

The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Civil Conflict Outcomes

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In 2000, Serbian nonviolent civil resistance groups were able to successfully bring about the downfall of the ruthless dictator, Slobodan Milosevic. While the success of this campaign was due in large part to excellent grassroots organization, nonviolent groups received external support throughout their campaign from foreign states like the US, as well as from various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist in achieving their goals. Meanwhile, the recent nonviolent uprisings in Ukraine rapidly descended into violence, particularly after certain opposition groups received military external support from Russia. In the first case, the civil resistance campaign that received external support was successful at achieving their stated objectives. In the later case, however, the civil resistance campaign has continued on with very little progress since the step down of President Viktor Yanukovich as a result of the injection of Russian military support to the opposition. Current literature has primarily focused violent civil resistance or civil war and the role external support plays in duration, severity, and outcome. Meanwhile, recent studies suggest nonviolent civil resistance strategies tend to lead to more successful outcomes for the campaign than violent strategies. Yet, it is unclear how external support might facilitate or hinder this disparity in success rates between violent and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. The two questions I address with this proposal are first, does external support of civil resistance campaigns influence the likelihood of campaign success? Second, is the relationship between external support and civil resistance campaign outcomes different in violent versus nonviolent contexts?

The prominent approach to understanding the potential for external support as a force for conflict management or conflict resolution has been to examine when external support can lead to peace in violent contexts. However, this approach assumes external actors only support violent campaigns and that violence is the only means through which aggrieved citizens engage in civil resistance. Yet, we know nonviolent civil resistance campaigns often employ nonviolent tactics specifically to attract attention from external actors (Bob, 2005; Nepstad, 2011), and that nonviolent campaigns have higher levels of success than violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2013). From a research perspective, there is still a large gap in our knowledge about the role of external support to civil resistance more broadly and about how violent and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns might differ

from one another. This gap is also important from a policy perspective. While external actors often claim to be seeking peaceful conflict resolution when providing support to civil resistance campaigns, external support has been linked to increased duration and severity of violent civil resistance (Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay et. al., 2008; Metternich, 2011). Meanwhile, research on the role of external support to nonviolent civil resistance suggests foreign state support in particular can be damaging to a campaign's ability to succeed (Zunes and Ibrahim, 2009; Nepstad, 2011). It will continue to remain unclear which kinds of external support are most influential for peaceful conflict resolution or the promotion of nonviolent strategies until we systematically test the conditions under which different external support leads to different outcomes.

I argue one of the key mechanisms for civil resistance campaign outcomes is external support. Specifically, the effectiveness of this support will differ based on the external actor providing the support and the strategy choice of the civil resistance campaign. Thus, the successful use of external support is conditional on where the support comes from and the strategic decision of civil resistance groups to choose with violent or nonviolent strategies. In this proposal I first discuss the literature on the role of external support in civil war and civil resistance campaigns more broadly. Second, I outline a theory about the relationship between external support and campaign outcomes. Third, I discuss the data available to systematically test this relationship. Finally, I will propose two modeling strategies for answering my research questions and addressing potential research design issues.

Civil Conflict and External Support

As noted, most of the current literature on civil resistance outcomes and external support has been limited to only exploring civil war and violent group behavior. Despite this limitation, this body of literature has provided a strong foundation from which we can begin to explore the relationship between external support and a broader category of civil resistance strategies that include the use of strategic nonviolence. Building on research suggesting civil conflict duration can be detrimental for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) demonstrate civil conflict duration and outcome are two pieces of a dynamic and connected conflict process. The authors find intervention on behalf of the government decreases conflict duration and subsequently

increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Intervention on behalf of the violent civil resistance campaign, on the other hand, increases conflict duration and has no significant relationship to peaceful settlement. While these findings are useful for potentially demonstrating the negative consequences of external support, they are limited in the level of nuance in support type. In other words, they can demonstrate the timing of the external support and the direction of that support (i.e. for the target government vs the rebels). However, like so many previous and subsequent studies, there is no analysis of how these dynamics differ for different types of support (military, economic, diplomatic) or for different types of external actors (foreign states, IGOs, etc).

Additional research on the role of external support to violent civil resistance has begun to parse out the variance in external support based on type and external actor to more clearly demonstrate the role it can play in civil conflict outcomes. For example, military and economic external support, in general, have been shown to have negative consequences for the probability of peaceful resolution (Dixon, 1996; Findley and Teo, 2006; Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012). On the other hand, both Regan and Aydin (2006) and Svensson (2009) find diplomatic support or mediation from a third party that is biased in favor of either the government or the opposition leads to shorter, less violent civil wars as well as more stable post-conflict outcomes. Unfortunately, scholars analyzing the impact of diplomatic interventions face the issue that diplomacy and mediation are often occurring along with other forms of external support, some of which may potentially undermine the diplomatic process (Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012). Thus, another useful way of measuring variance in external support type is to look at the actors providing the support, which correlates with certain support types, but still captures some of the potential variance.

The obstacle to taking the civil war literature and applying it to a theory about the relationship between external support and civil resistance outcomes is the fact these results may not apply in nonviolent contexts. Approaches in the literature on strategic nonviolence have primarily been qualitative and therefore are difficult to compare to the more quantitative large-N approaches of civil conflict scholarship. However, extensive case study research on the relationship between external support and nonviolent civil resistance outcomes can elucidate some of these differences. Zunes and Ibrahim (2009) argue support from foreign states tends to be military or economic and, specifically when that support comes from the US, can significantly undermine the goals of the campaign or their

ability to mobilize participants. The most successful cases of nonviolent resistance, the authors find, are those in which the support came from a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or was indirect in nature. In other words, external support fostering an environment where nonviolent resistance can flourish - building civil society and institutions that promote resistance group organization - is the most effective type of external support.

External Support and Campaign Success

Civil resistance campaigns are sparked by a number of different conditions, ranging from political grievances, ethnic grievance, and economic inequality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). When civil resistance campaigns are able to overcome the collective action problems necessary to mobilize mass support, they use this mobilization to achieve a variety of goals. These goals can be as minimal as specific policy changes and as drastic as entire regime changes. Typically, civil resistance occurs when citizens have attempted to achieve their goals within the existing political institutions and those political institutions have failed, forcing citizens to seek extra-institutional approaches.¹ Once the struggle against the government takes place outside of the existing political institutions, resistance groups make strategic decisions about what tactics will help them be successful.

When choosing a strategy, resistance groups choose the strategy they believe will be most successful. One of the ways in which they attempt to ensure success is by considering which strategy will attract the most support, both internally and externally (Opp, 1989; Bob, 2005). A successful resistance campaign, whether violent or nonviolent, needs to be able to mobilize participants. One key mobilization tool is organizational capacity and the ability to effectively communicate with a campaign's potential base of support. Successful resistance, thus, can heavily depend on access to resources that can sustain the participants for the duration of the campaign (Sharp, 2005). These resources can be diplomatic, financial, infrastructural, or military in nature. Finally, successful resistance requires legitimacy both domestically and internationally (Sharp, 2005; Zunes and Ibrahim, 2009). Resistance groups need to have a broad base of support, internally and externally, to sustain

¹Ivan Marovic, personal interview, May 21, 2014. Marovic is a former leader of the Otpor campaign in Serbia and served as a consultant and trainer for civil resistance groups in Ukraine and Egypt

their selected strategy and to achieve their stated objectives. Importantly, support from external actors influences the ability for civil resistance campaigns to mobilize support through its impact on organizational capacity, campaign legitimacy, and potentially even group cohesion with the campaign. The way in which external support provides these necessities will depend largely on the type of support being provided, but also on the actor that is providing it.

The decision to provide external support to a civil resistance campaign is driven by a number of factors, the most important being the external actor's perception about the campaign's likelihood of success. External actors strategically choose which resistance campaign to support and what type(s) of support to provide. Just as engaging in civil resistance can be costly, providing external support to resistance campaigns can be costly for the external actors (Wolfe & Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012; Regan, 2002). Understanding the determinants of providing different types of support to resistance groups is important for understanding how external support influences resistance campaign dynamics and will be the goal of extended research on this subject. However, in this paper, I focus on how external support by a variety of external actors can influence the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success. Different external actors will have different incentives for providing external support. This influences the kinds of support they provide and the commitment they will have to different civil resistance campaign goals. As a result, each type of external actor will influence resistance campaign success differently.

External Support From Foreign States

Most scholars of civil resistance or civil conflict are skeptical about the role foreign states can play in helping campaigns achieve their stated objectives. Regardless of whether the civil resistance campaign is violent or nonviolent, one common concern is the fact foreign states enter into the conflict because of strategic national interest or rivalries with the target government rather than to help the campaign achieve its goals (Colaesi and Thompson, 2002; Gleditsch et. al., 2008). Research on the impact of foreign state support to nonviolent campaigns in particular has also demonstrated the delegitimizing influence to the campaign. External support from foreign states can often be used in propaganda by the target government to accuse the civil resistance campaign of being a puppet for foreign interests (Zunes and Ibrahim, 2009; Nepstad, 2011). This can decrease the campaign's ability

to mobilize domestic participants. Finally, support from foreign states is often provided in the form of military or direct financial support, which is especially detrimental to nonviolent campaigns that splinter as a result of disagreements over competing strategies. In other words, providing military or financial support to civil resistance campaigns that are struggling to demonstrate progress using nonviolent tactics can cause fractionalization of the campaign into nonviolent and violent factions. Some research suggests when foreign states act as biased mediators in diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the civil resistance campaign, they can reduce conflict duration and increase probability of campaign success (Regan and Aydin, 2006). However, I expect foreign state external support, in general, will decrease the probability of civil resistance campaign success. Since nonviolent groups are especially dependent on domestic participation, making any potential delegitimizing force of foreign state support particularly damaging in. Thus, while foreign state support is detrimental for civil resistance more broadly, it should be particularly problematic for nonviolent groups in particular.

H1a: External support from foreign states decreases the likelihood of violent resistance campaign success.

H1b: External support from foreign states strongly decreases the likelihood of nonviolent resistance campaign success.

External Support From INGOs

International nongovernmental organizations often play a major role in civil resistance campaigns. First, they typically have the luxury of being able to put people on the ground during civil resistance campaigns since they are not bound by international laws regarding sovereignty that typically restrict foreign state involvement. As a result, INGOs can more readily assess and respond to the needs of civil resistance campaigns than can other types of external actors. The only obstacle they typically face is funding, making the number of campaigns they can participate in more limited in breadth, despite the depth of support they can provide. Second, INGOs require support from international donors and are therefore more likely to respond to normative pressures restricting their ability to provide support to groups within a civil resistance campaign that are seeking to escalate the conflict (Bob, 2005; Zunes and Ibrahim, 2009). This normative pressure increases their legitimacy to the domestic

audience making it easier for the civil resistance campaign to mobilize domestic participants. In fact, INGO involvement in civil resistance campaigns typically follows international condemnation of the target government. International condemnation makes the campaign more salient and the ability to divert resources to the campaign more imminent. Third, and related to the previous point, INGOs can serve as “gate keepers” for networks of external supporters due to the international scope of their organizations (Bob, 2005). The gate keeper can then increase attention to the civil resistance campaign and place increased pressure on the target government via international audience costs. Finally, INGOs are more likely to provide the kinds of support that are particularly useful for nonviolent campaigns. INGOs provide training, expertise, and increased organizational capacity. While this type of support can be influential for violent campaigns as well, it tends to be provided to nonviolent groups or organizers. I expect that external support from INGOs will increase the probability of civil resistance campaign success for nonviolent campaigns. However, INGO support should do little to aid in violent campaign success, especially given that this supporter-supportee relationship is much more rare.

H2a: External support from INGOs has no effect on the likelihood of violent resistance campaign success.

H2b: External support from INGOs increases the likelihood of nonviolent resistance campaign success.

Multiple Actors and External Support Networks

Another implication of the “gate keeper” theory discussed with regard to INGO external support is the possibility that having multiple external actors providing support can be helpful for civil resistance campaign success. While the literature on collective action sees increased numbers of actors as making coordination more difficult and free riding more likely (Olson, 1965), in terms of external support it can be an important source of international pressure on the target government (Bob, 2005). More external actors means that increased attention is being placed on the target government, limiting their ability to engage in violent repression (Nepstad, 2011). Another result that follows is that the doors are open for increased use of nonviolent tactics as opposed to armed resistance. Finally, having

more external actors involved has been argued to increase the decision-making autonomy of the civil resistance campaign since the different strategic interests of the external actors have to converge on goals more related to those of the campaign.² On the other hand, more actors involved can make coordination between external supporters more costly and less effective (Oslon, 1964). Thus, increased heterogeneity of support by way of multiple external actors may decrease the campaign's ability to utilize the support, making success less likely.

H3a: Heterogeneity of support from multiple external actors increases the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success.

H3b: Heterogeneity of support from multiple external actors decreases the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success.

Empirical Analysis

I test my hypotheses using data from the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes dataset (NAVCO) covering 250 civil resistance campaigns in a global sample from 1946-2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). There are some limitations to working with the NAVCO 2.0 dataset in analyzing the relationship between external support and civil resistance campaign outcomes. First, the unit of analysis is highly aggregated with respect to time. In other words, we can only observe campaigns on a yearly basis where external support is coded if a campaign received support at any point during that year. The problem with this level of aggregation is that it makes it difficult to get at the potential selection bias inherent in cases of external support and to deal with causal priority with respect to time. When the support is provided the same year that success is coded, it is not clear whether the support led to that success or whether the support was provided because of a perceived increased likelihood of success by the supporter. This would be a problem even at lower levels of time aggregation, but the restriction to annual-level data increases the extent of the problem.

Another potential research design issue with using the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is the lack of more nuanced data on external support type. While the dataset contains nuanced information about

²Ivan Marovic, personal interview, May 21, 2014. Marovic is a former leader of the Otpor campaign in Serbia and served as a consultant and trainer for civil resistance groups in Ukraine and Egypt

the identity of external actor, my theory suggests the type of external support these actors provide can also have implications for the civil resistance campaign dynamics and potential outcomes. It limits inferences about what kinds of external support might be more or less effective and limits the researcher to the broader question of whether or not external support generally has a positive or negative impact on civil resistance campaign success. This limitation is particularly important for the potential policy implications of the findings where a clearer understanding of what types of support are more or less beneficial is crucial. Many of these concerns can be addressed with increased data availability. In the interim, there are many benefits to the NAVCO 2.0 dataset and its use for parsing out the relationship between external support and civil resistance outcomes.

First, this dataset is the first to use a global sample of violent and nonviolent campaigns. There has been extensive data collection in the area of violent civil resistance, and civil war in particular. However, simultaneous nonviolent campaigns in violent contexts have been largely ignored as have strictly nonviolent campaigns. Additionally, transitions from nonviolence to violence have been neglected since most data collection begins once the campaign has become violent. These dynamics are important for examining the process that leads some campaigns to be more successful than others. As previously stated, the current approach assumes that campaigns can be violent or do nothing. By expanding the data to include nonviolent campaigns, we can use NAVCO 2.0 to make clearer distinctions between violent and nonviolent campaigns and the role of external support in different contexts. Second, this dataset captures various civil resistance campaign dynamics and the processes that lead to success or failure. It includes government responses to the campaign, support from external actors, changes in violence level, and a nuanced measure of campaign progress. Thus, I can isolate potential mechanisms for civil resistance campaign outcomes in the face of substantively important confounders.

Since my theory suggests the influence of external support from different actors on campaign success is conditional on the initial strategy choice of the campaign, I divide the data into two subsamples: 1) campaigns that initially chose violence, and 2) campaigns that initially choose non-violence. This division is important for parsing out the relationship between external support and campaign success in different civil resistance contexts. Additionally, dividing the data into these two subsamples allows me to control for the possibility that campaigns are choosing either a strategy of

violence or nonviolence in order to attract support from certain external actors.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this analysis is *Campaign Success*. A campaign is coded as successful in a given year if they achieved their stated objectives. These objectives range from policy changes, democratic elections, regime change, and national independence. *Campaign Success* is coded as 1 if the campaign was successful within the first year of peak activity and as 0 otherwise. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) note that this is a strict measure of success, but eliminates weaker cases that returned to active civil resistance within a short period after making gains. Thus, while a dichotomous measure can be problematic for capturing variance in the extent of success across campaigns, this strict threshold reduces the measurement of false-positives. Figure 1 shows the dispersion of successes and failures across violent and nonviolent campaign strategies. It is clear that a greater proportion of nonviolent campaigns end in success. A total of 70 out of 109 cases of nonviolent campaigns are successful within the first year of peak activity where as only 40 out of 142 cases of violent campaigns are successful.

Figure 1: Campaign Success by Strategy Type


	Success	Failure	Total
Violent	40	102	142
Nonviolent	70	39	109
Total	110	141	251

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable for this analysis is external support based on identity of the external support provider. The two key external actors whose support I examine in this analysis are *Foreign States* and *INGOs*. External support from each actor is measured dichotomously where *Foreign State* is coded as 1 if external support was provided by a foreign state to the campaign and as 0 otherwise; *INGO* is coded as 1 if external support was provided by an international or nongovernmental organization to the campaign and as 0 otherwise. Figure 2 below highlights one

potential problem with modeling the selection into providing support in separate subsamples. We can see there are fewer observations of support for nonviolent campaigns, limiting our nonviolent sample. In general, there are fewer observations of nonviolent campaigns when we examine these campaigns at the year level since nonviolent campaigns tend to be shorter.

Figure 2: External Support by Strategy Type



The ability to mobilize networks of external support can also potentially increase a civil resistance campaign’s likelihood of success, both in violent and nonviolent contexts. Thus, another key independent variable is the number and heterogeneity of external actors providing support. Unfortunately, the NAVCO 2.0 data set does not allow me to capture the depth of the external support network for a given campaign since the measures are dichotomized. However, the data set does allow me to capture the scope of external actors providing support to a particular campaign. While I don’t model the relationship between diaspora group external support and campaign success directly in this analysis, I am able to use information about diaspora group support to capture the extent of support heterogeneity to civil resistance campaigns. Using these data, I measure *Support Heterogeneity* as an ordered categorical variable coded as 1 when only one of the three types of actors provided support to the campaign in a given year, as 2 when any pair of the three actor types provided support, and as 3 when all three types of actors provided external support, and as 0 otherwise. This variable is then standardized to be between 0 and 1.

Controls

In addition to modeling the relationship between *Campaign Success* and external support from different actors, I also control for a number of variables that could potentially influence the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success. First, Stephan and Chenoweth (2013) argue that the ability of a civil resistance campaign to cause defections in target government military or police forces can increase a campaign's likelihood of success. They find that nonviolent campaigns, in particular, are very effective at winning the loyalty of domestic security forces and this is one mechanism for their higher record of success than violent campaigns. Nevertheless, they find that both nonviolent and violent campaigns that can rally the support of domestic security forces are more likely to achieve their goals. I will use their dichotomous measure of *Security Defections*, coded as 1 if the regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts, and coded as 0 otherwise. The presence of *Security Defections* during a campaign should increase the likelihood of its success.

In order to control both for the past progress of the campaign and for the fact that external actors will consider the campaign's likelihood of succeeding prior to providing support, I include the variable $Progress_{t-1}$. This is an ordered categorical variable coded as 0 for the status quo in a given year, 1 for visible gains short of concessions, 2 for limited concessions achieved, 3 for significant concessions, and 4 for successfully completing the campaign goals.³ Category 4 is the limit for the dichotomous variable of *Campaign Success*. I expect higher levels of progress in the previous year to increase the likelihood of success for both violent and nonviolent campaigns. Also, if external actors are behaving strategically, signs of progress should increase the likelihood they will provide support to a campaign.

My analysis is directed at capturing the outcomes for the civil resistance campaign. However, the target government is also an active part of the civil resistance campaign and can heavily influence the likelihood that the campaign will be successful. One common government response to civil resistance is violent repression against civilians or rebels. There is a debate in the literature over whether or not repression changes the severity of response from civil resistance groups leading to increased violence. However, there is a general consensus that the typical response is for civil resistance campaigns to employ more violent strategies, often increasing the duration of the conflict as well (Pierskalla,

³This is the NAVCO 2.0 coding of progress.

2010). This can impact the subsequent outcome of the campaign by decreasing the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success. I control for *Repression* using an ordered categorical variable ranging from 0 to 3 where 0 = no repressive government response and 3 = extreme violent repression. Increased *Repression*, according to past research, should decrease the likelihood of success for both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

The literature on civil war suggests that external support to the target government can delegitimize the civil resistance campaign and increase the bargaining leverage of the target government (Balch-Lindsay et. al. 2008). However, competing literature argues that external support for the target government can also serve as a credible commitment that the government will offer the civil resistance campaign negotiated concessions (Regan and Aydin, 2006; Metternich, 2011). Thus, its not clear how support for the target government will influence the success of the civil resistance campaign. In general, the evidence points to external support for the target government increasing the target government's ability to succeed over the campaign. I expect that *Target Government Support* will decrease the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success for both nonviolent and violent campaigns. This variable is dichotomous, coded as 1 when the target government received external support in a given year, and 0 otherwise.

Finally, there are domestic mechanisms that make the use of nonviolent strategies more or less likely. Since nonviolent campaigns tend to be more successful than violent campaigns, it might be important to control for increased institutional capacity to engage in nonviolent civil resistance. One proxy for this is by controlling for the target government regime type. I will do this using country Polity scores from the Polity IV Project by Marshall et. al. (2013). It is important to note that this measure is particularly problematic in the range of countries that are considered to be "anocracies" since institutional distinctions captured by the polity measure are very blunt and fail to appropriately deal with institutional variation in these countries (Trier and Jackman, 2008). However, this blunt measure does provide some indication of whether or not democratic institutions are in place within a country that could potentially increase the ability for civil resistance campaigns to employ nonviolent methods. I use the Polity IV measure to code for the variable *Target Polity* which ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being the most autocratic and 10 being the most democratic countries. Higher levels of democracy should increase the likelihood of civil resistance campaign success, especially for

nonviolent campaigns.

Modeling External Support and Civil Resistance Outcomes

One key issue with modeling the relationship between external support and civil resistance outcomes is the necessity to deal with selection bias related to the decision to provide external support to some campaigns and not to others. Just as civil resistance campaigns make strategic decisions about the use of violent or nonviolent tactics, external supporters make strategic decisions about whether or not to support certain campaigns. Some research has argued external actors select into providing support in situations where they already believe the side they are supporting is likely to be successful (Shannon et. al., 2010). As previously stated, this problem is particularly salient for foreign states and INGOs, but less so for diaspora groups. Thus, I attempt to capture the nature of this selection bias directly in my modeling approach.

A second issue is the endogeneity between civil resistance campaign strategy choices and external support. Recent research provides evidence for civil resistance campaigns choosing tactics that can attract certain kinds of external support. While my dependent variable is campaign success and not strategy choice, my theory suggests that choice of strategy heavily influences the likelihood of success. Thus, it will be important to consider testing the relationship between strategy choice and the likelihood of receiving external support to explore potential sources of endogeneity in the model. Unlike the selection bias issue, however, the endogeneity between strategy choice and external support is more difficult to measure directly in the modeling process. One potential way to deal with this issue is by modeling the conditional relationship directly using an interaction between strategy choice and external support. However, modeling the conditional relationship in this manner makes the use of selection models less tractable. In order to demonstrate this conditionality, I test my hypotheses by using two separate subsamples representing the campaigns that initially choose violence and the campaigns that initially choose nonviolence.

The problem of selection bias is often attributed to an omitted variable problem where unobserved factors are affecting both the the outcome of interest as well as the chance of it being observed (Heckman, 1976). Stated differently, it is highly likely the selection into providing external support for a civil resistance campaign is related to the expected likelihood of success since external actors

are behaving strategically when they decide which campaigns to provide support to. Typical regression approaches, however, assume the conditional mean of the error is 0 – there are no unobserved confounders related to the selection variable conditioning the result – leading to bias in the resulting coefficient in cases where strategic selection is in fact an issue (Signorino, 2002). An external actor’s choice to provide external support to civil resistance campaigns selects those civil resistance campaigns into a particular sub sample of the total sample of observed civil resistance campaigns. In order to capture this bias, which certainly exists in theory and may exist statistically, I employ a bivariate probit model. The selection stage models the selection of campaigns into receiving external support and the outcome stage models the likelihood of success given this receipt of external support.

In the first stage, where the external actor makes the decision whether or not to provide external support, we can observe the outcome of the decision but the selection into support is driven by the unobserved latent variable y_1^* . This latent variable is the result of unobserved factors or an omitted variable(s) that we will want to attempt to model more directly in the selection equation. The challenge is in finding an instrumental variable in the selection equation that is not likely to be correlated with the second stage, or outcome equation, but that is theoretically motivated (Reed, 2001; Hendrix and Wong, 2013). Since the strategic decisions of foreign states will be different from those of INGOs, different factors will likely influence their decision to provide external support to civil resistance campaigns. As previously mentioned, foreign states often provide external support to campaigns when they want to hurt the target regime or change the target regime’s behavior. Foreign states providing external support in these cases may care very little about the particular goals of the campaign or think of their goals as secondary, so long as they can change the target regime’s behavior in a way that suits their strategic interests. Additionally, foreign states will also provide support to a civil resistance campaign when the target regime is an enemy of their allies. Thus, the instrumental variable that can capture the strategic calculus informing the utility an external actor places on providing support to civil resistance campaigns is *Interstate Rivalry*.⁴ This is coded as 1 if the target regime is a strategic interstate rival to potential foreign state support providers. This data is a quantitative coding the Thompson’s (2001) qualitative outlining of strategic interstate rivals in

⁴Correlations and bivariate regressions were run comparing *Interstate Rivalry* to both *Foreign State Support* and *Campaign Success*. These results can be found in the appendix and provide support for using this variable in the selection model. This variable is positively and significantly related to selecting into support and not significantly related to campaign outcomes.

the international system (Boutton, 2014). It is a particularly useful depiction of interstate rivalry since it is based on multiple layers of international competition rather than just on past history of conflict.

INGOs have limited resources and can only participate as an external actor in those conflicts where they know they can be instrumental. Additionally, they depend on donors for funding when they want to provide support to civil resistance campaigns. Thus, they are more likely to support civil resistance movements that are salient or have attracted a lot of international attention. Unlike foreign states, INGOs are also more likely to support those campaigns that are up against a target regime that is engaging in behavior that is condemnable by international standards since the mission of many INGOs is related to human rights and protecting international norms. As a result the instrumental variable used to capture the selection of INGOs into civil resistance campaigns is *International Condemnation*, coded as 1 if the target regime was condemned by the international community in the previous year for their actions during the civil resistance campaign, and 0 otherwise. There are two important things to note here. First, bivariate tests show that *International Condemnation* does significantly increase the likelihood of *INGO Support* and is not related to campaign outcomes, making it a statistically viable instrument. However, the selection effect in the bivariate probit models for both the violent and nonviolent subsamples was not statistically significant. In other words, the extent of the selection bias related to *INGO Support* is not significant enough to warrant the use of a selection modeling approach. Thus, I test the relationship of *INGO Support* to *Campaign Success* using a basic probit regression model. Results of the selection model demonstrating the statistically insignificant ρ coefficient can be found in the Appendix.

Results

The results of the bivariate probit selection model are in Table 1 below. Model 1 tests the relationship between external support from foreign states and violent campaign success. Contrary to *H1a* those violent campaigns that receive external support from foreign states are more likely to be successful at achieving their goals. Interestingly, when the target government is a major interstate rival, foreign state external support is significantly more likely. Meanwhile, those factors that are thought to posi-

tively predict campaign success, such as target government security defections and more democratic political systems, negatively predict foreign state support. Similarly, within the sample of violent campaigns that receive foreign state support, factors that tend to predict success for civil resistance campaigns in general do not significantly increase the likelihood of success for violent campaigns. Consistent with previous research, security defections are positively related to campaign success but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Thus, these results suggest that the violent campaigns that receive external support from foreign states are more likely to be successful, but this increased probability of success is driven by very different factors from campaigns that are more successful in general. This finding suggests that further research is needed to understand what makes violent campaigns receiving external support from foreign states unique to other successful campaigns.

The results from Model 2 testing the relationship between external support from foreign states and nonviolent campaign success provide preliminary support for *H1b*. Foreign state external support to nonviolent campaigns strongly decreases the likelihood of campaign success. Two important notes of caution are needed for this particular result. First, the instrument of interstate rivalry is not significant in the selection stage for the nonviolent sample suggesting that this particular factor is less important to foreign states interested in providing external support to nonviolent movements. Secondly, selecting into external support for nonviolent movements significantly reduces the sample size used in the outcome stage of the model. Thus, even with bootstrapped standard errors these results should be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, the results in Model 2 have some interesting implications for the probability of success for nonviolent campaigns receiving foreign state support. First, security defections are much more instrumental than they are for the violent campaigns. While the coefficient is still not statistically significant, it approaches significance at the 90% confidence level. Second, external support for the target government is negatively and significantly related to nonviolent campaign success when those campaigns are receiving foreign state support. This finding suggests that increased involvement of third parties on both sides for strategic purposes inhibits the success of nonviolent campaigns. Finally, while increases in the level of democracy within the political institutions of the target government is negatively related to violent campaign success, it increases the likelihood of nonviolent campaign success.

As previously noted, the selection models exploring the potential strategic selection of INGOs into

Table 1: Bivariate Probit of Success With Foreign State Support

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	Violent	Nonviolent
Success		
Security Defections	0.003 (0.004)	0.011 (0.008)
Target Support	0.003 (0.237)	-0.737 (0.447)
Repression	-0.207 (0.128)	0.021 (0.119)
Progress (t-1)	0.388 (0.101)	-0.045 (0.102)
Target Polity	-0.025 (0.016)	0.088 (0.036)
Success α	-1.712 (0.369)	0.939 (0.339)
Foreign State Support		
Interstate Rivalry	0.526 (0.099)	0.106 (0.239)
Security Defections	-0.006 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)
Target Support	-0.083 (0.100)	-0.377 (0.291)
Repression	0.124 (0.093)	-0.118 (0.123)
Progress (t-1)	0.255 (0.061)	0.132 (0.097)
Target Polity	-0.037 (0.007)	0.018 (0.023)
Foreign State Support α	-0.747 (0.283)	-0.281 (0.323)
Selection Effect ρ	2.496 (0.002)	-11.580 (0.002)
Observations	707	122

Standard errors in parentheses.

supporting certain campaigns provided evidence that the statistical nature of this selection was not significant and therefore did not call for a two-stage model. Thus, Table 2 below shows the results from the simple probit regression of campaign success given INGO support and support heterogeneity. Model 3 tests the relationship between INGO external support and violent campaign success. I find support for *H2a* stating INGO external support does not significantly influence the likelihood of violent campaign success. The coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant. Once again,

security defections are a positive predictor of violent campaign success, but this relationship is insignificant when we control for external support. External support for the target regime significantly reduces the likelihood of violent campaign success when we don't only examine those violent campaigns that receive foreign state support like in the outcome stage of Model 1. Finally, past progress of the campaign is a significant predictor of success in the following year in Model 3.

The results in Model 5 provide moderate support for *H2b*. INGO external support is positively related to nonviolent campaign success, but does not reach the level of statistical significance. Thus, INGO external support is a sufficient but not necessary condition for nonviolent campaign success. Again, these results come from a very limited sample supporting the need for increased data to test this relationship. Consistent with the selection model results in Table 1, in Model 5 security defections are a positive predictor of nonviolent campaign success. While this result shows a stronger relationship between security defections and nonviolent campaigns than the result for violent campaigns, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Two important predictors of nonviolent campaign success in Model 5 are campaign progress in the previous year and more democratic institutions in the country where the campaign is occurring.

Models 4 and 6 provide limited and conflicting support for *H3a* and *H3b*. Violent campaigns are more likely to be successful when they have a diverse external support network, providing some support for *H3a*. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Thus, Model 4 provides limited support for research that suggests a more diverse support network provides campaigns with greater bargaining leverage and an increased probability of success. On the other hand, this result does not appear to hold for nonviolent campaigns. A more diverse external support network decreases the probability of nonviolent movement success suggesting that the collective action problem of more actors hurts nonviolent campaigns. Once again, this coefficient is not statistically significant suggesting that the nature of the problem may not be very severe. What these results do demonstrate is a need for increased research on external support networks and their influence on violent and nonviolent campaigns. One future extension that will be explored, barring increased data on external support to violent and nonviolent groups, is a social network analysis of how the structure of external supporters and internal recipients might influence campaign success. For now, the results are limited.

Table 2: Probit Model of Success With INGO Support and Support Heterogeneity

	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
	Violent	Violent	Nonviolent	Nonviolent
INGO Support	-0.043 (0.412)		0.389 (0.529)	
International Condemnation	-0.030 (0.272)		-0.813 (0.517)	
Support Heterogeneity		0.411 (0.343)		-0.208 (0.402)
Security Defections	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.008)	0.013 (0.006)
Target Support	-0.365 (0.226)	-0.211 (0.207)	-0.629 (0.481)	-0.222 (0.344)
Repression	-0.153 (0.170)	-0.152 (0.137)	-0.225 (0.213)	-0.106 (0.145)
Progress (t-1)	0.314 (0.109)	0.328 (0.096)	0.688 (0.160)	0.583 (0.117)
Target Polity	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.018)	0.068 (0.036)	0.088 (0.026)
Logged Likelihood	-68.745	-81.584	-26.962	-46.829
Observations	647	738	100	142

Standard errors in parentheses.

Discussion

We know that external actors providing support to civil conflicts, both violent and nonviolent, are behaving strategically. Moreover, civil resistance campaigns are making decisions about what strategies to employ based on their desire to achieve their goals successfully, but also to attract certain kinds of external support. Thus, the dynamic process of civil resistance or civil conflict is further complicated by the presence and actions of external actors. What has been unclear is whether or not external actors, with their own goals and interests, can help civil resistance campaigns achieve success and how this differs in violent and nonviolent contexts.

In this paper I attempt to unpack some of the dynamic process of civil resistance campaigns by exploring how different types of external actors influence the likelihood of violent and nonviolent campaign success. First, my results suggest that foreign states are the most strategic external actors providing support to civil resistance campaigns. They are more likely to provide support to campaigns when the campaign has shown some signs of success, demonstrating the fact that they select into campaigns where they already believe the campaign will be successful. Also, they are more likely to

selection into supporting violent campaigns in particular when the target state is a strategic interstate rival. Support from foreign states, thus, is correlated with success for violent campaigns. However, as my theory suggests, foreign state support is detrimental to the success of nonviolent campaigns.

Second, my results find that INGO external support is not significantly related to success of either violent or nonviolent campaigns. While it does appear to have a positive effect on nonviolent campaign success, which is consistent with my theory, this relationship is not particularly strong. One potential issue with establishing the strength of the relationship between INGO support and campaign success, especially for nonviolent campaigns, is data availability. My theory suggests that its not just INGO support in general, but INGO networks and the type of support they provide that makes their support particularly useful for nonviolent campaigns. However, I am unable to directly test those mechanisms in this preliminary examination of the relationship between INGO external support and campaign success. Thus, there is extensive room for further research here.

Finally, my results suggest that external support can influence the efficacy of other mechanisms that are known to help civil resistance campaigns achieve success, such as security defections and level of democracy within a country. Therefore, further research is needed to examine how external support influences not only the strategic behavior of civil resistance campaigns, but also the dynamics between these campaigns and the target government over the course of the campaign. Many of the issues faced with examining these extensions require increased data collection.

From a policy perspective, these results are not optimistic about the role of external support from foreign states in particular. The fact that foreign state support appears to be helpful for violent campaigns but not for nonviolent campaigns calls into question the strategic calculus of foreign states and what exactly it is they are trying to achieve with their support for civil resistance campaigns. One potential silver lining worth exploring is the extent to which the successful violent campaigns that received external support from foreign states are able to provide post-conflict stability. Past research seems to suggest the outcome is not good. Meanwhile, we need to know more about how external actors can effectively support nonviolent campaigns and post-campaign stability if they are going to continue to provide support to these campaigns.

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Appendix

Examining Statistical Support for Instrumental Variable

Instrumental variable choices need to be supported both theoretically and statistically. In this paper I discuss the theoretical decisions that support the use of *Interstate Rivalry* as an instrument for *Foreign State Support* selection and the use of *International Condemnation* for *INGO Support* selection. The instruments must be correlated with the selection dependent variable, external support, but must not be significantly correlated to the outcome dependent variable, campaign success.

The results for the basic OLS regressions can be found below. The regressions are divided by the subsamples of violent and nonviolent campaigns. All of the data on campaign success and external support comes from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. Additionally, the variable *International Condemnation* comes from NAVCO and Chenoweth and Lewis's (2011) dichotomous measure of any instance in which the target government was condemned internationally in the media. The data for *Interstate Rivalry* and *Number of Rivals* come from Boutton (2014). His measure of rivalry is based on Thompson's qualitative distinctions of strategic interstate rivals based on economic, political, and social competition rather than the measure of rivalry based on past history of conflict or MIDs. Finally, the additional data on *International Shaming* is from Murdie and Peksen's (2014) work on the effect of international shaming on human rights transgressions. This data is only available from 1990-2005 and thus is less preferable than the more blunt NAVCO measure.

The violent subsample was completed supported with the results in Table 3. The instruments are significantly and highly correlated with the selection into foreign state and INGO external support, but were not significantly related to the likelihood of violent campaign success. The nonviolent subsample suffers from issues related to sample size. There are fewer campaigns, the campaigns tend to be much shorter, and there are fewer instances of external support. Thus, I attribute many of the issues to missing data problems. However, I discuss some of the theoretical causes of significant and insignificant results in the paper. For example, while *Interstate Rivalry* in the nonviolent subsample is not significantly correlated with campaign success, it also is not significantly correlated with *Foreign State Support* for this subsample. Meanwhile, *International Condemnation* is significantly correlated to *INGO Support*, but is also significantly related to *Success* for the nonviolent subsample. Since the selection effect was null for the models implementing these variables, this result is less of a concern.

Table 3: Instrumental Variable OLS Bivariate Regression Results

	<i>Foreign State</i>		<i>INGO</i>		<i>Success</i>		<i>Foreign State</i>		<i>INGO</i>		<i>Success</i>	
	Violent		Violent		Violent		Nonviolent		Nonviolent		Violent	Nonviolent
Interstate Rivalry	0.102 (0.029)				-0.005 (0.011)		0.012 (0.055)					-0.037 (0.042)
Number of Rivals	0.071 (0.018)				-0.010 (0.007)		-0.798 (0.051)					0.023 (0.039)
International Condemnation			0.120 (0.019)		0.011 (0.011)				0.283 (0.079)			-0.126 (0.059)
International Shaming			0.025 (0.008)		-0.002 (0.005)				-0.016 (0.032)			-0.011 (0.022)

Standard errors in parentheses.

Testing Selection Effect for INGO Support

The models in Table 4 suggest the selection effect for INGO support to both violent and nonviolent campaigns is not statistically significant. These results provide support for utilizing a more simple modeling approach to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. Thus, in the paper I use a simple probit regression model to explore the relationship between INGO support and campaign success.

Table 4: Bivariate Probit of Success With Foreign State Support

	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
	Violent	Nonviolent
Success		
Security Defections	0.534 (0.766)	0.008 (0.007)
Target Support	1.406 (0.635)	-0.057 (0.651)
Repression	-50.467 (75.687)	-0.082 (0.262)
Progress (t-1)	0.798 (1.069)	0.327 (0.177)
Target Polity		0.170 (0.052)
Success α	148.467 (225.557)	-0.432 (0.545)
INGO Support		
International Condemnation t-1	0.691 (0.143)	1.815 (0.400)
Security Defections	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.012 (0.004)
Target Support	-0.430 (0.144)	-0.206 (0.347)
Repression	0.904 (0.360)	0.049 (0.164)
Progress (t-1)	0.335 (0.065)	0.216 (0.136)
Target Polity		-0.073 (0.031)
INGO Support α	-4.283 (1.073)	-2.099 (0.475)
Selection Effect ρ	-0.486 (1.230)	-0.449 (0.333)
Observations	747	100

Standard errors in parentheses.

A few important notes should be made regarding these models. First, both have insignificant selection effect rho coefficients, thus supporting the decision to use simple probit regression models. The second note is particular to the violent subsample. Due to the high percentage of censored observations (682/747) as a result of very few instances of INGO support for violent campaigns, the

model will not run with the *Target Polity* covariate included. Also the alpha parameters and results for the *Repression* covariate are much higher than might be expected from a better performing model. These results provide additional support for the need for increased data collection.