by using pronouns like “we”, “our”, and “us”; offer mediating proposals; and admit their ignorance. The fact that participants knew that others at the table were mindful of their behaviour made them more mindful of their own behaviours. Moreover, the congenial atmosphere that was created because of this mindfulness made it easier for participants to forgo professing to have all of the answers and admit ignorance about different topics. Deliberative worth exercises were also similarly able to reduce cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as disrespect and unproductive dialogue.

4.2.2 Simulated representation

Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in reason-giving (36% compared to 17%) and respect (21% compared to 8%) when

\textsuperscript{37} 15 instances in the control group compared to only one instance under deliberative worth conditions.
participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of simulated representation in effect. There was also a slightly higher percentage of instances of reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (28% compared to 20%) and productive dialogue (5% compared to 2%).

There were more than 2.5 times more instances of reason-giving either through offering a justification or making attempts to make what one had said before more intelligible under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation than in the control group\textsuperscript{38}. This was perhaps incentivized because of the process of facilitative treatment: participants had to do a good job of getting their positions and rationales on the table in order to find the points of agreement and disagreement; then, they had to invest further by explaining those rationales to the person with whom they were paired in order to ensure that he or she was able to represent their view in the next round; furthermore, participants in their role-reversal were motivated further to properly present, justify, and make the other side intelligible knowing that the representation of their views and rationales were in the hand of the other side; and finally, they were induced to invest in deliberative capital by justifying and making their views intelligible after the role-reversal was over in order to remind others of their original positions and take ownership of it.

Furthermore, there were ample instances of participants demonstrating their reflection on and incorporation of the views of others\textsuperscript{39}. Particularly, there were many instances of participants amending or changing their minds throughout the course of the discussion under this facilitative treatment\textsuperscript{40}. Sometimes, they admitted to the change. At other times, they simply added an issue

\textsuperscript{38} There were 109 instances of reason-giving in the control group compared to 288 instances of the same investment under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation. Incidentally, there were more instances of investments in reason-giving under this treatment than under deliberative worth conditions which had 189 instances of it.

\textsuperscript{39} There were 226 instances of reflection on and incorporation of the views of others under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation compared to 195 under deliberative worth conditions and only 126 in the control group.

\textsuperscript{40} There were 16 instances of amending/changing one’s view under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation compared to six under deliberative worth conditions and eight in the control group.
or a factor as part of their argument. In the following passage, S8P6—a strong supporter of religious arbitration—admits that he conceded a flaw in his opinion as a result of the deliberation and particularly as a result of being paired up with S8P1—an ardent opposer to religious arbitration. I have only included a fraction of his speech act:

“**S8P6:**...but then, the only thing I’ll say is that I’ve been naive in the sense that I put in so much trust into the fairness of the religious arbitrators. Believing that they would try to the best of their ability to be very, um, unbiased and fair to both parties. And deciding strictly based on, strictly based on what the rules are and what their opinions are.”

Moreover, there were many instances of the participants connecting their points to that of another. In addition to the investments in reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, there were also more instances of investments in respect than in the control group. In particular, there were quite a few instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation by asking others what they thought.

It has to also be noted that in both groups deliberating under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation, there were numerous instances of investment in rephrasing and repeating the point of the other side as the participants engaged in their role-reversal. I bring this up because there was only one instance of a participant presenting her own view instead of that of the person with whom she was paired. In fact, at times, there were many passionate exchanges between participants presenting the views and rationales of the other side.

Most importantly, there were frequent investments in productive dialogue, particularly, participants were more likely to make concessions and show willingness to compromise. For

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41 21% of all speech acts coded under simulated representation were instances of respect compared to 8% for control conditions.
example:

“C8P1: Ok. Now I concede that that’s a good example where arbitration could work.”

and,

“C8P2: But I’m saying, I am the one willing to compromise.”

However, based on the results from these two sessions, there was no indication that simulated representation was actually successful at encouraging investments in empathy. There were fewer instances of investments in empathy in simulated representation than either the deliberation under control conditions or under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth. It might be that while simulated representation allows participants to understand the rationales of the other side better, it does not achieve the same results when it comes to others’ feelings. But it could also be that the exercise (interview and role-reversal) puts a great deal of cognitive effort on the participants who feel like they must learn as much as they can and worry about misrepresenting the other side. Therefore, there are fewer chances for emotional connection.

There is also the possibility that there were not a larger percentage of empathy in the simulated representation condition because the participants felt like it did not need to be stated as they knew that in that condition, they would need to be more empathetic and they could focus on other issues instead of making explicit speech acts that were empathetic.

In addition to the investments, there were significantly fewer instances of biased information processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion and

42 There were 27 instances of biased information processing under control conditions. There was only one under simulated representation.
43 There were 12 instances of cognitive apartheid under simulated representation, compared to that of the control condition: 43.
44 There were 115 instances of disrespect under control conditions. There were 27 instances when participants deliberated under simulated representation.
45 There were six instances of hermeneutical exclusion, compared to 15 which occurred under control conditions.
rhetorical action\textsuperscript{46} when participants deliberated under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation than when they were deliberating under control conditions.

Simulated representation was successful at getting the participants to really justify their positions and make sure that others understand them. It was also capable of getting the participants to see more areas of mediation and concession; to connect their ideas to those of others; and rephrase and repeat the positions of others. The fact that participants were paired up and asked to present the view of others forced them to think about and better explain their own positions and allowed them to better take in and understand the rationales behind the positions of others. Simulated representation was also able to significantly reduce the number of statements made without justification and those made to promote a false consensus. Furthermore, it was able to reduce cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action.

4.3 Results: outcomes of deliberation

In this section, I look at the data gathered from pre and post deliberation questionnaires looking specifically at: increased political efficacy, opinion change, increased knowledge, and participants’ evaluation of the process. In the following sections, I will go into detail about each of these variables.

4.3.1 Political efficacy

The participants were gauged their opinion on the following statement both before and after the process of deliberation: “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on”\textsuperscript{47}. When divided by different groups,  

\textsuperscript{46} There were 66 instances of rhetorical action under control conditions. There were 15 under simulated representation.

\textsuperscript{47} The variable is coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2). Overall, there was a statistically significantly mean increase of 0.3 points (from 0.1 to 0.4; p=0.012) in all groups.
the largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.44 (from 0.12 to 0.56; p=0.03). The smallest effect was seen under control conditions (0.21 to 0.36; p=0.43). Finally, there were moderate gains (0.3 points) increase under simulated representation (p=0.28). This means that there were larger increases in political efficacy under facilitative treatments and specially under deliberative worth exercises. This is perhaps caused by the fact that the congenial atmosphere under deliberative worth better enables participants to view contributions to political conversations and decision making as easy and manageable.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall change in political efficacy. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.29 units increase in political efficacy under deliberative worth (p=0.28) and 0.16 units increase under simulated representation (p=0.61). However, the results, unfortunately, are not statistically significant. This is likely the result of the small sample size (40 across all three groups).

### 4.3.2 Decision-making ability

Moreover, the participants were asked about their expectations regarding the ability of the group to make a decision before the deliberation and asked about their assessment of the same ability after the deliberation.\(^{48}\)

When divided by different groups, the largest increase was under the control group: an increase of 0.64 (from 0.43 to 1.07; p=0.022). There was an increase of 0.44 under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth (0.625 to 1.06; p=0.048). There was no difference under simulated representation (0.8 to 0.8; p=1.000). The results from the simulated representation are not surprising. The more people understand both sides, and the more they think that everyone

\(^{48}\) Overall, there was a statistically significantly mean increase of 0.4 points (from 0.6 to 1; p=0.007) across all groups.
understands both sides, it becomes more likely for someone to think that decision-making will not be any easier. Figure 6 shows the effect of deliberation on these two factors for each group.

A regression shows that there was a 0.21 units decrease in evaluation of decision-making ability under deliberative worth \( (p=0.53) \) and 0.64 units decrease under simulated representation \( (p=0.09) \)\(^{49}\).

### 4.3.3 Information gains

The participants were asked a series of questions checking their factual knowledge regarding the issue of religious arbitration as well as the legal factors surrounding the issue. When divided by different groups, the largest increase was in the control group: an increase of 0.24 (from 0.47 to 0.71; \( p=0.24 \)). The smallest effect (+0.03) was seen under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: (0.58 to 0.61; \( p=0.88 \)). Finally, there were small gains (+0.08 points) increase under simulated representation (from 0.56 to 0.64; \( p=0.77 \)). Figure 7 summarizes these results.

\(^{49}\) However, the results, unfortunately, are not statistically significant. This is likely the result of the small sample size (40 across all three groups).
A regression looking at this difference showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.2 units decrease in information gains under deliberative worth (p=0.009) and 0.15 units decrease under simulated representation (p=0.083).

4.3.4 Opinion change

The participants were asked six questions before and after deliberation to see if their opinions changed as a result of the deliberation process. One of the questions asked participants regarding their views on whether or not religious arbitration should be allowed in British Columbia. When divided by different groups, the largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.25 (from 0 to 0.25; p=0.04). This was followed by simulated representation where, unlike deliberative worth, participants became 0.2 points less supportive of religious arbitration as a result of the deliberation (from 0 to -0.2; p=0.17). The smallest change was seen in the control group (from 0 to 0.14; p=0.34).

The variable was coded from never allowed (-1) to always allowed (1).
Regression showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.39 units increase in support for religious arbitration under deliberative worth (p=0.029) and 0.06 units decrease under simulated representation (p=0.773).

Another question asked participants whether they thought that the procedural rules and oversight by Canadian courts can ensure that vulnerable groups are protected under religious arbitration\textsuperscript{51}. The largest, and only positive, increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.25 (from 0.31 to 0.56; p=0.26). This was followed by simulated representation where, unlike deliberative worth, participants became 0.1 points less convinced that procedural rules and courts could protect vulnerable groups as a result of the deliberation (from 0.4 to 0.3; p=0.78). There was no change in the control group. Figure 8 summarized the results of these two first questions gauging opinion change.

The regression showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.25 units increase in belief in the efficacy of procedural rules in protecting vulnerable groups under deliberative worth (p=0.452) and 0.01 units decrease under simulated representation (p=0.8).

\textbf{Figure 8} Effect of deliberation on general support for religious arbitration and positive evaluation of procedural rules and courts

\begin{figure}[h]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{51} The variable is coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2).
The other questions gauged the participants’ views on religious arbitration and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—particularly on sections of the Charter which deal with equal treatment, religious freedom, and multiculturalism. Two questions, which were merged for the purposes of analysis, asked the participants whether they believe that religious arbitration should be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism; and commitment to freedom of religion.

As it can be seen in Figure 9, the largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.37 (from 0.97 to 1.34; p=0.16). This was followed by the control group where there was an increase of 0.22 points as a result of the deliberation (from 0.57 to 0.79; p=0.49). The smallest change was seen in simulated representation (from 0.35 to 0.4; p=0.94).

A regression looking at this difference showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.16 units increase in belief that religious arbitration should be considered as part of Charter’s commitment to freedom of religion and multiculturalism under deliberative worth.

![Figure 9](image.png)

Figure 9   Effect of deliberation on opinions on religious arbitration and Charter values

(p=0.57) and 0.16 units decrease under simulated representation (p=0.6).
The other two questions, which were also merged for the purposes of analysis, asked the participants whether they believe that religious arbitration should not be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to equality between persons; and commitment to procedural legal equality.

As it can be seen in Figure 9, the largest decrease was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: a decrease of 0.53 (from -0.2 to -0.7). This was followed by the simulated representation group where there was an decrease of 0.3 points as a result of the deliberation (from 0.25 to 0.55). The smallest change was seen in the control group (from -0.18 to -0.25).

Regression analysis showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.46 units decrease in belief that religious arbitration should not be considered as part of Charter’s commitment to personal and legal equality under deliberative worth (p=0.22) and 0.23 units decrease under simulated representation (p=0.58).

I can conclude based on the questions gauging opinion change that deliberative worth was the most successful at creating the conditions for real opinion change. Perhaps the less adversarial atmosphere of deliberative worth allowed participants to really take in what was being said and change their opinions as a result of it.

4.3.5 Participants’ evaluation of deliberation

The participants were asked a series of questions after the deliberation asking the participants to offer their evaluations of the deliberation on a number of factors. Instead of going into detail about all of these, I will only touch on a few.

As it can be seen in Figure 10, there were significant differences between the evaluation that only a few participants dominated the discussion between the different conditions. It is
perhaps not at all surprising that a very small group of participants deliberating under
deliberative worth conditions believed that only a few dominated the discussion since the
treatment encouraged the participants not to engage in such a behaviour. It is also unsurprising
that a large majority deliberating under control conditions believed otherwise. A regression
focusing on this difference showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.51 units
decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth (p=0.17). There was also a 0.27 unit
decrease this evaluation under simulated representation (p=0.51).

Participants were also asked whether they believed that as a result of the deliberation,
their opinions on the topic changed. This was different from the questions that actually looked at
their opinions before and after deliberation. What is surprising is that while the questions looking
at actual opinion change showed that it was under deliberative worth that we saw the largest
degree of opinion change, when participants were asked about their subjective evaluation of
opinion change, there was a significant difference. Participants deliberating under simulated
representation expressed the most amount of change and those deliberating under deliberative
worth expressed the least degree of it. The results can be seen in Figure 10.

Regression analysis shows that compared to the control group, there was a 0.15 units
decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth (p=0.69) and 0.14 units increase under
simulated representation (p=0.74).

While I am not surprised by the results of simulated representation—after all, role-
playing could have achieved this—the results for deliberative worth are surprising and hard to
explain. Perhaps, what this question gets at are the basic values of participants that remained
unchanged even though the nuances of their opinion did change.
Similarly, participants were asked if they believed that the deliberation helped them empathize with others and their views. As it can be seen in Figure 10, participants deliberating under simulated representation were much more convinced that the deliberation made them empathize with others than those who deliberated under deliberative worth. A regression showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.27 units decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth (p=0.23) and 0.16 units increase under simulated representation (p=0.54).

Finally, when participants were asked if they would be open to participating in the future, participants who deliberated under simulated representation expressed much more willingness for future participation than those deliberating under control conditions and slightly more than those deliberating under deliberative worth. This can be seen in Figure 10. Regression on this difference showed that compared to the control group, there was a 0.15 units increase in this evaluation under deliberative worth (p=0.49) and 0.21 units increase under simulated representation (p=0.39).
5. Limitations

There are a number of limitations with this study. Just as with the survey, the study has a small sample size. There were only 40 participants divided in three groups. Moreover, the participants were all students—limiting the variance in age as well as education levels; and most likely, political and social beliefs. Moreover, all the participants are, residents of Vancouver, BC or surrounding cities creating a geographical limitation to the study. There are two main methodological limitations with this study as well.

The first has to do with the fact that I was the only coder analyzing the transcriptions. This creates two sources of bias. First, there may be a gendered pattern of interpretation of what counts as an investment or divestment. Moreover, I was aware of which condition was which while coding the transcriptions. This can perhaps create a bias in favour of the facilitative treatments. I did my best to reduce this by going through the coding process at three different times. However, it would be best to have someone (preferably more than one) else going though the transcriptions, doing to coding without knowing about the conditions to ensure the accuracy of the codes. The second methodological limitation has to do with lack of replication. Due to lack of funds and time, I was not able to run each of these settings (control plus two treatments) more than once. For me to be able to draw decisive conclusion from these experiments, I need to be able to re-run and replicate the same coding results.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I introduced and developed a theory of deliberative capital as the by-product of cycles of investment (i.e. instances of respect, taking the extra step to understand, offering a potential compromise, etc…) and easily threatened when these investments are
replaced by divestments (i.e. dominating the speaking time, ignoring or attacking the views of other participants, cutting others off, etc…). I argued that such a reframing allows us to think about ways that we can encourage investments and discourage divestments within a deliberation, most notably through the use of facilitative treatments such as deliberative worth exercises and simulated representation. Finally, I provided a preliminary analysis of two of these treatments utilized in deliberative experiments conducted at the University of British Columbia on the topic of institutionalization of religious arbitration in British Columbia, Canada.

The results from the deliberations conducted under different facilitative treatments show that they are capable of improving the quality of deliberation by increasing investments and decreasing divestments.

 Particularly, deliberative worth exercises were shown to be successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity; and decreasing respective divestments in rhetorical action, disrespect, unproductive dialogue, cognitive apartheid and hermeneutical exclusion. Moreover, simulated representation were shown to be effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and even respect; and reducing cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action, among other divestments. More specifically, facilitative treatments were able to reduce the divestments of men and non-visible minorities who were responsible for a significant majority of divestments under control conditions. However, when it came to raising the factual knowledge of the participants, control conditions were the clear winner.
Bibliography


