Diverging Models of Participatory Governance:

A Framework for Comparison

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Participatory governance (PG), the state-sanctioned direct engagement of the public in policy decision-making, has become increasingly widespread. As of 2008, over 100 different cities in Europe had decided to allow citizens to directly allocate significant portions of the cities’ budgets (Sintomer et al 2008), while conservative estimates suggest that in Brazil alone 2 billion dollars of public money is being allocated through participatory processes (APSA 2012). Provincial governments in British Columbia and Ontario tied their hands and allowed the general public to design, propose, and ultimately vote on extensive reforms to the provincial electoral system. City planners from Europe fly to conferences in Brazil and India to learn new ways of decentralizing decisions at the community level. In the face of economic collapse and loss of confidence in government, Iceland embarked on a process of rewriting its constitution that embedded several different avenues for direct citizen participation in the shaping of priorities and proposals for a new constitution. These developments have been built on the dedication of millions of dollars in public and private money as well as the time and political capital of many policy-makers and civil society activists.

The expansion of participatory governance has been propelled by a wide range of positive outcomes ascribed to these reforms, including improved accountability, stronger norms of citizenship and a more civic-minded public, a more densely connected and more effective civil society, increased voter turnout and more legitimate government. With the ensuing increase in on the ground experimentation and innovation in approaches to participatory governance, it has become clear that there is substantial and systematic variation in the structure of participatory governance. One major pattern in this variation is the emergence of two general 'bundles' of institutional design: one which seems to more closely tied to deliberative traditions in democratic theory and another which seems more committed to standards articulated by participatory, what I
refer to as Assembly and Community models of participatory governance, respectively. In this paper, I argue that the substantive democratic outcomes from PG are likely to vary across the participatory and deliberative approaches in predictable and important ways related to the normative commitments embedded in the institutional design. Recognizing that different outcomes are implicated by each approach can help to make sense of the wide-ranging and often inconsistent field of research on the outcomes participatory governance in general. The theoretical framework I articulate here is important as it provides a basis for the comparative development of empirical study of participatory, which has been dominated by exemplary case studies or limited evaluation of within country variation in implementation of a single institutional reform.

In this paper, I begin with an introduction to participatory governance in general, describing both the emerging consensus and continued diversity in scholarly and practical work. Next, I briefly review the contrasting priorities of participatory and deliberative theorists of democracy, and map these differences onto directions for empirical research. I then draw out the distinction between deliberative and participatory perspectives as it applies to the observed patterns in the development of participatory governance institutions. Finally, I offer a series of specific and divergent expectations for outcomes from the Community and Assembly models of PG that can help provide a basis for future comparative empirical evaluations of PG reforms.

**Introducing participatory governance**

Participatory governance can be defined as the formal extension of public voice into political decision-making beyond the ballot box, “the devolution of decision-making authority to state-sanctioned policy-making venues jointly controlled by citizens and government officials” (Wampler 2012b: 669). PG innovations are designed to complement, rather than to replace, the
traditional representative institutions of liberal democracy. They emphasize institutional solutions, characterized by the development of formal rule structures incorporating the public decisions into the policy process. Outside the PG process, the public may have ample opportunity for expression or even influence: through lobbying, protest, singing, or participating in limited opportunities for public comment. PG is distinctive by introducing rules formally reserving opportunities for public control of decision-making.

Participatory governance shares roots with direct democracy, but should be distinguished empirically. Direct democracy is generally understood to refer to initiative and referendum processes or New England town meetings, in which unmediated public control takes the place of representative government. Institutions of direct democracy such as referenda may be integrated with participatory governance, for example in the use of referenda to decide whether the new provincial voting systems proposed by the Citizens’ Assemblies for Electoral Reform in British Columbia and Ontario should be implemented in law. Participatory governance refers to a distinct approach to incorporating public voice in the formulation of law and policy and, often, in the oversight of its implementation, in conjunction with existing representative institutions.

How is participatory governance distinct from the widespread municipal practices of ‘consultation’, public comment periods, and much-derided public meetings? The key difference is in the extent of the public’s authority. In a classic article building on evaluations of federal social programs in the 1960s, Arnstein (1969) introduces a helpful framework to think about the authority citizens have in a participation process: an eight-rung “ladder of participation,” which describes a spectrum of citizen participation from “manipulation” and “therapy” (lowest levels of citizen power) to “delegated power” and “citizen control” (highest level). Common existing consultation and public meeting processes would fall under the middle sections of this spectrum,
informing and possibly even collecting input from the public, but not assuring public control over the agenda, policy proposals, or decision-making. Participatory governance as outlined here includes processes that would fall under the two highest levels, in which the public has control over agenda-setting, decision-making, and/or implementation. What this looks like, practically, can take numerous forms, but in their ideal type PG processes provide for the public generation of priorities and problems as well as a range of possible solutions and ultimately public decisions about the final policy approach. Such public control over policy has been implemented in a range of policy areas, from budgeting and strategic planning, to healthcare and social issues, and to constitutional and electoral reforms.

This expansion of new opportunities for public participation in decision-making has not occurred in a vacuum. The increased attention to the role of popular voice and vote in decision-making has coincided with broader debates about the role of civil society participation in democratic consolidation and maintenance (Diamond 1999; Putnam 1993; Cohen and Arato 1992), the importance of building broadly accountable and/or deliberative political societies (Habermas 1989; Gutman and Thompson 2004; Gastil 2008), the role of decentralization in development (Conyers 1984; Craig and Porter 2006), and the ominous threat of democratic decline in advanced democracies (Macedo et al 2005; Norris 1999, 2011; Putnam 2000). While connected to these broadly overarching debates, the role of direct citizen participation in governing offers distinct theoretical and empirical concerns. Participatory governance is characterized by distinct practices and rules, actors are ordinary citizens rather than (sometimes as well as) political elites, engaged in collective decision-making activities determining public service or political outcomes in their communities. This type of civic participation directs attention to participation at the interface of the public and the state and the explicit creation of a
point of interaction distinct and additional to any opportunities for representation of public voice through the ballot box or advocacy campaign or contentious politics. Significantly, these new institutions represent the formation of an extended interface between citizens and the state, and are neither a development of civil society distinct from the state, nor simply as a form of devolution or decentralization to smaller units of political authority.

The expansion of participatory governance has also produced a relatively coherent and distinct field of study and practice, anchored by professional networks and collaborations (such as the IAP2, NCDD, DDC, Involve, Kettering Foundation, and the Ash Center for Democratic Innovation at Harvard) and seminal texts (e.g. Abers 2000; Fung and Wright 2003; Baiocchi 2005; Smith 2009). The emerging consensus around the stories of canonical cases has served as a focal point for scholarly research and the development of principles of best practices (building especially on existing typologies of participation such as Arnstein's ladder participation). Approaches to PG exemplified by these canonical cases are presented as models, reworked into toolkits, and actively advocated. Nevertheless, as implementation expands into new settings and resolves itself more clearly, there is an increasing need for better comparative analysis and understanding of the implications of variation in the PG models. There is a shared conviction that expanding public participation in governance, if done with genuine cooperation and buy-in by political and government actors, can have a real effect reinvigorating democracy and improving the quality of government.

Complicating consensus: diverse institutions and mixed result

While I can point to the emergence of an increasingly well-consolidated community of practice and scholarly works, the label participatory governance in fact encompasses a diverse range of processes. For example, two of the most commonly cited PG processes are the British
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly for Electoral Reform and Participatory Budgeting, as originated in Porto Alegre in Brazil. In the former, a group of 100 citizens selected by a stratified random sampling approach designed to be broadly representative of the province met over the course of several months to learn and deliberate about electoral rules in order to construct a proposal for a package of reforms to the electoral rules in the province that was put to the public vote in a referendum.¹ In contrast, in the latter, a self-selected (or mobilized by community organizations) group of citizens come together in a series of widely open and inclusive neighborhood meetings where priorities for the city budget are articulated and delegated to committees of members of the community who agree to dedicate considerable amounts of time to refining proposals to be voted on by the city/neighborhood generally, reporting back to their neighborhood throughout the process. These archetypes fall clearly into a common framework of participatory governance, with direct decision-making by members of the general public rather than elected officials or government staff. Nevertheless, they also demonstrate diverse institutional arrangements and varied priorities of approach and outcome. Within the community of PG scholarship, there has been limited research how these choices in the design of these institutions actually matter.

This is not to say that there has been no discussion of how participatory governance in general matters. Scholars and advocates of PG have attributed a range of positive outcomes to PG. Such outcomes have included greater legitimacy of government or a decreased “democratic deficit” (Norris 2011), greater transparency, more equitable distributional outcomes, increased political efficacy at the individual level, and a stronger, more effective civil society (or, in other words, a more ‘civic’ culture). Not only does research on how these innovations matter present

¹ The package of reforms narrowly failed to meet the standard of a 60% necessary for implementation, but it did reach a solid majority of support at 58% (Warren and Pearse 2008).
varied results across a wide range of outcomes all identified as measures of success, but even within the research focusing on each more narrow outcome, evidence is often mixed. There may be a rough consensus on what PG looks like, but the actual record of evidence for its outcomes is less clear. Ultimately, I will argue that the ambivalence in the existing empirical work on PG a reflection of the variation of processes along a spectrum from an emphasis on more ideally participatory vs. more ideally deliberative. Here, I briefly consider the scope of the research on effects from PG in several key outcome areas.

Regarding effects on civil society, different studies have demonstrated a range of results from PG actively catalyzing civic activity to PG having little effect and being dependent on already-mobilized civic actors. Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011) show that PG can support the transformation of civil society activity from clientelist to formalized relations with the state, but at the same time that PG does not actually enable stronger autonomous mobilization of civil. In contrast, Wampler (2012a) offers evidence that participatory budgeting across Brazil encouraged direct negotiation and alliance-building between civil society organizations and Akkerman et al (2004) show that introducing a more participatory “interactive state” encourages the bridging social capital by strengthening overlapping organizational networks. In yet a further contrast, earlier work by Wampler (2007) shows that successful implementation of participatory budgeting in Brazil is actually dependent on a pre-existing well-mobilized civil society.

Looking at PG’s impact on political efficacy and voter behavior, results have been more consistent, but have possibly limited external validity due to the conditions under which effects are observed. In both experimental settings (Morrell 2005) and high-intensity, highly structured forums (Nabatchi 2007, 2010; Gastil et al 2010; Gastil and Xenos 2010; Gastil and Dillard 1999) experiences with facilitated deliberation have been associated with increases in both internal and
external evaluations of political efficacy by participants. Moving into research in more realistic conditions, Knobloch and Gastil (2012) find that general public awareness of a deliberative public decision-making event (the Oregon Citizens Initiative Review) increases external political efficacy while Docherty et al (2008) offer some further general evidence that in communities where participatory processes are implemented see higher levels of reported efficacy (ambiguously defined). Negative results have not been commonly reported, but efficacy in the larger community has not been a primary outcome for evaluations of many real world participatory processes.

In terms of accountability and trust in government, evidence is harder to pin down. Speer 2011 uses fuzzy set QCA on case studies of participatory planning in Guatemala to establish that participatory governance mechanisms can enhance accountability when combined with electoral mechanisms, and that this operates primarily through increasing voters' information about government performance. Brinkerhoff and Azfar (2006) review a number of studies and conclude that "community empowerment" can strengthen accountability and responsiveness in a context of decentralization. Plenty of single case studies and anecdotal describe feelings of greater accountability or trust, but it has been less well established in a social-scientific approach.

Finally, the responses to big questions of redistribution and equity from PG are as uncertain as those of effects on civil society and mobilization: A significant chunk of research has claimed that processes like participatory budgeting increase pro-poor investment and lower poverty rates, or at least quality of life of the poor (World Bank 2008, Avritzer 2010, Donaghy 2011). However, when Boulding and Wampler directly investigate measurable outcomes in communities with PB, they find that overall measurable outcomes of well-being are largely unchanged.
In each of these studies, researchers have used either single case studies or, at most, comparisons within a single model of PG within a single country. We can learn a great deal about how PG works in each case from these works, but have not yet really begun to engage with explanations of why we see this variation in outcome. Might the actual variation in the design of the PG process matter for the outcomes we see?

**Deliberative and participatory democracies**

Taking a step back, it seems reasonable to expect that observed democratic outcomes may vary with the design of the participatory institutions. The development of participatory governance has been building (often quite explicitly) on well-established traditions in democratic theory. On the one hand, PG has drawn from traditions of participatory democracy, with its common emphasis on enabling the general public to be directly responsible for agenda-setting and decision making as both an educative and an empowering process, in combination with a concern for maximizing the inclusiveness and openness of a process. On the other hand, most PG institutions additionally try to embed norms and practices from deliberative democracy, setting aside space for deliberative exchange, with the collection of evidence and information and the articulation of positions and reasoned justifications for those positions. PG innovations are often trying to improve the breadth and depth of public participation in policy making as well as the quality of both the decision process and the policy outcome.

While PG advocates have liberally drawn from both traditions, political theorists have nevertheless long recognized tensions between the normative priorities of deliberative and participatory democrats.\(^2\) This is an extensive, wide-ranging literature, for which I will not provide yet another fully comprehensive review (for good examples of these, see Hauptmann

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However, to outline the distinctions salient to this project, a core tension can be identified in the prioritization of inclusion and learning by the participatory democrats in contrast to the emphasis on reasoned justification in aid of mutual understanding and orientation to the collective good by deliberative democrats.

One classic critique of deliberation raises serious concerns that the association of deliberation with rationality and, often, a particularly Habermasian ideal of the public sphere excludes subaltern publics and those who are not equipped with the time, informational, or linguistic resources to participate in idealized rational discourse (Sanders 1997; Young 1990, 2000; Mouffe 1996; Fraser 1992). Alternatively, there is a commonly voiced concern that people simply do not want, and do not enjoy, deliberating. For example, Mutz (2006) argues that reaching for a standard of deliberation will drive down democratic participation, undermining rather than reinforcing democratic governance while even Mansbridge (often considered a theorist of deliberative democracy) also articulated that deliberation and exposure to conflict can serve as a deterrent to participation (Mansbridge 1983). This is not to overstate an incompatibility between deliberative politics and greater inclusion and participation, but rather to highlight that there are real reasons to suspect that sometime deliberative politics may have mixed results if the objective is maximized participation.³

Deliberative democrats, meanwhile, present concerns that participation without deliberation is the basis of a dysfunctional democracy. The multiple perspectives and reasoned consideration demanded by deliberation as a standard are understood to encourage both the democratic inclusion of the range of public voices and interests and good decision-making which builds on a solid and well-examined base of information (Gastil 2008; Fishkin 2009; Jacobs, 2001 or Bohman 1998).

³ On the interesting empirical question of actual observed participation in democratic events, Scheufele et al (2006), Jacobs et al (2009), and Neblo et al (2010) all present empirical findings providing evidence against these theoretical concerns.
Deliberation thus comes to be seen as a way to reconcile differences and come to recognize what members of the public have in common, encouraging policies for the public good, rather than private interest (Habermas 1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Participation without establishing a framework for deliberation will turn people off, as there are no assurances that their voice will be heard and their perspective accounted for in any final decisions. In this perspective, deliberation is necessary to elicit decisions in the common good while ensuring that a process includes all perspectives and interests fairly.

**Aligning empirical expectations**

Empirical work on PG reflects these contrasting expectations from these theoretical perspectives. The different priorities of deliberative and participatory democrats can be seen in the range of outcomes researchers have chosen to evaluate. Take for example the outcome of political efficacy, a commonly identified outcome from PG. Efficacy is generally understood to be distinguished into internal and external efficacy: respectively one’s sense of personal capabilities to understand and take political action vs. one’s expectation of actually having an impact on political outcomes if action is taken. The choice of a researcher to focus on internal or external efficacy as a salient outcome implicates a theoretical perspective. Ever since Pateman’s seminal (1970) articulation of participatory democracy a primary outcome of participation is understood to be its educative effect, participation as a form of training into the practice of citizenship. In contrast, deliberation leads to an emphasis on external efficacy, whether and how well an observer of a process believes that the input of “a person like themselves” could and did have an impact on the final outcome.⁴

⁴ Knobloch and Gastil (2012) provide an engaging empirical example of this dynamic, when they identify very different mechanisms underpinning changes in internal and external efficacy in the general public.
Similar relationships can be found across the other dominant outcomes of interests in the study of PG. The focus on PG’s impact on civil society, particularly on social mobilization, is largely reflective of participatory priorities. Even such fundamental democratic outcomes as trust and accountability may be more aligned with one or the other tradition in how the concept is operationalized: is trust established by standards of transparency and explanation of reasons by government or by the public having direct access to decisions and decision-makers? Measures of PG’s success in establishing more equitable spending or investment in true public goods may be linked to either tradition, but the mechanisms through which researchers expect this outcome to be generated (and thus the conditions necessary for it to come about) will be dependent on whether success is understood be a result of broad-based meaningful participation, or successful framing of a decision around collective needs. As a final point, democratic legitimacy as an indicator of success cannot be clearly delineated as drawing on one or the other tradition, as each offers a different standard of legitimacy inherent in the theory itself.

**Framing a framework**

I argue that, in fact, the distinct priorities and predictions that emerge from these different theoretical perspectives can be exploited to make sense of the variation in the empirical work existing on PG. I propose a framework for comparison that directly engages with this distinction, building on theoretical insights and the full range of empirical findings to structure a rigorous comparative evaluation of PG.

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5 Some might even argue, using a deliberative standard, that a measure of a successful PG process is in fact whether it limits patterns of direct social mobilization and advocacy outside the controlled ‘balanced’ framework of a deliberative decision process (the prescription against public lobbying of courtroom juries is an ideal example of this dynamic).
Community and Assembly: two models of participatory governance:

There are many ways that the implementation of PG may vary. In establishing this framework I focus specifically on variation in the formal rules governing PG (rather than on its framing, the area of policy concern, the origination of the initial impulse for participation, or the dominant party providing political context, among others). Rules are established in response to a range of demands and interests, and certainly not entirely on the basis of carefully articulated normative ideals. Nevertheless, actual variation in PG can be seen to reflect different normative compromises.

Considering the variation that exists within the PG institutions observable on the ground, it is possible to differentiate PG institutions into two general clusters of approaches to public engagement: one with a highly deliberative mode of communication and limited participant selection with a fixed number of participants and random selection into the process (Assembly) and another that prioritizes mass participation via self-selection and selective recruitment for representativeness, with less of a narrow focus on deliberative communication (Community). As Fung (2012) explains, choices during design may be made to respond to particular democratic deficits that reformers have identified. In this sense, priorities articulated by democratic theorists are reflected or even amplified during design. Nevertheless, the empirical work around outcomes from PG has not exploited this variation as well as it could have, in order to understand when and why participatory governance broadly considered may seemingly have different effects in the community.

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6 The dimensions along which I am classifying approaches to PG are informed by Archon Fung’s (2006, 2012) approach to classifying on the diversity of approaches to public participation. He has identified three important dimensions of variation in institutional design: participant selection (including self-selection, selective recruitment, random selection), communication and decision mode (for example: expressive, aggregative, or deliberative), and extent of decision authority (reflecting Arnstein’s ladder). Given my definition of PG, I am only interested in the empowered end of his authority spectrum, and when considering the placement actual empowered instances of participation along the remaining two dimensions, tend to fall into these two clusters of traits that I identify as Assembly and Community models.
These two general trajectories of institutional design reflect different priorities given to the depth of participation versus the quality of deliberation and with distinct rules about selection of participants and the structure of information-sharing and discussion. The Assembly approach emphasizes high quality reasoned deliberation by a subset of the public, a statistically representative group drawn from the general public who meet and become experts on an issue or set of policy problems to come to a decision meant to stand in for an informed public. In practice, this approach is exemplified by the British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly described above. Alternatively, the Community approach emphasizes participatory and socially embedded decision-making, and is usually open to any interested parties with quality of representation determined by the number and descriptive representativeness of people who participated. The Porto Alegre experience with Participatory Budgeting mentioned earlier can be held up as an exemplar of this approach.

To further illustrate this distinction, consider the following hypothetical pair of examples: A midsized municipality decides, for whatever reason, to implement participatory governance. They are particularly interested in developing more community involvement in allocating discretionary components of the municipal budget. Local government officials, perhaps with the participation of civil society and community leaders look around at existing models of PG to use. Based on existing case studies and developed expertise from organizational leaders in the field (such as from the International Association of Public Participation, National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, or the practitioner networks supported by Involve), they identify two possible approaches:

1. (Assembly): Organizers are committed to maintaining a broad representation of the priorities of the general public and to allowing for a transparent and deliberate
consideration of challenges and possible solutions. The city decides to convene a representative sample of the public, which draws together a stratified random sample of people from across the city for several months of repeated meetings, structured learning from experts and civil society organizations, and moderated discussion ultimately producing a set of budget priorities and allocations sent to the city administration for implementation.

2. (Community): Organizers are committed to broad inclusion of the interested public and building on familiar meeting structures of public participation. The city decides to have an open process whereby anyone is invited to a series of accessible neighborhood-based meetings where issues and problems are articulated, priorities formed, and decisions on budget allocations made, and aggregated at the municipal level through elected delegates to a city-wide body.

The final choice to implement of either of these models will reflect the different priorities and institutional resources, as well as the preferences, of the dominant local advocates for civic innovation in combination with the interests of the politicians and/or officials who have decided to implement participatory reforms. While implementation along either approach is part of a common trend toward participatory governance, often carried by the same justifications and declared motivations, the particular design choice will likely generate differences in impact depending on the approach. This is where renewing connections between practices of participatory governance and democratic theory can become helpful. While in practice, participatory governance innovations draw on both normative traditions, the different strength of each tradition in the process as implemented can be a guide to designate likely outcomes, helping to build a framework to guide comparative work. While insights from democratic theory can
help generate well-reasoned complex predictions, a detailed empirical understanding of the mechanisms through which different models of PG have the effects that they do (or do not!) can help to clarify how these ideal models of democracy play out in fact. A comparative analysis of PG highlights how the deliberative and participatory ideals, in fact operate simultaneously in our political practices. Rather than representing a choice to be made between ideal visions of democracy, recognizing the tensions between participatory and deliberative democracy can actually help to understand why subtle differences in the design of PG institutions may have dramatic effects on the outcomes.

**Observable implications**

Building on these contrasting expectations from participatory and deliberative theory, in combination with research elsewhere in political behavior and communication, it is possible to outline a set of expectations for empirical implications. Recognizing the importance of seemingly minor choices about the process and conditions of implementation can help to generate empirical expectations which can incorporate a diversity of possible outcomes, even from “successfully” implemented PG processes. At least in part, this can help to explain the ambivalence of some of the empirical record on PG.

In general terms, the Community model (when implemented effectively and in good faith) can be expected to increase perceptions of internal political efficacy, levels of community mobilization and density of civil society networks, accountability, and (assuming equitable representation and support during the process) may result in more equitable or pro-poor policy outcomes. On the other hand, under ideal conditions the Assembly model may be broadly expected to generate increased perceptions of external efficacy, greater trust in government, and (depending on the information and framing available in deliberations) result in more equitable
community-oriented policy outcomes. Obviously, many of these outcomes are themselves related, and this is an oversimplified representation of outcomes as they may be actually observed. For example, if new information does not reveal untrustworthy behavior by government, greater accountability may in turn generate more trust, or implementation of more equitable policies may in turn generate stronger senses of external political efficacy. Thus, actual testing of these claims as hypotheses through observation of distinct outcomes from either approach will be complex and difficult using a purely observational statistical approach.

Table 1: Participatory governance reform: ideal outcomes and their conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Direct outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◦ increased internal efficacy</td>
<td>◦ increased external efficacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>◦ increased public mobilization</td>
<td>◦ greater trust in government</td>
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<tr>
<td>◦ denser civil society</td>
<td>◦ more equitable policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>◦ greater accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>◦ more equitable policies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◦ broad early outreach</td>
<td>◦ wide publicity during and especially after process, including</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◦ well-managed inclusive process</td>
<td>◦ accurate and detailed information on process and participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>◦ buy-in from government officials includes adequate information for good decision-making</td>
<td>◦ deliberation facilitation activates collective preferences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ full information on all community needs included</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Either approach is also dependent on government officials acting in good faith and implementing decisions generated by the public through PG. Without real commitment from government the process does not meet the core conceptual standards of PG and may be understood at best as a process of consultation and at worst cooptation and demobilization.</td>
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In addition to these broadly distinct causal arcs, approaching PG by distinguishing Community and Assembly models also highlights different conditions necessary for participatory reforms to have the anticipated positive democratic impact. To have a broad impact in the community, Assembly approaches to PG will be highly dependent on publicity, specifically publicity toward the end of the process and during implementation of any decisions and publicity
that communicates a relatively nuanced level of reporting on the composition of the assembly and the deliberative process it followed. Participants must be understood by the rest of the general public to be “people like me” and the inclusion and consideration of a range of perspectives must be clearly communicated. If better or more equitable decisions result from the assembly, more positive results may eventually be seen, but may not be understood to be directly attributed to the process itself. Community approaches have their own conditions for impact: publicity (in the form of outreach into the process) is critically important in the early stages of the process in order to maximize participation and with discussion and decision within the process effectively open to all participants.

Table 1 above outlines these effects and conditions for each model. It can be seen that the more participatory Community model is in fact dependent on a degree of deliberation as a condition for successful impact, while the Assembly model is dependent on a participatory principles of inclusion. In this way, examining the dynamics of democratic innovation as it plays out on the ground can in fact help temper the apparent tensions between participatory and deliberative democracy.

Conclusion

The direct engagement with variation in the implementation of PG reforms is critically important to building a basis of evidence about how participatory governance matters. While numerous descriptive case studies exist, systematic comparative research on PG institutions, especially their outcomes, is still an emerging field of study. Initial research on participatory governance innovations focused on explanations of why PG emerged in specific cases, typologies of innovations (Smith 2009; Fung 2006), and, later, describing and explaining variation in the successful implementation of similar processes within a country (McNulty 2011;
Wampler 2007). Scholarship is now turning to the question of evaluating impact, but has lacked a strong framework with which to understand divergent outcomes and diverse models while maintaining a focus on the common class of participatory governance reforms.

This examination of the impacts of these different models will also help to connect the discussions of theorists of participatory and deliberative democracy to on the ground democratic experiments. While to some extent distinctions between deliberative and participatory ideals have been set aside in the course of practical implementation, theorists have repeatedly outlined tensions between the normative priorities of deliberative and participatory democrats. Without arguing that one approach is universally ‘better’ than the other, by disaggregating PG this project will allow for an improved understanding of the impact of these philosophical dilemmas on the political opportunities and lives of people in actually existing democracies. The existence of a debate between participatory and deliberative democrats, and the implications for divergent design priorities in application should not be taken to mean that these choices are all mutually exclusive. Rather, recognizing these distinct theoretical roots helps to clarify the complexity of the choices of design and implementation, and supports a more nuanced understanding of what these choices may mean for democratic outcomes.

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