When Does Race Matter?
Exploring White Responses to Minority Candidates in a “Post-Racial” Era

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Abstract

In what many view as a “post-racial” world, does race still matter in minority candidate evaluation? I argue that an increasingly racially diverse array of candidates necessitates a more dynamic look at how race might help or hurt minority candidacies. My study is unique in three ways: first, I test the relative role race plays in the evaluation of white voters for black, Asian, and Latino candidates of both major parties, examining observational data on Latinos and Asian candidates for the first time. Second, my study uses combines new data that allows me to account for the main factors outside of race that could drive the vote - incumbency, spending, and candidate ideal points. Finally, using the 2010 and 2012 CCES, I am able to look at voter perceptions about their candidates that might drive their vote choice, namely ideological assessments and competence assessments. I find that even after accounting for non-racial variables, white voters are less likely to vote for Hispanic and black Democrats because they are viewed as less competent and more ideologically extreme than similar white candidates. Meanwhile, I find that Asian candidates and minority Republicans are largely unaffected by these biases.

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The election and subsequent re-election of Barack Obama were defining moments for race and American politics. Not only did President Obama succeed in being the first person of color elected to the highest office in America, he overcame a weak economy and a polarized electorate to win re-election. According to some commentators and scholars, the election of Barack Obama was merely the culminating point in a “post-racial” America where racial attitudes are no longer as pervasive as they once were (Thernstrom, 2009a; Logan, 2011). President Obama’s election was undoubtedly important, but was it really a sign of transformative change?

Past studies on minority candidates have grappled with the central question of whether a candidate’s race has a negative impact on their electoral performance (Highton, 2004; Sigelman et al., 1995; Terkildsen, 1993). Two narratives have emerged from this literature. One views race as a persistent prejudicial screen that is difficult to dislodge (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Terkildsen, 1993). The second finds race to be an decreasingly significant consideration in candidate evaluation and political outcomes (Highton, 2004; Abramowitz, 1994; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1999). I propose a third view that considers race as a dynamic variable that changes in its significance depending on racial and electoral context. In other words, I argue that asking whether race matters is merely the first step in a larger exploration. The next question that must be asked is when race matters, by exploring the circumstances under which race has an influence on political and electoral outcomes. Finally, in an increasingly diverse America, we must ask whether candidates belonging to different racial groups are assessed in different ways. This study extends the analysis on minority candidates to Hispanic and Asian candidates for the first time.

I hypothesize that attitudes towards minority candidates will reflect an emerging racial hierarchy in American politics, with Asians at the top and blacks and Hispanic at the bottom. I also hypothesize that racial bias against minority candidates will be rooted in political stereotypes that see blacks and Latinos as less competent and more ideologically extreme than whites, and that these biases will be diminished by a stereotype-disconfirming partisan label (in other words, a Republican party label). Finally, I hypothesize that racial biases will be especially manifest among the racially resentful segments of the white population.

In order to test my theory, I turn to a host of dynamic new datasources that allows me to explore the electoral nuances of race in a way that incorporates a number of variables that prior observational
studies were unable to consider. I draw from the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), a nationally representative internet survey that asks respondents not just whom they voted for but also to rate the ideological leanings and assess the competence of their respective candidates. In addition to the variables provided in the CCES, I also incorporate new candidate ideal-point estimation that generates ideological scores for challengers and incumbents (Bonica, 2013). Using this data as a baseline, I can examine whether minority candidate evaluations are biased when compared to their “true” ideological leanings.

A thorough analysis of this data confirms my hypotheses. I find a strong perceptual bias against Hispanic and black Democratic candidates in both ideological evaluation and assessment of competence. I also find that these biases do not apply to Asian Democrats and black and Hispanic Republicans. In addition, I find that these perceptual biases account for the bias in the vote against black and Hispanic candidates. Finally, I find that these biases are especially prevalent among those with negative racial attitudes.

1 Minority Candidates and Vote Choice

How much does the race of political candidate matter when it comes to white voters? Does race still matter now, given the social advancements of the Post-Civil Rights Era? The answers to these questions have proved elusive, despite numerous studies that have sought to isolate the effect of race on vote choice. From the Bradley Effect to the recent election and re-election of Barack Obama, scholars have sought to examine what penalty (or benefit) if any, do minority candidates incur from their race (Krysan, 1998; Beck, Tien and Nadeau, 2010; Jacobson, 2011; Kinder and Dale-Riddle, 2012). In the Pre-Civil Rights era, race undeniably played a major role in the formulation of white political attitudes, both in terms of attitudes on policy and behavior in the voting booth (Key, 1949). In the intervening years, however, there has been substantial debate as to whether race remains a significant handicap for minority candidates. In the age of Obama, some have argued that racism is largely a thing of the past that we should reconsider the political safeguards put in place during the Civil Rights Era (Thernstrom, 2009b). To some extent, the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Shelby County v. Holder*, which repealed certain parts of the Voting Rights Act, endorses this “post-racial” view.
Yet, the pervasiveness of race remains a contentious issue within the literature because of a disparity in findings. These findings can be broadly divided among scholars who believe that race remains an active and continuing impediment to the fortunes of minority candidates and those who argue that race no longer presents the same persistent barrier to minority representation that it once did. Electoral data suggests that minorities, especially Asians and Latinos, remain underrepresented in elected office (Hajnal, 2010), and that there is disparity in the racial composition of electorates that elect minority candidates, with most black and Latino representatives coming from majority minority districts. Asians are the notable exception to this, as most Asian representatives are elected in majority white areas (Hajnal, 2007). Prominent studies have found that black candidates fare worse among white voters when paired against white candidates (Terkildsen, 1993; Reeves, 1997). These studies seek to isolate the effect of race experimentally, and find a significant racial penalty incurred by black candidates, not just in the vote, but also in evaluation of candidate quality and ideological extremity (Williams, 1990; Sigelman et al., 1995; McDermott, 1998). According to this narrative, overtly prejudicial attitudes may be a thing of the past, but a type of averse or “modern” racism in which whites evaluate their minority candidates negatively despite their qualifications, still exists. Those who support this view argue that even Obama’s election and re-election to the presidency was still marred by racial prejudice, and that he won in spite of his race (Kinder and Dale-Riddle, 2012; Beck, Tien and Nadeau, 2010).

On the other hand, several prominent studies have found race to be a minor or insignificant impediment for minority candidates. The most notable of these studies is Highton (2004), who examined real world black candidates using exit polls. He finds that black incumbents are evaluated on par with their white counterparts and are just as likely to be re-elected. His findings are echoed by Bullock (2000) who studies aggregate white turnout and finds that black Democrats do not receive a lower proportion of the white vote when compared to white Democrats. These studies have been backed up by surveys of white voters that have found them to be increasingly less resistant to vote for minority candidates (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1985; Jones, 2012). These results back a narrative of an increasing egalitarianism in American society. According to this narrative, America has changed to the point where race is no longer the predominant motivating factor in the issue positions and political behavior of whites, and that most of the opposition to minority candidates and racial policy is because of political conservatism as opposed to
racial bias (Abramowitz, 1994; Sniderman and Carmines, 1999; Feldman and Huddy, 2005; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1999).

In addition to the discrepancy in findings, I argue that the existing literature on race and candidate evaluation is missing two key components. First, it does not take into account the increasing racial and political diversity in American politics, and does not consider how the electorate might respond differently to candidates of different racial groups and partisan stripes. Second, prior observational studies are missing the full array of racial and non-racial variables necessary in creating a test that measures the independent effect of race. I address both these issues by utilizing a dataset that examines candidates from all the major racial groups in America - black, Latino, and Asian. I compare candidates of these groups to white candidates with similar characteristics by controlling for party, spending, incumbency, and candidate ideology by using candidate ideal point estimates. The data allows me to trace the origins of vote bias against minority candidates by examining how ideological and competence assessments of candidates drives white voting behavior. Finally, I examine the impact of differing racial attitudes has on minority candidate evaluation. To that end, I posit a contemporary theory of race and candidate evaluation that seeks to explain how race functions as a variable in the political attitudes of whites.

2 A Contemporary Theory of Race and Candidate Evaluation

2.1 When Does Race Matter?

The calculus of voting is already intricate, even without the added component of race. Individual level variables, such as partisan identification (Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2000), socioeconomic status (Converse, 1966; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Markus, 1988), and a voter’s social network (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Christakis and Fowler, 2011; Bond et al., 2012), have a significant influence on vote choice. In addition to these individual level characteristics, electoral context also matters. Candidate quality (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983), incumbency status (Mayhew, 1974; Hajnal, 2001), ideological leaning (Hinich and Munger, 1994), as well as national economic conditions (Markus, 1988; Hibbs, 1987) have all been shown to influence vote choice and candidate perception. How does race figure into this calculus? Popkin (1994)’s theory of low-information rationality argues that voters often
make choices based on informational heuristics and cues, like partisan affiliation, incumbency, and campaigns. Using this literature as a theoretical base, I propose a view of racial politics which considers race as an informational heuristic, much like partisan identification or incumbency status. Voters incorporate a candidate’s race as a part of a larger equation of political decision making. A candidate’s race can cue different aspects of that candidate’s politics, whether it be ideology, integrity, or competence.

The strength of race as an informational cue depends on the context of that information. Studies of racial candidate cues have found two distinct types of political stereotyping. The first of these is ideological stereotyping. Prior studies find that black candidates were seen as more liberal and more supportive of minority rights than white candidates (McDermott, 1998; Williams, 1990; Sigelman et al., 1995). Ideological stereotyping is not surprising, given black America's strong and enduring allegiance to the Democratic party (Dawson, 1994). The second, more insidious strand of racial-political stereotyping is “competence” stereotyping, in which whites view minorities as inherently less capable and ill-suited for political office. Sigelman et al. (1995) finds that blacks and Latinos are stereotyped as being unable to manage major policy issues. Hajnal (2007) finds that among black challengers, stereotypes about incompetence are especially pervasive, which leads to a voting backlash among whites.

Because white responses to minority candidates are rooted in these political stereotypes, I hypothesize that the manner in which these stereotypes will effect electoral outcomes will depend on certain contexts, which I define as “stereotype-confirming” or “stereotype-disconfirming” contexts. The psychological basis for these two contexts lies in an “assumed-characteristics” interpretation of candidate qualities, in which information about a particular person’s characteristics or beliefs can either serve to confirm or override prior biases (Locksley et al., 1980). I hypothesize that a Democratic partisan affiliation will feed into preexisting racial-political stereotypes and that this will lead to a racial bias against minority Democratic candidates. This bias should manifest itself in respondents rating their minority Democrats as more ideologically extreme. On the other hand, because the strength of party labels can change voter attitudes (Nicholson, 2011), I hypothesize that a Republican party label will disconfirm these stereotypes.

While the expectations for minority ideological evaluations can be clearly delineated by party, formulating how a partisanship effects competence assessments is slightly more difficult. Prior studies (Sigelman et al., 1995) have found that whites view black and Hispanic candidates as significantly less
competent than whites, but that negative assessments of competence also cuts across party labels. The mechanism by which a candidate’s party may mediate assessments of competence is “expectancy violation,” in which white voters evaluate minority Republicans more favorably because they very clearly deviate from expected stereotypes. If this is the case, then we should expect a bias against competence assessments of minority Democrats, but no significant effects for minority Republicans.

From this informational theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the first of three hypotheses:

- 1. Racial-Political Stereotyping Hypothesis - Whites will be perceptually biased against minority Democrats, rating them as more ideologically extreme and less competent than their white counterparts. These biases will have a direct effect on the vote for minorities Democrats. These biases will not apply to minority Republicans.

2.2 Which Races Matter?

Most scholarly works on minority candidates focus primarily on black candidates and their relation to white voters (Hajnal, 2007, 2001; Highton, 2004; Bullock, 2000; Terkildsen, 1993). However, the literature on minority candidacies has yet to account for the increasing racial diversity in the array of candidates. From Asian-American Governors Bobby Jindal (R-LA) and former Washington Governor Gary Locke (D-WA), to Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), who are of Latin American descent, America has seen a marked increase in the amount of Latinos and Asians seeking and winning elected office, even among white majority electorates. The work that has been done on Asian and Hispanic candidates has focused on the effect of minority candidacies on minority voters. Masuoka (2006) and Baretto (2007) have found increased participation among Asians and Latinos when they are voting for co-ethnic candidates. Many of these studies are motivated by the fact that, especially among blacks and Latinos, most of the minority candidates have run in majority-minority districts. However, the number of minorities seeking electoral support in white plurality/majority districts has increased, and studying the effect of race on white voters has become increasingly relevant. Minority candidates from each major racial group have sought and won office in white majority electoral districts, from municipal offices to the federal level.

How being of Hispanic or Asian descent affects a candidate’s electoral prospects among whites is
still mostly a mystery, despite increased political participation from both of these groups (Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010). The work that has been done has established a link between racial stereotypes and minority candidates (Hajnal, 2007; McDermott, 1998; Sigelman et al., 1995). Both Hajnal (2007) and McDermott (1998) find that black candidates, challengers in particular, lead to political stereotyping among white voters. Do these stereotypes still apply for candidates of other races? My study will seek to answer this as yet unexplored question.

Extensive studies have been done about the different political stereotypes that afflict each racial group. Bobo (2001) conducted survey research about racial stereotypes and established the existence of a racial hierarchy in the attitudes of white americans. Both blacks and Hispanics are seen as “lazy”, “violent”, more welfare dependent, and Latinos are more likely to be identified with an illegal citizenship status. Asians, conversely, are seen as industrious and hardworking, unlike blacks or Latinos. On the other hand, Asians are also seen as foreign and inscrutable. This finding is reflects the theoretical work of Kim (1999), whose theory of racial triangulation posits two dimensions of prejudice, “foreigner-insider” and “superior-inferior”. The for “foreigner-insider” dimension captures the fidelity of a racial group to American social and political traditions. The “superior-inferior” dimension, on the other hand, judges racial groups based on how behave in society relative to whites. According to her scale, Asians place highly and are more proximal to whites on the “superior-inferior” scale, in which they are seen as hardworking and industrious, but are also, at times, seen as perpetually foreign and disloyal to the American civic ideal. Blacks, conversely, are seen as “inferior” and farther away from whites on the “inferior-superior” dimension, but closer to whites on the “foreigner-insider” dimension. Abrajano and Alvarez (2010) find that blacks, Latinos, and whites identify with Asians as a racial group the least when compared to other racial groups While the literature on racial-political stereotyping provides certain expectations for Latinos and black candidates, the expectations for Asian candidates is more muddy. I hypothesize that the stereotype of Asians as the model minority will make whites more receptive to their political candidacies. It is certainly possible that Asians will cue foreignness and that this could hurt the candidacies of

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1Extensive scholarly work has been done on the changing nature of racial classifications. See Omi and Winant (1994) for a thorough examination. I recognize the inherent problems in treating each of these racial classifications as self-contained. I argue, however, that using these broad racial classifications that cut across ethnicities is still very much relevant when studying white attitudes, as whites tend to view racial groups as monolithic. Future studies should focus on the differences of ethnic cues vs. racial cues.
Asian American candidates\textsuperscript{2}, however since the expectations of public office largely play into the positive stereotypes of Asians as industrious and hardworking, I expect the model minority stereotype to override concerns about their relative inscrutability.

If race does indeed function as a political cue, then we should expect that minority candidates of different racial stripes should inspire different types of political responses from whites. I propose a theory of racial hierarchy that considers the different role taken by each of the major racial groups in contemporary America. Not all minority candidates will evoke the same reactions from white voters. Black candidacies, having roots in a more thoroughly established political history and clear racial political allegiance towards the Democratic party and the policies of social liberalism (Dawson, 1994), are more likely to cue racial-political stereotypes towards political liberalism when compared to comparable white candidates. Hispanics, who suffer from the same stereotypes as blacks (Bobo, 2001; Sigelman et al., 1995), will likely inspire a similar reaction. Racial-political stereotypes of Asians, on the other hand, are not rooted in the policies of social liberalism and minority driven policies (like affirmative action and welfare)\textsuperscript{3} in the same way black and Hispanics are (Bobo, 2001), and instead center around perceptions of being inscrutable, perpetually foreign, and of being a model minority (Wu, 2003; Kim, 1999). I hypothesize that Asians will be the least racially polarizing candidates of all, and we will see weak to no racial effects in the results.

From this racial-hierarchy theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the second of three hypotheses:

\textbf{2. Racial Hierarchy Hypothesis} - Asians will be evaluated favorably when compared to blacks and Hispanics. A racial hierarchy in candidate perception and the vote will emerge, with Asians on equal footing with whites, and blacks and Hispanics below them.

\subsection*{2.3 For Whom Does Race Matter?}

Prior studies have found that partisanship, ideology, and other sorts of informational cues do not affect voters uniformly (Popkin, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). What segments of the population is most}

\footnote{This is difficult to test, as there is no question on the CCES that relates to a candidate’s foreignness. I plan to address these questions in future experimental studies that will test the effect of foreignness on vote choice and candidate perception.}

\footnote{Though these issues are linked to Asian Americans in the sense that they are ”model minorities” and therefore are not dependent on such policies.}
likely to oppose the political candidacies of minority groups? What type of voter will hold the deepest stereotypes of minorities? Hajnal (2007) finds that the political candidacy of blacks triggers racial anxiety even among white voters who identify as politically liberal. Kinder and Sanders (1996) argues that white antipathy towards minorities has taken a more subtle form of distrust of minority candidates and hostility towards race policy. The existence of this distrust is rooted in the theory that while overtly prejudicial expressions are a thing of the past, a certain segment of the white population still very much holds “symbolically” racist views that penalize minorities under socially acceptable grounds (McConahay, 1986; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Kinder and Sanders (1996) argues that these racial attitudes are stable and difficult to reverse. If this theory is true, then we should expect those with racially prejudicial attitudes to be inherently distrustful of minority candidates, and render harsher judgements upon minority candidates when compared to white candidates of the same partisan and ideological stripe. On the other hand, if the “egalitarian” narrative is a more accurate reflection of the world today, then we should see no significant differences between the evaluation of minority candidates and white candidate, when controlling for partisanship, spending, and ideology.

Measuring racial attitudes has been a challenge that race scholars continue to grapple with. While overtly prejudicial sentiment expressed in survey questions has declined significantly in the post-Civil Rights Era (Virtanen and Huddy, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2005), some have found that whites are more willing to express anti-black and anti-minority attitudes when answering indirect questions about race (Schuman et al., 1998; Sears and Henry, 2005). Kinder and Sanders (1996)’s racial resentment scale is the most common survey measure of implicit racial attitudes or “averse” racism, and it is the principle measure that I use to test for whom does race matter.\(^4\)

From this respondent-contextual theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the third of three hypotheses:

- **3. Racial Resentment Hypothesis - Biased perceptions against minority candidates will be espe-**

\(^4\)While some have argued that the racial resentment questions has less to do with race and more to do with ideological conservatism (Feldman and Huddy, 2005; Sniderman and Carmines, 1999), Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) found racial resentment to be significantly related to a lack of support for President Obama. For the purposes of this paper, I use racial resentment as my primary measure of racial attitudes, with the acknowledgement of the literature that has challenged its validity as a measurement of racial attitudes. This is partly due to convenience, as the CCES asks the racial resentment question, but also because if the racial resentment measure is not capturing racial attitudes, then it should bias my results against my hypotheses.
Table 1: Minority Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Republican</th>
<th>% Democrat</th>
<th>% Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cially prevalent among the racially resentful segments of the electorate.

3 Data

For this study, I use 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), a collaborative effort by political scientists across the country to gather survey data in congressional elections (Ansolabehere, 2010, 2012). The CCES has several important advantages over existing studies (Highton, 2004; Bullock, 2000). First, the CCES has a much larger set of respondents. Between the 2010 and 2012 CCES, there were roughly 100,000 respondents. Second, this large sample means that there are enough voters to examine every Congressional district in America, which means I can get an all encompassing view of the role of race across the entire nation. Third, and most critically, this data allows me to study candidates of every racial stripe, political orientation, and experience level. This allows for a more rigorous exploration of the intersection of these different candidate level variables and race on candidate evaluation. This variation in race, partisanship, and candidate type differs from previous studies, which only look at black candidates, who were mostly incumbent Democrats (Highton, 2004; Bullock, 2000).

Table 1 shows the racial and political makeup for the candidates in 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections. 135 black candidates, 103 Hispanic candidates, and 37 Asian candidates ran for Congressional office between the 2010 and 2012 elections. While most minority candidates ran as Democrats, there is a fair amount of political diversity among each of racial group. 28 black Republicans, 43 Hispanic Republicans and 8 Asian Republicans ran for Congress. On the other hand, there is substantially

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5The CCES survey is nationally representative and is conducted through the internet. More information on the CCES can be found at http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces

6For the purposes of this study, South Asian candidates were coded as “Asian”.

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Table 2: Racial Competition Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White(D) vs. Black(R)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(D) vs. Hispanic(R)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(D) vs. Asian(R)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(R) vs. Black(D)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(R) vs. Hispanic(D)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(R) vs. Asian(D)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. Black</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic vs. Hispanic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian vs. Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

less political diversity among minority incumbents, almost all of whom were Democrats.

There is also substantial variation in the racial match ups in these elections. Table 2 shows the racial competition makeup in the 2010 and 2012 elections. A black candidate ran against a white candidate in 90 contests, a Hispanic candidate ran against a white candidate in 48 contests, and an Asian candidate ran against a white candidate in 27 contests. While there were races in which co-ethnics ran against one another, there was still a fair amount of diversity among the types of bi-racial elections.\(^7\) Both Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate the racial and political diversity amongst candidates and election type between these two election cycles. This racial and political diversity enables us to study how voters respond to different intersections of racial and political identities. For instance, we can observe whether voters view black, Hispanic, or Asian Republicans differently than black, Hispanic, or Asian Democrats.

Prior studies relied mostly on exit polling and aggregate vote data. The CCES is unique in several ways. The CCES asks its respondents to rate their candidates ideology on a 7-point scale\(^8\). Finally, the 2010 CCES asks its respondents to rate the competence of their candidates on a 7pt scale (from very strong to very weak).\(^9\) The incorporation of ideology and competence ratings allows for a more nuanced and flexible measure of candidate evaluation that stands in contrast to the binary nature of the

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\(^7\) There were only two Non-White bi-Racial races in the sample.

\(^8\) The 2008 CCES asks its respondents to rate their candidate’s ideology on a 1-100 thermometer rating. As of this writing, I have yet to figure out how to adjudicate this ideology scale with the 7pt scale that the 2010 and 2012 CCES uses, which is why I opted not to include the data from the 2008 CCES in this study. I plan on using the 2008 CCES data as a replication dataset as needed.

\(^9\) The 2010 CCES also asks its respondents to rate his or her candidate’s “integrity” which correlates at .91 with “competence.” For the purposes of this paper, all the analysis using non-ideological variables uses “competence” instead of “integrity.” Unfortunately, the 2012 CCES does not feature these non-ideological evaluations.
vote. Previous observational studies (Highton, 2004; Bullock, 2000) have looked exclusively at the vote, and while several important experimental studies (McDermott, 1998; Sigelman et al., 1995) have found that race can cue ideology, there has yet to be an observational study that looks at evaluations that go beyond the vote. With the CCES, we can look beyond the vote and examine how voters rate candidates of different races.

In addition to the CCES, I also incorporate new candidate ideal point estimations (called Campaign Finance Scores, or CFscores) pioneered by Bonica (2013) into my analysis. This allows us to do analysis on challengers in addition to incumbents. As previously illustrated in Table 1, many minority candidates run for office but often lose, especially if they are Republicans. The use of CFscores allows me to incorporate a methodologically rigorous measure of challenger ideology into my analysis. It also provides an objective control for actual candidate ideology, which is important for any analysis of assessments of candidate ideology. Bonica’s ideology estimates resemble DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984a,b) scores, by mapping candidates onto a liberal-conservative dimension ranging from -3 (most liberal) to +3 (most conservative). Bonica found that the correlation coefficient between DW-NOMINATE scores and his CFscores was around 0.90 for incumbents, open seats, and challengers in both the House and the Senate. In my study, CFscores serve as a proxy for a candidate’s “true” ideology.11

In order to examine the white vote, I excluded non-white respondents from the sample. I also excluded races that had no challenger, and minority vs. minority contests. In addition, I only included respondents who were able correctly to identify the race of their candidate, since respondents must be able to recognize the race of the candidate in order to use it as a political cue.

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10 The details of how Bonica generates his campaign finance scores is in Bonica (2013). To summarize briefly: Bonica uses an IRT count model to estimate ideology scores for candidates that received money from at least thirty unique contributors during their election cycle. Bonica assumes that giving to a campaign is a reflection of these ideological and political preferences. This is the same assumption made by other spatial models of political preferences, including DW-NOMINATE.

11 There is a lower correlation between non-incumbent candidates and their future DW-NOMINATE scores, but this could be because contributors base their financing decisions on party affiliation rather than ideology in the absence of non-incumbents lack of roll call votes or consider the ideological views of the incumbent candidate more than those of the challenger.

12 There may be a question as to whether voters are able to meaningfully perceive the extremity of their candidates, and whether CFscores can be linked to these perceptions. I explore this question in a different project and find that voters are indeed able to perceive the ideological extremity of their candidates. See redacted (2013) for more details.
Table 3: Race of Candidate and Vote Choice in Contested Elections, 2010 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of Dem Candidate</th>
<th>Race of Rep Candidate</th>
<th>% Dem Vote</th>
<th>Diff. with baseline (white vs. white)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White(D)</td>
<td>White(R)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black(D)</td>
<td>White (R)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic(D)</td>
<td>White(R)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian(D)</td>
<td>White(R)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>+4%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of Dem Candidate</th>
<th>Race of Rep Candidate</th>
<th>% Rep Vote</th>
<th>Diff. with baseline (white vs. white)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White(D)</td>
<td>White(R)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(D)</td>
<td>Black(R)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-8%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(D)</td>
<td>Hispanic(R)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-20%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White(D)</td>
<td>Asian(R)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†prob < .10, *prob < .05, **prob < .01

4 Results

4.1 Examining Racial Bias in Candidate Evaluation

I start my analysis with the most basic and fundamental measure of racial bias: bias in the vote. If there is racial bias in the vote, then minority candidates should perform worse than their white counterparts. Table 3 shows the raw vote totals for all minority candidates vs. white candidates by party. At first glance, these results suggest that there exists a cumulative racial bias in the white vote against minority candidates of both parties. Compared to the baseline (white vs. white) blacks and Hispanic Democrats do marginally worse. Minority Republicans, on the other hand, do worse across the board, with Asian Republicans doing the worst of all. These results point to a persistent racial bias against minority candidates of almost all racial and political stripes, with the notable exception of Asians Democrats who do better than the baseline. At the very least, this most basic examination of racial bias reveals that, despite a purported willingness to support minority candidates, whites are not voting for their minority candidates at the same rate as their white counterparts.

At the same time, these results are very preliminary. They fail to control for central aspects of the campaign and candidate characteristics, such as incumbency, spending, and candidate ideology. Perhaps these results are the result of electoral variables independent of race. For instance, many of the minority
Table 4: Logit Model for Vote Preference on Race and Candidate Variables - All Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.176**</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.229**</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.146†</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.665**</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.277**</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.779**</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spent</td>
<td>0.129**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spent</td>
<td>-0.192**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle 2012</td>
<td>0.366**</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>-0.131**</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>4.299**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Ideology</td>
<td>0.059**</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.234**</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 104,024
Log-likelihood -35155.745
$\chi^2_{(12)}$ 39234.966

†prob<.10, *prob<.05, **prob<.01

candidates who ran for office were challengers running against established incumbents. Perhaps minority candidates were unable to raise the same amounts of money to stay competitive with their white counterparts. Or perhaps minority candidates were ideologically extreme and out of line with the electorates they were trying to represent. In order to account for those electoral variables, I turn to a logit regression model that controls for non-racial electoral variables. The main dependent variable is whether a respondent voted for the candidate, which is coded as 1 if the respondent did and 0 if the respondent did not. The independent variables of interest is the race of the candidate, with the excluded category being white, so that each coefficient is a comparison to white candidates. I control for incumbency (along with open seats, with the excluded category being challengers), how much the candidate spent, how much the opposition spent,\(^\text{13}\) whether the candidate is a Democrat, the candidate’s CFscore (meant to control for candidate ideology), and a control for the cycle year (a dummy variable for 2012). A random effects model was used in order to control for district level variance.

Table 4 shows the logit model on the vote with all the aforementioned controls on all candidates (with Democrats and Republicans included in the same model). Whites are the excluded category in

\(^{13}\)I generated this measure of campaign spending by taking the total disbursements of all candidates and dividing it by two standard deviations to create a scale of -.5 to 7 with mean 0. See Gelman (2008) for more details
this regression and serve as the comparison group. The coefficients for each race reflect a comparison with white candidates after considering all the listed controls. The first result worth noting is that black candidates do significantly worse than whites. Hispanic candidates also do significantly worse than whites. Asians outperform whites, but the coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value of .07). In order to illustrate these results in a more meaningful manner, I generated predicted probabilities for the vote. Black candidates incur a 3% penalty in the vote when compared to whites. Hispanics incur a 4% penalty in the vote when compared to whites. Asians, on the other hand receive a 2% benefit when compared to whites.

The most important result worth noting is that, even after controlling for a host of electoral variables, there is still a bias against black and Hispanic candidates in the vote, while there is a bias in favor of Asian candidates. These results stand in contrast with prior observational studies, and indicate that even in a “Post-Racial” America, certain minority candidates are still handicapped by their race. This is also evidence in support of the racial-political stereotype hypothesis and the racial hierarchy hypothesis. While this finding is notable in and of itself, the next step is to explore these two hypotheses in more detail by examining among which candidates are these biases more prevalent and what the perceptual source of these biases are.

4.2 Partisanship and Racial-Political Stereotyping

The regression analysis to this point treats all minority candidates as the same, regardless of party. But my theory of racial-political stereotyping argues that minority Democrats are more likely cue perceptual biases than minority Republicans. In order to test whether the racial bias is more prevalent among minority Democrats, I run two separate regressions for Democratic and Republican candidates. The results of these two separate regressions are represented in Table 5.

When looking at only Democrats, the results closely mirror the results in the general model. The predicted probabilities bear out similar results to the general model. Black Democrats suffer a 3% penalty when compared to white Democrats. Hispanic Democrats suffer a 6% penalty when compared to white Democrats. Asian Democrats, on the other hand receive a predicted 10% increase in the white vote when compared to white Democrats.
Republican blacks and Hispanics, on the other hand, do not appear to suffer from the same biases that minority Democrats do when all the controls are accounted for. The effect of race on minority Republicans is statistically insignificant across both these racial groups. While the coefficients for each racial group points in the negative direction, the strength of these coefficients is weak for both black and Hispanic Republicans. Asian Republicans do significantly worse than when compared to their white counterparts, but this likely reflects the idiosyncrasies related to the small number of Asian Republicans who ran in biracial contests in 2010 and 2012 (N of 3).

Thus far, these results lend support to the racial-political stereotyping and racial hierarchy hypotheses. Minority Republicans do not incur a significant penalty among white voters when compared to white Republicans. Both black and Hispanic Democrats, on the other hand, incur a racial penalty when compared to their white counterparts. These results support the racial-stereotyping hypothesis. On the other hand, Asian Democrats perform significantly better than black or Hispanic Democrats among whites which supports the racial hierarchy hypothesis.

In the next section, I test the racial-political stereotyping and the racial hierarchy hypotheses with the other two measures of candidate perception - perception of a candidate’s ideological leaning and the assessment of a candidate’s competence. I then examine how these two perceptions influence the vote for minority candidates.
Table 6: Ordered Logit Model of Ideological Distance from Respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Democrats (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Republicans (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.288** (.056)</td>
<td>0.108 (.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.301** (.090)</td>
<td>-0.071 (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.026 (.097)</td>
<td>-0.029 (.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.066 (.040)</td>
<td>0.089* (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>-0.004 (.047)</td>
<td>0.064 (.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spending</td>
<td>0.111** (.034)</td>
<td>0.033 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spending</td>
<td>-0.081* (.035)</td>
<td>0.189** (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle (2012)</td>
<td>0.655** (.038)</td>
<td>0.019 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>0.221** (.029)</td>
<td>0.059 (.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>3.055** (.041)</td>
<td>-2.388** (.039)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No of Obs | 38,605 | 44,768 |
| Log Likelihood | -66837 | -76805 |

†prob < .10, *prob < .05, **prob < .01; Standard errors in parentheses

4.3 Where Does Racial Bias Come From?

How do we explain racial biases in the vote? I posit two possible explanations. The first is because minorities are viewed as more ideologically extreme than their white counterparts. The second is that minorities are viewed as less competent than their white counterparts. Questions in the CCES allow us to explore how voters perceive their candidates in ways that we could not before. In addition to the vote, we can also examine how voters see their candidate’s ideologically and assess candidate competence. Prior studies have established the importance of how voters perceive their candidate’s ideologically and their candidate’s competence in determining the vote (Hinich and Munger, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Vavreck, 2009; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Exploring how white voters might see their minority candidates as different in both these respects is critical in determining what might generate white bias against minority candidates.

First, I examine the ideological rating of candidates. In order to generate a more meaningful measure of candidate ideology, I construct a measure of ideological difference by subtracting the ideological rating of the candidate with the ideological rating that the respondent gave themselves, both on a 7pt scale. This generates a measure of ideological distance from the respondent, which is arguably more meaningful than a simple measure of ideology. The variable produced is a 12pt ordered variable with 0 representing a respondent perceiving ideological distance from that candidate. For example, of a candidate rates their
Table 7: Ordered Logit Model of Competence Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Democrats (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Republicans (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.527** (.089)</td>
<td>0.181 (.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.409** (.136)</td>
<td>-0.274† (.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>-0.142 (.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.254** (.064)</td>
<td>0.462** (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.192* (.094)</td>
<td>0.066 (.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spending</td>
<td>-0.005 (.053)</td>
<td>-0.094* (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spending</td>
<td>-0.093* (.042)</td>
<td>-0.022 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>0.162* (.053)</td>
<td>-0.024 (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>1.442** (.058)</td>
<td>1.350** (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance</td>
<td>0.592** (.015)</td>
<td>-0.634** (.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No of Obs 19,194 21,468
Log Likelihood -25766 -27171

†prob < .10, *prob < .05, **prob < .01; Standard errors in parentheses

own ideology as “Very Liberal” and rates their candidate as “Very Liberal,” this would produce a 0 on this scale. Negative values mean that the respondent sees their candidate as ideologically to the left in relation to their own ideology, while positive values indicate an ideological placement of the candidate to the right.

Table 6 shows the result of an ordered logit regression of ideological distance. The results of this regression paint a telling picture. Black and Hispanic Democrats are seen to be significantly further away ideologically from white respondents than white Democrats, even after controlling for a candidate’s actual ideology (as measured by CFscores). Asian Democrats, on the other hand, are not seen as significantly more extreme than their white counterparts. On the other hand, minority Republicans are not seen as significantly ideologically distinct from their white Republican counterparts.

These results support both the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis and the racial hierarchy hypothesis. Black and Hispanic Democrats are seen as more ideologically extreme than whites, even when controlling for actual candidate ideology, but these biases do not apply to Asian Democrats and minority Republicans. It also provides a possible explanation as to why we are seeing bias in the Democratic vote against minorities. Whites see their black and Hispanic Democratic candidates as more ideologically extreme than white Democrats, and this perceptual bias may be what leads to a bias in the vote.

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14 A series of robustness tests were run on this data that verify the same result, with some relatively minor variation. I ran the ordered regression using on the original candidate ideological rating, and also ran the data using DW-Nominate instead of...
The other possibility is that whites are biased against minority candidates because they see minorities as less competent. In order to explore this aspect of candidate evaluation, I examine assessments of candidate competence. Respondents in the 2010 CCES were asked to rate the competence of their candidate on a 7pt scale, from “Very weak” to “Very Strong”. Using a similar model that I used for both the vote and for ideology, I ran an ordered logit on ratings of competence on racial variables and other control co-variates. The 2012 CCES did not ask competence questions, so this analysis was run using only the 2010 CCES. The patterns that stand out are similar to the results of the model on ideology. Even when controlling for incumbency, campaign spending, and candidate ideology, both black and Hispanic Democrats are seen as significantly less competent than their white counterparts.

The implications of these findings are potentially far reaching. These results represent the first look at competence assessments of minority candidates. They suggest that perceptual biases against minority candidates remain pervasive even in the age of Obama and five decades after the Civil Rights Movement. Black and Hispanic Democrats suffer the most from these biases, but Hispanic Republicans are also seen as significantly less competent than their white counterparts. This result affirms the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis. The result for Asian Democrats, on the other hand, is not significant, which reaffirms the racial hierarchy hypothesis.

On the whole, the evidence suggests that white voters are perceptually biased against minority candidates, especially minority black and Hispanic Democrats. How do these candidate perceptions influence the racial vote? Accounting for these perceptions could account for the bias in the racial vote and paint a clearer picture of what might cost minority candidates white votes. In order to explore this, I revisit the logit model from Table 4 and add in the ideological distance from respondent and competence assessments as control variables in the regression. The purpose of this regression is to see examine how the coefficients on race changes in order to determine whether bias in ideological assessment or bias in competence assessments drive bias in the vote. Table 8 shows the results from the original logit on the

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15 The 2010 CCES also asked respondents to rate their candidate’s “integrity”. I found “integrity” to correlate with “competence” at a .89 level so I chose to focus on the competence evaluation for the purposes of this paper. I ran the models in this paper using “integrity” in order to check for robustness, and bore similar results to the models using competence.

16 There was a lack of Asian Republicans in bi-racial contests in 2010, so I could not analyze the effect of competence on Asian Republicans.
vote the results with a perception of ideology variable and competence variable added as controls. Because the competence question only appears in the 2010 CCES, I reproduce the original model on just the 2010 data. The ideological assessment variable was also changed to absolute values. When controlling for competence assessments and ideological assessments, the results of the original regression change significantly. The coefficients on black, Hispanic, become insignificant. This means that the bias that does exist against minority candidates is captured mostly by ideological and competence assessments.

The results suggest that whites are voting against minority candidates because they view them as both less competent and more ideologically extreme. Blacks and Hispanics are still faced with deep rooted perceptual biases that fit prevailing stereotypes and that directly effect their electoral prospects. These findings confirm Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012)’s assertion that minority candidates often win in spite of their race, and that racial bias is still prevalent in this “post-racial” era.

While the results so far point to a general bias against black and Hispanic candidates, I also theorize that this bias will not be distributed equally in the electorate. In the next section, I explore my third hypothesis by taking an in-depth look at which subset of the electorate is more likely to hold biased views against minorities.
4.4 Exploring Racial Bias in the Electorate

What portions of the electorate holds racially biased perception of their minority candidates? Among what subsections of the electorate are the biases against minority candidates most prevalent? The results to this point assume that all white respondents are the same. But my theory argues that certain subsets of the population are more likely to be biased against minorities than others. In this section, I test my third hypothesis: that racial biases will especially prevalent among racially resentful segments of the population.\textsuperscript{17}

In order to examine the effect of racial attitudes on candidate evaluation, I use two of the CCES’s racial attitudes questions. Respondents are asked the following: “The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors” and “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Respondents are asked to indicate whether they “Strongly Agree” with this statement to “Strongly Disagree” with this statement, creating a 5 point ordered scale.\textsuperscript{18} I combine the answers to both these questions to produce 9 point ordered measure of racial attitudes. I then interact the race of the candidate and the respondent’s racial attitudes in the model,

\textsuperscript{17}For the purposes of illustration, the interaction models used as a basis for the plots in this section are basic OLS models.
\textsuperscript{18}While these questions focus primarily on blacks and African Americans, I argue that the responses to these questions will be able to capture general racial attitudes of the respondent.
in order to examine how respondents rate their candidates conditional on their racial attitudes. The clearest way to test my hypothesis is by looking at the marginal effects of the interaction. Capturing the marginal effects is essentially looking that the difference between the baseline group, in this case, white Democrats, and the group of interest, in this case, each racial group. Any value significantly lower than the baseline means that a white respondents see their minority candidates as significantly more liberal/less competent than white Democrats. I then plot the marginal effects of these interactions in order to visualize the whether the difference with the baseline changes at each level of racial resentment.

The results of this interaction provides very strong evidence in support of the racial resentment hypothesis. Figure 1 show the marginal effects of racial attitudes for candidates of each racial group on competence. Because the racial attitudes variable is ordered, I elected to show the marginal effects at each level of the racial attitudes variable, with a value of “1” representing positive racial attitudes and a value of “9” representing the negative racial attitudes. Thus, the graphs in Figure 1 show whether white respondents are evaluating their minority candidates differently depending on their racial attitudes.

The most noticeable pattern among each of the racial groups is that negative racial attitudes are strongly related to lower competence ratings for each race, including Asian candidates. As racial attitudes become more positive, bias against minority candidates not only disappear, it appears as though Asian candidates actually do better than their white candidates among respondents with positive racial

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19The proceeding analysis using just one of the scales produced similar results.
attitudes. For Hispanic and black candidates, the marginal effects become insignificant. These results clearly suggest that the bias in competence assessments in whites is driven largely by racial attitudes. High levels of resentment even biases respondents against all of the racial groups.

Does racial resentment also lead to a bias in ideological evaluation? Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of racial attitudes on ideology rating. Contrary to the results on competence assessments, there are no significant differences between how those with positive racial attitudes view black candidates as opposed to those with negative racial attitudes. Only those with the most negative racial attitudes see Hispanic candidates as significantly more liberal than white candidates. The marginal effects are insignificant at all all the other levels for Hispanics. The marginal effects is insignificant across all levels for Asian candidates.

Not only do these results strongly support my third hypothesis, but they also point to an asymmetry in the way the racially resentful evaluate their minority candidates. The key takeaway from these findings is that there exists strong racial biases against minority candidates among the racially resentful, and that these biases are not centered around ideological evaluations, but rather assessments of competence and an ability to perform in office. This suggests that biases against minority candidates go beyond stereotypes about ideology, but are decidedly more insidious and discriminatory. While those with negative racial attitudes might distrust white Democrats because of ideology, they distrust minority Democrats because
Table 9: Racial Resent Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Attitudes Value</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Strongly Positive</td>
<td>3.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Mixed</td>
<td>13.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - Strongly Negative</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of a perceived lack of competence.

It follows that since a significant portion of the electorate holds these negative views of minority candidates, this should translate to less support in the vote. In order to this, I return to the logit model on the vote and interacted racial resentment with race and plotted the marginal effects in Figure 3. In keeping with the racial attitudes hypothesis, the results show a persistent bias in the vote against all minority candidates among those with very negative racial attitudes. For Asians, this bias seems to be offset by Asians receiving much higher levels of white support than the baseline among those with very positive racial attitudes. These results hold to a lesser degree for blacks, and positive racial attitudes does not help Hispanic candidates in any significant way.

On the whole, the results of these interactions suggest that much of the bias in competence assessments of minority candidates comes from the racially resentful subsections of the population. These results also point to three different groups of white voters: those for whom race helps, those for whom race hurts, and those for whom race is insignificant. How large are these groups in relative terms? Table 9 shows summary statistics of white respondents and where they place on the racial attitudes scale. Those who scored the highest on this scale represent a significant portion of the sample, easily a plurality (30%). While blacks and Asians perform significantly better among respondents who are less racially resentful, those who scored 1-4 on this scale comprised of only 21% of the sample. This proportional imbalance means that any benefit minority candidates may receive from their race in the electorate is likely nullified by the sheer size of those who hold negative racial attitudes.
5 Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to combine large N data sets with contextual variables to reexamine the role of race in minority candidate evaluation in contemporary America. I posited three hypotheses - that a candidate’s race would lead to political stereotyping among whites (the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis), that racial biases would be less pervasive for some racial groups as opposed to others (the racial hierarchy hypothesis), and that racial bias will be the most prevalent among the racially resentful segments of the population (the racial resentment hypothesis). I find strong support for each of these hypotheses within the data, suggesting that not only is race still very much an issue in contemporary America, racial bias is something that afflicts each racial group in different ways.

The first and most important finding was a finding of bias in how whites see minority candidates. Whites see black and Hispanic Democrats as both more ideologically extreme and less competent than their white counterparts, even after controlling for a candidate’s actual ideology. Not only did I illustrate this bias, I also showed that these biases have a direct affect on whether whites vote for blacks or Hispanics. These results support the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis.

This study began not just as a reexamination of old studies, but as an exploration of whether Asian or Hispanic candidacies. In keeping with my racial hierarchy hypothesis, Asian Democrats seem to do significantly better than all racial groups, including whites in terms of the vote and do not suffer from the same kind of perceptual biases (ideological and competence) that afflict black and Hispanic Democrats. The results for Hispanic Democrats more closely track with the results for black Democrats, in terms of voting, ideological perception, and perception of competence, showing that both Hispanics and blacks are afflicted by similar political stereotypes. All in all, a picture of a racial hierarchy in white voting emerges, with whites and Asians on top and blacks and Hispanics at the bottom.

Race is an especially significant factor in the political calculus of racially resentful white Americans. Those who score highly on the racial resentment scale are more likely to see their minority candidates as more liberal, less competent, and are ultimately less likely to vote for their minority candidates. On the other hand, white respondents with low levels of racial resentment are significantly more receptive to their minority candidates. However, whatever benefit a minority candidate may receive from their race is likely washed out by the large proportion of white voters who are racially resentful.
To conclude, I return to the fundamental question in the study of race and ethnicity in American politics: does race matter? The answer to that question is yes, but with the caveat that it is dependent on which racial groups, what subsection of the population, and what types of candidates. It’s clear from these results that race matters for minority candidates, who still face steep obstacles when it comes to appealing to white voters. Barack Obama may have broken new ground with his election, but the obstacles that afflict minorities remain as pervasive as ever. In a “Post-Racial” America, we must not only consider whether race biases whites against minorities, but also how different subsets of the population responds to different minorities. This study is merely an important first step in understanding how race matters in a modern era. But it is very clear that race does indeed still matter.
References


