The Impotence of Enhanced Surveillance

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Introduction

The post-9/11 search for improved security has led to the rapid growth of systems of technologically enhanced visual surveillance (STEVS). Particularly striking is the dramatic increase in public and private investment in closed circuit television (CCTV) systems despite the dearth of empirical evidence of CCTV’s effectiveness in deterring, preventing, detecting, or prosecuting most harmful crimes. This paper joins the rising chorus of challenges to the wisdom of installing STEVS, and it attempts to diagnose why our societies are investing so much in this unproven approach to human security. Although the relevant scholarly literature in surveillance studies to date has raised many reasons for doubting the underlying assumption that being watched provides for a more secure environment, it has not paid adequate attention to considerations of gender. However, using a gendered lens to examine this phenomenon sheds a great deal of new insight. For many women, the experience of being watched can be especially unnerving, even menacing, whenever there is reason to wonder about the possible presence of predatory tendencies behind the other’s watchful gaze. While examples of voyeuristic and sexually predatory CCTV practices have been mentioned in passing in recent scholarly studies, this article asks whether the psychosexual motives underlying such examples might play a deeper role in the seemingly blinkered rush towards the implementation of STEVS. Might the...

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1 “Human security” is typically employed as a way of framing security issues around the goal of securing the well being of people rather than the interests of states as political institutions (Lammers 1999; Stoett 1999; Commission on Human Security 2012).
The disembodied, bureaucratized gaze of CCTV and related technologies constitute a vestigial form of patriarchal power?

The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1, on “The Rush to Surveillance,” we canvass the largely failed search for confirming evidence of CCTV’s effectiveness as a security provision, singling out CCTV as the best studied exemplar of a broader class of STEVS. This broader class of security industry\(^2\) technologies also includes systems of infrared imaging, facial and biomechanical recognition, backscatter body scanning, camera-equipped Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’), internet based Remote Access Tools (RATs), and the like. In section 2, on “Voyeurism and Predatory Masculinity,” we examine the biocultural connections between masculinity, voyeurism, and predatory tendencies, combining insights from constructivist ethnography and cultural theory with insights from biosocial or evolutionary psychology. This hybrid methodology stems from our conviction that attempts to partition influences on behavior into biological and cultural categories are “exactly like asking how much of the area of a field is due to its length, how much to its width” (Hebb, 1953, p. 44). In section 3, on “Surveillance, Feminism, and Democratic Security,” we examine the gender inequities that STEVS engender. Drawing upon the perspective of women considered alternatively as objects of visual culture and as agents in the provision of security, we reach three modest conclusions. First, the rush to implement STEVS is symptomatic of a loss of the ‘organic’ security provisions that have traditionally operated through social networks of trusted eyes. Second, far from providing an adequate artificial substitute for lost social trust, STEVS may actually exacerbate the problem. Third, STEVS represent an emerging modality of gender inequity that is inconsistent with the ideal of democratic security.

\(^2\) Throughout this chapter we use this term as shorthand for both the public and the private wings of the security industry.
1. The Rush to Surveillance

Homeland security has become increasingly important in our post September 11, 2001 world. Those who govern have become increasingly preoccupied with security: preparing for it, providing it, coordinating it, and to a lesser extent, studying it. Government’s responsibility to protect its citizens from harm is first and foremost in the minds of many-citizens and politicians alike. Technology has come to the forefront in the quest to procure security. CCTV systems, or plans to install them, are ubiquitous; governments have, at considerable cost, increasingly installed CCTV to create safer public spaces. In the United Kingdom over the last decade, CCTV has accounted for more than three-quarters of the total spending on crime prevention by the British Home Office. It is estimated that over £500 million (approximately $1 billion) of public money was spent on CCTV from 1992-2002 (Hempel and Topfer, 2009). In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has no CCTV-specific grant application or tracking process, thus thwarting information about how much money the federal government has spent on CCTV systems. However, since 2001, the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) has granted over $29 billion to state and local governments to help combat terrorism, including the purchase of CCTV systems. It is fair to assume that millions (if not billions) of these dollars have been used to purchase CCTV systems (Savage, 2007). Much of this money, particularly in the U.S., has been spent to install CCTV systems without any requirement of cost/benefit analyses or an evaluation process.

Empirical studies have done little to support the assertion that such systems actually make us safer. In 2009, Welsh and Farrington published a comprehensive systemic review, including a meta-analysis study, of the effects of closed circuit television on crime in public
space, including city centers, public housing, public transport, car parks, residential areas and a hospital. Their review was international in scope and not limited to English-speaking countries. The authors employed strict selection criteria, with a minimum design involving before-and-after measures of crime in experimental and comparable control areas. From their meta-analysis, Welsh and Farrington (2009) note “…it might be concluded that CCTV reduces crime to a small degree” (p.133). They find that it is most effective in reducing crime in car parks, and more effective in reducing crime in the United Kingdom than in other countries.

More recently, in September 2011, the Urban Institute published a report on the use of CCTV. “Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention” reports on three cities in the United States and their use of CCTV cameras. For this study, established surveillance systems in Baltimore, MD, Chicago, IL and Washington D.C. were studied. The study found mixed results, with Baltimore experiencing a significant crime drop in the downtown area, but less of a decline in two other neighborhoods and one neighborhood reporting no reduction in crime after the cameras were installed (pp. vii-viii). The Chicago portion of the study looked at two neighborhoods, with one neighborhood reporting a nearly 12 percent drop in the crime rate while the other neighborhood experienced no change in the crime rate (pgs. 61, 66). Washington, D.C. reported no effect on crime from the installation of 73 cameras in locations with a high volume of violent crime (pp. 80, 83).

Despite mixed empirical quantitative findings, The Urban Institute states that “the results of this evaluation are promising” (Urban Institute, 2011a, p. 3). Although the report does not explicitly clarify the basis for this positive conclusion, it would appear to be based upon the Urban Institute’s process evaluation, which included conducting interviews with various officials and reviewing policies, budgets and other documents. The process evaluation highlights the fact
that police, policymakers, and others involved in the criminal justice system largely perceived the cameras as “a useful tool for preventing crimes, aiding in arrests and supporting investigations and prosecutions.” (Urban Institute, 2011, p.87). It seems however that, at least as far as crime prevention goes, quantitative evidence has not shown this to be uniformly true. Thus, we have a situation where the qualitative assessment points to a belief that is not supported by the quantitative findings. This is particularly troubling, and a clear weakness in the report. Reporting that people believe CCTV systems make us safer is to state the obvious. Substantiating that belief with quantitative evidence is what is needed and the justification the Urban Institute claims for undertaking its study. Perhaps what was shown instead is that CCTV does not actually make us safer, but simply makes us think we are safer. One may marvel at the seductive ability of CCTV systems to convince us that they will make us safer.

There is some behavioral scientific evidence that people who are concerned to maintain good social reputations are more inclined to cooperate with trust-based honors systems when they are under the impression that someone may be watching them (Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006; Rompay, Vonk & Fransen, 2009). This fact may or may not significantly augment security for societies under CCTV surveillance, however. In light of the dearth of evidence of its effectiveness in deterring crime, the pervasive presence of CCTV systems may be as likely to foster a society of cooperative victims as to curb anti-social elements.

2. Voyeurism and Predatory Masculinity

It is especially noteworthy here that the chief source of support for CCTV’s effectiveness discovered by the Urban Institute study was a consensus of opinion among an overwhelmingly male class of security professionals. The fact that this consensus persists even in the absence of
independent confirming evidence raises the question of whether the rush to CCTV systems might be motivated, in part, by a gendered predilection or bias. There is, after all, a striking asymmetry between the gender composition of those who show up in publicly accessible and visually monitored places and the gender composition of those who typically guide and implement the visual monitoring of such places. Consider the findings of Hille Koskela’s (2000) study of surveillance and gender:

In public and semi-public space, the places where surveillance most often occurs are, as mentioned above, the shopping malls and the shopping areas of city centres and, likewise, areas of public transport (such as underground stations, railway stations and busy bus stops). The people who usually negotiate and decide upon surveillance are the management: managers of shopping malls, leading politicians, city mayors, etc. Furthermore, the people who maintain surveillance are the police and private guards. From this it is possible to draw some conclusions about the gender structure of surveillance. Women spend more time shopping than men, and everyday purchases are mostly bought by women (Reeves, 1996: 138). The majority of the users of public transport are women (Hill, 1996; Kaartokallio, 1997). Thus women quite often occupy the typical places of surveillance. By contrast, those in charge of deciding on surveillance are usually men. More importantly, those who maintain surveillance (the police and guards) are also mostly men. Thus, at the simplest level, surveillance is, indeed, gendered: most of the people ‘behind’ the cameras are men and most of the people ‘under’ surveillance are women. (pp. 245-255)

This finding confirms and expands upon Sheila Brown’s (1998) earlier account of CCTV as part of “male policing in the broadest sense” (p. 217). In light of the skewed gender demographics of technologically enhanced visual surveillance practices, one cannot help but wonder whether masculine psychosexual proclivities might lurk behind the rush to implement more of the same. More specifically, one cannot help but wonder whether and to what extent STEVS might conceal ‘Peeping Toms.’

Empirical studies of CCTV have consistently discovered significant and justifiable public anxiety about the voyeuristic potential of the technology (Honess and Charman 1992, p. 9; Koskela 2000). Women are especially concerned about the lurid possibilities that CCTV cameras
open up (Trench et. al., 1997, p. 149; Brown, 1998, p. 218), especially when they are placed in locations of an “intimate nature” (Koskela, 1999). Such anxieties are validated by the mounting record of CCTV camera abuse, which includes many cases in which male security guards have made video recordings or screen shots of women in various stages of undress for purposes of prurient entertainment (Hillier 1996; Ainley 1998; Koskela 2000). In some cases the process of visual capture has functioned as an auxiliary to more overt and aggressive modes of harassment (Cant 1998; Koskela 2002). Moreover, in addition to the anecdotal and “emotional” (Koskela 2000) evidence, there is also some quantitative evidence of voyeuristic bias in the use of CCTV systems. For instance, Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong (1999) found that “10 percent of all targeted surveillances on women, and 15 percent of operator-initiated surveillance were for apparently voyeuristic reasons” (pp. 115-116). Hence, although it is tempting, it is nevertheless facile to write off cases of voyeuristic CCTV abuse as mere aberrations in which a generally legitimate security technology is misappropriated for prurient purposes. Our concern is that there is an unmistakable social pattern of aberrant surveillance that is symptomatic of all-too-normal voyeuristic and predatory tendencies that are in fact rather widespread within our culture and especially deep-seated within masculine sexual psychology.

At first blush, CCTV and associated STEVS may appear to have little to do with the male erotic perspective. Yet, if Sigmund Freud taught us anything, it is that sexual psychology is more pervasive than first meets the eye. It may color and shape, to some degree, aspects of human life that do not initially appear to be overtly sexual in nature. Accordingly, the concept of voyeurism not only designates a paraphilia in abnormal sexual psychology, and a misdemeanor in criminology, but it has also been employed as a central paradigm in media studies for the interpretation of our voyeuristic popular culture (Calvert 2000). This range of applications of the
concept suggests that, although it may be exceptional as a treated pathology and as a legally sanctioned crime, voyeurism is fairly pervasive, and sometimes socially accepted, in its more prosaic cultural forms. As technology amplifies and outpaces human organic development, we find many different manifestations of the voyeuristic urge in today’s world, ranging from traditional peeping Toms to global networks of internet RATters (Anderson, N. 2013). Most forms of voyeurism, but especially the more deviant forms, represent male-dominated activities. For a fuller understanding of these related phenomena, and their dominant gender dynamics, it will be helpful to examine the deep biocultural connections between them.

For diagnostic purposes under the DSM-IV pathological voyeurism is a long-term pattern of obsessively recurrent, intensely arousing fantasies, urges or behaviors involving observation of unsuspecting disrobed, disrobing, or sexually engaged persons; especially where this pattern leads to serious personal, social or occupational distress or dysfunction. It is typically a “secluded” practice of achieving “intrapersonal pleasure through a clandestine act of peeping . . . usually targeting female strangers” (Davis 2003, p. 133). It is the most common paraphilia among adult male psychiatric inpatients (Marsh et. al. 2010), it is a “predominant past or present sexual behavior” among serial rapists (Davis 2003, p. 135), and it is exceedingly rare among women. Normal voyeurism is the less obsessive, less risky, and more sociable version of the same kind of fantasies, urges and behaviors (Feigelman 1974; Bryant 1982). It is not uncommon among women; yet one study (Langstrom 2009) found it to be three times less common among women than among men.

There are well-known patterns of enculturation that reinforce the link between masculinity and voyeurism. Consider Nate Anderson’s description of the typical pattern of

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3 Thanks to Robin Michel for bringing this to our attention.
online normalization of deviance that takes place within the subculture of internet “RATters,” hackers who spy on people, usually women, through their webcams: “By finding their way to forums filled with other ratters, these men -- and they appear to be almost exclusively men -- gain community validation for their actions” (2013, p. 1). This follows a similar pattern found, and more thoroughly studied, in more traditional and organic (low-tech) varieties. For example, ethnographic field studies have found that voyeurism is a normal and sociologically normalizing mode of fraternization among American male construction workers (Feigelman 1974; Iacuone 2005). Within this subculture, engaging in concealed surveillance of women both facilitates and is conditioned by social inclusion among male coworkers. Sharing the guilty pleasure with one’s fellow men, and making efforts to remain undetected in the enjoyment of it, are essential elements of the practice (Feigelman 1974). In this way voyeurism functions as a form of “normal deviance” that serves to maintain the social boundaries that define real men as such. Yet, psychologists have found that normal voyeurism is not only part of the standard self-schema of traditional male heterosexuality, but also a common source of psychosexual and psychosocial pathologies (Brooks 1995). It is a fragile set of psychological and cultural boundaries that separate normal voyeuristic deviance from its more pathological forms.

It is not surprising that one finds among voyeurs as asymmetrical a gender demographic as one finds among those who are responsible for implementing and operating STEVS; for systems of technologically enhanced visual surveillance embody (or rather, disembody) the same logic of concealed watching that is involved in voyeurism. (Even when there are signs announcing the presence of CCTV cameras, those who are being watched typically do not know whether they are being watched, nor do they know who might be watching.) Moreover, in civilized society, this logic of concealment is imperative for the masculine erotic gaze insofar as
it is fraught with predatory possibilities. The male erotic gaze often teeters on the brink of transgression, such that the normal, socially restrained looker is typically obliged not to look like he is looking. It is, of course, true that all erotic looking, regardless of gender, carries transgressive and dangerous possibilities. Yet, the masculine gaze is particularly closely associated with the exercise of predatory agency. By not concealing their erotic glances, men are more likely to reveal predatory urges, whereas women are more likely to be perceived as inviting them.

Here we find the connection between concealed surveillance and the most extreme form of patriarchy, that which is associated with predatory masculinity as a form of intentional agency. The class of predatory forms of intentional behavior starts with hunting, killing, and raping; and it may also include other auxiliary forms of behavior, such as predatory stalking, hiding, and watching. No one can deny that there is such a thing as predatory surveillance. If you doubt it, “Look at a cat when it stalks a bird” (Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* §647). Predation is not, of course, exclusively masculine; but it is undoubtedly a male dominated field of human conduct. To see the connection between patriarchy and the rush to implement STEVS, one need only note one further unassailable fact: that there is also a deep natural linkage between predatory behavior and the fruits and pleasures of concealed surveillance. If predation is predominantly masculine, and concealed surveillance is a natural auxiliary of predation, then it would be surprising from a biological point of view to find women predominating behind CCTV’s disembodied gaze. In sum, in addition to well studied patterns of enculturation, there is also a perfectly good biological and evolutionary explanation of the connection between masculinity and voyeurism that may help to explain the rush to implement CCTV and other STEVS even in the absence of demonstrable security gains.
This is not to say, however, that predatory patriarchy by means of technologically enhanced surveillance is the natural way for men to contribute to the maintenance of public order. In his study of “Attention Structure as a Basis of Primate Rank Orders,” M. R. A. Chance (1967) found that gaze-following behavior is an important indicator of individual positions within primate dominance hierarchies. As N. J. Emery (2000) explains and elaborates this finding, each member of a social group gives and receives attention “as a function of his or her rank,” but according to a pattern that inverts the expectation that associates the most powerful and the most watchful. “The most dominant animal in a social hierarchy receives the highest number of glances (attention from less dominant animals), and glances at other animals the least” (p. 587). This pattern illustrates how natural dominance tends to be exhibited in the body language of confidence. The confident male, who is secure in his social position and rank, feels no need to engage in surveillance of other members of his community. All eyes are on him. If pressed, he will give great displays of his capacity for domination, until others express their acquiescence and support (Waal 2007). If he stares intently at you, it is because there is already trouble (if not desire). STEVS follow a very different logic. This suggests that they are not part of a natural, biological, or ferine mode of male domination within human communities. STEVS are therefore culturally masculine in character in a specific sense which betokens not the confidence of natural male dominance, but rather an anxious overcompensation. In short, predatory patriarchy as a cultural form, and technologically enhanced visual surveillance as a means of domination appear to be hyper-masculine from a motive of insecurity. Hence, the implementation of STEVS is not a natural male dominance strategy. Instead, it is symptomatic of a deviant politics of anxious and overreaching social control.
For confirming evidence of this conclusion, consider that, in addition to finding a pattern of sexual deviance in the official use of CCTV systems, Norris and Armstrong also found that “those who directly challenged, by gesture or deed, the right of the cameras to monitor them were especially targeted” (Holtzman, 2006, p. 158). Or consider how Blackshades, a webcam spyware developed by young voyeuristic RATters, quickly became an instrument of political repression in Syria’s ongoing civil war (Kujawa, A. 2012). In both cases, STEVS reflect the deviance and insecurities of those who deploy them while generating further and even greater insecurities for their targets. In this way, they function not as bulwarks of security, but as media for the social contagion of insecurities. Our worry is that, far from representing anomalies, these patterns are fairly prevalent. Further study is required to discover just how prevalent.

To sum up so far, it is important to note that we have not argued that the mobilization of STEVS is simply a conspiracy of men preying upon women. Instead, we only surmise at a minimum that part of the motivational complex driving social investment in these unproven technologies consists of a voyeuristic cultural mentality that is predominantly masculine in origin, though it is commonly shared by men and women alike. The pervasiveness of this broad cultural mentality, together with the male-dominated character of the security industry, makes it likely that expressly masculine forms of normal deviant voyeurism are also part of what has been motivating the implementation of STEVS. Whether it is expressly a ‘guy thing’ or a broader cultural mentality, normal voyeurism is a dangerous engine of social policy. In a narrow sense, it opens up opportunities for pathological voyeurs, typically men who are especially likely to target women as their victims. And in a broader sense, it paves the way toward predatory forms of surveillance that are incompatible with the goals of a genuinely democratic security system.
3. Surveillance, Gender, and Democratic Security

While the relationship between STEVS and democracy has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention in recent years (Haggerty and Samatas 2010), the special case of the relationship between STEVS and democratic gender relations has been relatively neglected. This is an unfortunate lacuna in the literature, firstly, because gender equity is essential to democracy (Butler, J. 1990; Young, I. M. 1990; Phillips, A. 1991; Benhabib, S. 1996; Anderson, E. 1999; Gerring et. al. 2005); and secondly, because STEVS are afflicted with gender equity deficiencies. In the remainder of this chapter, we map two interconnected patterns of gender inequity associated with STEVS. The first pattern concerns the experience of women as visible objects, and the second concerns their agency in the production of security.

If social deficiencies in gender equity are essentially undemocratic, then we should be concerned with the unequal experiences and vulnerabilities of men and women as gendered objects of surveillance. For this reason, in addition to canvassing biological and cultural evidence linking STEVS to a predominantly masculine form of voyeuristic agency, it is also crucial in assessing the reasonableness of this pattern of technological investment to consider some of the ways in which women are especially marked for treatment, and are especially vulnerable, as visible objects. In particular, it is important to understand how practices of concealed surveillance engender democratic insecurity instead of the intended opposite goal.

Broadly speaking, it is not difficult to see the disconnect between the goal of democratic security and the practice of concealed social control by means of STEVS. Norberto Bobbio’s The Future of Democracy is especially instructive on this point, because it makes “the ‘visibility’ or transparency of power” one of the “defining characteristics” of democratic power (1987, p. 18). Here Bobbio means ‘power over,’ something exercised by those ‘in power’ over those who do
not similarly occupy privileged positions of social power. In order for genuinely democratic security to flourish, the most powerful must be visible to the least powerful. Making the power elite especially visible to the relatively powerless many is therefore an essential step for any stratified society seeking transition to democracy. Democratic security cannot be achieved unless and until the relatively powerless masses achieve a collective capacity to be as watchful over the powerful few as the few are watchful over them. Yet, the mobilization of STEVS has largely followed a contrary logic.

Consider Michel Foucault’s (1979) seemingly gender-neutral emphasis on the significance of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon as the exemplar of modern disciplinary power. Like the prisoners who live within the architecture of Bentham’s ideally efficient prison control system, subjects of modern disciplinary power are controlled by means of a technologically enhanced and concealed gaze. To be subject to this form of power is, as Koskela (2000) notes, “to be seen but never to know when or by whom” (p. 243). Although STEVS may make social spaces more observable, knowable, and predictable for the watchers, it makes those spaces less certain to those who move within them without knowing who might be watching, where the watchers are located, whether anyone is actively monitoring the images that the system is producing, or whether the system is even presently in operation. Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the phenomenology of being under technologically enhanced and concealed surveillance is not knowing who, or what kind of person, is watching. Does the watcher have lurid, predatory, or hostile intentions? Could it be the Bad Lieutenant? Thus, as an instrument of modern disciplinary power, STEVS are supposed to make one secure by placing one under a gaze that is essentially uncertain, even though this very uncertainty is itself often somewhat unnerving, perhaps sometimes very unnerving. In this respect, STEVS are always partially self-
undermining as providers of security. Accordingly, as noted above, empirical surveys find that citizens in general question the legitimacy of public CCTV systems due to doubts about who (if anyone) is watching (Oc & Tiesdell, 1997, pp. 130-142). Moreover, such misgivings are particularly pronounced among women (Trench et. al., 1997; Brown, S. 1998).

One reason why women’s confidence in CCTV is especially weak is that such systems are unable to prevent violent and sexual assaults; and they only marginally enhance a forensic response after the trauma of the assault has already occurred. As Hellen Jones (2005) notes, “The unresponsive eye of the CCTV camera cannot stop violence; it can only observe and record” (p. 589). To take a more specific example of a predominantly feminine security concern, it is worth noting that because CCTV surveillance is limited to visual monitoring of conduct at a distance it is not sensitive to verbal forms of sexual harassment. To make matters worse, in addition to being insensitive to verbal and interpersonally proximate sexual harassment, video surveillance is also formally indistinguishable from the kind of visual scrutiny that represents one of the most common forms of sexual harassment (Gardner 1995). Some forms of “girl watching” are inherently harassing (Quinn, B. 2002). Since it is always uncertain what is going on behind STEVS, it is an open question for women passing through the purview of such systems whether or not they are targets of the kinds of attitudes and behaviors typically associated with sexual harassment.⁴ There is also a further general connection between technologically enhanced surveillance and objectification, which involves a reductive way of perceiving others. In contrast with traditional street-level policing practices, wherein the “beat cop” would encounter citizens as whole persons, video surveillance mediates between a physically distant security official and citizens who have been reduced to some partial visual aspect of themselves, or who have been

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⁴ It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to resolve the question of whether it is possible for A to sexually harass B without B knowing that the harassing behavior has actually occurred.
dissected into types of bodily movements. There is a striking analogy between this reductive visual process and what has become among feminist theorists a fairly common characterization of the masculine objectifying gaze (Bartky 1990, p. 130; Langton 2009, pp. 228-229). Last, but certainly not least, there is the fact that STEVS can be and have been used to facilitate harassment and stalking, especially of women. For these reasons, we are sympathetic to Koskela’s (2000) concern:

For a lone woman in an underground station subject to surveillance by a camera, the camera (as an object) could represent threat more than security or, even more interestingly, threat as well as security. The very same object that is reminding her of (male) power is, at the same time, supposed to protect her from male (power). (258)

It may be tempting to suppose that there is no real security issue here on grounds that Koskela’s concern is articulated merely through the emotional phenomenology of feminine experience. But that would be a mistake. As recent advances in neuroscience have taught us, our emotion systems often know more than our conscious minds can process (Damasio, A. 2005). Far from being discounted, the kind of emotional response that Koskela invokes ought to be thoroughly and systematically studied. If these insecurities are found to be as pervasive as we expect, then we also need to investigate the gendered threat landscape of our social world in search of adequate causes.

The feelings of insecurity that STEVS induce, and that women seem to feel more acutely than men, may also stem in part from the way in which such systems signify a lost sense of community and interpersonal trust. Every CCTV camera is a fixed reminder of the absence of social trust. After all, as Bruce Schneier (2012) points out, “security is what you need when you don’t have any trust” (17). Schneier also emphasizes that “security is ultimately how we induce trust in society” (ibid). This is undoubtedly true. Yet, it is only half of the story, because the relationship between security and trust is one of mutual reinforcement. For this reason, it is also
necessary in general, and particularly in connection with the feelings of insecurity that STEVS engender, to appreciate how networks of trust function as crucial resources in the social production of security.

To see this (feminine?) side of the relationship between trust and security, it is helpful to recall Oscar Newman’s *Defensible Space* (1972), which articulated what has become the accepted view of the visual geography and architecture of security. Newman found that security is a function of visibility, and that visibility may be optimized by combining organic and technologically enhanced modes of surveillance. His work is especially renowned for showing the importance of architectures that facilitate the kind of social surveillance and consequent social familiarity that directly results from spontaneous flows of human activity. For the purpose of increasing security, the places where we live, work, and consume ought to be built in such a way that our bodies naturally tend to enter upon vantage points that optimize our organic visual recognition capacities. Hence, homes that face or open up to shared public spaces tend to provide better security than do high rise apartment buildings. The reason for this is that denizens who inhabit the former become visually familiar to one another, whereas denizens of the latter do not. Where there are gaps in the social system of organic surveillance and familiarity, Newman supposes that technologically enhanced video surveillance systems may serve as an effective secondary means of making our world more visible and therefore more secure. According to this now orthodox view, technologically enhanced surveillance can and ought to complement and reinforce organic surveillance, and thereby help to facilitate social coordination and trust.

To the contrary, however, recent social developments have not followed this optimistic logic. Instead, we are struck by how far the mobilization of STEVS not only derives from but also reinforces the loss of spontaneous human togetherness, familiarity, and social trust. The
overall pattern of surveillance in urban areas is rapidly tilting towards electronic eyes as replacements rather than as supplements for the organic presence of “eyes on the street” (Fyfe, N. R. and Bannister, J. 1998). Although CCTV systems often supplant the trusted gaze of fellow community members, they are extremely unlikely to provide adequate substitutes. The unknown watchers concealed behind the disembodied gaze of CCTV and related systems are simply not natural subjects of social trust. In ideal theory, STEVS are supposed buttress organic modes of security that grow out of direct interpersonal visibility, familiarity, and trust. In recent practice, however, they are serving instead to displace and even fracture them. When CCTV cameras are deployed in lieu of ‘beat cops,’ they displace a traditional organic security provision. When CCTV-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or “drones”) are deployed to monitor and help disperse peaceful protest gatherings, they fracture networks of trust that might otherwise help to make citizens more secure. STEVS that fill in the gaps where organic security measures cannot reach may help to facilitate social coordination and democratic security; but STEVS that protect privileged social groups from unprivileged ones do not. In order to appreciate how pervasive this latter pattern may actually be, it is helpful to recall Mike Davis’s analysis of Los Angeles in City of Quartz (1992). One of the virtues of Davis’s often criticized but important book is how well it demonstrates some of the ways in which security has become a “prestige symbol” that “has less to do with personal safety than with the degree of personal insulation, in residential, work, consumption and travel environments, from ‘unsavory’ groups and individuals, even crowds in general” (224). The resulting pattern of undemocratic securitization he describes as a kind of “spatial apartheid.” Although Davis was concerned to map economic class divisions, there are also significant overlapping patterns of gender inequality. Poverty, after all, has a well-known gender bias. This is true both globally and in the world’s most economically developed nations
On the agency side of the surveillance relationship, we are also concerned with inequities in the field of opportunities to participate in and shape essential practices of shared governance, including the provision of basic security. Such inequities are essentially undemocratic if democracy is understood, following Elizabeth Anderson, to be “collective self-determination by means of open discussion among equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all”\(^5\) (1999, p. 313). The mere fact that women are underrepresented within the decision-making nexus of the security industry is alone enough to cast doubt on whether ongoing social investment in STEVS has been vetted in a sufficiently gender-balanced way. Clearly administrative processes need to pay greater attention to the feminine perspective on surveillance; and it is not enough for this point of view to be imagined by male security officials and articulated as part of the special province of their paternalistic authority. The traditional paternalistic approach is both normatively and epistemically flawed. Normatively, it violates the principle of equal standing: “To stand as an equal before others in discussion means that one is entitled to participate, that others recognize an obligation to listen respectfully and respond to one’s arguments, that no one need bow and scrape before others or represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of having their claim heard” (1999, p. 313). Epistemically, it falsely supposes that men know what makes women feel secure without bothering to ask them.

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\(^5\) Here we indicate our endorsement of a discursive conception of democracy as complementary to Bobbio’s emphasis on the defining feature of visible transparency. It is obviously beyond the scope of the present work to defend this hybrid conception of democracy.
It would be convenient for the predominantly male administrative establishment if security policies could be made (largely by men) from an abstract, impartial, and gender-neutral perspective, one which represents the perspective of “pure reason” (Kant, I. 1998), a universal rather than a particular perspective (Baier, K. 1958), or an ideally fair position behind a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls, J. 1971). More realistic and pragmatic, however, is the kind of approach commonly favored by feminist political theorists, which emphasizes the epistemic value of “positional” policy assessments (Anderson, E. 2003). Such an approach would open up opportunities for women’s anxieties about being targets of concealed surveillance to be heard. A more discursively open, pluralistic, and gender-equitable security policy-making process is also likely to problematize the standard way of framing issues surrounding surveillance practices in terms of privacy. As David Lyon (1994) noted long ago, a “gender-sensitive approach” to surveillance “will rightly be concerned about the apparent lack of accountability in the ‘private’ sphere” precisely because “patriarchy is buttressed by such concepts of privacy” (185). Lyon points out that the concept of privacy is “hopelessly bound up with property, patriarchy and privilege,” and that the importance of privacy “actually grows from the same modern soil as surveillance.” These are both reasons for doubting the “efficacy” of privacy “as a tool of ‘counter-surveillance’” (159). We concur. It is more fruitful to critically examine STEVS in terms of their effectiveness or ineffectiveness in increasing democratic security and enhancing social trust. To do so, it is necessary to examine STEVS through a gendered lens. Only by taking this task seriously as a subject of further study can we sincerely make all-things-considered pragmatic decisions about alternative ways of making human communities more secure.

*****The remainder of this section is currently under construction.*****
References List


