Multiple or Malleable Traditions in American Politics?: Insights from the Intersection of Immigration, Social Capital, and Welfare Policy

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Values in American Politics: Traditions, Pluralism, and Culture

Smith’s (1993, 1997) argues that a tradition of ascriptive hierarchy has played an important role in development of American politics. He extensively criticizes of Louis Hartz, Gunnar Myrdal, and their more contemporary successors for seeing American politics as being dominated solely by liberal idealism. He instead asserts that America is characterized by three rival traditions: liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive hierarchy. In line with Hartz’s (1955) definition, the liberal tradition involves limited government, deference to market forces, and the protection of individual rights and liberties. The republicanism emphasizes mass self-governance and regulation for the popular good. The hierarchical tradition argues that some Americans, often separated by racial or ethnic classifications, possess morally superior values or intellectual traits. These individuals are therefore entitled to a greater distribution of good and resources from society (Smith 1993, 563). This idea is termed the multiple traditions thesis.

Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have largely embraced the notion of multiple traditions and offered related arguments. Hero (1992, 1998, 2007), for example, argues that American politics is characterized by a form of two-tiered pluralism which can be a seen as compatible with the notion of ascriptive hierarchy. In two-tiered systems, racial and ethnic minorities have achieved full formal equality but still fail to see their preferences adequately represented in the political system. A large body of work supports Hero’s belief that minority interests are poorly represented within the policymaking process generally (Espino 2007; Gonzalez Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Lublin 1997; Meier and Stewart 1991) and that communities with large minority populations are not responsive to minority demands even today (Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008; Preuhs 2007).
Hero also describes as system of competitive pluralism, wherein all groups as capable of influencing politics and the institutions are responsive to different types of input. Significant differences in resources across groups do not present a fundamental problem for democratic institutions as a result (Dahl 1961). This scenario, wherein government serves as a passive referee of private disputes is akin to the liberal tradition described by Smith and Hartz. Hartz’s commitment to this conceptualization of America was so strong that recent scholarship (King and Stears 2010) has accused Hartz of believing in the state as an absentee force.

What Smith terms republicanism, Hero calls consensual pluralism. Both predict a set of outcomes also at odds with the liberalism or competitive pluralism. Whereas liberalism tends to result in utilitarian conception of government, republicanism requires government to be a tool for accomplishing agreed upon ends. Unlike Smith, Hero is careful to note that consensual pluralism tends to be restricted to racially homogenous contexts (Smith is less consciously of geographic variation in the strength of traditions). Both scholars admittedly echo distinctions made decades ago by Elazar (1966), who famously argued that three political cultures a present in the United States: traditionalism, individualism, and moralism.

Hero (1992) is careful to assert that minority experiences are diverse and competitive or consensual pluralism may, at times, be a more accurate description of minority politics. Smith (1993, 1997) is also clear not to argue that ascriptive hierarchy should occupy liberalism’s role in explaining American development. Instead, scholars need to understand how ascriptive hierarchy, republicanism, and liberalism have distinctly influenced politics in the same time and place.

Smith’s multiple traditions thesis stands in contrast to work of others who argue that liberalism itself has been responsible for hierarchical outcomes. Some see American politics
actively promoting inequality in contemporary times (Hochschild 1996) or argue that past policies which appeared to reduce class inequality exaggerated racial inequality (Katznelson 2005). Most who object to the Hartizan interpretation of the liberal tradition do not believe that liberalism inevitably leads to disparities. But, their review of historical evidence suggests that the meaning of political traditions is malleable. Liberalism can be used to justify inegalitarianism as easily as they can used to justify egalitarianism (Gerstle 1994; Horton 2005; King 1999; Skowronek 2006). In short, traditions mean different things at different times and in different places. Given this, there is little use in thinking of America as being characterized by multiple rival traditions. Traditions are not constant and therefore not distinct. I call this the malleable traditions thesis.

I attempt to determine whether traditions are indeed malleable. To do so, I reexamine recent work concerning the effect of social capital on policy outcomes across the states. Social capital, for reasons I detail below, implies the existence of consensus within political systems. If, as Hero and Smith believe, American politics is characterized by multiple pluralistic traditions, then high levels of social capital should be associated with what Smith (1993) terms republicanism. Before discussing the role of social capital, I review the attitudinal and representational roots of ascriptive hierarchy in American politics. This literature suggests a hierarchical interpretation of political relationships cannot be applied evenly to all subgroups. Immigrant-native interactions, however, are well understood by the hierarchical framework.

If social capital is going to have a clear moralistic effect, it should be seen within therefore be seen within the context immigration politics. Social capital should result in the extension of public benefits to all publics, even immigrants. Thus, examining intersection of immigration, social capital, and social welfare policy, offers a useful test of tradition theories.
Social capital, in turns out, does not always produce moralistic/republican/consensual pluralistic outcomes. Instead, it is associated with the kind of outcomes which should be produced by individualism/liberalism/competitive pluralism or traditionalism/ascriptive hierarchy/two-tiered pluralism. I conclude by suggesting that American politics is not well understood via the multiple traditions framework because ideologies are malleable across space.

**Contemporary Foundations of Ascriptive Hierarchy**

*Attitudes*

How can a hierarchical system of relations be justified in a nation committed to liberal or republican values? For decades, scholars have investigated the relationship between race, ethnicity and public opinion. Key’s (1949 [1984]) famous observation that racial conservatism in the South was most abundant in counties with large black populations was based upon voting behavior and some subsequent work continued with this emphasis (Giles and Buckner 1993; Liu 2001; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Wright 1977). Key’s greatest impact, however, has been in the application of this argument to the study of attitudes (Giles 1977; Glaser 1994; Hood and Morris 1997; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000; Welch et al. 2001).

In short, a number of studies find that non-Latino whites living in communities with large minority populations are more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes and take conservative positions on racial policy issues. Scholars have made many efforts into trying to reconcile this empirically regularity with a parallel stream of research which finds that contact with individual minority group members almost always reduces prejudice. The basic threat argument has been subject of a number of qualifications as a result. The presence of minorities may only create interracial antagonism when economic conditions are depressed (Branton and Jones 2005; Orey 2001),
groups are spatially concentrated (Baybeck 2006; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995) or significant cultural and linguistic barriers exist (Hood and Morris 1997; Rocha and Espino 2009).

However, even integration between racial/ethnic groups of comparable sociolinguistic status in communities with positive economic climates does not necessarily promote attitudinal harmony (a prerequisite for republicanism or consensual pluralism). Minority public opinion, studies suggest, is not subject to the same forces as whites. In general terms, residential isolation increases racial consciousness among blacks and lowers support for interracial marriage (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Welch et al. 2001). High status blacks are more likely to be racially aware. Their presence in neighborhoods facilitates the dissemination of consciousness to others (Gay 2004), thereby reinforcing divisions in communities where economic equity makes whites more moderate. There is some evidence that Latinos do respond ethnic environments in the same way as whites (Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Knoll 2012), although some research disputes this point (Leighley 2001; Rocha et al. 2011).

Racial polarization in diverse jurisdictions offers a clear-cut mechanism for the (apparent) failure of the competitive pluralism to explain minority politics. Policymakers may be accounting for the preferences of blacks and Latinos in their deliberations; however, minority voices are drowned out by an increasingly vocal chorus of antagonistic whites. A straightforward application of the median voter model suggests white voters will be more influential unless communities are made up of majority-minority electorates. Contrary to this expectation, and in accordance with the idea that diversity leads to more congruent opinions between groups, is research which finds group size improves policy outcomes for minorities. Large black populations dampen the positive relationship between state conservatism and the punitive correctional policies (Yates and Fording 2005), something especially notable given the clear
racialization of criminal justice (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002). In short, the behavior literature makes ascriptive hierarchy appear to be a natural consequence of social interactions.

*Two-Tiered Representation?*

Support for competitive pluralism in the domain of race enjoys more support from studies of how the presence of minorities influences the voting behavior of legislative priorities of elected officials; still, support for the argument should be characterized as mixed at best. Lublin (1997) observes that members of the U.S. House with large black constituencies tend to be more liberal than their counterparts from homogenous districts, with patterns varying slightly by partisanship and region. This finding has been replicated at other levels of government, including the states, and for legislative activities beyond roll call voting (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001). Other research is less optimistic, especially when examining roll call votes on what scholars define as black-interest legislation rather than more general measures of liberalism or conservatism (Canon 1999). On such issues, representatives may even be less responsive to black-interests when their district contain enough blacks to create a threat effect among whites but an insufficient number allow blacks to determine election outcomes (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Griffin and Newman 2008).

Early studies of Latino politics were supportive of the pluralist perspective, noting a connection between Latino group size and general voting patterns among members of Congress (Welch and Hibbing 1984). As with studies of black representation, this relationship appears to be less certain for issues thought to be particularly salient to Latinos. There may be a threat effect present (Griffin and Newman 2007; Preuhs 2007) or simply no effect whatsoever (Hero and Tolbert 1995). Non-roll call voting activities offer another avenue for constituency forces to
influence the behavior of representatives and indeed members of Congress with large Latino populations are more likely to sponsor Latino-interest legislation, offering another parallel between black and Latino politics (Wilson 2010).

**Immigration and Continued Patterns of Ascriptive Hierarchy**

**Attitudes**

How can the points above help us understand whether racial politics is best understood via the hierarchical, liberal, or republican traditions? Considerable variation in political power and influence, of course, occurs within groups in addition to across groups. Sources of difference within the Latino community are many and include but are not limited to national origin, citizenship status, and language fluency. Non-citizens cannot voice their opinion at the ballot box. They are also less likely to participate in forms of political activism open to them, such as attending public meetings, writing elected officials, protesting, and signing petitions (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Leal 2002; Verba et al. 1993). The effect of generational status is more complex. Recent immigrants are less likely to participate, but this effect diminishes with time so that after several years first generation immigrants act like their second generation co-ethnics (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Wals 2011). Differences in participation are less pronounced among members of different national origin groups (Hero and Campbell 1996).

One mechanism by which two-tiered pluralism or ascriptive hierarchy operates is the sway prejudice has on the political behavior of dominant group members. Two-tiered pluralism will occur if whites living amongst Latinos discriminate more. Evidence of such a relationship abounds (Eitle and Taylor 2008; Rocha et al. 2011; Tolbert and Grummel 2003), but scholars have also been carefully to delineate a series of conditions that cause whites to react more or less (Branton and Jones 2005; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003).
Allport (1964) argued decades ago that social contact works to reduce, not enhance, prejudice. The social contact hypothesis has since been tested repeatedly within Latino politics (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011; Welch and Sigelman 2000; Wilkinson 2010). As with studies of black politics, findings confirming Allport’s theory have often been seen as creating discordance with Key’s (1949 [1984]) notion of racial threat. Allport was careful in *The Nature of Prejudice* to specify that contact reduced prejudice when it occurred between individuals of roughly equal social status. Branton and Jones (2005) remind us of this nuance and then continue to look for evidence of racial threat in communities with varying levels of economic heterogeneity. They find that when environments are economically homogenous, and therefore different racial/ethnic group members are generally on par with one another, no evidence of threat exists.

Citizenship status has well documented relationship with wealth and other indicators of social wellbeing (Leal 2002; Stamps and Bohon 2006). Given this, it is perhaps not surprising when scholars argue that white reactions when encountering Latinos differ depending what segment of the Latino community they are near. Hood and Morris (1997) go so far as to suggest that whites distinguish between Latino immigrants who are documented and undocumented. Threat like responses occur when living in proximity to the undocumented, whereas living around documented Latino immigrants results in an outcome in line with contact theory. Rocha and Espino (2010) make a more modest assertion in suggesting that whites are react to Latino differently depending on nativity and language fluency. As with Hood and Morris’s (1997) study, racial threat theory is supported when examining the least assimilated Latinos, but whites...
are not more likely to express resentment in contexts with large native born and English speaking Latinos.

Social contact, one must conclude, can lessen or reverse the effect of racial/ethnic threat (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000). Ellison et al.’s (2011) recent analysis confirms this, but they are careful to note that only intimate forms of contact, such as close friendship, have a significant effect. The same is true for black-white social contact (Welch et al. 2001), and such relationships are most likely unlikely to occur if language or other social barriers do not exist between group members. Even if contact changes white attitudes, it’s unclear whether Latino attitudes shift much when contact occurs (Welch and Sigelman 2000) and inter-group relations may only be marginally improved as a result. In sum, the literature immigration and political behavior makes clear that non-citizens are seen an out-group by many. The ascriptive hierarchical tradition should offer a good lens through which to understand the politics of immigration as a result. But, the ability of ascriptive hierarchy to explain political outcomes should be weaker in regions with strong histories of republican norms.

**Political Traditions and Social Capital**

What conditions should predict when each tradition will prevail? Social norms, I argue, play a key role in translating population characteristics (or mass attitudes) into public policy. Unassimilated Latinos are most likely to find themselves marginalized when social norms are not set up allow for integration. One norm, *social capital*, has been the focus of much research over the past several years. In its simplest form, social capital can be said to refer to “connections among individuals” or in other words, “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, 19). There is no shortage of claims regarding the positive benefits for individuals holding social capital or even for those lacking in
social capital but living in social capital rich environments. In addition to bettering health, happiness, and safety, social capital appears to improve government performance by making it easier for the public to make policy demands on government thanks to higher levels of political sophistication and cooperation within society (Claibourn and Martin 2007; Putnam 2000; Tavits 2006).

Putnam’s (2000, 469, nt. 9) own review of the literature concludes that while not all studies have found a positive relationship between civic engagement and tolerance, not one has established a negative relationship. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s (1995) influential study, for example, demonstrates that civic engagement (e.g. attendance at community meetings) is linked with increased political tolerance, although non-social forms of political participation (e.g. contacting a government official) are not. One exception to this trend is participation in religious organizations, which may be associated with lower levels of political tolerance (Beatty and Walter 1984).

Of course, one of Putnam’s central theses is that social capital can have “externalities” which go beyond the individual and affect the larger community. Extending this argument to the state-level, Putnam observes that residents of high-social-capital states tend to express higher levels of support for racial integration, gender equality, and civil liberties than residents of low-social-capital states. As Putnam (2000, 356) states “far from being incompatible, liberty and fraternity are mutually supportive…the most tolerant communities in America are precisely the places with the greatest civic involvement. Conversely, communities whose residents bowl alone are the least tolerant places in America.” In short, this work argues that social capital is associated with value congruence and the outcomes predicted by consensual pluralism (Hero 1998) or the republican tradition (Smith 1993, 1997). Social interactions will likely produce
political agreement among members of different groups (Kenny 1994), leading to broad consensus about what government should do. What government does is expected to involve the promotion of equality.

While acknowledging that social capital is likely affected or determined by issues pertaining to race, Putnam only offers support for the claim that residents of high-social-capital states are more likely to possess attitudes which are more supportive of racial/ethnic equity; he provides no evidence that actual public policies designed to promote equality differ.

This lack of direct attention to the potential consequences of social capital on levels on public policy has resulted in a series of critiques of the social capital theses by Hero (2003a, 2003b, 2007), who has suggested that while social capital may be positively associated with various absolute, or aggregate, policy outcome measures, it is negatively associated with indicators designed to account for the position of racial/ethnic minorities relative to whites. Putnam, Hero’s critique suggests, is guilty of an omission King and Smith (2005) warn of when they write:

“When political scientists ignore [racial hierarchies]...they often neglect or misunderstand the conduct of actors who are responding to the tensions and opportunities generated by America’s racial orders. As a result, not only are these writings inadequate in their discussion of race, but they fall short in their accounts of the apparently nonracial topics they address (84).”

Hero (2003b, 113) himself states “the appropriate assessment of social capital’s impact on American civil society and politics shows that it depends on what dimensions of public life we consider, how we define ‘better off,’ whether one is black or white, and whether one lives in a more or less racially heterogeneous community.” In short, Hero’s observation has been that the benefits of social capital are maldistributed. When Putnam makes claims such as “schools work better in high social capital states” or “health is
better in high social capital states,” he is reporting findings which may not be true for all. Hero’s claim stands in direct contrast to Putnam’s (2000, 294) assertion that “inequality and social solidarity are deeply incompatible.”

*Social Capital as a Test of the Multiple Traditions or Pluralisms Thesis*

What are the implications of this debate for multiple traditions thesis? Social capital, in principal, is a hallmark of republicanism, consensual pluralism, or moralism. It entails high levels of civic involvement and a belief in using government to provide for the collective good. This stands in stark contrast the liberal or competitive pluralistic value of minimal governments which protects individual rights but does not promote other values. It is diametrically opposed to the use of government as a means to encourage group-based inequality, as seen with ascriptive hierarchy.

If these traditions are truly rivals, then high levels of social capital should be associated with social welfare policies that are inclusive (few restrictions on eligibility) and generous. Low levels of social capital will be observed in hierarchical systems where policy is used to exacerbate group-based inequality. This means that policy will offer benefits that are exclusive but generous in order to create differences between eligible and ineligible publics. Benefits may also be limited so that policy becomes an ineffective means of reducing inequality. This same outcome occurs in liberal or competitive pluralistic systems where social capital is also low, but policies will always be inclusive so as to preserve individual rights.

If social capital has these effects, then I will have empirically demonstrated spatial variance in the strength of the rival traditions Smith hypothesizes. If social capital produces outcomes predicted by liberalism or ascriptive hierarchy, then traditions may need to be thought of as reinforcing rather than rivals. If the republican tradition’s primary trait (social capital) is
associated with the provision of collective goods only to certain publics, then it must be seen as actually contributing to group-based differences. If the allocation of social resources declines when diverse publics are eligible to receive them, then social capital (ironically) serves to promote individualist liberal values. This also reinforces the point that social capital, even when held in high levels in the aggregate, is a resource whose externalities do not cross groups. Republican values will need to be interpreted as malleable and capable of producing outcomes inconsistent with a straightforward interpretation of the ideological tradition. These possible outcomes are summarized in Figure 1.

**Data**

I turn to the variation offered by subnational governments in the U.S. to test this argument. Subnational governments play a key role in pluralist theory. Participation in federal policymaking is a resource intensive endeavor and a focus on state politics is therefore biased towards minimizing the importance of difference on marginalization (Hero 1992). Data are drawn from the 50 states for the year 2010.

I chose to focus on the archetypal policies designed to promote equality via governmental action, the Temporary Aid to Needy Family (TANF) cash assistance program and Medicaid. TANF and Medicaid are explicitly redistributive policies and scholars often study benefit levels and eligibility requirements because they are controlled by states. I also chose to focus on welfare benefits because they are a direct result of political deliberation. Other indicators, such as the percentage of minorities living in poverty, are undoubtedly of great substantive importance to minority communities and merit examination. However, such outcomes are not directly manipulable by voters and political institutions in the same way as program rules and benefit levels.
The TANF and Medicaid program is also useful because states possess discretion regarding the extension of benefits to non-citizens. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation act gave states discretion to restrict TANF eligibility to qualified non-citizens after a federally imposed five-year ban from receiving benefits directly after immigrating. Any extension of benefits to otherwise eligible non-citizens during the five-year ban must be funded entirely with state revenue.

Hero and Preuhs (2007) use factor analysis to create a measure of immigrant inclusion in social welfare programs based upon laws enacted as of the year 2000. I create a similar measure using updated information from 2010. Specifically, I generate a factor based upon laws determining eligibility in five regards:

1) Does the state provide state-only-funded cash assistance to some or all qualified immigrants during the five-year ban?

2) Does the state provide state-only-funded food assistance to some or all qualified immigrants during the five-year ban?

3) Does the state provide state-only-funded health coverage to some or all qualified immigrants during the five-year ban?

4) Is assistance provided to lawfully present children and/or pregnant women with federal/state funding under Medicaid and/or CHIP?

5) Does the state covers pregnant women regardless of their immigration status under the CHIP unborn child option?

Information on state rules is available from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Hero and Preuhs (2007) endorse use of a factor-score because it offers a broad indicator of immigrant inclusion in social welfare programs. This measure is based on the first factor of a principal components factor analysis of the five policy items. The Eigen values suggest that a single dimension accurately captures variation across these policies. The Eigen
value for the first factor is 1.519, while the second factor’s Eigen value is .140 and diminishes thereafter. The factor scores for the states range from −1.006 to 2.280, with higher numbers indicating more inclusive social welfare policies.

This measure serves as the dependent variable in the first analysis, when the relationship of social capital and racial context on immigrant inclusion is explored. This score then becomes a key independent variable when we analyzing overall levels of welfare generosity. Generosity is accounted for by examining the maximum TANF cash benefit level for a family of three, adjusted for cost of living. If social capital is associated with republican or consensual pluralist outcomes, then it should be positively related to immigrant inclusion and generosity. It should not predict that policy is used to actively promote inequality by creating policies that are generous but exclusive or passively promote inequality by resulting in policies with limited benefits.

Social capital is measured via an indicator produced by Hawes, Rocha, and Meier (2013). The measure is based on data from MediaMark Research Inc. (MRI), a marketing research firm that conducts personal interviews with over 20,000 individuals biannually in the contiguous 48 states. This results in an overall yearly average of 728 unweighted responses per state when these data are aggregated by state. MRI asks respondents questions regarding organizational membership and political participation. Hawes et al. (2013) also supplement MRI data with information of state-level voter turnout for national elections, a measure of non-profit activity in each state, charitable giving, and non-political volunteerism. The result is 22 items which display considerable internal consistency and are thus also factor analyzed in order to produce a single score.
Studies which offer explanations for two-tiered pluralism stress the role of racial/ethnic context in shaping patterns of minority marginalization. Accordingly, I account for the size of the non-citizen, Latino citizen, and black populations within each state. The population data come from the census population estimates and the 2010 decennial census. Both incorporation and generosity are likely to be a function of liberalism. As a measure of mass ideology, I include the updated measure of citizen ideology developed by Berry et al. (1998). The measure ranges from 0 to 100, with higher scores denoting a more liberal ideology. Lastly, I control for the partisanship of each state’s governor with data provided by Klener (2011).

An Empirical Test of the Multiple Traditions Thesis

Table 1 presents the results for the first set of models, which look to explain immigrant inclusivity in the states. The results suggest inclusivity is primarily a function of non-citizen group size and liberalism. The idea that non-citizens are able to receive policy benefits without any means by which to hold officeholders accountable is surprising given the literature of ethnic context, public opinion, and representation. It suggests that non-citizens are well represented, a situation not predicted by the value of ascriptive hierarchy. The effect mass liberalism confirms that preferences capable of predicting policy outcomes. This result is expected given past work on policy responsiveness generally (Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002) and in state politics in particular (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1994). The result for non-citizen group size, however, appears to be contingent upon mass liberalism (see column 3). The presence of non-citizens is not associated with greater degrees of inclusion in conservative states. In liberal states, policymakers react to high levels of immigration by establishing policy environments that foster incorporation. Note that non-citizen group size and mass liberalism are themselves insignificantly correlated at -.1.
Table 1 also finds that social capital is positively correlated with immigrant inclusivity, as Putnam’s work would suggest, but the relationship is not statistically significant. Thus, republican values do not, at this stage, appear to be associated with policies that use government to promote equality among all publics. A negative relationship would mean that social capital is associated with ascriptive hierarchy. I interpret this null finding as suggesting that high social capital promote individualism, where government is minimalist and not used to promote collective good or inequality. Not surprisingly, Table 1 does not find that high social capital environments are more responsive to non-citizen demands (see column 2).

Table 2 displays two models of welfare generosity, defined as TANF cash benefits. The first model does not offer much insight. Unlike immigrant inclusivity, TANF cash benefits are not predicted by levels of racial/ethnic diversity or mass liberalism. The correlation between inclusivity and generosity is positive, an outcome consistent with republicanism. However, this relationship is again insignificant. Examining the interactive effect of social capital and inclusivity offers a test of the dueling predictions of the multiple traditions and malleable traditions hypotheses. Social capital, a defining characteristic of republicanism, should result in greater levels of inclusivity and more generous benefits. Neither appears to be the case. However, the effect of social capital may be constrained by other factors, such as citizen ideology. If environments allow for inclusivity, then social capital should be associated with more generous benefits. This also does not appear to be true.

Examining how the relationship between social capital and generosity varies across inclusive and exclusive systems produces a result that fails to support the multiple traditions thesis. Social capital is indeed associated with greater levels of generosity, but only in exclusive systems. Thus when policy environments are exclusive, civically engaged regions are more
likely to use government to promote equality among eligible publics. The relationship between social capital and generosity is actually negative in inclusive environments, although the relationship is not significant (see Figure 2). Social capital is a resource which can be used to promote equality, but only amongst in-group members (natives). As Hero (2007) argues, the benefits of social capital do not extend to all. It is a resource whose “externalities” are mostly felt by dominant groups within society.

Conclusions

Republican traits are not associated with policies designed to promote collective good. There is limited evidence that social capital is associated with inclusive welfare programs. However, they are not associated with the simultaneous maximization inclusivity and generosity. When policy is inclusive, benefits tend to be lower in high social capital environments. This outcome is predicted by liberal or individualist values, where government is not expected to be an instrument of either egalitarian or inegalitarian outcomes. Social capital is associated with generosity when policy exclusive and welfare benefits are unlikely to go to immigrants. This policy results in greater income inequality between citizens and non-citizens. This outcome is predicted by the ascriptive hierarchical tradition. In short, republican traits are associated with liberalism or inegalitarianism, but never with policies designed use government as a means to achieve equality among all publics. This suggests that the republicanism actually constitutes another face of the liberal and hierarchical traditions.

The conclusions drawn from this insight may be even broader. If a traits association with one “tradition” can be used to produce outcomes associated with different and theoretically incompatible ideologies, then it is possible to argue that traditions lead to fixed outcomes. They are instrumental or malleable. Values can be used to justify a wide variety of outcomes.
Hartizans are incorrect when they speak of the broad explanatory power of a single American ideology. But, Smith is also incorrect when he argues that American politics is characterized by a handful of rival ideologies.
References


[http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm](http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm).


### Table 1.
The Republican Tradition and Immigration Inclusion

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| N            | 47          | 47          |            |
| R²           | .57         | .56         |            |

*p<.05 **p<.01 (standard errors are in parenthesis)
Table 2.  
The Republican Tradition, Immigration Inclusion, and Welfare Generosity

Dependent Variable = Adjusted TANF Cash Benefit  
(mean=412, min=179, max=683, sd=119)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robust Regression Results</th>
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<th>(2)</th>
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<td>43.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.1)</td>
<td>(24.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Inclusion</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>65.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.3)</td>
<td>(22.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital * Immigrant Inclusion</td>
<td>-45.7*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(18.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-Citizen</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.1)</td>
<td>(12.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Citizen Latino</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Liberalism</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Governor</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33.3)</td>
<td>(31.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N  | 47   | 47   |
| R² | .47  | .55  |

*p<.05  **p<.01 (standard errors are in parenthesis)
Figure 1.
Alternative Conceptualizations of Traditions in American Politics

[Graph showing the relationship between TANF Cash Benefits and Immigrant Inclusivity with states labeled and two lines indicating hypothesized effects of social capital.]

Ascriptive Hierarchy Republicanism

Hypothesized Effect of Social Capital (Multiple Traditions Thesis)

Liberalism

Hypothesized Effect of Social Capital (Malleable Traditions Thesis)
Figure 2.
Traditions in American Politics are Malleable

Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.