The free states of the classical world (especially in Greece and Rome) used citizen armies to promote and protect their free societies. The same model continued in the renaissance in free Italian city-republics where Machiavelli himself memorably favored militias over mercenaries as he felt they were more reliable and loyal to the city. In the American founding, Jefferson and others championed a popular militia as the backbone of American national defense. The French Revolution was driven by the *levee en masse*. It was not until the late twentieth century that we seem to have turned from this as part of the democratic ideal.

In the United States, after 9/11 everyone was asking what they could do to help. Then-president George W. Bush responded by saying that Americans were to go about their lives as they had before (and famously told the American people to “go shopping”). Many Americans thought back to their parents’ and grandparents’ experiences in the Second World War when the whole country was asked to collect raw materials for the war effort or to go without luxuries so that all resources would be available for fighting the war. It was largely because of that lack of sacrifice that the Bush administration was able to prosecute its wars with minimal resistance (at least for the first few years).

Throughout the western world, there is a widespread trend in favor of minimizing state impact on the lives of citizens, in taxes, regulation, and conscription. This trend is not only a reflection of the technocratic revolution and neoliberalism, it is anathema to the democratic ideal, especially as practiced in the original democracies. In those societies, they were democratic because it fell to the citizens of the state to enforce the dictates of the government. There could not be substantial distance between the people
and the state because the people not only selected those who ran the state, they were the state.

Perhaps we now believe that the only reason this was ever part of the ideal in the first place was that it served to prevent the military from forging itself into an autonomous actor in the public arena. If that is true, then there would be no democratic downside to having a military force that is separate from the general civilian population. In the modern post-cold war world where advanced industrial democracies do not see military coups, perhaps this was the thinking when those states abandoned conscription and mandatory state service.

This paper will first establish this as the reality of the ancient world and then set about to establish it as the reality of the modern world. The question is whether higher levels of participation by the inhabitants of a polity have any direct bearing on the character of the regime? As more is demanded of citizens, are they better represented in the government? Does the government better serve them? Does an increase in what is demanded of citizens in a polity lead to increased democratization and/or social welfare? Does conscription lead to democratization?

Here I contend that the issue of democracy is rooted not only in electoral control over those who control the state apparatus but in democratic control over and exercise of the apparatus itself. We can easily think of examples of regimes that have called upon their citizens for heavy sacrifices and yet given them very little. The scope of the theory in this paper is limited to regimes with at least minimal democratic institutions. The ancients and early moderns incorporated universal service to promote and protect their democratic and republican states. It is the contention of this paper that they did this
because the composition of the armed forces was the defining feature of sovereignty over the state. Those who constitute the forces charged with violence are those who determine how the state will operate (as, according to Weber, that is the defining feature of the state).

A democratic society ought not to privatize or compartmentalize the state capacity for violence because it is the compartmentalization of the state capacity for violence that is the seed of tyranny. This truth was well-known to the ancients and yet we seem to have forgotten it today. We have traded the security of a democratic military for the efficiency of a professional force. If we wish to maintain a democratic society, elections are not sufficient. The whole of the state must be democratic, not merely efficient or effective in its ends. The purpose of this paper is not to prove the causal veracity of the democratizing nature of conscription but to prove that it would be worth studying, even in our modern era.

**Surrounding and Established Theory**

In the ancient and early-modern world, there was an established belief that increased levels of service to the state facilitated greater levels of ownership of that state. Often this manifested itself in two beliefs. First was that in order to gain rights in the state, one had first to serve that state. This did not always happen immediately, but, as per Hintze, it would happen in the long run. The second belief was that a mass-based military was a boon for maintaining democracy.

Aristotle argued that when “states began to increase in size and infantry forces acquired a greater degree of strength, more persons were admitted to the enjoyment of
political rights.”¹ Put another way, as the politically-dominant class of citizens (what Bueno de Mesquita would later call the selectorate²) expanded as the need for soldiers expanded beyond the very elite in the society. It is with that in mind that I would contend that rulership over a state is intrinsically tied in with the composition of the state governance itself.

Aristotle’s politics was perhaps the first time that this idea was to be found in political thought:

And the earliest government which existed among the Greeks, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, infantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in their cavalry). But when cities increased and the heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government; and this is the reason why the states which we call constitutional governments have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical and royal; their population being small they had no considerable middle class; the people were weak in numbers and organization, and were therefore more content to be governed.

(1298a, 15-28)

In this passage, and others like it, Aristotle seems to have formed the basis of the idea for the political scientists and social theorists who see the military and its form as having a key influence on the course of national politics.

In section thirteen of book four of the Politics, Aristotle marks out the use of arms as one of the five ways in which oligarchies are capable of maintaining their hold over the people (1296b, 15-17).³ It is not unreasonable to contend that they possess the use of these arms to maintain their rule because they are the ones often found to be holding

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¹ Kyriazis and Metaxas, 2013, p 17 n14
Aristotle Politics: 1297β 16-28


³ The five ways are: “[the composition of] the assembly; the magistracies; the courts of law; the use of arms; and gymnastic exercises.” (1296b, 16-17)
those arms. Aristotle himself continues on to contend that the rich maintain control of their cities because (among his other reasons) they are obligated to serve in the military whereas the poor can opt out (1296b, 29-31). Aristotle held that in order to have a democratic society, the poor must be encouraged through monetary compensation to participate in the affairs of the city and the rich must be materially punished if they do not. Only in this way would all the citizens be made active participants in the affairs of the city and democracy could be maintained (1296b, 35 through 1297a, 8). All of this was rooted in the empirical reality of Aristotle’s time and indeed is abundantly present in the whole of classical history.

Following Aristotle’s lead and drawing on many of the same cases, as well as others from the medieval and enlightenment periods, Otto Hintze began his arguments with the assertion that all state organization was originally military organization. Hintze holds that to understand the relation of military organization to the state one must look to (a) the structure of social classes and (b) the external ordering of states and their relation to each other and the world.4

According to Hintze, wherever the situation was adaptable, as in Rome, the expansion of military need forced the extension of the citizenry with political rights. He goes into great depth on the cases of medieval Europe under feudalism. He also discusses the raising of peasant militias in the renaissance in England and France. Smith and Klinker quote Hintze saying that “[a] phenomenon repeatedly encountered in history is that fulfillment of public obligations leads in the long run to acquisition of

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public rights.”

Hardenberg in 1807 argued that monarchy would cling to the elitist composition of the professional army, he called it “democratic institutions under monarchical government.” Hintze also mentions the common dictum that militarism and republicanism are antithetical.

Weber, in writing on citizenship, argued that there are three kinds of citizenship: first is a classification of “specific communal or economic interest” which can be of greater or lesser degree; second is political citizenship which “signifies membership in the state” and holding political rights; third are the strata which are drawn together as a class (as opposed to the bureaucracy or proletariat). Weber develops what he sees as the origins of citizenship in world history at some length. He specifically sees it as an urban and western phenomenon as these were fortified positions often of some autonomy that required defense.

The occidental city is in its beginnings first of all a defense group, an organization of those economically competent to bear arms, to equip and train themselves. Whether the military organization is based on the principle of self-equipment or on that of equipment by a military overlord who furnishes horses, arms and provisions, is a distinction quite as fundamental for social history as is the question whether the means of economic production are the property of the worker or of a capitalistic entrepreneur.

Weber continues:

The basis of democratization is everywhere purely military in character. It lies in the rise of disciplined infantry, the hoplites of antiquity, the guild in the middle ages. Military discipline meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was compelled to secure the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms, and along with arms political power,

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6 Hintze, 184, 196, 211.


8 Weber, 330.
As Weber tells the story, the common people of the city then continue their quest for equality in government and before the law through their own institutions (once those are granted). They do so because they feel their power in that they are the defenders of the state.

The *popolani* know that they are rich and have fought and won the great wars of the city along with the nobility; they are armed, and hence feel themselves discriminated against and are no longer content with the subordinate class position which they have previously accepted. (326)

Weber further marks that the development of ancient democracy was characterized by differentiation among the strata such that those who could afford to outfit themselves formed the phalanxes and then those who could not afford to outfit themselves formed the navy. This is what gave even the poor in Athens a voice in the government. Notably the same action undercut republican government in Rome following the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones. ¹⁰

Among those who did study the power of conscription was Stanislav Andreski. Andreski’s work (1968) was centered around the relationship between the military and society and how the military’s form impacted society. Andreski’s MPR (Military Participation Ratio) measures those utilized for military ends as a proportion of the total population. ¹¹ Andreski notes that militarization sometimes flattens and sometimes heightens social stratification. He develops at some length the idea that the kind of military matters, but that kind of military is determined by the military environment of

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⁹ Weber, 325-326.
Porter (1994) xvi.3


¹¹ Dahl (1989) cites Andreski for his Military Participation Ratio
the era. One of the distinctions that he makes is that it matters whether the army is self-equipped (as was the case for the Greeks and Romans) or paid by the state and given a high MPR the first category will exert more of a leveling force while the latter will exacerbate social stratification. Andreski’s worry with the cost of equipping an army seems to have more to do with the potential for rebellion, but the point is still valid as applicable to the force for democracy. Societies which use women to fight also seem to have dramatic increases in their treatment though that would require more than he was able to do in this work.\(^{12}\)

Andreski advanced the idea that increased militarization facilitated the move toward “hierachization and monocratiazation” as militaries are organized monarchically (one leader).\(^{13}\) Responding to the “common complaint” that conscription did not produce democracy, Andreski argues in passing that “there is no doubt that it fostered egalitarian reforms.” He goes on to note that there is no reason to think that conscription would have led to increased peace or less intense or costly war.\(^{14}\) He did not elaborate on why this might be or what it implied, he sought only to place a firm limit on what could be inferred based on his analysis of the effects of conscription (namely that you could presume a more peaceful world would follow from higher levels of conscription). He did not speculate as to why this might be, merely that it was.

Andreski classifies militaries on three criteria: MPR, the level of subordination in the military, and the cohesion of the military.\(^{15}\) Polities with high MPR, low cohesion


\(^{13}\) Andreski, 96.

\(^{14}\) Andreski, 116-117.

\(^{15}\) Andreski, 120-123.
and low subordination are most likely to produce democratic outcomes.\textsuperscript{16} He then explains the ways that transitions between these kinds of militaries take place and the probability of revolution.\textsuperscript{17} Andreski classifies militaries on three criteria: MPR, the level of subordination in the military, and the cohesion of the military. Polities with high MPR, low cohesion and low subordination are most likely to produce democratic outcomes. He then explains the ways that transitions between these kinds of militaries take place and the probability of revolution.\textsuperscript{18}

Klinkner and Smith demonstrate how the participation of African Americans in the war efforts led to greater participation and the increased demand for new rights.\textsuperscript{19} Specifically they assert that racial progress only occurs when a) large scale mobilization includes African Americans, b) the nature of America’s enemies requires justification of founding values even applying to African Americans, and c) when protest movements put pressure on political leaders to live up to ideals. I note that all of these are seen to have fallen after major wars where African Americans were necessary to win the war.\textsuperscript{20}

In his treatment of citizenship’s development, Ceteno begins with the historical reality that military service has been key to forging citizens in the United States and Europe since World War Two. He further holds that it has become clear in recent work on the social bases of democracy that war has facilitated social interaction and formation of associations of social capital. Until 1848, the army was an ally of liberalism,

\textsuperscript{16} Andreski, 139-147, esp. 146-149.

\textsuperscript{17} Andreski, 157-160.

\textsuperscript{18} Andreski, 139-160.

\textsuperscript{19} As referenced by Scheve and Stasavage (2012) p 84.

not the rightist regime and, citing/paraphrasing Joenniemi, that “[c]onscription became an emancipatory measure; the conscript was seen as having a role in the nation.” The army was also directly advantageous to the people who enrolled or were conscripted as it served as their hospital and school.  

Ceteno cites Andrew Vagts who argued that each stage of social progress produces military institutions in accordance with its needs and ideas. Ceteno observes how the military grew in Europe, while in Latin America over the nineteenth century it never reached comparable size in war and in peacetime it was usually disbanded. Ceteno further notes the oft-cited fact that in Europe and the United States, these large-scale mobilization and conscription efforts created nations where (arguably) none existed before.  

Centeno’s work is focused on Latin America where historically there has been very low participation in the military. There were definitely ideologues who preached the virtues of the military for national regeneration. The universal draft was intended as a way to address the inequalities of society and provide a meeting place for different segments of society. Ceteno cites many examples of how the armies in the wars of independence and thereafter were drawn from the criminal classes, the indians, and (former) slaves, a practice used on both sides of the wars for independence, though some question the truth of this claim. Race was an explicit factor in most Latin American countries and the structure of their militaries. According to Ceteno, service in the colonial militia was very influential in forging the local identity defined by territory.


22 Centeno, 218, 232, 239.
At the same time, the elites feared the power that would be accumulated by the people and therefore often turned to foreign mercenaries.

The standard approach across Latin America in the face of a national security threat was not to mobilize more of the people but to use the armed forces to repress and control the populace. Surprisingly the militaries of Latin America did not play a role in advancing a welfare state to produce better soldiers or better rewards for veterans.\(^{23}\) Ceteno marks out four patterns of military conscription found in Latin America. Paraguay during the war of triple alliance is perhaps the only example of total mobilization on the scale of European wars. Argentina with its limited conscription. Chile’s use of the national guard. In most cases there is a huge gulf between the armed forces and the dominant segments of society. By contrast the British, French, and American military experiences not only helped to create the nation but a more equal nation.\(^{24}\) For Centeno and those of like mind, it was this lack of cooption into the state that facilitated the ease with which states in Latin America remained nondemocratic.

Ceteno cites Barkley and Parikh as saying that as people were granted the right to participate in war, they were also granted more rights and more welfare services and that “when states grew dependent on populations for crucial resources, they were forced to develop symbiotic relations with the latter.”\(^{25}\) According to these authors, in the course of monopolizing the use of violence in the state they inevitably faced resistance. In order to fight those wars, they needed taxes and the capacity to gather them, this

\(^{23}\) Ceteno, 218, 246-249, 254-257.

\(^{24}\) Ceteno, 259-260.

seems to be in line with Tilly’s famous comparison to organized crime (527-528). This becomes relevant to my work when they say that “[w]hen states grow dependent on populations for crucial resources, they are forced to develop symbiotic relations with the latter.” (528). This seems to have been the one relevant line in the article. It essentially embodies the sentiment of the literature on the subject of how the people gain a say in the state but does not provide anything close to a mechanism.

With these few exceptions, modern comparative politics has largely avoided the subject of what social role might be played by the military in the development of democracy. There are numerous studies that point to the perils of militarization as they present themselves in the form of coups or military control over the government but few that point to its democratic benefits. Lasswell spoke for many when he warned of what he termed “the garrison state.” While his writing has been exaggerated by scholars since then, the worry over the threat posed by stronger indoctrination has become well-established in the literature. Similarly, Huntington’s work served repeatedly to emphasize this danger.

Despite all of that history, we no longer attribute the same democratizing power to conscription. It would seem that the experience of totalitarianism soured our theorists on the concept of conscription and mandatory state service as a democratizing or otherwise positive force. This is not to say that we have ceased to give any role to the power of military service. Perhaps the most extreme example is that of military service as a tool in nation-building. The cardinal example of this is, like most studies of nationalism, France. As Eugen Weber (1979) demonstrated so adeptly, military service

throughout the provinces was a major driving force in the development of the French national identity.

One place where the sacrifice of citizens is still an issue in comparative politics is on the subject of taxes. The resource curse is a well-known political phenomenon. Those who support its argument contend that the lack of accountability that regimes face when they do not need to extract taxes is not conducive to democratization. Bates and Lien pose the research question as follows: in order to increase the willingness of people to pay taxes, do governments cater to the policy preferences of their citizens? They posit that governments make concessions to those whose monies they need in order to better raise revenue. Bates and Lien do not test the hypothesis but they do establish the theoretical explanation for their theory. They back up their hypothesis by an appeal to the historical record. Drawing on the historical record (especially from western Europe in the middle ages, Bates and Lien find that the mode of taxation directly influences the form of government and who has a say. More broadly they find that the monarchs of Europe needed monies to fight their wars but warfare did not determine the nature of the tax system and that the rational monarch will make concessions to the people to increase his tax revenues.27

The logical implication here is that as states and leaders need more resources from their people that the people must have more of a say in that government. This is both helpful and insightful in that it helps to explain the rise in representation among non-aristocratic segments of society. It becomes questionable if it were to be applied en

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masse to the breadth of the people without providing a mechanism by which that change should be effected.

Weins addresses the more famous side of this contention which is popularly called the resource curse. He posits that a preponderance of natural resources inhibits democracy because it not only reduces the demand on governments to negotiate concessions from citizens but also reduces the credibility of a threat of a citizen withholding resources. They further posit that while resource revenues might inhibit democratization, they would not reverse the process in a democracy.\footnote{David Weins. “Natural Resources and Government Responsiveness.” \textit{Politics, Philosophy and Economics} (August 2013): esp. 2-4.}

Ross, in 2004, set out to empirically test the proposition that representation is a product of taxation. He takes the data on taxation and democracy from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997 and tests it against the theories that representation either arises because of resistance to taxation or representation arises because of a bargaining process between the people and the state. Ross eventually finds that there is no support for the anti-tax hypothesis but that there is support for the tax bargaining hypothesis. More broadly they find that a rise in the cost of government (i.e. tax/spending) is associated with a rise in the level of democracy.\footnote{Michael Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” \textit{British Journal of Political Science}, 34.2 (April 2004): esp, 243-244.}

\textit{my theory}

Every regime must ensure its ability to function through control of two resources: labor and money. The regime needs those resources for every function which protects its power or establishes its authority and defends it from those who would challenge its rule
(either from inside its territory or outside of it). The regime must gather those resources from some source inside or outside of the population. They can take those resources from mineral wealth, taxes, conscription and other forms of forced labor and resource collection either from its citizens, the non-citizens in its population or a source external to its boundaries (e.g. tribute or aid from a foreign power). Many regimes have used an elite guard to safeguard the capacity for violence and funded their efforts from mineral wealth and levies on the nobility. On the other hand, many great civilizations have turned to the common body of citizens for their support and defense. The Spartans\textsuperscript{30}, Athenians and Romans (and others including the modern Swiss) all relied upon the breadth of their citizen population for the basic maintenance of their state in the face of internal or foreign enemies.

According to Cohen, one of the basic reasons for a popular military is that it is insurance against a monarch using professional troops to crush popular liberties. The common traits of militia obligation (universality, limited active service, local recruiting and service, and limited obligation to fight) should make it most ideologically attractive to liberal democratic states. Universal military service serves the purpose of instilling national values.\textsuperscript{31}

The ancients and early moderns agreed that expanded military service led to the expansion of state (what Bueno de Mesquita calls the selectorate). Aristotle argued that

\textsuperscript{30} Being asked once how far the bounds of Sparta extended, he said, with a flourish of his spear, “As far as this can reach.”
\textsuperscript{31} When someone else wished to know why Sparta was without walls, he pointed to the citizens in full armour and said, “These are the Spartans’ walls.”
Plutarch, Sayings of the Spartans, 28-29.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Sayings_of_Spartans*/Agesilaus.html

Cohen, 123-133.
“when however, states began to increase in size and infantry forces acquired a greater degree of strength, more persons were admitted to the enjoyment of political rights.”

Max Weber concurred when he argued that “[t]he decisive criterion (for the voting right in the assembly) was initially the capacity to equip oneself for service in the hoplite infantry.” These rights are not always granted immediately but the long-term pressure will eventually bring about this result. As Hintze argued “[a] phenomenon repeatedly encountered in history is that fulfillment of public obligations leads in the long run to acquisition of public rights.”

We may of course, contend that this is no longer relevant as most of the world is democratic and if the only benefit of mandatory state service is increased democratization it would be of minimal benefit in today’s world. The question now before us is whether we risk the reverse process by removing the democratizing and nationalizing force of mandatory state service. Rousseau identified republican virtue with military service and contended that the transition from physical service to the state into monetary service to the state was the mark of a declining [state]:

As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocketbooks rather than with their persons, the State is already close to ruin.

It is the contention of this paper that mandatory state service (most often conscription) was and is a major driving force of democratization. State service binds
civil society to the state. This mandatory service serves to tie the individual to the state. Not just because they will be bound to implement the decisions taken by the government but because they gain a sense of ownership over the government. It is a mistake to abandon this building block of democracy because we have already achieved some measure of democracy and we believe it to be invulnerable. Unless there is some other institutional mechanism by which people can gain a connection with the state, whatever civil society exists will become isolated from the state and democracy will erode.

The Historical Record

The question is whether the choice in who is called upon to fund and serve the regime is linked to the kind of regime that they are called to support. At face value, it seems that they were linked in that the Athenians initially established their democracy and shortly thereafter the citizen class worked together to win the battle of Marathon; they then expanded their democracy after they won the sea battle of Salamis by shifting the rule away from the leading citizens and toward the common people (many of whom had been those sailors). Rome gradually expanded their franchise and the power of the plebeian class over the first two centuries of the Republic; between the end of the Second Punic War and the fall of the Republic they demanded less of their citizens and protected them less from the harsh economic realities they faced; by the end of the Republic landed citizens did not even fill their armies. Similarly in the modern era of the twentieth century the rates of involvement in government and the generosity of the government have seemed to increase directly following the great wars. The question of this study is whether there is actually a relationship which is constant throughout the
ancient and modern world and not limited to anecdotal evidence, which exists over long periods of time and across cases.

**The Classical World**

All of the great examples of free peoples in the ancient world demanded military state service as a condition of citizenship. The two cardinal examples are Athens and Rome. In both of these cities, the basic social contract was that citizenship was to be accompanied by mandatory service to defend the state. In Athens, the hoplite phalanx meant that in order to be a citizen, the individual had to provide themselves with arms and armor as well as training with the rest of the city in preparation for military service. The Athenians reflected this in the entirety of their government was a product of direct participation by those citizens randomly assigned to their duties.

Modern scholars, looking at this phenomenon, have emphasized the power of the trireme as the driving force of democracy rather than the phalanx. Many histories of the classical world explain the advent of democracy through the expansion of military forces from different parts of society. In ancient Greece, that expansion came with the introduction of the phalanx and then the trireme. In much of the literature on the classical world (from ancient times, through early modern, and on to today) that expansion of who protects the state was seen as an integral part of who would be seen as a part of the city.

One of the great dividends gained by the Athenians due to their democratic government was the more ardent support of their citizens. Today we point to the words of Pericles, in his famous funeral oration, where he marks the stronger devotion held by the Athenians over the state-induced patriotism of the Spartans. Yet, for all that the
Athenians do in fact seem to have reaped this advantage, they were not the only one with universal state service among their citizens.

Most notable among their contemporaries was, of course, the Spartans. While few would mark them as a democratic society, the armed camp that was Sparta did produce some of the same kind of cohesion and shared identity among their people that was enjoyed among the Athenians. This shared loyalty to the state (rather than a political patron) and common identity seems to resurface continually among the societies that have practiced universal military service. Kyriazis and Metaxas use the concept of a macroculture. A macroculture is a essentially the undirected ability of a society to organize itself toward efficiently accomplishing some end. They show how the Trireme and the Phalanx were both schools for cooperation among equals. Also important were the new values brought into being by these military formations. Because oligarchies and tyrannies fielded hoplite armies, Kyriazis and Metaxas consider the hoplite to be a necessary but not sufficient cause for democracy genesis. Tyrants were supported by hoplites before the advent of the trireme.36

In looking at the different cities of ancient Greece, modern scholars have looked beyond the phalanx as a “school of the nation” (to borrow a phrase that would appear more then two thousand years later). They have noted that many cities across Greece had the phalanx but not all adopted the democracy that came about in Athens. One of the key differences was presence of the trireme. The phalanx was, by necessity, still an elite institution. It was necessary in most cities to have the members of the phalanx provide their own arms and armor in addition to the time to drill and train together. As

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such, only the wealthier strata of the society had the means and ability to participate in the phalanx. The trireme was another matter entirely. To serve on a trireme, a man had to be strong. He had to be able to row the ship and work as part of a team. As such, there were no property or wealth requirements and it was the poor who were recruited into the navy. It was at this point that Athenian democracy moved into its position of a democracy of all free citizens.37

The other great example of the democratizing power of conscription is Rome. There are numerous examples of this in the ancient world but perhaps the primary example is the republic of Rome. From the reforms of Servius Tullius, Rome filled its military ranks as needed according to a census of the people and who owned how much property. The fact of their property ownership was the factor which determined that they would serve in the army. This was somewhat unique in world history as in organized societies a professional military has been far more common. The Roman example is however far more instructive than any volunteer armed force as it was both mandatory and more was required of citizens the more property they held. Traditionally, the wealthy have found ways to avoid state service and push the poor of society into the ranks (see for instance the United States during its Civil War). The fact that for the ancients the fact that they purposely put the leading members of society into their armed forces is telling.

The Roman case is further illustrative as the progression over time of its democratic inclusiveness is mirrored in the inclusion of more and more of the society into the armed forces. The Roman example of democratic genesis and decline is perhaps

more instructive than any other as it was entirely driven by internal factors. Athens has various external forces which invaded or pushed it to the brink of disaster at different moments in its history. Where Rome was pushed to the brink of disaster, it was never pushed over the edge until well after it was an established dictatorship.

Rome had more diverse military forces and organized them around the principle that more property meant more arms and armor would be required when the individual was called into military service. In Rome, this was reflected in the political reality that those from leading (often wealthy) families constituted the senatorial and equestrian classes. The Comitia Centuriata was literally constituted according to the wealth of citizens. Even the Plebeian Assemblies were structured such that the wealthy would be the ones to participate. As military service expanded to fill the constantly expanding need for more soldiers in the armies, these assemblies did become more democratic. At the foundation of the Republic, the Senate was composed of the leading families of the city.

The Secession of the Plebs in 493 led to reform of the laws on debt. In 449 they seceded again and gained acceptance of the twelve tables, laws which protected them against arbitrary action by the patricians. In 287 BCE, there was another secession of the Plebs and the plebiscites (laws passed in their Assembly) gained the force of law. In 367, the Plebs gained the right to have one of their own as Consul. Like everything else in Rome, it only happened because of the loyal and extraordinary service rendered by the Plebs in war.

The same principle held true of the advance of citizenship among the non-Roman parts of the Roman Republic and Empire. The Romans only granted citizenship rights to
other cities as they had served the Roman interest and demonstrated loyalty. It was always a struggle and there were always those who opposed it, but over time the more long-established parts of the Republic and Empire were brought into full Roman citizenship.

Perhaps uniquely in history, the Roman Republic lasted long enough that its decline was not initiated by some outside force but its own internal corruption. Interestingly for the purposes of this paper is that both the rise and the decline of the Roman Republic coincide with the growth and decline of the use of citizen armies. The Republic rose in power and prominence while it still used citizen armies. As they drew in more and more of the population, their Republic became more and more democratic. As the armies of Rome moved to enlist more and more of the landless peasants, it was less than sixty years until the ultimate fall of the Republic (and the only two military coups in its history happened in that period).

In the early Republic, the Roman welfare program was rooted in the fact that they barred the excessive accumulation of property\(^\text{38}\) and assured themselves stability by maintaining that in order to serve the state in the army the soldiers had to meet property requirements. When everyone was serving in the state armed forces, it was easier to argue for a degree of equality across society.\(^\text{39}\)

In the late Republic, the wars which Rome fought became so long and so costly that the tours of service for these soldiers effectively ruined the economic viability of the soldiers once they returned home (especially as the man of the house was no longer

\(^{38}\) At least among public land which constituted the majority of Roman territory.

\(^{39}\) In another example of this, between 133 and 121, the Gracchi worked to restore the dignity of the now-landless soldiers. In this time, Rome saw the advent of what to modern eyes appear to be state welfare policies as their old system slowly disintegrated.
there to work the land). As more and more people lost their farms, the Romans needed to continually lower the property requirements for military service in order to fill the legions. Eventually this process culminated in the Marian reforms in and around 100 BCE which removed all property requirements for military service and essentially created a military that fought for profit (they were to be paid and settled on homesteads at the end of their service). Many historians have marked this as one of the key factors in the end of the Roman Republic and the advent of the Empire.

**Sacrifice, Citizenship, and Democratic Power in modern times**

Athens and Rome are the cardinal examples of the incredible democratizing effect of conscription. Their example did not go unnoticed by ancient and early-modern scholars, though we seem to like to believe we have outgrown their lessons in our modern age. Through the turn of the century, it seems to have been a common thought that democratization of the armed forces leads to democratization of the state. The theory was reinforced by the history, especially from the renaissance forward. Machiavelli famously favored the army of citizens for his native Florence. While that didn’t work out as well for him, others had better luck under the same theory. Perhaps the most notable examples are the American Revolution and the French Revolution. In terms of establishing the pattern of increasingly large and ideologically-motivated armies, Cohen examines the idea that the French revolution was the real catalyst for this trend.⁴⁰

In the west however, the historical record does not stop in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth, the massive amounts of service in the American Civil War was the

⁴⁰ Cohen, 35.
basis for the first iteration of the American welfare state. The massive expansion of the French welfare state coincided directly with the massive efforts of enlistment and national improvement in the Third Republic after the disaster of the Franco-Prussian War. The same process was underway in Germany under Bismark at the same time, where despite the autocratic nature of German government at the time, many contend that the reforms that first arose to take care of and placate the veterans led directly to democracy in Weimar.

By far the greatest example however was the flowering of democracy that followed both world wars but especially the second world war. After the Great War, the outbreak of democracy may have been short-lived, but the argument goes that it did result in new democracy in Germany as well as expanded democracy throughout the postwar world. It was after the Second World War however that the truly great expansion of democracy occurred. Obviously there were the conquered nations, but they were not the real showcase for this trend. That honor fell to the victors. In the United States, the war was immediately succeeded by the GI bill which expanded economic rights to an entire generation of U.S.-Americans. It was the activists who came of age serving in that war who drove the civil rights movement. In the United Kingdom, they saw the creation of the NHS which similarly expanded economic freedom throughout Britain. Across the war-torn world, they worked to rebuild from the ashes and what they built was far more democratic than the world that had burned.


The modern United States is a prime example of a state going through much the same transformation. In order to fight the great wars of the twentieth century, it was necessary throughout the western world to mobilize vast numbers of citizens to fight on behalf of the state. As it is always a risky proposition to enlist those who have no stake in the success or failure of the regime, the governments of western Europe and the United States found themselves move to promote more democratic and welfare measures. These, in turn had the benefit of securing the support of those who were need to defend the state if the regime was to survive.

In more recent years however, there has been a great shift away from the ideal of the citizen-soldier and toward a professional military. Most states in the modern world have abandoned mandatory military service. France abandoned the practice in 1996 and Germany did so in 2011. In the United States, while there was never mandatory service, there was a draft which was abolished in the 1970s. The modern United States has moved away from state service as a requirement of citizenship. We have done so in the name of efficiency and professionalization. Cohen marks how the study of military systems used to be considered key to understanding constitutional systems, yet now as in the case of the Gates Commission, the mode of conscription is seen as a mere source of taxation. In building the case that the mode of conscription matters to the society, Cohen alludes to Tocqueville on the American jury system as an example of how the society set up a system of justice that was far from the most efficient, but it had the added benefit of instilling the practice of democracy.

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We hear a great deal in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq about that separation of the military and civilian worlds as a cause for those wars (or at least their longevity). Whether that is a direct cause or not, this paper contends that there is a serious danger to the democratic experiment in professionalizing the state, particularly as it pertains to violence. Most would trace this to the failures in Vietnam. The leadership believed that the people came out against the war because it required the service of a broader swath of the American people. Setting aside the judgements about whether this was a prudent check on policymakers, it also has consequences for the practice of democracy in maintaining the state. There is widespread belief among many scholars and public intellectuals that the lack of a corrective check from the public in the early days of Afghanistan and Iraq came because the military was professional. It was not drawn from the breadth of the population. It was drawn from those duty-bound or desperate enough to enlist. These were a small segment of the population that was not connected to most of the citizenry and therefore would not carry the political weight that past generations of the American military had carried.

It is hard to have a discussion of the morality of war when it is paid for, waged, and all costs are borne by a small cadre of professionals. That situation is more conducive to a discussion of costs and benefits than a discussion of morality. “We” did not invade Iraq. “We” only marginally paid for it. The campaign was planned and executed by the elites because the broader population did not bear any immediate costs. Similarly, in the war on terror, things were done to the population by the state. Things were done for the population by the state. Things were not done by the population for the state. And that
state was not a reflection of the population as it would have been had that population
been broadly enlisted into the goals of the government.

**conclusion**

This paper raises the concern that in abandoning state service as a prerequisite for
citizenship, we may have given up one of the primary means by which we have knitted
both the nation and the state together. And one of the primary ways that the people both
owned and controlled the state apparatus. It is, of course, possible that state service is
no longer necessary, that once it has done its work it is no longer needed to secure the
ongoing democratic nature of the state. If that is true, we should expect there to be a
new and different democratizing mechanism to continue to produce competent and able
democratic citizens. Especially in the modern United States, there are precious few
examples of other institutions that could serve that role. The depressing conclusion is
that the role is not likely to be filled without state direction and that unless it is filled,
democracy will rapidly erode as civil society becomes further divorced from the state.

There are two reasons for conscription: necessity and ideology. Referring to
necessity, Cohen holds that the best, if crudest, predictors of a state’s military form are
the length of its borders with potentially hostile neighbors and the size of its population
relative to those neighbors. The geopolitical reality largely dictates the kind of military
power needed to survive. The central question of this paper is what changes occur in
the state as citizens and inhabitants take a greater or lesser share in the maintenance of

\[45\] Cohen, 25-34.
the state. Do they receive more power within the state and do they receive more social benefits from the state as they contribute more to its survival and prosperity? This paper posits that the greater the involvement of citizens in the actions and affairs of state and the greater the sacrifice required of citizens (particularly state service but also taxes) the more likely the state is to be stable, democratically governed and possibly to foster a welfare state as well.

The idea of a republic dates back to the Romans who coined the term and founded the first republic. The word means “the public thing” and it very often confounds those who would classify it according to the standard types of governments. Political theorists and students of politics try to see all regimes as monarchies (ruled by one man), aristocracies and oligarchies (ruled by a small number) or democracies (ruled by the many). Republics challenge this because while they do very often fit the profile of being ruled by the one, the few or the many, they are a public thing. They are not the property of any one group but the property of all citizens. Whether it is literally inscribed in law or not, a monarch effectively owns the state and rules it as his personal property. Similarly the aristocrats collectively own the aristocracy and the majority owns the democracy. In a republic, one few or many many rule the state but they do not own it. We think of democracy and regime type as embodied in the voting booth. However this holds the great deficiency of merely assigning others to do the will of the majority. Democracy, as the ancients correctly understood, is embodied not only in the democratic decision-making process but in the democratic collection of resources. In order to be democratic, resources (both labor and money) must be contributed by all citizens. Without that connection, there is no effective tool for holding civil society (and
the general population) and the state together. Without that connection, democracy will erode.

In the classical republics, the potential for violence required to uphold the regime was distributed throughout the population. In the medieval and feudal states, the state such as it was had far less power and far less need or capacity to command the potential for violence. In liberal states, the capacity for violence is specialized and limited to a small portion of the population which would specialize in violence. It was only with the rise of the more modern state (and notably totalitarian states) that the capacity for violence and the mandate for governance was once again spread throughout the population. In the spirit if not the teaching of Charles Tilly in his 1985 “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” that organized violence harnessing resources need not have the official label of the sovereign state to act as a state.

As a state determines how much of its population it will enlist in its governance and defense and in accomplishing state objectives the state must determine which if any portions of its population are to be the source of state power. This is the contribution of classes of citizens to the power of the state. The society must be divided according to criteria relevant to that society (rather than a universal division of the society into quintiles or some other arbitrary division). The contribution of each group to the state is measured by the monetary and relative labor (often but not exclusively military service) contribution which is required of them. Once the power of different parts of society is established, it becomes important to understand how they shape the form of government together.