The 2012 Presidential Elections in the U.S. and Korea: Polls, Forecasts and Outcomes

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The United States and South Korea have somewhat similar methods of selecting their presidents (primaries, debates, etc.). In 2012, both nations conducted their presidential campaigns during the same year. Since the U.S. is on a four-year cycle and South Korea on a five-year cycle, this was the first time in 20 years that both held presidential campaigns in the same year. Holbrook (1996) developed a theory of presidential campaign dynamics. We hope that this paper will provide readers with a) a brief overview of the similarities and differences between the two election systems, b) an explanation of Holbrook's theory and why parts of his theory may or may not apply to South Korean presidential elections, c) a narrative of each of the two 2012 campaigns, focusing on aspects that relate to Holbrook's theory (forecasts, campaign "events", acquisition of information, etc.). We conclude with some suggestions for future research related to the applicability of major components of Holbrook’s theory to campaigns other than in the U.S.
In 2012 both the U.S. and South Korea held presidential elections. Since the U.S. is on a four-year cycle and South Korea on a five-year cycle, this was the first time in 20 years that both held presidential elections in the same year. The two presidential selection systems are share several important similarities, though there are important diffs. Both systems include presidential nominations by the two major parties as well as presidential debates. In both nations, voters are influenced by partisanship, region, ideology and approval or disapproval of the incumbent party’s performance in office.

One major difference involves the long-term stability of the party systems. South Korea has a two-party system but the parties are have not yet reached the level of stability of those in the U.S.; thus partisanship is not as strong a factor in vote decisions in South Korea as in the U.S.. In the U.S., the two major parties (Republicans and Democrats) are well-known to American voters. Although new issues arise, some issues have reliably divided the parties for decades. For example, the Republican party is widely perceived as being more conservative, supporting a stronger military, cutting taxes, and generally a smaller government, relying on a free market economy to produce prosperity. On the other hand, the Democratic party is widely perceived as being more liberal, supporting social programs such as Social Security and Medicare, favoring civil rights and generally regarding the government as an instrument to help people, especially those in need.

In South Korea, although there are two major parties, their issue positions are not as firmly established -- indeed, even the names of the parties sometimes change from election to election.
Furthermore, it is common in South Korean presidential elections for a third candidate to emerge as a viable alternative to one or both of the other parties. (This is rare in U.S. presidential elections -- in the past 100 years only two non-major party candidates have received more than 10% of the vote and none has received more than 20%.) Although third candidates are not uncommon in South Korean elections, such candidates usually form an alliance with or drop out and support, one of the two major party candidates.

In the U.S., region used to be a very strong factor in presidential voting. For decades the “Solid South” (the eleven states that tried to secede from the union in the 1860s) voted overwhelmingly Democratic, while some other regions were reliably Republican. Although there were major changes in regional loyalties in the 1960s and 1970s, region still plays a role in the vote choices of many Americans, in particular, for white Southerners. In Korea, region continues to be a major determinant of vote choice.

Do Campaigns Matter?

A particularly interesting question in terms of U.S. presidential campaigns is this: since political scientists are able to forecast the results of the election months in advance, do campaigns matter? In August and early September political scientists using statistical analysis of past elections forecast the national popular vote. They do so on the basis of pre-existing national conditions, the most important of which is the state of the economy. Although they use different measures of the economy, the pattern is clear. When the economy is weak, the incumbent or his party tend to do poorly in the election; when the economy is strong, the incumbent or his party tend to do well. The forecasters also include other
variables such as presidential approval ratings. These forecasts have been very accurate, with the exception of the 2000 election. Except for 2000, the average of the forecasts are generally within 2 or 3% of the actual vote. Even though these forecasts are made months before the election, they are usually about as accurate as actual polls taken in the last week before the election. Thus one can ask: if we know how the election is going to turn out, do campaigns matter?

Tom Holbrook (1996), following the work of Gelman and King (1993), has come up with a possible explanation of this apparent contradiction. Gelman and King hypothesize that as voters become more informed, or 'enlightened', they increasingly move toward the results forecast by pre-existing national conditions, which Holbrook refers to as the “equilibrium”.

Most Americans do not know or care very much about politics. However, during the presidential campaign voters pay more attention to the parties, the issues, and national conditions. During the campaign, they pay increasing attention to the relationship between policies and outcomes and thus public opinion tends to move toward the equilibrium. It is common that public opinion polls taken in the summer of the election year are very poor predictors of the election outcome. However, as the campaign progresses, with the conventions, speeches, ads and debates, voters become more informed and make clearer connections between parties, policies, and national conditions. Thus public opinion moves towards equilibrium.

Jeonghun Min (2010) attempted to apply this theory to Korean presidential elections. Because there have been so few presidential elections in South Korea, it is not possible to statistically estimate an equilibrium. However, Min was able to demonstrate that specific groups tend to move in the expected direction and that the influence of fundamental variables on vote
intention becomes greater over the course of the campaign. For example, in 2002, Honam voters increased their support for Roh, Moo-Hyun from 44% in July to 97% on election day in December. Similarly, 39% of those who approved of the performance of the incumbent administration supported Roh (of the incumbent party), that figure rose to 88% on Election Day. These examples, as well as statistical analysis of changes in public support over the course of the campaign, suggest that the phenomenon Holbrook identified for American campaigns seems also be true in the Korean context.

The major components of Holbrook’s theory are as follows.

A) Before the campaign begins, there exists an “equilibrium” that reflects pre-existing national conditions such as the state of the economy. (National conditions, and thus the equilibrium, do not vary much over the course of the campaign.)

B) Campaign events, such as conventions and debates, tend to influence public support for the candidates. (Other events, such as speeches and ads may also affect public support, but their influence tends to be more diffuse and of lesser magnitude.)

C) It is more likely that public support for the candidates will move toward the equilibrium than away from it. (Aggregate support may move in either direction but regardless of initial levels of support, by the end of the campaign public support will be close to the equilibrium.)

D) Early campaign events have greater impact on public support than do later events.
As much research shows, partisanship in the U.S. is both long-lasting and is the most important determinant of individual-level vote choice. Thus the identity of the major candidates (especially the incumbent president) becomes known early in the campaign and is reinforced by the national conventions. Thus voters tend to acquire critical information early on and most are unlikely to be swayed by additional (later) information. Several studies show that the final voting decision is usually based more on partisanship than on debates, ads and news stories that occur just before the election. This supports Holbrook’s hypothesis that campaign events that occur early on are more influential than those that occur later.

This highlights an important difference between U.S. and Korean presidential elections. Holbrook hypothesizes (and provides evidence) that in U.S. presidential elections early events have a greater impact than later events (presumably because most voters learn about the candidates early, so later information is less influential). It seems that the opposite is true in Korean elections. It may be that many Korean voters do not form firm preferences until the identity of the major candidates becomes clear. Considering that the incumbent president is ineligible to run, that party nominations occur later than in the U.S., and that alliances among candidates often form, Korean voters lack critical information until later in the campaign season. Once the identity of the major candidates is clear, voters are more able to form their vote intentions based on party, region, approval of the current administration and evaluations of the candidates’ qualities (experience, honesty, leadership, etc.).
Election Forecasts

There are various methods that can be used to forecast the outcomes of presidential elections. In the U.S., there have been 16 elections since World War II (through 2008). Using a limited number of independent variables (such as the economy and presidential approval), one can statistically estimate the coefficient of each var and thus produce a point estimate of the actual outcome (as a per cent of the major party vote). South Korea has not had enough presidential elections since becoming a democracy to establish a statistical forecast. However, there are other ways to forecast election outcomes. South Korean political scientists have used expert panels, previous non-presidential election outcomes and other techniques. In addition, Min has demonstrated that although there are insufficient data to establish an overall point estimate, it is possible to forecast the direction in which specific sub-groups of the electorate will move. For example, those voters who approve of the performance of the incumbent administration would be expected to move toward that party as the campaign progresses. Gelman and King used a similar approach in U.S. presidential elections, though it has not been applied to recent elections. Within the constraints of available data, several forecasting methods can be applied both to U.S. and to South Korean elections.

The major methods of forecasting vary in U.S. vs South Korea. In the U.S., presidential election forecasts are mainly derived from statistical analysis of national conditions before the campaign officially begins. The main variables used are first, a measure of the national economy, second a measure of Presidential approval (whether or not the incumbent is running, and third a dummy variable for "terms" (i.e., 1 if the incumbent party has held the White House for only four years, and zero otherwise). Almost all of the dozen or so forecasts (as of 2012)
use some measure of the national economy, though the measures differ (per capita GDP growth, unemployment, RDI, prospective evaluations, etc.). Some forecasters include other variables (such as "war", polarization, open seat) instead of or in addition to Presidential approval or "terms". (One forecast, Norpoth and Bednarczuk, does not use these variables; their forecast is based entirely on the results of the two most recent Presidential elections plus the New Hampshire primary results, a surrogate for an unopposed incumbent).

For the South Korean presidential election, political scientists tested several methods to forecast the results. However, because of the very small N, statistical tests were not applicable. Sung-Jin Yoo (2012) applied the general forecasting approach used in the U.S.: that presidential election results depend on national economic conditions and presidential approval. The pre-election presidential approval rating of 41% was closer to Rho Moo Hyun’s 34% rating, which led to an incumbent party defeat, than to Kim Dea Jung’s 58% rating in 2002, which led to an incumbent party victory. Yoo points out that this did not bode well for the incumbent party in 2012. He did not find a relationship between several economic indicators and election results in previous elections.

Similarly, Jinman Cho and Jong-Bin Yoon (2012) surveyed a representative sample of 30 experts on Korean elections. The experts predicted that the Saenuri Party would likely lose the election (chance of winning: 40.1%) mainly because of the unpopularity of the Lee Myung-Bak administration. (The experts strongly predicted that Park would get the nomination for the Saenuri Party.) The same researchers (Yoon and Cho, 2012) analyzed the results of the 2010 local election results in 13 congressional districts that tend to vote similarly to presidential

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1 In U.S. forecasting, different models use different measures of the economy and most, but not all, use presidential approval.
elections, to predict the 2012 election. They predicted that the liberal party candidate would win the election.

Jang, Seung-Jin (2012) used data from post-election polls in the previous four presidential elections to predict the vote of individual voters based on demographic characteristics. Applying those coefficients to current Korean demographics, he predicted that the Saenuri party candidate would receive 52% of the vote, a remarkably accurate prediction.

The 2012 South Korean Presidential Election

The fifth South Korean presidential election since democratization was held on December 19, 2012. Park Geun-hye of the incumbent Saenuri Party defeated Moon Jae-in of the opposition Democratic United Party (D.U.P.) by a small margin. Park won 51.6% of the vote, while Moon captured 48.0%. On election day, 30.7 million voters cast their ballots and voter turnout was 75.8%. Even by Korean standards, turnout was unusually high. (For example, turnout in 2007 was 63%, and 71% in 2002). Turnout is potentially important in Korean presidential elections since, for many voters, the critical decision is whether or not to vote. (In comparison, the critical decision for many U.S. voters, especially independents, is which party or candidate to vote for.)

Park is the daughter of Park Chung-hee, the dictator who led South Korea to economic development, seizing power in 1961 and assassinated by his security services in 1979. Park Geun-hye assumed control of the Saenuri Party at the end of 2011. She distanced herself and her party from the unpopular Lee Myung-bak administration whose approval ratings

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2 The Saenuri Party succeeded the Grand National Party (G.N.P.) in February 2012. However, substantial changes did not occur within the party, except changing its name.
declined to below 30% by 2012. The Lee administration was criticized for political scandals and controversial policies such as the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project and the Jeju-do Naval Base. In the National Assembly elections in April 2012, Park guided her party’s victory and it took the majority in the National Assembly. This contributed to increasing her public popularity and to consolidating her lead in the race for the Saenuri Party nomination. The ruling Saenuri Party held its presidential primary on August 19, 2012 and announced the results at the party convention on August 20, 2012. Park won the nomination, receiving 84% (86,589 out of 103,118) of the vote. The primary process included primary voting by party members and the general public as well as the result of a public opinion survey of 6,000 citizens.

Opposition to the ruling Saenuri Party was divided primarily between the D.U.P. and supporters of Ahn Cheol-soo (a liberal independent), who had emerged as a leading potential candidate. In July 2012, after months of speculation, Ahn published a book, Thoughts of Ahn Cheol-soo, laying out his positions on a number of major issues including the economy and relations with North Korea. Many saw this as an indication that he would indeed run for president. He declared his candidacy on September 19, 2012.³ Ahn was well-known and popular, especially among young people. The D.U.P. nominated Moon Jae-in, a confidant of former president Roh Moo-hyun, as its presidential candidate on September 16, 2012. The D.U.P. had a three-week long open primary system involving several regional primaries. After being nominated, Moon attempted to unify his candidacy with that of Ahn to increase their chances of victory against Park in the general election.

³ Ahn Cheol-soo was former Dean of Seoul National University Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology and former chairman of antivirus software firm Ahn Lab Inc.
Unlike the United States, Korea only elects a president, not a vice president. When Moon and Ahn attempted to form an alliance, one candidate would run for president and the other would strongly support the presidential candidate in the campaign. However, it was very difficult to reach an agreement about the way of selecting the candidate. They failed to forge an alliance and Ahn dropped out of the race on November 23, 2012. Thus voters did not know which candidate, Moon or Ahn, would oppose Park until a month before the election. Ahn was slow to throw his support behind Moon, and Moon’s campaign apparently did not have enough time to unite the liberal vote before election day.

These events are reflected by public opinion polls (see Table 1). Once Ahn published his book in July, his standing in the polls increased by more than 10%. Park’s support increased by approximately 6% following her primary victory and nomination by her party in August. In September, Moon won his party’s primary and nomination just days before Ahn announced his candidacy; both saw their public support increase slightly. The presidential debates, held in October, seemed to have increased Park’s support relative to than of Ahn. When Ahn dropped out of the race in November, Moon’s support increased by more than 10%.

Previous studies have found that several factors, such as regionalism, party identification, presidential approval, and age, affect how voters make their decisions in Korean presidential elections since 1987. Post-election surveys show that at least two of the above factors, age and regionalism, affected vote choices in the 2012 presidential election. For example, an exit poll, which was conducted on election day by KBS, MBC, and SBS (three major TV networks in Korea), found that age (a “generation gap”) and regionalism significantly affected vote decisions
in the election. As shown in Table 2, voters in their twenties and thirties voted two-to-one for Moon, while voters in their fifties and sixties voted two-to-one for Park.

Young voters tend to be more liberal but tend to have a lower turnout rate than older Korean voters. It was expected that turnout would be higher in 2012 than in previous presidential elections. Since there was greater potential for increases in turnout among younger voters than among older voters, high turnout seemed likely to benefit the liberal candidate (Moon). Moon’s campaign and political pundits anticipated that if turnout reached 75%, Moon would defeat Park in the election. The 76% turnout rate was not enough to defeat Park although it apparently contributed to the close election outcome. Voters in their 20s and 30s turned out rates of 65.2% and 72.5% respectively; on the other hand, voters in their 50s and those over 60 turned out rates of 89.9% and 78.8% respectively.

As seen in Table 3, regionalism is a very important factor in Korean elections. The G.N.P. (now called Saenuri) won by margins of 45-54% in the Youngnam Region (North Gyeongsang, South Gyeongsang, Daegu, Ulsan, and Busan Provinces) in the presidential elections of 1997, 2002 and 2007. Similarly, the G.N.P. lost the Honam Region (North Jeolla, South Jeolla, and Gwangju Provinces) by margins of 71-91%! In 2012, voters in the Honam and Youngnam Regions supported their regional parties far beyond the average level of support nationwide: 87.8% of Honam voters supported their regional party candidate, Moon Jae-in of the D.U.P., and 68.7% of Youngnam voters voted for their regional party candidate, Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party.

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5 Nearly identical results were found in a Korean Gallup survey on the election day. The biggest difference was among voters in their thirties; Gallup found approximately 5% greater support for Moon than did the joint exit poll.

The U.S. Presidential Selection Process

The presidential selection process in the United States is long and complex. There basically two phases in the selection process: the nomination phase and the general election phase. In the nomination phase, each party holds primaries or caucuses to select delegates to the national conventions during the first five months of the election year. However, after the first few states have voted, it usually becomes clear that there are only a few viable candidates. In most cases, within a month or two after that, one candidate has effectively captured the nomination. For example, 2012 Mitt Romney, although challenged by a number of other Republicans, had won enough delegates to effectively secure the nomination by April.

The two major parties hold their conventions during the summer of the election year. Conventions are often the most important events of the campaign. They introduce the parties’ nominees to the American people, and they reinforce party loyalty. Democrats and Republicans who are undecided are reminded of the major differences between the parties; at that time, those voters tend to make their decision -- to support their party’s nominee.

The two nominees campaign against each other. They travel across the nation, make speeches, raise money and advertise on television. In October, near the end of the campaign, they engage in televised presidential debate. The general election is held in early November. In several ways, the U.S. presidential selection process is similar to the system used in South Korea.
Partisanship and the timing of voting decisions

Partisanship is a very powerful influence on the votes of individuals. In almost every election about 80-90% of Democrats and Democratic leaders vote for the Democratic candidate and about 85-95% of Republicans and Republican leaners vote for the Republican candidate. Thus there are relatively few voters who might go either way. This group includes pure independents and some partisans who, for whatever reason, are not sure that they will support their party this time. About 15% of the electorate are strong Democrats and about 15% are strong Republicans. These people make up their minds very early; they almost never vote for the other party. Before the conventions, before the nominees are chosen, they have already decided to vote for their party.

The national conventions are in some ways the most important events in a presidential campaign. Conventions serve two major functions. First, they reinforce partisanship for those who are wavering or unsure. Weak and leaning partisans watching the conventions are reminded of the policies and ideology of their party. Many of them move from undecided to supporting their party. In addition, the party base is energized and becomes more motivated to work for their party’s candidate. The second major function of the national conventions is to introduce the nominee to the American people. For example, before the Republican convention last year many people knew very little about Mitt Romney. Watching the convention, especially Romney’s acceptance speech, many Americans learned a lot about him -- what kind of person he is, what his experience and background are, what his policy positions are, and his vision for the American future.
In general, the presidential debates, held a few weeks before Election Day, do not change many people's minds. Watching the debates, the great majority of Americans, have already decided for whom to vote, believe that their candidate performed better and presented better policy positions. For most people, the debates reinforce their decision. Speeches, ads and debates during September and October are mainly targeted at those few remaining undecided voters. Some of those individuals are persuaded by the ads and speeches, some of them are persuaded by the debates, some of them do not make up their minds until the last days before the election.

The 2012 U.S. presidential campaign

Mitt Romney benefitted from his ability to raise a lot of money, from having several opponents dividing the conservative vote, and from his previous presidential campaign experience. Also, Romney moved toward more conservative positions on issues such as tax cuts and abortion. There was no opposition to Obama’s nomination; that was an advantage. When one party is united and the other divided, the united party almost always wins. The Democrats were very united. The Republicans, despite a nasty primary campaign, united behind Romney, seeing him as much better than Obama.

Most of the political science forecasts came out in July or August, before the conventions. In 2012, all the forecasts indicated that the popular vote would be close. The average of the forecasts was almost exactly 50/50 (see Table 4). Holbrook’s theory does not posit that public support for the candidates will be close to the equilibrium throughout the campaign. Rather it posits that campaign events will alter public support (in either direction) and that the aggregate movement over the course of the campaign will be toward the equilibrium. In 2012,
the equilibrium (as estimated by the average of the forecasts) was 50-51% for the incumbent president.

From the time Romney effectively captured the nomination in April until the Republican convention, Obama led Romney by 1-5%. Romney apparently benefitted from the convention (the “convention bounce). During and just after the Republican convention, Obama led by 1% or less. However, Obama also benefitted from his convention; after the Democratic convention (until the 1st debate), Obama regained the lead, generally leading Romney by 3-4% in the national polls.

Although debates rarely have much impact on public support for the candidates, the first presidential debate of 2012 was big win for Romney. He seemed presidential, self-confident, assertive without attacking, and he showed passion about his hopes for America’s future. As predicted by Holbrook’s theory, the polls moved toward the 50/50 forecast. After the 1st debate, the polls indicated effectively a tie, with neither candidate leading by more than 1%. This continued throughout the remainder of the campaign. The final results were Obama 51.1%, Romney 47.2%, strikingly similar to the Korean results (51.6% for the incumbent party). The political science forecasts were again very accurate; about the same as the average of the last national polls.

*Holbrook’s theory in the Korean context*

The major components of Holbrook’s theory have generally been supported in recent U.S. presidential campaigns. Campaign events tend to alter candidates’ public support generally toward the equilibrium and earlier events have more impact than later events. In 2012,
Obama’s support (except during and just after the Republican convention) exceeded Romney’s by approximately 2-4%. However, the first presidential debate moved public support in Romney’s direction, with the national polls right at the equilibrium for the remainder of the campaign. The relatively large impact of a late event (the first debate) is rare in U.S. presidential campaigns; usually the conventions have much greater impact than the debates.

Although it is not possible to statistically estimate the Korean equilibrium, if one makes the (heroic) assumption that the final results reflect the (unmeasurable) equilibrium, then some evidence of movement toward the equilibrium can be seen in the 2012 Korean election. (For example, Moon’s support rose from a low of about 10% in late July to over 45% in just before the election. (Recall that Moon received 48% of the vote on election day.) There seems to be clear evidence of the impact of campaign events on public support for the candidates. In particular, Park’s nomination and Ahn’s withdrawal from the race apparently produced a major change in the polls. Thus the 2012 Korean presidential campaign appears to confirm some components of Holbrook’s theory.

Nonetheless, one component of the theory, that early campaign events have greater impact on public support than do later events, does not seem to be supported. Although Moon, Park and Ahn appeared to be the leading potential candidates throughout the election year, the events that seemed to have the greatest impact related directly to the identification of the two major candidates. Park’s nomination and Ahn’s withdrawal provided voters with critical information. Park was nominated four months before the election and Ahn’s withdrawal (securing Moon’s candidacy) occurred just a moth before the election. In comparison, U.S. voters usually know the identity of both major candidates on or about Super Tuesday,
generally held in early March, about eight months before the election. When an incumbent president is running unopposed (as was Obama in 2012, Bush in 2004 and Clinton in 1996), it is clear a year before the election that he will be one of the two candidates.

Holbrook’s hypothesis, that earlier events have greater impact, makes sense and is supported by evidence from previous elections, it may in part be a function of the structure of U.S. campaigns, which tend to identify the two major candidates long before the election. The structure of Korean campaigns, however, often leaves the identity of one or both candidates unclear until shortly before the election. If many Korean voters wait until they know who the candidates will be, then late events can have a large impact. And since partisanship in Korea is not nearly as strong as it is in the U.S., the identity of the candidates can be especially important. All of this suggests that future research should attempt to disentangle several phenomena that could explain why this component of Holbrook’s theory may not be generalizable to other nation’s elections. To what extent does the structure of the campaign, the strength of partisanship and other factors cause earlier or later campaign events to have a larger influence on public support for the candidates?
Table 1 - 2012 Korean Election Polls
Table 2 Generation Gap in the 2012 Korean Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Park Geun-hye</th>
<th>Moon Jae-in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Joint exit poll by KBS, MBC, and SBS
### Table 3 Election Outcomes by Regions in the 2012 Korean Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Park Geun-hye</th>
<th>Moon Jae-in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchong</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngnam</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Joint exit poll by KBS, MBC, and SBS; original tables from *Joongang Ilbo*
Table 4: 2012 U.S. Election Forecasts

The 2012 Presidential Vote Forecasts (as of 9/11/12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecaster</th>
<th>Name of Model(s)</th>
<th>Predicted 2-Party Popular Vote for Obama</th>
<th>Days Before Election</th>
<th>Certainty of an Obama Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Forecasts</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abramowitz</td>
<td>Time for Change Model</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>Trial-Heat Model and Convention Bump Model</td>
<td>(52.0) 51.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzán</td>
<td>Fiscal Model</td>
<td>46.9 (45.5)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erikson &amp; Wlezien</td>
<td>Leading Economic Indicators and the Polls</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hibbs</td>
<td>Bread and Peace Model</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Holbrook</td>
<td>National Conditions and Incumbency</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis-Beck &amp; Tien</td>
<td>Jobs Model and the Proxy Model</td>
<td>48.2 (52.7)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockerbie</td>
<td>Expectations Model</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery, Hollenbach, Ward</td>
<td>Ensemble Bayesian Model Averaging (EMBA)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>Norpoth &amp; Bednarczuk</td>
<td>Primary Model</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>State Forecasts</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry and Bickers</td>
<td>State Level Economic Model</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Jerôme &amp; Jerôme-Speziari</td>
<td>State Level Political Economy Model</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klarner</td>
<td>State Level Presidential Forecast Model</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A forecast without parentheses is the preferred forecast. A number in parentheses is a secondary or companion forecast. Summary: 5 forecast an Obama plurality (with 3 being on the cusp of predicting a toss up), 5 forecast a Romney plurality, and 5 are too close to call (but lean toward Obama).


