

# Police Militarization in the United States: reform traditions and the fallacy of expertise

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**Abstract**

*This paper examines the rise of state and local police militarization in American policing through the lens of police reform traditions and their interaction with local police cultures. What an investigation of the progressive, neoliberal and community-oriented reform traditions demonstrate is the gradual, piecemeal embrace of militarized policing approaches, often driven by the top-down implementation of national initiatives targeting drugs trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. Attempts at demilitarization must also reckon with the fallacy of expertise, eschewing reform programs overly reliant on the authority of political and administrative elites in favor of initiatives with street-level support from officers and police organizations.*

**Introduction**

I suspect that my initial reactions to the events unfolding in Ferguson, Missouri after the tragic shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson last August, were not unique. Like many who observed from afar I was both deeply unsettled by the heavy-handed police response to peaceful public demonstrations in Ferguson, and perhaps because I did not come of age during the civil rights protests, marches and accompanying police brutality of the 1950s and 1960s, I made immediate comparisons to the images of allied forces broadcast by embedded reporters during the American-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Observers, whether they received their information via traditional media outlets, social media platforms, or digital livestreams – were shown images of police officers wearing black tactical gear, wielding assault rifles and launching tear gas canisters at crowds, a vision of American policing that seems out of place in most American communities. Indeed, one of the most intriguing responses to the policing in Ferguson came from American military veterans who shared insights and images via Twitter comparing the tactical gear and weaponry they used while in active combat zones abroad to the gear and tactics used by police officers in Ferguson. Tweets gathered by Kelsey D. Atherton of *Popular Science* for a “Veterans on Ferguson” project add support to a general critique of police actions like those in

Ferguson claiming that while American police departments may now possess military-grade weaponry and equipment and in some cases receive training from military personnel, the aggressive actions on display in Ferguson were not only inappropriate in the context of domestic law enforcement, but were actively escalating and worsening an already volatile situation.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, questions concerning an increase in militarism within domestic policing, along side yet distinct from criticisms of excessive force or institutional biases, are being asked increasingly asked in the public and political spheres.

This paper focuses on the broad claim that American law enforcement at the local and state level is becoming increasingly militarized. I contend that militarism within American law enforcement can be understood as a product of several larger reform traditions concerning public safety services and governance more broadly.<sup>2</sup> Police militarization is not a reform program in and of itself, but exists as a consequence of various police reform traditions that have reshaped domestic law enforcement and that continue to effect local police cultures throughout the United States. This examination of militarized policing through the traditions of reform not only highlights the leading role played by national political elites, but also points us towards the challenges to democratic accountability posed by police militarization as well as the difficulty in slowing or reversing the rise of militarism in policing due to the persistent “fallacy of expertise.”

We begin by addressing the connection between racial discrimination and policing in Ferguson. Next we orient ourselves by coming to a working definition of police militarization. From there we can provide context for the rise of militarism in

American policing by reviewing the three primary traditions of police reform – the progressive, neoliberal and community-oriented – examining how a politically driven push towards militarizing local law enforcement was supported by sympathetic police cultures. Finally, looking more broadly at increasingly militarized policing in the United States, we will investigate the fallacy of expertise and the challenges facing those who would wish to reduce or prevent a militarization of domestic law enforcement.

### **On Race and Ferguson**

An important aspect of this issue to address at the outset is the intersection of race and policing in the United States. The fact that the militarized police response in Ferguson took place in a community with a demonstrated pattern of racially discriminatory police and judicial behavior adds another complicated layer to our examination of militarization. As the Department of Justice made clear in its review of police and municipal court practices in Ferguson, racial stereotyping and institutionalized discrimination played a significant factor in the increasing distrust and animosity in that community, eventually erupting late last year after the shooting of Michael Brown.<sup>3</sup> Given the troubling history of racial discrimination and the unequal application of justice throughout American history, it seems safe to assume that while what went on in Ferguson is perhaps not the rule, many communities of color in America see more than their fair share of police intervention. The issue of racially discriminatory policing is deservedly receiving broader academic and public attention with an accompanying examination of the long and complex history of race and politics in America more generally. The events

in Ferguson, along with other highly publicized deaths of African-American men at the hands of uniformed police officers in Cleveland and New York, for instance, have tragically fueled this public discussion.

That being said, I do not see racial bias as a primary force driving militarization and in this paper only indirectly address questions of racial discrimination in American policing. While my observation of the unrest in Ferguson, caused in part institutionalized discrimination, served as the intellectual catalyst for the arguments included herein, it does not serve as the jumping off point for my investigation of police militarism. This does not stem from a belief that a focus on racial discrimination in the criminal justice system is not of immediate academic, popular, or political importance but rather reflects my position that police militarization exists as a consequence of the implementation of broader police reform traditions, which in their design (if not always in practice) appear racially neutral. Furthermore, having not read extensively in the area of American racial and ethnic politics, I feel that anything that I could offer on the topic would be cursory at best. Recognizing that this is not the only way to approach the issues of race and policing, I welcome comments on and criticisms of this approach. Additional insight on how grappling with the literature on race and policing would add to or modify the questions asked and conclusions drawn in this paper is very welcome and appreciated.

### **Police Militarization**

Before turning to the police reform traditions and historical trends towards increased militarism in law enforcement, it is important to have a clear

understanding of what we mean by police militarization. Characterizations of police militarization – such as those used to introduce this very paper – rely heavily on the observation of highly-publicized events. In the wake of police operations in cities like Ferguson, the charge of increased police militarization is primarily motivated by reactions to the images of police officers clad in tactical gear, aggressively wielding military-grade weaponry, and using heavily-armored vehicles on the streets of American cities. As mentioned earlier, these scenes elicit comparison to portrayals of American soldiers patrolling streets in Iraq or Afghanistan that permeated global media outlets during the height of the United States' military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the way we process the information and images we encounter, and in the way media outlets and opinion leaders frame these events, we are encouraged to draw parallels between recent military operations and the actions of local law enforcement. Yet, analytically examining police militarism cannot credibly be done with an understanding of militarization based simply upon the subjective optics of disparate incidents.

Peter Kraska has written extensively on police militarization and most recently in his recent article, "Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Police," sketches a helpful conceptual framework for the rigorous study of police militarism. Discussing militarism as a broad theoretical concept, Kraska states that militarism is an ideology that refers to the influence a military-oriented mindset – focused on the threat or use of force – has on how any organization understands, frames and responds to problems. Militarization, then, refers to the extent that an organization has implemented this mindset in its culture of shared

beliefs, routine practices, and goal-driven actions. In short, when we speak of police militarization, we are addressing the “process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model.”<sup>4</sup> More specifically, Kraska identifies four dimensions along which law enforcement agencies and actions can be classified as more or less militarized: 1) material, referring to equipment and technology; 2) cultural, referring to beliefs, language and value systems; 3) organizational, referencing the organizational structure of departments and the existence of special, elite units; and 4) operational, referring to routine patterns of action modeled on martial activity.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in examining police militarization, we move beyond mere optics to incorporate an understanding of the beliefs and tactics employed by civilian law enforcement. Optics may in fact be simply the outward facing consequence of the training and policing strategies being routinized by state and local policing agencies. The proliferation of techniques and strategies that mirror or borrow from military strategies and codes of conduct would therefore be evidence of militarized policing.

It is also important to note that police militarization does not mean the nationalization of state and local policing. Increased collaboration between military forces and civilian law enforcement will have a large part to play, but this is not a story about the breakdown of federalism and the creation of a national police force. Additionally, while David Bayley and Clifford Shearing are no doubt correct in asserting that profound changes in policing over the last generation have expanded policing activities to include both governmental and nongovernmental institutions, in this paper I deal specifically with the practices of “the police” – formal agencies

and individuals at the state and local level imbued with the responsibility of enforcing the state and local laws that establish the criminal justice system and who have been delegated governmental authority to wield coercive and potentially lethal force.<sup>6</sup> To sum, in this paper I'll be looking exclusively at governmental policing cultures and strategies under the control of local and state governments while recognizing that this focus does not exhaust the category of policing actions in the United States. But how do we understand the prevailing police culture in the United States, much less the particular culture within an individual department?

### **Police Cultures and the Traditions of Reform**

As employed in "Police Reform, Governance and Democracy," a chapter co-authored with Mark Bevir, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, police culture should be mobilized as an aggregate term that is descriptive of beliefs, routine actions and practices within local police agencies. Cultures are "aggregate concepts based on the inter-subjective beliefs and the routine actions and practices of a group of individuals."<sup>7</sup> The term police culture, whether applied to an individual department or to the state of policing in the United States, is thus malleable and does not determine the beliefs and actions of individuals involved in policing. As Edward Maguire and William King also recognize in their summary review of contemporary policing trends, "it is difficult to speak of the American policing industry as a monolith. Nested within it are thousands of separate police organizations of various sizes and types (and nested within them are hundreds of thousands of employees)."<sup>8</sup> These cultures are amalgams of beliefs and practices and are anti-essentialist, meaning they are



susceptible to change over time when individuals and communities change their practices and beliefs as they respond to dilemmas. As we will discover later on, some police reform initiatives have been more successful than others in broadly transforming the goals, practices and beliefs of departments and officers across distinct police cultures.

In order to describe and explain changes in local police cultures, their potential militarization, and industry-wide changes in American policing, I employ the analysis of three primary traditions in police reform. The context supplied by a discussion of these traditions – the progressive, neo-liberal and community-oriented – will be useful in illustrating those actions primarily responsible for giving rise to police militarization and points us towards the opportunities and challenges faced by programs seeking to reform American policing. Philosophically, this approach has the advantage of recognizing and respecting the contested and contingent nature of human action while not reifying relevant cultures or institutions. This approach is also historically grounded as it examines beliefs and traditions temporally, paying particular attention to the interactions and dilemmas that change beliefs and actions over time. With regard to studies of police militarization, it moves beyond merely descriptive accounts in seeking to connect intellectual movements with accompanying reform initiatives and their implementation at the local level while not ascribing beliefs and action to essentialized concepts like bureaucracies and special-interest groups.<sup>9</sup> As stated in our earlier work, “where many social scientists think of governing structures as

formal institutions, we conceive of institutions as practices composed of actions, beliefs, and the narratives in which they are embedded.”<sup>10</sup>

To better understand how police reform programs have affected local police cultures, we use the concept of reform traditions. Traditions are pragmatic, descriptive narratives of various theories of policing and public administration that have had a profound effect on law enforcement and the provision of governmental services in the United States more generally.<sup>11</sup> Traditions are narratives which “concern police, their attitudes, their behavior, their interactions with criminals and citizens, and the problems they face” and from those particular narratives a set of theories about policing strategies and policies emerge.<sup>12</sup> These traditions, like local police cultures, are anti-essentialist as they change when individuals modify their beliefs and actions in response to dilemmas and changing circumstances.<sup>13</sup> They also maintain a corresponding intellectual ethos, mode of governance and democratic ideal.<sup>14</sup> Traditions exist simultaneously and aspects of one or more may be present within a local police culture. Thus, a local departmental culture - referring to the organization, routine actions and beliefs existing within the department - is best described an amalgam of the various reform narratives combined with novel approaches to dilemmas faced in the line of duty. Some cultures may have a more bureaucratic, neoliberal or community-oriented character due to the overlapping and inconsistent nature of reform implementation and/or resistance to reform initiatives.

By providing context with a discussion of the progressive, neo-liberal and community-oriented traditions, this paper argues that police militarization has been

a industry-wide yet varied and incomplete response by local police cultures to national political initiatives, most notably the wars on drugs, crime and terrorism - pushed most forcefully by national political actors. Thus, this paper seeks to tell a story about how policy initiatives driven by members of the political and administrative elite interact with members of state and local police departments and their particular, individualized cultures. Often the implementation of these initiatives will be inconsistent, imperfect and lead to individual dilemmas, especially as rank and file officers are forced to choose between courses of action recommended by two or more competing police reform traditions. The militarization of local law enforcement within the United States is not simply a story about the blending of military personnel and tactics with state and local law enforcement agencies. Rather, a more nuanced understanding is achieved by viewing the rise in police militarism as a series of successes and failures of broader police reform traditions, ones that have reshaped American police culture over the last half century. While not a distinct tradition of reform in and of itself, police militarization found intellectual and political support within aspects of the progressive and neoliberal traditions in particular.

### *Progressive*

The progressive tradition of police reform is primarily responsible for the professionalization of American law enforcement in the early and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. First associated with reform initiatives during the Progressive Era in American history, the progressive tradition carved out an exclusive sphere of authority for career law enforcement officials. Policing powers became reserved for individuals

imbued by the state with certain specialized powers. The professionalization of American policing during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as Diane Weber affirms, “essentially grant[ed] a monopoly of specialized knowledge, training, and practice to certain groups in exchange for a commitment to a public service ideal.”<sup>15</sup> Much like the progressive narrative in public administration more generally, progressive reforms in policing led to the adoption of hierarchical and bureaucratic modes of organization, often modeled on the military. Policing became specialized and scientific, separated from the historical and cultural forms of justice found within the local community.

A consequence of this professionalization, and thus a successful, industry-wide progressive reform, has been the insulation and separation of police cultures from those of the communities they are meant to serve. Police officers both operate and are seen as distinct and privileged governmental agents, able to exercise formal powers and informal authority to a much greater extent than other community members. This has an effect not only on police practice but on the broader police culture as the insulation of local police cultures from the surrounding community has cultivated a strong in-group bias and out-group skepticism by law enforcement officials. In many local police cultures there is a strong bias towards individuals on the force or who have previously “worn the badge.” The public and political strength as well as the personal and passionate responses to police officers killed in the line of duty demonstrate the close-knit character of local and national police cultures. Long-lasting displays of solidarity throughout the nation with officers killed, for instance, during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or with the two

NYPD officers recently killed in Brooklyn reinforce the entirely rational belief that police officers are a distinct group who face particularized demands and challenges.

Furthermore, the professionalization of policing in the United States resulted in the increased influence of technocratic elites – political bureaucrats, academic experts, and veteran officers who take on supervisory roles – as American cities attempted to grapple with riots and social discontent during the 1960s and 1970s. Blue ribbon commissions were established, with memberships comprising individuals from political, academic and policing fields, who further refined the progressive narrative of policing and published their recommendations for implementation across the nation. Of particular importance to the rise of militarism in American policing was the creation of the nation’s first Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. Arising out of a perceived need to address what were seen as extraordinary circumstances like hostage situations and domestic terrorism where an increased level of expertise, coordination and force were deemed necessary. In *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*, Radley Balko traces the birth of America’s SWAT teams to the 1960s and the Los Angeles Police Department. According to Balko, several dilemmas faced police departments at that time, including a need for effective strategies to deal with unconventional threats to officers and the public order, such as: rioting in Watts and other major American cities, Cesar Chavez’s farm worker uprisings, and in 1966, the mass shooting of 46 people - 15 fatally - on the campus of the University of Texas in Austin.<sup>16</sup> During this tumultuous period in American history, Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates was able to garner political and public support for a unique police task force, one

that was to be trained by former U.S. Marines and modeled on a military special forces unit, to combat the unique challenges posed by riots, hostage situations and mass shootings.<sup>17</sup> As Balko writes, in the wake of the shootings at the University of Texas and successful and highly publicized deployments of the new SWAT team against the Black Panthers and Symbionese Liberation Army, “SWAT teams subsequently began to pop up in larger urban areas across the country.”<sup>18</sup> In addition to capturing the public’s imagination, SWAT teams were recommended as an effective and surgical way to deal with extraordinary policing problems. Indeed, the mindset inculcated by these special units strengthens and reinforces the in-group/out-group bias heightened by the progressive professionalization of policing. Diane Weber argues that “departmental SWAT teams have accepted the military as a model for their behavior and outlook, which is distinctly impersonal and elitist; American streets are viewed as the ‘front’ and American citizens as the ‘enemy.’”<sup>19</sup> The existence and proliferation of specially trained police units with military-grade weaponry and equipment may, if properly restrained, be a perfectly rational and acceptable response to the dilemmas faced by police forces in American metropolitan areas, but as we will see, the success of the neoliberal reform tradition dramatically expanded the “usefulness” of these specialized units, expanding their jurisdiction far beyond hostage situations and mass shootings and bringing these units into greater use in routine police patrols.

Thus, from the successes of the progressive reform tradition we see the first wave of militarization taking place. Especially along the cultural and organizational spectrums, referencing the dimension of militarism outlined in Kraska’s recent

research, we see an initial trend towards more militarized police practices. Culturally, local police departments across the country were reformed and organized bureaucratically with a command hierarchy often modeled on military rank. The separation and insulation of police cultures from broader community cultures fostered an us-versus-them mindset that will eventually support further militarization. At the organizational level, the progressive reformers conceived of policing as the exercise of technical expertise, which contributed to the initial establishment of SWAT teams, specialized squads that explicitly modeled themselves on military special forces units. Additionally, this persistent reliance on political and administrative elites will contribute to the fallacy of expertise and highlight some of the challenges facing contemporary reforms looking to reduce the current level of militarism in American policing. Next, though, we will examine how the neoliberal tradition's view of policing continued the trend towards increased police militarization.

### *Neoliberal*

In addition to responding to the dilemma of state overload, the neoliberal reform tradition transformed the goals, jurisdiction and capacity of local police operations. Several successes of the neoliberal reform program are particularly important to our discussion of police militarization: first, the creation of national initiatives against drugs, urban crime and global terrorism – labeled “wars” for political marketing and public consumption – had a profound effect on local police cultures and officers' understanding of their role; second, the militarized reframing of police operations led to the removal of legal barriers to cooperation between

military forces and local law enforcement; and finally, the neoliberal preoccupation with efficiency and performance budgeting created a scenario where local law enforcement agencies have become increasingly reliant on federal funding and equipment tied to defense initiatives. The wars on drugs, crime and terrorism actively encouraged the establishment and proliferation of specialized police units, led to the revision of the Posse Comitatus Act – weakening the legal barrier between military-police collaboration – and made available millions of dollars in federal funding and technology transfers which have provided local police forces with resources never dreamed of during the progressive wave of reform. These profound changes have furthered the spread of militarism within civilian law enforcement.

As mentioned earlier, a consequence of the progressive reform movement was to insulate local police cultures from those of the surrounding community through the professionalization of policing. Departments developed a sense of camaraderie that valued supporting fellow officers based on their in-group status. The neoliberal reform tradition transformed and further militarized this group-oriented loyalty by casting the rank and file participants not merely as officers of the peace, but as soldiers in local and global conflicts. Along the cultural dimension of beliefs and values, the militarization of local police cultures was driven from the top-down by major crime programs initiated by the federal government. The rhetoric used by American presidents and other political elites to promote these new security initiatives relied heavily on war metaphors and military imagery. Beginning in the late 1970s, American presidents spoke forcefully about declaring



war on crime and drugs. After the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 the United States launched a global war on terror. Local police agencies were portrayed and seen as partners – street-level officers as fellow soldiers – in the wars on crime, drugs and global terrorism. War rhetoric and imagery became the principle metaphor employed to explain the narrative and design policies to tackle these problems. This choice of metaphor has a profound affect both on the public understanding of the threat and the local police cultures involved in enforcing law on drugs and violent crime. The neoliberal narrative calls for the implementation of a more militarized mindset within police cultures, one which views communities as problem areas or possible threats as opposed to individuals with constitutionally protected rights who are being served by the police. When communities or the police themselves are seen as continually threatened, officers take an increasingly aggressive stance towards potential threats in order to defend themselves and their communities. Previously understood to be enforcing the nation’s laws by reacting to criminal infractions, local police agencies were increasingly relied on to take proactive measures in the wars against drug trafficking, terrorism and urban crime. This shift in focus manifested itself across the nation in a more proactive approach to law enforcement and a more militaristic mindset within local police cultures. Daryl Meeks argues in “Police Militarization in Urban Areas” that “the transformation from a service-oriented policing model to that of a military operational model – the declaration of war on crime, and the militarization of the policing culture – have combined to encourage street-level officers, as well as law enforcement executives, to adopt the view that the inner-city urban environment is

a war zone[...].”<sup>20</sup> Even when initiatives were meant to combine social service and law enforcement approaches, such as in President George H.W. Bush’s “Weed and Seed” program, which sought to eliminate urban crime and revitalize urban neighborhoods, “law enforcement efforts often overshadowed social service strategies and the ‘Weed and Seed’ program came to resemble a crime control offensive, led by law enforcement.”<sup>21</sup> This besieged mentality has only strengthened since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 as police officers were told to be the first line of defense in preventing acts of terror on home soil.

Adding to the creep of militarism within local police cultures is the fact that two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have increased the numbers of sworn officers who have been in active combat zones abroad. As Diane Weber explains, one key distinction between police officer and military personnel is that “police officers are expected to apprehend suspected law-breakers while adhering to constitutional procedures. They are expected to use *minimum* force and to deliver suspects to a court of law.”<sup>22</sup> Soldiers, at least traditionally, are trained to use overwhelming force to subdue and eliminate an enemy. It is estimated that roughly 10 percent of the ranks of the National Guard and Reserve corps are employed in the public safety field.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the Department of Justice provides funding and other services to entice police departments to hire military veterans through the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Program, which in 2014 awarded 215 grants totaling nearly \$123 million to hire military veterans as law enforcement officers.<sup>24</sup> The implication is not that military veterans, many of whom were employed as local police officers before beginning their military service,

automatically become overly reliant on their military training. Rather, the role in which officers are being cast, and the joint-training exercises and task forces established to combat urban crime, drugs and terrorism have increasingly combined law enforcement and military cultures. The distinction between the two becomes increasingly blurry as the cultural mentality of soldier and police officer become more alike. Increasingly, the ongoing collaboration between local law enforcement and the American military not only includes shared training and equipment, but an increasing number of shared personnel as well.

Changes have occurred not just as the cultural level of shared beliefs and values. Operationally, local law enforcement agencies have expanded the use of special units which model themselves upon the military. This trend was documented in the academic literature as far back as 1996. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler's survey of police departments serving populations of at least 50,000 people turned up fascinating results concerning the growth and use of what they termed police paramilitary units (PPUs). These units, based on the SWAT model and military special forces units, were characterized as militarized due to the fact that they use militaristic equipment and technology, routinely used military jargon and followed a military-like command structure.<sup>25</sup> Both in mindset and appearance they were made exceptional, distinct from regular officers and routine police work. From the survey results, the establishment of PPU's saw steady growth during the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Of the 548 departments responding to their survey, 490 had established a police paramilitary unit by 1996, with 20% of the remaining departments indicating that they intended on establishing a unit in the near

future.<sup>26</sup> As the authors summarize, “in 1982, about 59 percent of the police departments surveyed had a PPU. By 1990, this figure had increased to 78 percent, and by 1995 it reached 89 percent,” with most recent growth being experienced in smaller communities and state agencies.<sup>27</sup>

The survey results confirm an increase in the number of PPUs established by local departments since the beginning of the wars on drugs and crime as well as documenting how these PPUs were being used for purposes far beyond the initial, exceptional justification. During the initial wave of SWAT team creation in the 1970s PPUs were designated for assignment only in exceptional circumstances - anti-terrorism operations or hostage takings, for instance - yet Kraska and Kappeler found that by the 1990s these teams were being used more regularly in instances where the display or use of overwhelming police force was being used as a first, rather than last, resort. The annual number of deployments for PPUs remained fairly consistent during the early 1980s, then expanded exponentially: doubling by 1986, nearly tripling by 1989, and quadrupling by 1995.<sup>28</sup> This increased use, claim the authors, resulted in the “normalization of paramilitary police groups” and the spread of PPUs to communities who may not demonstrate the need for such heavy-handed approaches to policing.<sup>29</sup> The growth of PPUs in communities without a demonstrable need for such highly specialized units is what Kraska and Louis Cubellis have referred to as the militarization of Mayberry, a reference to the fictional community from *The Andy Griffith Show* where the title character plays the local sheriff.<sup>30</sup>

Implementation of the neoliberal reform narrative has transformed the cultural and operational dimensions of many local police departments. The separation of police and community cultures that began with progressive reforms became further militarized as more aggressive and proactive enforcement operations were made routine. While perhaps not true in every community, there seems to be a documented shift in mindset and tactics that accompanied the expansion of police efforts in combating drug trafficking and domestic terrorism. Local communities were viewed more skeptically by law enforcement officials as militarized tactics and personnel became a much larger part of daily police activities. Additionally, this transition seems to have been most forcefully pushed at a level far above the rank and file. National policy itself was revised to encourage collaboration between civil law enforcement and the military.

The aforementioned change in mindset and operational approach did not happen simply by accident or chance; the neoliberal reform tradition's success in redefining how to combat issues of law and order resulted in an ongoing dismantling of the legal barrier between the military and local law enforcement efforts. This was achieved through revision of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, the legal edifice separating military and domestic law enforcement efforts in the United States. Advocates of neoliberal reform programs critiqued the progressive tradition by decrying its preference for bureaucratic organization, arguing that bureaucracies were ill-equipped to deal with the globalization of crime, particularly threats posed by drug trafficking, international organized crime and global terrorism. Effectively combating these transnational threats would require institutional flexibility that

was impossible given the state's siloed domestic and international security bureaucracies. As borders become more permeable, the argument goes, so too should the lines between military and domestic law enforcement. Transnational problems like terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and organized crime required cooperation between formerly legally separate entities.<sup>31</sup> The Posse Comitatus Act, enacted at the end of the Reconstruction Era as a condition of the disputed presidential election of 1876, imposed penalties on anyone using the military as agents of domestic law enforcement. While federal troops and the national guard have been used domestically since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – in order to quell uprisings or enforce public school desegregation, for instance – the expanded use of military forces in cooperation with local law enforcement expanded widely with the advent of the wars on drugs, crime and terrorism.<sup>32</sup>

In 1981, Congress passed and President Ronald Reagan signed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act. This act “authorized the military to ‘assist’ civilian police in the enforcement of drug laws;” principally by “[encouraging] the military to a) make available equipment, military bases, and research facilities to federal, state and local police; b) train and advise civilian police on the use of the equipment; and c) assist law enforcement personnel in keeping drugs from entering the country.”<sup>33</sup> The weakening of the barrier between military and police operations was deemed necessary in order to effectively combat the war on drugs, which was made a national priority by the Reagan Administration. Subsequent presidential administrations and congresses have continued to encourage cooperation and joint enforcement operations between the military and civilian law

enforcement as the neoliberal interpretation of these transnational problems persists. Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush continued the militarized offensive against drug trafficking with the creation of joint task forces which brought military and law enforcement personnel together to mutually support and enforce the nation's drug laws.<sup>34</sup> Further revisions supporting joint military-police operations were made to the Posse Comitatus Act in the wake of other national tragedies, including: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the ill-fated raid on the Branch Davidian complex in Waco, Texas in 1993; the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995; the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. in 2001; and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.<sup>35</sup> Especially after acts of terror, primacy is placed on cooperation and communication between the military, federal law enforcement agencies and local police as the prevention of future attacks and an investigation into the inability to prevent attacks take center stage. Since 2001, this cooperation has become a routine part of police work in many communities. As of 2012, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, put together by the FBI, "include more than 4,400 personnel from more than 600 local and 50 separate federal agencies."<sup>36</sup> An unintended consequence of this ongoing, enhanced cooperation is that local police agencies and individual officers are being exposed to and trained in a military culture whose goals, mindset and legal restrictions are very different from their own.

Having elsewhere discussed the neoliberal tradition's success in transforming American governance more broadly, through the adoption of efficiency-promoting, market-oriented reforms like the marketization and

privatization of public services, neoliberal thinking has also had several other profound effects on policing in the United States.<sup>37</sup> Advocates of private sector managerial techniques, like the new public management, led to the adoption of performance budgeting strategies, consequently “turning police departments into providers of services in competition with other agencies for resources and customers.”<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, “police are under greater pressure to demonstrate their effectiveness in deterring crime, enforcing the law, and using resources appropriately.”<sup>39</sup> In some extreme cases, the causes of increased productivity and efficiency may even supplant public safety as operational goals. As the Department of Justice made quite clear in their scathing review of policing in Ferguson, a preoccupation with generating revenue and increasing budgets was a significant factor contributing to the gross violation of constitutional and civil rights in that community. As the report summarizes, “the City’s emphasis on revenue generation has a profound effect on FPD [the Ferguson Police Department’s] approach to law enforcement.”<sup>40</sup> The following table provides additional excerpts from the report which corroborate the argument regarding revenue-generation and also point towards the top-down implementation of a neoliberal reform narrative that was successful in transforming Ferguson’s policing along the cultural, operational and organizational dimensions.



### **The effect of financial/budgeting concerns on policing in Ferguson:**

- "The City budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees each year, exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases, and closely monitors whether those increases are achieved."
- "Ferguson police officers from all ranks told us that revenue generation is stressed heavily within the police department, and that the message comes from City leadership."
- "Patrol assignments and schedules are geared towards aggressive enforcement of Ferguson's municipal code, with insufficient thought given to whether enforcement strategies promote public safety..."
- "Officer evaluations and promotions depend to an inordinate degree on 'productivity,' meaning the number of citations issued."
- "Many officers appear to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson's predominately African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be protect than as potential offenders and sources of revenue."

Source: Department of Justice<sup>41</sup>

Adopting aspects of the neoliberal reform narrative were also responsible for militarizing policing along the material dimension as well. In the 1990s, the administration of President Bill Clinton played a substantial role in funding special local police units of the SWAT model and equipping local law enforcement with military-grade weaponry and vehicles. Further revisions to the Posse Comitatus Act and the establishment of a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Justice and Defense "enabled the military to transfer technology to state and local police departments. Civilian officers now have at their disposal an array of high-tech military items previously reserved for use during wartime."<sup>42</sup> As federal resources and equipment became increasingly available for local law enforcement beginning in the 1980s, a correlated need to demonstrate and therefore justify the use and effectiveness of these new resources also rose.

Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the weaponry, body armor and vehicles used in patrolling American streets.

The advanced weaponry, armor, and equipment used by local law enforcement in Ferguson last year was primarily been made available through the Department of Defense's "1033 Program," named for the section of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 which permanently established the Defense Department's authority to transfer equipment and other materials directly and free of cost to federal and state agencies "for use in law enforcement, particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities."<sup>43</sup> As of 2014, Defense reports that 11,000 state and local agencies are currently registered with the Law Enforcement Support Office that administers the program, with 8,000 agencies currently using material provided through the program.<sup>44</sup> Although all military equipment is only considered on loan from the federal government to the receiving agencies, no program report to Congress is required by statute.<sup>45</sup> As reported by the *Washington Post*, since the inception of 1033 Program, nearly \$5 billion in equipment has been transferred to federal and state law enforcement agencies – will \$500 million in military equipment transferred in 2013 alone.<sup>46</sup>

**Equipment received by local law enforcement agencies via the Department of Defense's "1033 Program" since 2006**

Assault rifles	79,288
Grenade launchers	205
Bayonets	11,959
Combat knives	3,972
Mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs)	600+
Airplanes	50
Helicopters	422
Bomb-detonating robots	479
Night-vision equipment	\$124 million
Camouflage gear and "deception equipment"	\$3.6 million
Source: NPR <sup>47</sup>	

Again, the neoliberal concern with market-oriented efficiency is well reflected in the program's design and intention; as the *Post* writes, "military equipment that would otherwise be destroyed instead gets diverted to cash-strapped local law enforcement agencies."<sup>48</sup> In addition to providing weaponry and vehicles to local law enforcement agencies, the federal government has also made available billions of dollars in federal funding for these local departments to support counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts. Federal grants through programs like the Urban Areas Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Program in the Department of Homeland Security and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program through the Department of Justice have supported the hiring, training, equipping and deployment of special task forces to combat anti-terrorism and anti-drug efforts.<sup>49</sup> From these federal grants and the 1033 Program, Missouri's law enforcement agencies in St. Louis County have been able to procure, among other weaponry and equipment: ballistic helmets and suits, helicopters,

pistols, assault rifles, night vision equipment, and a BearCat armored vehicle.<sup>50</sup> Far from being used for their express anti-terrorism and anti-drug purposes, this equipment has instead been turned on protestors in Ferguson and elsewhere, demonstrating the continued creep of militarism into routine enforcement and crowd control operations.

Examining the overall impact the neoliberal reform tradition has had on police culture in the United States, it becomes clear that the implementation of national initiatives aimed at combating drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism led to a profound transformation of policing at the state and local level. On the cultural level, the beliefs and values of police cultures increased in militarism as professionalized and insulated local cultures embraced the more aggressive and proactive mindset recommended by advocates of the neo-liberal narrative. Additionally, a preoccupation with organizational efficiency, manifesting itself in the promotion of performance budgeting and obsession with revenue-generation, led local department to compete for resources and see surrounding communities as possible sources of revenue. This change in mindset framed the local community as a threat or a target in need of aggressive policing. This aggressive mindset was aided by material support from the federal government, helping to establish special police units and the transfer of military-grade equipment and weaponry to local departments. Originally intended for specific and exceptional purposes, special units have become increasingly used for routine police work, with much of their increased workload stemming from warrant work where the threat of violence is normally low. Given the fact that many of these operations take place within the full

view of the public, as overwhelming shows of force are not easily shielded from the public eye, this reliance on special unit deployments has added to the isolation of local police cultures from the surrounding community as well as to the growing distrust of local police exhibited in communities like Ferguson.

### *Community-Oriented*

The police reform tradition that seems least associated with either facilitating or reducing police militarization is the community-oriented tradition. At first this may seem odd, given that community-oriented policing is often seen as leading to potentially significant enhancement of police-community relations intended to deescalate aggression and promote mutual respect and participation. As the Department of Justice explicitly outlines in their recommendations for improved policing in Ferguson, “the City must replace revenue-driven policing with a system grounded in the principles of community policing and police legitimacy” and then goes on to outline six primary community policing reforms necessary to begin rebuilding trust and legitimacy between the police force and the broader community.<sup>51</sup> While the Department of Justice has established the Community Oriented Policing Services Office in an effort to encourage the implementation of this particular policing narrative, it is not at all clear how widespread and successful the community-oriented reform movement has been. As Maguire and King state in their review of contemporary police research, “Some practices – like community policing, in our opinion – are implemented across the landscape of policing but so weakly, or in such a scattershot fashion, so as not to constitute a significant transformation at the industry level[...].”<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, it is also important to

recognize that among public safety scholars and practitioners there does not exist a broad consensus on what constitutes community-oriented policing. Indeed, the two primary schools of thought on how to implement community policing differ significantly. One strand, advocated by Louis Radelet and Robert Trojanowicz, emphasizes empowerment, the development of meaningful relationships between police officers and community members and public/police partnerships. The other, commonly identified with James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, focuses much more on the creation of an ordered community through aggressive policing of livability ordinances and the elimination of “broken windows” in order to reduce fear and withdrawal among community members.<sup>53</sup> Depending on which version of community policing is being promoted, and how much resistance or acceptance to community-oriented approaches is exhibited by the local police culture, “community policing” can either be a hindrance to or harbinger of more militaristic approaches to policing. As Kraska and Kappeler’s survey of local police organizations uncovered, some departments count amongst their community-oriented activities saturation patrols in “hot spots” with a heavy emphasis on significant displays of weaponry and tactical equipment.<sup>54</sup> Other officers, upon review of these responses, strongly disagreed with what they saw as a counterproductive approach at odds with their understanding of community-oriented policing. Without additional evidence pointing towards an industry-wide movement towards implementation of what loosely could be agreed upon as community-oriented policing, a generalized account of the reform movement’s relationship to police militarization is problematic. What can be inferred from responses from local police agencies to

Kraska and Kappeler's survey is that some departments have embraced community-oriented approaches that run counter to the broader trend towards militarism, while other agencies see militarization as a key component of a community-oriented approach.

What I hope the preceding analysis of police militarization via the three primary traditions of reform has demonstrated is the piecemeal and inconsistent encroachment of militarized beliefs and practices utilized by local law enforcement. Militarization has occurred gradually, over several decades, as a response to a variety of reform initiatives stemming from different political and intellectual motivations. In some cases, as with the progressive tradition's professionalization of local policing or the neoliberal tradition's focus on efficiency and revenue generation, militarism appears to be an unfortunate unintended consequence. Reform recommendation were either interpreted and implemented in a way that encouraged more militarized approaches to policing. Other reforms, like the revision of the Posse Comitatus Act and technology transfers from the federal government to state and local agencies were explicitly aimed at providing local police departments with military training and equipment as they carried out national initiatives against drugs, crime and terrorism. Especially at the cultural and organizational level, local police departments and officers have become increasingly militarized as they respond to, concurrently, the implementation of new goals and initiatives, generally shaped and driven by members of the political and administrative elite, as well as individual dilemmas experienced in the line of duty. Among the most influential reforms of the progressive tradition, we saw the

development of a cultural mindset whereby the police were increasingly insulated from the surrounding community feeding into the development of a strong in-group bias and out-group skepticism. The insulated nature of police cultures was susceptible to the influence of the neoliberal tradition's call to combat transnational wars on crime, drugs and terrorism. Police officers internalized the mindset in which they were increasingly viewed as soldiers in these wars, as the first line of defense on home soil. Policing became increasingly proactive, with the display or use of force seen less and less as a tactic of last resort. The federal government continues to play an important role in the militarization of state and local law enforcement agencies by supplying local departments with funding, weaponry, and other equipment that reinforces a culture of militarized policing. The elimination of legal barriers to coordination between military forces and local police, via revision of the Posse Comitatus Act, encouraged joint training and a blending of military and police cultures while federal grants and technology transfers gave local law enforcement the resources to implement the militarized approaches being pushed by those higher up the food chain. What we see as militarized policing, then, is the culmination of the interaction of these traditions on the beliefs and practices of local cultures and the policing industry more broadly.

Taken together, reform initiatives inspired by a neoliberal understanding of crime and crime prevention have been the most responsible for the documented rise of militarism in American policing. If the progressive tradition began to militarize policing along the cultural and operational dimensions, the neoliberal tradition enhanced and expanded militarized policing along all four dimensions of



militarism explained earlier. The implementation of reforms recommended by supporters of the community-oriented tradition, as discussed earlier, has thus far been too inconsistent and ineffectual to warrant much of an evaluation. Perhaps it is worryingly then that in communities like Ferguson reforms aligned with the community-oriented tradition are being recommended as the highest priority response to problems in policing.

### **The Fallacy of Expertise**

The fact that militarization stems from a diverse intellectual and political heritage complicates subsequent efforts to slow or reverse this trend. The danger in relying on federal pressure to reform individual police cultures, like agreements overseen by the Department of Justice in Cleveland and Ferguson, is that it assumes that the top-down implementation of reform programs will proceed without resistance. What Mark Bevir and I labeled the fallacy of expertise in our earlier work on police reform occurs when political and administrative elites assume that rank and file members of local police cultures will seamlessly implement their policy initiatives, ignoring the “contingent and contestable nature of action.”<sup>55</sup> The failure to account for individual or departmental resistance, the contradictory demands of competing traditions of police reform and the formal and informal training received by street-level officers gives rise to the patchwork acceptance and implementation of reform programs, often resulting in unintended consequences.<sup>56</sup> As Maguire and King have also recognized, “[w]hen transformations occur within the policing industry, they must diffuse throughout the population of police organizations. Sometimes, transformations start at the organizational level and

bubble up to the industry level. Other times, they are diffused down to the organization level from policy elites or government.”<sup>57</sup> The fallacy of expertise arises when industry-wide, or even departmental, transformations are pushed from the elite to the street level, too often without considering the idiosyncrasies of local police cultures. We have already seen how the top-down implementation of national initiatives against drugs, crime and terrorism resulted in the widespread militarization of American policing as many local departments sympathetically embraced a more aggressive approach due to the already isolated, quasi-militaristic culture of many local police departments. Political and administrative elites committed the fallacy of expertise when they assumed the increasingly militarized approach to combat the wars on drugs and terrorism would remain isolated from the normal, day-to-day police work undertaken by local departments. As officers are instructed to integrate new beliefs and strategies into their routine, they do not just accept these changes blindly. They interpret the reform initiatives to fit their experience, their understanding of their role, and their view of the problems facing their service area. Officers “interpret the reforms, they transform them, resisting them or domesticating them in ways that have consequences unforeseen and certainly(sic) unforeseen by the advocates of the reforms.”<sup>58</sup>

Similarly, any effort to undo police militarization must also seek to avoid the fallacy of expertise. Resistance most often occurs when the top-down implementation of new policing practices assumes that local departments can be reformatted, erasing any trace of the beliefs, practices and traditions that came before. This assumption drastically underestimates the varying pressures and

contradictory recommendations that officers face on a regular basis. For example, rookie officers face sometimes-contradictory pressures to trust in their training but also to follow the advice of their departmental veterans and superiors who they partner with on patrol. The fact that the training manual and the approach of a seasoned officer or supervisor may differ introduces the new officer to a dilemma, one in which they must choose between competing alternatives or create a novel approach. It is because of this process of conflict and creation that reform traditions are never seamlessly and comprehensively implemented as intended by political and administrative elites. The failure to acknowledge this puts the success of the reform tradition at risk, as it has for the community-oriented tradition. Note that resistance from local police cultures or individual officers does not necessarily mean that they disagree with the reform program, although resistance in opposition is a possibility. Rather, any new reform program must contend with the culture and tradition already established within a local department. Too often, political and administrative elites assume that their authority to command or compel overrides any preexisting beliefs and routines.

What an examination of the fallacy of expertise points us towards is the need to encourage bottom-up approaches to demilitarization of policing. This is especially true given the enabling role played by the federal government. Lost in the public and political furor surrounding the actions of local law enforcement agencies in Ferguson is a discussion of just how culpable the federal government and in particular political elites have been in militarizing local law enforcement. In a U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee meeting the month

following the initial demonstrations in Ferguson, senators from both major political parties took the opportunity to express their outrage at the militarization of local law enforcement agencies, casting blame variously on the Pentagon and local police.<sup>59</sup> What their indignation fails to capture is how culpable they themselves were in passing legislation that encouraged police militarization. While not necessarily an intended consequence of their legislation, their fallacious assumption that the top-down implementation of national policy would adhere both to the letter and intent of the law as they understood it reinforces the fact that the fallacy of expertise is persistent in American governance. As Daryl Meeks writes in response to aggressive policing strategies in urban cities, “the authority to conduct this campaign was delegated down a chain from the federal government to local governments, and finally the policing agencies, which then established authority to implement the strategies for the war.”<sup>60</sup> Meaningful reform, then, is not simply a case-by-case review of individual police departments or officers when militarism seems to exceed the boundaries of appropriate policing, as if they are implementing a corrupted vision of a policy without troubling questions concerning the use of legitimate state authority. Local police departments and rank and file officers are responding to inconsistent and sometimes-contradictory pressures from initiatives pushed by political officials and subsequently higher ranking police executives. With all the resources and military equipment being made available to local police departments, they, in turn, feel that they have to justify their expenditures or face losing operational revenue, something of increasing importance due to the success of the neoliberal tradition of reform. While potentially politically unfeasible,

reformers clearly see a need for federal action to limit state and local police access to unnecessary military equipment, but buy-in from local departments and police cultures is perhaps even more essential for any meaningful de-emphasis of militarized approaches to policing. Without the support of officers and local police cultures, a elite-level movement to demilitarize policing would face much the same resistance as any other reform tradition, with inconsistent results as some cultures incorporate and others discard or significantly modify the intent of proposed reforms.

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<sup>1</sup> Kesley D. Atherton, "Veterans on Ferguson," as cited in Nick Wing, "Actual Military Veterans Say Pos in Ferguson Are Excessively Armed, Untrained Wannabes," *The Huffington Post*, 8/24/2015. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/police-militarization-ferguson\\_n\\_5678407.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/police-militarization-ferguson_n_5678407.html)

<sup>2</sup> Previous explanation and analysis of these reform traditions can be found in Mark Bevir and Ben Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance, and Democracy." In *Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions*, edited by Megan O'Neill, Monique Marks and Anne-Marie Singh. *Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance* 8. (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, "Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department," published March 4, 2015, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Kraska, "Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Police," *Policing* 1.4 (2007), 4.

<sup>5</sup> Kraska, "Militarization and Policing," 3.

<sup>6</sup> David H. Bayley and Clifford Shearing, "The Future of Policing," *Law & Society Review*, 30.3 (1996), 585-6.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Bevir and Ben Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance, and Democracy." In *Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions*, edited by Megan O'Neill, Monique Marks and Anne-Marie Singh. *Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance* 8. (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2007), 155.

<sup>8</sup> Edward Macguire and William King, "Trends in the Policing Industry," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 583: To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices (May 2004), 16.

<sup>9</sup> Abigail R. Hall and Christopher Coyne, "The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing," *The Independent Review*, 17.4 (Spring 2013).

<sup>10</sup> Bevir and Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance and Democracy," 156.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 156-8.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 154-6.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

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- <sup>15</sup> Diane Weber, "Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments." *Cato Institute Briefing Papers* 50. (Washington, DC: August 26, 1999), 5.
- <sup>16</sup> Radley Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*. (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2006), 6.
- <sup>17</sup> Balko, *Overkill*, 6.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Weber, "Warrior Cops," 10.
- <sup>20</sup> Daryl Meeks, "Police Militarization in Urban Areas: The Obscure War Against the Underclass," *The Black Scholar* 35.4 (Winter 2006), 36-7.
- <sup>21</sup> Meeks, "Police Militarization in Urban Areas," 34.
- <sup>22</sup> Weber, "Warrior Cops," 3.
- <sup>23</sup> E.C. Ritchie and S. Curran, "Warrior Transition by Army Reserve and National Guard Personnel from Combat Operations in Iraq to Policing in the United States," Presented to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Psychological Services Section, Boston, 2006. As cited in Barbara Webster "Combat Deployment and the Returning Officer," Report for the Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, August 2008. <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e08086158Combat.pdf>
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- <sup>26</sup> Kraska and Kappeler, 6.
- <sup>27</sup> Kraska and Kappeler, 6.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 5.
- <sup>30</sup> Peter Kraska and Louis Cubellis, "Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond," *Justice Quarterly*, 14.4 (December 1997).
- <sup>31</sup> Stephen Hill and Randall Beger, "A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut" *Social Justice*, 36.1.115: Policing Protest and Youth (2009), 28.
- <sup>32</sup> Weber, "Warrior Cops," 4.
- <sup>33</sup> Weber, "Warrior Cops," 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 5.
- <sup>35</sup> Stephen Hill and Randall Beger, "A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut," 29.
- <sup>36</sup> Hall and Coyne, 497.
- <sup>37</sup> Bevir and Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance, and Democracy," 160-3.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 163.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> Department of Justice, "Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department," 2.
- <sup>41</sup> Department of Justice, "Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department," 2.
- <sup>42</sup> Weber, "Warrior Cops," 5.
- <sup>43</sup> Daniel Else, Summary section of "The '1033 Program,' Department of Defense Support to Law Enforcement." Congressional Research Service Report. August 28, 2014.
- <sup>44</sup> Else, "The '1033 Program,'" Summary.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., 4.
- <sup>46</sup> Christopher Ingraham, "The Pentagon gave nearly half a billion dollars of military gear to local law enforcement last year," *Washington Post*. August 14, 2014.

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- <sup>47</sup> Arezou Rezvani et al., "MRAPs and Bayonets: What We Know About The Pentagon's 1033 Program," *NPR*, September 2, 2014.
- <sup>48</sup> Ingraham, "The Pentagon."
- <sup>49</sup> Alicia Parlapiano, "The Flow of Money and Equipment to Local Police," *New York Times*, August 23, 2014.
- <sup>50</sup> Parlapiano, "The Flow of Money."
- <sup>51</sup> Department of Justice, "Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department," 5.
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- <sup>53</sup> Peter Kraska, "Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Police," *Policing* 1.4 (2007), 9.
- <sup>54</sup> Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 10.
- <sup>55</sup> Bevir and Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance and Democracy," 171-2.
- <sup>56</sup> Bevir and Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance and Democracy," 172.
- <sup>57</sup> Maguire and King, "Trends in the Police Industry," 16-7.
- <sup>58</sup> Bevir and Krupicka, "Police Reform, Governance and Democracy," 170.
- <sup>59</sup> Tom Devaney, "Senators blast DOD program that 'militarized police,'" *The Hill*, September 9, 2014.
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