COVID-19 and the 2020 Latinx Vote: Teetering Between Anxiety and Hope in Times of Uncertainty

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Abstract

COVID-19 continues to wreak havoc in communities of color in the United States. The pandemic has exacerbated cracks within our healthcare system, political infrastructures and throughout our global economy. Despite having more to lose in the pandemic's mishandling and occupying the majority of the essential workforce during the crisis, how can we explain COVID-19 skepticism within one of the hardest hit communities? Though Latinxs still voted for Biden at a 2:1 ratio, they are a group for whom partisan loyalties do not run deep. Swing voters are especially prominent among the more religious and evangelical subsets of the Latinx electorate. Thus, we turn to the role of religiosity and linked fate within the Latinx community to unpack the 2020 vote and opinions about COVID-19. This project leverages data from a sample of Latinx adults from the 2020 American National Election Study (n=786). As people managed varying levels of anxiety throughout the pandemic, we turn to religiosity to test whether one's faith helped them manage their anxiety and hope leading up to the election. We test whether COVID-skepticism was largely driven by their levels of anxiety, which are moderated by people's desires to their sense of control during the pandemic. Among those with a strong sense of linked fate, they are more likely to perceive a stronger sense of COVID-19 risk because they are more likely to be aware of its disprortionate impact on communities of color. Thus, those with strong linked fate and high levels of anxiety are more likely to express support for COVID-19 protocols and less support for Trump.

Introduction

The 2020 general election laid the groundwork for new voting records to be set. We know the popular vote reached new heights (with over 159 million Americans voting), and President Biden was the first president to win more than 80 million votes, eclipsing voter turnout from the last time records were set (in 2008)(Lindsay 2020). According to the Pew Research Center (2020), three-fourths of most of the growth in the electorate in the last twenty years was based on non-white voters exercising the franchise. Latinxs were the largest voting minority group, for the first time in history, occupying 13.3 percent of the electorate (relative to 13 percent among African Americans), nearly doubling their turnout rate from 2008. Immigrants turned out at record rates as well (Weiyi Cai and Ford Fessenden 2020).

Beyond major gains made in the proportion of the electorate turning out to vote, how did Latinxs vote? How did immigrants vote in 2020? Though Donald Trump implemented restrictive immigration policies and often use vitriolic language that were largely expected to alienate immigrants and voters of color, he surprisingly gained the lion's share of the immigrant electorate, making gains among Latinxs and Asians, relative to how he did in 2016 (Weiyi Cai and Ford Fessenden 2020). The inroads made within immigrant communities partially explains how he increased his Latinx support from 2016 (29 percent) to 2020 (32 percent). However, other scholars are less surprised by these trends. Partisan loyalties do not run deep for Latinx and Asian subsets of the electorate (Hajnal and Lee 2011; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). In fact, among a sample of Latinx immigrants (including those who are naturalized), nearly 36 to 41 percent express party ambivalence when it comes to which party better represents the interests of either Latinxs, Hispanics or immigrants (McCann and Jones-Correa 2021).

Since we know the Latinx electorate is complex and diverse, it is important to note the top leading issues people prioritized this past year were the economy (80 percent), health care (76 percent), and the Coronavirus outbreak (72 percent) (Pew Research Center 2020). The Coronavirus outbreak clearly impacted concerns about health care and the economy, particularly as the virus wreaked havoc in multiple aspects of people's lives. Gamboa (2020) finds that Latinxs were disproportionately represented in the fatality rate across the country, resulting in more than 54,000 fatalities, a rate that is 3 times higher than that of the non-Latinx white population. In a recent Voto Latinx poll, 73 percent of Latinx people surveyed knew someone who had COVID-19, and a third of the sample knew someone who died of the illness (Hassanein 2021). Guynn and Murphy Marcos (2021) find that only 36 percent of Latinxs said they would definitely get vaccinated, compared to 46 percent among non-Latinx whites. Latinx populations are less likely to report accurate information about vaccine availability and modes of transmission (Christensen et al. 2020).

Less work is focused on Latinx public opinion surrounding COVID-19 and how it factored into the 2020 election. Some of the omitted variables in the 2020 election are that of religiosity and racial group concerns, concerns which likely had cross-cutting effects on people's support for COVID-19 protocol and GOP/Trump support. In particular, we expect Trump's messages regarding the exaggeration of COVID-19 to resonate most with those who saw COVID-19 disrupt their everyday lives, including their religious practices. As such, we expect those who are higher on this religiosity scale to be most COVID-skeptical. It is especially important to consider the importance of one's religious identity (and other important social identities) among newer Americans who have not expressed strong party loyalties (Hajnal and Lee 2011). The prevalence of non-partisanship or weak partisan ties among Latinx voters (and

Asian)—electorates that are large immigrant communities—confirms the importance of shifting our focus to more salient identities to make sense of their public opinion (Hajnal and Lee 2011). As such, it is also important to include measures for one's racial identity and sense of group consciousness, especially given the role of race in shaping people's lived experiences (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Sanchez 2006). We also know the looming racial disparities of COVID-19 may have rung more salient for those who have a strong sense of group consciousness.

Are reported levels of anxiety conditional upon one's religiosity, meaning is religiosity serving as a coping mechanism in times of uncertainty? Do those with a greater sense of religiosity tend to be COVID-skeptical and more in favor of voting for Trump? By honing on in on the role of religiosity, and its conditional effect on anxiety and enthusiasm, we will better understand how Trump made inroads with large immigrant groups in 2020. And due to the disproportionate impact COVID-19 had on communities of color, to what extent are perceived levels of anxiety and enthusiasm moderated by one's sense of linked fate?

Affective Intelligence, Religiosity and Group Solidarity

Albertson and Gadarian (2015) point to affective intelligence theories to better understand how anxious politics take hold of people's evaluations of candidates and public opinions in times of crisis. When people are in threatening political environments, their brains are triggered into a more vigilant and careful thought-processing mode (known as our surveillance system), so as to protect one from the threats at hand (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2004). The emotions triggered during a crisis tend be anxiety-based. Under the surveillance system, one often seeks more information at this time to curb the threat, they turn to more authoritarian leaders to handle the threat on their behalf (boosted trust), and they revisit

their prior political beliefs. Under the *surveillance system*, we see a more loosened grip of one's political party predispositions and people are more likely to change their routine news consumptions habits (e.g. seeking more information) (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Again, the more anxious one is, the more likely they are to trust in more authoritarian figures. The less control one has over their situation, the more likely citizens express more anxiety.

To the extent that religiosity provides a sense of control in adversity, especially as people rely on their faith to help them push through the difficult circumstances, then people are probably less likely to report high levels of anxiety during the pandemic. Those who believe the government shutdown response to the pandemic was exaggerated, will likely also benefit from a sense of reduced threat (boosting their sense of control), and lower levels of anxiety. When one is in a more enthusiasm or hope-inducing environments, they are more likely to process that information through the *disposition system*, where they rely more likely to rely on their predispositions, as they are less alert and less likely to seek more information (Marcus et al. 2004).

We turn to religiosity in this paper because we expect it to be a means for people to handle the uncertainty, distress and rollercoaster of emotions the pandemic has posed (Bentzen et al. 2020; Pirutinsky et al. 2020; Asma, 2018). Thus, aside from providing access to social support (even through virtual gatherings) (Pirutinsky et al. 2020), we argue that religiosity provides people with a sense of hope and emotion regulation (Asma, 2018). The role of hope in motivating action and helping people navigate adversity (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Phoenix 2020). It is important to account for ways in which negative and positive emotions serve as feedback to inform people's decision-making behaviors (Cruz Nichols 2017; Vasi and Macy 2003; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Leventhal 1970; Rogers and Mewborn 1976). Fear shakes a

person out of their routines (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2006), while hope reinforces one's commitment to their goals because they see a pathway leading to improvements for their group (Cruz Nichols 2017; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Cohen-Chen and Van Zomermen 2018). Religiosity can also serve as a source of optimism and hope for many people managing the uncertainty facing the country in 2020. Because enthusiasm among the most religious would make one more reliant on their predispositions (prior political beliefs and parties), we expect enthusiasm among the most religious to have a conservatizing effect and reducing levels of support for COVID-19 protocols.

On the other hand, one's sense of linked fate may likely magnify one's sense of perceived threat and the devastating effects its had on the Latinx community and frontline workers. Thus, the effect of anxiety will be conditional on one's religiosity. If one is COVID-skeptical, they are also less supportive of candidates wanting more COVID restrictions (less support for Biden, more supportive of Trump) (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). The more religious one is, the less anxious they are about crises, leading them to be less supportive of both COVID protocols and candidates who advocate for more COVID safety measures. The more heightened one's sense of linked fate, the more aware one would be of the racial disparities COVID-19 has caused, causing them to be more anxious (and less enthusiastic) overall, leading them to be less supportive of both COVID protocols and candidates who advocate for more COVID safety measures.

As for the interactive effects we expect to find, we have laid out two hypotheses based on how religiosity (H4) and linked fate (H5) would condition people's emotional responses. Religiosity lends itself for community empowerment (Kelly and Morgan 2008), especially given the role of the church in mobilizing political activity for both African American communities

(Phoenix 2020; Laird and White 2020) and civic engagement skills for immigrant communities who are dealing with hostile political environments (Garcia 2020; Azab and Santoro 2017).

In fact, Phoenix (2020) argues that hope should be particularly mobilizing for an electorate with generally low agency "as hope inspires optimism for change regardless of the individual's capacity to realize it" (p. 158). Hope is an essential foundation of the African American discourse and political experience, especially when envisioning collective visions of change (Phoenix 2020). Along the same lines, optimism has been a source of strength of for many immigrant communities in the U.S. McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) find evidence for persevearance and a steadfast commitment to democratic values among Latino immigrants, including their desires to belong and willingness to exercise their political voice, despite living in locales with more restricting immigration policies.

Phoenix (2020) delves more deeply into the role of racial solidarity and linked fate as it relates to the effect of anger on action. He finds that anger is not the most likely pathway through which linked fate's capability to promote political activity among African Americans (Phoenix 2020, p. 141). Instead, Phoenix (2020) argues racial solidarity and linked fate are likely most mobilizing due to the sense of racial pride or optimism they trigger. He finds pride to be particularly mobilizing for African Americans and other communities of color, especially when considering multiple forms of political participation (ranging from volunteering, attending a meeting, protesting, boycotting, etc.).

Based on the literataure we have reviewed regarding the main effect and expected moderating effects of religiosity and linked fate, we have laid out the following hypotheses below.

Hypotheses:

H1: Feeling less anxious (more enthusiasm) is associated with lower (greater) levels of support of COVID-19 protocols and greater (lower) support for GOP/Trump.

H2: Greater levels of religiosity, will be associated with lower levels of COVID-19 compliance and more support for GOP/Trump.

H3: Greater levels of linked fate, will be associated with higher levels of COVID-19 compliance and less support for GOP/Trump.

H4 (*emotions conditioned by religiosity): We expect the effect of anxiety (risk perceptions) and enthusiasm to be conditional on one's level of religiosity. Reduced levels of anxiety among the more religious will results in lower levels of COVID-restrictiosn and more support for the GOP/Trump. Higher levels of enthusiasm among the more religious will result in lower levels of COVID-19 protocols and higher levels of support for the GOP/Trump.*

H5 (*emotions conditioned by linked fate)*: *We expect the effect of anxiety (risk perceptions) and enthusiasm to be conditional on one's sense of linked fate as it relates to pandemic handling and vote choice. Higher levels of anxiety will result among high identifiers will result in more approval of strict COVID-19 protocols and more disapproval of the GOP. More enthusiasm among high identifiers will result in greater support for COVID-19 protocols and lower levels of Trump support.*

Data and Methods:

In this manuscript we rely on the American National Election Studies Time Series 2020 and we restrict our analyses to a nationally representative sample of 786 self-identified Latinx adults. Due to unprecedented times in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the ANES assigned participants to 1 of 3 survey modes: web-only, mixed web (web or phone) and and mixed video (video, web or phone).[1] Participants completed the post-election survey in the same mode as the pre-election survey. The pre-election survey was fielded from August of 2020 until Election Day, and the post-election survey was fielded the day after the election through the end

[1] For more details on the sampling frame, recruitment method and survey mode, we refer readerst to the ANES 2020 Time Series user guide and codebook: https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/anes_timeseries_2020_userguidecodebook_20220210.pdf

December 2020. Eligible participants had to be U.S. citizens who are 18 or older at the time of recruitment living in a residential address within any of the 50 United States or the District of Columbia. Our analyses are weighted and include several demographic controls. Our outcome measures are coded in a continuous (COVID-related beliefs) or dichotomous (vote choice intent) structure, as such we employ linear regression models and logit models where appropriate.

Outcome Measures:

Our first dependent variables focus on 1.) whether people perceive COVID-restrictions to be too strict, and 2.) approval of the GOP's future handling of the pandemic. The measures are standardized from 0 to 1. The restrictions question read, "Do you think the limits your state placed on public activity because of the COVID-19 pandemic were far too strict, somewhat too strict, about right, not quite strict enough, or not nearly strict enough?" Higher values represent those who felt the limits were "far too strict." The second measure was a 5-item categorical measure that asked, "Which party do you think would do a better job of handling the COVID-19 pandemic." The options were standardized from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning "the Republicans would do a much better job," .5 meaning "Not much difference between them," and 0 meaning "Democrats would do a much better job." When estimating these two dependent measures, I rely on OLS regression models.

The final two dependent variables are based on 3.) how people evaluated Trump's job performace on COVID-handling (1= approve, 0= disapprove), and 4.) whether people intended to vote for him in the 2020 election (1 = Trump, 0 = Biden). These last two dependent variables are dichotomous and thus require a nonlinear logit model estimation technique.

Moderators:

Religiosity

Since we expect messages regarding the exaggeration of COVID-19 to resonate most with those who saw COVID-19 disrupt their everyday lives, including their religious practices, we expect those who are higher level of religiosity to be most COVID-skeptical. The religiosity scale is based on a composite scale made up of religious importance, beliefs in Bible origins and and church attendance. We expect religious importance to play a large role in predicting COVID-skepticism beliefs. Religious importance is based on a 5-point Likert scale, asking "How important is religion in your life?" The 5 category options ranged from "not important at all" to "extremely important." The continuous measure is used across all the analyses. Church attendance is an additional dimension of religiosity, and the dichotomous measure (1=yes, 0=no) taps into whether people attend church outside of occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals. The final measure in the composite scale asks about Bible origins. The questionnaire provides 4 options for people to choose from to describe their feelings about the Bible and how literally it should be interpreted. The response options are coded from 0 to 1, with higher values meaning it is the actual word of God and should be taken literally. The religiosity scale is similar to the religious traditionalism scales developed by previous scholars who are focused on the role of religiosity in the political calculus of diverse electorates (Kelly and Morgan 2008; McKenzie and Rouse 2013).

Linked Fate

When considering the issue agenda of a community, stronger perceptions of linked fate have been very important resources and heuristics in the existing literature of public opinion and

political behavior for communities of color in the U.S. (Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2006). We use a measure of linked fate in our models, which consists of a 4-category question ranging from not at all, not very much, some and a lot. The question read, "How much do you think that what happens generally to Hispanic people in this country will affect what happens in your life?" Higher values on this measure equate to feelings of a strong sense of panethnic Latino identity. Individuals with high levels of group identification also are more likely to mobilize in response to group attacks so as to protect their politicized Latinx identity (Perez 2015; Zepeda-Millán 2017).

Emotion – Anxiety and Enthusiasm

The emotion measures in the ANES asks participants about emotions at different timepoints. We rely on the meaures regarding more global emotions. "How [worried/nervous] do you feel about how things are going in the country?" The 5 category options range from not at all to extremely. We combined these two 5-catgory measures into a continuous scale of anxiety, recoded to range from 0 to 1 (feeling high levels of both worry and nervousness). Similarly, we combine measures of hope and pride to create a cotinuous enthusiasm scale.

To test the conditional effect of anxiety and the ways religion provides people with a means to cope with the stress, we interact anxiety with *religiosity* terms. We also want to test the conditional effect of enthusiasm and the source of hope religion provides, so we interact hope with religiosity. Furthermore, we also want to test the extent to which one's level of anxiety might be more heightened among those who have a stronger sense of *linked fate*, especially as the threat of COVID-19 and the many systems the pandemic has disrupted feel more salient to communities of color. Simultaneously, we could see those who have a strong sense of linked fate

having a greater sense of enthusiasm as a strong group identity and exposure to more group-bsed relief efforts could help one see the light at the end of the tunnel more easily.

For ease of interpretation, we run the interactions based on dichotomous versions of these emotion scales (with values at the midpoint and higher being equal to 1, while everything else equals 0). As a robustness check, our results also hold when using the continuous emotion scales as well.

Controls:

The *socioeconomic* and *sociodemographic* controls are ideology (7-item, higher values lean more conservative), partisanship (7-item, higher values leaning more Republican), home language (Spanish=1), highest level of education and age. We also control for household income. Regarding *political engagement*, we include whether the respondent follows campaign coverage, whether they trust the media and whether trust the government. Each of these items operationalize the information bubble and whether respondents are more amenable to the CDC's COVID-19 protocols recommonedations. The "follow campaign coverage" item also captures how exposed people were to Trump's message in some states. To account for the potential predictive effect of religious denomination, we use the following dummy variables as controls: Secular (baseline), other religion, Catholic, and Protestant. Since we know there is a large portion of the evangelical vote is COVID-skeptical and they were known as swing voters in previous elections (Wong 2018; Espinosa 2012, 2020), we controlled for religious identity throughout our models. In terms of another dimension of group consciousness, previous scholars have also emphasized the sense of discrimination. Thus, aside from linked fate, we control for measures of experienced discrimination as well.

Results

We first estimate results with basic multilevel regression results and logit models. The first two outcome measures in Table 1 are focused on COVID-19 handling. The first dependent variable captures whether one believes their state's COVID-19 protocols have been too strict, and the second dependent variable is based on which party they feel is better equipped to handle the pandemic. The two models depicted below in Table 1 are based on continuous outcome measures, and thus we use OLS regression estimation techniques.[2]

[Insert Table 1 here]

The most important independent variables central to our theory are listed in chronological order, chief among them being people's sense of anxiety and enthusiasm, religiosity and linked fate. We also highlight controls for ideology and partisanship throughout our models. As a reminder of our initial hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3), we predicted higher levels of anxiety would be associated with lower support for COVID-19 protocols and greater approval of GOP/Trump.

We find that greater levels of anxiety are correlated with more approval of the Democratic Party to handle COVID-19 (Model 2), in line with our expectations. People who are more anxious abou the trajectory of the country are also less approving of then-President Trump at the time. Finally, more anxiety was associated with a lower predicted likelihood in voting for Trump. Again, all three of these findings are in line with our first hypothesis. In fact, we find the inverse is true for enthusiasm across all four measures. As we laid out in H1, we also expected

[2] We present abbreviated results in Table 1 for ease of readability. The fully specified model is available in Appendix A (Table 3A).

enthusiasm to be a strong and positively correlated predictor of COVID-19 protocol disapproval, more favorale opinions of the GOP, approving of Trump's record and a pro-Trump vote.

We find that as affective intelligence scholars might expect, there are divergent effects depending on whether you are anxious or hopeful about the direction the country is heading in (Marcus et al. 2000; Alberston and Gadarian 2015). An anxious mindset triggers the brain's surveillance system in processing information, and one remains more open to new information and revisting their predispositions (including party loyalties and typical news consumption patterns). In this anxious state, subjects are more likely to comply with more authoritarian leadership (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), or in this case a more heavy-handed approach to COVID-19 protocols; this is particularly true as those who are more anxious would perceive the pandemic to be a more real threat and they are looking for more assertive leaders to squelch that threat and change course for the country (Gadarian et al. 2020; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Feeling a greater sense of hope also is processed through our brain's disposition system, and we are less open or willing to revisit our predispositions or engaged in new action. Without a threat, our brains and modes of operations are less vigilant, and we might expect those respondents to not see the need for a strong authoritarian response to a pandemic (especially if they see it being blown out of proportion).

Moving onto Hypothesis 2, we focus on the effect of religiosity on people support for COVID-19 protocols and opinions about the GOP/Trump. We expect the main effect of religiosity to be positively correlated with more disapproval of health protocols, more approving of the GOP's handling and more approving of then-President Trump. The only statistically distinguishable result was based on predicting vote choice. Higher levels of religiosity amounted

to a greater predicted likelihood in voting for Trump (Model 4).[3] The more traditional one is in their view about religion, the more likely they are to be more favorable towards Trump, which was in line withour expectation. Some of this may have to do with the more religious people having more conservative views on marriage and abortion, which have been more aligned with the more conservative Republican agenda.

When it comes to linked fate (Hypothesis 3) and utlitizing this group-based measure as a proxy for one's interess and group solidarity, linked fate is expected to be negatively correlated with disapproving of COVID-19 protocols as well as voting for Trump. In other words, those with strong levels of linked fate are expected to be more likely to agree with COVID protocols (should be a negative coefficient in Table 1, Model 1). A strong sense of linked fate should be negatively correlated with approving of the GOP's handling of the pandamic, Trump's job performance and a Trump ticket at the ballot. We find support for Hypothesis 3 in Table 1 when focusing on two outcome measures: approving of COVID-19 protocols and Trump vote choice (Models 1 and 4). The higher the level of linked fate, the more likely you are to be in agreement with COVID-19 protocols. However, higher levels of linked fate were linked with lower predicted likelihoods in voting for Trump.

Individuals with high levels of group identification also are more likely to mobilize in response to group attacks so as to protect their politicized Latinx identity (Perez 2015; Zepeda-

[3] We also controlled for denominations in additional robustness checks. These results are available in Appendix B. This is worth further explorations, especially since our null results may be a function of small sample size and lack of ability to test more detailed denomination specifications.

Millán 2017). In this case, perhaps these high-identifiers are aware of the racial disparities in COVID-19 cases and fatalities, and they are more willing to support their state's COVID-19 protocols so as to reduce the likelihood of additional fatalities in their black and brown communities. So, among participants with a high sense of linked fate, they are more likely keenly aware of the racialized rhetoric throughout Trump's campaign trail and the racial disparaties of the pandemic, thus they would be less likely to vote for him. Along with his rhetoric, they are more likely to be aware of his anti-immigration policies, which is consequential upon reviewing the literature on the role of anti-immigrant legislative threats (Zepeda-Millan 2017; Jordan Wallace et al. 2014). Anti-immigrant legislation politicizes Latino identities because of their broad and racialized impacts among Latinx communities, regardless of one's nativity or citizenship status (Zepeda-Millan 2017). These linked fate results hold throughout subsequent analyses in the paper.

Across all 4 models, we see some support that partisanship does matter (and in ways that conform with the literature). Among those who identify more closely with the Republican party report higher likelihoods of disapproving of COVID-19 protocols, approving of the GOP and Trump, as well being in favor of voting for Trump. Furthemore, ideology is also in the anticipated directions, as more conservative respondents were more likely to express higher levels of approval for the GOP's COVID-19 handling, Trump's job as president, and they were also more likely to express a higher probability of voting for Trump in the general election.[4]

[4] Some might wonder if partisanship would be a large driver of one's emotional response. We also tested whether partisanship moderated people's leves of anxiety (enthusiasm). By and large, partisanship did not tend to have a moderating effect on anxiety across our dependent

Results – Moderating Effects

What we argue here is that the causal mechanism behind religiosity lies in its ability to manage one's anxiety. Religiosity is a coping mechanism for folks who are under a lot of uncertainty, particularly relevant in a pandemic. So, religiosity is likely providing people with some assurance that God is in control and that their lives are in God's hands. In this case, religious importance is a helpful resource to help people cope with the ways the pandemic derailed so much for them. Thus, the effect of anxiety will be conditional on one's religiosity. If one is a COVID-skeptic, they are also less supportive of candidates wanting more COVID restrictions (less support for Biden, more supportive of Trump) (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Moving onto the interaction effect findings between emotions and religiosity, we turn to Table 2.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

We see that religiosity helped people manage their anxiety, particularly when asked about which party was more equipped to handle COVID-19 and whether they approved of the president's job performance (Models 2 and 3). We also see that the role of religiosity also conditions people's enthusiasm regarding which party is more equipped (Model 2) and vote choice (Model 4).

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

To best visualize the interaction effect findings, Figure 1 contains the marginal effects of anxiety and religiosity while estimating opinions about COVID-19 protocols. Moving from left

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variables, with the exception of evaluating COVID-19 protocols. Among those who were reported feeling more anxiety, Republican-leaning voters tended to report higher levels of disapproval of COVID-19 protocols. We provide these results in Appendix B.

to right on the x-axis scale of religiosity (with more religiosity levels on the right side), we see that anxiety is the driving force behind people's opinions about COVID-19 protocols, but the biggest distinctions are between those who are more religious. Meaning among those who were worried, even if they had a strong sense of religious importance, they were more compliant with COVID protocols (less willing to see the protocols were too strict). Whereas among those who did not express anxiety about the country's direction, they were typically most disapproving of COVID-19 protocols, but we start to see these results approach levels of statistical significance past the midpoint level of religiosity. The lower panel in Figure 1 plots the results for the enthusiasm and religiosity interaction effect. We find that feeling good about the direction of the country was definitely correlated with higher levels of saying COVID-19 protocols were too strict, but these results were most distinguishable among those who were on the high end of religiosity. Thus, along the low end of religiosity or no religiosity, people are processing their sense of anxiety and enthusiasm in similar ways. As for those with greater levels of religiosity, the effect of one's emotions are aligning with affective intelligence theory expectations. The more anxious one is, the more likely they are to approve of more strict ways to deal with the threats before them (these anxious emotions are processed through the surveillance system); affective intelligence theories also expose those who feel more enthusiastic to rely more on their previous predispositions (processed through the disposition system). Given the modest slopes in Figure 1, we can see the more religious one is, the more likely they are to be committed to their sense of hope and anxiety (it is not like either line is flat).

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

In terms of Model 3, approval of the president's job performance, we start to see more distinct results as we move along the religiosity scale. In Table 2 we saw the interaction effect

between religiosity and emotions emerged as statistically distinguishable from zero. The plotted marginal effects allow us to see what is driving that effect. Interestingly, based on the slope in Figure 2, we see those who are more religious and do not feel anxious are much more approving of Trump's performance. There is no movement along the religiosity scale for those who do feel anxiety about the country's direction. These results are similar for the interaction between enthusiasm and religiosity. Those who are not enthusiastic about the country do not really see their evaluations of the president's job change according to their levels of religiosity. Those who are enthusiastic about the direction of the country are more approving of President Trump and the effect of such enthusiasm only heightens as we move along higher levels of religiosity.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

In terms of vote choice, again the impact of enthusiasm is only magnified as we move along the religiosity scale. This makes sense because Republican candidates have always done well among the more religious communities, especially more protestant communities. Based on these findings, the more religious Latinx communities are driven to the polls by enthusiasm. The top panel of Figure 3 demonstrates the results for anxiety and religiosity. The impact of anxiety is not impacted by levels of religiosity when focused on this vote choice outcome. Religious communities are not driven by anxiety, at least not among Latinx communities.

[**Insert Table 3 about here]**

The impact of one's anxiety and enthusiasm is moderated by one's sense of linked fate, but only when estimating COVID-19 protocols (Model 1) and which party is best equipped to handle the pandemic (Model 2). This makes sense, particularly as the greater sense of group consciousness would increase the awareness of the racial disparities excacerbated by the pandemic. This interaction term in Table 3 allows us to test Hypothesis 5. *Higher levels of*

anxiety will result among high identifiers will result in more approval of strict COVID-19 protocols and more disapproval of the GOP. More enthusiasm among high identifiers will result in greater support for COVID-19 protocols and lower levels of Trump support (H5). We find that enthusiasm is not conditioned by one's sense of linked fate. However, we do find partial support for Hypothesis 5 when focused on anxiety and the moderating effect of linked fate.

[Insert Figures 4 and 5]

Among those with higher levels of linked fate, we see the level of anxiety has diverging effects, with more anxiety leading to more disapproval of COVID protocols and feeling no anxiety drives you more likely to support the health precautions taking place. The impact of little to no anxiety about the direction the country is headed is not affected by the role of linked fate (see Figure 5's flat line) when estimating support for the GOP's handling of the pandemic.

Discussion/Conclusion:

Our next set of ANES analyses will hone in on the extent to which our COVID-skepticism and more favorable Trump opinions results are driven by gender or gender beliefs within our sample. We know that Latinx men are less educated than women, and they tend to be more vaccine-hesitant (Kaiser Family Foundation, Dec. 2020). We also know more women tend to lead in community-organizing efforts (Hardy-Fanta 1994) and are often more community-focused than their male counterparts. Given additional differences in the socialization process by gender, women may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the plight of one's community (Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Hardy-Fanta 1993). Because men prioritize their self-interest more, they would be more likely to be driven by concerns about the economy. This is helpful as public health officials address vaccine disparity

issues and craft more effective vaccine rollout messages. Future avenues of research could also include more on the cross-cutting effects of authoritarian beliefs and experiences with authoritarian governments as they relate to COVID-skepticism and the reluctant support of more strict COVID-19 measures among Latinx males.

The salience of healthcare and access are not going to disappear in the near future, and we cannot continue to neglect investments in our health education and healthcare infrastructure, especially as it relates to creating a more engaged and "healthy" citizenry. In terms of vaccine equity and reducing vaccine hesitancy, we will not be able to protect our society if we do not know more about the coping mechanisms people rely on when they navigate a crisis such as the Coronavirus pandemic. We know the Center for Disease Control has tried to partner up with trusted community leaders, including *promotoras*, community health clinics and religious leaders to dispel the misinformation and improve vaccine rollout efforts(Sesin 2021). Public health campaigns aimed at vaccine hesitancy tend to use linguistic interventions (Geipel, Grant and Keysar 2022) and exposure to trusted messengers (Kritz 2020) to reduce vaccine hesitancy. In unpacking this further, culturally competent community engagement efforts are likely working most effectively among those with the highest levels of linked fate, as they may see themselves more directly linked the well-being of their group.

This project carries broader implications for future crisis communication strategies and the importance of not leaving the most vulnerable behind. We will not have a healthy democracy without the inclusion and incorporation of the growing Latinx electorate. The health of a democracy is dependent upon expanding the scope of engagement under times of uncertainty.

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Table 1: Estimating Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump, Main Models without any Interacting Effects

	(1) Covid Limits (1=Too Strict)	(2) Party Equipped to Handle Covid (1=GOP)	(3) President Approval (1= more favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1=Trump)
Anxiety, (0, 1)	-0.023	-0.043*	-1.402***	-0.853*
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.420)	(0.509)
Enthusiasm, (0, 1)	0.053*	0.060**	1.323***	0.916**
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.410)	(0.408)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale, 3	0.025	-0.015	0.939	1.204*
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.597)	(0.703)
Ideology7 (Higher values = Conservative)	0.169**	0.298***	4.461***	6.215***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.098)	(1.308)
Party ID 7= (Higher values = Republican)	0.051	0.450***	3.587***	4.981***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.776)	(0.844)
Linked Fate	-0.143***	0.024	-0.645	-2.360***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.759)	(0.760)
Constant	0.386***	0.210***	-3.253***	-4.543***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.092)	(1.289)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.135	0.499		

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Showing abbreviated results. The fully specified models are available in the appendix, along with additional robustness checks.

Table 2: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm by Religiosity Intensity on Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Party Equipped to Handle Covid (1=GOP)	(3) President Approval (1=More favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety, (0, 1)	0.022	0.018	0.042	-0.601
	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.706)	(0.896)
Enthusiasm, (0, 1)	0.017	-0.036	0.599	-0.991
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.711)	(0.811)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale, 3	0.077	0.040	2.517**	0.630
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(1.031)	(1.334)
Anxiety X Religiosity Scale	-0.086	**-0.121***	**-3.143****	-0.928
	(0.084)	**(0.072)**	**(1.335)**	(1.379)
Enthusiasm X Religiosity Scale	0.066	**0.167****	1.691	**3.727*****
	(0.080)	**(0.069)**	(1.110)	**(1.280)**
Ideology7 (Higher values = Conservative)	0.169**	0.291***	4.497***	5.581***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.141)	(1.331)
Party ID 7= (Higher values = Republican)	0.047	0.444***	3.735***	4.941***
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.792)	(0.798)
Linked Fate	-0.147***	0.017	-0.788	-2.493***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.785)	(0.741)
Constant	0.358***	0.186***	-4.091***	-3.330**
	(0.083)	(0.071)	(1.293)	(1.591)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.139	0.510		

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Showing abbreviated results. The fully specified models are available in the appendix A, along with additional robustness checks.

Fig. 1: Predictive Margins of Anxiety/Enthusiasm by Religiosity, Estimating **Which Party is More Equipped to Handle COVID-19 (1= More Favorable towards GOP)**





Fig. 2: Predictive Margins of Anxiety/Enthusiasm by Religiosity, Estimating **Presidential Approval (1=More favorable)**





Fig. 3: Predictive Margins of Anxiety/Enthusiasm by Religiosity, Estimating **Vote Choice (1=Trump)**





Table 3: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm by Linked Fate on Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Party Equipped to Handle COVID (1 = GOP)	(3) President Approval (1 = More Favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety, (0, 1)	0.118**	0.024	-1.101	-0.566
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.693)	(0.929)
Enthusiasm, (0, 1)	0.021	0.031	1.264*	0.618
	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.654)	(0.814)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale, 3	0.017	-0.020	0.906	1.141
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.618)	(0.700)
Ideology7 (Higher values = Conservative)	0.174***	0.301***	4.453***	6.144***
	(0.067)	(0.059)	(1.093)	(1.288)
Party ID 7= (Higher values = Republican)	0.044	0.448***	3.573***	4.918***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.770)	(0.822)
Linked Fate	0.062	0.115	-0.294	-2.066
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.994)	(1.523)
Anxiety X linked fate	**-0.275*** **	**-0.130***	-0.585	-0.573
	(0.088)	**(0.077)**	(1.206)	(1.426)
Enthusiasm X linked fate	0.058	0.051	0.126	0.520
	(0.082)	(0.071)	(1.108)	(1.239)
Constant	0.297***	0.171**	-3.421***	-4.528***
	(0.077)	(0.067)	(1.175)	(1.446)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.154	0.503		

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Showing abbreviated results. The fully specified models are available in the appendix, along with additional robustness checks.

Fig. 4: Predictive Margins of Anxiety/Enthusiasm by Latinx Linked Fate, Estimating **Disagreement with COVID-19 Limits (1= Too Strict)**





Fig. 5: Predictive Margins of Anxiety/Enthusiasm by Latinx Linked Fate, Estimating **Which Party is More Equipped to Handle COVID (1 =More Favorable towards GOP)**





Appendix A

Table 1A: Main Models Estimating Emotions (using Dummy Measures), using logit models

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Enthusiasm	(3) Anxiety (Few Controls)	(4) Enthusiasm (Few Controls)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	-0.100	1.017**	-0.636	1.307***
	(0.571)	(0.435)	(0.507)	(0.416)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	1.412	1.061	0.978	1.643*
	(0.923)	(0.875)	(0.874)	(0.872)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	-1.350	0.722	-2.346***	1.553***
	(0.824)	(0.627)	(0.656)	(0.503)
Gender	0.267	0.323	0.300	0.257
	(0.324)	(0.273)	(0.312)	(0.270)
Education	0.140	-0.339	-0.105	-0.139
	(0.573)	(0.512)	(0.559)	(0.498)
Age	0.007	-0.016	0.003	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Household Income	-0.064	0.420	0.037	0.281
	(0.528)	(0.470)	(0.490)	(0.439)
Foreign Born	-0.680**	0.437	-0.629**	0.438
	(0.326)	(0.317)	(0.316)	(0.309)
Attention to Politics	0.286	1.145**	0.270	1.014**
	(0.715)	(0.489)	(0.652)	(0.472)
Discrimination	0.251	-0.921	0.576	-1.211**
	(0.699)	(0.631)	(0.640)	(0.585)
Linked Fate	0.582	0.203	0.557	0.089
	(0.550)	(0.487)	(0.517)	(0.471)
Religious Identity Baseline= Secular				
Other religion	0.039	-1.203		
	(1.119)	(0.770)		
Catholic	-0.339	0.282		
	(0.354)	(0.321)		
Protestant	-0.027	0.034		
	(0.443)	(0.420)		
Trust in Media	-0.346	-0.003		
	(0.704)	(0.488)		

Trust in Government	-1.315**	0.164		
	(0.666)	(0.537)		
President Economy Approval	-0.652	0.424		
	(0.481)	(0.343)		
President Healthcare Approval	0.273	-0.305		
	(0.364)	(0.289)		
President Immigration Approval	-1.039**	1.036***		
	(0.472)	(0.376)		
Constant	1.748	-2.944***	1.453	-3.027***
	(1.175)	(1.051)	(0.972)	(0.907)
Observations	574	574	578	578

Table 2A: Main Models Estimating Outcome Measures, Without Emotions

	(1) Covid Limits (1=Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle or Covid (1=GOP)	(3) President Approval (1=more favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1=Trump)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.039	0.002	1.327***	1.459**
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.505)	(0.704)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.181***	0.309***	4.100***	6.199***
	(0.067)	(0.059)	(1.081)	(1.392)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.074*	0.483***	4.156***	5.530***
	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.729)	(0.854)
Gender	-0.039*	0.022	0.012	0.619
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.367)	(0.441)
Education	0.078*	-0.030	0.378	0.583
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.564)	(0.685)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.065*	-0.094***	-0.754	-1.794***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.586)	(0.685)
Foreign born	0.031	0.006	-0.061	0.438
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.436)	(0.433)
Attention to Politics	0.016	-0.016	-0.071	-0.658
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.596)	(0.799)
Discrimination	-0.071	-0.195***	-1.512*	-0.400
	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.892)	(0.905)
Linked Fate	-0.145***	0.022	-0.597	-2.227***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.648)	(0.784)
Constant	0.364***	0.172***	-4.126***	-5.029***
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(1.065)	(1.341)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.128	0.491		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3A: Estimating Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump, Main Models without any Interacting Effects

	(1) Covid Limits (1=Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle Covid (1=GOP)	(3) President Approval (1= more favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1=Trump)
Anxiety (0, 1)	-0.023	-0.043*	-1.402***	-0.853*
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.420)	(0.509)
Enthusiasm (0, 1)	0.053*	0.060**	1.323***	0.916**
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.410)	(0.408)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.025	-0.015	0.939	1.204*
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.597)	(0.703)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.169**	0.298***	4.461***	6.215***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.098)	(1.308)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.051	0.450***	3.587***	4.981***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.776)	(0.844)
Gender	-0.041*	0.021	0.023	0.570
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.410)	(0.461)
Education	0.078*	-0.030	0.378	0.735
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.637)	(0.725)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.067*	-0.096***	-1.009	-1.763***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.721)	(0.683)
Foreign born	0.026	-0.001	-0.299	0.157
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.488)	(0.433)
Attention to Politics	0.007	-0.026	-0.237	-0.817
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.637)	(0.846)
Discrimination	-0.058	-0.179***	-1.091	0.145
	(0.048)	(0.041)	(1.026)	(0.966)
Linked Fate	-0.143***	0.024	-0.645	-2.360***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.759)	(0.760)
Constant	0.386***	0.210***	-3.253***	-4.543***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.092)	(1.289)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.135	0.499		

Table 4A: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm by Religiosity Intensity on Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle Covid (1=GOP)	(3) President Approval (1=More favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety (0, 1)	0.022	0.018	0.042	-0.601
	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.706)	(0.896)
Enthusiasm (0, 1)	0.017	-0.036	0.599	-0.991
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.711)	(0.811)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.077	0.040	2.517**	0.630
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(1.031)	(1.334)
Anxiety X Religiosity Scale	-0.086	-0.121*	-3.143**	-0.928
	(0.084)	(0.072)	(1.335)	(1.379)
Enthusiasm X Religiosity Scale	0.066	0.167**	1.691	3.727***
	(0.080)	(0.069)	(1.110)	(1.280)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.169**	0.291***	4.497***	5.581***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.141)	(1.331)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.047	0.444***	3.735***	4.941***
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.792)	(0.798)
Gender	-0.042*	0.019	0.029	0.420
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.419)	(0.482)
Education	0.077*	-0.032	0.411	0.855
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.621)	(0.765)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.070*	-0.103***	-1.070	-1.826***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.754)	(0.694)
Foreign born	0.027	0.002	-0.299	0.222
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.511)	(0.416)
Attention to Politics	0.011	-0.017	-0.003	-0.603
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.603)	(0.876)
Discrimination	-0.059	-0.182***	-1.280	-0.468

	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.985)	(0.958)
Linked Fate	-0.147***	0.017	-0.788	-2.493***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.785)	(0.741)
Constant	0.358***	0.186***	-4.091***	-3.330**
	(0.083)	(0.071)	(1.293)	(1.591)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.139	0.510		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5A: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm by Linked Fate on Latinx Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle COVID (1 = GOP)	(3) President Approval (1 = More Favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety (0, 1)	0.118**	0.024	-1.101	-0.566
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.693)	(0.929)
Enthusiasm (0, 1)	0.021	0.031	1.264*	0.618
	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.654)	(0.814)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.017	-0.020	0.906	1.141
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.618)	(0.700)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.174***	0.301***	4.453***	6.144***
	(0.067)	(0.059)	(1.093)	(1.288)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.044	0.448***	3.573***	4.918***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.770)	(0.822)
Gender	-0.040*	0.022	0.034	0.575
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.419)	(0.464)
Education	0.068	-0.036	0.350	0.751
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.642)	(0.716)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.066*	-0.096***	-1.000	-1.772***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.726)	(0.684)
Foreign born	0.021	-0.003	-0.325	0.143
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.505)	(0.442)
Attention to Politics	0.018	-0.019	-0.214	-0.782
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.648)	(0.861)
Discrimination	-0.072	-0.186***	-1.103	0.061
	(0.047)	(0.041)	(1.011)	(1.020)
Linked Fate	0.062	0.115	-0.294	-2.066
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.994)	(1.523)
Anxiety X linked fate	-0.275***	-0.130*	-0.585	-0.573
	(0.088)	(0.077)	(1.206)	(1.426)
Enthusiasm X linked fate	0.058	0.051	0.126	0.520
	(0.082)	(0.071)	(1.108)	(1.239)

Constant	0.297***	0.171**	-3.421***	-4.528***
	(0.077)	(0.067)	(1.175)	(1.446)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.154	0.503		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix B

Table 1B: Full Model Specification while Estimating Opinions Surrounding COVID-19 and Trump, Using Anxiety and Enthusiasm (with continuous measures)

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle COVID (1 = GOP)	(3) President Approval (1 = More Favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety (Worry + Nervous Contin)	-0.122***	-0.097**	-1.857*	-1.086
	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.990)	(0.859)
Enthusiasm (Hope + Pride Contin)	-0.045	-0.026	2.960***	0.012
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.981)	(1.088)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.007	-0.050	0.723	0.672
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.753)	(0.696)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.102	0.198***	2.899**	4.775***
	(0.068)	(0.058)	(1.188)	(1.692)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	-0.075	0.333***	1.128	3.662***
	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.829)	(0.920)
Gender	-0.028	0.032*	0.319	0.877*
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.443)	(0.533)
Education	0.050	-0.059	-0.895	-0.451
	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.851)	(0.978)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.003	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Household Income	-0.043	-0.082***	-0.744	-1.571*
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.769)	(0.838)
Foreign born	0.033	-0.001	-0.213	0.352
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.676)	(0.480)
Attention to Politics	0.011	0.008	0.080	0.462
	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.890)	(1.031)
Discrimination	-0.033	-0.154***	-0.563	0.527
	(0.047)	(0.040)	(1.149)	(0.844)
Linked Fate	-0.120***	0.053*	-0.364	-2.364**
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.966)	(0.962)
Religious Identity (Baseline= Secular)				

Other religion	-0.060	-0.032	0.261	0.449
	(0.074)	(0.063)	(1.171)	(0.952)
Catholic	-0.023	0.052**	-0.094	0.655
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.690)	(0.653)
Protestant	0.055	0.046	1.027	0.510
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.653)	(0.694)
Trust in Media	-0.039	-0.061	-0.024	-2.567**
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(1.472)	(1.061)
Trust in Government	-0.011	-0.082**	-0.537	0.040
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(1.200)	(1.117)
President Economy Approval	0.063**	0.109***	3.515***	2.571***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.616)	(0.558)
President Healthcare Approval	-0.026	-0.037	-0.027	0.101
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.525)	(0.516)
President Immigration Approval	0.121***	0.106***	2.062***	1.340**
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.702)	(0.672)
Constant	0.512***	0.320***	-4.909***	-4.727**
	(0.077)	(0.066)	(1.299)	(2.060)
Observations	574	574	574	438
R-squared	0.191	0.551		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2B: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm (using continuous measures) by Religiosity on COVID-19 and GOP Opinions

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle COVID (1 = GOP)	(3) President Approval (1 = More Favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety (Worry + Nervous Contin)	-0.166**	-0.189***	0.033	-1.969
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(1.222)	(1.557)
Enthusiasm (Hope + Pride Contin)	-0.104	-0.139	2.865	-1.861
	(0.104)	(0.090)	(1.939)	(1.832)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	-0.049	-0.171*	2.670	-0.504
	(0.118)	(0.102)	(1.983)	(2.036)
Anxiety X Religiosity Scale	0.029	0.113	-4.064*	-0.450
	(0.132)	(0.114)	(2.336)	(2.311)
Enthusiasm X Religiosity Scale	0.213	0.317**	1.339	5.411*
	(0.150)	(0.130)	(2.906)	(2.788)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.165**	0.285***	4.218***	6.085***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.178)	(1.383)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.025	0.433***	3.375***	4.579***
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.793)	(0.819)
Gender	-0.031	0.030	0.058	0.697
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.437)	(0.480)
Education	0.070	-0.035	0.302	0.700
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.610)	(0.720)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.007	-0.012
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.061	-0.093***	-0.928	-1.744***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.717)	(0.650)
Foreign Born	0.024	0.001	-0.144	0.299
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.469)	(0.429)
Attention to Politics	0.029	-0.007	-0.141	-0.455
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.675)	(0.904)
Discrimination	-0.063	-0.186***	-1.234	-0.308

	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.895)	(0.970)
Linked Fate	-0.134***	0.030	-0.684	-2.273***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.760)	(0.773)
Constant	0.505***	0.343***	-4.484***	-2.670
	(0.094)	(0.081)	(1.630)	(1.805)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.151	0.509		

Table 3B: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm (using continuous measures) by Linked Fate on COVID-19 and GOP Opinions

	(1) Covid Limits (1= Too Strict)	(2) Equipped to Handle COVID (1 = GOP)	(3) President Approval (1 = More Favorable)	(4) Vote Choice (1= Trump)
Anxiety (Worry + Nervous Contin)	0.098	-0.045	-1.940	-1.907
	(0.084)	(0.074)	(1.183)	(1.508)
Enthusiasm (Hope + Pride Contin)	0.044	-0.060	2.474	1.304
	(0.097)	(0.085)	(1.526)	(1.461)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale	0.025	-0.015	0.866	1.185*
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.581)	(0.691)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.163**	0.296***	4.141***	6.417***
	(0.067)	(0.059)	(1.127)	(1.351)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	0.023	0.441***	3.360***	4.857***
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.746)	(0.845)
Gender	-0.028	0.032	0.037	0.700
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.433)	(0.471)
Education	0.057	-0.044	0.352	0.686
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.634)	(0.720)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Household Income	-0.052	-0.088***	-0.908	-1.807***
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.655)	(0.662)
Foreign Born	0.020	-0.004	-0.156	0.262
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.481)	(0.437)
Attention to Politics	0.041	0.003	-0.167	-0.526
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.703)	(0.919)
Discrimination	-0.062	-0.182***	-1.177	0.092
	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.948)	(0.960)
Linked Fate	0.156	0.072	-1.220	-1.867
	(0.110)	(0.096)	(1.376)	(2.262)
Anxiety X linked fate	-0.434***	-0.143	0.030	-0.053
	(0.125)	(0.110)	(2.467)	(2.562)

Enthusiasm X linked fate	-0.025	0.196	1.703	-0.743
	(0.141)	(0.123)	(2.155)	(2.320)
Constant	0.304***	0.227***	-3.282**	-4.376***
	(0.089)	(0.078)	(1.340)	(1.425)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.168	0.510		

Table 4B: The Impact of Anxiety and Enthusiasm (using emotion dummies) by Partisanship on COVID-19 and GOP Opinions

	(1) Covid Limit	(2) GOP Covid Handling	(3) President Approval	(4) Vote Choice
Anxiety, (0, 1)	-0.108**	-0.024	-0.891	-0.260
	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.995)	(1.049)
Enthusiasm, (0, 1)	0.002	0.036	0.727	0.647
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.830)	(0.768)
Religiosity: Church, Rel Important, Bible Scale, 3	0.027	-0.015	0.959	1.197*
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.610)	(0.689)
Ideology (Higher = Conservative)	0.147**	0.297***	4.636***	6.455***
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(1.128)	(1.402)
Party ID (Higher = Republican)	-0.110	0.461***	3.893***	5.596***
	(0.085)	(0.074)	(1.481)	(1.533)
Anxiety X Party ID	0.167*	-0.034	-0.986	-1.110
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(1.620)	(1.637)
Enthusiasm X Party ID	0.115	0.049	1.118	0.487
	(0.078)	(0.068)	(1.263)	(1.328)
Gender	-0.039*	0.021	0.040	0.574
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.410)	(0.469)
Education	0.074*	-0.031	0.385	0.753
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.645)	(0.730)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Household Income	-0.069*	-0.097***	-1.021	-1.785***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.727)	(0.685)
Foreign born	0.030	0.001	-0.280	0.188
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.503)	(0.431)
Attention to Politics	0.006	-0.032	-0.299	-0.861
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.645)	(0.869)
Discrimination	-0.058	-0.177***	-1.131	0.146
	(0.047)	(0.041)	(1.023)	(0.933)
Linked Fate	-0.141***	0.023	-0.670	-2.425***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.751)	(0.737)
Constant	0.480***	0.203***	-3.391**	-4.951***

	(0.080)	(0.070)	(1.347)	(1.644)
Observations	578	578	577	439
R-squared	0.144	0.500		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1