

# The Impact of Democratic Transitions on Women's Legislative Representation

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## Abstract

Do democratic transitions increase women's legislative representation? Using a dataset of 63 countries between 1955 and 2010 that experienced a democratic transition between 1945 and 2010, I show that democratic transitions do appear to increase women's representation. I also find that the increase in representation after a transition is influenced by several factors—women's access to civil society, the electoral systems, gender quotas, and party system institutionalization.

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Democratic transitions are typically accompanied by an opening of the political system that allows previously disenfranchised groups to participate in the political process. Often, such transitions can help spur the formation of new political parties and other organizations that aid new groups in their attempts to influence the government. The free, or at least more free, elections that follow transitions can allow new forces to enter legislatures and parliaments, obtaining access that may have seemed impossible prior to the transition.

For gender scholars, the role of women in democratic transitions as well as the impact of democratic transitions on women are greatly debated questions. Researchers correctly point out that women often play significant roles in overthrowing authoritarian regimes in some contexts, but not in others (e.g., Baldez 2002; Hassim 2003; Jacobson 1995; Waylen 2000, 2007). In some instances, women's participation in overthrowing authoritarianism translated into influence in the new democracy; however, in many cases, women were unable to translate their work into greater gender equity in the new democracy. In fact, Racioppi and See (2006, p. 190-191) argues that:

Historically, democracies have not been guarantors of gender equality. They have excluded women from full citizenship, limited their suffrage rights and their eligibility for elected office and civil and military service, and constrained their inclusion in the market economy.

Obtaining influence in the democratically elected legislature is one goal that may aid women in their efforts to increase their policy relevance. Given that women often participate in the movements that created the democratic transition and the new openness of the polity itself, one might expect that women's representation in newly democratic legislatures might increase. Yet, the existing research finds only mixed results (Baldez 2003; Burnet 2008; Hassim 2003; Waylen 2007).

This paper seeks to answer the question—do democratic transitions increase women's legislative representation? I argue that democratic transitions do increase women's

representation in a non-linear fashion. I also argue that the increase in women's representation after a democratic transition is conditioned on a number of factors—female labor force participation, women's access to civil society, gender quotas, and the electoral system. I find little evidence, however, that party system institutionalization independently impacts women's representation.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the relationship women's legislative representation. I then will review the literature on the effect of democratic transitions on women's representation. I will then present an empirical analysis of 63 countries between 1955 and 2010 that experienced a democratic transition between 1945 and 2010. I will conclude with a discussion of the significance of these findings.

## Democracy and Women's Representation

Do women benefit from democracy? Empirical studies of democracy's impact on aggregate metrics suggest that democracy does positively benefit women. Beer (2009) finds that democracy is correlated with a greater number of women as the percentage of the population, a greater ratio of female to male life expectancy, lower levels of fertility, and higher labor force participation. Richards and Gelleny (2007) concludes that there is a positive correlation between democracy and greater gender equality and women's empowerment.<sup>1</sup>

Clearly, democracy, however, has never been a panacea for women's representation. Often, new civil and political rights cannot overcome traditional gender stereotypes and other preexisting obstacles to women's representation (Jacobson 1995; Saint-German 1989). Political parties, at times, simply mobilize along traditional gender lines that subsume women's interests (Racioppi and See 2006).

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<sup>1</sup>Other research flips the causality arrow arguing that gender equality causes democracy (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Wyndow, Li, and Mattes 2013).

Current research finds that women’s executive and legislative representation is not correlated with the level of democracy (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999). In fact, empirically, the average percentage of women elected to democratically elected legislatures has only surpassed the percentage of women found in authoritarian legislatures relatively recently.<sup>2</sup> Figure 1 plots the global average of women’s legislative representation in both democratic and authoritarian legislatures between 1946 and 2010.<sup>3</sup> The average percentage of women’s representation in democratic countries only surpassed that of authoritarian regimes after the transition to democracy of post-Communist regimes in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, we see a strong, positive increase in the average level of women’s representation over time in this sample. On the other hand, the average, at its highest, is less than 20 percent.

## Women’s Representation and Democratic Transitions

Why do countries become democracies? For political science, answering this question remains a significant topic of interest, with scholars focusing on several factors including culture, the level of economic development, and elite strategic behavior (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Rustow 1970). Not only do scholars debate the causes of democracy, they also debate the concept of democracy itself. There is a significant debate both about the defining democracy and measuring it (Pemstein, Meserve, and


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<sup>2</sup>Recent research on authoritarian legislatures undermines the notion that the institutions are simply “rubber stamp” bodies who play little role in politics (Boix and Svobik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Svobik 2012; Wright 2008; Wright and Escibà-Folch 2012). Little research has, however, examined the role of women in these legislatures.

<sup>3</sup>Data on women’s legislative representation comes from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2011). I used the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2014) to code democratic and authoritarian regimes.

<sup>4</sup>Communist parties typically used quotas to increase the representation of women in national legislatures (Kunovich 2003).

Figure 1: Average Percentage of Women in Authoritarian and Democratic Legislatures, 1946-2010




Melton 2010). In this paper, I use the definition from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) that is based on Dahl (1971). To be defined as a democracy, a country must meet a “minimal level of suffrage” and require that “the decisions that govern the state are taken through voting procedures that are free and fair” (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013, p. 5).<sup>5</sup> Countries that fall short in these measures are authoritarian regimes. A democratic transition occurs when a country obtains a sufficient level of contestation and inclusiveness to be defined as a democracy.

Does increasing inclusiveness and expanded political competition create opportunities for women to expand their political representation? Existing research in a

<sup>5</sup>The measure requires democracies to grant suffrage to a majority of the male population (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013). This allows the measure to better “capture the considerable cross-country variation in political conditions before World War I” (Boix and Svobik 2013, p. 7). Paxton (2000) argues that the failure to include women’s suffrage limits such measures.

Figure 2: Average Percentage of Women by Year after Democratic Transition



number of different contexts finds only limited support for the positive effect of a democratic transition on women's descriptive representation. Waylen (2007) presents an analysis of several cases, arguing that expanding political and civil rights does not automatically translate into gains for women in legislatures. In time, however, representation does increase even if slowly. While a transition may benefit women in some cases, such as South Africa, other case studies, such as post-communist Eastern Europe, find little evidence that women's representation increased dramatically after the transition (e.g., Baldez 2003; Hassim 2003; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Waylen 2007; Wolchik 1998).

Figure 2 plots the average and standard deviation of the percentage women in the legislature by year of democratic duration for a sample of countries who experienced

a transition between 1945 and 2010.<sup>6</sup> The data reveal several interesting patterns. First, democratic transitions do not lead to long-term, significant increases in women's representation. In fact, women's representation decreases in the first four years, on average, of a transition. Second, women's representation does not, on average, surpass 10 percent until year 14. Third, the level of women's representation displays a clear non-linear trend across democratic duration. The average increases steadily for most countries through the first 26 years, then dips, till it increases dramatically for countries that have remained democratic for over 40 years. Finally, the standard deviations for the individual years are quite wide, suggesting significant variation in women's representation in most duration years. This suggests that time after a democratic transition alone is a weak predictor of women's legislative representation.

The pattern of women's representation after a democratic transition suggests that while over the long run women's representation increases as democracies consolidate, other factors matter. The exiting literature on women and democratic transitions offers several elements that can influence the number of women in the legislature after a transition. It is clear that the strength of women's movements not only varies across different authoritarian regimes, but also their strength can vary after the establishment of democracy. Waylen (2000) argues that the women's movement in Chile more effectively pressured political parties after the transition than did those movements in Argentina, leading to better outcomes. Hassim (2003) points out that the women's organizations within the ANC in South Africa were strong enough to influence the transition itself, influence the post-transition policy process, and adopt institutions to improve women's representation such as a party quota for female electoral candidates in the ANC. Similarly, Burnet (2008) describes how women's groups pushed for greater representation in Rwanda through the Rwandan

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<sup>6</sup>The data on democratic transitions and the duration of democratic regimes is taken from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2014). See table 8 in the appendix for a list of countries in the sample.

Patriotic Front, resulting in significant increases in women's representation in both the legislature and the executive. Baldez (2003) contends that the success of women's mobilization in East Germany, Brazil, and Chile led to better outcomes for women in comparison to Poland, where women were less successful. Several studies note that the weak organization of women's groups in post-communist Europe undermined women's representation (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Sloat 2005; Wolchik 1998).

A successful democratic transition may not undermine traditional, patriarchal political cultures that limited women's access to politics. Without effective women's organization and participation, societies may not move beyond traditional political cultures that maintain restrictive norms about women's roles and participation in politics (Chimiak 2003; Einhorn and Sever 2003; Jacobson 1995; Matland 2003; Montgomery and Ilonszki 2003; Ristova 2003; Saxonberg 2000; Titkov 1998; Waylen 2000; Wilco, Stark, and Thomas 2003; Wolchik 1998). Matland (1998) suggests that the persistence of cultural stereotypes may mitigate the effectiveness of institutions that increase women's representation in less developed societies. In post-communist Europe, the weakness of women's movements meant that political parties were free to embrace traditional gender stereotypes, avoiding support for gender equality (Kostadinova 2003; Kunovich 2003; Saxonberg 2003; Wolchik 1998).

Variance in the post-transition institutional environment may also explain variation in women's representation. The literature on women's legislative representation consistently finds that PR systems tend to elect more women than other systems (e.g., Matland 1993; Matland and Studlar 1998; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987; Thames and Williams 2010, 2013). In addition, the quotas requiring a certain number of female candidates and reserved legislative seat quotas also increase women's representation (Franceschet and Krook 2008; Krook 2009; Thames and Williams 2013; Tripp and Kang 2008). The research on women's representation and transitions finds similar



results (Burnet 2008; Hassim 2003; Htun and Jones 2002; Matland 2003; Waylen 2007).

Political parties may also matter. As mentioned earlier, the ability of women's groups inside and outside of parties to push parties towards gender equity and greater women's representation clearly matters. For some scholars, however, this is more likely to occur in systems where parties are institutionalized. Weakly institutionalized party systems feature weak ties between parties and voters, inchoate party organizations, significant electoral volatility, and weak trust in parties (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The limited research on party system institutionalization finds that women are more likely to win seats in those systems with greater institutionalization (Goetz and Hassim 2002; Waylen 2000, 2007).

## Research Design and Hypotheses

To test whether democratic transitions increase women's representation, I created a time-series cross-sectional dataset of 63 democratic countries between 1955 and 2010 that all experienced a democratic transition between 1945 and 2010.<sup>7</sup> I am only examining countries with transitions after 1945 since the processes that created democracies such as the United States or Great Britain may differ dramatically from the post-World War II era. I limit the sample to democratic countries that experience a transition to avoid comparing new democracies to more established democracies in Europe or North America. The dependent variable in all models is the percentage of women elected in the lower house of the legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011).

Measuring a democratic transition is difficult. One method would be to code each country year with a dummy variable indicating that a democratic transition took

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<sup>7</sup>Data on women's legislative representation comes from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2011). I used the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2014) to code democratic regimes.

place. The difficulty with this approach arises from trying to measure the impact of a transition that occurred in the past. Given the current research, it is likely that the impact of transition may be felt years later. One could simply include a series of lagged dummy variables; however, this approach would add significant collinearity to models as well as reducing the sample size. In fact, if the effect of a transition is actually years or decades later, the lagged transition variable strategy is difficult. Consequently, I code all country years with the duration of the current democratic regime measured in years (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2014). This strategy will allow me to avoid using a dummy variable approach. As figure 2 demonstrates, the democracy duration variable has a non-linear relationship with the percentage of women in the legislature. Thus, in all models, I include a logged version of the democracy duration variable.

If democratic transitions increase women's legislative representation, then we would expect that increasing the duration of democracy will increase the percentage of women in the legislature. Consequently, I hypothesize that:

$H_1$ : Increasing democratic regime duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

The existing research raises the possibility that the impact of a transition may depend upon other factors. This suggests an interactive effect between democratic regime duration and other factors. To test this, I will examine four different factors that may explain women's representation—women's movements, quotas, electoral systems, and party-system institutionalization.

Measuring women's movements empirically is difficult. For this paper, I will use two different variables. First, I code all country years with the percentage of female labor force participation. There is a significant literature arguing that increasing women's participation in the labor force raises their political consciousness while also giving

them the resources to participate (Matland 1998; Norris 1985; Rule 1987; Salmond 2006). Second, I code all country years with a measure of women’s participation in civil society (Coppedge et al. 2016). As its value increases, women face fewer restrictions on participation in civil society organizations. I create an interactive term with both of these variables and the democracy duration variable. I hypothesize that:

*H<sub>2</sub>*: Increasing female labor force participation and duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

*H<sub>3</sub>*: Increasing women’s access to civil society and duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

To test for an interactive effect between quotas and transitions on representation, I use two variables—a dummy variable indicating a national-level gender quota and the number of political parties with gender quotas in the system (Thames and Williams 2013). Both variables should be correlated with women’s representation. The existing literature argues that quotas increase representation during transitions. Consequently, I hypothesize that:

*H<sub>4</sub>*: Increasing duration with presence of a national-level gender quota increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

*H<sub>5</sub>*: Increasing the number of parties with quotas and duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

Electoral institutions may matter as well. I code all countries with their natural log of district magnitude (Bormann and Golder 2013). I then interact his variable with duration. I expect that:

*H<sub>6</sub>*: Increasing district magnitude and duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

Lastly, there is evidence that party system institutionalization increase opportunities for women. I code all countries with an index of party system institutionalization

created by Coppedge et al. (2016). If party system institutionalization encourages women’s representation, then it should be positively correlated with the dependent variable. An interactive effect would suggest that:

*H<sub>7</sub>*: Increasing party system institutionalization and duration increases the percentage of women in the legislature.

The rest of this paper will test these hypotheses.

## Models and Empirical Results

To test my hypotheses, I estimate Bayesian hierarchical regression models using Rstan (Stan Development Team 2016). Different countries may have different error variances; therefore, I include random intercepts to control for these differences. A Wooldridge (2002) test revealed evidence of serial autocorrelation in the data (Drucker 2003); therefore, I include an AR 1 correction in all models. I use uninformative priors for all parameters except for the random intercepts, which I employ weakly informative Cauchy priors (Gelman 2006; Gelman et al. 2013). I estimate 4 chains with 2,000 iterations apiece and a “burn-in” of 1,000 iterations per chain.<sup>8</sup> As show in figure 1 the percentage of women in the legislature variable among democratic countries has a strong, curvilinear trend. To deal with this, I include a variable measuring years since 1954. I log the variable to control for the non-linearity.


Figure 3 plots the first differences of the expected values for changes in the main independent variables in model 1, which does not contain interaction terms.<sup>9</sup> The figure plots the posterior median and credibility intervals of the expected percentage women in the legislature for an increase in each independent variable listed, holding

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<sup>8</sup>For all parameters, the potential scale reduction factor,  $\hat{R}$ , was close to 1 and the number of effective independent simulation draws,  $\hat{n}_{eff}$ , was over 600 (Gelman et al. 2013).

<sup>9</sup>Please see the appendix for a detailed presentation of the parameter estimates and convergence diagnostics.


Figure 3: Model 1: First Differences of Key Variables



all other variables at their means or modes. For all continuous variables, I calculate the difference of one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean. For the *Quota* dummy variable, I calculate the difference of changing its value from 0 to 1. For the *N. Quota Parties* variable, I calculate the difference of increasing the number of parties with a quota from 0 to one standard deviation above the mean.

The first differences indicate that increases in each of the variables produces a statistically significant, non-trivial increase in the percentage of women in the legislature. For the *Duration*, *Civil Society*, *Labor Force Participation*, *District Magnitude*, and *Party System Institutionalization* variables, the increase is between 1.3 and 2.5 percent. Quotas have the strongest impact. The existence of a quota increases the percentage of women in the legislature by 5.3 percent. An increase in the number of

Figure 4: Model 1: Expected Values of Democracy Duration




quota parties increases women’s representation by 4.9 percent.

To gain more insights on the impact of transitions, I calculate the posterior median and credibility intervals for the expected value of women’s legislative representation for each value of the *Democracy Duration* variable with the remaining variables at their means or modes. These values are plotted in figure 4.<sup>10</sup> The results show that a moderately steep increase in women’s representation in the first years following a transition; however, the slope of the increase begins to attenuate, becoming nearly flat after year 7. Women’s representation does tend to increase yearly after this inflection point; however, the increases are minimal. The results support  $H_1$ .

To test the remaining hypotheses, I estimated a series of models that included

<sup>10</sup>The equation included a logged version of democracy duration due to the clear non-linear relationship between the two. The calculations in figure 4 were created by including the log value of duration for the range of years of the variable. This not only reveals the curvilinear relationship between the variables, but also provides a more intuitive means for interpreting the results.

Figure 5: Models 3-7: First Differences of Interaction Terms over Duration



interaction terms between *Democracy Duration* and the remaining covariates.<sup>11</sup> Figure 5 presents a series of graphs that plot the median and credibility intervals of the first differences of six variables over the values of the *Democracy Duration* variable. The first differences represent the same changes in the values of the variables plotted earlier in figure 3 with the values of all other variables at their means or modes. The medians represent the effect on women’s representation of an increase in that variable in each year value of the duration variable. Consequently, I am plotting the change in women’s representation for each year of duration for a change in the covariates.

The results presented in figure 5 largely support hypotheses 2-6, though to varying degrees. In addition, as one would expect, the impact of the interactive terms changes initially, but then peters out over the course of duration. Increasing women’s labor

<sup>11</sup>Please see the appendix for the detailed parameter estimates and convergence diagnostics for these models.

force participation increases women's representation between 0.5 and 1.3 percent during the first ten years following a transitions, supporting  $H_2$ . A similar increase in civil society increased representation between 1.3 and 1.9 percent during the first decade, supporting  $H_3$ . The presence of a national quota increased the percentage of women's representation between 3.3 and 4.8 percent during the first ten years, which supports  $H_4$ . Increasing the number of quota parties from 0 to one standard deviation over its means increases women's representation between 0.1 and 1.9 percent over the initial decade of democracy; a finding that support  $H_5$ . Electoral systems matter as well. Increasing the log of district magnitude increases women's representation between 2.0 and 3.9 percent in the first ten years of democracy as hypothesized in  $H_6$ .

The results of model 7, which included the interaction of *Democracy Duration* and *Party System Institutionalization*, provided unexpected results. The first differences presented in figure 5 demonstrate a negative correlation between party system institutionalization and women's representation; therefore, we find no support for  $H_7$ . In the first year after democratization, increasing the *Party System Institutionalization* variable from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean increases women's representation by a robust 2.7 percent; however, by year 5 a similar change only increases women's representation by 1.2 percent. By year 20, we see a negative impact of increasing party system institutionalization. Yet, after year 5, the predicted first differences are no longer statistically significant, meaning 0 is inside the credibility intervals for all estimates after year 5.

## Conclusion

This paper sought to determine whether democratic transitions increased women's legislative representation. Using a dataset of countries that experienced a transition



between 1945 and 2010, I found strong evidence that a transition to democracy improved women's representation. The results show that after a transition, women's representation increases in a non-linear fashion. The size of the increase improves over the first years of democracy, before slowing. I also find support for the arguments of various scholars that the impact of a transition will vary based upon other factors. The model shows an interactive effect between democracy duration and five covariates—female labor force participation, women's access to civil society, a national quota, the number of parties with a gender quota, and district magnitude. Thus, the impact of a democratic transition is dependent upon not only women's ability to participate politically, but also key political institutions. Surprisingly, the empirical models find limited support for the impact of institutionalized political parties. As party system institutionalization and duration increased, women's representation decreased or had no independent effect.

Clearly, democratization does appear to improve women's representation. In addition, the effect is conditional on other factors. Yet, several questions remain. The results still find that women's legislative representation is low. It is not as if a transition, in most cases, leads to gender parity. Second, it is not clear how well the improvement over time in women's representation impacts substantive representation. Waylen (2007) points out that democratic transitions do not always lead to better representation of women's interests. It begs the question of whether differences in legislative representation drive this process or not.

# Appendix

Table 1: Model 1

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	4000	0.006	0.009	0.012
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	3269	0.001	0.001	0.001
N. of Quota Parties	1.000	4000	0.027	0.032	0.036
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.045	0.053	0.061
Party System Institutionalization	1.003	1482	0.003	0.034	0.065
Civil Society	1.000	2774	0.005	0.011	0.016
Log District Magnitude	1.000	4000	0.002	0.007	0.011
Log Year	1.000	1938	0.006	0.010	0.015
intercept	1.001	1856	-0.091	-0.043	0.008
$\rho$	1.000	1269	0.656	0.698	0.736
LOO I.C.			-5,558.2		
N			1,288		

Table 2: Model 2

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	4000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	4000	0.006	0.009	0.012
N. of Quota Parties	1.000	3876	0.000	0.001	0.001
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.027	0.032	0.036
Party System Institutionalization	1.000	4000	0.045	0.054	0.062
Civil Society	1.001	2025	-0.001	0.030	0.062
Log District Magnitude	1.001	4000	0.005	0.010	0.016
Duration*Female Labor Force P.	1.000	4000	0.003	0.007	0.012
Log Year	1.001	2254	0.006	0.010	0.015
intercept	1.001	2676	-0.090	-0.043	0.008
$\rho$	1.001	1186	0.656	0.698	0.738
LOO I.C.			-5,547.1		
N			1,288		

Table 3: Model 3

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	4000	0.001	0.003	0.006
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	4000	0.007	0.010	0.013
N. of Quota Parties	1.000	2403	0.001	0.001	0.001
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.026	0.030	0.035
Party System Institutionalization	1.000	4000	0.044	0.052	0.061
Civil Society	1.004	1563	0.000	0.030	0.062
Log District Magnitude	0.999	3377	-0.002	0.005	0.012
Duration*Civil Society	1.001	3267	0.002	0.007	0.012
intercept	1.002	1810	-0.095	-0.045	0.004
Log Year	1.002	1712	0.006	0.010	0.015
$\rho$	1.004	617	0.656	0.696	0.736
LOO I.C.			-5,557.7		
N			1,288		

Table 4: Model 4

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	3089	-0.027	-0.022	-0.016
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	4000	0.010	0.014	0.017
N. of Quota Parties	1.001	3567	0.000	0.001	0.001
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.029	0.033	0.038
Party System Institutionalization	1.000	3138	0.090	0.106	0.122
Civil Society	1.002	1995	0.006	0.038	0.069
Log District Magnitude	0.999	4000	0.005	0.010	0.016
Duration*National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.002	0.006	0.011
Log Year	1.002	2123	0.005	0.009	0.014
intercept	1.001	2522	-0.098	-0.046	0.003
$\rho$	1.003	1188	0.668	0.708	0.749
LOO I.C.			-5,600.7		
N			1,288		

Table 5: Model 5

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	2593	0.001	0.006	0.011
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	4000	0.008	0.011	0.015
N. of Quota Parties	0.999	4000	0.001	0.001	0.001
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	2517	-0.002	0.013	0.028
Party System Institutionalization	1.000	4000	0.044	0.052	0.060
Civil Society	0.999	2723	0.007	0.039	0.071
Log District Magnitude	1.000	4000	0.005	0.010	0.016
Duration*N. Quota Parties	0.999	4000	0.002	0.006	0.011
Log Year	1.001	3001	0.006	0.010	0.014
intercept	1.000	2815	-0.095	-0.046	0.004
$\rho$	1.001	1471	0.657	0.696	0.734
LOO I.C.			-5,560.7		
N			1,288		

Table 6: Model 6

<i>Parameter</i>	$\widehat{R}$	$\widehat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	4000	-0.001	0.001	0.004
Female Labor Force Participation	0.999	4000	0.006	0.009	0.012
N. of Quota Parties	1.000	3406	0.001	0.001	0.001
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.027	0.031	0.036
Party System Institutionalization	1.000	4000	0.045	0.053	0.061
Civil Society	1.002	2132	0.003	0.035	0.065
Log District Magnitude	1.000	3091	0.005	0.011	0.016
Duration*District Magnitude	1.001	4000	-0.003	0.004	0.011
Log Year	1.000	2035	0.006	0.011	0.015
intercept	1.000	2056	-0.099	-0.047	0.003
$\rho$	1.003	1056	0.657	0.697	0.737
LOO I.C.			-5,552.0		
N			1,288		

Table 7: Model 7

<i>Parameter</i>	$\hat{R}$	$\hat{n}_{eff}$	2.5%	50%	97.5%
Log Democracy Duration	1.000	4000	0.004	0.008	0.011
Female Labor Force Participation	1.000	3241	0.001	0.001	0.001
N. of Quota Parties	1.000	4000	0.029	0.034	0.038
National Quota (1,0)	1.000	4000	0.045	0.053	0.062
Party System Institutionalization	1.001	1750	0.029	0.068	0.105
Civil Society	1.000	3101	0.005	0.010	0.016
Log District Magnitude	1.000	4000	0.002	0.007	0.011
Duration*Party System Institutionalization	1.000	1521	-0.039	-0.023	-0.008
intercept	1.001	1598	-0.086	-0.037	0.015
Log Year	1.001	1268	0.005	0.010	0.014
$\rho$	1.003	844	0.665	0.706	0.745
LOO I.C.			-5,559.5		
N			1,288		

Table 8: Country Sample

<i>Country</i>	<i>Years</i>
ALBANIA	1992-2010
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	2004-2010
ARGENTINA	1958-2010
AUSTRIA	1946-2010
BANGLADESH	1991-2010
BENIN	1991-2010
BOLIVIA	1982-2010
BRAZIL	1946-2010
BULGARIA	1990-2010
BURUNDI	2005-2010
CAPE VERDE	1991-2010
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1993-2002
CHILE	1945-2010
COLOMBIA	1945-2010
COMOROS	2006-2010
COSTA RICA	1949-2010
CROATIA	2000-2010
CYPRUS	1977-2010
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1966-2010
ECUADOR	1948-2010
EL SALVADOR	1984-2010
FRANCE	1946-2010
GAMBIA	1972-1993
GEORGIA	2004-2010
GHANA	1970-2010
GREECE	1945-2010
GRENADA	1974-2010
GUATEMALA	1945-2010
GUINEA-BISSAU	1994-1997
GUYANA	1992-2010
HONDURAS	1957-2010
HUNGARY	1990-2010
INDONESIA	1955-2010
ITALY	1946-2010
JAPAN	1952-2010
KENYA	2002-2010
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	1960-2010
LATVIA	1993-2010
LEBANON	1971-1975
LESOTHO	2002-2010

<i>Country</i>	<i>Years</i>
LIBERIA	2006-2010
LITHUANIA	1992-2010
MADAGASCAR	1993-2008
MALAWI	1994-2010
MALDIVES	2009-2010
MALI	1992-2010
MEXICO	2000-2010
MONGOLIA	1990-2010
MOZAMBIQUE	1994-2003
NEPAL	1991-2010
NICARAGUA	1984-2010
NIGER	1993-2008
PAKISTAN	1973-2010
PANAMA	1950-2010
PARAGUAY	2003-2010
PERU	1956-2010
PHILIPPINES	1946-2010
POLAND	1989-2010
PORTUGAL	1976-2010
ROMANIA	1991-2010
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1991-2010
SENEGAL	2000-2010
SIERRA LEONE	2002-2010
SOLOMON ISLANDS	1980-2010
SOUTH AFRICA	1994-2010
SPAIN	1977-2010
SRI LANKA	1948-2009
SURINAME	1975-2010
TAIWAN	1996-2004
THAILAND	1975-2005
TURKEY	1961-2010
UGANDA	1980-1984
URUGUAY	1945-2010
VENEZUELA	1959-2004
ZAMBIA	2008-2010

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