Abstract: This paper compares the Moroccan and Egyptian state responses to their respective migrant populations. Both Morocco and Egypt are considered to be countries of emigration and transit, despite the fact that an increasing number of migrants who fail to enter Europe or to be successfully resettled in Western countries remain on their territories. Several tens of thousands have settled in cities like Tangiers, Casablanca, Rabat and Cairo on a semi-permanent basis rather than return to their home countries. Due to their precarious status as non-citizens, migrants are vulnerable to social and economic marginalization, human rights abuses and the risk of refoulement by authorities. While both Morocco and Egypt therefore face similar human security concerns, the countries vary in several important respects—the demographic and spatial organization of current migrants, the role of international institutions, NGOs and local civil society pertaining to human rights and advocacy, and the conflux of domestic and international pressures. Using a mixed-methods approach, this paper examines how stringent Western immigration policies are transforming MENA states into countries of settlement, and the factors that determine the treatment of long-standing migrant populations residing on their territories.
Introduction

How are new spatial controls that regulate the movement of people – deemed the ‘global governance of international migration’ – affecting various regional contexts? This paper examines this question using one particular region: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Due to increasingly stringent border controls enacted by Western countries since the end of the Cold War, countries across the Middle East and North Africa are becoming migrant destinations, though unwillingly on behalf of the receiving states.

To explore what this pattern means for new migrant host states, this paper selects two destination countries within the MENA region – Morocco and Egypt – to examine through the method of controlled comparison, using a most similar systems design supplemented by process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005). Morocco and Egypt have long been sending countries and countries of transit that migrants pass through to reach Europe and other Western states, but their roles as countries of settlement within the global migration context are a recent phenomenon. While this paper will touch briefly on the changing migration schemes within Western countries, the bulk of the paper will focus on the factors that affect how new countries of settlement in the MENA region are reacting to the long-term presence of migrants.

In the academic literature there is a bias toward understanding migrant settlement and integration from the perspective of Western receiving countries. In reality though, more than fifty percent of the world’s migration occurs between developing countries, not from developing state to Western state (OECD 2011). As a result of this misplaced emphasis, scholars understand much less about the factors shaping policies toward immigrants and access to citizenship where the majority of migration is taking place. This
paper will therefore contribute to the small but growing literature on migrant integration in developing countries.

Both Egypt and Morocco, the two countries selected as cases for this study, are among those affected by the increased stringency of Western migration regimes. These policies are causing a build-up of stocks of migrants in countries that were once viewed as temporary routes of passage for East African and West African migrant flows. While both Morocco and Egypt are experienced migrant-senders and have policies in place for managing the emigration of nationals, they have little experience with receiving or integrating migrants. As such, it is important to understand existing policies toward migrants, and the factors that have contributed to the formation of those policies. The outcome variable of this study is therefore the set of policies, both formal and informal, of host states toward migrants.

The first section of the paper will make important distinctions between immigrants, migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers and the connotation of each term in developed and developing contexts. It will also briefly examine how the policies of Western states have changed over the past two decades and the effect that this has had on countries in the MENA region. Lastly, the first section will discuss predicted migrant policy outcomes based on existing explanations from the migration and citizenship literature.

The second section will explore the case studies of Egypt and Morocco using data collected from approximately forty semi-structured interviews conducted in the two countries during 2012 and 2013. The analysis focuses on three causal factors that have the potential to affect host state policies toward migrants: the demographic and spatial
organization of migrants, the relationship between migrant organizations, international organizations, and local civil society, and the conflux of international and domestic pressures. Ultimately the paper argues that the extent to which new MENA host countries are willing to support a sustained migrant presence depends primarily on the level of domestic political unrest and whether the issue of migration has gained traction within local civil society.

**Part I: Migrants in ‘Transit’ Countries**

*Migrants, Immigrants, Refugees and Asylum-seekers*

The terms migrant, immigrant, refugee and asylum-seeker will be used throughout this study and therefore require specification. Each term reflects important legal and political distinctions, yet they are often used interchangeably. In this study, immigrant will only be used to refer to individuals who are formally selected by a host country. This process is much less frequent in developing host states than in developed ones, and with few exceptions, developing countries do not solicit immigrants (Jacobson 1996). While most developing countries possess a working-class that often consists partially of migrants, few of these are formally selected by the state. Most formally selected immigrants are chosen by large companies wishing to hire foreign labor, though unlike in Western states, the promise of employment does not generally entail the ability to eventually naturalize. In developing countries, the term immigrant therefore refers to an individual who is selected to work in a host country and who does so through a state-approved process, regardless of whether such employment will eventually lead to the ability to naturalize. Conversely, the term migrant refers to an individual who is not formally selected by the state but who nonetheless resides in the host country.
Refugee and asylum-seeker are two other categories that require clarification. In Western states, refugees are formally selected by the state prior to arriving on the host state’s territory. The term asylum-seeker refers to an individual who already resides on the host state’s territory, and who subsequently requests from the host government the right to remain on its territory. In developing countries, the nuance is slightly different. The term refugee refers to an individual who has been officially recognized the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as having fled from his or her home country for officially approved reasons, and who now deserves protection under the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of the Refugee or under subsequent protocols. The term asylum-seeker refers to an individual who has applied to receive the designation of ‘refugee’ from the UNHCR, but who has not yet gone through the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process. The asylum-seeker is thus entitled to some protection in the host country under international law, but he or she cannot yet receive UNHCR-funded services or assistance.

The term migrant in developing countries is therefore left to serve as a blanket term for those who do not fit into the other three categories: immigrant, refugee, or asylum-seeker. The category thus contains individuals who have left their home countries to seek economic opportunities elsewhere (‘economic migrants,’ ‘illegal migrants,’ ‘undocumented migrants’), as well as individuals who genuinely consider themselves to be refugees but do not meet the UNHCR’s criteria for an official designation (‘rejected refugee applicants’). The term ‘transit’ migration has also entered the migration lexicon to refer to people initially heading for regions further away – Europe, North America, or the Gulf states – who never complete their journey because they do not meet visa
conditions (Fargues 2009). According to Fargues, “Transit migration reflects a paradox: at a time when the movement of people is increasingly easy and affordable due to cheap means of transportation, migration becomes increasingly difficult and costly due to more restrictive legislation and reinforced border controls” (ibid, 564).

Importantly though, since the 1990’s, migration scholars and some international migration bodies have begun advocating for use of the term ‘mixed migration.’ This is due to the realization that, a) the ‘root causes’ of migration, such as conflict and poverty, are interrelated, and b) it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between forced and economic migrants in certain movements (Betts 2011; Castles and Van Hear 2005). Some individuals will also ‘jump’ categories in order to obtain work or as they acquire new information concerning legal categories (Castles and Van Hear 2005). In addition, both refugees and other migrants may use similar networks and smugglers to facilitate transit (ibid). However, refugee classifications do not reflect the issues raised by the mixed migration debate. Because the UNHCR’s classification of ‘refugee’ is based on political, not economic, reasons for fleeing one’s home state, economic migrants generally do not qualify as refugees (Zolberg et al 1989).

Recognizing this debate, the term migrant will be used in this study to encompass both refugees and ‘economic’ or ‘transit’ migrants, while the term immigrant will only be used to refer to individuals that migrate through formal state procedures. If referring only to those who are recognized by the UNHCR as either asylum-seekers or refugees, and excluding migrants that are not recognized, the term asylum-seeker or refugee will be used respectively.
The closing of legal routes and methods of spatial control

The treatment of migrants once they have arrived on Western countries’ territories has generally improved over the last three decades. Western states are bound by ideologies that dictate the equal treatment of migrants once they reside on host territories and the extension of citizenship-like rights to non-citizens – immigrants, refugees and even ‘illegal’ migrants—is now commonplace in most Western democracies. The research of immigration scholars such as Brubaker (1992), Bosniak (2008) and Joppke (2009) examines how liberal democracies, which require an agreement between elected officials and the governed, would be violated by the long-term presence of sizeable alien populations, thus forcing these countries to adopt inclusive citizenship policies. Migrants may still face racism, discrimination, and even the threat of deportation, but in general policies toward migrants have improved over the last three decades in Western states (Joppke 2009).

Yet at the same time, Western states have also taken steps to further control which persons manage to reach and successfully cross their borders. States are accommodating and welcoming of migrants once they manage to penetrate a Western state’s border, but in order to prevent unwanted migrants from doing so, Western states have found new means of fortifying their territories. This process manifests itself both physically (such as the United States’ amplification of the wall along its Southern border with Mexico) and through technological means (biometric scanning systems, enhanced passports, etc.). New methods of immigration control have even extended beyond the state itself, in both concrete forms (such as zones established for policing illegal migrants within the territory
of another state), as well as through more subtle ‘soft power’ mechanisms (coercing or threatening other states to more effectively counter unauthorized migration).

Goldschmidt (2006) argues that when the EU created the ‘Schengen space,’ an internal zone of free movement, in 1985 it also barred legal entry to migrants from developing countries. Since this time it has granted continually fewer visas for migrants coming from developing countries in all immigration categories, despite an increase in the number of aspiring immigrants (ibid). Part of this was the backlash against the guestworker system that had fueled much of Europe’s migration prior to the 1990s. With the realization that migration was not the low-cost answer to Europe’s economic and demographic problems, and that many migrants would not return home following the end of their contracts, Europe began to phase out the guestworker system. When it became clear that European states would be unable to ‘import labor but not people,’ the governments instead sought to limit the number of migrants able to immigrate through formal venues (Castles 2006).

European governments also began pressuring North African countries to bolster border security in order to curb illegal migration, instigated primarily by the Italian Berlusconi government in 2008 (Boubakri 2013). Concurrently, after the embargo had been lifted on Libya, EU states used the incentive of increased trade and the normalization of relations to compel the Gaddafi regime to adapt its migration policies to fit EU objectives, resulting in the establishment of Italian-Libyan joint patrols in Libyan and international waters in 2008 (ibid). Tunisia and Morocco also conformed their immigration policies during the same time period, and it has subsequently become
extremely difficult and costly\(^1\) for ‘irregular’ migrants, as well as legal migrants, to successfully cross into Europe.

Post-9/11 the United States has also reduced the number of migrants it is willing to accept through its formal immigration process. Additionally, migrants hoping to pursue political asylum in the United States must reach its territory or already be present in order to apply, and post-9/11 immigration-related security has made gaining access to American soil more difficult (Kerwin 2011). These events have implications for migrants attempting to apply for immigration via formal avenues, as well as for refugees attempting to successfully navigate the official UNHCR resettlement route. It is important not to entirely conflate recent trends in European and North American migration policies as there are important ideological differences affecting the citizen-state dialectic in both regions that have implications for migration policies.\(^2\) Nonetheless, those states generally considered to be the world’s primary ‘immigrant receivers’ – namely, the US, Europe and Australia -- have enacted a series of progressively restrictive migration controls over the past decade that are affecting migration patterns elsewhere.

Yet the image of migrants aiming for Europe but stranded in MENA countries is not entirely accurate. In reality it is the minority, not the majority, of labor migrants, refugees, and transit migrants who are bound for Europe (Fagues 2009). According to a study conducted by Fagues in 2009, of the at least 3.6 million irregular migrants in the Middle East and North Africa today, between 2 and 3 million of them are workers

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\(^1\) According to de Hass (2007) it cost between US$ 800 and US$ 1,200 for sub-Saharan Africans to cross between Morocco and Spain in 2003. A sub-Saharan migrant I recently interviewed in Rabat quoted the

\(^2\) These ideological differences are evident at the policy level and both would-be migrants through quotas for specific categories or migrants and family reunification policies, as well as for migrants who have arrived in-country through procedures such citizenship tests.
attracted by local labor markets, and only some 100,000 are transit migrants originally destined for Europe (ibid). Perhaps, realizing the near impossibility of crossing into ‘Fortress Europe,’ migrants have amended their plans. As Fagues notes, “The novelty is that [MENA] countries have recently become receivers of immigrants, and this happened not because they willingly opened their doors as much as because they did not close them (ibid, 573-4).” However, this paper is less concerned with migrants’ original intentions and more concerned with host government responses to their extended presence.

Predictions for Migration Policies

What determines what type of migration policy will be adopted by a specific state? Drawing from the migration and citizenship literature in Western states, the neo-institutionalist approach purported by Hollifield (1992) and others claims that states will adopt liberal migration policies when migrants are able to mobilize and capitalize on political opportunities. In this approach, state institutions like the judiciary or welfare bureaucracies are instrumental in assisting and advancing the rights claims of migrants (Miller 1981; Joppke 1999). Conversely, the postnationalist approach asserts that the influence of international norms explains why states have converged in the ways they address migration. That many non-citizen residents of Western states currently enjoy the same rights and privileges as citizens demonstrates that human rights have become globally sanctioned norms that supersede the rights granted by nation-states (Soysal 1994). Lastly, beginning with the work of Brubaker (1992), supporters of the ‘cultural idiom’ approach assert that cultural and institutional legacies are the strongest determining factor in a country’s policies toward migrants.
Applying these theories to a study of migrants in new countries of settlement, we can predict how certain causal factors will affect the outcome variable: host state policies toward migrants. For example, if the neo-institutionalist approach is correct, then we can expect to see mobilization on behalf of migrants and civil society actors prior to the instigation of any liberal migration policies. If the postnationalist approach has more bearing, then the presence of international organizations and the state’s adoption of migrant-rights treaties should be an important factor in incentivizing states to adopt policies that guarantee rights for migrants. Or, tied into the cultural idiom approach, we might expect to see preferential treatment toward migrants from other Arab states as opposed to African migrants. This is because most Arab states historically operate according to the principles of singularism as opposed to pluralism, and acquisition of nationality in the Arab world is generally easier for those who present some ethnic or religious affinity with the host country (Parolin 2009).

Part II: Factors Affecting Host Country Responses

Research Design and Case Selection

As mentioned previously, both Egypt and Morocco, the two countries selected as cases for this study, are among those affected by the increased stringency of Western migration regimes. These policies are causing a build-up of stocks of migrants in countries that were once viewed as temporary routes of passage for East African and West African migrant flows. While Morocco and Egypt are experienced migrant-senders and have

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3 Singularism refers to the idea that the state community is constituted by a single and specific collective identity, and that the state is the embodiment of that identity. In pluralistic states, separate subgroups avoid programmatic predominance through power sharing mechanisms, whereas power-sharing is rejected explicitly and in principle by singularism.
policies in place for managing the emigration of nationals, they have little experience with receiving or integrating migrants.

Egypt, the most populous state in the Arab world, attracts migrants because of the existence of one of the largest resettlement programs in the world, both through the sizeable UNHCR presence as well as private sponsorship programs to Canada, Australia, and the United States (Grabska, 2006). This system constitutes a strong pull factor for those who want to be resettled, attracting migrants primarily from the Horn of Africa and other countries in the Middle East (Fargues 2009). Yet the post-9/11 measures taken by Western countries to tighten control at their borders and to contain migration has meant that the numbers of resettled migrants are relatively small: an average of only 3,000 per year (Kagan, 2011). Migrants in Egypt are thus particularly affected by minimizing of legal refugee resettlement program.

Like Egypt, Morocco has long been viewed as a country of transit. For approximately five decades it has served as the final transit country on one of the most popular routes for migrants from Africa en route to Europe. But due to the increasing difficulty and cost of reaching Europe, Morocco itself has become an option for Sub-Saharan African migrants. Several tens of thousands have settled in cities like Tangiers, Casablanca, and Rabat on a semi-permanent basis (de Hass and Nijmegen 2005).

Morocco and Egypt therefore both face similar human security concerns, as a result of changing Western migration policies.

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4 According to Kagan (2011), the UNHCR resettled very few refugees from Egypt throughout the 19990s, often fewer than 300 annually. Kagan notes, “In 1998 the UNHCR increased resettlement to 1,364, up from 196 the year before, reaching an eventual peak of 4,110 in 2004. However, in 2004, the UNHCR suspended RSD for Sudanese, and for the next two years, the UNHCR resettled between 1000 and 2000 refugees per year. Then, in 2007 the number of refugees resettled by the UNHCR dropped to 443 and fell below 200 in 2008. In 2009 UNHCR resettled 712 (mostly Iraqis), and 671 in 2010” (ibid, 27).
The states also share other commonalities in that they have highly similar economic indicators: GDP per capita, inequality and unemployment.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morocco and Egypt: Economic Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (PPP current international $)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank*

Additionally, both economies benefit from the presence of migrants who fill positions in the informal economy – primarily in the fields of construction, farming (in the case of Morocco), homecare (for females), and security (car watch) – because papers are not checked and the jobs are non-contracted. Since these states are highly similar regarding economic indicators, they provide a strong comparison for examining which other causal factors – the demographic and spatial organization of the migrant populations, the activities of migrant rights organizations and local civil societies, domestic political climate, and international pressures – are important in determining host country response.

To examine the relative importance of each of these causal factors on host country response, I will employ the method of process tracing. Process tracing is a technique used in qualitative comparative studies to determine whether any causal factors can be eliminated from an explanatory statement or theory (George and Bennett 2005).
To do so, the next section relies on data collected from policy documents and secondary analytical sources such as the International Organization for Migration (MPI) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)\(^5\) as well as approximately forty semi-structured interviews conducted in Morocco and Egypt.\(^6\) These interviews were conducted between October 1 and December 31\(^{st}\), 2012 in Cairo, Egypt and between September 1 and October 15, 2013 in Rabat and Casablanca, Morocco. Data was collected through both group and individual interviews with volunteers and employees at migrant rights organizations, migrant community leaders, service providers and policy planners at the UNHCR and IOM. Interviews were conducted in both Arabic and English, and interviews were transcribed (if recorded) and analyzed.

In the subsequent sections, each causal factor will be examined separately for each country to tease out its relative importance in determining host government response to migrants.

**Causal Factor I: Demographics and Spatial Organization of Migrants**

**Egypt**

Continuing conflict in the MENA region and the so-called Arab Spring has caused a sudden, periodic rise in the number of first Iraqi, then Libyan, and most recently Syrian refugees, though the predominant refugee groups in Egypt since the 1990’s have been from the Horn of Africa, with Sudanese refugees being the most numerous (Kagan, 2002). Egypt hosts a large number of ‘irregular’ migrants from Horn of Africa countries, but estimates of these migrants vary from a few tens of thousands to millions (Fargues 2009; Ohri 2011). This disparity is partly a result of the fact that many Sudanese live in

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\(^5\) Though this data will be viewed critically as numbers pertaining to the stock and flow of migrants are often inaccurate (Sadiq 2009).

\(^6\) IRB approval was obtained for this study (E-CPA # 10036; HS# 2012-9054).
Egypt without being recorded as foreign nationals. Prior to 1995, Sudanese migrants could reside and work freely in Egypt due to a continuation of colonial policies that linked the two countries. When this privilege was revoked, legal Sudanese migrants became illegal effectively overnight (Fargues 2009).

The other factor contributing to the lack of a reliable estimate of the number of migrants in Egypt is that many refugees choose not to register with the UNHCR, either due to fear of political persecution from their home government or because they are not aware of the need to do so (Author Interview, Ezzat 2012). For example, Human Rights Watch estimated that there were 300,000 Syrians in Egypt at the end of 2013, but only 125,000 of them were registered with the UNHCR (Human Rights Watch 2013b). Official UNHCR numbers from the end of the 2013 are below, though these numbers are recognized to be gross underestimates.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Population</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Dec-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assylum-Seekers</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>157,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR 2013a

The vast majority of migrants reside in Egypt’s capital, Cairo, which is a sprawling city of nearly 30 million. Most reside in Cairo’s poorest neighborhoods and informal

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7 In 1995 a Sudanese extremist attempted to assassinate former Egyptian President Mubarak during a trip to Ethiopia, leading Egypt to revoke Sudanese right to freedom of circulation and residence.
settlements where rent is cheapest, including some of Cairo’s unfinished ‘satellite cities’ that are geographically separated from the rest of Cairo. The director of an organization in Cairo that provides mental health training to migrant communities lamented the spatial organization of migrants in Cairo, saying,

“We want to help provide services, even if it’s just the basics – food, shelter, safety, etc. In a city like Cairo that is nearly impossible to do. There’s no infrastructure – you’re basically at the mercy of the city”

(Author Interview, Baron 2012).

In addition to cheaper rent, migrants feel more secure in Cairo’s informal neighborhoods due to the lack of formal governance, and thus a smaller likelihood that they will be arrested or come to the attention of authorities (Arous 2014).

**Morocco**

Unlike Egypt, Morocco has received relatively few refugees from other MENA states over the last ten years, and the majority of migrants residing in Morocco are from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to a 2010 study, seventy-six percent of the total number of Sub-Saharan migrants residing in Morocco are illegal and are therefore not represented in UNHCR or official government numbers (Khachani 2010). Because most migrants come from West African countries, Morocco also has very few groups that automatically qualify for refugee status, so the UNHCR figures for Moroccan refugees are quite low (see Table 2). Also, up until September 2013, due to the absence of an operative national

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8 There are two processes by which a refugee can be recognized by the UNHCR. One is on an individual basis through the guidelines laid out by the 1951 Convention, and the other is through the broader mandate of the UNHCR, meaning that if a refugee is coming from a region with general unrest, of if they belong Tribe X or Y, then it is not possible for that individual to return, and thus the refugee is granted status through group membership. In Morocco, the process of ‘group’ recognition is only possible for people coming from Central African Republic, Malians, Syrians, and those from Ivory Coast (Author Interview, Fawe 2013).
asylum system, UNHCR used to carry out registration, refugee status determination (RSD) and documentation. After years of lobbying the Moroccan government, September 2013 saw the establishment of a temporary joint Morocco-UNHCR asylum procedure. According to the UNHCR, Moroccan authorities will eventually take on responsibility for carrying out the full asylum process (Author Interview, Fawe 2013).

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Population</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>3,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR

Migrants in Morocco are physically dispersed between several cities and locations. This geographic dispersal proves challenging for organizations that want to provide services to migrants and lobby the government on their behalf, given the lack of credible statistics (Author Interview, Bouchez 2013; Author Interview, Fawe 2013). The dispersal also has ramifications in terms of migrant protection. Before the year 2000, there were many migrants who would travel by sea via the route through Tangier or via the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the northern coast of Morocco. But between 2000 and 2006, the Spanish authorities began to erect border fortifications between Spain and Morocco and the Moroccan, Spanish and EU governments collaborated to make it more difficult to cross from Morocco to Europe (Author Interview, Ryadil 2013). Due to increased fear of arrest or detention from Moroccan authorities, migrants began living clandestinely in a forest near Tangier on the Northern coast called Belounis before
preparing to go to Spain. Beginning in 2005, authorities in Morocco started raiding this location and arresting migrants they found living there. Once arrested, migrants were taken to the Oujda, a Moroccan town on the Eastern border of the county, and forcibly deported across the border to Algeria (ibid).

While the dispersal of migrants throughout the country reportedly has a negative effect on the ability of international service providers like IOM and the UNHCR to carry out their work, migrant community organizations – groups or associations organized by migrants themselves – appear less negatively affected by this difficulty. Migrant community leaders interviewed in Rabat and Casablanca did not find the geographic dispersal of fellow migrants to be problematic when organizing meetings, protests or other political activities (Author Interview, Mola 2013; Author Interview, Odoi 2013). This is perhaps because, unlike international service organizations operating in Morocco whose work is concerned with migrants living in remote border regions like Oujda, the work of community organizations is primarily concerned with improving the lives of migrants residing on a semi-permanent basis in Morocco’s cities. Additionally, the train and bus routes connecting Tangier, Casablanca and Rabat are highly efficient, affordable and easy to navigate, making in-person communication possible.

There are therefore two important demographic and spatial differences in the Moroccan and Egyptian cases. While both Egypt and Morocco receive Sub-Saharan migrants, only Egypt has seen large influxes of other Arab migrants – Iraqis, Libyans and Syrians – over the last decade. The effect of mass influxes of Arab refugees has likely had an effect on the Egyptian government’s willingness to host migrant groups in general, as will be explored in the third section. And while migrants are predominantly
concentrated, like the majority of Egyptians, in the capital city of Cairo, migrants in Morocco are spread throughout several cities. However, this geographic dispersal does not seem to negatively affect the organization of migrants in Morocco, as will be explored in the next section.

**Causal Factor II: Migrant Organizations, IOs and Local Civil Society**

In the literature on citizenship and migration, the actions of local civil society actors in conjunction with migrants rights organizations are viewed as a pressure on states to enact less stringent, more accommodating policies toward migrants (Miller 1981; Soysal 1994). To what extent is this occurring in Egypt and Morocco?

**Egypt**

In Egypt, both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) provide migrants with the services they are unable to access as non-nationals and, in some cases, advocate on their behalf regarding four major topics – education, health care, employment and legal aid. However, organizations that receive the majority of their funding from the UNHCR can only service officially registered refugees, a status that is ultimately determined by the Egyptian government. For example, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) serves as the UNHCR’s main implementing partner in terms of educational provision, but they are only able to provide funding to eligible refugees. Consequently, “…only fifty percent of refugee children in Egypt attend school at all, with very few of them attending Egyptian public schools,” and, “…this figure is even lower for unaccompanied minors” (Author Interview: Mayer, 2012).

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9 While the UNHCR conducts RSD procedures, it must have the agreement of the host country to designate which nationalities are eligible for asylum.
Caritas, the major implementing partner of the UNHCR regarding health care, faces the same difficulty.

Alternatives to UNHCR-funded services exist, though these privately and religiously funded organizations presently face a challenging political environment. The increased nationalism following the 2011 Egyptian Revolution has created an extremely difficult atmosphere for foreign organizations attempting to work on behalf of non-Egyptians, as well as for the refugees themselves. This plays out in several ways. First, since the revolution, the Egyptian government has been more critical than it was previously of foreign NGOs. Most NGOs operating in Egypt are unlicensed as, “…the process to officially register with the Egyptian government can take multiple years” (Author Interview: Turland, 2012). Though it is not official policy, several NGOs interviewed claimed that the post-revolution Egyptian government has been unwilling to register refugee-based organizations, thereby rendering them ineligible for funding (ibid; Ezzat 2012).

In times of extreme political instability such as the period following the Egyptian revolution, government decisions may be rash and unpredictable, creating a particularly precarious environment for foreign organizations. This is evidenced by the events of early 2012 when the transitional government decided to ‘crack down’ on specific American NGOs by raiding their offices and preventing dozens of foreign employees from leaving the country (Murphy, 2012). According to the director of Refugee Legal Aid Protection (RLAP), in such an environment, “…there is no space for advocacy” (Author Interview: Bristow, 2012), particularly for refugees and other non-nationals.
In addition to NGOs, CBOs, organized primarily by refugees themselves, are also prevalent in Cairo and often provide a physical location for community meetings and gatherings. There are also CBOs that work specifically on the issue of community organizing. PISTIC (the Psychosocial Training Institute of Cairo) trains members of various refugee communities over several months, preparing them to work in schools, with other organizations and within their Cairo neighborhoods where they are expected to provide various mental health services—suicide prevention, child protection, counseling and therapy—to their constituencies (Author Interview, Baron 2012). Another CBO, Tadamon (Arabic for ‘solidarity’), has six locations across Cairo, each of them run by a member of the local community. They provide language-training, aid for those experiencing difficulties in obtaining service provisions or seeking informal work, and community activities, particularly for children (Author Interview, Ablahi Abdikarim 2012).

Yet despite the presence of numerous CBOs, these organizations are fragmented and focused primarily on supporting the individual members of their national communities (i.e. Sudanese, Eritrean, Central African Republic, etc.). For example, while Sudanese regional communities have several physical community centers and a political network for advocacy purposes, other nationalities, such as Somalians, are spatially divided between several neighborhoods in Cairo, have no physical community space in which to meet, and are comparatively inactive politically (Author Interview: Abdikarim, 2012). And even for those more active migrant communities like the Sudanese, attempts at advocacy have largely been unsuccessful and in some instances have led to confrontations with Egyptian security forces.
**Morocco**

Organizations providing services to migrants in Morocco are less hindered by the dichotomy of eligible vs. ineligible refugees or migrants. With the exception of the UNHCR itself, most organizations are able to provide services to all migrants, regardless of status. This is perhaps because the UNHCR operation in Morocco is significantly smaller and less well funded than its Egyptian counterpart (Author Interview, Fawe 2013). As such, migrant organizations seeking institutional and operational funding have had to look beyond the UNHCR, and are thus not restricted by the official refugee designation.

There also appears to be a greater deal of interaction between Moroccan local civil society and migrant organizations. One such organization, ATTAC (the Association for Financial Transaction & Help for the Citizens), began organizing around the issue of taxing financial transactions and providing better public services for Moroccans in 1999. Its mandate has since come to include migration, and the organization provides physical and moral resources to migrant community organizations. The organization views migrants as caught up in the battle over ‘neoliberalism,’ and the director stated that, “The situation of migrants is the result of the [economic] alliances between Europe and Morocco” (Author Interview, Daunas 2013). Unlike the majority of Egyptian organizations willing to work with migrants, ATTAC is not a humanitarian organization, and their goal is not service provision, but to further explain the link between neoliberalism and migration policies to the Moroccan and international public and to help migrants organize their own advocacy efforts and protests.
The Moroccan Association for Human Rights (*Association Marocaine des Droits Humains*), which has 10,000 members, has also adopted the issue of migration. The head of the Committee for Migrants within the association believes that protecting the rights of migrants goes hand-in-hand with protecting the rights of all Moroccans. Under his leadership, the committee will work over the next several years to, “…ensure that migrants really do have the rights promised to them as foreigners under the new 2011 Constitution,” as well as, “…access to hospitals and regularization for all migrants” (Author Interview, Ryadil 2013). The organization has 300 to 400 people working on this issue alone.

Legally registered Moroccan organizations also help migrant community organizations by serving as parent organizations. The Council for Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco (*Conseil des Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc*), a migrant-run organization, is not able to legally register as an organization in Morocco, but the Moroccan Association for Human Rights has taken responsibility for them through a formal association that is recognized by the government. With this protection, they are free to organize sit-ins and peaceful protests, where, according to the current president elect, “…no police have bothered us” (Author Interview, Ibanda Mola 2013). Another organization, the Community of Sub-Saharan Migrants (*Communauté de Migrants Subsahariens*) employs the protection of Tadazom, a Moroccan organization with mostly foreign employees. The director the Community of Sub-Saharan Migrants, a migrant from Ghana, focuses his work on activism and the regularization of migrants. Speaking of his colleagues and the broader migrant community in Casablanca, he stated, “Most of
the migrants I know want to stay here. They want to settle here. The problem is how to 
regularize them” (Author Interview, Odoi 2013).

Both Morocco and Egypt possess local civil societies, international NGOs and 
migrant community organizations, and there is interaction and coordination between all 
three types of associations. However, the spillover effects from domestic political affairs 
hinder the ability of organizations, both local and migrant-run, to do much beyond 
immediate service-provision in the Egyptian case. Comparatively in Morocco, the 
relatively calmer political atmosphere has allowed migrant groups to stage 
demonstrations (without repercussion) and to indirectly lobby the government regarding 
the legalization of migrants through the aid of local Moroccan organizations and NGOs. 
Additionally, the fact that most migrants in Morocco would not qualify as refugees has 
made the Moroccan migrant-service providers less reliant upon the UNHCR for funding, 
and has made the entire migrant-servicing apparatus less UNHCR-centric. Lastly, the 
plight of migrants in Morocco has been taken up by local civil society actors in the larger 
battle against European domination and neoliberal economic and trade policies, and this 
mobilization may have helped bring the issue of migration to the forefront.

This section demonstrates that the presence of international organizations, NGOs, 
and migrant organizations is not a strong enough factor by itself to encourage welcoming 
policies toward migrants. The case of Morocco suggests that migrant organizations must 
be able to find linkages with actors in local civil society, and the case of Egypt suggests 
that domestic political strife eclipses the possibility of progressive policy change. These 
two factors will be explored more thoroughly in the next section.
Causal Factor III: The Confluence of International and Domestic Pressures

_Egypt_

As a signatory to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention and the 2003 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Egypt has undertaken an international obligation to provide asylum and guarantee rights for refugees and migrants, both legal and illegal. In reality though, the Egyptian government’s engagement with its migrant population can be described as a general ambivalence, punctuated by incidences of engagement driven by distributive interest, i.e. engagement with certain refugee populations when doing so is perceived as politically advantageous.

In the case of African refugees, these incidences of engagement are almost wholly negative. One of the most extreme examples is the massacre of twenty-six Sudanese migrants who were killed by Egyptian security forces after refusing to disband a protest outside the UNHCR offices in the upper-class Cairo neighborhood of Mohandiseen in 2006 (Salih 2006). The Egyptian state will also periodically deport politically active African migrants if it considers them a threat to state security, in violation of the international legal norm of non-refoulement, or forced deportation.

The case of Syrian refugees in Egypt demonstrates this theory of distributive interest more succinctly. When Syrians began arriving en mass in 2012, former President Mohamed Morsi extended a relatively warm reception to Syrian refugees, in comparison to the country’s longer-standing population of Africans. Morsi announced in September of 2012 that all Syrian refugee children residing in Egypt would be able to enroll in
public schools regardless of their UNHCR status, a service not extended to all refugee
groups, and also allowed them access to public health facilities. This recognition and
willingness to offer services to Syrians represents an anomalous break with the generally
ambivalent and occasionally aggressive policies toward Egypt’s other migrant
populations.

It seems plausible to think that this demonstrated preference for Syrian as opposed
to African migrants is related to the pervasive idea of a common Arab lineage, and
support on behalf of the Egyptian populace for co-ethnic or co-religious migrants. Yet
former President Mohamed Morsi’s rhetoric regarding Syria points more to an Islamic
and sectarian ideology than one based on co-ethnic affinities. As clearly demonstrated
just prior to his ousting, Morsi supported Syrian oppositional forces to the point of
cutting diplomatic ties with the Bashar al-Assad government. On 15 June 2013, two
weeks before the military coup, Morsi announced at a mass rally in Cairo that he would
be closing the Syrian embassy in Egypt and that, ”the Egyptian people and army are
supporting the Syrian uprising” (Al-Ahram 2013). Hardliners also spoke at the rally,
calling for jihad to combat the Syrian regime. Vocalizing support for Syrians was
therefore a means of bolstering Morsi’s own support among Islamic factions within
Egypt.

Following the military coup on 3 July 2013, Syrian refugees were again used by
political leaders, but in a very different fashion. While technically the special treatment–
healthcare and access to primary education–extended to Syrian refugees under former
President Mohamed Morsi was upheld by the subsequent military government, the de
facto treatment changed dramatically. Syrian refugees became the subjects of a
government-organized media campaign that refers to them as ‘terrorists’ who are allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and former President Mohamed Morsi’s supporters. These accusations were fueled by the arrest of a Syrian national at a rally in support of the ousted president on July 5, solidifying the association between the Muslim Brotherhood and Syrians in the minds of many Egyptians.

Three days after this incident, on July 8, the new military-led government modified its entry rules pertaining to Syrians. Whereas before these changes there were no visa restrictions on Syrians entering Egypt, refugees from Syria would now need to obtain a visa and security clearance before their departure. The new system was applied on the same day that it was announced, and ninety-five Syrians were sent back to Syria on a flight to Latakia (Human Rights Watch 2013a) Egyptian authorities originally claimed that the new restrictions would only be a temporary measure until security conditions improved, but the changes were not reversed as of December, 2013.

As a result of these policies and the increasingly hostile treatment of Syrians within Egypt, Amnesty International has documented a particularly sharp increase in the number of Syrian refugees in Egypt attempting to escape to Europe (Amnesty International 2013). Between January and the end of August 2013 an estimated six thousand Syrian refugees managed to reach Italy by boat from Egypt, but between September and mid-October—just one and a half months—over three thousand Syrians arrived in Italy from Egypt. Human Rights Watch has also documented over 1,500 cases of prolonged detainment of Syrian refugees in the last few months, as well as hundreds of cases of coerced refoulement, or forced return to Syria (Human Rights Watch 2013b).
Egyptian activists argue that Syrians and Palestinian Refugees from Syria have become an ‘easy target’ through which the new government can bolster its security state. Revolutionary activist Nadar Attar, who founded an organization in 2013 that advocates for Syrian and Palestinian refugees, reasons that in order for the military-led government to legitimize its rule, it must create a heightened sense of fear among citizens (Author Interview, Attar 2013). Syrian and Palestinian Refugees from Syria have thus joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, anti-coup protestors and other revolutionary activists that the state has labeled as ‘security threats’ in order to expand its policing apparatus over the past several months. Under former President Mohamed Morsi, policies toward Syrian and Palestinian refugees were used to garner further support among Islamic factions in Egypt by demonstrating an affinity with revolutionary groups in Syria. Under the post-coup leadership, exclusionary policies toward Syrians and Palestinians, under the label ‘state security measures,’ are being used to sustain an existing climate of fear toward outsiders—refugees, anti-coup protestors, and other dissenting voices—in order to further legitimize the actions of the military.

Morocco

Morocco has been an independent constitutional monarchy since 1956, currently led by King Mohammed VI. When Mohammed VI came into power in 1999, succeeding his father, he promised liberalization and reform (Arango and Martin 2005). However, not until the Arab Spring in the winter of 2011 did the king seek to make substantive changes. While Morocco did not experience a revolution on the level of Egypt or Tunisia, the ‘20th of February Movement’ led calls for reforms that resulted in a new constitution in 2011. Fearing a full-blown revolution like those unfolding in neighboring countries,
King Mohammed VI gave an ‘unprecedented’ speech on March 9 that announced the drafting of the sixth constitution in the history of the country (ibid). On July 1, 2011 a referendum was held and the constitution was adopted with a majority vote. The goal of 2011 Constitution was to create a popularly elected parliament that would have authority over Morocco’s economy, domestic politics and the regulation of civil society, and which would also be responsible for selecting the country’s the prime minister (previously he had been appointed by the king) (Pollack 2011).

The general consensus regarding democratic reforms in Morocco is that the king has been slow to enact the provisions laid out in the new Constitution. The first elected government following the constitution was dismantled in May of 2013 and a second government formed in October of the same year. Given this instability, the King has asserted the necessity of his rule and his continued oversight of matters that, according to the new Constitution, were supposed to be handed over to the purview of parliament (Pollack 2011).

During the same year the new Constitution was written and ratified, the Moroccan government enacted a series of punitive measures toward unwanted migrants. Since the end of 2011, the Moroccan government has carried out a visible increase in internal policing and border security, supported and encouraged by European states (in particular the Spanish government) in order to combat, “cross-border crime, illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs and weapons” (Médecins Sans Frontières 2013). This has resulted in a dramatic rise in wide-scale, indiscriminate raids on sub-Saharan migrant communities in Morocco, with daily raids carried out on communities in the Algerian border region and specific suburbs of cities including Rabat, Casablanca, Fes and
Tangiers (ibid). The sub-Saharan migrants that are arrested during these raids are taken at night en masse to the border of Morocco and Algeria and expelled into the ‘no-man’s land’ separating the two countries. As part of this new protocol, European authorities were also given the ability to deport migrants arrested in Europe to Morocco, regardless of the migrant’s original country of origin (Author Interview, Ryadil 2013).

France and Spain are Morocco’s most important trading partners, with France receiving one third of Morocco’s exports and providing one fourth of its imports, and Spain receiving one eighth and providing ten percent (Arango and Martin 2005). Pressure from these two countries regarding enhanced migrant policing did not begin in 2011. Morocco, along with other North African countries, has a long track record of complying with the requests of European countries regarding enhanced border security policies dating back to at least the early 2000’s (Boubakri 2013).

And yet merely two years later, in a meeting on September 10, 2013 between King Mohammed VI and several political officials, there was discussion of drafting a new ‘comprehensive policy on immigration’ that will attempt to normalize the situation of all migrants in Morocco, whether from Sub-Saharan Africa or elsewhere (Lebbar 2013). That there was use of the term ‘integration’ during the meeting, and thus acknowledgement that these migrants will not be returning to their home countries in the near future, is substantive. However, the King’s Office also noted in its press statement that it would not be able to provide integration for ‘all’ migrants wishing to settle in the country. The statement also denied the use of ‘systematic violence by the police,’ directly contravening the findings of the final report released by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) before the group shut down its Moroccan operations in March of 2013 in objection to the
violence. Lastly, in parallel to asylum law, Moroccan authorities announced a process of regularization for six categories of irregular migrants, including humanitarian cases, persons married with Moroccan nationals for more than two years and their children or migrants able to prove that they live in Morocco for more than five years (UNHCR 2013b).

This meeting on a new immigration policy and its promises for major reform may yet prove to simply be ‘cheap talk’ in the face of allegations over migrant abuse emanating from various NGOs, as the Moroccan government does not have a history of being particularly receptive to the requests of migrant-focused international organizations. A representative from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which must cooperate with the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior regarding visas issued to migrants, noted that dealing with the government on issues relating to migrants, “…is like talking to a wall” (Author Interview, Hardy 2013). The UNHCR has also been lobbying the Moroccan government for immigration and refugee policy reform for years without any tangible action (Author Interview, Fawe 2013). The timing of this sudden announcement is therefore puzzling. When asked about the timing of the decision by the king to enact migration policy reform and whether it was related to other political activities in the country, the UNHCR representative replied, “The reasons that have motivated the decision of the King to endorse [our] recommendations remain... in the head of the King and his advisors” (ibid).

In both the cases of Morocco and Egypt, pressures exist that cause the state to either enact strict policies against potential migrants – hardening border security or enhancing policing – or to enact policies against migrants already residing in the host
state – deportations, arrests or the refusal of public services. In the case of Morocco, the pressure emanates primarily from Europe, whereas in Egypt, pressures are homegrown. While international conventions regarding human rights or international actors such as the UNHCR have the potential to serve as mitigating factors in favor of more rights for migrants, the cases of Morocco and Egypt prove that these factors are relatively impotent when domestic incentives for exclusionary policies toward migrants are present. And yet we see a distinctive movement toward greater recognition and rights for migrants in Morocco. Why might this be the case?

Borrowing from liberal international relations theory, I argue that the king’s willingness to acquiesce to the demands of NGOs and civil society actors is best understood from the perspective of domestic actors. The pressure that King Mohammed VI felt following Morocco’s ‘silent’ revolution of 2011 to maintain economic and social order in Morocco may help to explain his willingness to discuss immigration policy reform and the recommendations of NGOs. The fact that local civil society was able to work in conjunction with migrant organizations and international organization may also have played in a role in bringing the issue of migration to the forefront. This helped make the plight of migrants inextricable from the plight of Moroccan citizens more generally, and helped place the issue of migration within the narrative of social change that has been the focus of Moroccan civil society since the revolution of 2011.

Conclusion

This paper examined the transformation of North African and Middle Eastern states from countries of emigration and transit to countries of migrant settlement, using the case studies of Egypt and Morocco. While both countries receive regular flows of migrants
who constitute an informal labor force, there is greater movement in Morocco toward recognizing and accepting migrants. Why is this the case?

The resistance toward accepting migrants in Egypt may be partially due to recent waves of Arab migrants and refugees that overwhelm the capacity of the Egyptian state and its migrant-service providing community. Additionally, political and social unrest following the Egyptian revolution in 2011 has led to a highly unstable environment that has proved particularly trying for foreign organizations working on behalf of migrants and also particularly dangerous for some migrant groups, particularly Syrian and Palestinian refugees. In the case of Morocco, the political environment since 2011 has been much more stable. While Morocco has submitted to the requests of European states for increased policing of migrants and enhanced border control policies, the country also took a major step towards accommodation in 2013 with the announcement of its new immigration policy.

From these two case studies, we can hypothesize the following about migration policies in new countries of migrant settlement:

• Accepting or welcoming policies toward long-term migrants are unlikely to transpire in countries with domestic unrest;

• In relatively stable countries, accommodating policies are more likely to transpire if the issue of migration can be linked to demands for social change from local civil society, and if domestic pressures can generate governmental interest.

My findings therefore provide some support for the neo-institutionalist approach to migration policy, since the actions of migrants and civil society actors appear to have played a role in the movement toward more liberal policies in Morocco. My findings do
not support the postnationalist approach, since the presence of international institutions and international treaties appear to have had little effect in both the Moroccan and Egyptian cases. Additionally, the poor treatment of Syrian and Palestinian refugees in the Egyptian case provides evidence against the cultural idiom approach, as previous institutional preferences did not dictate special treatment for co-ethnics in this instance. Above all, my findings support the importance of domestic stability in the development of progressive policies toward migrants. This variable has been relatively unexplored in the citizenship and migration literature, likely because this literature is derived mostly from the experiences of Western receiving countries in which stability is taken for granted.

I acknowledge that my findings are tenable, and based only the experience of two states – Morocco and Egypt – both of which have undergone social and political upheaval of varying degrees over the past several years. While this makes Morocco and Egypt exceptional to some degree, the reality is that most new countries of migrant settlement (former transit countries) are non-democracies or semi-authoritarian states. As such, it is important that we understand how migration policy functions in states that are not fully stable, and even in states that are experiencing ‘exceptional’ political circumstances. As a next step toward understanding migration policy in new countries of settlement, these tentative hypotheses could be tested in other Middle East and North African states or in other regions of the globe, such as Asia or Central America.
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**The names of those interviewed for this research that have uncertain refugee or migrant status are changed in order to protect their identity.**


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