# Racial Consciousness and Interracial Marriage

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**Abstract:**

Political Science has traditionally paid little attention to the subject of interracial marriage. Typically, study of the topic in the discipline has taken the form of studying public opinion of intermarriage and how that public opinion can be correlated with other political attitudes. Glaringly missing from this approach has been the political attitudes of the interracially married. In this paper, I build on recent scholarship that *inverts* the traditional paradigm, shifting focus *from* public opinion of interracial marriage *to* interracially married individual's public opinions. I advance this novel line of research by clarifying the inadequately addressed problem of endogeneity and leveraging CMPS data to demonstrate the role racial consciousness plays in predicting for interracial marriage. I find that intermarriage probability is increased when racial consciousness is decreased. Furthermore, I show that Racial Identification, Relative Group Discrimination, and Black Antagonism are powerful predictors of intermarriage, while Systemic Attribution and Linked Fate are not.

## Introduction

One of the greatly under-studied topics in the field of political science is the phenomenon of interracial marriage. Since the *Loving v. Virginia* Supreme Court decision in 1967, Constitutionally protecting marriage across the races, intermarriage has been on the rise, going from just 3% of newlyweds marring someone of a different race in 1967, to 17% in 2017 (Pew). The Census reports that interracial marriages constitute 10% of all existing marriages in the United States. Furthermore, intermarriage is a highly dynamic social phenomenon that has been found to differ between racial groups and within racial groups by gender, age, education, group size, sex ratio, and geography (Qian and Lichter; Gevrek 2013; Wright et al. 2003).

In addition to being an important demographic trend, interracial marriage has remained an important symbol in American politics. Despite the Court's decision in 1967, the final state law against intermarriage was abolished in Alabama in 2000 (sos.alabama.gov). Though the law held no legal authority, a significant number of Alabama's counties had majorities that voted against the resolution to abolish the law banning intermarriage. More recently, we saw Congress spending much time deliberating about the Constitutional guarantee of marriage across genders and race. The bill eventually passed in late December 2022, called The Respect for Marriage Act (H.R. 8404).

Interracially married individuals being a notable demographic trend as well as powerful symbol in American Politics, Political Scientists have begun to show increased interest in the topic. The lens through which Political Science has studied interracial marriage is Public Opinion of interracial marriage as a social phenomenon. For example, Tesler (2013) finds disapproval of intermarriage to be negatively associated with support for Obama in 2008 and Perry (2012) finds opinion of intermarriage to be shaped by diversity of social environment.

This public opinion approach has been insightful into how occurrence of marriage between the races still operates as an important symbol and predictor of political attitudes among Americans. However, this approach has has a significant limitation that has only been bridged in the past few years by a small collection of scholars who have begun the public opinions of individuals who are interracially married. This important *inversion* could be described as the transition from studying public public opinion of interracial marriage to studying interracially married individuals public opinions. The emerging literature has begun to ask important questions about how interracial marriage might be a unique site of political attitude formation and modification. Initial research has led to the promising findings that interracially married individuals are political distinct (Lemi and Kposowa 2017) and have more sympathetic racial views than their co-racially married counterparts (Phan et al. 2022).

Despite these findings, a number of gaps remain. First, the problem of endogeneity potentially confounding causation has not been adequately addressed (Phan et al. 2022). Second, a representative sample has yet to be located (Lemi and Kposowa 2017). Third, questions have not yet been raised about how one's racial consciousness may relate to marrying across races.

This recent line of research not only asks questions highly relevant to public opinion of a group that is steadily increasing in size, but also asks grand normative questions about the dismantling of systemic racism and improvement of race relations. As Lemi and Kposowa remark in their investigation of the political attitudes of interracially married Asian American immigrants, "Examining the consequences of intermarriage for one's racial politics is necessary to understand how intermarriage may or may not undermine efforts toward eradicating systemic racism" (558). Furthermore, Perry (2012), studying public opinion on interracial marriage observes, "understanding what factors contribute to greater support of interracial marriage provides insight into what factors may contribute to more harmonious intergroup relations more broadly" (13). As these political scientists suggest, the study of intermarriage may have significant implications for the broader study of race relations and systemic racism in the United States.

In the rest of this paper, I review the relevant literature of intermarriage in Political Science, which leads me to a discussion of the potential problem of endogeneity. In conversation with Contact Theory (Alport 1954) I justify my methodology which does not establish causal relationships. Next, I turn to my empirical analyses, outlining my analytic plan, regression framework, variables, data, and results. I conclude by discussing my findings and and outlining directions future research may take to build on this highly relevant novel line of inquiry.

## Literature Review

### *Interracial Marriage*

Since its national legalization interracial marriage has attracted the attention of scholars from a number of disciplines. The earliest studies of interracial marriage come from sociology and anthropology (Park 1924). Other disciplines and researchers have studied interracial marriage as a mechanism for blurring racial boundaries and closing social distance (Qian and Lichter 2007), as a means of bringing together stratified dominant and subordinate groups (Fang et al. 1998), a context for potential increased marital conflict (Zhang and Van Hook 2009), and a place for the exploration of the flexibility of identity (Afful et al. 2015). Assumed within all of these studies is interracial marriages *uniqueness,* its difference from intraracial marriage.

Political Science, on the other hand, has had relatively little to say about the phenomenon of interracial marriage. Study of the topic has remained outside the discipline's top journals (*American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, and *Political Analysis*). A keyword search of "interracial marriage" in all three journals returns 0 articles primarily about the topic.

In what has been studied, most research of interracial marriage in Political Science has focused on trends in public opinion and how public opinion of it is correlated to other political preferences (Tesler 2013; Perry 2012). Tesler (2013 finds disapproval of interracial marriage to be negatively correlated with support for Obama in 2012. Perry (2012) finds support for interracial marriage to be correlated with diversity of one's social environment. These studies show the continued importance of racial attitudes in public opinion and that interracial marriage is a social phenomenon that stands out against intraracial marriage.

A recently emerging line of study has shifted it focus from public opinion of interracial marriage to the public opinions of those who are in interracial marriages. At its heart, this novel line of research asks whether or not those who enter interracial marriages are politically distinct or if interracial marriage drives political distinctness.

The two articles emblematic of this emerging literature are Lemi and Kposowa (2017) and Phan et al. (2022). Lemi and Kposowa (2017) investigate the question of whether or not Asian American Immigrants are politically distinct. They find that that these individuals are more concerned about racial issues, less supportive of co-ethnic candidates, and no different on support for a path to citizenship for immigrants than their intraracially married counterparts. Phan et al. (2022) investigate a similar question, but frame it in causal language: does intermarriage *cause* more sympathetic racial views? Advancing a theory of *racialized political socialization,* they find that interracially married individuals have more sympathetic racial views, except for interracially married Hispanics. This represents the most comprehensive study to date on the associations between interracial marriage and views on the amount of discrimination ethnic minorities experience. However, the study exhibits a problem that needs to be clarified. While the findings of the study are insightful and generative, the conclusion of the findings as causal fails to take into account the possible problem of endogeneity.

These recent papers have succeeded in demonstrating that interracially married individuals are political distinct from their intraracially married counterparts. I build on this line of literature by bringing interracial marriage into conversation with the concept of *Racial Consciousness,* a concept with a long history in the field of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics (REP).

*Racial Consciousness*

*Racial Consciousness* is a concept in REP that was pioneered around Black Public Opinion (Brown 1931; Ferguson 1938; Verba and Nie 1972). It attempts to measure the degree to which an individual exhibits "in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (McLain 2009, 476). Early measurements of the term relied on the number of times an interviewee mentioned race of whether they capitalized the "N" in Negro (McClain et al. 2009). These rough means of measurement were given increased robustness by Gurin (1980) and Miller et al. (1981) who argued for a multi-dimensional concept of racial consciousness, composed of racial identification, polar affect, polar power, and systemic attribution.

Racial Identification, often confused for the concept of racial consciousness itself, is just one dimension of the measure and captures the degree of closeness an individual feels with a given group. More recent scholarship that points to the complexity and fluidity of racial identity as a social construct points to the need to cautiously asses the limitations of any measurement of racial identity (Garcia 2017; Junn 2007). Polar Power describes the sense of a lack of power in the status quo relative to other racial groups (Miller et al. 1981). Polar Power is the next generation of "Power Discontent", which was used to capture a similar sense of relative powerlessness (Gurin et al. 1980). Systemic Attribution is a measure of blame individuals attribute to disparities in America being caused by individual factors (family, effort) versus systemic factors (racism, education).It is built on the concept of internal-external control (Rotter 1966) and "evaluation of legitimacy" (Gurin et al. 1978).

Racial Consciousness has been shown to operate with great variation among the major racial groups in the US. For as long as the concept has been measured, African Americans have shown a high degree of racial consciousness by exhibiting racial identification, racial solidarity, and advocacy for systemic measures to rectify disparities. For Blacks, racial consciousness has been higher than other minority groups, such as women, working-class folks, and the elderly (Gurin et al. 1980) as well as positively correlated with voter turnout (Miller et al. 1981). An innovation in racial consciousness for Blacks was Michael Dawson's (1994) famous concept of "Linked Fate", a measure of the degree to which an individual believes what happens to others in their racial group will happen to them. The concept, though now almost 30 years old, exercises influence in REP scholarship. The concise concept has been tied to THINGS for African Americans. Though Blacks have typically shown high levels of racial consciousness, one dimension of the measure has been slowly waning: systemic attribution (AUTHORS). Phoenix and Jasso (2022) attribute the increase of individualist explanations of

disparities to the rise of respectability politics. Despite the decrease in systemic attribution, Blacks continue to display high levels of racial consciousness, with the consciousness being predict of certain behaviors. Scholarship has not yet investigated how this concept operates for African immigrants.

While Blacks constitute a relatively homogenous (ethnically, not ideologically) racial group, Asians and Latinos are more diverse in their proximate immigration backgrounds. In order to understand the various degrees of racial consciousness in the Latino community, one must grasp the heterogeneity in the Latino community, something that before Beltran 2010 had not yet been fully reckoned with in scholarship. Much of the degree to which an individual exhibits racial consciousness is mediated through personal encounters with racism. Highlighting the heterogeneity of opinion and role of racism, Masuoka (2006) shows that racial consciousness varies greatly by region of original immigration location for Latinos and that experience with discrimination to be a strong predictor for group consciousness.

Though Asians bear similarities of racial consciousness with Latinos, there are marked differences in the formation of racial consciousness. While encounters with racism predicts lead likelihood to have group consciousness for Latinos, experiences with racism strongly predict for greater racial consciousness in Asians. While Democrat does not predict for racial consciousness for Latinos, it does for Asian Americans. In sum, Asian Americans show different trends for racial consciousness, not totally

**Table 1. Sample Statistics**

| Statistic | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 5,962 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Male | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| White | 5,962 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Black | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Asian | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Foreign.Born | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Married | 5,962 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Single.but.living.together | 5,962 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Divorced | 5,962 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Widowed | 5,962 | 0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 |
| Employed.Full.Time | 5,962 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Employed.Part.Time | 5,962 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Full.Time.Student | 5,962 | 0.03 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 |
| Retired | 5,962 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Unemployed | 5,962 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Employed.Homemaker | 5,962 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Education.Numeric | 5,962 | 4.4 | 1.1 | 1 | 6 |
| Income.Numeric | 5,527 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 1 | 6 |
| Republican | 5,962 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Democrat | 5,962 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Independent | 5,962 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| IdeologyLiberal.to.Conservative | 5,492 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 5,958 | 45.3 | 15.1 | 18 | 98 |
| Interracial.Partner | 5,962 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Coracial.Partner | 5,962 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Political.Interest | 5,962 | 2.8 | 0.9 | 1 | 4 |
| Linked.Fate.Yes | 5,962 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Linked.Fate.Degree | 5,962 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0 | 3 |
| Linked.Fate.Scale | 5,962 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| White.Discrimination.Numeric | 5,502 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 1 | 4 |
| Black.Discrimination.Numeric | 5,657 | 3.3 | 0.8 | 1 | 4 |
| Asian.Discrimination.Numeric | 5,416 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 1 | 4 |
| Hispanic.Discrimination.Numeric | 5,543 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 1 | 4 |
| American.ID.Importance | 5,962 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Oppose.Slavery.Apology. | 4,306 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| BLM.Opposition.Scale | 5,962 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Black.Discrimination.Scale | 5,657 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Black.Resentment.Scale | 5,962 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 |

unexpected given their unique position in the American racial hierarchy relative to Blacks and Whites as well as Hispanics (Kim 1999).

The study of group consciousness generally, and racial consciousness in particular, has focused on subordinate group. This is not only a methodological consideration, but at the very heart of the theorization of group consciousness. Borrowing the word "consciousness" from Marx's "class consciousness", group and racial consciousness theorists alike have attributed consciousness only to subordinate groups, or stratum (Miller at al. 1981). However, the reason for not studying Whites goes beyond the theoretical. Empirically, previous studies have shown that Whites did not exhibit characteristics of racial consciousness. White political participation correlated with none of the four dimensions of racial consciousness (Miller et al. 1981). Focus, instead has been on how Whites view racial minorities as outgroups. The key measure in the literature here is "Racial Resentment" (Kinder and Sanders 1996). However, recent scholarship has shown, in spite of both theory and previous empirical research, Whites have begun to think of themselves as an *in-group* and exhibit racial consciousness. Jardina and Mickey (2022) found White racial solidarity to be positively correlated with support for authoritarian rule. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the competing explanations of this increase in White racial consciousness, but the key takeaway is that Whites are increasingly exhibiting signs of racial consciousness. More specifically, Whites are more strongly identifying as White, feeling relatively deprived in the American racial hierarchy, more pro in-group, and increasingly skeptical of the system.

**Data and Methodology**

In order to answer the question of how racial consciousness predicts for intermarriage across the major racial groups in the US, I leverage a question asking if a respondent is married and the race of their partner on the the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Raical Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (Frasure 2016). This survey not only includes a question crucial to my analysis about the race of a romantic partner, but the CMPS also offers uniquely large and representative sample sizes for often under sampled groups. The CMPS will allow me to conduct my analyses with confidence across all major racial groups.

Importantly, my empirical analysis differs from previous efforts in a number of ways. First, I explicitly present my analyses as non-causal. In this way it is in stark contrast to Phan et al. (2022) analysis that claims to be causal. Secondly, I run logistic regressions and use Intermarriage as an outcome variable rather than an explanatory variable. Using Logistic regression and Intermarriage as an outcome variable avoids a cursory interpretation that intermarriage is causally related to racial consciousness. Though the opposite causal interpretation is possible with my analyses, given that previous efforts have used Intermarriage as a predictor, I believe my model guards against this all too easy assumption in the literature up to this point.

In order to justify my explicit claim to non-causality, I now turn to a brief discussion of the selection problem in the context of this research question. The core challenge of interpreting causal findings in this line of research can be stated as follows: Does interracial marriage *cause* levels of racial consciousness, or do those with certain levels of racial consciousness *select into* interracial romantic relationships. It is reasonable to think that the causal pathway could go in either direction, an unobservable variable such as *tolerance* or *open-mindedness* might be correlated with both, or the two elements are reciprocally causing the other.

Other scholars grappling with similar potentials for endogeneity clouding causal interpretations have turned to a number of methods. Pettigrew (1998)—a noted scholar of *Contact Theory* (Allport 1954)—has attempted to reduce the selection problem by turning to contexts in which the choice of selection is near zero (such as the Marines or a sports team), using endogenous switching models (Powers and Ellison 1995; Winship and Mare 1995; Heckman 1979). However, broadly speaking in contemporary America, marriage is one of the

*least* random selection pools. Secondly, endogenous switching models require an Instrumental Variable, something not yet located in the United States for intermarriage. Where an instrumental variable has been located for intermarriage, findings have shown that the problem of endogeneity is likely (Meng and Gregory 2005; Gevrek 2009; Rodriguez 2015). Wang and Zhao 2021 study the effects of interracial marriage on the assimilation of non-Han Chinese migrants. They point to the problem of endogeneity and instead opt to use an Instrumental Variable for region of birth and rate of intermarriage. *A priori* reasoning, the non-randomness of marriage, the lack of an instrumental variable, and the warning of other scholars lead me to conclude that the endogeneity cannot be assumed away in this research context. Any results presented as causal would be upward-biased.

The final unique element of my model is that I run separate regressions for each race and gender-racial subgroup for a number of substantive reasons. First, I take race to be more than just an indicator variable (Figgart 1997; Garcia 2007; Junn 2007). Second, each racial group and each gender within each racial group has very different baseline probabilities of being in an interracial relationship (Lichter 2013; Pew 2017). Third, the control variables will likely have very different effects for each group that would be flattened if all groups were included in a single regression (Masuoka 2006).

**Outcome Variable**

The primary outcome variable in this analysis is "Interracial Marriage". This includes two components: marriage and race. I follow the lead of Phan et al. (2022) by including in the "married" category anyone who indicates that they are married to, living with, widowed by, or divorced from someone of another race. This is a simple binary indicator where 0 = partner of same race and 1 = partner of a different race. Importantly, I use Intermarriage as an outcome variable not to causally claim that certain racial dispositions cause intermarriage, but to more easily describe the relationship between racial consciousness dimensions and intermarriage. I believe treating intermarriage as a "treatment" lends itself to misunderstanding. Because my outcome is binary, I use logistic regressions, running r's generalized linear model (glm) function, indicating family = "binomial". Importantly, I only run regressions within the "married" population of the survey, a total of 5,962 respondents. I do this because those who are married, or ever have been married, may likely be systematically different from those who are not, or have never been married.

**Explanatory Variables**

Because I am unable to perfectly replicate the questions used on classic surveys examining racial consciousness, I best approximate the measures by creating new variables and indexes available on the CMPS. I now turn to a discussion of the new measures and their operationalizations.

<u>Racial Identification:</u>

The classic studies of racial consciousness include sets of questions that ask about the relative intensity of importance of one component of an individual's identity. In this study, due to data constraints, I can only examine racial identification for Hispanic and Asian respondents. I operationalize ***Racial Identification*** by using a set of questions from the CMPS that asks Asian and Hispanic respondents to rank different identities on which is most important to how they see themselves: American, Racial, and Ethnic (a195_1 - a195_3 & l195_1 - l195_3). I create three separate measures by reversing the ordering of ranking to create a score of importance. Respondents who rank American identity as most important and Racial identity as least important are then given a score of 3 on the American scale, 2 on the Ethnic scale, and 1 on the Racial scale. I run these scores in three separate models to acquire estimates for how

ranking of certain identities predicts for intermarriage. The CMPS also asks three separate questions about how important their American, Racial, and Ethnic identity are for how they see themselves, but I believe the forced-choice format provides a more focused approximation of which identities are most important. Based on what was outlined in the literature review, I expect ranking of racial identity and ethnic identity to be negatively associated with intermarriage and American identity to be positively associated with predicted probability of interracial marriage.

**Hypothesis #1**: I expect ranking of racial identity to be negatively associated with probability of intermarriage.

**Hypothesis #2**: I expect ranking of ethnic identity to be negatively associated with probability of intermarriage.

**Hypothesis #3**: I expect ranking of American identity to be positively associated with probability of intermarriage.

Relative Group Discrimination:

I use Relative Group Discrimination (Berry et al. 2020) to approximate Polar Power. Due to data constraints, I am unable to ask the classic battery for Polar Power that includes questions about relative group influence. Instead, I opt to use Berry et al.'s (2020) novel concept of *relative group discrimination* (RGD) that measures a similar sentiment—the degree to which an individual perceives their group to be worse off (or more poorly treated) than other racial groups. I expect that RGD will be negative associated with probabilities of intermarriage.

I operationalize ***Relative Group Discrimination*** in the same way as Berry et al (2020). This is done by using a set of four CMPS questions (c243 - c247) that ask, "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against…:" Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos on a scale between, "None", "A little", "Some", and "A lot". An index is created that places each respondent at zero, adding 1 for every group the respondent thinks experiences *less* discrimination, subtracting 1 for every group the respondent thinks experiences *more* discrimination, and adding 0 for every group the respondents thinks experiences *the same* level of discrimination. The scale index ranges between -3 for those who report the lowest levels of relative discrimination to 3 for those who report the highest levels of relative discrimination. I scale the answer between 0-1. To make sure my scoring is accurate, I replicate the density plots provided in Berry et al. (2020).

**Hypothesis #4**: I expect Relative Group Discrimination to be negatively associated with probability of intermarriage.

Black Antagonism:

In order to approximate Polar Affect, I develop a measurement—based on Racial Resentment (Kinder and Sanders1996)—I call **Black Antagonism**. I choose not to use the exact term of "Racial Resentment" or even "Black Resentment" because I cannot use the exact same questions as the classic battery, but I am able to somewhat approximate the concept. Racial Resentment intends to capture White people's racial attitudes in a Post-Civil Rights era (Phoenix and Jasso 2022). It was developed as a measure of antagonistic anti-Black views that had become more subtle since "old-fashioned racism" was beginning to become less socially acceptable (Sears 1988; Kinder and Sears 1981). While the concept remains controversial (Carmines et al. 2011), it has stood the test of time in Political Science and has been shown to predict for disapproval of Obama (Tesler and Sears 2010) and support for Trump (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2017). I use this concept because it resembles aspects of Polar Affect, a liking of the in-group and a disliking of the out-group. In this case, the one particular out-group is African Americans. Results of this variable will need to be carefully interpreted for each racial group because the same questions may mean something very difference for each group (Tesler and Sears 2008).

I operationalize ***Black Antagonism*** by using three questions to tap into anti-Black sentiment. The first measure is "opposition to slavery apology" and asks respondents whether or not the US should apologize for slavery (c158). This is intended to approximate two questions on the Racial Resentment battery that ask about Slavery and Discrimination & Blacks getting what they deserve. The question is meant to measure a belief that slavery was perhaps not as bad as Blacks make it out to be, something that needs to just be forgotten and Blacks need to move on, or conjure up images of reparations (0 = support slavery apology & 1 = oppose slavery apology). The next question asks about support or opposition to BLM (c228). I am not the first to use this as a question to tap into racial resentment (DeSante and Smith 2020). Fortunately, the question does not just ask how much the respondent supports and provides, "A little" to "A lot", but provides options ranging from "Strongly Oppose" to "Strongly Support". I reverse code the responses to measure "Opposition to BLM" (1 = Strongly Support & 5 = "Strongly Oppose"). I scale the responses between 0-1. Finally, I use a question that asks respondents how much discrimination Blacks face in America (c244). I reverse code the options so 1 = "A lot" and 4 = "None at all". I scale the responses between 0-1. I run




**Figure 4.** Minimum to maximum effect sizes of importance of American identity (top), Racial identity (middle), and Ethnic identity (bottom) on probability of having an interracial partner. Plotted from logistic regressions controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born..

regressions on each of these outcomes independently and then put them together into a scale I call, “Black Antagonism” (Cronbach’s alpha = .7).

**Hypothesis #5**: Black Antagonism will be positively associated with intermarriage for groups of color, but negatively associated with intermarriage for Whites.

Systemic Attribution:

Though an important component of racial consciousness and one that is changing in the Black community (Phoenix and Jasso 2022), I do not believe systemic attribution will be a particularly strong predictor of intermarriage. Because it is a policy-oriented dimension, it will not activate identity in such a way as to predict of intermarriage, one way or the other. Additionally, the CMPS only asks this question to Black respondents. For these reasons, I do not include my operationalize of the concept or a formal hypotheses in this paper, but rather locate it in the Appendix.

Linked Fate:

Just as I believe Systemic Attribution to not be significantly associated with intermarriage, neither do I believe Linked Fate to be. Though a compact predictor of some political behavior, I do not believe it to be activating of identity in the way other dimensions of racial consciousness to be. I do not include a formal hypothesis, but further discuss results in the appendix.

## Control Variables

I use a number of controls that are used in the literature in order to protect against unintended confounders in prediction of intermarriage. I use income, education, age, ideology, immigration status, foreign born, and party as controls (Qian and Lichter 2007; Meng and Gregory 2005; Wang and Zhao 2021; Phan et al. 2022; Lemi and Kposowa 2017; Eastwick 2009).

## Results




**Figure 5.** Relationship between perceived RGD and Intermarriage probability. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 6.** Relationship between perceived RGD and Intermarriage probability, disaggregated by race and gender subgroups. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.

Racial Identification

Because racial identification involved one regression for each racial group and each subgroup for each identity measure (a total of 18), I condensed the findings into a plot (Figure 4) that provides the estimate for the change in log probability of indicating an interracial partner for American identity scores (top), Racial identity scores (middle), and Ethnic identity scores (bottom). As hypothesized, ranking of American identity had a significant and positive effect on the predicted probability of having a spouse of another race. This holds true for both Asian and Hispanic respondents. The more importance they give to their American identity, at the cost of their Ethnic and Racial identity, the more likely they are to be involved in a relationship with someone not of their own race or ethnicity. Though the effect holds for both groups, we can see a clearly largest estimate for Hispanics. The salience and importance of American identity has been identified by other scholars who have found that Hispanics support American identity and American values of democracy and patriotism at high rates (de la Garza, Falcon & Garcia, 1996; Bergman et al. 2014; Junn and Masuoka 2008).

The middle section on Figure 4 shows the estimate for ranking of racial identity. I hypothesized that importance of racial identity would be negatively associated with likelihood of having an interracial partner. This is true for the Hispanic groups, but not the Asian groups. In the aggregate, Hispanics who rank their racial identity as most important have log probability 100% lower of being intermarried than Hispanics who rank racial identity as *least* important. On the other hand, the key variable for Asians not being intermarried is ranking of ethnic identity, which does not have a significant relationship for Hispanic respondents. In the aggregate, Asians who rank ethnic identity as most important have a log probability of being interracially married 50% lower than those who rank ethnic identity as least important.

These results suggest a puzzle as to why racial identity would have a significant relationship for Hispanics, but ethnic identity would have a significant relationship for Asians. While a puzzle, these findings fit neatly into previous research that has found group identity for be formed and operating differently between Hispanics and Asians (Junn and Masuoka 2008a; Junn and Masuoka 2008b; Masuoka 2006). I offer a number of interpretations for this finding. First, the racial heterogeneity of Hispanics could mean that mostly identifying as Hispanic




**Figure 7.** Relationship between opposing the US apologizing for slavery and Intermarriage probability. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 8.** Relationship between opposing the US apologizing for slavery and Intermarriage probability, disaggregated by race and gender subgroups. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 9.** Relationship between opposing BLM and Intermarriage probability. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 10.** Relationship between opposing BLM and Intermarriage probability, disaggregated by race and gender subgroups. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.

signals something about the racial views or values of the respondent. Hispanics, mores than other racial groups, show signs of clear racial creation and have a long history with grappling with white identification. Therefore, the "choice" (as much as it can be construed as such) to primarily identify as Hispanic is something that is unique to Hispanics. Asians, on the whole, do not need to consistently make the same choice, especially with their social construction as perpetual foreigner (Kim 1999). Additionally, the survey does not let us fully tap into phenotypic factors. To the degree that someone cannot choose their racial identity (because they "look" much more Hispanic) may tells us something either about the individual's consciousness of race or their dating options being more constrained within their own racial group due to white prejudice against those with darker skin (RENDON'S FRIEND???) Furthermore, the path of acculturation of Hispanics may lead them to adopting American group distinctions of race, something not indigenous to other countries. In other words, a Hispanic individual who identifies as Hispanic is likely someone who has to some degree adopted American norms and overall will be more likely to marry someone of a different race, more often than not white.

For Asians, this finding could also be the result of the ethnic heterogeneity. Asians may show lower pan-ethnic racial identity because it operates as a more latent trait for them (Junn and Masuoka 2008a). These results do not claim that racial identity is more important for Hispanics and ethnic identity is more important for Asian overall, but that they are specifically predictive in the context of interracial marriage. Identifying most with Ethnic group might signal something about the individual about the degree to which they have not adopted American racial norms, which may, in turn, tell us something about that individual's chances of dating outside of the race.

Relative Group Discrimination

Hypothesis #4 stated that Relative Group Discrimination would be negatively associated with intermarriage for all racial groups. The logistic regressions indicate that the relationship is significant and negative for all racial groups. However, the magnitudes vary between racial groups. Figure 5 shows the steepest decline in predicted probability of intermarriage to be among Asian respondents. At the lowest levels of perceived RGD Asians have the highest predicted probability of being intermarried (around .5), but as perceived RGD

increases to its maximum, the probability drops about .15. Notably, Black respondents have a large standard error at lower levels of perceived RGD and a very small standard error at the higher levels of perceived RGD, indicating many more Blacks perceive higher levels than lower levels of RGD.

When the models are disaggregated by subgroup, the significance and magnitude of estimates change. Figure 6 shows that the relationship flattens out for both White women and Black men. Part of the reasons for Black men appears to be that so few perceive low levels of RGD that the estimate is unstable. The relationship remains negative. The relationship between RGD and intermarriage is more significant and intense for White men than for White women and more intense for Black women than for Black men.

One surprising finding of this analysis is that Asian men have the largest negative change in predicted probability (-2.154). This means that Asian men who perceive the most RGD have a log likelihood of intermarrying that is 215% *less than* Asian men who perceive the least RGD. Relative Group discrimination is significantly associated with lower probabilities of intermarriage.

Black Antagonism

The next results presented are from the three items that compose the Black Antagonism scale. First, opposition to the US apologizing for slavery has a positive and significant relationship for Black and Hispanic respondents. However, the effects are not equal; Black respondents who oppose a slavery apology are have log odds of being interracially married 96% lower than those who support an apology. For Hispanics, the difference is about 40%. Unsurprisingly, because slavery is primarily associated with Black people historically in the US, the effect would be the largest for Black respondents.

The coefficient for the second item, opposition to BLM, is only significant for Black respondents. For white respondents, the coefficient approaches significance but is not significant at conventional levels. The effect for Blacks is even larger than that of an apology for slavery. Again, because this dimension of racial consciousness is most directly related to




**Figure 11.** Relationship between perceived discrimination against Blacks and Intermarriage probability. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 12.** Relationship between perceived discrimination against Blacks and Intermarriage probability, disaggregated by race and gender subgroups. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.

African Americans, it is not surprising that both a slavery apology and opposition to BLM would be most significant and quite large for Black respondents.

The third component which asked respondents how little discrimination Blacks face in the United States present different findings, however. Coefficients are significant for all racial groups. This question must be tapping into something slightly different such that it is significantly correlated with intermarriage for all groups. Importantly, the directions and effects are not uniform. The coefficient is negative for Whites and Asians and positive for Blacks and Hispanics. The biggest effect is for whites: whites who believe Blacks experience no discrimination have a log likelihood of being married to someone another race 160% lower than Whites who believe Blacks experience a lot of discrimination. Notably, in the previous two items, the Asian line has been roughly parallel to the Hispanic line (Figures X and Y). However, for this item we observe a notable departure in direction. Rather than Asians being more likely (not significantly, though) to intermarry if they exhibit the other two items of Black Antagonism, Asians are less likely to intermarry if they exhibit this item of Black Antagonism. In other words, Asians depart from the other groups of color and follow more closely the pattern of Whites: for those who exhibit this type of Black Antagonism, they are more likely to marry someone of their own race.

Finally, when all the items are scaled together into the measurement of Black Antagonism, we can see in Figure XX that the patterns hold from before. The coefficients are large and significant for all racial groups but Asians. As discussed in the previous paragraph, having two items lean in one direction and one in the other most likely creates a nearly net zero effect that is not significant. However, breaking the measure into its constituent units showed that forms of Black antagonism that take the form of opposition to a slavery apology and BLM are insignificant predictors for Asians. However, Black Antagonism that takes the form of believes Blacks experience little discrimination does have a significant negative effect on probability of being married to someone of another race. For Whites the coefficient is -1.34 and for Blacks it is 1.96. The coefficient for Hispanics is about half that of Whites and a third that of Blacks: .65. These are quite large effects that suggest that importance of Black Antagonism on predicting whether or not an individual is interracially married. Harboring Black Antagonism, a




**Figure 13.** Relationship between Black Resentment and Intermarriage probability. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.




**Figure 14.** Relationship Black Resentment and Intermarriage probability, disaggregated by race and gender subgroups. Plotted from predicted probabilities of logistic regression controlling for Ideology, Party, Age, Income, Education, and Foreign Born.

form of Polar Affect and Symbolic Racism is strongly associated with marrying other Whites for Whites and marrying outside of their race for Blacks and Hispanics.

The intuition with this finding is that Black Antagonism is specifically leading individuals to marry Whites. The simple binary indicator of "Intermarried" does not capture this phenomenon, so I also ran regressions where the outcome variable was "Married White". The regressions are contained in the Appendix and confirm this intuition that Black Antagonism moves all groups more toward White romantic partners. The coefficient for Asians is not significant, but it is positive. The other coefficients are 1.34 for Whites, 2.01 for Blacks, and 1.23 for Hispanics (all $p<.01$).

Systemic Attribution

The final formal component of Racial Consciousness is Systemic Attribution. I predicted that Systemic Attribution would not be significantly associated with intermarriage. The relationships are all visibly negative, but none of them reach significance. As expected, while Systemic Attribution, is an important component of racial consciousness, it makes up an insignificant predictor for intermarriage. If the outcome were political participation or vote choice, this might have strong prediction, but in the realm of interracial romantic relationships, blaming systems more than individuals for Black-Whites disparities does not have a significant relationship.

Linked Fate

Linked Fate was included in the empirical analyses because it has been occasionally been used to approximate the whole concept of racial consciousness. I include it as a baseline comparison to demonstrate that it is insufficient for predicting outcomes compare to the more robust concept of racial consciousness. The slopes do not reach conventional levels of significance. However, we can see, as before, that the direction for Respondents of Color moves in the opposite direction as Whites.

**Conclusion**

The results from my empirical analyses point to a number of notable findings. First, and most obvious, is that interracial marriage is a highly dynamic phenomenon that varies by race and by gender within each racial group. The significance, magnitude, and direction of predicted probability to be intermarried can vary widely by group and subgroup. Though some trends are dynamic, some trends are consistent. A heightened sense of negative treatment, measured by Relative Group Discrimination, is significantly and negatively associated with intermarriage across all racial groups (Figure 5). A racial antipathy toward Blacks, measured by Black Antagonism, is associated with higher levels of intermarriage for Blacks and Hispanics, but lower levels of intermarriage for Whites (Figure 13). More specifically, Anti-Blackness is positively associated with having a White partner for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics.

In line with assimilation theory, for Asian and Hispanic respondents, I showed that a heightened American identity, and a necessarily lessened Racial or Ethnic identity, is associated with higher levels of intermarriage (Figure 4). Conversely, a heightened Racial or Ethnic identity was associated with lower levels of intermarriage. The key variable for Hispanics was a heightened Racial identity, while the key variable for Asians was a heightened Ethnic identity. For Black respondents, I showed that Systemic Attribution is not a statistically significant predictor of intermarriage (Figure15). While it remains an important dimension of racial consciousness, it does not seem to have much relevance to intermarriage.

Finally, I showed that Linked Fate, for all respondents, is not a significant predictor or intermarriage (Figure 16). Linked Fate is not an original component of racial consciousness, but has occasionally been used by scholars to approximate the whole of racial consciousness. My findings suggest, in line with Chong and Rogers (2005), that Linked Fate is not equivocal with Racial Consciousness and that scholars should insist on deploying robust, multi-dimensional measures when using the concept.

A challenging question is how to interpret the findings for Black Antagonism for Black respondents. There is much debate about how the concept I based mine on (Racial Resentment) should be interpreted for Blacks (Kam and Burge 2018; Phoenix and Jasso 2022). In the context of this paper, it seems to me that the concept being tapped is telling us something about an individual's identification with or solidarity with their own community. A Black individual who holds these views might be more likely to be desired by a White partner (Eastwick et al. 2009), or being married to a White partner might heighten these views.

Overall, I consistently found a consistently strong relationship between predicted probability of intermarriage and racial consciousness. This tells me that racial consciousness either significantly leads someone into/away from marrying outside of their race, or being married to someone of another race increased/decreases their racial consciousness, or both. The crux of this paper was the inability to conduct causal analyses. Though I have not been able to do that, my findings do strongly hint the reality that their is some significant relationship at play: Intermarriage is not a mundane phenomenon, but rather tells us much about how individuals in those marriages think about race, their own and others.

Ultimately, my findings complicate the conclusions of Lemi and Kposowa (2017) and Phan et al. (2022) who find that interracially married individuals are more racially sympathetic and more concerned about racial issues than their co-racially married counterparts. First, methodologically, I diverge from their work by using logistic regressions and locating interracial marriage as an outcome rather than an explanatory variable. My findings about Whites are similar to Phan et al. (2022): interracially married Whites exhibit less racial consciousness than co-racially married Whites. My findings, however, challenge Lemi and Kposowa's (2017) findings about interracially married Asians. I find that Asians who identity more with their American identity than their racial or ethnic identity are about 40% more likely to be in an interracial relationship.

The scope of this paper has been wide: to recount the recent history of the academic study of intermarriage, clearly address the problem of endogeneity, introduce a new theoretical tradition to the study, and measure a number of REP concepts on prediction for intermarriage. The wide scope of this paper has not allowed me to more deeply investigate a number of findings that came up. First, fruitful research could be done to look more into why Racial identity is key for Hispanics and Ethnic identity is key for Asians. Another interesting question is why RGD has a stronger negative relationship for Black women and White men than Black men and White women. Why exactly Asians, and particularly Asian men, have such a strong negative relationship between RGD and intermarriage is another interesting avenue of research.

In the future, I would like to more specifically investigate the political positions of interracially married individuals. I would examine the outcomes of voting, participation, and policy positions. This research also bears resemblance to an increasingly studied phenomenon of inter-party marriage (Iyengar and Konitzer 2017, unpublished).

Finally, continued work should be done to investigate the problem of endogeneity. I am currently doing qualitative research interviewing interracial couples to determine both the direction and degree of causation as well as the heterogeneity of interracial relationships. Work should also continue to be done to locate an instrumental variable, so that models that account for endogeneity can be implemented.

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# Appendix:

**American Identification Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | M.Int | | |
| | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Ranking of American Identity | 0.424*** | 0.499*** | 0.944*** | 0.748*** | 0.644*** | 1.081*** |
| | (0.144) | (0.179) | (0.290) | (0.149) | (0.180) | (0.277) |
| Liberal to Conservative | -0.122** | -0.114 | -0.263** | -0.127** | -0.209*** | 0.051 |
| | (0.062) | (0.077) | (0.116) | (0.054) | (0.066) | (0.098) |
| Democrat | -0.039 | -0.246 | 0.059 | -0.624*** | -0.671*** | -0.525** |
| | (0.126) | (0.153) | (0.247) | (0.122) | (0.147) | (0.226) |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.014* | 0.001 | -0.0001 | 0.004 |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.147*** | -0.110** | -0.145* | 0.091** | 0.120** | -0.006 |
| | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.078) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.071) |
| Education | -0.236*** | -0.276*** | -0.007 | 0.158*** | 0.175** | 0.133 |
| | (0.063) | (0.077) | (0.127) | (0.058) | (0.071) | (0.105) |
| Foreign Born | -0.372*** | -0.200 | -1.060*** | -0.539*** | -0.320** | -1.051*** |
| | (0.117) | (0.144) | (0.240) | (0.130) | (0.160) | (0.232) |
| Constant | 0.984*** | 1.148** | -1.096 | -1.178*** | -1.040*** | -1.486** |
| | (0.381) | (0.479) | (0.754) | (0.316) | (0.374) | (0.615) |
| Observations | 1,593 | 945 | 648 | 1,516 | 1,039 | 476 |
| Log Likelihood | -917.883 | -597.351 | -272.104 | -925.676 | -626.482 | -289.450 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,851.765 | 1,210.702 | 560.209 | 1,867.353 | 1,268.965 | 594.901 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Racial Identification Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | M.Int | | |
| | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Ranking of Racial Identity | -0.047 | -0.089 | -0.290 | -0.957*** | -0.951*** | -0.930*** |
| | (0.148) | (0.183) | (0.277) | (0.162) | (0.194) | (0.300) |
| Liberal to Conservative | -0.116* | -0.108 | -0.241** | -0.114** | -0.198*** | 0.069 |
| | (0.062) | (0.077) | (0.115) | (0.054) | (0.066) | (0.097) |
| Democrat | -0.049 | -0.247 | 0.042 | -0.660*** | -0.698*** | -0.591*** |
| | (0.126) | (0.152) | (0.244) | (0.121) | (0.147) | (0.224) |
| Age | 0.007* | 0.012** | 0.019** | 0.002 | 0.0002 | 0.007 |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.135*** | -0.096** | -0.127* | 0.097** | 0.122** | 0.020 |
| | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.077) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.070) |
| Education | -0.234*** | -0.274*** | -0.011 | 0.147** | 0.164** | 0.116 |
| | (0.063) | (0.077) | (0.126) | (0.058) | (0.071) | (0.104) |
| Foreign Born | -0.433*** | -0.288** | -1.135*** | -0.750*** | -0.526*** | -1.244*** |
| | (0.115) | (0.140) | (0.239) | (0.125) | (0.151) | (0.228) |
| Constant | 1.053*** | 1.247** | -0.656 | -0.320 | -0.203 | -0.574 |
| | (0.395) | (0.493) | (0.772) | (0.324) | (0.388) | (0.611) |
| Observations | 1,593 | 945 | 648 | 1,516 | 1,039 | 476 |
| Log Likelihood | -922.204 | -601.150 | -277.197 | -920.439 | -620.546 | -292.502 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,860.409 | 1,218.300 | 570.394 | 1,856.878 | 1,257.093 | 601.004 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Relative Group Discrimination Models by Subgroup**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | White Female | White Male | Black | Black Female | Black Male | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Relative Group Discrimination | -0.951** | -0.632 | -1.543** | -1.158*** | -1.505** | -0.539 | -1.833*** | -1.791*** | -2.154*** | -0.887*** | -0.891** | -0.857 |
| | (0.423) | (0.542) | (0.709) | (0.439) | (0.601) | (0.671) | (0.290) | (0.357) | (0.561) | (0.296) | (0.361) | (0.535) |
| Liberal to Conservative | 0.071 | 0.171 | -0.061 | -0.070 | -0.091 | -0.032 | -0.149** | -0.163* | -0.244** | -0.165*** | -0.247*** | 0.0001 |
| | (0.116) | (0.155) | (0.184) | (0.083) | (0.115) | (0.123) | (0.066) | (0.084) | (0.121) | (0.057) | (0.070) | (0.100) |
| Democrat | 0.135 | 0.344 | -0.317 | -0.764*** | -0.609** | -0.693** | -0.077 | -0.265 | 0.004 | -0.632*** | -0.642*** | -0.614*** |
| | (0.269) | (0.340) | (0.462) | (0.191) | (0.279) | (0.276) | (0.135) | (0.168) | (0.256) | (0.128) | (0.156) | (0.230) |
| Age | -0.019*** | -0.021** | -0.013 | -0.018*** | -0.026*** | -0.021** | 0.006 | 0.011** | 0.020** | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.010 |
| | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.035 | -0.022 | -0.091 | 0.078 | 0.044 | 0.026 | -0.138*** | -0.108** | -0.068 | 0.092** | 0.107** | 0.029 |
| | (0.078) | (0.100) | (0.133) | (0.059) | (0.088) | (0.086) | (0.041) | (0.051) | (0.082) | (0.040) | (0.051) | (0.071) |
| Education | 0.338*** | 0.542*** | 0.010 | 0.010 | -0.031 | 0.061 | -0.180*** | -0.220*** | 0.030 | 0.161*** | 0.203*** | 0.075 |
| | (0.122) | (0.165) | (0.184) | (0.093) | (0.128) | (0.147) | (0.068) | (0.084) | (0.133) | (0.060) | (0.074) | (0.105) |
| Foreign Born | -0.092 | -0.170 | 0.283 | 0.104 | 0.387 | -0.325 | -0.271** | -0.082 | -1.042*** | -0.703*** | -0.487*** | -1.158*** |
| | (0.513) | (0.667) | (0.827) | (0.327) | (0.440) | (0.493) | (0.122) | (0.152) | (0.249) | (0.132) | (0.161) | (0.232) |
| Constant | -2.185*** | -3.526*** | -0.010 | 0.364 | 0.820 | 0.363 | 1.874*** | 2.104*** | -0.209 | -0.200 | -0.189 | -0.078 |
| | (0.720) | (0.964) | (1.161) | (0.572) | (0.768) | (0.916) | (0.432) | (0.552) | (0.820) | (0.387) | (0.461) | (0.734) |
| Observations | 632 | 384 | 247 | 1,173 | 775 | 398 | 1,396 | 803 | 593 | 1,369 | 921 | 447 |
| Log Likelihood | -261.766 | -158.714 | -98.392 | -452.218 | -239.514 | -198.194 | -812.307 | -512.589 | -253.382 | -846.912 | -559.773 | -280.175 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 539.532 | 333.428 | 212.783 | 920.436 | 495.028 | 412.388 | 1,640.615 | 1,041.179 | 522.764 | 1,709.823 | 1,135.546 | 576.349 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Slavery Apology Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | Black | Asian | Hispanic | White Female | Black Female | Asian Female | Hispanic Female | White Male | Black Male | Asian Male | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Oppose U.S. Apologizing to Blacks for Slavery | -0.444 | 0.936*** | 0.214 | 0.401*** | -0.667* | 1.085*** | 0.033 | 0.362** | 0.025 | 0.722** | 0.568** | 0.460* |
| | (0.292) | (0.209) | (0.147) | (0.135) | (0.362) | (0.293) | (0.189) | (0.166) | (0.526) | (0.310) | (0.264) | (0.247) |
| Liberal to Conservative | 0.074 | -0.077 | -0.157** | -0.132** | 0.265 | -0.127 | -0.145 | -0.197*** | -0.228 | -0.002 | -0.298** | 0.002 |
| | (0.134) | (0.089) | (0.074) | (0.061) | (0.174) | (0.123) | (0.098) | (0.074) | (0.217) | (0.136) | (0.132) | (0.113) |
| Democrat | 0.388 | -0.863*** | -0.067 | -0.566*** | 0.649* | -0.739** | -0.288 | -0.594*** | -0.140 | -0.805*** | -0.010 | -0.547** |
| | (0.309) | (0.208) | (0.157) | (0.139) | (0.383) | (0.300) | (0.200) | (0.170) | (0.541) | (0.298) | (0.286) | (0.254) |
| Age | -0.008 | -0.017** | 0.008 | -0.0001 | -0.009 | -0.027*** | 0.017*** | -0.005 | -0.007 | -0.017* | 0.019** | 0.009 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.008 | 0.091 | -0.154*** | 0.119*** | 0.005 | -0.002 | -0.080 | 0.147*** | -0.008 | 0.117 | -0.155* | 0.044 |
| | (0.087) | (0.066) | (0.046) | (0.044) | (0.109) | (0.097) | (0.058) | (0.055) | (0.153) | (0.095) | (0.090) | (0.078) |
| Education | 0.255* | -0.025 | -0.212*** | 0.142** | 0.406** | 0.009 | -0.311*** | 0.169** | 0.044 | -0.089 | 0.049 | 0.111 |
| | (0.134) | (0.102) | (0.074) | (0.065) | (0.178) | (0.137) | (0.094) | (0.079) | (0.209) | (0.165) | (0.141) | (0.120) |
| Foreign Born | 0.166 | -0.167 | -0.409*** | -0.574*** | 0.119 | -0.160 | -0.221 | -0.248 | 0.383 | -0.261 | -1.227*** | -1.236*** |
| | (0.574) | (0.387) | (0.137) | (0.138) | (0.686) | (0.567) | (0.173) | (0.168) | (1.135) | (0.535) | (0.277) | (0.247) |
| Constant | -2.634*** | -0.692 | 1.112** | -0.788** | -3.778*** | -0.485 | 1.403** | -0.689* | -1.020 | -0.210 | -0.948 | -1.027 |
| | (0.805) | (0.545) | (0.455) | (0.344) | (1.064) | (0.739) | (0.593) | (0.409) | (1.343) | (0.866) | (0.861) | (0.672) |
| Observations | 547 | 1,064 | 1,050 | 1,161 | 318 | 697 | 582 | 775 | 227 | 367 | 468 | 385 |
| Log Likelihood | -217.819 | -383.313 | -632.702 | -731.679 | -130.066 | -203.773 | -381.322 | -484.113 | -83.767 | -169.600 | -211.999 | -238.542 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 451.638 | 782.627 | 1,281.405 | 1,479.358 | 276.132 | 423.545 | 778.643 | 984.225 | 183.534 | 355.201 | 439.997 | 493.083 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**BLM Opposition Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | White Female | White Male | Black | Black Female | Black Male | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| BLM Opposition | -0.683* | -0.886* | -0.427 | 1.162*** | 1.095** | 1.257*** | 0.262 | 0.407 | 0.139 | 0.175 | 0.055 | 0.445 |
| | (0.394) | (0.526) | (0.612) | (0.319) | (0.456) | (0.470) | (0.227) | (0.283) | (0.424) | (0.196) | (0.245) | (0.340) |
| Liberal to Conservative | 0.043 | 0.174 | -0.166 | -0.129 | -0.146 | -0.083 | -0.140** | -0.145* | -0.244** | -0.127** | -0.202*** | 0.029 |
| | (0.118) | (0.157) | (0.187) | (0.084) | (0.118) | (0.124) | (0.066) | (0.082) | (0.123) | (0.056) | (0.068) | (0.104) |
| Democrat | 0.186 | 0.355 | -0.243 | -0.729*** | -0.644** | -0.632** | -0.016 | -0.200 | 0.064 | -0.660*** | -0.709*** | -0.553** |
| | (0.268) | (0.336) | (0.462) | (0.187) | (0.269) | (0.268) | (0.129) | (0.156) | (0.251) | (0.124) | (0.151) | (0.224) |
| Age | -0.017** | -0.020** | -0.010 | -0.019*** | -0.028*** | -0.020** | 0.007* | 0.011** | 0.019*** | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.011 | 0.012 | -0.084 | 0.099* | 0.080 | 0.031 | -0.138*** | -0.098** | -0.134* | 0.105*** | 0.130*** | 0.013 |
| | (0.077) | (0.097) | (0.132) | (0.059) | (0.085) | (0.087) | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.077) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.070) |
| Education | 0.290** | 0.437*** | 0.050 | -0.009 | -0.044 | 0.039 | -0.228*** | -0.269*** | -0.004 | 0.160*** | 0.183*** | 0.121 |
| | (0.118) | (0.156) | (0.182) | (0.090) | (0.121) | (0.146) | (0.063) | (0.077) | (0.127) | (0.057) | (0.070) | (0.103) |
| Foreign Born | -0.073 | -0.230 | 0.433 | -0.062 | 0.225 | -0.494 | -0.429*** | -0.282** | -1.119*** | -0.743*** | -0.526*** | -1.241*** |
| | (0.510) | (0.663) | (0.821) | (0.321) | (0.436) | (0.482) | (0.115) | (0.140) | (0.238) | (0.124) | (0.149) | (0.227) |
| Constant | -2.057*** | -2.960*** | -0.393 | -0.720 | -0.514 | -0.339 | 0.946** | 1.092** | -0.905 | -0.915*** | -0.802** | -1.069* |
| | (0.697) | (0.916) | (1.146) | (0.495) | (0.665) | (0.799) | (0.386) | (0.483) | (0.762) | (0.308) | (0.367) | (0.595) |
| Observations | 684 | 419 | 263 | 1,320 | 885 | 435 | 1,593 | 945 | 648 | 1,516 | 1,039 | 476 |
| Log Likelihood | -277.780 | -170.612 | -102.928 | -480.690 | -258.250 | -207.007 | -921.590 | -600.236 | -277.691 | -938.192 | -632.954 | -296.633 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 571.559 | 357.224 | 221.857 | 977.380 | 532.500 | 430.014 | 1,859.181 | 1,216.472 | 571.383 | 1,892.385 | 1,281.907 | 609.265 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Black Discrimination Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | White Female | White Male | Black | Black Female | Black Male | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| How Little Discrimination Against Blacks? | -1.605*** | -1.554** | -1.882** | 1.022*** | 1.126** | 0.707 | -0.748*** | -0.695*** | -0.699* | 0.478** | 0.503* | 0.398 |
| | (0.485) | (0.654) | (0.767) | (0.365) | (0.519) | (0.537) | (0.212) | (0.256) | (0.416) | (0.211) | (0.259) | (0.374) |
| Liberal to Conservative | 0.090 | 0.184 | -0.042 | -0.060 | -0.079 | -0.025 | -0.099 | -0.106 | -0.193 | -0.162*** | -0.254*** | 0.036 |
| | (0.117) | (0.153) | (0.191) | (0.081) | (0.113) | (0.120) | (0.064) | (0.081) | (0.118) | (0.056) | (0.068) | (0.100) |
| Democrat | 0.158 | 0.323 | -0.213 | -0.782*** | -0.689*** | -0.689** | -0.140 | -0.368** | 0.017 | -0.647*** | -0.671*** | -0.580** |
| | (0.268) | (0.338) | (0.465) | (0.186) | (0.267) | (0.268) | (0.131) | (0.161) | (0.250) | (0.124) | (0.151) | (0.227) |
| Age | -0.018** | -0.023** | -0.009 | -0.019*** | -0.028*** | -0.021** | 0.005 | 0.011** | 0.018** | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.010 |
| | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.006 | 0.012 | -0.115 | 0.095 | 0.074 | 0.038 | -0.142*** | -0.098** | -0.128 | 0.103*** | 0.117** | 0.035 |
| | (0.078) | (0.099) | (0.134) | (0.059) | (0.085) | (0.086) | (0.040) | (0.049) | (0.078) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.070) |
| Education | 0.358*** | 0.559*** | 0.022 | -0.007 | -0.047 | 0.040 | -0.214*** | -0.257*** | 0.017 | 0.166*** | 0.198*** | 0.105 |
| | (0.121) | (0.162) | (0.184) | (0.090) | (0.123) | (0.145) | (0.065) | (0.080) | (0.129) | (0.058) | (0.071) | (0.103) |
| Foreign Born | 0.064 | -0.040 | 0.504 | -0.044 | 0.320 | -0.552 | -0.334*** | -0.189 | -1.038*** | -0.788*** | -0.558*** | -1.285*** |
| | (0.519) | (0.672) | (0.835) | (0.321) | (0.437) | (0.480) | (0.119) | (0.145) | (0.249) | (0.126) | (0.152) | (0.230) |
| Constant | -2.355*** | -3.481*** | -0.187 | -0.695 | -0.490 | -0.182 | 1.246*** | 1.447*** | -0.865 | -0.905*** | -0.831** | -0.966 |
| | (0.701) | (0.933) | (1.151) | (0.501) | (0.671) | (0.810) | (0.398) | (0.500) | (0.791) | (0.313) | (0.375) | (0.596) |
| Observations | 666 | 407 | 257 | 1,296 | 864 | 432 | 1,491 | 870 | 621 | 1,482 | 1,011 | 470 |
| Log Likelihood | -264.787 | -160.704 | -98.986 | -477.942 | -254.104 | -208.726 | -872.975 | -559.688 | -267.541 | -912.956 | -611.917 | -292.653 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 545.575 | 337.408 | 213.972 | 971.884 | 524.209 | 433.452 | 1,761.950 | 1,135.375 | 551.082 | 1,841.912 | 1,239.835 | 601.307 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Caption

**Black Resentment Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | White Female | White Male | Black | Black Female | Black Male | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Black Resentment | -1.343*** | -1.581*** | -1.156 | 1.906*** | 2.022*** | 1.597*** | -0.063 | -0.142 | 0.333 | 0.645*** | 0.517* | 0.881** |
| | (0.468) | (0.612) | (0.776) | (0.385) | (0.546) | (0.557) | (0.239) | (0.295) | (0.447) | (0.223) | (0.273) | (0.403) |
| Liberal to Conservative | 0.109 | 0.237 | -0.084 | -0.114 | -0.145 | -0.050 | -0.110* | -0.094 | -0.255** | -0.159*** | -0.229*** | -0.013 |
| | (0.121) | (0.159) | (0.195) | (0.082) | (0.115) | (0.121) | (0.065) | (0.081) | (0.120) | (0.056) | (0.068) | (0.106) |
| Democrat | 0.117 | 0.302 | -0.330 | -0.677*** | -0.606** | -0.572** | -0.057 | -0.263* | 0.091 | -0.590*** | -0.632*** | -0.515** |
| | (0.268) | (0.334) | (0.465) | (0.189) | (0.269) | (0.272) | (0.129) | (0.155) | (0.252) | (0.125) | (0.152) | (0.225) |
| Age | -0.016** | -0.021** | -0.007 | -0.018*** | -0.026*** | -0.019** | 0.007* | 0.012** | 0.020*** | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.009 |
| | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.013 | 0.016 | -0.101 | 0.092 | 0.068 | 0.037 | -0.135*** | -0.095** | -0.132* | 0.098** | 0.123** | 0.012 |
| | (0.077) | (0.097) | (0.134) | (0.059) | (0.085) | (0.087) | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.077) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.070) |
| Education | 0.287** | 0.436*** | 0.039 | -0.006 | -0.025 | 0.015 | -0.234*** | -0.274*** | -0.007 | 0.164*** | 0.185*** | 0.127 |
| | (0.118) | (0.156) | (0.181) | (0.090) | (0.122) | (0.147) | (0.063) | (0.077) | (0.126) | (0.057) | (0.070) | (0.104) |
| Foreign Born | -0.051 | -0.219 | 0.485 | -0.057 | 0.270 | -0.525 | -0.429*** | -0.282** | -1.138*** | -0.738*** | -0.516*** | -1.246*** |
| | (0.512) | (0.663) | (0.823) | (0.322) | (0.437) | (0.481) | (0.115) | (0.140) | (0.240) | (0.124) | (0.149) | (0.228) |
| Constant | -2.005*** | -2.868*** | -0.296 | -0.966* | -0.830 | -0.415 | 1.032*** | 1.210** | -0.944 | -0.989*** | -0.894** | -1.115* |
| | (0.693) | (0.912) | (1.145) | (0.501) | (0.678) | (0.802) | (0.384) | (0.480) | (0.758) | (0.309) | (0.368) | (0.597) |
| Observations | 684 | 419 | 263 | 1,320 | 885 | 435 | 1,593 | 945 | 648 | 1,516 | 1,039 | 476 |
| Log Likelihood | -275.112 | -168.622 | -102.052 | -475.240 | -254.508 | -206.476 | -922.220 | -601.152 | -277.468 | -934.394 | -631.186 | -295.088 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 566.223 | 353.243 | 220.104 | 966.480 | 525.016 | 428.951 | 1,860.440 | 1,218.304 | 570.937 | 1,884.787 | 1,278.372 | 606.176 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Linked Fate Models**

| | DV is Predicted Probability of Indicating Interracial Partner | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M.Int | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | White | White Female | White Male | Black | Black Female | Black Male | Asian | Asian Female | Asian Male | Hispanic | Hispanic Female | Hispanic Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Linked Fate | 0.317 | -0.200 | -0.165 | -0.265* | 0.411 | -0.286 | -0.017 | -0.296 | 0.208 | -0.284 | -0.436 | -0.195 |
| | (0.305) | (0.218) | (0.158) | (0.149) | (0.390) | (0.300) | (0.190) | (0.183) | (0.506) | (0.341) | (0.309) | (0.266) |
| Liberal to Conservative | -0.023 | -0.058 | -0.117* | -0.125** | 0.090 | -0.079 | -0.106 | -0.210*** | -0.209 | -0.015 | -0.232** | 0.066 |
| | (0.110) | (0.080) | (0.062) | (0.054) | (0.144) | (0.113) | (0.077) | (0.066) | (0.174) | (0.119) | (0.115) | (0.098) |
| Democrat | 0.296 | -0.842*** | -0.039 | -0.657*** | 0.508 | -0.758*** | -0.246 | -0.673*** | -0.181 | -0.710*** | 0.079 | -0.597*** |
| | (0.261) | (0.182) | (0.126) | (0.121) | (0.326) | (0.262) | (0.153) | (0.148) | (0.454) | (0.264) | (0.246) | (0.221) |
| Age | -0.018** | -0.020*** | 0.006 | 0.004 | -0.021** | -0.028*** | 0.012** | 0.002 | -0.011 | -0.022*** | 0.018** | 0.009 |
| | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.012) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Income | -0.008 | 0.099* | -0.135*** | 0.105*** | 0.011 | 0.071 | -0.096** | 0.127*** | -0.080 | 0.038 | -0.131* | 0.021 |
| | (0.076) | (0.058) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.097) | (0.085) | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.132) | (0.086) | (0.077) | (0.069) |
| Education | 0.301** | 0.004 | -0.227*** | 0.162*** | 0.456*** | -0.029 | -0.273*** | 0.186*** | 0.052 | 0.059 | 0.013 | 0.115 |
| | (0.118) | (0.089) | (0.063) | (0.057) | (0.156) | (0.121) | (0.077) | (0.070) | (0.183) | (0.145) | (0.127) | (0.103) |
| Foreign Born | 0.034 | -0.102 | -0.436*** | -0.758*** | -0.066 | 0.170 | -0.285** | -0.549*** | 0.486 | -0.555 | -1.133*** | -1.234*** |
| | (0.511) | (0.323) | (0.115) | (0.124) | (0.664) | (0.439) | (0.140) | (0.150) | (0.823) | (0.482) | (0.239) | (0.226) |
| Constant | -2.416*** | -0.470 | 1.080*** | -0.702** | -3.489*** | -0.242 | 1.194** | -0.589 | -0.575 | 0.022 | -0.730 | -0.861 |
| | (0.692) | (0.506) | (0.386) | (0.322) | (0.917) | (0.681) | (0.484) | (0.384) | (1.141) | (0.815) | (0.758) | (0.620) |
| Observations | 684 | 1,320 | 1,593 | 1,516 | 419 | 885 | 945 | 1,039 | 263 | 435 | 648 | 476 |
| Log Likelihood | -278.758 | -486.732 | -921.709 | -937.012 | -171.504 | -260.597 | -601.264 | -631.670 | -103.089 | -210.215 | -276.748 | -297.221 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 573.515 | 989.463 | 1,859.418 | 1,890.023 | 359.007 | 537.194 | 1,218.528 | 1,279.339 | 222.177 | 436.430 | 569.497 | 610.441 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01