When Women Run the Show:
Female Executive Authority and Agenda Setting in Latin America

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Do female executives exercise the authority of their office in a distinct way from their male counterparts? Anecdotal evidence suggests that women legislators are likely to play peacemakers and negotiators, or to try and solve problems across partisan lines rather than reinforce political divisions. Further, there is some evidence that women legislators govern with a closer eye to women- and family-friendly issues. Yet there has been little systematic work extending such claims to the actions of women in executive office. As women increasingly secure the highest political offices, greater attention should focus on the implications for the political process and policy outcomes if gendered styles of governance and policy agendas do exist. We evaluate the agenda setting record – focusing on rates and policy content of executive decree issuance and cabinet appointments of women – of four female Latin American presidents between 2000 and 2014. We show that female executives wield their authority in a manner distinct from their male co-partisan predecessors: female presidents are less prone to rule by decree but much more likely to appoint higher rates of female ministers and to assign those women to more prestigious portfolios. Our findings have implications for understanding the potential benefits of women achieving executive office for governance in Latin America.

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A decade of female executive domination of the Southern Cone was solidified on October 5, 2014, when the BBC's headline read "Brazil's next President looks sure to be a woman." Over the course of fifteen months in 2013 and 2014, women headlined executive elections that resulted in the presidencies of Michelle Bachelet in Chile and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. They joined Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in becoming second-term presidents.

Despite relatively low female representation rates in Brazil and Chile, the popularity and reelection of these female presidents suggests that voters consider them to be doing a good job. Persistent commentary early on in Kirchner’s first administration suggested that she was simply serving as a placeholder until her husband could run for re-election; Bachelet was mocked for being emotional and lacking management skills necessary for a president. Yet Kirchner handily won re-election in the first round in 2011 and Bachelet ended her first term in 2010 with an 84% approval rating, the highest approval rating of any Chilean president since democratic transition, and politicians must pass the “Bachelet test” in demonstrating their “heart” to the Chilean electorate (Chavarría 2010). In short, the sex of these presidents appears to have had limited effect on their ability to prove their capacity to govern.

Beyond the rate at which women win (and re-win) Latin American presidencies, little is known about the gendered trends that might characterize their administrations or differentiate them from male executives. Though male and female candidates and leaders are often portrayed as having different campaign styles, policy preferences, and approaches to wielding authority, there has not yet been a systematic assessment of these approaches to commanding the authority and resources of a country’s highest office. Do female executives exercise the authority of their office in a distinct way from their male counterparts?
Anecdotal evidence from various cases suggests that women are more likely to play peacemakers and negotiators, and to try and solve problems across partisan lines rather than reinforce divisions. Female leaders often refer to this tendency as one of their strengths and contributions to the process of leadership (Bassett 2013; Miller 2013). Leadership studies in social psychology and management confirm these intuitions, highlighting that women tend to display or prefer leadership styles that are more communal and democratic, compared with men who are more inclined to autocratic styles of leadership (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001; Eagly and Johnson 1990).

However, most studies of political authority continue to focus on the bias facing female political elites, or cases in which such bias is either overcome or canceled out by other factors. Despite continuing to face bias against their role as leaders, leadership studies tend to reveal that women, once promoted or propelled into positions of power, are quite good at their jobs of managing, negotiating, and governing. Whether this is because they must be “twice as good to get half as much,” women tend to accomplish what they set out to do once in leadership roles. Yet while we know that women often take different paths than men to reach high leadership positions (Jalalzai 2013; Lawless 2009; Mansbridge 1999), and are often required to prove their multifaceted or masculine attributes to get there (Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie, Reichard 2008; Kark, Waismel-Manor, Shamir 2012), the link between doing what it takes to reach high office and what women are likely to do in those offices remains understudied. To date, very little systematic scholarly work has attempted to understand whether what women set out to accomplish or the methods through which they seek to accomplish those goals in high political office are distinct from men.
Therefore it is not simply a question of whether women wield their authority on distinct issues, focusing on elements of politics that touch on women’s and social issues over issues of national security and defense. It also matters whether women wield their authority in a distinct manner, in a less abusive way or less frequently, from their male counterparts, even co-partisans. Scholarly work has long established that parties, usually Leftist or more progressive, tend to focus on women’s, family, and social issues, and selecting more female cabinet and legislative members to do so (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Htun 2003; Studlar and Moncrief 1999). Yet at the level of the national executive far less work has been conducted, in part because of data limitations and a lack of theoretical attention to the distinct authority and potential explanatory power of a female executive.

To answer these questions, we focus on three criteria to assess distinctiveness of leadership style and use of authority. First, controlling for partisanship, legislative fragmentation, and presidential party/coalition dominance, economic and security crises, and female legislative representation, do female executives issue more decrees than their male predecessors? This may indicate a divergence in governing styles, with women less likely to pursue authoritarian (“abusive”) authority channels in favor of democratic (negotiated) channels, such as working through legislature-initiated legislative action rather than legislating “from on high.” Second, do female executives appoint more women to cabinet posts than their male predecessors, do female-held posts fit into “high” or “medium” prestige ministries, and what is the percentage of state spending by the portfolios held by female appointees? This may reflect an interest on the part of female executives to place women into positions of authority in order to enforce female control over the policy agenda, it may reveal an interest in gender
egalitarianism in roles for which they are ample qualified females, or it may be suggestive of the transformational leadership style of female executives who may see themselves as mentors to other women. Third, in comparison with their male predecessors do female executives pursue, either via executive decrees or cabinet appointments, agenda items that touch on women’s or social issues? This may reflect an alternative route that studies of critical mass have long sought to show: when women have sufficient power to affect the policy agenda in pro-woman or pro-equality ways (e.g. through holding directly elected executive office), they will.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we trace key developments in the literature on gendered leadership styles, female political office-holding and authority, and the relationship between the executive and the legislature, in comparative perspective. We then propose our own theoretical framework and offer three testable hypotheses regarding our expectations about the nature and agenda setting of female executives in wielding their considerable policy authority. We then test these hypotheses using an original dataset of female executive authority from 2000 to present, and discuss the results. These indicate distinctiveness between male and female executives on some evaluation metrics but clear similarities on others. Finally, we conclude with an eye toward future policy implications of understanding female executive authority that does generally derive from a more collaborative, negotiation-prone, and woman-friendly policy agenda, but with some caveats.

**Gendered Differences in Leadership Styles**

The literature in social psychology on leadership style and effectiveness has investigated leadership style as a consequence of differences between the sexes with respect to approaches
to leadership and as a cause of difference in effectiveness in business. Early work focused on the distinction between autocratic, directive, or agentic attributes – such as aggressiveness, competitiveness, or dominance – and democratic, participative, or communal attributes – such as focusing on interpersonal connections, being helpful, or being supportive. People associate women with leadership styles that rely on the latter, and the empirical research on these style-based differences typically found that women favored the democratic and participative styles more than men (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001, 789; Eagly and Johnson 1990).¹

Social psychology and management studies have investigated sources of the advantages and disadvantages that women leaders face. A meta-analysis of leadership effectiveness pointed to transformational styles of leadership, relying on motivation, stimulation, and idealization, being more effective, and women are more likely to favor such leadership styles (Judge and Piccolo 2004). Since the 1990s different management evaluations concur that companies with better female representation in top management groups outperform companies with weaker female representation in top management positions (Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003; Krishnan and Park 2005).

Yet in contrast to the evidence that leadership effectiveness is more synonymous with female-favored leadership styles, leadership effectiveness can still be constrained by subordinates, peers, or superiors whose expectations for women’s gender roles conflict with their perceptions of what a good leader “should” act like. Those very agentic qualities that men are more likely to favor are the traits most closely associated with leaders (Powell, Butterfield,

¹ For an exception, see Barakso (2007) on the effect of perceived gender role expectations that may condition this finding in same-sex environments.
to the incongruity between the perception of what they are good at or prefer and the perception of what “makes a good leader” (Eagly and Karau 2002; Eagly and Carli 2004; Heilman 2001). Thus female leaders may face pressure to assert themselves through more typically masculine behavior in order to advance in the workplace, and yet may face additional criticism for straying from their typically feminine behavior (Fiorina 2006; Catalyst 2001; Rudman and Glick 2001; Rudman and Phelan 2008). Studies have found the double-standard complicates the process of advancement in the workplace for women: they must be perceived as having or demonstrate both masculine and feminine attributes or leadership styles, while men must only demonstrate masculine attributes or leadership styles (Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie, Reichard 2008; Kark, Waismel-Manor, Shamir 2012).

Gendered Leadership Styles and Politics

A large and growing body of literature has evaluated two distinct but interrelated elements of female political leadership: how do women achieve political office and do they govern distinctly once they are there? Particularly in the context of female executives, data limitations have rendered answers to these questions difficult. Beyond an individual case or limited policy context, assessing distinctiveness of female decision-making and use of authority was often hindered by a lack of substantial numbers of female office-holders. More specifically, female executives, government ministers, and heads of powerful legislative committees were in short supply, rendering scholars unable to conduct systematic analysis of their decisions compared to those of their male counterparts. Only during recent decades have these numbers changed
enough to provide sufficient examples for comparative evaluations of whether and how female
decision-making may be distinct from that of men.

Recent attempts to gain leverage over how women achieve high political office have
been more successful in this regard: studies have been able to evaluate the ways in which
women are helped or hindered by particular institutional configurations, social and economic
demographic contexts, or both. In the context of female national executives, though the
numbers have been relatively small there has been sufficient improvement in this area over the
past three decades to enable statistical tests to pair with case studies. Such studies have shown
that female executives have often been “elite” in their own right, even when the socio-
economic context of women more generally is low or not improving, conservative and
traditional mores govern society, or the country is in a post-conflict situation (Adams 2008;
Jalalzai 2008; Tobar 2008). In the context of female cabinet members, women are more likely to
receive appointments where Leftist parties are in power and the national legislature’s female
representation rate is higher, though female “high prestige” appointments are still relatively
rare outside of Western Europe (Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; 2009;
Studlar and Moncrief 1999). While scholars typically agree that “supply-side” factors limited
female advancement, the cause of the limited supply tended to result from party and legislative
leaders failing to advance female careers within the legislature (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and
Taylor-Robinson 2005), despite evidence that women legislators tend to follow similar paths of
advancement as their male colleagues (Schwindt-Bayer 2011).

Related to these studies, scholars have begun to ask whether the mode through which
women come to power results in the increased likelihood that they “resemble” men or can
somehow demonstrate similar qualifications or attributes. Studies show that a female
candidate may not be prevented from electoral success due to gender stereotypes that bias
voters against her feminine traits or qualities but that she faces the double bind of presenting
herself as both masculine and feminine (Alexander and Andersen 1993), or must demonstrate
greater levels of qualification in order to achieve the same level of electoral success (Fulton
2012; Lawless and Pearson 2008). Women typically face different, often higher, evaluation
criteria in order to receive appointments to cabinets (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995, 29; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008; Kenney 1996, 458), but less frequently benefit from intra-
political party networking rather than professional or personal connections that men appointed
to cabinet portfolios do (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008; Kobayashi 2004; Studlar
and Moncrief 1999). If these factors are true, and there is evidence that women who gain
access to executive office tend to do so from an already elite position in politics, economics, or
society, should we expect women in office to act differently than their male counterparts?

With regard to substantive issues, we know that there are key differences in the areas in
which men and women pursue legislation and enact policy. Women are more likely to support
national legislation on social policy and work and family issues (Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson
2008; Thomas 1994, 7), spend on healthcare and welfare (Carroll 2001; Stanwick and Kleeman
1983), and pursue more generally liberal and gender egalitarian policies (Lovenduski and Norris
2003). The first Latin American country to adopt a National Action Plan implementing United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on gender inclusion into peacekeeping forces and
processes was Chile under Bachelet in 2008, while gender mainstreaming of the Argentine
armed forces only began under the tenure of the country’s first female defense minister, Nilda
Garré. Rising proportions of female national legislators are correlated with the adoption of comprehensive legal protections against domestic violence and sexual harassment (Richards and Haglund 2015), a decline in civil conflict (Melander 2005a), state repression (Melander 2005b), and interstate conflict and defense spending (Koch and Fulton 2011).

**Expectations about Female Executives**

Though plenty of scholarly work has attempted to unpack the potential of the “critical mass” to change women’s status in legislative chambers and to alter the policy agenda to more women friendly issues, much of this work is inconclusive regarding the level needed to reach the critical mass or the specific policies it can affect (Grey 2006; Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994). Gender is a cross-cutting cleavage in party politics, so female representatives may not always pursue women’s issues simply because they have diverse interests as a group (Htun 2004; Weldon 2002); as their numbers increase, the group is likely to become more diverse and possess more diverse interests (Reingold 2000). Women may be just as able as men to push forth their policy agendas, but it is not clear that all women should share the same agenda to push forth.

Female executives, however, are in a unique position to provide an answer to this puzzle. Rather than needing to overcome a collective action problem or facing a cross-cleavage set of interests among group members, female executives have the ability to be as singularly decisive about their policy agenda as any male executive. If the collective action or divergent interests hurdles are removed, we might expect to see female executives able to problem solve, be goal oriented, and achieve their own agenda items at the same rate or with similar success as male executives. If we do not, perhaps there is some credence to theories that there are
gendered differences in approach to, success at, and focus of policy agenda setting. That is, perhaps men and women not only have different interests, but different approaches to achieving those interests, which also may affect policymaking outcomes.

To that end we pose two intertwined research questions regarding executive governance. First, do female executives govern in a manner distinct from their male counterparts? More specifically, we want to understand whether they wield unilateral authority differently or less frequently, and also whether they buckle under pressure from or prefer to negotiate with other government branches more frequently. Second, how does their gender affect the policy decisions and appointments they make? Regardless of their manner of governance, we also seek to understand whether they pursue different policy agendas, which may be more women and/or family friendly, or less focused on security and defense.

Women who rise to leadership positions, particularly in various stages via the electoral process, cabinet appointments, and advancement within political parties, no doubt face challenges that are equal to or outstrip those of their male counterparts. However, while we expect that women elected to executive office (and those who re-win it) will possess both masculine and feminine leadership characteristics, we expect their style of governance to be more in line with communal and transformational attributes. As a result, we anticipate that female presidents will wield executive authority with more restraint, curbing their autocratic tendencies in favor of greater cooperation and negotiation with legislative and party counterparts. We also expect that while female presidents will pursue more social and women-friendly policies than their male counterparts, they may be more reluctant to do so through the use of decree authority, preferring to seek the legitimacy of legislative support. With respect to
cabinet appointments, we anticipate that female presidents will choose more women and
elevate them to more prestigious posts, in efforts to lead via idealized influence and mentoring.
As such, controlling for partisan affiliation, legislative fragmentation and presidential
party/coalition dominance, economic and security crises, and female legislative representation,
we propose four hypotheses:

H1: Female presidents will issue fewer decrees than male presidents.
H2: Female presidents will issue decrees on issues of social and female-friendly policy at the
same rate as male presidents.
H3: Female presidents will appoint higher proportions of women to their cabinets than male
presidents.
H4: Female presidents will assign women to higher prestige cabinet portfolios than male
presidents.

The Latin American Context and Paired Cases

Latin America has experienced dramatic growth in the number of female executives over the
past decade. The earliest elected female presidents were Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (1990-
1997) and Mireya Moscosco of Panama (1999-2004), whose own administrations were notable
for ushering in new democratic eras in their respective countries. By October 2013 there were
three female presidents in Latin America – Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, Dilma
Rousseff in Brazil, and Laura Chincilla in Costa Rica – who were set to be joined by the winner of
the first all-female directly-elected executive contest in history, the second round runoff
between former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet and her opponent Evelyn Matthei.

Bolivia, Haiti, and Ecuador have also had female acting or interim presidents, though they were not directly
elected and each served for less than one year. Chamorro’s ascendance to the presidency confirmed
misperceptions by the Reagan administration about democratic intentions of the previous Sandinista government
and her administration has long been credited for helping to stabilize and bring peace to post-civil war Nicaragua
(Prevost 1996). Moscosco’s administration oversaw the handover of the Panama Canal in 2000, though her
administration was plagued by a weak economy, legislative deadlock, and persistent allegations of corruption
(Gandásegui 2006).
Fernández de Kirchner, Rousseff, Chinchilla, and Bachelet each became the first democratically-elected female president in their respective country. And yet, this rarified group also boasts other "firsts": Fernandez de Kirchner is the first directly-elected female executive to win consecutive re-election, and Bachelet is the first former Chilean president to be re-elected since the country’s democratic transition.³ Lastly, the number of viable female candidates is also on the rise, with women being contenders in elections in Peru (Lourdes Flores - 2006; Keiko Fujimori - 2011), Mexico (Josefina Vázquez Mota - 2012), and Honduras (Xiomara Castro de Zelaya - 2013). In short, Latin American presidencies are an ideal place to test theories about gender and leadership because there is an ample selection of observations in which to make gender-based comparisons.

Additionally, Latin America has recently witnessed several presidencies that fit our paired-comparative research design particularly well. We choose four countries cases where female executives immediately followed male co-partisans in office, detailed in table 1. These cases have three distinct advantages. First, the specific pair-wise combinations of male-female executives provide a way to both evaluate a substantial number of female executives but also to compare them to male executives, while accounting for some key alternative arguments that might be made. The period from 2000 to 2015 provides a useful window of comparison not simply for the substantial number of women elected to the top job, but because these also represented dominance of Leftist ruling parties in the region. All four of our female executives

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³ Chilean presidents are term-limited to non-consecutive terms, so Bachelet was the first to win the second election she contested, with a one-term break in between her first and second administrations.
come from the same party of the man that preceded her.⁴ Therefore we include a built-in control for a general change in agenda and broad party ideology, as well as for the argument that Left-based parties are more likely to have women’s issues and women leaders as priorities. There is no Right-Left switch in our analysis. This is important, as it allows us to establish that distinctions in female cabinet appointments or the quantity and issue areas of decrees are not attributable to a Leftist political background that might make them more dove-ish or pro-woman than a man (or woman) from the Right. Ostensibly, they should have similar ideological backgrounds and pursuits compared with their male co-partisan predecessors, all else equal.

-- Table 1 about here --

Second, a long literature has claimed that Latin American presidents are more likely to abuse or overuse their executive authority at the cost of inter-branch power checks and balances (Calvo 2007; Carey and Shugart 1998; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Negretto 2006; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). While not definitive from a statistical standpoint, many Latin American presidents do wield the authority of the executive branch in a relatively heavy-handed manner. Certainly in contrast to premier systems, Latin American presidents are more likely to lean heavily on the strength of their office. As such, only choosing cases with similar political institutional structures – presidential systems, similar rules governing judicial appointment and executive order powers, history of strong militaries and associated legacies of authoritarian rule – allows us to control for a host of political culture factors that might affect executive decision-making strategies across cases. Though the Chilean and Costa Rican

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⁴ We do not evaluate Bachelet’s second term in office, in part because of data availability and in part because it deviates from the controlled pattern of “same party male-same party female” paired comparison.
presidents are understood to be relatively weaker executives in Latin America, both lacking a
decree power of their counterparts in Argentina and Brazil, we explore some
alternative measures to assess executive power in these cases. By comparing along some of
these measures within case using a male executive-female executive pair, we hope to eliminate
some of the potential concern about incomparability across our cases.

Third, and finally, while not all of these countries have gender quotas or similar
affirmative action mechanisms to boost female political representation, all have at least
considered the adoption of such policies and all have been the focus of intense international
NGO pressure to become more gender egalitarian across the political and social arenas.\(^5\) The
factors at play in creating this environment have been similar across the cases, with the same
NGOs and intergovernmental organizations playing key consultative roles in the debate about
these countries’ proposed and adopted quota laws (Baldez 2004; Htun and Jones 2001; Krook
2006). Thus, the pressures that played key roles in the elevation of gender egalitarianism and
women’s issues over the past three decades have been relatively constant across our cases.
Female representation increases in all the countries between 2000-2015 but the differences
between male-female pairs are relatively modest.\(^6\)

These four executive comparisons follow a most-similar comparative design: within-
party policy preferences, within-country partisan interests and institutional constraints, and
within-country social-demographic factors do not vary in the male-female pairs of executives –

\(^5\) In our sample only Chile does not have a gender quota law that applies to the national legislature, though
Chileans have debated the adoption of such a quota for a number of years and appear poised, under Bachelet’s
second administration, to finally adopt wide-scale electoral reform that includes a gender quota.
\(^6\) Dramatic improvements in Argentine and Costa Rican female representation began prior to the presidencies of
Nestor Kirchner and Óscar Arias, with Argentina ranging between 30-40% during the presidencies of Kirchner and
Fernández de Kirchner and Costa Rica ranging between 32-39% during the presidencies of Arias and Chinchilla.
the sex of the executive is the difference of interest. There are certainly events and
environmental or economic factors that differ from administration to administration: examples
include Nestor Kirchner facing the fall-out of Argentina’s 2001 macroeconomic crisis while
Michelle Bachelet weathered the 7.7 magnitude Tocopilla earthquake and ensuing damage in
2007. However, we control for many constraints that often affect the ability of executives to
govern with this research design and sample.

The four cases that we have chosen for paired comparisons demonstrate small
differences in terms of ascendance to the presidency within country. Thus, while within-pair
comparisons are still good examples of “most similar” case design, across the pairs there is
more significant variation in the correlation between prior professional training, prior political
success and success in executive elections. A brief summary of each pair of executives’ path to
the presidency demonstrates the utility of the within-pair versus cross-pair comparative logic
upon which we build our argument.

Both Argentine presidents come from the Front for Victory (FPV - Frente para la
Victoria), an offshoot of the Peronist Party created as an electoral vehicle for Nestor’s
presidential campaign, and both served in elected office for decades before becoming
president. Nestor was mayor of the city of Rio Gallegos from 1987 to 1991 and then governor of
the province of Santa Cruz from 1991 until his election as president; Cristina was elected twice
as a provincial legislator in Santa Cruz beginning in 1989, then to national Deputy and Senate
seats between 1995 and 2005, her last Senate victory before running for president in 2007.
Both were trained as lawyers at the National University of La Plata and were active in the
Peronist Youth, following similar educational and professional trajectories.
While both Brazilian presidents came from the Workers Party (PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores), their rise to executive office came as a result of somewhat different educational and experiential backgrounds. Da Silva was relatively poorly educated but rose to prominence as a labor advocate in Brazil’s steel and auto workers unions. He was imprisoned for organizing strikes in the 1970s before becoming a one-term national deputy in the transitional democratic elections in 1986 and losing three consecutive presidential elections in 1989, 1994, and 1998 before finally winning in 2002. Rousseff was an anti-junta activist, jailed and tortured for her participation in Marxist guerilla actions against the military junta in the early 1970s. She finished her undergraduate degree in economics and went on to hold a series of municipal- and state-level bureaucratic appointments through the 1990s. Da Silva appointed her to the mines and energy portfolio in his first cabinet, then as his chief of cabinet mid-way through his first administration, a position she held until becoming president. While da Silva and Rousseff both had previous labor movement experience that contributed to their policy positions and roles in the PT, Rousseff’s climb to the presidency resulted from a series of bureaucratic postings rather than political party work, as da Silva had chosen.

Both Chilean presidents were active members of the Concertación alliance’s Socialist Party (PS – Partido Socialista), and professionals who served as cabinet members prior to their elections. Ricardo Lagos was a trained lawyer, economist, and academic, a vocal public opponent of the Pinochet regime. He served in two positions in the cabinets of Presidents Aylwin and Frei in the 1990s, winning the presidential election in his first successful campaign. Michelle Bachelet was a medical doctor. She was tortured and then exiled to Australia by the Pinochet regime, and served in two positions within Lagos’ cabinet, including as one of the first
female defense ministers in Latin America. Both Lagos and Bachelet had unsuccessfully run for office only once prior to their successful bids for the presidency.⁷

Similarly, both Costa Rican presidents were members of the leftist National Liberation Party (PLN – Partido Liberación Nacional) and were professionals before becoming politicians. Óscar Arias was a UK-trained academic with degrees in law, economics, and political science. He served as president in two separate administrations, from 1986-1990 and 2006-2010, but not in any other domestic civil bureaucratic or elected position in Costa Rica. Laura Chinchilla holds a public policy degree from Georgetown University. She worked for NGOs focusing on judicial reform and public security, and then took up a ministerial portfolio under President Olsen before being elected as a national Deputy in 2002. She served as one of Arias’ vice presidents and minister of justice, one of the first women to hold the position in Latin America, before running her successful presidential campaign. Like their Chilean counterparts, the Costa Rican presidents both came from highly educated, professional backgrounds and had limited experience and success with electoral politics prior to their presidential bids.

In short, the male executive-female executive pairs suggest modest differences in paths to the presidency within country, though across countries there is more significant variation in the correlation between prior professional training and political success and executive electoral success. Notably, da Silva is the stand-out for lack of higher education, while all seven other presidents hold at least a bachelor’s degree and most possess formal legal, economic, or public

⁷ Lagos had run unsuccessfully for a Senate seat in the first democratic elections in 1989, winning the second highest vote total in the district but failing to obtain a seat due to the binomial electoral system’s requirements. Bachelet had run unsuccessfully for a seat on the council of the city of Las Condes in 1996; among those she lost to in the multi-member district elections was eventual presidential election adversary Joaquín Lavín.
policy training, with Bachelet the lone physician in the group. On the political experience side, the Argentine presidents each had decades of electoral success and experience preceding their presidential bids, while the Chilean and Costa Rican presidents had the least experience and, along with da Silva, the least electoral success prior to winning national executive office.

**Criteria for Comparison**

The basis for our comparison requires careful consideration of the criteria by which we judge (ab)uses of executive authority. Our hypotheses offer general criteria, but here we explain and justify our specific measures in greater detail relative to each individual hypothesis. Table 2 outlines the broad concept, the specific measurement with which we test the theoretical relationship between gender and the concept of executive authority, and the corresponding hypothesis tested using the concept and measure.

-- Table 2 about here --

To test our first two hypotheses, we gathered count data on decrees issued under each executive through 2014 or as late as was available. These data were available from governmental websites and typically included the date of decree issuance as well as a title and sometimes basic information regarding the content of the decree. When considering policy issue areas, we disaggregate decrees into six categories: administrative, economic, social, law enforcement, foreign/security, and regulatory. The first and last categories are similar but nonetheless distinct. Administrative decrees touch on day-to-day governance issues, such as non-essential appointments and naming issues. Economic decrees touch on fiscal, budgetary, and borrowing issues, such as tax policy, substantial spending authorizations, and debt
restitution policy. Social decrees touch on a range of social, cultural, labor and welfare issues, such as school funding or curriculum revisions, pensions and childcare programs, abortion and anti-discrimination, and minimum wage policy. Law enforcement decrees touch on all matters of law enforcement, including police qualification criteria and punishments for abuse, as well as legal issues such as judicial appointments or requirements for law associations. Foreign/security decrees touch on external affairs and include both international aid and trade as well as security concerns, such as providing or receiving foreign assistance, foreign debt renegotiation, censuring members of regional and international organizations, war declarations and border control. Finally, regulatory decrees touch on any aspect of regulation including environmental policies, transportation and communication policies, and setting rates and regulatory standards in science and technology. Where a decree clearly touches on multiple issues, we code a primary category that is most directly related to the area touched by the decree.

The Argentine president has the authority to issue both executive decrees and law-like decrees of necessity and urgency (DNUs); the Brazilian president has the authority to issue both executive decrees and medidas provisórias (MPs), which carry the force of law and must be considered by the Brazilian congress for conversion to full law within 90 days or automatically converts to law. The Chilean and Costa Rican presidents have the authority to issue administrative/regulatory decrees and presidential decrees that implement existing policy, but effectively neither has the ability to issue decrees that are law-like as in the case of Argentine DNUs and Brazilian MPs.

One primary reason for considering male-female pairs of executives is the different nature of the law-making power of decrees, as discussed in the previous section on rates of
decree issuance. When considering the possible variation in the content of decrees being issued, it is once again important to note that only four of the eight executives have what is typically considered to be full policy decree authority. The Argentine and Brazilian presidents have the authority to issue both executive decrees and law-like decrees—DNUs in Argentina and MPs in Brazil. The Chilean and Costa Rican presidents do not have the ability to issue decrees that bear the force of law, only the authority to issue administrative/regulatory decrees and presidential decrees that implement existing policy. In this sense, the Chilean and Costa Rican executives may prove much more limited regarding the substantive policy areas in which they may actually have the power to issue decrees. As such, it makes sense to consider policy areas in which executives issue decrees on a country-pair basis rather than as a pooled sample.

Finally, executives in all four cases have the same power to appoint cabinet ministers or individuals in roles that are deemed to be “cabinet level,” such as the head of the central bank. Our data come from the US Department of State and CIA’s *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments* publication, which record the name and title of all ministers on a monthly basis from 2001 onward.\(^8\) We retained posts with the title minister or secretary, and follow Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) in coding attorneys general where there is no minister of justice. However, we expand on their sample by also including individuals with cabinet-like ranks, such as heads of central banks and the Brazilian “chief of household.” Executives often have no formal requirements regarding who to appoint to which portfolio though common norms are followed, such as appointing someone with an economics

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\(^8\) The only exception in our sample is Lagos’ initial appointments in 2000, which were the same as those listed in the January 2001 CIA publication.
background to head the central bank. We consider initial appointments of the executives when they come to office.

Rather than focusing on the likelihood of placing women into “feminine” or “soft” ministries, such as family or culture, while keeping them from appointments in “masculine” or “hard” ministries, such as defense, we instead opt to focus on the overall prestige level accorded to the ministries to which females are appointed. Following Esobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005, 833), we distinguish between low, medium, and high prestige appointments. The low category includes ministries with perceived lower prestige and fewer resources: Culture, Science and Technology, Sports, Women’s Affairs, etc. The medium category includes ministries with substantial resources but perceived moderate prestige: Agriculture, Education, Health and Social Welfare, Justice, Labor, etc. The high category includes ministries with both significant policy control, high visibility, and perceived high prestige: Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, etc.

**Executive Decrees**

*Rates of Executive Decree Issuance*

We begin our analysis by evaluating the differences between male and female executive pairs in the issuance of decrees. Figure 1 indicates some of the differences between male and female executives in the four cases. Each graph represents the number of decrees issued in each quarter of an executive’s administration, beginning with the quarter represented by the first
The data for each “pair” of executives is limited to the shorter term available during the first term in office: Nestor (NK) only served 18 quarters while Cristina (CFK) is in the middle of her 29th, Rousseff is currently in the middle of her 17th while da Silva served 32, Bachelet is currently in the middle of her 17th quarter but only served 16 in her first administration while Lagos served 24 quarters during his administration, and Chinchilla and Arias both served 16 quarters.

-- Figure 1 about here --

Within the four cases, Bachelet is a clear outlier in an otherwise observable trend that male executives issue more decrees than their female counterparts. CFK issues more DNUs in only one quarter compared to NK, and this occurs during the quarter in which NK issued the fewest decrees of his administration. In only one quarter in CFK’s first administration did she reach ten decrees issued, while NK only has four quarters in which he issued fewer than ten decrees. CFK’s total of 67 decrees during her first 18 quarters in office comprise only 24% of NK’s total of 281 decrees issued during his 18 quarters in office. There are few similarities in the trends when comparing CFK to NK, with CFK’s decrees staying relatively low and constant across her first term while NK has a substantial peak of decree issuance at least two times each of his first three years in office.

In Brazil, Rousseff issued far fewer MPs than Lula, only twice surpassing his totals and twice meeting the same level. Even at her highest quarter of decree issuance Rousseff’s total

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9 Nestor began his first term in office on May 25, 2003 so his first quarter is coded as Q3 to reflect the closest full quarter he served; Cristina began her first term in office on December 7, 2008 so her first quarter is coded as Q1 to reflect the closest full quarter she served. All Brazilian presidents begin their terms in office on January 1, so the first quarter for both Lula da Silva and Rousseff are coded as Q1; all Chilean presidents begin their terms in office on March 11, so the first quarter for both Lagos and Bachelet are coded as Q2, all Costa Rican presidents begin their terms in office on May 8, so the first quarter for both Arias and Chinchilla are coded as Q3.
was still 50% lower than da Silva’s highest quarter. Her total of 143 decrees during her first 16 quarters in office comprised only 60% of da Silva’s total of 240 decrees during his first 16 quarters in office. Da Silva’s second term resulted in an additional 180 decrees issued, still 26% higher than during Rousseff’s administration. For the most part, the trend lines are fairly similar except for a peak in decree issuance late in the first year of da Silva’s administration and toward the end of his first term in office.

Bachelet appears more proactive in decree issuance than Lagos, both over time and in total during the 16 quarters for which there is decree data. Though he still has the quarter with the highest total, 12 in his first quarter in office, compared to her highest total, 11 in her first quarter in office, she issued 22% more over the course of her four years in office. She does have one quarter in which she issued no decrees, midway through her term, and her general trend looks relatively similar to that of Lagos. Since Chilean decrees lack the legal force of the DNUs in Argentina and MPs in Brazil, the relatively lower number of both Bachelet and Lagos indicates that Chilean executives are not typically prone to wielding such authority compared to working through legislative supporters to set the agenda and accomplish policy goals.

In a similar fashion, the Costa Rican presidents do not wield law-like decree authority but do possess administrative or regulatory decree authority. In this case, Chinchilla more closely resembles CFK or Rousseff in that she issued far fewer decrees than her predecessor overall, and far fewer during her first 7 months in office. Since Costa Rican decrees are issued at considerably higher rates, and data for the second half of Chinchilla’s administration are not available, the rates illustrated in Figure 1 represent monthly, rather than quarterly, decree issuance by each president. Arias and Chinchilla did issue similar levels of decrees for many
months, and their trend lines look similar for large portions of the time period, but the aggregate totals are quite different: 1009 for Arias and 792 for Chinchilla, for an average different of 53 per month by Arias compared to 42 per month by Chinchilla.

-- Table 3 about here --

In general, female executives do rely less upon unilateral policymaking mechanisms, such as decrees. Despite the potential pitfalls of comparing across decree types in the different cases, and even if we reduce our sample to the law-like decree authority held by the Argentine and Brazilian presidents, there appears to be a considerable difference in the propensity of male and female executives to wield their constitutional decree authority. Difference of means tests on each individual country pair produce statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 level, with higher means for the male executives in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. This data is presented in table 3. Only Chile is the exception, with a slightly higher difference in favor of Bachelet's rate of decree issuance; however, this difference is not statistically significant. If we take the group of eight executives as a whole, the difference in means of decree issuance between male and female executives is statistically significant and higher for the men. This finding provides support for our first hypothesis, and leads us to next consider the range of policy areas on which executives use their decree authority.

Policy Content of Executive Decrees

Within the group of executives there is variation with respect to how socially liberal or conservative the individual presidents are, despite all representing parties clearly labeled as “left-oriented.” For example, though Chinchilla belongs to a leftist party, she is socially
conservative and religious, leading her to oppose abortion and other reproductive rights. Upon
election, she met with resistance from the country’s feminist movement, which indicated that a
woman, purely by genetics and biology, does not champion the causes of equality and justice
(Viñas 2014). At the same time, she has been more accommodating of same-sex unions and
other forms of equality, though not quite to the same extent as Rousseff and Bachelet, who
spoke publicly in favor of civil unions during their first presidential campaigns, or CFK, who
signed into law the first same-sex marriage law in Latin America in 2010. Though there has been
variation in the degree to which the female presidents have demonstrated an interest in
pushing socially progressive policy agendas, all four have raised issues related to social equality
in some form or another during their administrations.

Female presidents in Latin America have wielded their decree authority for high profile
policy issues that many scholars consider to be among “women’s issues,” including access to
contraception and divorce rights. For example, Bachelet used a decree in her first year in office
to ensure free access to morning-after pills for girls as young as 14;\textsuperscript{10} Rousseff issued a decree
at the start of her second year in office to expand the home ownership rights of women during
the process of divorce.\textsuperscript{11} However, Rousseff’s ability to issue a decree that affected divorce
settlements would have been a non-issue in the Chilean context, where divorce only became
legal in the last years of Lagos’ administration. Picking and choosing individual decrees passed
by executives as evidence of their commitment to women’s and social issues is problematic;

\textsuperscript{10} Bachelet actually issued two separate decrees, the first was an administrative decree that was deemed
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and so the second was a presidential decree in January 2007.
\textsuperscript{11} Medida provisória 561, issued March 8, 2012, was eventually passed into law by the Brazilian Congress as Law
12693 on July 24, 2012.
these decrees may occur as a result of a clear attempt to side-step a hostile Congress, as in both previous examples. Instead, we consider each executive's decree issuance across a range of policy areas. We compare between male-female pairs to control for the within-country variation in the socio-economic status and legal rights of women. In this manner, we ensure that evidence of attempts to set the policy agenda via decree is not the result of different female presidents facing more or less partisan or biased legislative counterparts.

Figure 2 shows the breakdown of each executive’s decree issuance during the first three months of her/his administration in the six key policy areas.

-- Figure 2 about here --

The Argentine executives look similar, except that NK issued more than four times the number of DNUs as CFK, 22 to 5 in each of their first three months in office. On substantive policy area, the ratios are similar – 8 economic and 9 social DNUs by NK to 2 economic and 3 social DNUs by CFK – and NK also issued 3 administrative decrees and 2 regulatory decrees. In substance, then, the two Argentine presidents look comparable in the general content on which they use their executive authority. The same is not true of the Brazilian presidents, where da Silva issued 12 MPs and Rousseff 7 in each of their first three months in office. On substantive policy area the ratios are different, though the absolute numbers are quite similar. In total, Rousseff issued the majority of her decrees (4) in the area of economic policy and only 1 social policy decree, along with two regulatory decrees. This contrasts with da Silva who was more balanced across policy areas, issuing three of his decrees in economic policy, 2 in social policy, 2 in law enforcement policy, and 1 in foreign and security policy, along with 1 administrative decree and 3 regulatory decrees.
While the Chilean president is not constitutionally empowered to legislate via executive decree, Bachelet did use her power of decree issuance more than Lagos in her first three months in office in the area of social policy. More specifically, two of her earliest decrees were issued to overturn and reform the commission on indigenous rights that Lagos himself had established in his second year in office. She also used her decree authority to establish an advisory board on children’s policy. Aside from these three social policy decrees, their numbers in the first three months in office look quite similar: Lagos issued all 9 administrative decrees while Bachelet issued 8 administrative decrees and one regulatory decree.

The Costa Rican presidents are relatively similar in their policy areas of issuance, with both Arias and Chinchilla issuing the majority of their decrees in the administrative and regulatory categories with most of the remainder roughly split between the economic and social categories. Arias issued a whopping 186 decrees in his first three months in office, with 117 in administrative and regulatory decrees alone and a relatively balanced split in economic (25) and social (33) decrees. Chinchilla issued 116 decrees in her first three months in office, with 95 in administrative and regulatory decrees, 11 in economic policy, and 15 in social policy. Each issued only a handful in the law enforcement and foreign and security categories.

However, the breakdowns by country pair suggest that male and female presidents from the same political parties generally use this type of executive authority to address a similar distribution of issue content. The specific content may matter tremendously in the context of particular issue areas, and the female- and family-friendly policies pursued by all four Latin American female presidents in our sample likely have had broader social effects regarding gender egalitarianism and gender bias in policy outcomes and outputs. Yet when considering
general categories of policy areas in which executives wield agenda setting or policy authority, there are no substantial differences between male and female executives in our country pairs. Thus we find support for Hypothesis 2 and turn to the question of whether female executives approach the cabinet appointment process differently than their male counterparts.

**Cabinet Appointments**

**Rates of Female Appointments**

Figure 3 shows the composition of the first cabinet of each president by proportion of women appointed.\(^{12}\) For each country pair, male executives in the lighter grey bars on the left and female executives in the darker grey bars on the right. The comparison is clear: female executives appoint greater proportions of women to cabinet positions than their in-country, in-party male counterparts. The lowest level of appointments in original cabinets belongs to Nestor Kirchner, whose only appointment of a female minister was his sister, Alicia, to the Ministry of Social Action. In fact, the only female president who did not serve as one of her predecessor’s few female ministers was Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was elected as a national Senator in 2003 when Nestor became president.

--- Figure 3 about here ---

The within-case pattern is striking: in their original cabinets female executives appointed 70-245% more female cabinet ministers than their male predecessors. While Nestor Kirchner did eventually increase the proportion of female ministers over the duration of his administration, only Lagos and Arias went into their administrations appointing women to fill more than a quarter of cabinet portfolios. Da Silva never had more than three women in his

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\(^{12}\) These figures include any ministers and secretaries with ministerial rank, as well as central bank chiefs.
cabinets, despite the fact that Brazil’s cabinet typically included far more ministers than any other of the cases. In the cases of Bachelet in 2006 and Chinchilla in 2010, achieving greater female representation in the cabinet was an explicit policy initiative, with both presidents-elect making public statements about putting women in positions to control substantial portfolios and policy areas.

In comparing second to first administrations, where applicable, all executives dropped in the proportion of female ministers except for CFK who increased in absolute numbers (from 3 to 4) and remained relatively the same in proportion (from 23.08% to 23.53%). Da Silva declined from 3 to 2 and the ministers remained the same though not necessarily in the same posts: Rousseff shifted from Minister of Mines and Energy to Chief of Staff while Marina Silva remained as Minister of the Environment. Rousseff and Bachelet declined in both absolute terms – from 9 to 6 for Rousseff and 10 to 8 for Bachelet – and in the proportion of women appointed to begin their second terms – from 25% to 15.39% for Rousseff and 50% to 36.36% for Bachelet. However, it is worth noting that despite the drop-off in the second Rousseff administration, none of the female presidents had fewer than 15% female ministers while more than half of the mens’ administrations had fewer than 10% female ministers. Therefore we find support for Hypothesis 3 which posited that female executives will place more women into cabinet posts than their male counterparts. Though female executives from some countries assigned proportionately fewer cabinet portfolios to women than male executives from other countries, Brazilian cabinets under Lula and Rousseff have had between 27 and 33 ministers, while the Argentine, Chilean and Costa Rican cabinets had between 13 and 18 ministers under their respective presidents.
countries, in all of the within-country pairs female executives appointed more women to their original cabinets than their male counterparts.

Prestige of Female Appointments

Beyond simple numbers, assigned posts varied tremendously between the executives. Table 4 shows the comparison between cabinet posts assigned to women under each president, with “high” and “medium” prestige assignments in bold. Only Nestor Kirchner failed to appoint at least one woman to a medium prestige cabinet portfolio, while the other seven executives all appointed multiple women to at least medium prestige portfolios in each of their original cabinets. All original appointments of women to “high prestige” portfolios were made by female presidents – CFK (defense), Bachelet (defense; economy), and Chinchilla (economy, industry & trade; foreign trade) – although both NK and Lagos had appointed a woman to serve as defense minister in the second half of his administration. None of the executives ever appointed a woman to serve as chair of the Central Bank, and only one appointed a woman to serve as Finance Minister. Late in his term, in September 2009, Arias appointed Jenny Phillips as finance minister of Costa Rica when the previous minister left office to work on Laura Chinchilla’s presidential campaign; Phillips served in the post for nine months until the new presidential cabinet members assumed their posts.

-- Table 4 about here --

Again, within-case differences regarding the quality of cabinet appointments are relatively clear in three of the four cases, with Brazil as the exception. CFK, Bachelet, and Chinchilla all expanded the qualitative power and visibility of the female ministers they
appointed in their original cabinets, endowing women with greater control over resources and policy scope in areas ranging from defense to health to economic policy. While Lagos and Arias had appointed a number of women to medium prestige posts, their female successors both went at least two steps further by adding at least one high prestige post and increasing the number and size of the resources devoted to women in medium prestige portfolios. Rousseff was the outlier in this regard, appointing a much larger number of women than da Silva but endowing those women with not much greater aggregate authority or resource control. In general, we find support for Hypothesis 4 that female presidents assign women to greater numbers of more prestigious portfolios in their initial cabinets, though their male predecessors sometimes appointed women as replacement ministers in relatively prestigious posts. However, the only initial “high prestige” portfolio appointments occurred under the female executives of Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica.

Conclusion

Latin America was in the vanguard of those countries passing gender quota laws; women have no doubt been able to reach the pinnacle of power in these democracies because of the growth in female ministers, legislators, and candidates at lower offices. In some countries, we have seen dramatic shifts in women’s legislative and cabinet representation. However, as many authors have acknowledged, presence on its own is insufficient; it does not mean that women are empowered to govern effectively (Viñas 2014). One major contribution of our study is its recognition of the important role that female executives may play in empowering women at lower levels. By simply appointing women to their cabinets, not only in higher numbers, but
also to more influential positions and more high-profile portfolios, female executives are uniquely poised to challenge the norms of governance in Latin America. As we see an increase in female executives around the world, we should expect to see women being empowered to govern more effectively at all levels of government.

The phenomenon of female executives in Latin America has remained surprisingly understudied in the political science literature. Despite a substantial number of female executives as of 2015, many into their second terms in office, there has been no systematic study of the ways in which they govern that might (dis)confirm expected similarities between their actions and those of their male counterparts. Our study provides the first such test, evaluating pairs of male-female presidencies in four Latin American countries from 2000 to 2015. Once controlling for partisanship, legislative fragmentation, and female political representation, we find that female presidents are less likely to demonstrate the propensity to rule by decree, more likely to nominate higher rates of female ministers, and more likely to nominate female ministers to higher prestige cabinet portfolios than their male counterparts. However, despite anecdotal evidence that female executives place greater emphasis on women’s and children’s issues when wielding their decree authority, they are not more likely to issue decrees on social policy more generally in comparison to their male counterparts.

Our findings suggest that while women may rise to the top political offices through similar channels to men, and our female presidents reach office in largely similar ways to their respective countrymen, they wield their authority in distinct ways from their male predecessors. Though no less authoritative or capable of pursuing their political agendas, the female executives in our sample were more likely to demonstrate participatory and communal
leadership styles. This suggests that despite evidence that women may be more likely to win office when they more closely resemble men, once in office they will continue to pursue more traditionally feminine leadership styles. Given that such feminine styles are commonly associated with effective leadership in the business world, and given that in the context of executive politics that most scholars prefer the more participatory, more democratic, and more constrained authority wielded by our female executives, this style difference may indicate a positive new era of presidential governance in Latin America is taking place.

As more women reach the highest political offices, and indeed there are potential female presidential candidates for the 2016 U.S. presidential race from both major political parties, further analysis may shed light on the distinct ways in which women govern. Furthermore, linking the style of governance to effectiveness in the political arena would make a logical next step for analysis: does a more feminine leadership style produce “better” policy or more effective governors? For example, scholars may test whether more legislation gets passed by legislatures and executives with higher proportions of female legislators. Indeed, there is no reason to expect that the effectiveness of such leadership styles should be confined to women, and studies investigating when and why men employ such leadership attributes would answer other questions about what styles of governance are more effective. In short, our findings suggest that considerations of leadership styles, long assumed to be linked to the sex of political elites, are long overdue and have clear implications for the quality and effectiveness of executive authority.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female Executive</th>
<th>Male Predecessor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-present)</td>
<td>Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Laura Chincilla (2010-2014)</td>
<td>Óscar Arias (2006-2010)</td>
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<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Corresponding Hypothesis</td>
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<td>Use of Executive Decree Authority</td>
<td>1. Quarterly/Monthly count of decrees issued</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
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<td>2. Policy content of decrees (Administrative, Economic Policy, Social Policy, etc)</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
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<td>Appointment of Women in Government</td>
<td>1. Number of women appointed to cabinet in first term</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
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<td>2. Number of women appointed to cabinet in second term (where applicable)</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
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<td>3. Prestige of cabinet positions given to women (Defense, Health, etc)</td>
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Table 3. Difference of Means Comparisons of Decree Issuance

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Table 4. Female cabinet appointments by portfolio – original cabinets
Figure 1. Executive decree issuance by president
Figure 2. Policy Areas of Executive Decrees

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Costa Rica
Figure 3. Female Portfolios as a Proportion of Original Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% First Cabinet Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nestor</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
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References


*Political Studies* 51: 84-102.


