**The Virtuous Collision: Chaos and Redemption in Machiavellian *Fortuna***

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**Introduction.**

Questions of chance, change, selfhood, otherness, liberty, and identity are, from a political perspective, fundamentally questions about the relationship between agency and contingency. With the word ‘agency,’ I refer to the idea of the individual capacity to influence external events and conditions. By ‘contingency,’ I refer to the idea of external events and conditions’ capacity to influence the individual. These definitions are purposefully broad, and the boundary between the ideas I have just articulated is uncertain. One could indeed classify a range of traditions and conflicts in political thought on the basis of how each party conceptualizes the characteristics of, and relationships between, the agent and the contingent.

In this paper, I will attempt to render a sketch of what I believe to be an underexamined theory of political change, at times similar to but ultimately distinct from both Hellenistic paradigms of cyclicality and Hegelian philosophies of historical necessity or linearity. I will suggest that the most complete articulation of this theory emerges through the writing of Niccolò Machiavelli. By turning to his concept of *fortuna,* I propose, we can begin to map out a new ontology of contingency and its political value. From there, we can glean new modes of understanding and approaching circumstances that we regard as extrinsic and origin and unintended in design.

Machiavelli’s *fortuna* is not, I argue, a metonym for contingency. It is instead a function of the relationship between agency and contingency, which is fluid, interdependent, and inseverable.[[1]](#footnote-1) The theory I draw from his writing treats agency and contingency as two aspects (among infinite possible ones) within a fundamentally dynamic, plural, and ever-extensive whole. Their identities are fungible, and their boundaries are contingent upon the perspectives of political actors. In other words, whether something is a matter of agency or contingency—and the extent to which it is—is already a choice and therefore a type of action; and it is this choice, more than the ‘objective’ matter itself, that conditions further action.

Change, then, is the consequence of collisions between agency and contingency. I draw the word ‘collision’ from Machiavelli’s exhortation, in chapter 25 of *Il Principe,* to ‘strike at and collide with’ *fortuna—*the translation I offer for the two verbs that close his infamous *fortuna è donna* passage: *…batterla ed urtarla.* Machiavellian collisions, however, are non-destructive with respect to the energies and impetuses that initiate them. Instead, their impact re-forms existing modes of being; and their energy generates new ones, all without negating or abandoning their instigating forces, whose re-formation is essential to their preservation. According to such a theory, the aim of politics is creation, for which liberty serves as an essential conditioning good. States endure in service of this end through *rinnovazione* (literally, ‘renovation’ or ‘renewal,’ although as it applies to the process of political perpetuity, I will translate it as ‘redemption’), and actors are to potentiate this process by authoring, instituting, and perpetuating as many opportunities as possible for virtuous collisions: those that will realize, in new modes, the enduring *animo[[2]](#footnote-2)* of the political body.

To consider how this dynamic operates, I begin by revisiting one of Machiavelli’s best-known descriptions of the relationship between individual *virtù* and *fortuna,* given in chapter 25 of *Il Principe.[[3]](#footnote-3)* There, Machiavelli uses the verb *urtare*—often translated as ‘beat down’ or ‘kick'—to illustrate the ideal approach to *fortuna*. After considering the etymology of *urtare* and its use in the context of this passage, I challenge the conventional notion that *urtare* is meant to evoke attitudes of antipathy against or desires to dominate *fortuna.* Instead, I suggest that *urtare,* read holistically,here denotes a ‘knocking into’ or ‘colliding with’ the momentum of a contingent force. Nor, I argue, does Machiavelli present a fundamental disjunction between the *virtù* of the political agent and *fortuna* itself. *Fortuna* thus understood—as a contingent and dynamic force to be collided with, such that its strength is neither negated nor overcome, but augmented and channeled—guides us toward a more complete articulation of what I introduce as Machiavelli’s theory of involution: the perpetual process of conflict and creation that is both the genesis and the aim of political life. Political existence and experience, Machiavelli contends, preserves itself only through the continuous collision of its myriad aspects.

**Contingency and Collision.**

On how political actors are to approach *fortuna*, Machiavelli writes:

*…è meglio essere impetuoso che respettivo, perché la fortuna è donna; ed è necessario, volendola tenere sotto, batterla ed urtarla.*

Existing translations[[4]](#footnote-4) render this passage akin to the following:

…it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to hold her down, to beat her and knock her down.

Translated as closely as possible, the passage reads:

…it is better to be impetuous than cautious [or backward-looking], because *fortuna* **is woman**; and it is necessary, **wanting it to hold [or keep] under** [you, or beneath you[[5]](#footnote-5)], to **strike at it and collide with it**.

At least four differences, emphasized above in bold, should stand out to us. First is the omission of the article *una* in *fortuna è donna: fortuna* is not *a* woman; *fortuna* *is* woman. Second, while *fortuna* is woman (in this passage, albeit not frequently in Machiavelli’s writing), *fortuna* is not a ‘she’. Machiavelli’s corpus is rife with references to *fortuna*, but with very few exceptions, he assigns *fortuna* the non-sexed article *la* (‘it’), rather than *lei/le* (‘she/her’). Third, whereas conventional English translations render the clause *volendola tenere sotto* in a way that suggests *fortuna* is the object being ‘held down,’ in Machiavelli’s Italian *fortuna* is the active subject doing the holding. Fourth, the last two verbs—*battere* and *urtare—*are most faithfully translated ‘strike at’ and ‘collide with’. Below, I will elaborate on each of these differences and consider the significance they pose to our understanding of Machiavelli’s *fortuna* more generally*.* Before that, however, I want to touch on the curious relationship between *impetuoso* and *rispettivo* that Machiavelli introduces in this passage.

The most intuitive translation for *impetuoso* is also the most accurate: ‘impetuous’. In this instance, however, it would be misleading to hastily interpret ‘impetuous’ as a mere synonym for ‘reckless’ or ‘rash’. Impetuosity, as Machiavelli uses it, is hardly negligence or indolence. *D* III.11, for instance, appeals to the dormant impetuosity hidden by ‘sustain[ing] the first thrusts[[6]](#footnote-6) and with temporizing await[ing] the [proper] *tempo’;* in *Discorsi* III.45, a prudent leader, ‘having sustained the thrusts[[7]](#footnote-7)… [may then] collide with[[8]](#footnote-8) them.’ In contradistinction to the superficial impetuosity of ‘assault[ing] an enemy with fury from the first,’ the impetuosity inherent in Machiavelli’s ‘sustaining the first thrusts’ is, quite literally, the impetuosity of sustaining an impetus. *Impetuoso*’s root, *impeto,* means ‘thrust’ in Italian, and it is therefore not surprising that Machiavelli uses both *impeto* and *impetuoso,* more or less exclusively, in discussions of either *fortuna* or warfare.[[9]](#footnote-9) Machiavellian impetuosity combines prudence with industry,[[10]](#footnote-10) denoting a calculated yet swift, forceful, and proactive movement. By urging the individual to be impetuous*,* Machiavelli here charges his reader to initiate this collision: after all, *fortuna* is to be approached, even sought after, or *cacciata—‘*hunted’.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Yet to approach fortune impetuously is, in fact, to respect it. Given that fortune is portrayed as impetuous by nature,[[12]](#footnote-12) and lends itself to battle in both conduct and character, a ‘thrust’ towards fortune is indeed an imitation of fortune itself. Indeed, all of the kinetic referents in this passage—*impeto, tenere, battere,* and *urtare—*are elsewhere used to describe *fortuna’s* behaviour. What, then, should be made of the fact that Machiavelli appears to contrast *impetuoso* with *rispettivo,* in this passage?

Two points bear mentioning. For one, while Machiavelli’s *rispettivo* can certainly mean ‘respectful’ in the conventional sense, it also alludes to an air of reservation or timidity. There is, moreover, a hesitation in *rispettivo*, whose roots denote a sense of turning or looking back:[[13]](#footnote-13) *rispettivo* may thus indicate a ‘turning away’ from fortune. Second, by evoking these two apparent alternatives—respect and impetuosity—Machiavelli is in fact marking the pair as false antitheses, a practice that Victoria Khan refers to as pseudo-distinction and one that I will discuss, albeit in a new way, later on in this paper.[[14]](#footnote-14) The lexical proximity of ‘respect’ and ‘impetuosity’ in this passage highlights the incongruity between what ‘respect’ is thought to mean typically, and what a ‘respect’ for *fortuna* might demand. Recall also that, since Machiavelli uses the word *fortuna* to refer to any external actor or actant, the respect owed to *fortuna* is at once the same manner of respect owed to any entity (human or otherwise) deemed more challenging than conciliatory, or more chaotic than cooperative. To respect a force that so often materializes within the vicinity and vocabulary of battle is to form oneself in that force’s own warlike image: to adapt to its qualities, and to match its virtue or skill with one’s own.

Here another supposed contradiction emerges, although this one has less to do with Machiavelli’s own writing and more to do with his reception: is the ‘warlike’ behaviour prescribed in the passage above—*impetuoso*’s thrust, *battere*’s strike, *urtare*’s collision—not meant as a counter, rather than a complement, to the image Machiavelli presents of fortune as ‘a woman’? According to some interpretations, Machiavellian virtue is constructed precisely to *exclude* femininity, not embrace it—much less, to imitate it. Are readers then to believe that Machiavellian virtue, ostensibly ‘constructed in fierce opposition to femininity’[[15]](#footnote-15)—a quality Machiavelli allegedly finds ‘detestable’[[16]](#footnote-16)—demands fashioning one’s actions in the manner of ‘a woman’?

To begin to answer this question, we need first to revisit the claim that Machiavelli writes that ‘fortune is a woman.’ In fact, Machiavelli never writes this. What he writes is *fortuna è donna:* fortuna *is* woman*.* Italian is a particularly article-dense language—more so than English—so that, by omitting an article in the phrase *fortuna è donna,* Machiavelliis not simply being careless or taking grammatical liberties. His gesture effectively transforms the word ‘woman’ from a noun into an adjective, encouraging readers to think of *fortuna* not as *‘a* woman,’ but as something that has a woman-*like* essence (per Renaissance standards of femininity)*.* That *fortuna* has a feminine *quality,* one among many other qualities, and not a fixed female *status,* is further evinced by the fact that Machiavelli rarely refers to *fortuna* as ‘she’. The entirety of *P* 25 is no exception in this regard. As a gendered language, Italian assigns all non-sexed nouns either the masculine pronoun *il,* or the feminine pronoun *la.* (Designations as to a noun’s gender are typically made based on the letter with which the noun ends.) According to the grammar Machiavelli uses, then, *fortuna* is no more or less of a ‘she’ than the virtue*—la virtù—*that many scholars[[17]](#footnote-17) frame as its warlike, masculine foil. (As a matter of fact, while neither *fortuna* nor *virtù* are women in Machiavelli’s work, both are linguistically feminine, and both are warlike: there is not a single description of martial affairs into which *fortuna* does not figure. For both Machiavelli and his intellectual forebears, the battlefield is the arena in which *fortuna* is at once at its most potent relative to human device, yet most malleable to human action. A prince who does not ‘try the fortune of battle,’ Machiavelli claims, ‘is altogether mad,’ since to come to battle is inevitably to dare to aggrandize one’s virtue through colliding with *fortuna*.)[[18]](#footnote-18)

While *fortuna* is woman in this passage, and while *fortuna* as *a* woman was a common trope before and during Machiavelli’s time, it is not a trope that Machiavelli often uses. That he does so here is significant, for reasons that I suggest have to do with the creative potential present in collision. Depending on how we are to take the verb *tenere* and adjective *sotto* in this passage, moreover, it is possible that evoking *fortuna’s* womanlike qualities helps Machiavelli draw out this creative conceit, introducing a visual thread that readers can run between *impetuoso’s* ‘thrust’;[[19]](#footnote-19) *tenere sotto’s* ‘holding beneath’; and the collision in which this passage culminates.

*Volendola tenere sotto* has no single literal translation. Perhaps the most straightforward aspect of the phrase is that the elision *volendola* (‘wanting it’), followed by the infinitive *tenere* (‘to hold’), makes *fortuna* the agent in charge of the ‘holding’. Unfortunately, this is also the one aspect of the phrase that many translations overlook. From *volendola,* acombination of the gerund for *volere* (‘to want,’ ‘to will,’ or ‘to desire’) with *la* (‘it’), follows the infinitive *tenere,* which means either ‘to keep’ or ‘to hold’. *Sotto* has a range of meanings, but can generally be translated as ‘under’ or ‘beneath.’ A literal translation of this clause, then, would look something like ‘wanting it to keep (or hold) beneath (or under) [you]’.[[20]](#footnote-20) Here, *fortuna* is not the object being held: it is the subject doing the holding.

Given the regard Machiavelli demonstrates for *fortuna* elsewhere in his writing, *sotto,* if taken to mean ‘beneath’ or ‘below’, most likely refers not to *fortuna* capitulating to the individual’s will, but instead to its capacity to buttress the reader’s intent and augment their virtue. This is, at any rate, certainly more in keeping with Machiavelli’s claim that *fortuna* is never defeated, but ‘allows itself to be won.’[[21]](#footnote-21) Since *fortuna* is *won*, it bestows itself on the individual who knows how to profit by it; since *fortuna* *allows* itself to be won, it never loses a shred of its own power or agency in any interaction. It always falls to *fortuna* whether or not it will fulfill the individual’s desire as to where, or how, it holds itself.

Time and again, Machiavelli tells us, *fortuna* can be neither contained nor dominated,[[22]](#footnote-22) so that it is improper to suggest that Machiavelli’s *batterla ed urtarla* has anything to do with total resistance, opposition, or destruction. The entirety of Machiavelli’s tercet *Di Fortuna* refutes this interpretation; so too does *D* II.29, where Machiavelli writes that men can neither break *fortuna’s* orders nor oppose its designs. In *D* III.8, ‘those who enter upon an enterprise against *[fortuna]* come out badly,’ and in *D* III.9, readers are told that they ‘are unable to oppose’ that to with *fortuna,* via nature, ‘inclines [them]’.

Owing precisely to *fortuna’s* indomitability, it is therefore ‘necessary’ to work in the ways and to forge forward into the realm of fortune. That Machiavelli uses this term—*necessario—*when instructing the reader to proceed toward *fortuna* in a particular way; namely, striking at it and colliding with it, shows that the virtuous approach to *fortuna* is not a measure of the individual’s will or strength in its isolation. It is rather a consequence of *fortuna’s* own nature: necessity, after all (which also denotes a type of innateness or connection to something essential) is given by *fortuna.*[[23]](#footnote-23) The necessity of approaching *fortuna* in a particular mode—even and especially if that mode involves impetuosity and tumult—is therefore mandated by *fortuna* itself.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Contrary to first impressions, *battere* is not simply a cognate of ‘batter’. The sense of ‘striking at’ *fortuna,* rather than of subjecting it to sustained violence, is supported by Machiavelli’s treatment of *fortuna* in his tercets on *fortuna* and *occasione. Battere* as ‘strike’ is also evocative of what Machiavelli describes as *fortuna*’s own behavior: *fortuna* often proceeds in ‘thrusts’ *(impeti),* and on several occasions, *fortuna* is said to ‘strike’ at men.[[25]](#footnote-25) By ‘striking at’ *fortuna,* therefore, an individual effectively fashions themselves in *fortuna’s* image—something that Machiavelli elsewhere writes is essential to virtuous action and political survival.[[26]](#footnote-26)

*Urtare* derives from the noun *urto,* which refers to a physical collision between two objects. Although at times *urto* can signify a harmful blow, this is neither the exclusive nor the most extensive sense of the term. The essence of *urto* has to do with the swift and forceful product of one impetus meeting another, and of the further, mutual momentum born of that coincidence. *Battere* and *urtare* are not synonymous, but they are complementary. Whereas *battere’s* strike is quick—a movement towards a target—*urtare’s* collision is protracted: it begins at the exact moment the strike ends and endures as long as its inertia is able to produce effects. There is also an important difference in the relationship either verb defines between its subject and object. In English, this difference is best understood by considering the difference between the prepositions ‘at’ and ‘with’. When striking *at* something, there is a clear separation between subject and object: the subject possesses all the momentum of the strike until the moment of contact. When colliding *with* an object,those distinctions begin to dissolve. The boundaries between subject and object, between the role each one plays in the force of the collision, and between the power each one has over the outcome, ultimately collapse.

By translating *urtare* as ‘collide with,’ my intention is to retain the references to vigor and violence present in existing translations, while adding to them the equally critical connotations of creation, generation, and mutual, sustained momentum implicit within both *urtare* and the dynamic of *fortuna.* At the same time, I want to acknowledge the sexual conceit present within this passage—discussed at length by others—while pointing out that the *end* this conceit means to evoke is not about sex or domination as such. It is about creation. A virtuous collision with *fortuna* does not end in *fortuna’s* being overcome by or submitting to individual virtue: this would be impossible, since virtue and *fortuna* are (I propose) two involutory functions of the same relationship. As I will show later in this paper, the virtuous collision ends with birth.[[27]](#footnote-27) It is for these reasons, I argue, that in the culmination of this passage, we find the genesis of what I am calling Machiavelli’s theory of politics as involution.

**Involution.**

By ‘involution,’ I refer to a series of interconnected paradigms:**[[28]](#footnote-28)** All being is change, or flux; and all possibility is a type of energy. *A* change is an output of an involutory function, wherein multiple aspects of experience or existence ‘turn within’ one another, such that the possibility contained within each aspect bears on the way in which the other’s possibility manifests. (Put another way, the material and movement of each aspect bears on the form that the other adopts). Change is an alteration of form, not essence; and creation is an abstraction of possibility, which occurs when multiple aspects collide. Upon collision[[29]](#footnote-29)—which actuates involution[[30]](#footnote-30)—the forces of the possibilities involved are realized as one,[[31]](#footnote-31) and this ‘one’ is something new: an event, a circumstance, or a being. The process of collision renders newness. (‘Change’ and ‘newness’ are not synonyms; ‘change’ denotes a condition in which newness either is or is coming to be.) What is new is so because it has its own essence, which is derived from prior (still extant) essence.It is therefore both new and a continuation. This is not a dialectical process. There is no fundamental difference or negation between the colliding aspects, and there is no sublation or absolute achieved in the formation of the new. Neither change nor creation destroys their creators; and neither change nor creation are higher instantiations of prior being. The end of politics is to extend, in all directions, the range of the involutory functions available within the political. That is, it is to extend the possibilities of change itself.

From these precepts, we derive that collision and involution are not movements ‘toward’ freedom (or, speaking politically, liberty). Instead, their potential and their purpose are to extend infinitely, in all directions, *as* creation. Liberty is their precondition—not their end. Hence Machiavelli’s association of liberty with the freedom ‘to make experiment both of [one’s] virtue and of the power of *fortuna’[[32]](#footnote-32)—*and this with the perpetuity of a republic, conditioned by its infinite renewal *(rinnovazione),* each instantiation an example of redemption.

The way in which Machiavelli applies these paradigms politically is novel, but their intellectual tradition is vast.[[33]](#footnote-33) There is, to begin with, a strong Heraclitan tenor to the notion that being *is* change; that all action is transformation; and that no fundamental difference exists between any two entities. Writes Heraclitus: ‘Thus the composition of all things—I mean of heaven, earth, and the whole world—was structured by a single harmony through the blending of the most contrary sources’.[[34]](#footnote-34) Yet this harmony of contrarieties is hardly a peaceful one: by contrariety, all things come into being, Heraclitus insists, but adds that this process ‘which leads to generation is called war and strife.’[[35]](#footnote-35) These sentiments foreshadow Machiavelli’s emphasis on the necessity of tumults: examples of virtue ‘arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those tumults that many inconsiderately damn,’ we are told in *D* 1.4; later, Machiavelli attributes to tumults not only virtue but liberty as well.[[36]](#footnote-36) He returns at multiple junctures to reiterate his prejudice for tumult and civic discord, which he raises as a remedy to the festering insularity of factionalism. Most tellingly for our purposes, he too associates tumult with creation, writing that ‘if Rome wished to remove the causes of tumults, it [would have] removed too the causes of expansion.’[[37]](#footnote-37)

Another of Heraclitus’ contributions that will be useful in the discussion that follows is his particular notion of opposition, which is distinct from Pythagorean opposition. The latter describes a relationship of fundamental disjunction, in which one entity cannot become the other entity; or (as in the case of odd and even numbers) one cannot become the other without ceasing to be, essentially, what marked it as ‘opposite’. Heraclitan opposites, on the other hand, exist in a relationship of distinction without difference: they are mutually interdependent, able to interact with and transform one another. As I will discuss below, this is the same sort of relationship that enjoins the entities Machiavelli chooses to involve (that is, to set into involution).[[38]](#footnote-38)

From this it follows that ‘involution’ is not merely a word that describes the relationship between individual virtue[[39]](#footnote-39) and *fortuna.* As a theory, it is fundamental to Machiavelli’s political thought—but it also takes the form of a literary device in his writing. It is one of several textual techniques through which Machiavelli illustrates the conceptual aspects of his political thought rhetorically. Literary involution, a sort of lexical sleight-of-hand trick that Machiavelli uses to suggest that two concepts exist in a relationship of involution, occurs as a multi-step rhetorical process: first, Machiavelli introduces two seemingly heterogeneous concepts—Heraclitan opposites—in tandem with one another. Often, he does so in such a way that both appear in the same rhetorical breath; that is, very near one another in the text, if not within the same clause. (He usually hints at these relationships by situating the same pair of concepts together at multiple junctures in his work; so that each accompanies the other almost as a rule. This is the case, for instance, with the concepts *virtù* and *fortuna).* Next, Machiavelli articulates these concepts further but shuffles their terms, implying that there is some subtle similarity or fungibility between their boundaries. In more complex instances of involution, this occurs over the course of several pages or even chapters, as Machiavelli attributes to one concept a set of characteristics or conditions that he elsewhere attributes to the other. Generally, this takes place through an inversion of the terms themselves or of their respective functions: in *D* II.29 and II.30, for example, Machiavelli rattles off a litany of events and causes that he there ascribes to *fortuna,* but whose particulars are at other points associated with human action or *virtù.* The final step of literary involution occurs when Machiavelli reveals that the involved concepts ultimately operate as two aspects of a plural and dynamic whole, whose own aspects are shared and whose relationship is, as I have said, one of distinction without difference. Typically, Machiavelli does this by attributing a new event or condition to both concepts. The purpose of this device is to show readers that in all relations of seeming opposition, real or imagined—each can be discovered to ‘turn within’—informing and re-forming—the other.

In the first stage of this process, Machiavelli gestures toward the involution of two apparently antagonistic aspects or qualities together by playing off their textual proximity. Wayne Rebhorn, who also believes this juxtaposition is intentional but argues it serves a different purpose, points out that the headings of several of *Il Principe’s* most controversial chapters are rife with strategically-situated opposites: fear and love, liberality and miserliness, cruelty and mercy, principality and republic.[[40]](#footnote-40) Chapter headings, however, are hardly the only or even the most fruitful place we might look. One very compact example of how the entire process of literary involution plays out can be found in Machiavelli’s discussion of humanity and bestiality in *P* 18. When Machiavelli first introduces the pair, they are in stark opposition and their position appears static: ‘…there are two generations of combat,’ he writes: ‘one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts…’. Immediately, however, Machiavelli moves into the second stage of involution, introducing a necessary relationship between the two concepts that sets both in motion *toward* one another but leaves each one separate *from* the other: ‘…but because the first many times does not suffice, one must have recourse to the second. Therefore, for a prince it is necessary to know well how to use the beast and the man.’ This is not, however, the end of the matter. Very quickly, Machiavelli reveals that it is possible for humanity and bestiality not only to be *used* co-extensively, but to *be* two parts of one more complex entity: ‘Achilles and many of the other ancient princes were given to be raised by Chiron the centaur,’ he goes on, ‘so that under his discipline he would look after them.’ After admonishing princes to look after their own people by using recourse both to humane laws and to bestial force, Machiavelli turns to the matter of what sort of discipline should guide the prince—and renders the same verdict: the prince’s own guiding faculty, the character with which he governs and ‘tames’ *himself,* should be as a centaur is—both human and bestial. A prince should have *both natures,* Machiavelli suggests, with respect both to himself and to others; and he should ‘know how to use one and the other nature; and the one without the other is not lasting.’

‘One without the other is not lasting’ describes all involutory relations in Machiavelli’s work—because politics itself, without involution, is not lasting. Above, the involution of man and beast, embodied within Chiron the centaur, created ‘many… ancient princes’; and his likeness, Machiavelli tells us, should continue to condition the nature of the present-day prince. With such a nature, the prince might be able to cultivate and keep his state—else he, and it, risk being ruined.

Yet ruin, too, is for Machiavelli involved with its opposite: perpetuity. The literary involution of these concepts takes place four times in Machiavelli’s *Discorsi,* some of which I will discuss below. *Remedio,* or ‘remedy,’ also often appears in tandem with ruin at many critical points, often as a more concrete actant toward perpetuity, which always exists in adjectival form (as *perpetua)—*an ever-*possible* state—in the *Discorsi.* What both ruin and perpetuity are involved *in* is the enterprise at the heart of the work: *rinnovazione,* the redemption of a republic through the creation of new modes and orders. *Rinnovazione,* Machiavelli tells us,the only means through which a republic can aim at perpetuity, comes through creating new forms that bring further life to the republic. *Rinnovazione* does not destroy a republic. It redeems it: extending its life indefinitely, giving form to the material that contingency—necessity, present conditions, and all time up until this point—presents it. In other words, *rinnovazione-*as-redemption is creation that begets further creation.

There is, however, a type of ruin *(rovina)* within the perpetuity, and a type of perpetuity within the ruin, necessary to a republic’s redemption. In *D* III.17, Machiavelli writes that ‘because one cannot give a certain remedy for such disorders that arise in republics, it follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways.’ Note that Machiavelli does not write that it is impossible for there to be a perpetual republic. He writes that it is impossible to *order* one. One cannot order, in a republic’s beginnings, a rigid set of institutions and laws that will preserve it indefinitely. One *can,* however, order things so that ‘by *means of their orders* [they] can often be renewed,’[[41]](#footnote-41) embedding within their very institutions mechanisms for potentially infinite re-creation. This is the source of the value Machiavelli finds in Rome’s disunity and of the necessity he sees their tumults, so that ‘every day, new necessities were discovered for managing Rome’ that made it ‘necessary to create new orders.’[[42]](#footnote-42) It is also one of the infinite advantages inherent in the ‘experiments of fortune’ that Machiavelli commends in *D* III.31. Republics ‘do not last if they do not renew themselves,’ he continues; and ‘the mode of renewing them is, as was said, to lead them back toward their beginnings.’[[43]](#footnote-43) Here we see that renewal is not strictly progressive, although it is not reactionary either. To ‘lead [a thing] back toward [its] beginnings’ does not simply mean to start over with a zero-degree state: it means to return to the *particular* purpose—the *animo—*that incepted it, restoring its legacy and reviving its ‘ancient liberty’ (*D* I.40). Machiavellian renewal, as redemption, refers to a peculiar type of radicality—one that yields new life from ancient roots.

Later in the third book of the *Discorsi,* Machiavelli clarifies that it is, indeed, this process of redemptive *rinnovazione* that makes perpetuity a possibility. ‘[I]f a republic were so happy that it often had one who with his example might renew the laws, and not only restrain it from running to ruin but pull it back,’ he writes, ‘it would be perpetual’.[[44]](#footnote-44) To illustrate how this occurs—and to give an example of the destruction and ruin involved inredemption—Machiavelli turns to Lucius Junius Brutus, ‘father of Roman liberty’.[[45]](#footnote-45)

**Experiments of Fortune.**

Brutus also serves as a compelling example of what it means to collide with *fortuna,* and therefore how, according to a theory of politics as involution, the involution of agency and contingency potentiates liberty and redemption. First, however, it will help to explain in a bit more detail how Machiavelli understands the process of change and signals it lexically.

On its most general level, Machiavelli describes the process of change in terms of form *(forma)* and material *(materia).* Material can be thought of as givenness—the inherently dynamic amalgamation of external factors that condition experience. Form, on the other hand, is a particular, situationally-contingent, and transient instantiation of material. Whereas material is perceived as having been ‘given,’ form is perceived as something created, or worked,[[46]](#footnote-46) from that givenness. Machiavelli highlights the interplay between these two aspects in the same way that he illustrates the involution of Heraclitan opposites: as a rule, he nearly always situates the words *forma* and *materia* near and in reference to the other in a way that reflects the creative capacity potentiated by their shared essence. One of the better-known instances of this strategy occurs in *P* 26,where Machiavelli writes that in Italy ‘there is material that [gives] occasion to anyone prudent and virtuous to introduce a form there.’ By this, Machiavelli suggests that individuals are best capable of forming the material given them when they recognize that material as occasion *(occasione)*—its specific utility toward their chosen end. Before the more tangible transformation of material into form, then, there is a conceptual transformation that takes place in the mind of the agent who recognizes the corresponding potential of that material and their virtue to form it in a way that serves them. In the process of that recognition, material transforms into occasion.

Often, Machiavelli maps out how and to what end these conceptual transformations take place by engaging in perspectival shifts: that is, he refers to the same event or set of conditions with two distinct types of words, depending on whose perspective he is inhabiting. This process is akin to the second stage of literary involution described earlier: to describe how an event or condition appears at one point or to one group, Machiavelli uses a word he has relegated to the purview of contingency (such as *tempo, materia, accidente,* or *necessità);* at another point or with respect to another group, he refers to the same condition using a word that he relates to agential action (such as *modo, forma, occasione,* or *opportunità).* For example, in *D* III.44, lack of ‘space to deliberate’ is referred to as *opportunità* (opportunity) as it applies to the individual who creates, or takes advantage of, this lack of space and uses it against their opponent in battle. Shifting to the opponent’s perspective, however, Machiavelli refers to this same lack of space as *necessità* (necessity)*:*

‘[W]hen one prince desires to obtain a thing from another individual, if the *opportunity* allows he ought not to give him *space to deliberate,* and ought to act so that he sees the *necessity* of a quick decision.’[[47]](#footnote-47)

Both here and elsewhere, Machiavelli reveals that necessity and opportunity are of precisely the same material and can be distinguished only according to the manner in which they are formed by individual perception or action—not by the externalities of fortune, which do no more than materialize these conditions. Change, then, requires action; but more specifically, it requires a particular type of action: perception.

This dynamic is also at play in the case of Brutus, who introduced (or, as Machiavelli puts it, fathered) liberty in Rome—initiating the dawn of the republic—after deposing the last of its early tyrants, Tarquinius Superbus. Prior to Brutus’ actions, Rome had no memory of liberty; yet, Machiavelli writes, the Tarquin family ‘had already disposed the spirits of all Romans to rebellion whenever they would have occasion for it.’[[48]](#footnote-48) The phrasing—whenever *they would have* occasion for it, and not, for instance, ‘whenever occasion would come’—suggests that whether one has occasion or not is more a matter of one’s own willingness than it is of pure chance. Machiavelli goes on: ‘If the accident of Lucretia had not come, as soon as another had arisen it would have brought the same effect.’ Again, note how *occasion* is *had (by* the agent)*,* while the *accident* of Lucretia *comes (to* the agent)*.*

By the ‘accident of Lucretia,’ Machiavelli is referring to the suicide of a Roman plebian girl, Lucretia, who in Livy’s history of Rome stabs herself after being raped by Tarquinius’ son Sextus. This is another point at which cognates are not helpful: The Italian *accidente,* derived from the verb *accadere,* ‘to happen,’ is not a synonym for ‘mistake’. It is, quite literally, something that happens. In *D* II. 29, Machiavelli even attributes ‘accidents’ (a more accurate translation for which might be ‘happenings’) to *fortuna*. Elsewhere he characterizes ‘accidents’ as things that are unexpected, ‘unforeseen,’ and ‘extraordinary’.[[49]](#footnote-49) From the perspective of the Roman people, then, Machiavelli refers to Lucretia’s rape and death as an accident, or a happening. One sentence later, shifting to the perspective of Sextus (the perpetrator), he calls it an error.

To Brutus, however, Lucretia’s death becomes an occasion.

Leading up to the event, Brutus, Machiavelli explains, had been working in deliberate proximity to the Tarquins, feigning loyalty in order

to be less observed and to have more **occasion** for crushing the kings and liberating his own fatherland whenever **opportunity** would be given him. That he thought of this may be seen, first, in the interpreting of the oracle of Apollo, when he **simulated** **falling** so as to **kiss the earth**, judging that through this he would **have the gods favorable** to his thoughts, and afterward, when over the dead Lucretia he was the first among her father and husband and other relatives to **draw the knife** from the wound and to **make the bystanders swear** that they would never endure that in the **future** anyone should reign in Rome.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Above, Machiavelli gives two examples of how Brutus collides with contingency—both in very physical, tactile ways—toward the purpose of ‘liberating his fatherland’. First, Brutus feigns insanity, as Machiavelli points out in the heading of *D* III.2, *in tempo,* or ‘in accordance with the times’: striking at the earth (which, traditionally, was simultaneously the realm of natural necessity and a conduit toward communion with the divine: both areas thought to eclipse human agency)—and then *kissing* it. There is hardly a more concrete and yet concise example of what it means to be both impetuous and respectful toward *fortuna—*hearkening back to the involution between *impetuoso* and *rispettivo* introduced in *P* 25. In this case, Brutus even initiates a literal collision with the simulation of falling.

The second collision, however, is even more transformational. The advent of the Roman republic, which begins when Brutus’ hand hits the hilt of a knife, initiates Rome’sredemption,drawing it ‘back to its beginnings’ by ‘recover[ing] the liberty of Rome’.[[51]](#footnote-51) The act involves ruin[[52]](#footnote-52)—Lucretia’s and the Tarquins’—with the perpetual promise of the Roman people to ‘never endure that in the future anyone should reign in Rome.’ (Further ruin awaits Brutus’ sons, who threaten to become tyrants themselves and are executed by their father’s own command in the subsequent chapter. On this, Machiavelli writes ‘that it is necessary to kill the sons of Brutus if one wishes to maintain a newly acquired liberty,’ explaining: ‘This will always be known by those who read of ancient things: that after a change of state… a memorable execution against the enemies of present conditions is necessary.’)[[53]](#footnote-53)

Brutus’ actions also change the very fabric of this event from accident to opportunity. At the moment that Brutus physically seizes upon the accident’s most proximate cause—the knife, which he draws from Lucretia’s wound—he transforms the significance of her death: no longer is it yet another casualty of the Tarquins’ tyranny. It is becomes the birth of Roman liberty. The bystanders, too, are transformed in the oath they swear to live as the guardians of and heirs to that liberty. Yet perhaps no one is more powerfully transformed through this episode than Brutus himself—the nephew of Tarquinius himself; and now the ‘father of Roman liberty’.

It is also interesting that both of Brutus’ collisions deal with two distinct categories of contingency: that attributed to divine or natural causes; and that attributed to human actions. A closer look, however, reveals that the divine is invoked in both cases: first as a force of contingency; second as a touchstone for agency. In the first instance, motivated by a desire to ‘have the gods favourable to his thoughts,’ the interpretation of a divinely-decreed future provokes Brutus’ actions. In the second, Brutus induces the people to swear an oath—decreeing the course of their own futures to, and on behalf of, the gods. Here we can get an even deeper sense of *fortuna’s* scope: that it is neither will, nor chance, nor human, nor god—but rather a force that, if struck at and collided with, can make humans god-like.

By examining these episodes, we can also get a better glimpse of how Machiavelli understands and articulates the essence, value, and necessity of change, vis-à-vis involution. For Machiavelli, every action upon *fortuna* is a transformation of *fortuna’s* material, and it is thus a transformation of *fortuna* itself. Hence the agent, in their approach to contingency, forms the quality of their own *fortuna.* What is more, as we have seen above, in colliding with contingency the agent takes on those powers that Machiavelli initially relegates to the realm of *fortuna:* the power to create necessity, for instance; or the power to modify opportunity so that it becomes occasion; or the power to dictate the qualities of the times. This is why Machiavelli feels able to declare that individual ‘glory can be acquired in any action whatever.’[[54]](#footnote-54)

Finally, we also have some hint of how a theory of politics as involution understands itself metaphysically and normatively. Considering the questions—‘what is the purpose of politics, or of the political? How should political agents, human or institutional, order themselves and their actions toward that purpose?’—what answers can we expect such a theory to give? One is that change is inevitable, and that while (or indeed because) change has no end, it is the responsibility of agents to use that change toward *their* end. Machiavelli teases his readers with the possibility of a perpetual republic—but he does not trick them. Perpetuity, he explains, comes from the creation of new orders—orders that provide for their own renewal.[[55]](#footnote-55) Anything that accelerates change, then, has the potential to serve this end, if it is used well. Tumults are among the most beneficial of these accelerants; so, too, the pursuit of ambition and the reward of merit, so long as both pursuit and reward are open to everyone.[[56]](#footnote-56) Political longevity is achieved only through the consequent tumults of the collisions between apparently antagonistic orders, modes, and the disparate ends of a state’s diverse actors. In other words, there is no ‘end’ at which involution aims—it is its own end. Be that as it may, involution is not entropic. A ‘virtuous collision’ imbues involution with the life-giving and sustaining purpose—*animo—*necessary to animate involution itself. Without virtue (the unification of proper motives and salutary outcomes) political involution ultimately stagnates and both the political body and *animo* become corrupt *(corrotto):[[57]](#footnote-57)* literally, broken; torn from itself; unable to move.

So it is that collisions themselves must perpetually be renewed. For this reason, Machiavelli argues, republics are longer-lived than principalities, ‘for [a republic] can accommodate itself better than one prince to the diversity of temporal [things] through the diversity of the citizens that are in it.’[[58]](#footnote-58)Of course, a principality can enjoy just as much diversity among its subjects as a republic can. What distinguishes the two, as it bears on their longevity, is diversity of purposive action, or what Machiavelli calls ‘mode[s] of proceeding’.[[59]](#footnote-59) So that it does not ‘of necessity come to ruin,’ Machiavelli writes, a city should be ‘armed and ordered’ such that ‘every day it falls to its citizens, both in particular and in public, to make experiment both of their virtue and the power of *fortuna’.*[[60]](#footnote-60) Experiments of fortune (and therefore virtue) are, by definition, infinite extensions of possibility. Since virtue and *fortuna* exist in a relationship of involution, each one conditions and is conditioned by the other, such that neither is ever static. What is more, the collision inherent in their relationship is always-already creative, so that by operating according to infinite citizens’ infinite experiments of virtue and *fortuna—*infinite trials of one and the other’s possibility—the Machiavellian republic has the potential to be endlessly dynamic, tumultuous, creative, and redemptive. It is a self-generating mechanism of creation through collision.

That Machiavelli urges this sort of creation, even in the interest of perpetuating a republic’s life by drawing it back to its beginnings, suggests that neither change nor conservation is quite what it seems. Perpetuity involves both.

By this account, then, we might say that the ultimate purpose of political action is to never arrive at anything ultimate. It is to create in a way that begets further creation. By this same account, we might also say that as far as politics is concerned, the type of creation ‘that begets further creation’ comes from the involution of continuity and change. This is a non-annihilative change—it is change, with a memory. Impelled by the collective energy of all the collisions that bore it, the charge of involution is to extend ever outward the realm of political possibility.

1. Just as many scholars leave Machiavelli’s *virtù* in its Italian form to distinguish it from conventional conceptions of virtue, I leave Machiavelli’s *fortuna* as is for similar reasons. *Fortuna* is not the ‘fortune’ of Machiavelli’s contemporaries, his predecessors, or our own concepts of ‘pure chance’. Rather than regarding it as an external force, it is more helpful to think of *fortuna* as a relationship. Doing so removes *fortuna* from the realm of the arcane, antiquated, or make-believe and turns it into a question that political science continues to grapple with today. Indeed, it turns *fortuna* into what is arguably the political question itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Machiavelli’s *animo,* often translated as ‘spirit’,is distinct from the Hegelian concept of spirit, or *geist,* in that Machiavelli’s *animo* is not necessarily an all-encompassing term. Diverse states, peoples, and individuals have particular *animi,* and often harbor multiple ones simultaneously. Like the English word ‘animus,’ *animo* also denotes a sense of purpose or intent: *animo* is that internal Reason which ‘animates’ an agent to act in a given way. Unlike *spirito* (which Machiavelli uses, albeit far more rarely), *animo* also does not seem to refer to anything transcendental or universal. If *animo* is an extension of *spirito,* it is a particularized manifestation thereof, changeable and reconstituted according to individual intent. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Citations of Machiavelli’s writings will take the following format: references from *Il Principe* will be written as *P*[chapter]; references from *I Discorsi,* as *D*[book.chapter]; references from the poem *Di Fortuna,* as DF. The passage mentioned above occurs in *P* 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See, for example: *The Prince,* trans. Peter Bondanella. Oxford University Press, 1998; *The Prince and Other Writings,* trans. Wayne Rebhorn. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003; *The Prince,* trans. Harvey Mansfield. Chicago: UChicago Press, 1998; [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Because of the way this clause is constructed, it is unclear whether Machiavelli means ‘under you,’ or just ‘under’ (or ‘soft’). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Impeti* [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Impeto* [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Urtare.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. It is no coincidence that warfare is, both within and without the Machiavellian corpus, the realm in which fortune is thought to be at its most potent, and where individual virtue must match, rather than rely on, fortune’s arms. Warfare is also employed as a common canonical conceit for fortune’s harsh and unyielding nature. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See *D* III.11. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See D III.8, 9, 10, 12, and DF for the use of *cacciare.* Hunts are also called ‘an image of war’ in III.39. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. DF; D III.31 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Drawn from the Latin roots *ri-* (again)and *spett-* (to look). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See: Ascoli, Albert Russell, and Victoria Ann Kahn. *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993. Pseudodistinction is discussed on pp. 204-208. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Snyder, R. Claire. “Citizenship and Civic Practices” in *Feminist Interpretations,* pp. 213-246 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Smith, John J. “Beyond Virtù” in *Feminist Interpretations,* pp. 287-308 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. For a review of these alternate perspectives, see Clarke, Michelle Tolman. "On the Woman Question in Machiavelli." *The Review of Politics* 67, no. 2 (2005): 229-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. D III.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. It is also worth noting that *fortuna* is generally the one, in Machiavelli’s work, doing the thrusting. Outside of this passage, *impeto* is a word Machiavelli usually reserves for either the behavior either *fortuna* or military affairs—the arena in which *fortuna* was conventionally believed to be strongest. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Among *sotto*’s other connotations are its qualities of softness, gentleness, subtlety, and quiet. I would certainly invite interpretations that incorporate these elements as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Later in the same passage. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See also D III.10 and III.11 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See DF, D III.8, III.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. By admonishing readers of the necessary roughness thus demanded from a relationship with fortune, Machiavelli also recalls the counter-intuitive symbiosis between impetuosity and respect alluded to prior: it is now clear that, at least in some cases, when Machiavelli presents the appearance of a rhetorical or logical opposition, he follows it with a swift and subtle nuance to suggest that ‘in everything there is something of its opposite.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See, for example, *D* II.29; *D* III.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *D* III.7 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Almost as a rule, Machiavelli uses the verb *nascere* (‘to be born’) when referring explicitly to events or ideas that result from interactions between virtue and fortune. (Most English renditions of Machiavelli’s work will gloss *nascere* as *arise,* so that it is difficult to parse this effect in translation.) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. **This phrasing is my own. While I am drawing these as the theoretical implications of Machiavelli’s work, they are its implications as I understand them and would develop them.**  [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Collision is akin to an infinite ‘middle-voice’ moment; in the quasi-mathematical analogy above, collision is similar to the moment of ‘performing’ a function with respect to a chosen variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. More specifically, each collision generates a unique involutory dynamic [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. In a previous draft, I wrote that their force ‘becomes’ one. This is not as accurate. Each force is theoretically distinct. The force of their collision itself, however, acts as *a* force. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *D* III.43 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See also Buckels, Christopher (2016). “The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s *Theaetetus.” Phronesis* 61 (3): 243–259. These views are also resonant with many Epicurean and Stoic teachings, including the writings of Seneca, who was one of the better-known Stoic writers during Machiavelli’s era and likely the only Stoic whom Machiavelli could read, fluently, in his original language (Latin). There is strong evidence that the Stoic, and particularly Senecan, influence on Machiavelli’s theory rivals that of the Epicureans and Lucretius. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Graham, Daniel (2010). *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy.* Cambridge University Press,p. 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Graham, p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *D* I.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *D* I.6; later in the same chapter, ‘If someone wishe[s], therefore, to order a republic… to expand like Rome in dominion and in power… it is necessary to order it like Rome and make a place for tumults and universal dissensions, as best one can’. In *D* I.17, ‘This lack of corruption—men having a good end—was the cause that the infinite tumults in Rome did not hurt and indeed helped the republic.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. I realize that I run a risk by using a word that already has an everyday valence, as I have used it here, to discuss the process of involution. I only do so in hopes of clarifying, in an extremely mundane way, what it is I am actually talking about when I write about this process. The commonplace sense of the word ‘involve’ is, in fact, precisely the type of relationship I am referring to when I write about relations of involution. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Just as *fortuna* should not be thought of as a metonym for contingency as such, but rather as a function of the relationship between agency and contingency, so too should virtue. Both describe distinct functions of the same relationship. Virtue is whatever of that relationship, or of the effects it creates, I attribute to *myself. Fortuna* is whatever of that relationship, or of the effects it creates, I attribute to external causes. This is partly why I have argued elsewhere that Machiavellian *virtù* is a ‘double-ended’ concept, in that it describes the unification of good intentions with effective outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Rebhorn, “Introduction.” [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *D* III.1. See also *D* I.49: ‘Notwithstanding the many laws that were ordered [in Rome] by Romulus first, then by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius and Severus, and last by the ten citizens created for like work, nonetheless new necessities in managing that city were always discovered, and it was necessary to create new orders… that helped keep Rome in liberty for the time that it lived in liberty’; later, ‘Thus, seeing that in Rome, ordered by itself and by so many prudent men, every day new causes emerged for which it had to make new orders in favour of a free way of life, it is not marvelous if in other cities that have a more disordered beginning so many difficulties emerge that they are never able to reorder themselves.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *D* I.49 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *D* III.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *D* III.22 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *D* III.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Operare,* ‘to work,’ also appears frequently in reference to how individuals create form from material; *nascere,* ‘to be born,’ is often used in reference to the product of this work. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *D* III.44, emphases added [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *D* III.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *D* III.6 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *D* III.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *D* III.1, *D* III.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. A few sentences on in this episode, Machiavelli uses the word *rovine* several times in reference to the hypothetical ruin that Brutus risked by positioning himself so close to Sextus, concluding that it was necessary in order ‘to recover the liberty of Rome’. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *D* III.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *D* III.43 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *D* III.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. See *D* II.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See especially D III.22, III.27, III.30. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. *D* III.9 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *D* III.31 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)