

**The Emergence of the Bush Administration
and Changes in Kim Jong-Il's Belief System ***

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Abstract

The Kim Jong-il regime has departed significantly from the actions predicted by structural international relations theories, which analyze a state as the main unit of analysis. In order to understand North Korean behavior at the level of the individual, it is desirable to analyze the “supreme leader” of North Korea, Kim Jong-il. To discern and examine this North Korean leader’s belief system, operational code analysis as well as the Verbs in Context System (VICS) are employed, which draw inferences about a leader’s belief system from public statements. Kim’s public speeches and interviews are divided into two periods and sampled before and after the emergence of the George W. Bush Administration. The findings suggest that Kim’s beliefs significantly changed between the two periods. Kim’s perception of the image of the external world and the means to achieve his strategic goals significantly changed in a more conflictive direction. The impact of the Bush Administration and a chain of U.S. actions appear to have influenced Kim Jong-il’s belief system and led him to recommence a hostile policy toward the external world.

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Introduction

On June 15, 2000, two leaders from South and North Korea had a historic summit meeting in Pyongyang. The two leaders met with each other for the first time since the peninsula was separated into two parts fifty-five years ago. They announced the 6.15 South-North Joint Declaration for the preparation for the peaceful reunification and the improvement of a relationship between the two countries, and they promised to cooperate with each other as partners in the future. South Korean expectations for the peaceful reunification rose, and the South Korean leader, Kim Dae-Jung, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his great contribution to peace in the Korean Peninsula. Nobody in the South had doubts about the bright future of the relationship between North and South.

However, on June 29, 2002, North Korea provoked a military action: an attack on a Korean naval ship on the Yellow Sea. This military provocation resulted in dozens of casualties and drove South Koreans to extreme tension in a flash. With the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup final match stealing the attention of the world's sports fans just one day away and a successful conclusion of the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup ahead, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) provocation was expected by no one, and the people who wanted peace in the Korean Peninsula were shocked. Why had the DPRK suddenly changed its attitude from cooperation to conflict? Why had the DPRK chosen to instigate conflict instead of encourage reconciliation? What internal or external factors affected the DPRK's behavioral changes?

This paper aims to find the answers to these questions by examining North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-il's belief system and belief changes during this period. Given the

regime characteristics of the DPRK and the unparalleled influential power of its supreme leader, an effort that attempts to find answers at the individual level of analysis in explaining the DPRK's actions appears to be reasonable. In the remainder of this paper I will first review the general situation on the DPRK and its relationship with the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Second, I will review theoretical assumptions about foreign policy decision-making. Third, I will conduct an operational code analysis of Kim Jong-il and the subjective games based on his belief system, including as well a statistical comparison of him with other world leaders. Finally, I will draw a conclusion and derive implications for foreign policies toward the DPRK.

The “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il and the DPRK

With the end of the Cold War, the DPRK faced new changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a major donor and the biggest trading partner, was a smashing blow to the DPRK's economy, and the establishment of diplomatic relationships between the ROK and the DPRK's traditional allies, the Soviet Union and China, aroused political anxieties among the political elites of Pyongyang. Furthermore, a serious threat to the regime's stability emerged with the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in July 1993 and with the death of “the Great Leader” Kim Il-sung, the country's founding leader who had ruled the DPRK for nearly the last five decades.

Under these circumstances, Kim Jong-il became the leader of the DPRK, succeeding his father, Kim Il-sung. Scholarly and official circles had predicted the collapse of the DPRK in the near future, due to the unfavorable international political situation of the DPRK and Kim Jong-il's less charismatic personality compared to his father (Ahn 1994; Eberstadt 1997; Pollack and Lee 1999; Kim 1996). During a U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in December 1996, the report by the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that “the likelihood that North Korea will

continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now is low-to-moderate” and General Luck, the commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in Korea stated in 1997 that “North Korea would disintegrate.” The arguments that advocated the demise of the DPRK’s regime gained more ground when the DPRK had severe food shortages due to a series of natural calamities in the middle of the 1990s

However, contrary to those negative expectations Kim Jong-il achieved a relatively stable transfer of political power. Some scholars pointed out his “military-first politics” as the driving force of a smooth power succession (Oh and Hassig 2000; Noland 2004; Byman and Lind 2010; Lee 2011). Military-first politics was the policy that “prioritized the Korean People’s Army in all state’s affairs and provided state’s resources to the military” (Jeon 2009:196). Kim Jong-il’s pushing ahead with the military-first politics was deeply related to his career path in the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Entering the 1990s, he exerted himself to consolidate his status as a military leader in the KPA although he had never served in the military. He was named as the first Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People’s Assembly in May 1990, and then was appointed Supreme Commander of the KPA at the Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party in December 1991. Kim Jong-il seized military power when he was awarded the title of “Marshal” and was inducted as the Chairman of the National Defense Commission in April, 1993.

With this background Kim established a stable and strong power base through his military-first politics which became the main impetus for a stable power succession despite the fact that he was facing serious internal and external difficulties, such as the severe food crisis in the DPRK and conflicts with the international community over the nuclear issue. Kim completed a “one-man rule” political system when he became the General Secretary of the Korean Worker’s

Party (KWP) in October 1997, which signified that he could control the two major power apparatus in the DPRK, the KPA and the KWP.

The Inter-Korean Relationship

After the division of the Korean Peninsula the two Koreas continuously maintained antagonistic relations. The DPRK regarded the ROK as a puppet state of the U.S. and asserted that the country should be unified by them. In the KWP's regulations¹, it is prescribed that "building a communist society on the entire Korean Peninsula" is the goal and the way of peaceful unification is excluded. (The ROK Ministry of Unification 2012a: 117). The ROK military dictatorships in the past actively took advantage of an anticommunism sentiment to secure their lack of political legitimacy and employed the confrontational situation on the Korean Peninsula as a political means to maintain their regimes (Oh 2011).

This hostile relationship of the two Koreas continued after the emergence of the democratic government in the South. The Kim Young-sam Administration, which was the first democratic government and took power from 1993 to 1998, attempted to improve the inter-Korean relationship at the beginning. However, they turned back to a tough stance after the DPRK's withdrawal of the NPT. At this time Kim Jong-il, who had ascended to the throne and established the ruling structure of overall regime through the military, instigated more tough military provocations against the ROK in order to maintain the internal cohesion and solidarity of the North Korean regime² (Bennett 1995; Green 1997).

However, as the economy deteriorated due to the international isolation and the natural

¹ The KWP's regulation is the supreme law of the DPRK holding power over the constitution.

² The key example of the provocation was the DPRK's submarine infiltration in East Sea in September 1996. Due to the engagement between the North Korean crews and ROK soldiers, 41 people died including 4 South Korean civilians and the counter-infiltration operations conducted by the ROK Army lasted 53 days.

calamities in the late 1990s, the DPRK reached the limits with its own salvation measures and needed help from the external world to overcome its economic difficulties. At this point, the Kim Dae-jung Administration emerged in the South. With the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung in February, 1998 the ROK government, contrary to the previous governments, launched a comprehensive engagement policy called the “Sunshine Policy.”³ This policy was the outcome of President Kim Dae-jung’s political strategy that attempted to induce changes in the DPRK, improve the inter-Korean relationship, and ultimately lay the groundwork for peaceful unification in the future by embracing the DPRK as a part of an ethnic community instead of recognizing it as an adversary.

Despite the doubts about the utility of the Sunshine Policy due to the DPRK’s continuous military provocations and hostile policies against the South, the Kim Dae-jung government consistently pursued the Sunshine Policy and derived gradual changes in the DPRK’s behavior. As a result, the two Koreas finally had the first and historic summit in Pyongyang in 2000 and announced the North-South Joint Declaration that included the consensus on peaceful unification. However, when the DPRK executed a serious military provocation that caused dozens of casualties on both sides of the Yellow Sea in June 2002, hostilities once again began to emerge within inter-Korean relations.

The Clinton Administration and the North Korean Regime

When the first DPRK nuclear crisis occurred in 1994, the DPRK attempted to have direct negotiations with the Clinton Administration through the so-called “brinkmanship policy,”

³ The objective of the Sunshine Policy is to bring about peaceful coexistence and peaceful exchanges between the two Koreas, based on strong security. This policy included all measures to improve talks, contacts, exchanges, and cooperation with the DPRK. The main policies were the vitalization of aid to the DPRK at the level of non-governmental and governmental relations, invigorating inter-Korean economic cooperation based on the principle of separation of political matters from economic matters, and establishing a permanent liaison office.

including the withdrawal from the NPT and a refusal to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Kim 1995). Through the negotiations the DPRK and the U.S. reached an agreement and announced the Agreed Framework, containing the freeze and replacement of the DPRK's indigenous nuclear program, providing two light water nuclear reactors to the DPRK as a benefit in return, and moving forward with the normalization of the U.S.-DPRK relationship. With the Agreement, the DPRK gained a foothold for improving the relationship with the U.S. (Oh and Hassig 2000: 168-170).

After that, the U.S. and the DPRK cooperated in various fields. In 1996, they agreed to conduct the joint recovery efforts looking for U.S. remains inside the DPRK during the Korean War and to have four-party talks including the ROK and China. In September, 1999 the U.S. and the DPRK also agreed on the Berlin Agreement over the DPRK's missile program, in which the Clinton Administration expressed the softening of decades-old U.S. economic sanctions and at the same time the DPRK accepted a moratorium on testing any long-range missiles (Niksich 2004: 13). As an extension of those efforts the Clinton Administration appointed William Perry, a former Secretary of Defense, as a North Korea Policy Coordinator in 1999. In conjunction with the ROK and Japan, the U.S. provided a negotiation framework in which the allies would provide economic and diplomatic benefits to the DPRK if it abandoned its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) including nuclear and missile programs. In October 2000, during the exchanges between Vice Marshal Cho Myung-rok, the first Vice Chairman of NDC and a special envoy of Kim Jong-il, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, pending issues between the two states were discussed: the opening of diplomatic representation, identification of missing U.S. soldiers in the DPRK, and the specific measures to an easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula (Pollack 2003).

To sum up, having the principle of “Engagement and Enlargement” as a strategy, the Clinton Administration expressed its full support for the Kim Dae-jung Administration’s sunshine policy and initiated a well-coordinated engagement policy with the ROK government toward the DPRK. The Clinton Administration’s attitude was the driving force for maintaining the amicable U.S.-DPRK relationship.

The Bush Administration and the North Korean Regime

The Bush Administration emerged in January, 2001 and expressed an intention to re-examine of U.S. policy toward the DPRK. They criticized the Clinton Administration for not having effective verification measures on the DPRK’s nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Administration adopted Richard L. Armitage’s strategy “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea,”⁴ which encouraged a strong response to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as a basic policy towards the DPRK (Hwang 2004:15). In response to this development, the DPRK took a conciliatory gesture at the beginning by calling on the U.S. to follow the previous agreement over the improvement of the relationship between the two states and by sending an economic mission to the U.S (Em 2002: 94).

However, the DPRK’s position gradually changed into a tough stance against the Bush Administration. In particular, when President Bush made his State of the Union address in 2002 in which he pointed out the DPRK as one of the “Axis of Evil,” the DPRK reacted violently, criticizing the Bush’s speech as a declaration of war on them. In addition, when U.S. Assistant

⁴ This report, which was written in March 1999, emphasized a comprehensive approach and reciprocity. According to this document, conventional and nuclear weapons and missile development are to be dealt with as a whole, and easing sanctions is made contingent upon the DPRK’s acquiescence to U.S. demand. This report basically assumed that the 1994 Agreed Framework is necessary, but not sufficient to eliminate a threat from the North.

Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited the DPRK and identified a highly enriched uranium program in October 2002, the Bush Administration maintained its position that the negotiation talks could only be resumed after the DPRK had abandoned its nuclear program.

In response, the DPRK declared its intention to unfreeze nuclear-related facilities under supervision of the IAEA and to deport inspectors in December 2002 and announced the decision to withdraw from the NPT. The Bush Administration intensified its pressure on the DPRK by requesting “Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s nuclear program as well as issuing the Proliferation Security Initiative (Niksich 2004: 3). This confrontational relationship between the two states continued before the first round of six-party talks in Beijing in August 2003

Table 1. The number of North Korea’s military provocations against South Korea⁵

'96*	'97	'98*	'99*	'00	'01	'02*	'03	'04
3	5	8	1	0	2	2	10	7

Source: North Korea: Nanto (2003), The ROK Ministry of Defense (2010)

* Symbol indicates the year when a provocation caused loss of live.

While the DPRK attempted to improve the relationship and to increase the exchange with the adjacent states during the Clinton Administration, it showed a hostile and aggressive tendency against the external world during the Bush Administration. The DPRK turned back to a closed and belligerent state, which it had been until the late 1990s. The changes of the DPRK’s attitude can be explained by the pattern of its military provocations against the South in Table 1. Given Kim Jong-il’s official position as the Chairman of NDC, and the background of the implementation of the military-first politics, it can be inferred that the DPRK’s military provocation was a political means that directly reflected Kim Jong-il’s mind. The results in Table

⁵ I categorize military provocation that follows the following three standards from data suggested by CRS Report(2003) and the ROK Ministry of Defense (2010): the KPA’s invasion of borderline with the ROK; an occurrence of military engagement between the two states; the DPRK’s missile and nuclear test.

1 show that the DPRK exhibited a less hostile attitude around the year 2000 compared to the rest of the period.

Based on the results in Table 1, we can assume that the coordinated engagement policy between the Kim Dae-jung Administration and the Clinton Administration positively affected the DPRK's attitude change and that the tough stance of the Bush Administration negatively influenced it. Some would argue that the DPRK's belligerence might be influenced by the amount of support to the DPRK. However, Table 2 indicates that the Kim Dae-jung Administration's aid to the North steadily increased regardless of the changes of government in the U.S. and the DPRK's military provocations. If the amount of aid to the DPRK was a critical factor that affected the DPRK's attitude, the military provocations against the South should have decreased in the early 2000s, but they have not.

Table 2. The total amount of assistance from the ROK provided to the DPRK⁶ (Unit: billion Won)

'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04
3.6	42.2	42.9	56.2	244.2	175.7	322.6	337.3	423.0

Source: The Ministry of Unification (2012b: 282)

To conclude, it appears that there is no significant positive correlation between the DPRK's belligerence and the volume of economic support. I argue that Pyongyang's attitude change was related to the change of government in the U.S. Given the fact that there were no changes of governments in major adjacent countries (the ROK, China, and Japan)⁷ except for the U.S. from 1998 to 2003, it can be deduced that the difference of U.S. policy toward the DPRK between the Clinton and the Bush Administration might be a critical factor to explain the DPRK's actions. Thus, I hypothesize that the emergence of the Bush Administration and its chain of actions were the main cause of the sudden change of the DPRK's foreign policy.

⁶ The amount of money is the sum of both government and non-governmental aid.

⁷ The change of government refers to the event in which a power transition took place between political parties that had different party platforms and policy orientations.

Theoretical Assumptions of Foreign Policy Decision-making Models

The realist approach to foreign policy decision-making is state-centric, based on and informed by the national interest concept. A state is the basic unit of analysis for analyzing a state's foreign policy, and a state is regarded as a unified rational actor like an individual who is pursuing one's objective (Morgenthau 1948). Based on this assumption realists explain a state's behavior from the perspective of struggling for power. However, the realists' rational actor model, which assumes that the national interest is pursued based on proper information and calculation between cool-headed judgment and objectives, was challenged by other foreign policy decision-making theories that presume some irrationality in the policy-making process (Simon 1957; Lindblom 1959; Snyder, Bruck, Sapin 1962). These theories put emphasis on the nature of fallible human beings and contextual variables—decision maker's cognitions and personality traits, organizational and bureaucratic contexts—rather than on an abstract subject like a state.

Simon (1957) emphasizes the role of situational factors that act as constraints on the decision-making process, suggesting a “satisficing”⁸ model. He criticizes the realists' rationality model that does not take into account realistic constraints such as lack of information, and stresses that human beings only have “bounded rationality” in the decision-making process due to limited information and cognitive resources. In his model Simon emphasizes a satisficing choice rather than an optimal one in decision-making, and places the core of his argument on behavioral rationality that explains what is rational within the assumption of human limits

Lindblom (1959) also criticizes the rationality model, suggesting a “disjointed incrementalism model.” He includes bureaucracy as one of decision makers or elements in the

⁸ Satisficing is a portmanteau word that combines “satisfy” with “suffice”. The implicit meaning of this word is to pursue sufficient, satisfactory goals rather than optimal ones.

decision-making process. According to him, a state's policy is not decided rationally at once, but is made by several decision makers through modifications and supplementations at intermediate states. From his perspective a decision-making process is described as "incremental and disjointed, just muddling through." In his model Lindblom takes into account the limited problem-solving abilities of humans and insufficient information, as well as the influence of various groups in decision-making.

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), influenced by Simon and Lindblom, brought about a turning point for a decision-making approach with a micro-perspective in international relations. They argued that knowing how to define or interpret the situation among decision makers is indispensable for understanding a state's action. Namely, they contend that the cause of a state's behavior can be perceived by focusing on a human dimension. The core arguments they suggest are as follows: foreign policies are composed of decisions made by decision makers; for decision makers, a subjective cognition of the situation rather than an objective one is more important; the situation that decision makers are facing seriously affects the process of foreign policy decision-making; the process of decision-making itself is a significant object of analysis. Although their theory does not identify which argument among the ones above is more important and what relationship those arguments have, they arranged an opportunity for creating diverse foreign policy decision-making theories that take into account various factors.

As discussed above, foreign policy decision-making theories and models can be categorized based on what level of analysis they take. The division among levels of analysis varies according to different scholars. For example, while Waltz (1959) identifies three levels of analysis—individual, state, and system, Singer (1961) recognizes two levels—national state and international system and Rosenau (1966) classifies five levels—individual, role, government,

society, and system. From a micro-perspective, individual and governmental or organizational levels of analysis are mainly employed.

At the individual level there exist two main approaches—personality and cognitive. While the personality approach puts emphasis on diverse personalities of decision makers (George and George 1956), the cognitive approach stresses decision makers' belief systems or internal images to account for a state's foreign policy (George 1969; Holsti 1970; Starr 1980). Both approaches admit a significant impact of key decision makers on a state's foreign policy and assume that psychological features of an individual can distort perceptions of objective facts and lead to irrational decisions.

At the governmental or organizational level the “Organizational Process Model” and the “Bureaucratic Politics Model” are suggested as conceptual alternatives to the rational policy model (Allison 1969, 1971). In the two models Allison pays attention to “patterns of organizational behavior” and “various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government” in explaining the outcomes of decision-making. From his perspective decision-making is not an intended rational choice by a rational unitary actor, but an unintended organizational outcome or political result among governmental organizations or bureaucrats. After he uses the Cuban missile crisis to prove the relevance of the models, Allison concludes that any models, including the rational policy model, do not provide an appropriate explanation for the crisis and that the rational actor model should be supplemented by the two models that place emphasis on the governmental organizations or bureaucratic system.

Many studies also have been conducted over the DPRK's foreign policy decision-making with different levels of analysis. At the individual level researchers have focused on the unique personalities of the North Korean leaders, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il (Sin 1996; Lee

1997; Hwang 1999). These studies examined how the characteristics of leadership of the North Korean supreme leaders affected their decision-making. At the governmental or bureaucratic level, the relationship between the DPRK's actions and the influence of the political structures—the Korean Worker's Party, government, and the Korean People's Army—and their interactions have received attention (Kim 2001; Park 2001; Baek 2003) and at the system level, the influence of the two superpowers, the U.S. and China, over the DPRK's foreign policies has been considered as prime variables (Martin 2002; Sigal 2002; Scobell 2004; Liu 2003).

In this paper I attempt to investigate the DPRK's decision-making and the cause of its actions in conjunction with the individual level of analysis, focusing on Kim Jong-il. The individual level approach is effective when “decisions are made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from organizational and other constraints” (Holsti 1976: 30). On the surface, Kim Yong-nam, the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, was the head of the state; however, Kim Jong-il monopolized substantive power. In Chairman Kim's speech at the 10th SPA meeting in September 1998, he announced that “the office of the National Defense commission chairman is a very important post; it is in charge of the whole of our political, military and economic powers and is the top post of the republic” (Oh and Hassig 2009: 90).

The State-run media outlet, *Roding Sinmun* in an editorial on June 16, 1999 described that “the military-first policy depends absolutely on Kim Jong-il's extraordinary leadership, which does not allow any other competitor.” Oh and Hassig (2000:91) states that “Kim Jong-il was exercising almost total control over the government.” Hwang Jang-yup, who was the elite cadre of the DPRK and defected to South Korea, stated in an interview on July 10, 1997 that, “We should know the North Korean structure. Only Kim Jong-il has real power.”

Given the political situation and the regime characteristics in the DPRK, it can be deduced that Kim Jong-il is the state's unchallenged ruler and the DPRK's action cannot be explained without his influence. So I argue that it is necessary to analyze the DPRK's supreme leader Kim Jong-il in order to understand the state's foreign policy and policy changes. If Kim Jong-il was relatively free from organizational and other domestic constraints to make decisions, focusing on the individual level seems to be reasonable and relevant to discern the DPRK's behaviors. In this paper, therefore, I employ operational code analysis (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969, 1979; Holsti 1977; Walker 1977, 1983), which attempts to identify the relationship between a state's foreign policy direction and a leader's belief system, and thereby shed light on the relationship between Kim Jong-il's belief system and the DPRK's foreign policy.

Operational Code Research Design

Operational code analysis is a cognitive approach that attempts to explain a state's foreign policy decisions through a leader's belief system. "Cognitive constraints on rationality," which connotes a leader's irrationality in the perception and interpretation of the situation, and the saying of the philosopher Joseph Jastrow, "the human mind is a belief-seeking rather than a fact-seeking apparatus," support the argument that the cognitive factors of a leader, such as beliefs or motivations, operate as crucial elements in a state's decision-making process (Holsti 1976; Walker 1983). From the viewpoint that a state's foreign policy does not correspond with the external world itself, but "the image of the external world that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy," the operational code represents a decision maker's image of the external world (George 1969: 191).

The practical research of operational code was conducted by Nathan Leites on the Soviet Bolsheviks (Leites 1951, 1953). In his seminal research, Leites defined the operational code

construct as the “conceptions of political strategy” in Bolshevik ideology. Alexander George (1969) developed the concept of operational code by standardizing and systematizing Leites’ definition. He re-conceptualized the operational code from the conceptions of political strategy into a “political belief system.” George refined the intellectual aspect of a leader’s operational code into five philosophical beliefs—the nature of politics, and five instrumental beliefs—the most effective means of realizing fundamental political values.⁹ He defined the operational code as beliefs regarding how a leader defines a situation and what strategies and tactics a leader would employ as an effective means for the situation. With his research the operational code was transformed from a concept into a scientific construct (Walker and Schafer 2010).

Based on George’s contention (1969: 201-202) that the nature of the political universe (P-1) was the ‘master belief’ in the operational code, Holsti (1977) classified six types of belief system by using two variables, the nature of the political universe and the primary source of conflict. He constructed a typology of belief systems according to whether a leader’s perception of conflict in the political universe was permanent or temporary and whether the primary source of conflict in the political universe was human nature, the nature of society, or the nature of the international system. The significant inference of Holsti’s typology was that operational codes among leaders could be differentiated by the two variables.

Stephen Walker (1983) attempted to combine a leader’s belief system and motivational images of needs for power, affiliation, and achievement. He first recognized that the three types of Holsti’s typology were significantly overlapped for both philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He then suggested four modified types¹⁰ and analyzed each type of belief system in conjunction with the three motivational images. In his research, Walker found that each type of

⁹ For more details see Appendix 1.

¹⁰ For more details see Appendix 2 and Walker (1990: 407-411).

operational code contained a dominant motivational image. Based on this result, he argued that a leader pursued a consistency between his image that derived from motivations and the situation he faced (Walker 1995). Namely, a leader's definition of the situation and utility of means vary depending on his belief system, and as the situation or a leader's interest changes a leader rearranges the definition of situation and political means according to his altered belief system.

Walker restructured the operational code into a combination between belief system that perceives the situation and motivational factors that induce the strategic inclination. From his perspective, a leader's operational code was a code of conduct that included both a cognitive dimension of the political behavior and a leader's motivational identity. In this sense, the operational code, as an internalized action code, operates as a causal mechanism of political behavior that expresses a leader's motivational images of need for power, affiliation, and achievement.

In terms of a methodological approach, operational code analysis takes an "at a distance" approach. It postulates that a leader's psychological features or belief system can be assessed by analyzing how and what a leader says (Schafer 2000). Due to the difficulties of a direct analysis and evaluation on the internal factors of a leader, an "at a distance" approach has been adopted to investigate a leader's operational code beliefs. In addition, to enhance the objectivity and credibility of this indirect approach, the Verbs in Context System (VICS) as a quantitative analysis technique was developed (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998; Schafer and Walker 2006)¹¹. VICS analyzes a leader's operational code beliefs from official statements, such as speeches and interviews. One significant assumption of the VICS analysis is that "a leader's public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will

¹¹ For more details see Appendix 3 and 4.

consistently match his public beliefs” (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003: 223). This theoretical assumption does not accept the possibility of fabricated or deceived image in a leader’s public rhetoric over an extended period. Although beliefs and actions might diverge for a short time, it is expected to be a temporary or exceptional phenomenon (Larson 1985; Walker 2000).

With the definition of operational code and its methodological framework, I attempt to analyze the North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-il’s operational code by using the VICS content analysis method. I sampled Kim’s public statements, including his interviews and speeches concerning the DPRK’s foreign policy.¹² To test the question of whether Kim’s operational code beliefs changed due to the change of government in the United States, I divided the research sample into two time periods, before and after the beginning of the Bush Administration. I set the research period from 1998 to 2003. Specifically, the sample is limited, in order to exclude the influence of other external factors—there were no governmental changes of the major adjacent states, and given the time when Kim Jong-il had officially completed the power succession process. In the first period from 1998 to January 2001, I included the New Year’s address in 1999 and 2000 and the interview material in June 2000 with Julie Moon, the chief editor of *Asian News*, for coding data. In the second period from 2001 January to 2003, I chose the New Year’s address in 2002 and 2003, and the interview data in July 2001 with *ITAR-Tass* news agency.

In this research I employ two coding methods—by computer and by hand—to check the methodological validity. Computer coding is conducted by an automated content analysis program called Profiler+, and hand coding is performed according to the VICS hand-coding

¹² Given the fact that Kim Jong-il rarely made a public speech, making an at-a-distance analysis could be difficult (Oh and Hassig 2000:87). While Kim Il-sung publicly released the address to the public by himself, Kim Jong-il instead published it through the media. However, given the fact that Kim Jong-il supervised the content every year by himself, it can be included as important data for the analysis of Kim Jong-il’s operational code.

manual.¹³ The reason is that an automated coding method does not provide a dictionary for the Korean Language. That is, Kim Jong-il's public statements need to be translated into English in order to use an automated coding method. As a result, it would be possible that Kim's intention in his public statements might not be accurately reflected in the process of translation. So I examine the methodological validity of the automated VICS coding method by comparing the operational code outcomes between hand-coded VICS based on Kim's original Korean language text data and computer coding by using Profiler + software on English translations.¹⁴

The Operational Codes of Kim Jong-il

I conducted statistical tests to see whether significant changes in Kim Jong-il's beliefs had occurred between period 1 and 2. I compared period 1 with period 2 in hand coding, and compared each period in machine coding with the norming group¹⁵ by employing a t-test. According to the results of hand coding in Table 3, in the domain of philosophical beliefs during period 2, Kim viewed the nature of the political universe as more hostile (P-1= -.59 vs. .30), and was definitely more pessimistic regarding the realization of political values (P-2= -.41 vs. .20) compared to the pre-Bush period. In terms of instrumental beliefs, he had a definitely more conflictual strategic approach to goals (I-1= -.36 vs. .63), a somewhat more aggressive intensity of tactics (I-2= -.12 vs. .36), and a high propensity to choose Oppose tactics (I-5d= .38 vs. 00).

In machine coding, there are a few statistically significant differences in Kim's operational code beliefs in period 1 compared to the average world leader. Kim thought the

¹³ For a more detailed discussion of the coding rules and hand-coding procedures, see Walker (2006), Walker and Schafer (2006, 2010)

¹⁴ I employed English version of Kim Jong-il's public statements from the English website of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) of the DPRK. See <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/calendar-1998e.html>.

¹⁵ The norming group contains 255 speech acts given by 35 different and diverse world leaders including leaders of poor and rich states and weak and strong states. The operational code indices of the norming group are calculated by an automated coding method and are regarded as the reference point of world leaders' beliefs. Kim's operational codes in machine coding can be compared with those of the norming group.

Table 3. Kim Jong-il's Operational Codes during Period 1(1998-2001) and 2(2001-2003) with Each Coding Method¹⁶

Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs		Hand Coding		Machine Coding		Norming Group (N=255)
		Period 1 (N=3)	Period2 (N=3)	Period 1 (N=3)	Period 2 (N=3)	
P-1	Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)	.30	-0.59** (3.18)	.28	-.46** (-5.81)	.25
P-2	Realization of Political Values (Optimism/Pessimism)	.20	-.41** (3.93)	.17	-.27* (-3.68)	.12
P-3	Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)	.28	.42	.30* (3.03)	.16	.15
P-4	Historical Development (Low/High Control)	.44	.48	.31** (8.04)	.19	.21
P-5	Role of Chance (Small/Large Roll)	.86	.78	.91	.97	.97
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)	.63	-.36* (2.32)	.54	-.62* (-2.93)	.33
I-2	Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)	.36	-.12* (2.28)	.39	-.38	.14
I-3	Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)	.50	.45	.40	.71	.30
I-4	Timing of Action					
	a. Conflict/Cooperation	.37	.42	.45	.29**	.51
	b. Words/Deeds	.31	.07	.50	.10	.53
I-5	Utility of Means					
	a. Reward	.09	.04	.35	.05	.17
	b. Promise	.53	.22	.37	.43	.07
	c. Appeal	.23	.07	.08	.05	.43
	d. Oppose	.00	.38**	.00	.10	.15
	e. Threaten	.12	.29	.16	.38	.05
	f. Punish	.07	.00	.05	.00	.14

Note: Significant differences at the following levels: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$ (two-tailed test). Values in parentheses are t-statistics. The scores of the “norming group” are provided by Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University. The norming group contained 255 written speeches by 35 world leaders.

political future was more predictable (P-3= .30 vs. .15) and attributed a slightly stronger ability

¹⁶ There were a total of 104 hand-coded and 88 machine-coded verbs from the coding samples.

to exercise historical control to Self (P-4= .31 vs. .21) in the pre-Bush period. However, during the Bush period, several of Kim's philosophical and instrumental beliefs differed significantly compared to the average world leader. Similar to the results of hand coding in period 2, Kim viewed the nature of the political universe definitely conflictual (P-1= -.46 vs. .25), was somewhat pessimistic about the realization of political values (P-2= -.27 vs. .12), had a very hostile strategic approach to goals (I-1= -.62 vs. .33), and had a lower propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a= .29 vs. .51). The results in machine coding imply that when comparing Kim's operational codes in period 1 with the average world leader, Kim did not appear to be a "rogue leader" and he even had a positive and predictable state of mind. During period 2, however, Kim's beliefs became more negative and conflictual, including the three key philosophical and instrumental beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1).


In the operational code construct philosophical and instrumental beliefs are organized around P-1 and I-1 indices. P-1 (Nature of Political Universe) indicates how a leader perceives the use of power by others in the political universe and I-1 (Strategic Approach to Goals) displays a leader's own propensities for exercising political power toward others. Given the fact that the rest of indices in philosophical and instrumental beliefs show the central tendency, balance, intensity, and dispersion of P-1 and I-1, the two indices are regarded as the key beliefs (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 177). Another key belief is P-4 (Historical Development), which indicates to what extent a leader believes in relative ability of Self and Other to control historical development. That is, P-4 means where a leader puts the locus of control, self or other.

In sum, the two key beliefs—P-1 and I-1—in both coding methods differed significantly from period 1 to period 2, and P-4 shows a significant difference between the two periods in machine coding. The changes in Kim's operational code indicate that he perceived the image of


the external world as more conflictual and was likely to employ more hostile means to achieve his strategic goals over time. With these findings, it can be inferred that Kim's operational code beliefs were significantly changed after the emergence of the Bush Administration.

Figure 1. Changes in the Three Key beliefs in Hand and Machine Coding Results.

a. Hand Coding



b. Machine Coding



Note: Data 1 (New Year's address in 1999), Data 2 (New Year's address in 2000), Data 3 (Interview with July Moon in June 2001), Data 4 (Interview with ITAR-TASS in July 2001), Data 5 (New Year's address in 2002), Data 6 (New Year's address in 2003).

For a more detailed analysis and comparison I investigated the changing patterns of the three key beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1) in both hand and machine coding over time. Figure 1 shows similar changing patterns in the key beliefs. While P-1 and I-1 show the radical changes, P-4 displays a relatively constant pattern. Although P-4 in the machine coding results indicate a relatively low level of historical development compared to the hand coding results, P-1 and I-1 in both coding methods show a consistent pattern, in which Kim's operational codes changed in a

more conflictive and hostile direction from period 1 to period 2. The two graphs also imply that Kim's intrinsic dispositions are changed and his image of others (P-1) and his strategic orientation toward others (I-1) became more belligerent and aggressive from the pre-Bush to the Bush period.

In order to find out whether there existed a significant correlations between the two factors—time period and types of coding source—and Kim's operational codes, I conducted a two-factor MANOVA, where time period (pre-Bush and Bush period) and coding source (speech and interview) were the independent variables and Kim's operational codes were dependent ones. Table 4 shows the main and interaction effects of time period and coding source on Kim's beliefs. The results demonstrate that there are several significant main effects for both time period and coding source and a few significant interaction effects between them. The results indicate that Kim's diagnostic perceptions of others and self's strategic orientations were substantially influenced by both time period and coding source, and that his strategic approach to goals and intensity of tactics were influenced by interaction effects as well as the main effects of the two independent variables.

The interesting finding from Table 4 is that the main effects of coding source and time period are also significantly related to changes in Kim's operational code beliefs. That is, Kim's beliefs were reflected differently in his speeches and interviews. When compared to the speeches, Kim expressed a more cooperative view of the nature of political universe (P-1=.10 vs. -.23) and was more optimistic about the realization of political values (P-2= .08 vs. -.16) in the interviews. In terms of instrumental beliefs, Kim also revealed a more cooperative strategic approach to goals (I-1= .62 vs. -.24) and intensity of tactics (I-2= .44 vs. .21). In addition, he was more likely to prescribe Reward (I-5a= .29 vs. .05) and Appeal (I-5c= .22 vs. .05) tactics as a means of

Table 4. Beliefs in a Two-factor Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) between Period and Source

Philosophical & Instrumental beliefs	<i>MANOVA Effects</i>									
	<i>Kim Jong-Il's Operational Codes</i>				<i>Period</i>		<i>Source</i>		<i>Period X Source</i>	
	<i>Period 1</i>	<i>Period 2</i>	<i>Interview</i>	<i>Speech</i>	<i>F(1, 8)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>F(1, 8)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>F(1, 8)</i>	<i>p</i>
P-1 Nature of Political Universe	.30	-.59	.10	-.23	43.33	<.001***	6.56	.03**	.78	.4
P-2 Realization of Political Values	.20	-.41	.08	-.16	32.72	<.001***	5.34	.05**	1.16	.31
I-1 Strategic Approach to Goals	.63	-.36	.62	-.24	89.25	<.001***	49.59	<.001***	3.74	.09*
I-2 Intensity of Tactics	.36	-.12	.44	.21	49.04	<.001***	34.94	<.001***	4.64	.06*
I-4b Timing of Action	.31	.07	.26	.20	3.43	.10*	.53	.49	.42	.54
I-5a Reward	.09	.04	.29	.05	3.43	.10*	5.64	.05*	1.34	.28
I-5c Appeal	.23	.07	.22	.05	2.46	.16	6.28	.04**	4.91	.06*
I-5d Oppose	.00	.38	.13	.11	6.25	.04**	.01	.91	.01	.91

Note: Significant differences as the following levels: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

achieving political goals based on his rhetoric in the interviews.

The results might be a matter of timing in which the two interviews were conducted close to the reference point dividing the research periods. However, given the fact that Kim's speeches were announced via the DPRK's state media to the public and his interviews were conducted by the foreign news agencies, the divergent results of the operational codes between speech and interview seems to be more related to the difference in target audiences. That is, Kim's ambivalent beliefs may result from the different types of audience—international or domestic. Kim's rhetoric in his interviews contained more cooperative and positive messages compared to his speeches. This phenomenon is well demonstrated when analyzing the interaction effects of time period and coding source. While Kim's operational code indices of the strategic approach to goals (I-1) and intensity of tactics (I-2) in the speeches were negatively changed from period 1 to period 2, those indices were relatively static in the interviews. These results imply that Kim's views of Self and Others appear to be more genuinely expressed to the public in the DPRK, rather than to international audiences.

As discussed so far, it can be deduced that Kim's belief system was significantly changed after the emergence of the Bush Administration and his rhetoric in speeches was expressed in a more hostile and sincere way. Considering the consistency between Kim's changed operational code beliefs and the DPRK's belligerence during the Bush period, this situation could be explained by the concept of "experiential learning." Levy (1994: 283) defines it as "a change of beliefs or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience." From his perspective it is hard to say that learning has occurred with a simple behavioral change because an actor could exhibit his behavioral changes without altering his underlying beliefs or preferences, depending on the

situation around him. Levy refers to those behavioral changes as “social learning,” and he argues that experiential learning is the one regarded as real learning.

In particular, Levy cites the importance of “complex learning,” when an actor “changes in beliefs about the laws or cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the optimal strategies under various conditions” (Levy 1994: 295). In this regard, Kim’s belief changes can be assessed within the context of complex learning. Kim changed his beliefs after the emergence of the Bush Administration rearranged the U.S. policy toward the DPRK from an engagement policy to “hawkish engagement,” which was based on rigorous reciprocity (Cha 2002). In sum, it can be deduced that a series of actions of the Bush Administration toward the DPRK caused changes in Kim’s perception of Self and Others in a negative direction and thus led him to instigate aggressive and provocative actions toward the external world.

Kim Jong-il’s Subjective Game

Operational code approach provides an analytical framework for analyzing strategic interactions between Self and Others in a leader’s mind as well as an analysis of a leader’s belief system (Snidal 1985). The two theories—Theory of Inferences about Preferences (Marfleet and Walker 2006) and Theory of Moves (Brams 1994)—operate as the analytical basis for identifying the strategic interaction implications of a leader’s operational code. The Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) assumes that the preferences of Self and Other in a leader’s mind can be identified from the combinations of three key beliefs—P-1, P-4, and I-1, which show a leader’s image of the external world, effective strategic orientation, and perception of the power distribution between Self and Other.¹⁷ According to the TIP rules, Self and Other are specified as

¹⁷ P-4 can be divided into two indices, P-4a and P-4b. The two indices indicate where a leader attributes ability to

(I-1, P-4a) and (P-1, P-4b) respectively and their ranked preferences of Settlement, Deadlock, Submission, and Domination differ based on attributions of the key beliefs. Table 5 shows the six TIP propositions.

Table 5. The Six Propositions of the Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)

Proposition 1 (Appeasement Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
Proposition 2 (Assurance Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit.
Proposition 3 (Stag Hunt Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
Proposition 4 (Chicken Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
Proposition 5 (Prisoner's Dilemma Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit.
Proposition 6 (Bully Strategy)	If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, >), then Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.

Source: Schafer and Walker 2006

The explanation of Proposition 1, for example, is that if a leader's strategic orientation (I-1) is above (+) the mean for a norming group while he attributes less (<) historical control for Self (P-4a) or a leader's the nature of political universe (P-1) is above (+) while attributing less (<) historical control to Other (P-4b), then the ranked preferences of the leader himself and Other are settlement > deadlock > submission > domination.¹⁸ From these intersecting preferences for Self and Other, it can be applied to a set of 2x2 "subjective games," in which a strategic interaction occurs between Self and Other based on the leader's subjective perception of the game between them (Maoz 1990; Snyder and Diesing 1977).

The Theory of Moves (TOM) provides the basic rules of play for the game. TOM can assume that a game plays in an unbalanced power relationship between actors rather than a world

exercise historical control to Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b).

¹⁸ In machine coding, TIP propositions indicate whether a leader's P-1 and I-1 indices are above (+) or below (-) the mean scores for a norming group while the P-4 indices indicate whether they are greater than (>), less than (<), or within (=) one standard deviation of the mean for the norming group (Malici 2008: 790). The standard deviation of P-4 is .12. In hand coding, I followed the rules in the VICS manual for making these judgments.

that is identical or balanced; a game can start from a specific situation, such as conflict or no-conflict; the outcome of a game can vary depending on who acts first. That is, the result of game differs according to what the “initial state” of the game is and who moves first. Employing the rules of TIP and TOM associated with sequential game theory, I examine whether the subjective games in Kim’s operational code changed between the two periods and assess the methodological validity of the two coding methods in identifying his subjective games.

	Other			Other			Other	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	<u>CF</u>
CO	<u>4,4</u>	1,2	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	<u>4,4</u>	1,3
Self			Self			Self		
CF	2,1	“3,3”	CF	Dominate	Deadlock	CF	2,1	“3,2”
	Hand Coding		Outcomes of Game				Machine Coding	
	Self (+, =); Other (+, =)						Self (+, =); Other (+, >)	

Figure 2. Kim Jong-il’s Subjective Games in Period 1 with Machine and Hand coding Methods.

Note: The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player.

Figure 2 demonstrates Kim’s subjective games in both hand and machine coding during the pre-Bush period. Kim’s key beliefs in hand coding specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for both Self and Other and in machine coding specify the preferences in Proposition 2 for Self and in Proposition 3 for Other. As discussed earlier, given the fact that the DPRK maintained a conflictual attitude against the external world, especially the ROK and the U.S., and the two states responded with hard-line policies, the initial state of the game was Deadlock.

However, as the U.S. and the ROK initiated a coordinated engagement policy toward the DPRK, the two states first moved from a CF (Conflict) to a CO (Cooperation) strategy, which was (2,1) outcome. Considering that the preference ranking of Settle (4) for the DPRK is better

than Dominate (2), it would be reasonable for them to “move” to Settle rather than “stay,” so the DPRK choose to “move” to Settle. For the ROK and the U.S., the outcome of Settle is the highest (4) so there is no incentive to move and it would be reasonable for them to “stay.”¹⁹ In sum, based on Kim’s subjective game, the set of no-conflict games, identified with coding by machine and by hand, between Self and Other were expected during the pre-Bush period.

	Other			Other			Other	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	<u>CF</u>
CO	3,3	“1,4”	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	3,2	“1,4”
Self			Self			Self		
CF	4,1	<u>2,2</u>	CF	Dominate	Deadlock	CF	4,1	<u>2,3</u>
	Hand Coding			Outcomes of game			Machine Coding	
	Self (-, =); Other (-, =)						Self (-, =); Other (-, >)	

Figure 3. Kim Jong-il’s Subjective Games in Period 2 in Machine & Hand Coding Methods.

Note: The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player.

Figure 3 demonstrates Kim’s subjective games during the Bush period. Given the fact that the DPRK sent conciliatory gestures to the U.S. at the beginning of the Bush Administration, and the U.S., contrary to the Clinton Administration, rearranged its policy toward the DPRK and turned to a tough stance, the initial state was Submit for the DPRK. Considering it is the lowest outcome of the initial state for Self (1), the DPRK’s strategic choice would be “move” from CO to CF, which was the Deadlock relationship. For the U.S., there is then no incentive to move to (4,1) because if the U.S. believes that the DPRK “stay” (4,1) rather than “move” to Settle, the U.S. would get the lowest payoff (1). For the DPRK, same as the U.S., there is then no incentive to move to Submit because if the U.S. “stay” (1,4) rather than “move” to Settle, the DPRK would

¹⁹ According to Brams (1994, 2002), the game ends when both players choose “stay” either at the initial state or one of the other outcomes. The logic for solving the game is “backward induction,” which is a formal way of thinking ahead more than one move to the final outcome of the game.

get the lowest payoff (1). As a result, the strategic final outcome or equilibrium for the DPRK's subjective game between Self and Other during the Bush period was Deadlock.

In Kim's subjective game the set of conflict games between Self and Other were expected during this period. The Settle relationship between the two actors could also be the final state for each side; however, the initial state and first mover of this game made Deadlock as the final state. This finding from Kim's subjective games indicates that the Settle relationship cannot be reached unless the DPRK first changed its subjective game to a strategy that allows them to move from CF to CO. The results tell us that the U.S. had the key for explaining the relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK by moving from Settle (CO,CO) to Domination (CO,CF) over the DPRK.

This game theoretic analysis shows the substantive changes of Kim's belief system for Self and Other between periods 1 and 2. Kim's subjective games based on his operational code explains well why the DPRK took conciliatory gestures to the international community during period 1 and why the DPRK resumed hostile and aggressive policies toward the external world during period 2. The findings of this research also suggest some policy implications toward the DPRK. That is, an implementation of an engagement policy toward the DPRK, instead of sanctioning, would be beneficial for the U.S. and the ROK in the long-term.

Given the fact that the well-coordinated engagement policy between the Kim Dae-jung and the Clinton Administration had positive impacts on Kim Jong-il's belief system and led to the DPRK's gradual opening to the international community, new and stable status quo on the Korean Peninsula seemed feasible. The utility of engagement was underpinned by the decreased number of the DPRK's provocations and it controlled their appetite for development of WMD. However, the Bush Administration established the principle of rigorous reciprocity toward the

DPRK, it negatively affected Kim's belief system and led the DPRK to be a hostile and aggressive state again. According to Kim's subjective game in Figure 3, the Deadlock strategy is not the joint optimal outcome for the DPRK and the U.S. In sum, the findings support the argument that the tough stance of the U.S. foreign policy toward the DPRK influenced the DPRK's belligerence (Malich 2007, 2008; Kang 2003) and suggests the potential beneficial policy effects of a renewed engagement policy toward the DPRK.

In terms of a methodological perspective, the two coding methods show slight differences for Other's strategy in Kim's subjective games. While Other's strategy is specified as Proposition 2 (Assurance Strategy) in period 1 and Proposition 5 (Prisoner's Dilemma Strategy) in period 2 with hand coding, it is specified with machine coding as Proposition 3 (Stag Hunt Strategy) in period 1 and Proposition 6 (Bully Strategy) in period 2. These differences seem to be related the results in Figure 1, in which the index of P-4 in machine coding indicated a relatively low level compared to hand coding.²⁰ The lower index of P-4 in machine coding signifies a bit more influential power of Other in the Self and Other relationship. As a result, Other is described as a leading or dominant actor in the relationship. However, given the fact that the two coding methods make consistent interpretations on the intrinsic nature of Self and Other and their dominant strategies in Kim's subjective games, it appears that there is no serious problem regarding the methodological validity between the two coding methods for this leader.

Conclusion

I have investigated the relationship between the changes of Kim Jong-il's belief system and the DPRK's foreign policy by employing operational code analysis. The results of the

²⁰ Profiler+ software identifies Self if there is a first pronoun, such as I, we, us and me, and recognize Other if there is no first pronoun in a leader's public statement. This signifies that although a leader's rhetoric expressed in terms of Self, it is possible that the software perceives that rhetoric as Other if there is no first pronoun. As a result, it seems that the software has a tendency to identify more Other than Self.

research demonstrate that the DPRK's foreign policy during the research period had a consistent changing pattern in accordance with the changes in Kim's operational code beliefs. The Settlement strategy, the dominant strategy in Kim's subjective game during period 1, explains why the DPRK pursued conciliatory policies such as the improvement of relations with the U.S. and the inter-Korean summit; and the Deadlock strategy, the dominant strategy during period 2, provides an explanation for why the DPRK turned into a belligerent and aggressive state.

This research tells us that the emergence of the Bush Administration was a cause for the momentous change of beliefs on Kim's part. Kim's operational code during the pre-Bush period indicated that he was more like a normal leader when compared with the average world leader. He might be an "intelligent, well-informed, even charming" leader as the former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described him after her visit to Pyongyang in 2000 (Albright 2003). However, Kim's changes in his operational code during period 2 showed that he perceived the external world as more hostile and was likely to employ a more aggressive means to achieve his strategic goals. Thus, Kim's negative perceptions led to the DPRK's increased military provocations and the deteriorated U.S.-DPRK relationship. Given that no policy changes were made among the major adjacent states toward the DPRK except for the U.S., it can be inferred that the impact of the Bush Administration significantly influenced Kim Jong-il's belief system and led him to recommence a hostile policy toward the external world.

One implication of this research is that operational code analysis could be employed as a barometer to measure a leader's actual influence in a state. This research suggests that Kim Jong-il was a leader with absolute power in the DPRK. The high correlation between his operational code beliefs and the DPRK's foreign policy demonstrates Kim's strong influence and power of execution. This pattern suggests that the analysis of the DPRK's policy changes during Kim's

regime should have focused on the individual level, the supreme leader Kim Jong-il, rather than other levels, such as small elite groups, the regime structures, or the influence of the superpowers.

The operational code approach may also provide an insight into the influence of the new leader Kim Jong-un. Due to the new leader's young age, 29 years old, and the short preparation time for a power succession, many analysts and experts have doubted the stability of the new Kim Jong-un regime. While his father Kim Jong-il had been designated as a successor 20 years ago before he assumed power, Kim Jong-un only has had three years to be a leader. The operational code approach could provide an answer for whether Kim Jong-un holds the real power in the DPRK and whether he was the de facto power for the recent chain of DPRK provocations, such as a long-range missile test and the 3rd nuclear test. In turn, these results may provide insightful advice on whom to target in future negotiations with the DPRK.


George' Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code

P-1	What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict?
P-2	What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P-3	Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4	How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
P-5	What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

I-1	What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2	How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3	How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4	What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5	What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

Revised Holsti Typology* and Template of Tactics and Strategies **

*I-1 and P-1 Indices are scaled along the vertical axis, and P-4 Indices for Ego and Alter are scaled along the horizontal axis with VICS scores. The scale values for each index are calculated from the percentage differences between the attributions for Self and Other.

**Reward, Deter, Punish and Compel tactics around the midpoint of the horizontal axis are variants of reciprocity tactics in which Ego initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then responds in kind to whether Alter escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Ego's initial move. Appease, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics at the extremes of the horizontal axis are variants of unconditional conflict or cooperation tactics in which Ego initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then does not reciprocate after Alter escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Ego's initial move. These tactics are associated with the six strategic propositions in the Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP), as indicated by the P1...P6 notations (Walker and Schafer 2010).

STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM

1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF OR OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+) OR NEGATIVE (-)

WORDS

APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)

OR

OR

PROMISE BENEFITS (+2) THREATEN COSTS (-2)

DEEDS

REWARDS (+3)

PUNISHMENTS (-3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS

DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

AN EXAMPLE

A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980 address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan..."

1. **Subject.** The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category.** The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain.** The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and Context.** The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

The **complete data line** for this statement is: other -3 foreign past Afghanistan soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

Verbs in Context Attribution Indices for Operational Code Beliefs

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index*</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
P-1.	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2.	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3.	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation** for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control)	Self or Other Attributions ÷ (Self plus Other Attributions)	0.0 low control to +1.0 high control
P-5.	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of Control)	1 minus Political Future x Self Attributions ÷ (Self + Other Attributions)	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
I-1.	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2.	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3.	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4.	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of Tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%X minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
	a. Coop v. Conf Tactics b. Word v. Deed Tactics	Where X = Coop and Y = Conf Where X = Word and Y = Deed	
I-5.	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise Power)	Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent of to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish	a's frequency divided by total b's frequency divided by total c's frequency divided by total d's frequency divided by total e's frequency divided by total f's frequency divided by total	

*All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between -1.0 and +1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998, 2003).

** "The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications" (Watson and McGaw, 1980, p. 88).

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