

Informed or Influenced? Voting consistently in direct democratic votes

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Abstract

Through original data from direct democratic projects in California and Switzerland, I explore the impact of political knowledge and cues on consistent voting. That means, testing whether a voting decision lines up with a person's argument-position on the issue at stake.

Drawing from the literature on information processing, I predict that citizens who possess issue-specific knowledge are more likely to vote consistently. On the other hand, relying on cognitive shortcuts like knowledge of parties, interest groups, and government cues increase consistent voting when they are aligned with the position on the policy and decrease it when they are not aligned with it.

Empirical analysis validates the strong predictive power of citizens' policy positions on their vote choices, confirming the existence of consistent voting. While issue-specific knowledge does not affect consistent voting, knowledge of political cues works at cross purpose.

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Introduction

In elections, political scientists are often concerned about the coherence of voter's choices. This solicitude has been less prominent when examining the instrument of direct democracy. While several authors examined the role of preference formation in direct democratic votes (e.g. De Angelis et al., 2020; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Mullinix, 2016; Dermont & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2020), only a limited number of studies have specifically explored the extent to which vote choices reflect individuals' positions on policies (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Milic, 2012; Colombo & Kriesi, 2017;). Nevertheless, this is a crucial issue, as the inability of voters to align their opinions with their vote choices can undermine the efficacy of direct democratic votes. In direct democracy, citizens are expected to make decisions on specific policies or issues. If they cannot align their opinions with their votes, it may result in votes that do not truly represent their preferences or that are inconsistent with the outcomes they desire.

Moreover, little is known about the determinants influencing consistent voting. On one hand, it is widely accepted that democratic citizens need to be well-informed about politics to cast meaningful votes (Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Downs, 1957). Therefore, knowledge should influence the ability to cast a consistent vote. On the other hand, research indicates that individuals can be uninformed about politics and still make vote choices that accurately represent them, thanks to the use of cognitive shortcuts (Boudreau & Lupia, 2011; Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2021; Lau et al., 2008; Lupia, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). This would imply that knowledge of politics is not strictly necessary to cast a consistent vote.

Therefore, in this article, I test whether citizens make voting decisions that align with their argument position on policies, thereby determining if they vote consistently (Lanz and Nai 2015). I also explore whether political cues and knowledge of the policy aid (or hinder) consistent voting.

Based on the "dual models" of cognitive processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), I argue that citizens who systematically possess issue-specific knowledge (i.e. factual knowledge on the policy) are better capable of casting a consistent vote. Relying on cognitive shortcuts such as party, interest groups, and government cues work at cross purpose. This means cues confirming the direction of the argument-based position increase consistent voting, while cues conflicting with the argument-based position decrease consistent voting. By analyzing original data on four direct democratic projects in Switzerland and California, I also test whether the context of the vote influences consistent voting. I posit that the institutional characteristics of the Swiss type of direct democracy make government and party cues more influential in Switzerland than in California. Conversely, I expect interest group cues being more influential in California.

What's consistent voting?

The literature on voting behavior has been interested for several decades in the quality of vote choices. The lack of knowledge highlighted by the American voter (Campbell et al., 1960) has led many scholars to focus on the consequences of such political ignorance on vote choices (Andersen et al., 2005; Barabas et al., 2014; Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Mondak, 2001). Research on information has attempted to show what the outcome of elections is if less informed individuals voted like better-informed ones (Bartels, 1996; Christin et al., 2002; Lupia, 1994). This stream of research has been the antecedent of the "correct" voting literature (Merolla et al., 2016). Indeed, when Lau and Redlawsk introduced the concept of correct voting, they defined it as "the likelihood that citizens, under conditions of incomplete information, nonetheless vote for the candidate or party they would have voted for had they had full information about those same candidates and/or parties" (Lau et al., 2008: 396; Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). In other words, "the bottom-line question is whether they make the 'right' choice, that is, whether they are able to identify the candidate/party that best represents their views and interests" (André Blais et al., 2016:2).

In direct democratic votes, however, citizens vote on specific policies and not for candidates or parties. Measures adopted by scholars focusing on correct voting are not available for the evaluation of decision-making abilities in referenda (Milic, 2012 : 403). Scholars focusing on direct democratic votes employ an alternative strategy based on the evaluation of arguments reflecting the position of voters on the policy and their subsequent vote choice. Lanz and Nai (2015) coined the term consistent voting. For them a decision is consistent "if it is in line with the voter's position on the issue at stake and hence reflects her opinion on the principal issue-related arguments" (Lanz and Nai 2015, 121). They "only look at opinions on the project" and they do not "normatively assess which decision is correct for each voter" (Lanz and Nai 2015:121-122). This allows focusing simply on the relation between the voter's position on arguments and their vote intention/choice. A consistent decision is when a person's overall argument's position on the policy matches her vote intention/vote choice.

Despite some limitations related to survey designs and measure accuracy, studies found a strong link between position on the policy and vote choice (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Milic, 2012; Nai, 2014).¹ However, the empirical testing of consistent voting has been limited as all studies concentrate on Switzerland (Colombo & Kriesi, 2017; Lanz & Nai, 2015; Milic, 2012; Nai, 2014). As pointed out earlier, in the United States, scholars studying direct democratic votes focus mostly on the knowledge gap between voters, and what tools less informed voters use to emulate better informed ones. This contribution aims to bridge the gap between the two literatures, and compares consistent voting between California and Switzerland.

¹ First of all, the studies that employed such a concept (Milic 2012, Nai 2014, Lanz and Nai 2015, Lauener 2020) rely on surveys exposed to a rationality bias as they ask the argument positions after the vote choice question. Second, when testing the influence of individual-level variables on consistent voting, studies are subject to conceptual misconceptions or error measures. For instance, Milic (2012) claims to test the effects of party cues on consistent voting. This is inexact since he uses party identification as a proxy for knowledge of the party cue, assuming that respondents who strongly identify with a party will know the cue.

What influence consistent decisions?

Political knowledge versus cues

The dual process model of opinion formation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) posits that individuals utilize two distinct cognitive processes when shaping their political attitudes and making political decisions. On one hand, engaging in systematic processing implies to carefully analyzing different political positions, policies, or candidates, grounding their opinions on the quality of the presented arguments and evidence. This kind of process is cognitively demanding and it requires high-level cognitive elaboration. On the other hand, heuristic processing, entails relying on superficial decision-making using shortcuts like party endorsements, emotional appeals, or candidate appearance, which requires little cognitive elaboration.

High level of cognitive elaboration is associated with the gathering of detailed information on policies and candidates. To learn information about policies citizens needs time and effort, a common measure of high elaboration is political knowledge (Kriesi, 2005). General political knowledge which is broadly defined as the store of political information (Carpini & Keeter, 1993) allows citizens to connect their values to concrete political issues and helping them taking political decisions (Gilens, 2001). While the importance of political knowledge is hardly disputable, what is necessary as a piece of information to citizens is open to debate. While general political knowledge can help citizens form a candidate preference, this type of information is less useful when treating specific policy domains. Some authors (Gilens, 2001; Goren, 2004) argue that often well-informed citizens on general political topics lack knowledge of issue-specific information. If the two are unrelated, to take issue-specific decisions citizens need to form knowledge of the policy. In direct democratic votes, issue-specific knowledge should matter more than general political considerations for the study of votes on policy propositions (Lanz and Nai 2015). The benefit of knowing information about a policy is that it helps to judge its content and link it to a person's preferences. If a person knows the content of

the policy it means that she spent time and resources to collect information (*high elaboration*). With this information, she can better identify what are the positive and negative features of it and ultimately better relate her argument position on the policy to the vote choice. Since voting consistently is about casting a vote in line with your preferences, I argue that being well informed about the content of a policy helps a citizen to link her position over the policy to the vote choice. This increases the likelihood of having consistent decision-making.

H1: High level of issue-specific knowledge increases consistent voting.

Heuristic processing instead is a cognitive process that requires less elaboration since people rely on easy, accessible, low cognitive demanding pieces of information. The literature shows that various shortcuts are successful in different contexts, making vote choices easier, including in direct democratic votes (Arceneaux & Kolodny, 2009; Bullock, 2011; Lupia, 1994; McConaughy et al., 2010; Walder & Strijbis, 2022). For instance, Lupia (1994) identifies interest group cues as a kind of shortcut that helps voters to emulate the vote choice made by those with strong knowledge of the policies. The author finds "that relatively uninformed voters who could correctly identify the insurance industry's official position on a particular proposition were much more likely formulate the behavior of relatively well-informed voters on that proposition than were similarly uninformed voters who did not know the insurance industry's position" (Lupia 1994: 63). If voters know that a specific interest group endorse a ballot measure then the person will be likely to keep that information in mind, and adjust her voting decision accordingly (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2021). Similarly, exposure to party cues that indicate a voting recommendation makes party members more likely to adopt that position (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Colombo & Kriesi, 2017). This happens because messages from voters' preferred party lead citizens to reduce uncertainty as to how their partisan predispositions relate to the policy (Selb et al., 2009).

Unlike knowledge of the policy, cues inform voters about how political elites position themselves with respect to the policy, regardless of its content. Moreover, elites provide directional information to voters as they often recommend voting in favor of or against policy projects. Thus, relying on cognitive shortcuts in the decision-making process can enhance consistent voting, but it also holds the risk of steering citizens away from consistent decisions. Political cues can either reinforce or exert pressure on voters' position on the policy, depending on whether the cue conflicts with or confirms the argument-based position. Because the cue reinforces the position on the policy, when the cue aligns with the direction of the argument-based position, it increases the chances of voting consistently. If the cue conflicts with the direction of the argument-based position, it decreases the chances of voting consistently because the person will tend to follow the cue. For instance, if a citizen knows that her preferred party recommends voting No to a policy, but her argument position is in favor of it she will find herself cross-pressured. In this situation, the person will be less likely to vote consistently.

H2a: Knowledge of (party-government-interest group) cues confirming the direction of the argument-based position increases consistent voting.

H2b: Knowledge of (party-government-interest group) cues conflicting with the direction of the argument-based position decreases consistent voting.

Contextual variance

So far consistent voting has only been tested in the Swiss context a specific type of direct democracy however, different variants of direct democracy exist. Kriesi (2009:79-80) identifies three main variants, depending on the top-down versus bottom-up logic of direct democratic processes and on the extent of the government's and parliament's involvement: The 'unmediated' variant, the 'mediated' variant, and the 'plebiscitary' variant. This study compares the unmediated (California) and mediated (Switzerland) types of direct democracy.

The unmediated or populist variant (Bowler & Donovan, 2006) is a bottom-up approach that sees interest groups and common citizens proposing new laws and reforms to overpass the role of the government. Moreover, these initiatives are often used against political parties (Bowler & Donovan, 2006:651). Campaigns are mostly driven by interest groups while parties and governmental authorities are largely invisible. In this context, we can expect interest groups to take clear stances during direct democratic votes as well as leading campaigns to influence voters' choices on policy propositions.

The Swiss system combines bottom-up and top-down elements being the perfect example of the "mediated" variant. In Switzerland, different forms of direct votes exist from popular initiatives (similar to California) to optional and mandatory referenda where, on the latter, citizens vote on constitutional amendments. When it comes to elites' involvement in the process, direct democracy in Switzerland is more tightly controlled by the government than the unmediated version of citizen initiatives in the U.S: the Swiss government takes sides on initiatives – and may even respond to them with counter-proposals (Sciarini, 2018). Moreover, it actively campaigns for or against policy projects in order to influence voters' decisions. Political parties play a central role too. They do not only provide voting recommendations but they also campaign in favor or against policies as much as the government. Interest groups have a secondary role instead, they provide voting recommendations but they rarely take part in campaigning.

Depending on the top-down versus bottom-up logic of direct democratic processes and on the extent of government involvement, the knowledge of government interest groups and parties' voting recommendations would produce a different effect on consistent voting. This is given by the relative influence that these actors play in each variant of direct democracy. With the leading role that the government and political parties have in Switzerland, I expect their vote recommendation to have more influence in Switzerland than California. In the unmediated

variant, direct democratic votes follow a bottom-up logic resulting from citizens' and interest groups' sponsored initiatives. The predominant role that interest groups play in direct democracy in California (Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004) leads to the expectation that the knowledge of interest group cues influences the likelihood of consistent decision-making more in California than in Switzerland.

H3a: Knowledge of party cues has a stronger effect on consistent voting in Switzerland than in California.

H3b: Knowledge of government cues has a stronger effect on consistent voting in Switzerland than in California.

H3c: Knowledge of interest group cues has a stronger effect on consistent voting in California than in Switzerland.

Case studies

The original data comes from two post-vote surveys fielded in California (November 2022) and Switzerland (June 2023) covering each two policy projects.² The N size is 1157 units in California and 1823 units in Switzerland (See Appendix A).

In California, the survey covered two projects related to the introduction of sports betting in the state of California. The projects were competing one against the other either to introduce in-person sports betting exclusively at American Indian casinos (proposition 26) or to introduce sports betting exclusively on online platforms (proposition 27), through constitutional amendments. Like the Democratic party, the governor (Democrat) abstained from providing a voting recommendation on Proposition 26 and recommended to vote No on 27. The Republican Party instead recommended to vote No at both propositions. The main interest groups involved in the campaign were the California Nation Indian Gaming Association (CNIGA) and Draft King/Fan Duels. The first is the association that promoted and financed the campaign in favor of Proposition 26. Members of the association are Casinos companies having headquarters in California. The CNIGA recommended to vote Yes to Proposition 26 and No to Proposition 27. The second group is the cluster of companies that promoted and financed the campaign in favor of Proposition 27. Draft King and Fan Duels are major multinational companies involved in online sports betting. They recommended to vote Yes to Proposition 27 and abstained to provide a voting recommendation for Proposition 26. While sports betting is commonly discussed owing to its prevalent coverage in television and online advertisements, the reforms associated with the sports gambling industry introduce a more complex and less familiar political subject with little ideological divisions, representing a classic case of citizen initiatives.

² The data collection is part of the project "Opinion Stability and Change in Direct Democracy in a comparative perspective" funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant nr. 201119)

In Switzerland instead, the OECD law (mandatory referendum), promoted by the Federal Council and the Parliament proposed a constitutional amendment to implement a minimum tax rate specifically targeting large, globally operating corporate groups. This proposed amendment aligns with the OECD's recommendation to establish unique taxation regulations, imposing a 15 percent tax rate on such companies to promote global tax fairness. The Climate law (optional referendum), sought to diminish environmental pollution and increase energy security by reducing energy imports, creating a comprehensive framework to achieve climate neutrality by the year 2050. The regulation set a project to reduce the consumption of mineral oil and natural gas while concurrently boosting domestic production of renewable energy.

For the OECD law, most parties were in favor of it with the exception of the Socialist Party (second most important party in terms of vote share). For the Climate law, while most parties supported the policy, strong opposition emerged from the Swiss People's Party (right-wing party), the most important party in terms of vote share. The Swiss government supported both referenda and recommended to vote Yes. In Switzerland the two interest groups I considered for the analysis are peak associations, namely Economiesuisse (Swiss corporate union) and the Union Syndical Suisse (Swiss trade union), two major interest groups in the country. For both projects, the two interest groups recommended to vote Yes. Both had a marginal role throughout the campaigns.

Measures

Since consistent voting means voting in line with a person's argument-position on the issue at stake, to measure the concept, I relate arguments and vote choice. Vote choice is measured with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the person voted yes and 0 if the person voted no. This variable includes not only those respondents who declared to have voted but also those who did not participate but stated their vote intention (either in support or against each project). This choice is made to increase the N size for the models (See Appendix B). As a robustness check I run the models also with only those who participated in the elections. Moreover, I excluded voters who answered don't know to the vote choice question (See Appendix B). Looking at the descriptive statistics, the two projects in California were rejected while the two projects in Switzerland were accepted. The vote distribution of the survey follows official statistics (See Appendix B).

The position on campaign arguments follows the empirical approach of past research (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Milic, 2012; Kriesi 2005; Colombo & Kriesi 2017). This measure is an index summarizing a person's overall arguments' position on each project.³ In the survey I asked respondents to evaluate three arguments in favor of the project and three arguments against the project. For each argument, voters have to indicate their position on a scale ranging from strong disagreement (-2) to strong agreement (2).⁴ Then, I measure the agreement with the pro-arguments and the contra-arguments. Both dimensions range from -6 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly). Finally, I combine the positive and negative dimensions to create an index ranging from 12 to -12. A person fully agreeing with the positive arguments and fully

³ Compared to previous studies (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Milic, 2012; Nai, 2014) I asked the argument positions before the vote choice question. In this way, I avoid any rationality bias, which would see respondents answer the argument position questions according to the vote choice. Moreover, unlike past research, the formulation used for the arguments does not directly link the vote choice to the arguments. Example: "Legalizing sports betting will help to raise significant and regular funds to fight gambling problems".

⁴ Those who answered "do not know" to the argument position question take a score of 0. To avoid biases given by respondents who systematically answered don't know to the arguments, I excluded them from the analysis.

disagreeing with the negative arguments has a score of 12 while a person fully disagreeing with the positive arguments and fully agreeing with the negative arguments has a score of -12.

Issue-specific knowledge measures how acquainted a voter is with the project. It is composed of two items (California) and three items (Switzerland) based on factual knowledge related to the project. If the person answers correctly to a question it marks one point otherwise zero. Then the sum of correct and wrong answers is combined to make an issue-specific knowledge scale ranging from zero to two. This measure differs from previous works (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Kriesi, 2005) as it checks respondents' knowledge of substantive and key elements of the projects (See Appendix B).

Knowledge of interest groups' vote recommendation measures whether the person is aware of the real position that some of the main interest groups (two in California and two in Switzerland) took on the project (See Appendix B). If the person knows the voting recommendation takes a score of one while if the person does not recall the right position takes a score of zero.

Knowledge of government/governor vote recommendation measures whether the person is aware of the real position that this actor took on the project. If the person knows the voting recommendation takes a score of one while if the person does not recall the correct position takes a score of zero.⁵

Knowledge of party vote recommendation measures whether the person is aware of the real position that her preferred political party took on the project. The measures between the two contexts differ slightly to better suit the characteristics of the party system. Being Switzerland a multiparty system, I merge the position of parties in favor and parties against each project. Therefore, the categorical variable represents whether the person knows the correct party position including its direction. The variable takes three different values: doesn't know the position on the policy; knows the position in favor of the policy; or knows the position against

⁵ In the survey, for each question regarding knowledge of cues respondents could choose "freedom of vote" as a possible answer.

the policy. In California, the political system is bipartisan. The categorial variable represents whether the person doesn't know the position of the preferred party, or whether knows the correct position of the Republican or/and of Democratic party.

In Switzerland, I derived the respondents' preferred party from a battery of questions on party identification (see questions in Appendix C). After two questions asking whether the person felt close to a party, if respondents did not, I assigned them a party based on their answers on a 0-10 left-right scale. Respondents who answered 0 to 4 were assigned to the Social Democratic Party, those who answered 5 to the Center Party, 6-7 to the Liberal Radical Party, and those who answered 8 to 10 to the Swiss People's Party (See Appendix D).⁶

In California I followed the same strategy, if respondents did not feel close to a party, I assigned them a party cue based on their answers to a 0-10 liberal-conservative scale. Respondents who answered 0 to 4 were considered Democrats, while those who answered 6 to 10 were considered Republicans; respondents who did not position themselves on the liberal-conservative scale or who positioned themselves in the middle automatically skipped the question about knowledge of party cues and therefore are excluded from the analysis.

I also control for basic demographics (age and gender), self-reported importance and complexity of the project, as well as trust in the government (Switzerland), governor (California).

Concerning the modeling strategy, I first run a logistic regression model for each proposition with the dependent variable vote choice. With this model, I test whether the relation between the argument scale and vote choice follows the right direction, which means the more in favor a respondent feels about the policy the more is likely to vote in favor of it. To test the hypotheses, I run several two-way interactions logistic regression models with as dependent


⁶ I took a broader definition of preferred party to maximize the sample size. Voters who I assigned the party cue base on ideology represent 10% of the sample in Switzerland and 11% of the sample in California. In the future I will include a robustness check with analysis also made on only those that declared to have a preferred party.

variable vote choice. The dependent variable takes the value 0 when the project is rejected and the value 1 when the project is supported. I interact each time the argument position scale with either knowledge of the policy or one of the cues. I run each model separately to capture the effect of each interaction on the dependent variable. The figures I present, report the predictions deriving from each model. I estimated each model for a male voter with age, trust in the government, self-reported importance and complexity of the project at their means. For the logistic regression with interaction between the argument scale and issue-specific knowledge, the voter does not know any political cue. For the logistic regression with interaction between the argument scale and each time a different cue, the voter does not have knowledge of the policy and he does not know any political cue except the one tested in the model. While the figures provide a valid representation of the results, to really test the hypotheses, I compute the difference in probabilities between the slopes presented in the figures ($p = 0.05$). To test the effect of issue-specific knowledge on consistent voting, I compare the slopes representing different levels of knowledge with the slope representing no knowledge (0) of the policy. To test the effect of cues on consistent voting I compute the difference in probabilities between the slopes representing knowledge of the cue with the slope representing those who gave an incorrect answer or did not know the cue.

Results

Figure 1 presents the predictions deriving from the main model that tests the link between argument scale and vote choice (Appendix E for model specifications). The four slopes have the attended shape, the more voters have a favored view of the policy the more are likely to vote yes, hence consistently. As we can see, the relationship is strong for the four propositions. The results corroborate previous findings (Milic, 2012; Land & Nai, 2015) citizens tend to vote in line with their argument positions. Moreover, these results extend to California.

Figure 1 –Predicted probabilities deriving from logistic regression model: effect of argument scale on vote choice. The gray area represents 95% confidence intervals.



Across the four cases, however, we can find some differences. For proposition 27 and the climate law, the ambivalent voter (argument scale = 0) has around 0.5 probability of voting yes. For Proposition 26, the likelihood of voting yes is lower than 0.5 and for the OECD law, is higher than 0.5. This means that the ambivalent voter is more likely to vote yes for the OECD law and less likely to vote yes for Proposition 26. Therefore, consistent voting is higher for Proposition 27 and the climate law and less for OCDE law and Proposition 26. This difference across cases leaves leeway for the potential influence of moderators. However, seeing the strong predictive power of arguments position on vote choice we can expect rather small effects.

Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities of the logistic regression with a two-way interaction between the argument scale and issue-specific knowledge. Each slope represents the coefficients of the interaction between the argument scale and the different levels of issue-specific knowledge. For the OECD law and proposition 26, knowledge of the policy increases the chances of voting consistently when respondents have a position in favor of the policy compared to those who have little knowledge of it. This confirms the results of Lanz and Nai (2015) who also find that knowledge increases the chances of voting consistently, especially for voters who agree with the policy. However, as for their study, the results are non-statistically significant. The difference in probabilities between the slopes that represent respondents owning knowledge of the policy and the slope representing respondents with no knowledge of the policy shows no statistically significant results. This is constant across the four cases. Therefore Hypothesis 1 is rejected.

Figure 2 - Logistic regression: interaction effect argument scale issue-specific knowledge





Figure 3 shows the results of the logistic regression with two-way interaction between the argument scale and knowledge of the party cue. The expected effect is that knowing the party recommendation increases consistent voting when the knowledge of the party cue confirms the direction of the argument-based position. When instead the knowledge of the party cue conflicts with the argument position, it decreases consistent voting. To test this effect, I compare those respondents who know the party voting recommendation with those who do not.

In Switzerland instead, knowledge of the party cue mainly increases consistent voting. For the climate law, knowledge of the party cue affirming the direction of the argument-based position

increases consistent voting. Indeed, knowing that the preferred party recommended voting No increases the chances of voting consistently among voters who think negatively of the policy compared to someone who has a similar opinion but does not know the preferred party position (accepting H2a). At the same time, it decreases the chances of voting consistently for voters whose argument position is mildly in favor (accepting H2b).

Figure 3 – Predicted probabilities deriving from logistic regression model: interaction effect argument scale and knowledge party cue on vote choice. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.



Indeed, the difference in probabilities between the two slopes (blue and red) is statistically significant between points -10 and 2 of the argument scale. Turning to those parties that


recommended to vote Yes, knowing such party recommendation increases the chances of voting consistently among voters who think positively of the policy (accepting H2a, rejecting H2b). The difference in probabilities between the two slopes (green and red) is statistically significant between points -1 and 8 of the argument scale.

For the OECD law, the effects are even stronger. The difference in probabilities between voters knowing that the preferred party recommended voting No and someone not knowing the voting recommendation (blue and red slopes) is statically significant between points 2 and -12 of the argument scale. This means that knowing the party cue increases consistent voting for those who are against the policy but it decreases it for those mildly in favor of the policy (accepting H2a and H2b). Instead, the difference between voters knowing that the preferred party recommended voting Yes and those who do not know it (green and red slopes) is statistically significant between points -1 and 10 of the argument scale. In this case, knowing the party cue increases consistent voting for those who are in favor of the policy but it has no effect for those against the policy (accepting H2a, rejecting H2b). Concerning the contextual variance between the Swiss and Californian contexts, we can clearly see that knowledge of the party has an effect in both contexts, thus we reject H3a.

Figure 4 shows the results of the interaction effect between the government/governor cue and the argument scale on consistent voting. To test the effect of the knowledge of the government/or cue I employ the same strategy as for knowledge of the party cue. Looking at Switzerland, for the climate law, knowledge of the government cue does not have an effect on consistent voting (reject H2a and H2b). For the OECD law, the situation is different. Knowledge of the government cue increases consistent voting for those respondents who are in favor of the policy, but does not decrease it for voters against the policy (accepting H2a, rejecting H2b). The difference in probabilities between voters knowing that the government cue

and those who do not (blue and red slopes) is statically significant between points -1 and 8 of the argument scale.

Figure 4 – Predicted probabilities deriving from logistic regression model: interaction effect argument scale knowledge government/or cue on vote choice. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.



In California, the governor's voting recommendation does not have any effect on consistent voting for Proposition 27 (rejecting H2a and H2b). For Proposition 26, the governor abstained himself from providing a voting recommendation. Those voters who were against the proposition and who knew the position of the governor were still better able to cast a consistent


vote than does who did not. As knowledge of the government cue shows an effect in Switzerland but not in California, we can accept H3b.

Figure 5 shows the results of the interaction effect between the interest groups voting recommendation and the argument scale on consistent voting.⁷ In Switzerland for both propositions we see no effects: knowing or not the interest group cue does not affect consistent voting (rejecting H2a and H2b). The results are confirmed by the test of the difference in probabilities which shows no statistically significant results. In California, for both propositions, knowing the interest group voting recommendation reduces consistent voting when it conflicts with the argument-based position and it increases consistent voting when it affirms the argument position (accepting H2a and H2b). For Proposition 26 voters that have a favorable position towards the proposition are more likely to vote yes when they know the interest group voting recommendation (the California Indian Gaming Association it recommended to vote yes) compared to when they do not. Therefore, they are more likely to vote consistently. In parallel, voters – at least for those with a mild argument position against the proposition - are less likely to vote consistently when they know the interest group cue than when they do not. The difference between the slope representing voters that have knowledge of the CNIGA voting recommendation and the slope representing those voters not knowing the interest group voting recommendation is statistically significant between -3 and 10 of the argument scales. Looking at Proposition 27, the difference between the slope representing knowledge of the Draft King/Fan Duels voting recommendation and the slope representing those voters not knowing the interest group voting recommendation is statistically significant between -2 and 8 on the argument scales. From this analysis can clearly see that interest group

⁷ In this case, as matter of parsimony, I show only the interaction effect of one interest group in Switzerland, Economiesuisse. The results do not differ for USS. For Proposition 26 and 27, I show the effect of the promoter of the initiative. The remaining results are in the Appendix E.

cues have a strong effect in California, while in Switzerland interest group cues do not bear the same effect on consistent voting. Thus, we can confirm H3c.

Figure 5 - Predicted probabilities deriving from logistic regression model: interaction effect argument scale knowledge interest group cue. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.



Conclusion

In this article I test whether citizens vote consistently, meaning voting in line with their overall argument-position on policies. This is particularly crucial in a direct democratic context, as citizens' inability to align their opinions with their votes may lead to outcomes that do not accurately reflect their preferences or are inconsistent with their desired results. Using original data, I conducted a first-time analysis of consistent voting in California and compared the results to the Swiss direct democratic system.

Based on the heuristic systematic model of opinion formation I argue that knowledge of the policies increases consistent voting. Additionally, political cues, in the form of shortcuts, have two distinct effects. Specifically, when the argument position aligns with political cues, citizens are more likely to vote consistently. Conversely, when the argument position does not align with political cues, citizens are less likely to vote consistently.

While findings show that issue-specific knowledge does not have an effect on consistent voting across both contexts, political shortcuts do. Party cues affects consistent voting in both contexts. In Switzerland, knowledge of the government cue increases consistent voting, but interest group cues do not have any effect. In California instead, as Lupia (1994) suggested, citizens are more likely to utilize information coming from interest groups involved in initiative campaigns. Overall, the article presents a positive outlook on direct democracy. Citizens generally vote in line with their argument position on policies, indicating that they follow their opinions when making vote decisions. This is encouraging because they do so despite their level of knowledge. However, while often party and interest group cues reinforce the link between argument position and vote choice, when cues conflict with people's argument position they tend to trust the cue, confirming that shortcuts are powerful tools in the hand of the elites to steer voters from making consistent decisions. In other terms, political cues bias the position citizens have on policies (Colombo & Kriesi, 2017). This fact is even more problematic as often voters do

not have strong positions on direct democratic votes. Further comparative research is needed, especially considering additional situational determinants.

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Appendix

(A) Voting-age population vs. sample characteristics (percentages)

California		Survey	Targeted demographic quotas (Eurostat 2020)
Gender	Male	49	49
	Female	51	51
Age	18 to 24 years	4	11.1
	25 to 34 years	13	19.8
	35 to 44 years	20	17.5
	45 to 54 years	17	16.3
	55 to 65 years	22	17.3
	66 years and over	24	18
Education	Up to university	60	65
	University and above	40	35

Switzerland		Survey	Targeted demographic quotas (Federal Statistical Office 2021)
Gender	Male	54	51
	Female	46	49
Age	18 to 24 years	5	15
	25 to 34 years	14	18
	35 to 44 years	17	17
	45 to 54 years	19	18
	55 to 65 years	19	14
	66 years and over	26	18
Education	Up to university	60	55
	University and above	40	45

(B) Descriptive statistics dependent variable and main independent variables

California		Proposition 26	%	Proposition 27	%
Vote choice	No	634	64	779	76
	Yes	358	36	236	24
Total		992	100	1015	100
Share of participation	Voted	932	94	932	92
	Stated vote intention	60	6	83	8
Total		992	100	1015	100
Issue specific knowledge	0 correct	589	59	291	28
	1 correct	328	33	487	48
	2 correct	75	8	237	24
Total		992	100	1015	100
California Nations Indian Gaming Association	Don't know	600	60	716	70
	Know	392	40	299	30
Total		992	100	1015	100
Draft Kings and Fan Duels	Don't know	931	93	513	50
	Know	61	7	502	50
Total		992	100	1015	
Governor recommendation	Don't know	871	87	704	69
	Know	121	13	311	31
Total		992	100	1015	100
Party recommendation	Don't know	793	79	676	66
	Free (Dem)	94	10	/	/
	No (Rep)	105	11	339	34
Total		992	100	1015	100
Total		992	100	1015	100

Switzerland		OECD	%	Climate	%
Vote choice	No	362	22	602	35
	Yes	1286	78	1096	65
Total		1648	100	1698	100
Share of participation	Voted	1271	88	1291	86
	Stated vote intention	377	22	407	24
Total		1648	100	1698	100
Issue specific knowledge	0 correct	358	21	121	7
	1 correct	456	28	402	23
	2 correct	475	29	822	49
	3 correct	359	22	353	51
Total		1648	100	1698	100
Economiesuisse	Don't know	941	57	1101	65
	Know	707	43	597	35
Total		1648	100	1698	100
Union Syndacale Suisse	Don't know	1037	63	1013	73
	Know	611	37	685	27
Total		1648	100	1698	100

Government cue	Don't know	236	14	246	14
	Know	1412	86	1452	86
Total		1648	100	1698	100
Party recommendation	Don't know	906	55	660	39
	Yes	603	37	754	44
	No	126	8	284	17
Total		1648	100	1698	100

(C) Battery of questions on party identification and issue specific knowledge

California

Liberal-conservative scale

"Liberal" and "Conservative" are two concepts often used to characterize politics. Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 means liberal, and 10 means conservative?

Party identification

Do you feel close to a party?

1. Yes
2. No
99. Don't know

Which party is it?

1. Democratic Party
2. Republican Party
3. Other Party
99. Don't know

How close do you feel to this party?

1. Very Close
2. Not very close

If "No" or "don't know" to the first question:

Is there a party that you feel a little closer to than others?

1. Yes
2. No
99. Don't know

Which party is it?

1. Democratic Party
2. Republican Party
3. Other Party
99. Don't know

Switzerland

Left-right scale

"Left" and "Right" are two concepts often used to characterize politics. Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 means left, and 10 means right?

Party identification

Do you feel close to a party?

1. Yes
2. No
99. Don't know

Which party is it?

1. PLR
2. Le Centre
3. PS
4. UDC
5. PES
6. PVL
7. Lega
8. MCG
9. PCS
10. PEV
11. UDF
12. PST-POP
99. Don't know

How close do you feel to this party?

3. Very Close
4. Not very close

If "No" or "don't know" to the first question:

Is there a party that you feel a little closer to than others?

1. Yes
2. No
99. Don't know

Which party is it?

1. PLR
2. Le Centre
3. PS
4. UDC
5. PES
6. PVL
7. Lega

8. MCG
9. PCS
10. PEV
11. UDF
12. PST-POP
99. Don't know

Issue specific knowledge questions

Example : Climate law

La loi sur les objectifs climatiques a pour but d'atteindre zéro émission nette de gaz à effet de serre ...

1. ...en 2060
2. ...en 2070
3. ...en 2040
4. ...en 2050

Don't know

Example OECD law

Les nouvelles normes de l'OCDE prévoient un taux d'imposition des grandes entreprises de ...

1. ...5%
2. ...10%
3. ...15%
4. ...20%

Don't know

Example Proposition 26

If the initiative on the legalization of "Sports betting on American Indian lands" is accepted, part of the profits will be used for ...

1. ...gambling and mental health prevention programs.
2. ...homelessness policy.
3. ...high school sports programs.
4. ...the California Center for Addictions.

Don't know

Example Proposition 27

If the initiative on the legalization of "Online sports betting" is accepted, the taxes and fees will be allocated to ...

1. ...the General Fund.
2. ...homelessness only.
3. ...prevention of future pandemics.

4. ...homelessness and the economic and social development of Tribes.

Don't know

(D) Logistic regression model (Main Model)

Logistic regression model (CA)	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote Choice	
	Ref. Cat. (Yes)	
	Prop 26	Prop27
Argument Scale	0.310*** (0.026)	0.438*** (0.034)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	0.404** (0.184)	-0.134 (0.260)
Issue Specific Knowledge - High	0.123 (0.324)	-0.430 (0.335)
Knowledge Government/Governor recommendation (Know)	-0.434 (0.296)	-0.428 (0.305)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct DEM)	-0.198 (0.318)	
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct REP)	-0.811*** (0.309)	
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct DEM/REP)		-1.011*** (0.294)
Knowledge Draft King recommendation (Know)	0.388 (0.342)	0.821*** (0.237)
Knowledge CNIGA recommendation (Know)	0.846*** (0.177)	-0.728** (0.289)
Complexity	-0.102 (0.104)	-0.271 (0.142)
Importance of policy	0.147*** (0.028)	0.169*** (0.040)
Government/Governor trust	-0.052 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.038)
age	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.008)
gender (female)	-0.296 (0.173)	-0.617*** (0.235)
Constant	0.040 (0.463)	0.735 (0.631)
Observations	934	959

Note: In parenthesis standard error **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Logistic regression model (CH)	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote Choice	
	Ref. Cat. (Yes)	

	OECD	Climat
Argument Scale	0.224*** (0.022)	0.376*** (0.024)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	0.283 (0.193)	-0.070 (0.279)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Mid	0.333 (0.207)	0.035 (0.272)
Issue Specific Knowledge - High	0.383 (0.252)	-0.121 (0.308)
Knowledge Government/Governor recommendation (Know)	0.706*** (0.195)	0.263 (0.220)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct No)	-1.192*** (0.240)	-0.936*** (0.226)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct Yes)	0.776*** (0.198)	0.472** (0.187)
Knowledge Economisuisse recommendation (Know)	0.017 (0.217)	0.122 (0.204)
Knowledge USS recommendation (Know)	-0.121 (0.218)	-0.133 (0.205)
Complexity	-0.254*** (0.088)	-0.145 (0.088)
Importance of policy	0.151*** (0.028)	0.185*** (0.033)
Government/Governor trust	0.186*** (0.032)	0.218*** (0.035)
age	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)
gender (female)	-0.191 (0.152)	0.115 (0.159)
Constant	-1.137*** (0.433)	-1.448*** (0.497)
Observations	1,577	1,650

Note: In parenthesis standard error

p<0.05; * p<0.01

(E) Logistic regression model - interaction effects plot + tables

Figure 6 - Predicted probabilities deriving from logistic regression model: interaction effect argument scale knowledge interest group cue. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 6 shows the prediction coming from the logistic regression model with interaction effect between the argument scale and knowledge interest group cue. As for figure 5 in the main text, the interest group cue – this time the Union Syndical Suisse - does not show any effect in Switzerland, while in California we see an effect when the interest group provided an endorsement.

Logistic Regression Interaction Effects for
OECD Law

Dependent variable:

	Vote Choice Ref. cat. (yes)			
	ISK	Party	Gov.	Int.
Argument Scale	0.191*** (0.047)	0.185*** (0.027)	0.126** (0.053)	0.208*** (0.030)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	0.237 (0.198)	0.275 (0.192)	0.293 (0.192)	0.282 (0.192)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Mid	0.321 (0.208)	0.329 (0.206)	0.318 (0.206)	0.331 (0.206)
Issue Specific Knowledge - High	0.352 (0.256)	0.398 (0.254)	0.398 (0.253)	0.381 (0.252)
Knowledge Government/Governor reccomendation (Know)	0.717*** (0.195)	0.720*** (0.194)	0.637*** (0.196)	0.710*** (0.195)
Knowledge Party reccomendation (Correct No)	-1.201*** (0.241)	-1.369*** (0.265)	-1.173*** (0.242)	-1.180*** (0.241)
Knowledge Party reccomendation (Correct Yes)	0.779*** (0.198)	0.739*** (0.204)	0.773*** (0.199)	0.771*** (0.198)
Knowledge Economisuisse reccomendation (Know)	0.009 (0.218)	0.023 (0.220)	0.016 (0.218)	-0.004 (0.219)
Knowledge USS reccomendation (Know)	-0.114 (0.218)	-0.092 (0.220)	-0.110 (0.219)	-0.123 (0.218)
Complexity	-0.250*** (0.088)	-0.263*** (0.089)	-0.255*** (0.088)	-0.252*** (0.088)
Importance of policy	0.150*** (0.028)	0.151*** (0.029)	0.149*** (0.028)	0.150*** (0.028)
Government/Governor trust	0.188*** (0.032)	0.193*** (0.032)	0.185*** (0.032)	0.187*** (0.032)
age	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
gender (female)	-0.191 (0.153)	-0.170 (0.153)	-0.185 (0.152)	-0.191 (0.152)
Argument Scale*ISK - Low	0.066 (0.066)			
Argument Scale*ISK - Mid	0.014 (0.062)			
Argument Scale*ISK - High	0.055 (0.066)			
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct No)		0.214*** (0.078)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct Yes)		0.048		

		(0.055)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Government Cue (Know = Yes)			0.118**	
			(0.058)	
Argument Scale*Knowledge Economisuisse (Know = Yes)				0.037
				(0.045)
Constant	-1.146***	-1.164***	-1.059**	-1.141***
	(0.433)	(0.434)	(0.433)	(0.433)
Observations	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577

Note: In parenthesis standard error ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Logistic Regression Interaction Effects for Climate Law	Dependent variable:			
	ISK	Party	Gov	Int
Argument Scale	0.377***	0.311***	0.311***	0.371***
	(0.098)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.030)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	-0.071	-0.053	-0.071	-0.069
	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.277)	(0.278)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Mid	0.035	0.046	0.039	0.035
	(0.272)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.271)
Issue Specific Knowledge - High	-0.123	-0.108	-0.121	-0.122
	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.308)
Knowledge Government/Governor reccomendation (Know)	0.264	0.248	0.239	0.262
	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.220)
Knowledge Party reccomendation (Correct No)	-0.935***	-0.916***	-0.929***	-0.936***
	(0.227)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Knowledge Party reccomendation (Correct Yes)	0.471**	0.476**	0.471**	0.474**
	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Knowledge Economisuisse reccomendation (Know)	0.122	0.137	0.126	0.125
	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.205)
Knowledge USS reccomendation (Know)	-0.132	-0.141	-0.129	-0.132
	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.205)
Complexity	-0.145	-0.148	-0.145	-0.144
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Importance of policy	0.185***	0.186***	0.185***	0.185***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)

Government/Governor trust	0.219*** (0.035)	0.215*** (0.035)	0.215*** (0.035)	0.219*** (0.035)
age	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)
gender (female)	0.115 (0.159)	0.109 (0.159)	0.115 (0.159)	0.115 (0.159)
Argument Scale*ISK - 1	-0.003 (0.111)			
Argument Scale*ISK - 2	0.002 (0.104)			
Argument Scale*ISK - 3	-0.008 (0.110)			
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct No)		0.111 (0.071)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct Yes)		0.102 (0.053)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Government Cue (Know = Yes)			0.077 (0.063)	
Argument Scale*Knowledge Economisuisse (Know = Yes)				0.014 (0.051)
Constant	-1.451*** (0.498)	-1.435*** (0.495)	-1.415*** (0.496)	-1.450*** (0.497)
Observations	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,650

Note: In parenthesis standard error

p<0.05; *p<0.01

Logistic Regression Interaction Effects for Prop
26

Dependent variable:

	ISK	Party	Gov	Int
Argument Scale	0.270*** (0.032)	0.301*** (0.029)	0.300*** (0.027)	0.294*** (0.035)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	0.330 (0.193)	0.386** (0.185)	0.410** (0.185)	0.401** (0.184)

Issue Specific Knowledge - High	0.001 (0.354)	0.125 (0.326)	0.135 (0.326)	0.125 (0.326)
Knowledge Government/Governor recommendation (Know)	-0.411 (0.300)	-0.472 (0.305)	-0.505 (0.317)	-0.430 (0.296)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct DEM)	-0.231 (0.321)	-0.470 (0.387)	-0.238 (0.324)	-0.196 (0.318)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct REP)	-0.786** (0.307)	-0.757** (0.306)	-0.808*** (0.307)	-0.807*** (0.310)
Knowledge Draft King recommendation (Know)	0.411 (0.343)	0.381 (0.349)	0.393 (0.346)	0.394 (0.341)
Knowledge CNIGA recommendation (Know)	0.846*** (0.177)	0.849*** (0.177)	0.852*** (0.177)	0.817*** (0.182)
Complexity	-0.094 (0.104)	-0.100 (0.104)	-0.103 (0.104)	-0.102 (0.104)
Importance of policy	0.150*** (0.028)	0.145*** (0.028)	0.146*** (0.028)	0.147*** (0.028)
Government/Governor trust	-0.050 (0.030)	-0.051 (0.030)	-0.052 (0.030)	-0.052 (0.030)
age	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)
gender (female)	-0.295 (0.173)	-0.319 (0.173)	-0.296 (0.173)	-0.295 (0.173)
Argument Scale*ISK - 1	0.089 (0.058)			
Argument Scale*ISK - 2	0.163 (0.112)			
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct DEM)		0.217* (0.124)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct REP)		-0.055 (0.077)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Governor Cue (Know = Freedom)			0.096 (0.091)	
Argument Scale*Knowledge CNIGA (Know = Yes)				0.037 (0.052)
Constant	0.036	0.085	0.061	0.061

	(0.462)	(0.464)	(0.463)	(0.464)
Observations	934	934	934	934

Note: In parenthesis standard error

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Logistic Regression Interaction Effects for Prop 27	Dependent variable:			
	ISK	Party	Gov	Int
Argument Scale	0.491*** (0.076)	0.439*** (0.040)	0.451*** (0.041)	0.389*** (0.046)
Issue Specific Knowledge - Low	-0.159 (0.266)	-0.134 (0.260)	-0.137 (0.261)	-0.123 (0.260)
Issue Specific Knowledge - High	-0.433 (0.330)	-0.430 (0.335)	-0.422 (0.336)	-0.436 (0.337)
Knowledge Government/Governor recommendation (Know)	-0.413 (0.305)	-0.429 (0.305)	-0.426 (0.300)	-0.411 (0.308)
Knowledge Party recommendation (Correct DEM/REP)	-1.023*** (0.295)	-1.010*** (0.298)	-1.010*** (0.293)	-1.031*** (0.297)
Knowledge Draft King recommendation (Know)	0.833*** (0.238)	0.821*** (0.238)	0.820*** (0.238)	0.838*** (0.238)
Knowledge CNIGA recommendation (Know)	-0.739** (0.290)	-0.728** (0.290)	-0.728** (0.289)	-0.729** (0.295)
Complexity	-0.272* (0.143)	-0.271* (0.142)	-0.273* (0.142)	-0.277* (0.143)
Importance of policy	0.171*** (0.040)	0.169*** (0.040)	0.169*** (0.040)	0.168*** (0.040)
Government/Governor trust	-0.027 (0.038)	-0.025 (0.038)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.038)
age	-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.008)
gender (female)	-0.605** (0.236)	-0.617*** (0.236)	-0.624*** (0.236)	-0.619*** (0.236)
Argument Scale*ISK - Low	-0.049 (0.087)			
Argument Scale*ISK - High	-0.099 (0.095)			
Argument Scale*Knowledge Party (Correct DEM/REP)		-0.002		

		(0.076)		
Argument Scale*Knowledge Governor Cue (Know = No)			-0.044	
			(0.070)	
Argument Scale*Knowledge Drking (Know = No)				0.095
				(0.066)
Constant	0.759	0.735	0.759	0.729
	(0.634)	(0.631)	(0.633)	(0.631)
Observations	959	959	959	959
<i>Note: In parenthesis standard error</i>			**p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

(F) Difference in predicted probabilities deriving from each logistic regression model

Figure 7 - Difference in predicted probabilities between different categories of knowledge of the policy for each argument scale data point. Reference category: No knowledge of the policy.




Figure 8 - Difference in predicted probabilities between categories of knowledge of the party for each argument scale data point. Reference category: No knowledge of the party cue.







Figure 9 - Difference in predicted probabilities between categories of knowledge of the government/or cue for each argument scale data point. Reference category: No knowledge of the government/or cue.




0 = no difference between categories. 95% confidence intervals - climat Gov Know



0 = no difference between categories. 95% confidence intervals - OCDE Gov



0 = no difference between categories. 95% confidence intervals - P26 Gov Know FREE



0 = no difference between categories. 95% confidence intervals - P27 Gov K.

Figure 10 - Difference in predicted probabilities between categories of knowledge of the interest group cue for each argument scale data point. Reference category: No knowledge of the interest group cue.

