Strategic Compassion: The Determinants of U.S. International Emergency Aid after Natural Disasters[1]

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Abstract: Why do states offer international emergency aid to other states after they experience natural disasters? An interesting puzzle in international relations is why states routinely offer aid to other states, including hostile states, after they endure the effects of natural disasters. One could argue that international emergency aid is granted on an altruistic basis in response to emergent crises to alleviate suffering, provide food and shelter for affected citizens, and enable the reconstruction of key infrastructure in a disaster stricken state. However, recent research suggests that aid might be given to disaster stricken states for strategic purposes – even if little is known about what the donor state hopes to achieve through their offers of assistance. This paper aims to contribute to this debate through the introduction of a model of 'strategic compassion', where states pledge aid to hostile states in order to exert pressure on their government and because it offers better value for money than comparable gestures to states that already support the donor state. This paper tests this contention through quantitative analysis of the determinants of U.S. international emergency aid after natural disasters, finding that as disagreement between the donor and the prospective recipient state in the U.N. General Assembly increases, so does the amount of aid provided by the U.S. to the stricken state. These results lend support to the theory of 'strategic compassion' in the U.S. provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters.

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In 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, killing at least 84.5000 people, and another 2.4 million people lost their homes (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2011; Nelson 2010). The international community immediately responded with pledges of financial assistance, resources, and trained disaster response teams to the stricken government to assist them with their recovery. The United States was among the donors, despite strained diplomatic relations with the Myanmar regime after the Junta claimed U.S. involvement in anti-government movements, while the U.S. increased diplomatic and economic sanctions on Myanmar in 2007. The Military Junta initially refused some offers of assistance despite the obvious humanitarian need in the communities affected by the cyclone (Nelson 2010). The international community was quick to condemn the regime, and Laura Bush (2008) contended:

> If they don't accept aid from the United States and from all the rest of the international community that want to help the people of Burma, it's just another way that the military regime looks so cut off and so unaware of what the real needs of their people are.

Considering the adversarial relationship between the U.S. and the Myanmar military regime, why did the U.S. offer assistance? More generally, why do states offer international emergency aid to other states after they experience natural disasters?

Although humanitarian objectives certainly play a role in influencing the provision of aid, this paper argues that states pursue policies of 'strategic compassion'. Strategic compassion refers to a practice where states donate international emergency aid to exert influence on the recipient state in addition humanitarian incentives. I argue that there are two reasons why states pursue policies of strategic compassion. First, states might pledge aid to states they disagree with in order to exert pressure on the recipient state's regime by forcing them to either accept the possibility of domestic political costs if they accept the aid and back down from previous threats with the donor state (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007); or refuse the assistance and face the prospect of

facing domestic unrest in response to their policies, a possible threat to their control of power in their state. This gesture is relatively risk-free, as the occurrence of the natural disaster means that it is not perceived as hostile, and the donor state bears little liability beyond bearing the actual costs of the gesture, as long as the offer of assistance is not measly.

Second, offers of assistance to hostile states offer a potentially better return on the investment for the donor than those to states that already support them. In other words, any offer of assistance to a state that does not agree with the donor present an opportunity for improved relations between the states, an outcome that would be particularly rewarding as the result of a relatively small gesture of goodwill after the natural disaster. A donor state has much less to gain from the donation of international emergency aid to states that already support it, and with whom they share a friendly relationship. As such, the strategic provision of international emergency aid to hostile states makes financial and strategic sense through the concept of marginal utility.

Although other studies have used complex humanitarian emergencies[2] to demonstrate that states act out of purely humanitarian incentives (Everett 2015), focusing on natural disasters has distinct advantages. Complex emergencies are endogenous to both the donor and the recipient state as actions by both governments create the conditions for the emergency. Although natural disasters are not truly exogenous, their onset is independent of both states, even if the consequences are a function of disaster risk reduction practices in the affected state. Accordingly, natural disasters present a better window on state behavior during humanitarian crises that are more exogenous to the donor and recipient states than complex humanitarian emergencies.

[2] Everett (2015: 5) defined a complex humanitarian emergency as, "An episode of political violence that severely and extensively disrupts civilian life, and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to effectively shield the population (or facilitate outside efforts to do so)."

As the largest donor of international emergency aid (Van Belle, Rioux and Potter 2004; Fink and Redaelli 2011; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014), the United States represents an ideal case to test the determinants of the provision of international emergency aid. This paper suggests that these strategic incentives motivate offers of aid from the U.S. after natural disasters in states with which it does not share affinity. The paper tests this inference through an analysis of the determinants of U.S. international emergency aid after natural disasters. The results of the analysis lend support to the notion of 'strategic compassion', where the U.S. is more likely to provide aid to states it does not typically agree with than to states with whom they have more in common.

This paper is structured in six parts. It starts with a review of the literature surrounding the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters, suggesting four possible motivations behind these gestures: humanitarian objectives, national security objectives, economic incentives, and domestic political incentives. Second, I outline the theory of strategic compassion as the motivation for the provision of international emergency aid. Third, the paper outlines the empirical strategy, providing the hypotheses for the analysis. Fourth, I introduce the variables and the methods employed in the analysis. Fifth, the results are presented, which find that the allocation of international emergency aid is contingent on a combination of strategic and humanitarian incentives. Finally, the paper discusses the results and the implications of the findings for the study of international relations, before concluding with some areas for future research.

Determinants of International Emergency Aid after Natural Disasters

In recent years, scholars have paid more attention to aid as a foreign policy tool. For instance, critics of official developmental assistance [O.D.A.] argue that foreign aid has not been

effective at achieving its developmental goals (Moyo 2010), partially because it is vulnerable to governmental corruption and negligence (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 2009), and it can have the effect of solidifying the economic and political power of (frequently pernicious) governmental elites (Bauer 1981; Smith 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009), and can even prolong civil conflict (Narang 2015). Critics of O.D.A. suggest that the aid is often given for ulterior motives, and not simply to encourage "economic growth or greater provision of health or education" (Tierney et al. 2011: 1893). Instead, aid has often been granted conditionally on the basis that the state might directly change certain policies, or with the intention that the aid might buy some goodwill from the recipient state.

However, little attention has been given to international emergency aid as a foreign policy tool. At first glance, international emergency aid could be considered to differ from O.D.A. in that it is granted on an altruistic basis in response to crises that emerge as humanitarian catastrophes. As such, international emergency aid could be provided in accordance with broad imperatives to alleviate suffering, provide food and shelter for affected citizens, and enable the reconstruction of key infrastructure in a disaster-stricken state. The generosity of states after disasters might simply be a function of humanitarian norms that trump strategic incentives (Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Everett 2015). However, others argue that aid might be given to disaster stricken states for strategic purposes (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Fink and Redaelli 2011).

The literature about international emergency aid is small and still in the early stages of development, but it is already evident that any one single explanation is insufficient to account for state behavior after natural disasters. The decision-making processes among various branches of government in response to overseas natural disasters are likely to be particularly complex,

especially as they attempt to rapidly prepare an appropriate response for an event about which they do not yet possess much information. It is also likely to involve trade-offs between what and how much aid to provide, the needs of the disaster-stricken state, the likely domestic and international benefits for them, and the possible consequences if they get the decision wrong in the eyes of domestic and international observers.

In the spirit of Sil and Katzenstein (2010b), I review different theoretical explanations for patterns of state behavior after natural disasters using the concept of analytic eclecticism. This approach has the benefit of acknowledging competing motivations behind the provision of international emergency aid using a "multiperspectival mode of social inquiry" (Bohman 2002: 502). The provision of foreign aid, and international emergency aid in particular, fits neatly within this multidimensional approach to international politics. Several reasons have emerged from previous scholarship about why states might provide foreign aid to other states after they have been affected by natural disasters, although it is likely that a combination of reasons dictate state policy after these events.

Humanitarian Objectives

One motivation for the provision of international emergency aid is humanitarian objectives, where states provide aid to other states on the basis of need for normative concern for people affected by the natural disaster. Fundamentally, humanitarian aid is designed to improve the quality of life in developing countries, for instance "by means of economic growth or greater provision of health or education" (Tierney et al. 2011: 1893). International emergency aid is designed to give stricken states relief from the natural disaster, and assist their efforts at recovery so that they can continue to experience economic growth and find success in broad developmental objectives.

Donors might still aim to maximize the impact of their generosity. For example, Sweden prioritized donating O.D.A. to Southern Africa, a region where visible effects could be seen, and their money was more cost-effective than alternative projects (Lumsdaine 1993; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998: 316). As such, although humanitarian concerns might necessitate the aid, donors might also attempt to work in areas where progress is possible. If this is the case, donors might seek to give aid to those most desperately in need, as their donations might have greater effects.

International emergency aid does not have associated benefits for the donor. States might value international status, legitimacy and reputation, and they might provide aid for humanitarian reasons in the expectation that this will be recognized by other states. A state could cultivate a reputation for philanthropy and project soft power through providing humanitarian assistance (Nye 1990). In such a manner, states might be motivated to provide international emergency aid for humanitarian purposes, in the expectation that they would receive credit for providing the money to the state in need.

National Strategic Incentives

National strategic incentives might also explain international emergency aid donations, as "foreign policy choices, including foreign aid allocations, are…strategic choices focused on pursuing security through power" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004: 9). These strategic choices reflect geopolitical imperatives, where the provision of aid by foreign governments is "inseparable from power" as "politics is the governing factor, not an incidental factor which can be dispensed with" (Liska 1960: 15). This argument was adapted by Brown and Opie, who had earlier argued that "foreign assistance must be rooted in the interest of the United States" (1953: 580). Some empirical evidence supports these arguments in the provision of O.D.A. (McKinlay

and Little 1978; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). However it is much less clear whether these motives affect the provision of international emergency aid.

If strategic incentives motivate the donation of aid after natural disasters, one would expect to see that "greater levels of aid will be directed toward recipients that are strategically important to the donor and/or threatened, directly or indirectly, by opposing powers" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004: 10). Recently, Fink and Redaelli (2011) found that states were more likely to give disaster aid to states less politically aligned than others, but the authors did not present a case for why this might happen.

Economic Incentives

States might also allocate international emergency aid according to economic foreign policy objectives. In this conception of aid, "leaders of aid-donating core states, through their control of both public and private sources of financing, are able to dictate the development strategies of peripheral states in the Third World" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004: 13). Donor states might then be able to "employ control and influence strategies in order to protect their interests and thereby preserve their dominance" (McKinlay 1979: 450). Hayter and Watson (1985) suggested that foreign aid intensifies the economic and political control of elites within a recipient country, while the masses remain largely insulated from the benefits of the aid. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009: 310) demonstrated that aid-for-policy deals "perpetuate(s) poverty and promotes the political survival of leaders." Accordingly, rich donors might perpetuate their economic control over global resources through aid aimed at continuing core-periphery economic disparities.

However, international emergency aid could encourage mutually beneficial bilateral trade. International emergency aid could provide incentives for recipient states to trade with the

donor state. A donor might also give aid in the hope that they could develop preferential treatment from the recipient state through the abolishment of tariffs, improved access to the recipient's market, and generally more favorable conditions for trade and investment in the state. Aid could therefore be a means to increase trade between the donor and recipient states.

Domestic Political Incentives

Domestic political incentives could also be a motivation for the provision of international emergency aid. Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004: 15-16) contended that the costs of foreign assistance have to be justified to the domestic public, and Ruttan (1996: 17) found that domestic political incentives were "more important in determining the size and direction of assistance than has the international economic and political environment." Similarly, Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004: 19) argued that the bureaucratic institutions involved in the allocation of foreign aid might act in the wake of natural disasters "to avoid negative attention and critical scrutiny of their operations and their leadership" (Van Belle, Rioux and Potter 2004: 31). As such, news coverage might be a measure of likely bureaucratic responsiveness, as the responsible bureaucratic institutions mobilize to donate international emergency aid after distant disaster events so that they can remain out of the limelight and avoid becoming the focus of media attention themselves. Therefore, states might give aid for domestic political incentives, if only to avoid negative attention from the domestic public in the absence of such gestures.

Strategic Compassion: Towards a Model of International Emergency Aid

Although the previous four motivations for international emergency aid have their merit, none of them manage to capture the nature of international state behavior after natural disasters

in isolation.[3] To address this shortcoming, I propose a model of strategic compassion, where humanitarian concerns explain part of the picture, but an element of strategy is involved too. Accordingly, states provide international emergency aid based on need, but also according to strategic incentives they might be able to achieve out of the gesture. As such, states are more likely to provide aid to states they do not already cooperate with for two reasons: 1) the low-risk imposition of pressure on the recipient state's government, and 2) the improved marginal utility of the donation of emergency aid to hostile states compared to states the donor already agrees with.

First, states might offer aid to disaster stricken states to impose pressure on the government of the affected state. This is especially likely if the two states share a history of antipathy and distrust over the other's intentions. If the prospective donor state provides an unconditional offer of aid to the affected state, it might generate costs for the government of the affected state regardless of whether they accept the offer or not. If the affected state accepts the aid, they would likely find it difficult to maintain the hostility towards the donor state, and they might be compelled to back down from previous threats towards the donor. In this scenario, the leader of the disaster-affected state might be punished by the domestic public for backing down from previous threats made against the donor state (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007).

It is also conceivable that the gesture would generate a positive reception from the public, especially as they could use the assistance in their time of need. If this is the case, the disaster might create the conditions for improved relations between the two states. As a result of the rapprochement, the donor state has less reason to fear the recipient state, and a new cooperative

[3] It is also true that current research has not addressed the logical consistency of the competing theoretical determinants of international emergency aid. Furthermore, little work has been conducted to examine how they might interact with one another. Future research could further examine these relationships through the use of structural equation models or an exposition using systemism to discover the complex causal mechanisms leading to the donation of international emergency aid, in a similar fashion to Hayes and James (2014).

relationship between the two states might be pursued for mutual gain. The strategic donation of aid could therefore reap benefits for both parties.

Alternatively, the affected state might refuse the offer of aid. If this is the case, the animosity between the two states is likely to be maintained. Yet, while the affected state might benefit from their consistent attitude towards the donor state, the offer might have generated domestic pressures if the offer of assistance is well communicated to the domestic public. By refusing the aid, the affected state's government could increase opposition to their regime because they have demonstrated that they care more about reputation than helping their people during a crisis. The domestic public might mobilize and hold them accountable for their refusal of the offer by launching protests and civil unrest against their government.

Furthermore, it is possible that the refusal of aid might lead to civil conflict or unrest within the affected state, especially as the chaotic response to a disaster might create room for opportunistic opposition groups to rally support against the incumbent regime. The donor state might benefit from the affected state's domestic instability, while reaping no reputational costs themselves. Accordingly, states might donate money to states they do not generally cooperate with because they stand to benefit from the offer irrespective of the decision of the affected state. This strategic gesture could account for donations of international emergency aid after natural disasters.

Second, strategic compassion could also be the result of states selectively providing international emergency aid according to the concept of marginal utility. Put simply, a donor state stands to gain comparatively less from giving international emergency aid to friendly states than hostile states. States that share a cordial relationship with the donor will expect assistance from the donor state, but they have few bargaining chips as they already enjoy friendly ties.

In contrast, the donor has everything to gain financial assistance to hostile states in the aftermath of natural disasters. Even if they do not gain policy concessions from the recipient, there is a comparatively high prospective reward from donating aid after a natural disaster. The donor state can afford to accept the risk that the gesture will not reap any geopolitical rewards because they know there is little chance that the gesture could harm their standing, while they stand to benefit from the possibility of rapprochement with the disaster stricken state if it provides a more stable security situation.

This reasoning could explain why governments might seek to create the conditions for rapprochement with the other state during such a crisis, as shocks present opportunities for governments to explore cooperative relationships with long-standing rivals. In particular, Rasler, Thompson and Ganguly (2013) posited that shocks are necessary conditions for the termination of rivalry because they provide opportunities for states to reconsider their rivalrous relationship. A parallel literature in disaster diplomacy suggests that natural disasters can be exploited by state leaders to pursue rapprochement with states that would not otherwise have been possible in the absence of such events (Kelman 2012). Both approaches have contributed to the understanding of state behavior after natural disasters but the causal mechanisms in both literatures have been underspecified until now, and it has remained unclear why a state would decide to provide international emergency aid to hostile states.

This paper aims to provide an initial step in providing an answer for the underlying motivations through the model of strategic compassion. Drawing from elements from the humanitarian and national strategic motivations for international emergency aid, I suggest that states might donate international emergency aid because it is a low-risk way of putting pressure on the other government. They might also provide this assistance to hostile states because there

is simply much to gain from offering aid to them compared to states with whom the donor already enjoys friendly relations. As such, it is reasonable to expect that states would offer international emergency aid routinely to states they do not get along with. If the stricken state accepts the aid, this might provide the conditions under which more peaceful relations can be established for both states.

Empirical Strategy and Tactics

Building on previous research, this paper suggests that a combination of humanitarian need in the recipient state and strategic incentives of the donor state determine the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters. This paper aims to mark a step towards the better understanding of the motivations behind state behavior after natural disasters through an examination of U.S. international emergency aid from 1999-2010. This paper attempts to improve on previous literature with two key developments.

First, the paper makes use of recent data of a period in time where U.S. foreign policy is relatively stable. Previous studies into the donation of international emergency aid dealt with unusual periods of flux in international history, such as immediately after the end of the Cold War, when the U.S. responded to humanitarian crises with uncharacteristic vigor, before settling into a more normal foreign policy in the 2000s as it coped with challenges to its global hegemony after 9/11, as China continued to emerge as a global power (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Fink and Redaelli 2011; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Everett 2015).[4]

[4] Drury, Olson, and Van Belle's article covered U.S. foreign disaster aid from 1965 to 1995; Fink and Radaelli's study covered international emergency aid from 1992-2004; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser examined both natural and manmade (conflict) disasters from 1989-2009; and Everett's data ranges from 1989-2009. It is necessary to use more recent data to measure whether the findings in their studies reflect the patterns of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War in the case of Drury et al., and the period of change during the 1990s when the U.S. faced no credible challenges to their hegemonic status.

The second improvement is to only consider the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters. Recent studies that found humanitarian need to be the most important driver of international emergency aid also included conflict related disasters (Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014), or complex humanitarian emergencies (Everett 2015).[5] Their data included civil conflict, where there is a significant potential for endogeneity in the provision of U.S. international emergency aid because their decisions are unlikely to be made in isolation to national strategic incentives. Natural disasters are not necessarily entirely exogenous, as the effects of the disasters are "intimately connected to the processes of human development" (UNDP 2004: 9). However, while human vulnerabilities and manmade processes contribute to the effects of disasters, people have no direct effect on the timing, magnitude, and scale of disasters. As such, the analysis of natural disasters is well suited to examine patterns of U.S. international emergency aid.

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis reflects strategic motivations for the provision of aid to states after a natural disaster. If a state wishes to either exert some pressure on the leader of a disaster affected state through the generation of audience costs, or to exploit the opportunity of a natural disaster to make the first step towards rapprochement the other state, they might provide aid to the hostile state for strategic purposes. Arguably, states are more likely to provide this strategic compassion to states with which they do not share affinity because the rewards are greater for donor states from these gestures while the risks of the assistance backfiring are very small.[6]

[5] Everett defined a complex humanitarian emergency as "an episode of political violence that severely and extensively disrupts civilian life, and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to effectively shield the population (or facilitate outside efforts to do so)" (2015: 5).

[6] Conversely, it could also be argued that the provision of international emergency aid to hostile states demonstrates that the donor state accepts the risks of that gesture. In effect, the donor might be willing to accept the possibility of their gesture having little effect on the relationship between the two states because of the desirability of their intended outcome. This does bear the risk that their behavior might be interpreted as demonstrating neglect towards

Public pledges of aid to states they disagree with might result in some domestic pressure on the leader if they fail to accept the offer. On the other hand, a leader who accepts the offer of aid from a hostile state would have to justify that decision given previous rancor between the states, an action that might generate domestic audience costs for themselves. However, if the state accepts the offer of aid, it might eventually lead to rapprochement between the states, favoring both states. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is:

> **H1. Strategic Hypothesis: As the percentage of agreement in the U.N. General Assembly between the U.S. as donor and the recipient state increases, the amount of international emergency aid decreases.**[7]

The second and third hypotheses suggest that the needs of the stricken state after the natural disaster play a role in the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters. One measure of the size of the disaster is the number of people affected by the event. Although this measure might correlate with the number of people killed by the disaster, this is not always the case. The total number of people affected by the disaster measures need as a large proportion of those people might be displaced by the disaster, and they would require immediate food and shelter as a result.

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more friendly states by privileging the assistance of more hostile states. In this case, it could be that the provision of international emergency aid to hostile states would entail risks. However, in the case of the U.S., it is difficult to imagine that a state would have much of an impact on the relationship between the slighted state and the U.S. because of the status of the U.S. as both an economic powerhouse and a military hegemon in the 21st century. While it is conceivable that other donor states might be punished for the selective provision of international emergency aid, it is difficult to envision the U.S. being harmed by friendly states complaining about this behavior, even if they might raise it in diplomatic discussions and meetings. As such, it is more plausible that the donation of international emergency aid by the U.S. to hostile states is a relatively risk free proposition.

[7] There is also a possibility that the hypothesis interacts with the donation and allocation of aid in a curvilinear fashion. This is because two states that are extremely close together might have a positive effect on the likelihood of donation, and the amount of international emergency aid, while the amount of agreement generally has a negative effect on the provision of aid. For instance, one could imagine the U.S. as particularly receptive to appeals for assistance from Canada, because they are part of the same security community and share a great deal of affinity (Deutsch et al. 1957), as well as to appeals from states such as Iran with whom they agree over very few things and have a general lack of affinity with. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, in general the percentage of agreement with the U.S. decreases the disaster affected state's amount of funding, and those states that agree with the U.S. do not benefit from more closely sharing revealed preferences.

It is also reasonable to expect that if humanitarian concerns motivated the provision of aid, the likelihood of a donation and its size would be proportionate to the number of people killed in the disaster. Generally, the numbers of fatalities from natural disasters reflect the level of development of the stricken community.[8] Accordingly, the more people killed in the disaster, the greater the need for humanitarian assistance. Taken together, the second and third hypotheses reflect arguments that humanitarian motivations play a role in determining the amount of financial aid a donor state provides to the recipient state after they endure a natural disaster. These test the compassionate element of strategic compassion. The hypotheses are:

H2. Total Affected Hypothesis: As the number of people affected by the disaster increases, the amount of international emergency aid increases.

H3. Number Killed Hypothesis: As the number of people killed by the disaster increases, the amount of international emergency aid increases.

Data and Methods

Dependent variable

Data for the dependent variable is derived from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking System [U.N. O.C.H.A. F.T.S.] dataset. The organization charts the provision of international emergency aid as "an intervention to help people who are victims of a natural disaster or conflict meet their basic needs and rights" (U.N. O.C.H.A. F.T.S. 2015). The U.N. O.C.H.A. F.T.S. has collected the data since 1992, and it has

[8] Although comparisons between disasters are problematic because it is rare that two events are directly comparable, it is notable that an estimated 222,570 people were killed in Port-au-Prince by an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale in 2010 (EM-DAT 2014; U.S. Geological Survey 2013). Less than two months later, an 8.8-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Chile, but by comparison only 562 people were killed from the quake and the subsequent tsunami (EM-DAT 2014; U.S. Geological Survey 2013).

the benefit of including not only state governments' contributions to affected states, as well as those provided by NGOs and other international organizations.

Fink and Redaelli (2011: 743) extolled the virtues of this data compared to other sources given that it gives information about actions undertaken after each specific emergency, instead of providing only annual totals for each donor-recipient dyad. Furthermore, the channels of distribution of the aid are differentiated between bilateral aid and multilateral aid, and the data feature significantly more donor-recipient pairs than the O.E.C.D. dataset that only includes donations from their members. As such, it is a better measure of the donations for each disaster from all donors than existing alternatives.

The dependent variable is **the total amount of aid contributed by the U.S. to the affected state in U.S. million dollars, held constant at its 2005 value, for each natural disaster in the U.N. O.C.H.A. F.T.S. dataset**. This variable captures the amount of money actually contributed to the recipient state. There are limitations to this, especially considering that it only measures financial assistance the recipient state eventually received, and not the initial pledge of assistance. As such, if a state offered aid, but it was refused, it would be considered a 0 in this dataset, despite the initial offer of assistance.

Independent variables

The independent variable measuring the prevalence of national strategic incentives as determinants of the provision of international emergency aid by the U.S. is the **percentage of all U.N. General Assembly votes where the recipient state agreed with the U.S.** in the Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2015) Dyadic Ideal Points and Affinity Scores dataset. Their dataset reflects the affinity between the states based on votes made in the U.N. General Assembly from

1948-2012.[9] This measure is constructed through an analysis of "resolutions that were identical across years to serve as bridge observations to help make the preference estimates comparable over time" (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2015). This score measures the amount of agreement between states in the voting, providing a measure of states' political relationships with one another through revealed preferences. The variable itself is a percentage score that ranges from 0 to 1, with 100 per cent agreement with the U.S. corresponding to a 1.0 score in the measure. This was used as the most direct measure of affinity between the recipient state and the U.S., an improvement on the affinity scores relied upon in previous studies (Fink and Redaelli 2011; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Everett 2015). This score provides the means to estimate the effect of the relationship between the two states on the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters.

As mentioned earlier, there are different ways of measuring need from natural disasters. First is **the number of people affected by natural disasters**. This is operationalized as the number that require some form of assistance after a natural disaster, and measured according to reports from actors involved in the response to the disaster. Many people affected by a natural disaster would require some combination of food, shelter, and medical treatment in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

[9] A major contribution of Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten's article was the introduction of the ideal point estimates as a score that constructed through an analysis of "resolutions that were identical across years to serve as bridge observations to help make the preference estimates comparable over time" (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2015). This score measures the amount of similarity between states in this voting, providing a proxy measure of states' political relationships with one another, marking an improved and updated version of Gartzke's Affinity Index (2000), as it allows for valid comparisons between states over time, and it is better at removing noise from the estimates (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2015: 1-2). The ideal point estimates also allow for the analysis of changed patterns of individual states in U.N. voting, compared to previous measures where it was possible to see how the relationship had changed between two states in a dyad, but not which state had altered their position (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2015: 2). Despite these advantages of the ideal point estimates, the percentage of agreement between the recipient state and the U.S. in the U.N.G.A. was used in this study because it is the more direct measure of revealed state preferences in each donor-recipient dyad. However, the ideal point estimates are likely to be more useful in future studies involving multiple donor states. I report results for the models using the difference between the donor and recipient states' ideal points as an alternative independent variable in the Appendix, and the results are robust to the alternative measure.

Second, **the number of people killed by natural disasters** also represents the need of the stricken community. This is a measure that includes both confirmed deaths and missing people after the disaster. Because this is often correlated with the level of development of the affected state, this is also a good measure for the need of that state in the response to their disaster. Taken together, these variables measure the amount of need in the stricken community.

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters' Emergency Events Database [EM-DAT] provides the data for both independent variables that represents the need of the disaster-affected state. Although this is the most reliable and valid dataset concerning natural disasters, it is important to note the necessary conditions for inclusion in their dataset. EM-DAT defines a natural disaster as a "situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance (EM-DAT 2014). Events considered natural disasters include earthquakes, mass movements of earth, volcanic activity, extreme temperatures, fog, storms, floods, landslides, wave actions, droughts, glacial lake outbursts, wildfires, epidemics, insect infestations, animal accidents, extraterrestrial impacts such as meteors or asteroids, and changes in interplanetary conditions (EM-DAT 2014)

They include natural disasters in their database if an event meets at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people were killed, 100 or more people were affected, or whether the affected country declared a state of emergency or appealed for financial assistance (EM-DAT 2014). The data for this study are aggregated to the country-year level, and the measures correspond to the total damage caused by all disasters in a country-year that meet the EM-DAT criteria. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data from the EM-DAT database that are included in this paper. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the three independent variables used in this study.

Control Variables

A host of control variables are included in additional models to control for confounding factors that could conceivably have an effect on the provision of aid to the affected state. These variables include **distance from the U.S.**, **revised combined Polity IV score**, **gross domestic product (logged)**, **financial openness**, and the **percentage of followers of major religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism**. Results are reported in the Appendix, but they do not affect the effects of the independent variables on the provision of international emergency aid after natural disasters.

Table 1. Natural Disasters by Country-Year, 1999-2010.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
No. Disasters	2370	3.770886	7.710096	0	101
No. Killed	2370	563.6789	7167.288	0	229566
No. Injured	2370	1787.921	40205.32	0	1800063
No. Homeless	2370	15915.34	169001.1	0	5003500
Total Affected	2370	1197056	1.28e+07	0	3.42e+08
Total Damage	2370	490597.9	4713353	0	1.59e+08

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variable					
Amount of Aid ($USD million)	2370	9.318817	63.90733	0	1515.068
Independent Variables					
Pct. Agree U.S.	2228	.1989417	.1506734	0	1
No. Affected	2370	1197056	1.28e+07	0	3.42e+08
No. Killed	2370	563.6789	7167.288	0	229566

Methods

I model the provision of international emergency aid from the U.S. to disaster affected states using a series of ordinary least squares regressions.. Previous estimations used the Heckman selection model on the basis that there are two distinct processes involved. First, after a disaster occurs, the potential donor has to make a decision about whether to give aid to the affected country or not. Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005: 464) refer to this process as the 'gatekeeping stage' because the donor has to make a decision "whether the disaster warrants any assistance at all." The second process involves the decision about how much aid to give to the stricken state (Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005: 464).

However, even if they are two distinct decisions, it is almost certain that policymakers would make both decisions at once in the wake of a natural disaster. It is more unlikely that they would make a decision to donate, and then decide the amount of assistance later on. Furthermore, previous estimations such as the Drury et al. (2005) article used the same variables for each regression, which is either indicative of the fact there is only one process involved in the allocation of aid, or that the same covariates predict the outcomes of both steps.[10] As a result, I employ just OLS regression in this paper.

The model tests the determinants of the amount of aid provided by the U.S. to the disaster stricken state. This is tested through a series of ordinary least squares regressions to determine the effect of the three independent variables on the continuous dependent variable, the amount in

[10] The Heckman selection model refers to a technique that employs two stages of estimations that involve both a selection and an outcome equation with correlated errors. If one expects that there will be different processes involved in the selection and the distribution of international emergency aid, it might make sense to model both stages using the Heckman selection model to eliminate bias caused by using nonrandom samples to estimate the relationship between variables (Heckman 1979). The results from the analysis are robust to tests using the Heckman selection model with a dichotomous variable for whether the U.S. donated aid for an initial decision (not reported), but I employ OLS models in this paper for ease of interpretation and because it is more likely that there is one single process involved in the allocation of international emergency aid after natural disasters.

2005 U.S. million dollars contributed by the United States government to the disaster affected country. Because the amount of aid is left censored at 0, the model can be expressed as:

$$aid_{ij} = max(0, x_{ij}\beta + u_{ij}),$$

where aid_{ij} refers to the amount of aid provided by donor state *i* to the recipient state after a natural disaster *j*, and *x* represents the three independent variables.

Results

The results suggest that humanitarian concerns and strategic incentives on the part of the U.S. are also important determinants for the allocation of international emergency aid after natural disasters. The results for the OLS regressions are reported in Table 3. The first model is an OLS regression, the second model uses robust standard errors, and the third model uses country-year fixed effects.[11] Visual representations of the correlations are also presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3.

The evidence in support of the strategic hypothesis was consistently strong. The coefficients for the percentage of agreement with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly were consistently negative, and these continued to be significant with the addition of the control variables. This provides evidence that strategic incentives motivate the donation of U.S. international emergency aid after natural disasters, in addition to humanitarian motives. As can be seen in the Appendix, these results were also robust to models where the control variables were included. The strength and the consistency of these results mean that one can reject the null hypothesis on the basis of these results. Accordingly, there is support for the strategic hypothesis.

[11] I include country-year fixed effects to demonstrate the robustness of the results across time. However, there are good reasons to believe that the amount or number of disasters should not be predictable given the previous country year. While it is true that natural disasters are not entirely exogenous, and states have varying capacities to cope with these events, their distribution and effects do not necessary correlate across time in any given state.

However, some caution is advisable in the interpretation of the regression. As one can see in Figure 1, there is a consistently negative effect of the percentage of agreement with the U.S. on the amount of aid allocated to the state. The data is heavily clustered in the bottom left corner of the figure, indicating that most international emergency is relatively small, and that the majority of recipients are states that frequently disagree with the U.S. in the U.N.G.A. However, there are several recipient states that repeatedly receive large amounts of international emergency aid from the U.S, including Sudan, Pakistan, and Ethiopia. It is possible that there is something about those states that are not caught in this model, or among the control variables, that is driving these effects, and not the percentage of agreement in the U.N.G.A.

The effect of the number of people affected on the amount of aid provided to the recipient state was less clear. The size of the coefficient was negligible, and the sign changed when fixed effects or control variables were added to the model. As such, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for the total number of people affected hypothesis.

However, there is evidence in support of the humanitarian element of strategic compassion with the results for the number of people killed hypothesis. There was a statistically significant positive effect of the number of people killed on the amount of aid allocated to the recipient state in all but one of the models in the analysis. It should also be noted that the size of this effect was very small, with a one-unit increase in the number of people killed increasing the amount of money allocated by between 0.000 and 0.002 million dollars ($2,000) across all models. It should also be noted that Haiti could have been an influential outlier in these models, and this requires further tests to determine whether this could have driven the effect in this analysis. However, these results do demonstrate evidence supporting the number killed hypothesis, supporting the notion that aid might be allocated according to humanitarian concerns.

Table 3. The Allocation of International Emergency Aid.

Dependent Variable: The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)
Pct. Agree U.S.	**-36.660*****	**-36.660*****	**-31.490***	**-17.734****	**-17.734*****	**-13.741**
	(7.675)	**(5.799)**	**(15.236)**	**(5.857)**	**(4.743)**	**(9.503)**
Total Affected	**-0.000**	**-0.000**	**0.000****	**0.000***	**0.000**	**0.000*****
	(0.000)	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**
No. Killed	**0.002*****	**0.002**$^{+}$	**0.002*****	**0.000*****	**0.000**	**0.000****
	(0.000)	**(0.001)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**
Control Variables?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	15.048***	15.048***	13.681***	9.343	9.343	-66.047
	(1.926)	(2.211)	(3.158)	(6.899)	(5.994)	(77.753)
Observations	2228	2228	2228	1523	1523	1523
R^2	0.107	0.107	0.157	0.041	0.041	0.039

a) Standard errors in parentheses.

b) $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Figure 1. The Percentage of Agreement with the U.S. and The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million).



Figure 2. The Total Number of People Affected and The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million).



Figure 3. The Number of People Killed and The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million).



When the control variables are included in the models, there is little to suggest that economic incentives factor into the donor's decision about how much money to donate to an affected state.

It is important to acknowledge that the R-squared results are tiny in these models, but this is likely to be a function of the large variance in the amount of money given by the U.S. to different states after disasters. As such, even if the regression line does not fit the data points very well, the results are still substantively important. Furthermore, the R-squared measure is larger in the regressions run without control variables. This suggests that the original independent variables explain much of the variance in the model, which is grounds for some optimism that the independent variables are doing the work in explaining the amount of international emergency aid contributed by the U.S. to the recipient state after they experience natural disasters.

In sum, the results indicate strong support for the hypothesis that the percentage of agreement in the U.N.G.A. influences the amount of aid provided by the U.S. to states affected by natural disasters. In general, the more the two states disagreed, the more the U.S. provided to the recipient state. The results did not show support for the number of people affected hypothesis. However, there was evidence the number of people killed influenced the provision of aid, suggesting that humanitarian need does play a role in the U.S. allocation of international emergency aid.

Discussion

The results from the analysis demonstrate that the U.S. provides more international emergency aid to states it does not agree with in the U.N. General Assembly than those with whom it shares the same policy preferences. However, strategic incentives do not explain the

provision of international emergency aid alone. The results suggest that humanitarian motives also play a role in the allocation of aid to disaster-affected states, as the U.S. responds to the needs of the affected state by donating more aid as the number of people killed increases. Accordingly, it appears that the U.S. follows a pattern of strategic compassion in its provision of aid, where strategic imperatives and humanitarian concerns both determine its allocation of aid.

The findings have implications for the study of state behavior after natural disasters, but they also have broader repercussions for the study of international relations. The study of foreign aid is rapidly advancing, but little research has been conducted into international emergency aid and its effects on the relationship between donor and recipient states. Evidence from this paper suggests that there is a fruitful research agenda that lies ahead for scholars of international emergency aid.

Furthermore, the paper suggests there are important unanswered questions about how states attract allies and alliance formation in international politics. The counterintuitive finding that the U.S. gives aid to its adversaries in the U.N. General Assembly suggests that the formation of alliances might be more complicated than has previously been acknowledged. It raises the question of why states would attempt to court their political opposition after natural disasters, especially when there is little evidence that natural disasters affect the balance of power in any meaningful way in the international system.

It is possible that the U.S. makes decisions to donate aid according to a different set of priorities than other countries, so multi-state analysis of these patterns of behavior would produce more generalizable theory about how states give international emergency aid. Measures of political salience such as an index of news coverage and public opinion polls could also provide evidence that state behavior might be driven by domestic political motivations.

Further study could also determine whether there are different determinants of different types of aid. For instance, need might necessitate more resources, food, and human capital that might not be included in models of financial aid alone. It is also possible that public gestures such as commitments of a particular amount of money might be more strategically motivated than more quiet, more effective donations of particular scarce resources to the affected state. Different motivations could also account for the different distribution of aid. For example, multilateral aid channeled through NGOs might be caused by humanitarian concerns and a desire to ensure that the money is well spent and not siphoned off by a corrupt regime. In contrast, bilateral aid might be more strategically allocated because the donor state might be more concerned about the overt gesture of providing aid than whether it is effectively spent in the stricken state.

Future research could also further explore the underlying motivations behind these patterns of state behavior. Questions for this research could address what donor states expect as the outcome of their donations of money; how policymakers, bureaucrats, and politicians decide how much aid to donate to the affected country; what compels states to accept or refuse international emergency aid; the effects of aid on the relationship between two states; and the effect of an unfulfilled promise of aid on the relationship between states. There is a fruitful research agenda for scholars to answer to these questions.

Appendix. Robustness Checks and Alternative Models.

Alternative Independent Variables

One could argue that the independent variables included in the main analysis do not capture the nature of voting in the U.N. General Assembly or the amount of need in a disaster affected state. Accordingly, I include two alternative measures in the Appendix.

As an alternative to the percentage of agreement is the **difference between the donor state and the recipient state's ideal point** in the Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2015) Dyadic Ideal Points and Affinity Scores dataset. This measure is constructed by subtracting the donor state's ideal point from the recipient state's ideal point in the dataset. This produced a negative variable that ranged from no difference between the U.S. and the recipient state (0) to a significant difference between the two states (-4.485844). Results from the alternative measure are reported in Table 6, and the results suggest support for the contention in this paper, finding that as the difference in ideal point estimates between the two states decreased, the amount of international emergency aid provided to the recipient state decreased.

Second, one might argue that the need of the recipient state is better measured by economic damage caused by a disaster. Accordingly, I include **the total estimated damage caused by the natural disaster, measured in thousands of current U.S. dollars**. This variable provides the "value of all damages and economic losses directly or indirectly related to the disaster" (EM-DAT 2014). Table 6 reports the results from using this measure as an alternative measure of humanitarian motivations for international emergency aid, but there were no significant results from the analysis.

Control Variables

The control variables start with the **distance from the U.S.** as measured by the distance in kilometers between the most populous cities in the donor state (New York City) and the

recipient state respectively, as measured in the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) dataset. This is an approximate measure of psychological distance between communities, as it could be that a state is more likely to donate money to states in its immediate vicinity. To determine if very large distances have an effect too, this figure was also squared as an additional control in robustness checks (not reported), and the figure had no meaningful effect on the results.

The **revised combined Polity IV score** controls for the regime type of the affected country, as it is possible that a state might be more willing to donate money to more democratic states. This could be because there are institutions for the public to hold the government accountable if they do not allocate the aid well. Alternatively, states might simply provide aid to regimes that are similar to themselves, so the U.S. might be more inclined to give money to a democratic state than an autocratic regime. Conversely, a state might wish to allocate aid to autocratic states if they suspect that the regime will not accept the offer of assistance in the hope that it might lead to domestic political instability if there is civil unrest in response to the government's handling of the natural disaster. This data was sourced from Graham's International Political Economy Data Resource [IPEDR] (2015).

Economic imperatives on the part of the donor are accounted for through a series of economic indicators. Measured at the recipient level, the model includes the following as control variables measuring economic incentives for the provision of international emergency aid: the natural log of **gross domestic product** [GDP], sourced from Graham's IPEDR (2015). This measure indicates the size of the recipient state's economy, and it would be reasonable to expect that the U.S. is more likely to donate aid to states with smaller economies and a lesser ability to

recover from the natural disaster. Similarly, they might also provide more to those states, as the need for external assistance might be greater.

Financial openness is employed as a "standardized principal component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds" (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2010; Graham 2015). This variable accounts for the nature of the economy, providing an approximate measure of the attractiveness of the economy for foreign direct investment from companies and organizations within the donor state. If there are economic incentives driving international emergency aid, one might expect to see the more open economies attracting more aid from the U.S. than other states.

Finally, it is possible that cultural distance might play a role in determining the allocation of international emergency aid. One indicator of cultural affinity is the religious make-up of the state. As such, I use the **percentages of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists** of the total population of the recipient state as a control variable for the cultural distance between the U.S. and the recipient state. The number of Christians in the recipient state might be important because the U.S. is a majority Christian country and might wish to donate to like-minded societies. On the other hand, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism are all minority religions in the U.S. that could have greater cultural distance with the population of the United States. The data for these controls comes from Brown and James' Religious Characteristics of States [R.C.S.] Dataset, Phase 1 (2015).

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Alternative Models.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Alternative Independent Variables					
U.N.G.A. Ideal Point Difference	2228	-2.813034	.8634518	-4.485844	0
Total Damage	2370	490597.9	4713353	0	1.59e+08
Control Variables					
Distance from U.S.	2274	8733.217	3552.339	548.3946	16180.32
Revised Combined Polity Score	1898	3.524236	6.491606	-10	10
G.D.P. (Log)	2210	23.52154	2.423702	16.89317	30.24704
Financial Openness Index	1893	.5157274	.3730116	0	1
Percentage of Christians	2028	49.59944	35.98304	.0161881	99.37869
Percentage of Jews	1985	.3825398	4.000858	0	52.93141
Percentage of Muslims	2016	26.89307	36.64919	.0063423	99.77014
Percentage of Hindus	2016	2.371427	10.18636	0	82.26128
Percentage of Buddhists	2016	4.222899	15.63627	0	87.41725

Table 5. The Allocation of International Emergency Aid, with Control Variables.

Dependent Variable: The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)
Pct. Agree US	**-36.660*****	**-36.660*****	**-31.490***	**-17.734****	**-17.734*****	**-13.741**
	(7.675)	**(5.799)**	**(15.236)**	**(5.857)**	**(4.743)**	**(9.503)**
Total Affected	**-0.000**	**-0.000**	**0.000****	**0.000***	**0.000**	**0.000*****
	(0.000)	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**
Number Killed	**0.002*****	**0.002**$^{+}$	**0.002*****	**0.000*****	**0.000**	**0.000****
	(0.000)	**(0.001)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**
Distance from U.S.				0.001**	0.001***	0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(.)
Revised Combined Polity Score				0.003	0.003	0.819**
				(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.283)
G.D.P. (Log)				-0.326	-0.326	-1.078
				(0.271)	(0.216)	(2.980)
Financial Openness Index				-1.635	-1.635	-0.718
				(1.522)	(1.401)	(4.402)
Percentage of Christians				0.036	0.036	0.924**
				(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.325)
Percentage of Jews				0.166	0.166***	1.636
				(0.131)	(0.041)	(8.737)
Percentage of Muslims				0.003	0.003	2.009*
				(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.798)
Percentage of Hindus				-0.033	-0.033	1.349
				(0.051)	(0.039)	(1.782)
Percentage of Buddhists				-0.054	-0.054	-1.801
				(0.045)	(0.043)	(1.437)
Constant	15.048***	15.048***	13.681***	9.343	9.343	-66.047
	(1.926)	(2.211)	(3.158)	(6.899)	(5.994)	(77.753)
Observations	2228	2228	2228	1523	1523	1523
R^2	0.107	0.107	0.157	0.041	0.041	0.039

a) Standard errors in parentheses.

b) $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Table 6. The Allocation of International Emergency Aid with Alternative Independent Variables, including Control Variables.

Dependent Variable: The Amount of U.S. International Emergency Aid Contributed to the Disaster Affected State ($U.S. million)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)	OLS	OLS (robust standard errors)	OLS (fixed effects)
Ideal Point Difference	**-9.080*****	**-9.080*****	**1.142**	**-2.492****	**-2.492****	**2.046**
	(1.414)	**(1.525)**	**(4.874)**	**(0.944)**	**(0.786)**	**(2.381)**
Total Damage ($USD '000)	**0.000**$^{+}$	**0.000**	**0.000***	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
	(0.000)	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**	**(0.000)**
Distance from U.S.				0.001**	0.001***	0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(.)
Revised Combined Polity Score				0.003	0.003	0.830**
				(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.285)
G.D.P. (Log)				-0.176	-0.176	1.322
				(0.269)	(0.192)	(2.675)
Financial Openness Index				-2.234	-2.234	0.149
				(1.525)	(1.432)	(4.430)
Percentage of Christians				0.026	0.026	0.905**
				(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.329)
Percentage of Jews				0.078	0.078*	2.252
				(0.125)	(0.036)	(8.805)
Percentage of Muslims				-0.011	-0.011	2.075**
				(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.804)
Percentage of Hindus				-0.017	-0.017	1.559
				(0.051)	(0.050)	(1.799)
Percentage of Buddhists				-0.065	-0.065	-1.729
				(0.045)	(0.042)	(1.451)
Constant	-16.569***	-16.569***	12.151	-3.462	-3.462	-122.616^{+}
	(4.175)	(3.333)	(13.747)	(8.294)	(6.363)	(68.106)
Observations	2228	2228	2228	1523	1523	1523
R^2	0.019	0.019	0.002	0.028	0.028	0.021

a) Standard errors in parentheses.

b) $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

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