

**Peace through Peacekeeping:  
Assessing the role of regime type and democratic transition  
in state contributions to UN peace operations**

Timothy J. A. Passmore

PhD Candidate  
Department of Political Science  
University of Colorado Boulder

Timothy.Passmore@colorado.edu

Prepared for presentation at the Western Political Science Association Meeting, Vancouver, BC,  
2017.

**Abstract**

In the post-Cold War era, the provision of personnel for international peacekeeping efforts has been taken up largely by developing countries with weak democratic institutions. This observation challenges the theoretical approach of extant literature, which treats the relationship between a country's regime type and its proclivity to participate in peacekeeping efforts as linear. Such an approach invokes the democratic peace literature, arguing that strong democracies promote peacekeeping operations through the externalization of norms linking the democratic polity to the pursuit of peace. I present an alternative argument, arguing that the relationship between regime type and peacekeeping participation is non-linear, such that weak and transitional democracies are the most likely to contribute personnel. Rather than possessing a normative drive for peace, I argue that these states participate due to their proneness to conflict and instability. I test this argument on UN member state personnel contributions to 66 UN peacekeeping missions from 1990 to 2012. The results show that states considered weakly or moderately democratic give greater support to peacekeeping effort than autocracies and strong democracies, and in particular, states clustered around the conventional cutoff for democracy give the most personnel. It is therefore states transitioning into or out of democracy, or most likely to do so, that perceive the greatest benefit from participating in UN peacekeeping efforts. I briefly discuss a theory underlying this phenomenon positing that such states use peacekeeping as a means to consolidate democracy in the face of threats from the military and other domestic actors.

**Author Note:** This project will hopefully form the first chapter of my dissertation. I therefore present mechanisms briefly in this paper, but intend to unpack them in greater detail in additional chapters.

## **Introduction**

What effect does a state's domestic politics have on its decision to support international peacekeeping efforts? In recent years, a burgeoning literature has sought to understand what motivates self-interested states to contribute military personnel to global peace operations, which often address violent civil conflicts in far off parts of the world. The continued importance of this issue, as well as the emergence of much new data on the subject, has led to an array of attempts to answer this question, with varied conclusions. Yet, despite the vitality of this research agenda, little remains known about the role of domestic politics in the decision to participate in such operations. In particular, what role – if any – does regime type play in making this decision?

One argument offered is that democracies are more likely to support international peacekeeping operations with their military personnel than non-democracies, since democracies have a greater commitment to global peace and stability, as well as upholding the human rights of civilians in conflict zones. Yet studies making this claim have taken diverse approaches to answering the question and have received mixed results. In particular, such studies assume a linear effect of regime type on participation, such that strong democracies are the most likely to be involved, while the most autocratic states offer the least support. I challenge this claim, arguing that while regime type is an important indicator of involvement in peacekeeping operations, its effect is not linear. Rather, I argue that it is weak and transitioning democracies that will be most likely to provide the personnel for peacekeeping missions. In making my argument, I also challenge the findings of previous studies on anecdotal, theoretical, and methodological grounds. In particular, a clear trend has emerged in post-Cold War peacekeeping whereby developing countries, many of which are only weakly democratic, are doing the heavy lifting in outfitting

peacekeeping missions. I seek to explain this trend in the light of the previous findings and present a more accurate theoretical and methodological way of approaching the question.

In claiming that regime type has a non-linear effect on peacekeeping participation, I argue that weak and emerging democracies use involvement in such operations as a means by which to strengthen democratic institutions at home and increase legitimacy by reducing the threat of the military and other domestic groups and appeasing society broadly. The involvement of the military in peacekeeping operations sends a short-term credible signal that the military should not fear reform or dissolution, nor losing out to new government financial obligations such as social spending, since such ongoing operations promise funding, training, and active service for the military. In the long-term, this is also a means by which the government may seek to professionalize the military, by exposing its members to procedures and other militaries more supportive of democratic ideals. Both the short and long term effects of involving the military in peacekeeping operations should contribute to a reduced rate of a military coup. Moreover, by participating in peacekeeping, such governments can placate society by reducing its commitment to spend public funds on the military instead of social needs. Having a military that is kept paid, trained, and active can also serve to reduce threats to national security that stem from within or outside its borders, whereby the military can be quickly recalled to address such problems. These various factors that are largely unique to a weak or nascent democracies may very well explain why this subset of states has been so active in global peace operations in recent decades.

I preliminarily test this argument here by assessing the impact of a country's political regime type on its involvement in international peacekeeping efforts, taking into account a variety of other factors commonly proposed in explaining such contributions. Based on the findings, I then unpack some of the underlying mechanisms discussed above that may increase governments'

proclivity to contribute military personnel to peacekeeping operations. I proceed as follows: I first give an overview of global peacekeeping activity since the end of the Cold War, addressing important trends and common explanations for state participation. I then consider the role of regime type, offering theoretical and methodological alternatives to previous studies that more accurately assess the relationship. I then present my proposed mechanism behind this relationship and test my hypotheses using cross-sectional time-series analysis of involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions for all UN member states from 1990-2012. Finally, I present my results and consider their implications.

### **Understanding Global Peacekeeping**

Significant effort has been given to understanding the processes and outcomes of United Nations peacekeeping activity in recent years, and not without good reason. At the beginning of 2017, 16 UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) were deployed around the world, with over 99,000 uniformed personnel drawn from 126 countries. Since the end of the Cold War, no fewer than 69 operations have existed around the world (UNDPKO).

Early studies on the subject of peacekeeping largely focused on their effects, assessing the impact of missions on conflict reduction, resolution, and peace duration (Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel 1996; King & Zeng 2007; Jett 2001; Jones 2001; Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti 2008), many treating the presence of a peacekeeping mission as a binary variable. Yet variation in the impact of UNPKOs, as well as expanded data collection on the subject in recent years, has shifted the focus to opening up the black box of peacekeeping missions. These efforts have made it increasingly apparent that missions come in different shapes and sizes, have complex and multifaceted mandates, encounter varied political influences, and are in many other

ways very different from one another.<sup>1</sup> One major focus of this shifting agenda has been the composition of missions: why and to what extent UN member states get involved in providing the necessary resources for such operations to take place. Numerous studies have addressed mission composition as a dependent variable, assessing the push and pull factors that lead countries to give military personnel, equipment, or finances to these missions (for example Shimizu & Sandler 2002; Gilligan & Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Perkins & Neumeyer 2008; Bove & Elia 2011; Uzonyi 2015; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Kathman & Melin 2016), and factors that lead to missions either being adequately equipped or short-handed (Passmore, Shannon & Hart, Forthcoming). Others have alternately considered the outcomes of mission composition, such as how the number of personnel on the ground impacts battlefield and civilian violence (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon 2013, 2014) as well as war termination and the duration of peace agreements (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Gilligan & Sergenti 2008).


Of the approaches listed above, perhaps none has received the focus in recent years equal to that of understanding why countries contribute personnel to UNPKOs. Since 1990, 151 countries have contributed personnel in some form (Kathman 2013). Yet great variation in the size of the contribution exists from country to country, mission to mission, and year to year. For example, between 2000 and 2010, Bangladesh made an average annual contribution of 7,780 troops, while Switzerland gave 31. Ghana made an average annual contribution equal to 17% of its standing military, while Japan's amounted to 0.07%. Likewise, some missions are more successful at acquiring requested personnel than others. Between 1990 and 2010, the UN mission to India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was only 6% short of the mandated number of personnel for

---

<sup>1</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of this shift, see Jacob Kathman's "Personnel Composition and Member State Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." In the 2016 special edition of *International Peacekeeping*.

the mission in an average year, while ONUSAL in El Salvador had an average annual shortfall of 55% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Average monthly shortfall of personnel in UN peacekeeping missions (1990-2010)



To explain this variation, previous studies have considered the push and pull factors of peacekeeping contributions: those factors related to either the potential contributor, the country hosting the mission, or both. Such explanations include shared political or security alignments with the conflict country (Fortna 2008), shared colonial history (Gilligan & Stedman 2003; Marten 2004; Fortna 2008), shared ethnic affinity with the conflict country (Carment & James 2000), or the regime type of the conflict country (Perkins & Neumeyer 2008; Fortna 2008). An emerging argument suggests that countries may contribute due to third party influences. Since the establishment of missions is politically driven (Stojek & Tir 2015), powerful countries such as the UN Security Council Permanent Five might use coercion or incentives to encourage states to participate in order to protect or further their own interests (Henke 2016; Passmore, Hart &

Shannon n.d.). States may also contribute for less political incentives, such as to prevent the conflict spilling over its own borders (Diehl 1993; Evans 1994; Dorn 1998; Bove & Elia 2011; Binder 2015; Uzonyi 2015), or to protect financial interests relating to the conflict country (Gaibulloev et al. 2009; Passmore, Shannon & Hart, Forthcoming).

An important factor that has influenced this investigation is the overwhelming involvement of developing nations in peacekeeping missions in recent years. In the past, missions were staffed largely by “middle powers” such as Canada and Austria, who lacked the power to influence global politics unilaterally and so chose multilateral peace operation as a means by which to effect change (Cunliffe 2013:12). At times, major powers also played a role, although only in select instances and often with narrow political motivations. However, the post-Cold War era has seen the increasing role of developing nations in peacekeeping. Table 1 shows the top personnel contributors to UNPKOs from 2000-2010, both in total contributions and the size of the contribution relative to that country’s military size or expenditure. All three measures indicate the centrality of developing countries in peacekeeping over this period. The imbalance is most pronounced when accounting for countries’ capacity to send peacekeepers, such as their annual defense expenditure and their total standing military size. Accounting for military size, Ireland, Slovakia, Austria, and New Zealand are the only OECD countries that appear in the top 25 contributors. When accounting for contributions as a proportion of defense expenditure, no OECD countries appear in the list.

Several explanations for this shift have been offered. One major argument is that such countries benefit financially from participation. Since the contributing state is reimbursed by the UN at a rate of \$1,028 per month for each peacekeeper, this income may comprise a significant source of revenue for poorer states, while wealthier states would find that this amount does not

Table 1: Military contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, 2000-2010

	Country	Ave. Annual Contribution	Country	Ave. Annual Contribution / Defense Expenditure (US\$1 million)	Country	Ave. Annual Contribution / Total Military Personnel		
1	Bangladesh	7,780	1	Gambia	38.73	1	Ghana	0.17
2	Pakistan	7,711	2	Ghana	33.55	2	Gambia	0.15
3	India	6,005	3	Nepal	17.22	3	Benin	0.13
4	Nigeria	3,794	4	Rwanda	13.90	4	Senegal	0.10
5	Jordan	2,859	5	Benin	13.37	5	Fiji	0.10
6	Ghana	2,785	6	Senegal	9.19	6	Uruguay	0.08
7	Nepal	2,687	7	Niger	8.94	7	Niger	0.07
8	Uruguay	1,903	8	Fiji	8.92	8	Kenya	0.06
9	Ethiopia	1,581	9	Togo	8.47	9	Bangladesh	0.05
10	Kenya	1,407	10	Uruguay	8.38	10	Nigeria	0.05
11	Senegal	1,369	11	Bangladesh	8.29	11	Zambia	0.05
12	South Africa	1,329	12	Guinea	8.27	12	Ireland	0.04
13	Egypt	1,228	13	Nigeria	4.94	13	Togo	0.03
14	Morocco	1,147	14	Ethiopia	4.58	14	Namibia	0.03
15	Italy	1,098	15	Kenya	3.53	15	Rwanda	0.03
16	China	1,090	16	Mongolia	3.37	16	Jordan	0.03
17	France	1,079	17	Malawi	2.67	17	Nepal	0.03
18	Rwanda	1,001	18	Jordan	2.56	18	Guinea	0.02
19	Ukraine	884	19	Zambia	2.26	19	South Africa	0.02
20	Brazil	874	20	Burkina Faso	2.20	20	Malawi	0.02
21	Poland	813	21	Pakistan	1.86	21	Slovakia	0.02
22	Argentina	785	22	Bolivia	1.72	22	Austria	0.02
23	Zambia	679	23	Namibia	1.43	23	New Zealand	0.02
24	Benin	655	24	Tanzania	1.03	24	Burkina Faso	0.01
25	Indonesia	593	25	Guatemala	0.94	25	Mongolia	0.01

cover the overhead of participating (Victor 2010; Gaibullov et al. 2015). Others argue that this income is unlikely to be a major driver of participation for any states (Durch 1993: 50; Bove & Elia 2011). In particular, Cunliffe (2013: 172) argues that peacekeeping income rarely comprises a notable proportion of a country's defense budget, while Coleman (2014) highlights the fact that reimbursements from the UN are often late or do not arrive at all. Blum (2000) finds no empirical link between financial need and contribution of personnel.



While it remains unclear what has driven this shift in contribution patterns in recent years, one observation is worthy of note: the increasing role played by countries that are not considered strong democracies challenges a number of previous findings that posit the importance of democracy in promoting contributions. It is therefore necessary to revisit the question of how a country's regime type affects its proclivity to be involved in UNPKOs.

### **Democracy and Peacekeeping**

Of the various proposed explanations for country involvement in peacekeeping efforts, one that has featured prominently is regime type. This argument suggests that more democratic states will be the ones to offer up their military personnel, while more autocratic states will be the least likely to get involved. The argument rests largely on the notion that democracies have more internalized norms of promoting peace, upholding human rights, and creating political and economic conditions where peace and prosperity can thrive (Lebovic 2004: 912). Much of what is known about the impact of democracy on conflict resolution comes from the democratic peace literature (Babst 1972; Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Maoz 1998; Russett & Starr 2000; Russett & Oneal 2001; Rasler & Thompson 2004). Yet the strand of this theoretical endeavor which most appropriately applies to peacekeeping involvement – norm externalization – finds little empirical support in the literature (Chan 1984; Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1994; Rosato 2003). Moreover, the alternative approach to the democratic peace that considers institutional constraints and audience costs does not logically extend to peacekeeping. Since such factors promote peaceful relations through *restricting* the government's use of force when conflicts arise between it and another country (Doyle 1986; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2004), it does not logically follow that those same factors would *promote* the use of force to engender

peace in an ongoing conflict somewhere else in the world. Anecdotally, this reluctance to fight likely explains why so many developed countries have shifted from providing peacekeepers to supporting the mission with funding, equipment, and expertise (Lebovic 2010; Cunliffe 2013). It therefore stands that if democracy is to be considered an important factor in driving state contributions of peacekeepers, a more precise theoretical explanation is required.

The empirical record testing this relationship has been mixed. While some studies have found that more democratic states contribute more often and in greater numbers (Andersson 2002; Lebovic 2004; Perkins & Neumeyer 2008), others have concluded that there is no discernible relationship (Victor 2010; Uzonyi 2015; Kathman & Melin 2016). There are three possible explanations for these disparate findings. The first is *time*. As the burden of providing peacekeepers has shifted to developing countries in recent years, many of which are weak democracies or autocracies, it is possible that a once-existing link between democracy and participation has been weakened in recent years. During the 1990s, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, Finland, the United States, and Ireland all appeared at various points in the top ten personnel contributors (Heldt 2008). However, from 2001-2011, not one of these countries, nor any other western developed state, appeared in the top ten. Those that did make up the top ten contributed 60% of the personnel during this decade, while western countries provided only 6% (UNDPKO).

Andersson (2002) finds that democracies are more likely to contribute to UNPKOs, but the sample covers only the years 1991-1999. Similarly, Lebovic's (2004) positive finding covers the period 1992-2001. An interesting finding in the latter study is that while differences in contributions of democracies and non-democracies were statistically significant from 1992 to 1999, the difference was not significant in 2000 and 2001, the latter years of the sample. Moreover,

the statistically significant difference disappeared even earlier when looking only at troop contributions (as opposed to police and military observers), ceasing to be significant after 1998. These insights taken together suggest the relationship between democracy and UNPKO participation may have once existed, but has disappeared, or changed in nature, in recent years.

A second possible explanation for disparate findings on this question is *method*. The six studies cited above use various measures of democracy, including the Freedom House Index (Andersson 2002, Victor 2010) and the more common Polity measure (Marshall & Jaggers 2010), which in some cases is used as a scale (-10 to 10) (Lebovic 2004, Perkins & Neumeyer 2008, Uzonyi 2015) and in others is dichotomized (Andersson 2002, Kathman & Melin 2016). Samples vary across both time and space (for example, Victor 2010 looks only at contributions from African countries). Varied statistical tests are employed, including descriptive statistics (Andersson 2002), selection models (Lebovic 2004), logit tests (Perkins & Neumeyer 2008), ordinary least squares tests (Victor 2010), and zero-inflated negative binomial tests (Uzonyi 2015, Kathman & Melin 2016). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, are the varied measures of the dependent variable: participation in UNPKOs, such as a dichotomous measure of participation for sending at least one peacekeeper (Lebovic 2004, Perkins & Neumeyer 2008; Uzonyi 2015, Kathman & Melin 2016), a count of the total personnel given in a year (Lebovic 2004, Victor 2010, Uzonyi 2015, Kathman & Melin 2016); troops only (Perkins & Neumeyer 2008, Uzonyi 2015, Kathman & Melin 2016); troops and military observers (Victor 2010); or all uniformed personnel (Lebovic 2004). Other outcome variables offered include “man-months” standardized by population and economic factors (Andersson 2002), as well as the total number of missions a country supports with personnel (Andersson 2002, Victor 2010). In short, there is little in terms of overlap to suggest that

these studies offer a unified and conclusive assessment of the impact of regime type on UNPKO participation.

A third possible explanation for the varied findings is that some *unidentified process* exists that underlies the relationship between regime type and participation in peacekeeping and that changes the way in which this relationship should be thought. Specifically, it may be that while regime type is a factor in the decision to contribute to UNPKOs, this relationship may not be linear in the way the previous studies have all assumed. Since weak and strong democracies face a host of different challenges, there may be factors specific to one subset and absent in the other that promote or inhibit participation in peacekeeping. Such a possibility would be missed if democracy is merely dichotomized, and particularly where the middle category of states (those not considered strong democracies or strong autocracies) is omitted<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, where regime type is measured as a continuous variable, it is possible that these states, often termed “anocracies”, are driving the observed result, which then diminishes as democracy becomes stronger. The increasing role in peacekeeping of developing countries with weak to moderate democratic institutions suggests this is a sub-group of states that may have unique incentives to contribute, and may therefore be driving an underlying process in this research agenda.

Should it be the case that the relationship between regime type and peacekeeping contributions is not linear as previously thought, this would have major implications for current findings. In particular, if it is the emerging and weak democracies that are doing the heavy lifting, the return offered by democracy would diminish as the score reaches higher levels. This might

---

<sup>2</sup> Where dichotomous measures of democracy and autocracy are used, which cut off at a polity score of +6 and -6 respectively, a large class of states in between that are heavily involved in peacekeeper contributions is removed from the sample. The debate over the merits of a continuous versus a dichotomous measure of democracy is well summarized by Collier & Adcock (1999) and Elkins (2000).

explain why all measures used to reflect regime type in recent studies have failed to reach statistical significance, since they give no attention to this possible non-linearity in the relationship.

Indeed, the earliest cited study (Andersson 2002) posits the possibility that this relationship has a non-linear nature, and that perhaps, “the effect of democracy is greatest at the early increments in democracy but wanes at the later increments; the effect of polity on commitment is suppressed, or saturated, when a certain level of democracy is reached” (379). Such a proposition, however, is not tested in that, or any other, study on the matter. In making an assertion that those states in the middle of the regime type scale are more likely to participate in UNPKOs, however, an adequate theoretical explanation must be offered. It is to this task that I now turn.

### **Peace through Peacekeeping**

If it is the case that weak and nascent, rather than strong, democracies are the primary providers of personnel for UNPKOs, existing theories about the impact of regime type on UNPKO participation become problematic. In particular, appealing to the literature on the democratic peace is puzzling since evidence for this phenomenon has been found only to apply in cases where states are considered “strong” democracies, whereas states with weakly democratic political institutions are the most prone to war and internal conflict of all states in the international system (Mansfield & Snyder 1995). The participation of this group of states in international peacekeeping must therefore be for reasons other than the projection of internalized norms of peace. Rather, it may be the case that the very factors engendering instability and conflict in weak or nascent democracies might be the very factors that promote such states’ involvement in peacekeeping. Ironically, then, it may not be that states participate in peacekeeping because of their proclivity towards peace, as


was previously thought, but rather their proneness to conflict, a finding supported by Kathman & Melin (2016).

It may thus be no coincidence that the post-Cold War world has witnessed two clear trends. First, the nature of contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts has changed considerably, with a shift away from wealthy and more powerful states contributing personnel and towards developing countries with weaker political institutions. The second evident trend during this time period is the sharp increase in democracy around the world (Figure 2). While only 47 democracies existed in the world in 1988 (Polity score of 6 or more), this number more than doubled to 96 by 2015. Is it possible that the process of democratization is linked with the increased involvement of these states in peacekeeping? Of those states experiencing a democratic transition since 1990, 10 feature in the top 25 total UNPKO personnel contributors, despite often having inferior military capacity relative to wealthier strong democracies. What, then, might explain the heavy involvement of democratizing states in peacekeeping efforts?

As countries transition to democratic political institutions, they face a number of unique challenges, which often threaten the very viability of that political system. Indeed, many democratizing states in the post-Cold War era subsequently experienced collapse of their new institutions, whether through military coups, outbreaks of conflict, or general backslides into authoritarian governance. Nascent democracies are inherently unstable and conflict prone due to competing pressures that are often insurmountable for an inexperienced government operating under weak political institutions. Such governments face pressures from at least four angles: (1) a disgruntled military that stands to lose status and power; (2) society at large that demands improved social conditions and quality of life; (3) groups of non-military elites vying for power amid the

transitional period; and (4) the increased vulnerability to external threats due to opportunist rivals or nationalist bellicism fostered at home.

Figure 2. Total number of democracies in the world, 1800-2015.



### *The Military and Societal Demands*

Militaries have a long and storied history of involvement in domestic politics. Between 1945 and 2000, there were 432 coup attempts globally, with over half seeing success (Belkin & Schofer 2003: 596). One might ask why such interventions are not seen much more often. As Finer (1976: 4) suggests, “Instead of asking why the military engages in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise.” Yet the capacity of the military to use force in order to acquire power might be tempered by various factors. The “praetorian guard” approach sees the military as a noble protector of its land, stepping in when it deems necessary to bring order and stability amid poor

governance or economic upheaval (Gandhi 2008:27-28). Such action would therefore be restricted only to instances that reflect the national interest. In reality, it is more likely that coups reflect the corporate interests of the military and of its individual members (Finer 1976; Nordlinger 1977; Needler 1987). Preventing them is thus most effective when the military can be sufficiently incentivized to refrain from intervening, which typically takes the form of financial payment (Acemoglu et al. 2010: 2). A military on the side of an autocratic government serves the added purpose of being able to suppress popular uprising in hard time. A savvy ruler can therefore mitigate two major threats to his rule.

Democratic governments, on the other hand, being in very nature accountable to the public at large, find themselves having to balance their newfound responsibility to the public with the existing commitment to the military. Competing demands for public spending leave such governments in a quandary, whereby the public will expect to see improved economic conditions, and will oppose continued high spending on the military (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Przeworski et al. (2000) find that while economic development plays no role in a country democratizing, poor economic growth is highly likely to lead to democratic collapse.

Yet while the public may be placated by government spending on infrastructure, bureaucracy, education, and welfare, the military will likely be dissatisfied. Not only do competing claims for government funds threaten military rents, but it also loses a degree of status in a democratic transition: decision making has been decentralized, repression of the public through military force is no longer acceptable, and depending on the nature of the previous regime, there may even be calls for punishment or major reform of the military. The military will thus likely see democratic transition as a major threat and increase its likelihood of intervening in the new system, particularly where it enjoyed a greater degree of power in the previous regime. Cheibub (2007:140)



reports that democracies are 70% more likely to fail when they follow a military dictatorship than a civilian one, and that all countries that have experienced more than one breakdown of democracy did so at the hands of the military. Yet even when the previous regime was run by civilians, the military may have enjoyed a position of great status, or at least economic support.

Democracies may be able to offer short-term concessions to satisfy the military (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:36), but cannot credibly commit to not reforming the military in the long term. Acemoglu et al.'s (2010) formal theory addresses this problem for newly-democratic governments, finding that such long-term concessions are only likely where national security threats are sufficiently high, thereby justifying the sustenance of the military. However, if it is true that reduced threats to security are prerequisite to democracy (Gibler & Tir 2014), such a situation may not be likely to exist. The consolidation of democracy in the presence of a military legacy requires a credible commitment to the military that it will not be weakened, punished, or decommissioned. Yet a similar commitment must be made to the domestic public that the military is not a threat to stability and such things as political and civil freedoms, human rights, economic liberalism, and government-provided goods. Without both of these outcomes, democracy is unlikely to last long in that country.

### *Internal and External Threats*

Two other factors are important to note. Almost invariably, democratization has its “losers” beyond just the military. Mansfield and Snyder (1995:24) state that:

“[T]he development of efficient democratic institutions is hindered further by the fact that everyone is *not* made better off by effective democratic reforms. Many social groups, including many powerful ones, are likely to be losers from the strengthening of democratic institutions. These include the autocratic rulers themselves, state bureaucrats of the old regime who might fear that their function would lose its importance in a transformed polity, social and economic elites whose privileges might diminish in a more open system, or even

mass special interest groups who would lose from reforms that the average voter might find attractive.”

Such elites may seek to mobilize mass support for their causes through nationalist appeals or anti-government campaigns. In addition to, or in conjunction with this, the state may face the threat of political violence in the form of organized militant groups that seek to supplant the democratic system. Such threats have been evident with groups like Boko Haram and al Shabaab in Nigeria and Somalia. Facing these myriad threats, newly democratic governments must therefore maintain sufficient force to ensure stability and ward off threats from such groups. The government will also want to sufficiently protect the country from external threats to national security, true as it is that weak democracies are the most likely states in the international system to fight wars with other states (Mansfield & Snyder 1995). For example, Gibler & Tir (2014) find that external territorial threats are a major inhibitor to successful democratization. It is therefore likely that in democratizing and weakly democratic states, the government will want to keep the military around, at least in the short term until security threats are sufficiently minimized.

### *Peacekeeping as a Solution*

Considering these various dynamics together, the democratic government must find a way to respond to societal demands for public spending while maintaining support for the military, lest the military become dissatisfied and seek to usurp the government. A short-term credible commitment may be made through the need of the military to mitigate threats to national security stemming from domestic and foreign actors, yet this must be done in a way that does not inhibit public spending or give the military sufficient status that it might abuse its power.

One answer to all these problems may be found in participation in UN peacekeeping operations. First, by sending military personnel to serve in UNPKOs, the military itself receives a commitment from the government to its continued existence, since such activities are of an indefinite nature. It also receives sustenance in the form of payment from the UN, where each soldier receives approximately US\$1,028 per month. For many developing countries, this can comprise a major source of income by which to supplement the military budget, thereby freeing up government funds for public spending. Thus, social pressures can be assuaged by diverting more money from “guns” to “butter”. Moreover, involvement in UNPKOs physically removes the military from society, reducing its capacity to exert its influence domestically, thereby strengthening the democratic government’s autonomy and increasing public confidence that the military is not a threat to stability. Kathman & Melin (2016) find that countries with a recent history of military coups are more likely to contribute personnel to UNPKOs, and do so to a lesser extent as coups fade into the distance. Moreover, since the military is exposed to training and procedures of the UN, and serves alongside other militaries, often from more democratic governments, the military personnel are likely to undergo a process of professionalization that makes them more amenable to democracy and less likely to return to the home country with intentions of participating in a coup.

Such involvement can also assist in mitigating internal and external threats to national security, since an active military can be sustained without having to pay for large parts of it or needing to station it domestically. Large variation in monthly deployment figures shows the fluid nature of contributions, such that military personnel can be brought back home when needed and without significant delay. Furthermore, the peacekeepers receive training that may surpass that of

their own military's standards, strengthening the ability of the military to deal more effectively with threats.

Peacekeeping therefore provides a unique avenue by which a democratic government facing multiple competing pressures that threaten its legitimacy can increase its chances of survival. This highlights the irony of peacekeeping: that states facing domestic instability are the most likely to participate in engendering global peace and stability. It is for these reasons that I argue that those states most likely to participate in peacekeeping – those that stand to gain the most – are not strong democracies, as has previously been thought, but those looking to consolidate their legitimacy and institutions and become stable democracies.

### **Hypothesis**

To test the argument laid out above, I assess the relationship between regime type and involvement in UNPKOs. I challenge extant studies that find that the relationship is linear (Andersson 2002; Lebovic 2004; Perkins & Neumeyer 2008) or non-existent (Victor 2010; Uzonyi 2015; Kathman & Melin 2016). Rather, I argue that increasing levels of democracy in a state will lead to greater contributions of uniformed personnel to UNPKOs, but that as democracies become more consolidated, this effect will level off and turn to decline. I therefore expect to see a curvilinear relationship whereby autocratic states and strongly democratic states will make smaller personnel contributions to peacekeeping than states that are weakly or moderately democratic. I therefore test the following hypothesis:

*H1: As a state's regime score approaches that of democracy, it will make larger contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. However, once considered a democracy, further increases in the regime score will lead to smaller contributions of personnel.*

Graphical representation of this relationship would therefore show an inverse-U, where the peak of the curve sits at or around the standard cut-point for democracy.

## **Research Design**

I test the relationship discussed above on the sample of all available UN member states and covering 66 UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2012. The sample of UN member states is restricted to those for whom regime type data is available. The resultant sample therefore includes 162 countries. Countries do not all span the entire period, since some ended or came into existence during this period (for example Yugoslavia and associated states). My hypothesis implies a contributor-year unit of analysis. However, many factors affecting participation in UNPKOs exist at the dyadic level between the potential contributor and the country in which the mission exists (such as colonial legacy or contiguity), or factors specific to the mission itself (such as the level of violence or its geographic location). In order to apply a more stringent test to my hypothesis by including these alternative explanations, my data use a contributor-mission-year unit of analysis, where standard errors are clustered on the contributor to account for correlated errors within each cluster, and mission fixed effects address mission-specific factors unaccounted for in the models.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> I use mission dummies rather than a true fixed effects method, since the negative binomial fixed effects model is highly criticized. For example, Allison (2012) points out that the commonly used conditional likelihood method proposed by Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984) is not a true fixed effects method since it allows for unit-specific variation in the dispersion parameter instead of in the conditional mean. Dummy variables is the recommended alternative to fixed effects for the negative binomial model.

### *Models and Dependent Variables*

The dependent variable, *contribution*, measures the average monthly personnel (troops, police, and observers) given by a state to a mission in a given year (Kathman 2013).<sup>4</sup> The mean contribution is 18.4 uniformed personnel in an average month. Removing the observations of zero (i.e. when countries *do* participate), the mean contribution is 122.4 personnel. While some studies have considered only a state's binary participation (Perkins & Neumeyer 2008), It is important to measure the size of the contribution in addition just to the decision to contribute, since the two processes are likely different. Some states will make a nominal contribution to UNPKOs for specific reasons, but given the great variation in contribution sizes from country to country, it would be naïve to compare a single-digit contribution of one state to the thousands contributed by another state when seeking to understand commitment to global peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, my theory posits that there are marginal benefits to the state for each additional personnel contribution, which therefore makes the size of the contribution a meaningful outcome.

This variable is equal to zero in 84.9% of observations, suggesting that, in the vast majority of mission-years, countries do not contribute at all. Since zeros comprise most observations, it is necessary to account for a possible separate process that determines whether or not states will contribute *at all* before analyzing *how many* personnel they give. Many countries simply do not participate in UNPKOs for a variety of reasons, often linked to their capacity to do so. Including such observations in a single model would therefore not give a clear picture of what drives personnel contribution sizes. In order to model this joint process, I therefore employ a zero-inflated

---

<sup>4</sup> Unlike other studies that use the total personnel in a year, I use the average monthly since the deployment data are counted monthly. Since troops are not replaced on a monthly basis, adding months up to give an annual figure may be misleading as personnel serving for more than one month will be counted multiple times in the number. This also creates more accuracy in that missions do not always last an entire year, and so contributions to a mission lasting only 3 months of a year will inevitably be much smaller than those for a mission lasting all 12 months.

negative binomial regression (ZINB). This is the most appropriate modeling choice since the dependent variable is a count outcome that appears to follow a negative binomial distribution and that experiences a large number of zeros. This method is preferred to a zero-inflated Poisson model since there is evidence of overdispersion in the data, which is confirmed by a ZIP test. Furthermore, a Vuong test confirms the appropriateness of the ZINB model over a simple negative binomial model, which would treat contributions as a single process and neglect to consider the initial decision to participate at all.

The ZINB model consists of two components. First is a logit equation that tests the probability that states will never participate in UNPKOs. This equation treats participation as a binary outcome. Predictors in this equation therefore have coefficient signs in the opposite direction of convention: a positive coefficient means an increase in that variable leads to a greater probability of never participating. For this equation, I model a set of predictors that are likely to affect a state's decision to even contribute to a UNPKO in the first place. The second component of the ZINB is a negative binomial equation, which uses as the dependent variable the count outcome measuring the number of personnel contributed by a state. Predictors in this equation therefore address those factors likely to influence how much support a state will give to a mission.

### *Independent Variables*

My key explanatory variable is the regime type of the UN member state. As with previous studies addressing this phenomenon, I use the measure of regime type found in Marshall & Jaggers' (2010) Polity IV Project, which is a scale from -10 to 10, and reflects a composite score of factors measuring levels of democracy and autocracy. This variable is named *democracy*, where higher values indicate stronger democracy. Since I will be using a squared term for this variable also, I

rescale the measure to range from 0 to 20 to give all positive integers. There has been a vigorous debate over whether to use a scaled as opposed to a binary measure for democracy with many favoring the latter (Linz 1975; Sartori 1987; Huntington 1991; Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski & Limongi 1997). However, I have chosen to use the scale based on my assumption that weak democracies face different incentives for participating in peacekeeping than strong democracies. This is supported by a large body of work that believes there are meaningful sub-categories of democracies (Bollen & Jackman 1989; Dahl 1971, 1989; Collier & Adcock 1999; Elkins 2000). For robustness, I also use a composite measure of regime type that combines the commonly used Freedom House index of democracy with the Polity scale. Each constituent part is rescaled from 0 to 10, and the average taken to give a final scale ranging from 0 to 10. This measure imputes values where Polity data is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. This variable has been shown to perform better than the individual Freedom House and Polity measures, both in validity and reliability (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005). As mentioned above, I also include squared terms for these two measures in order to model the non-linear relationship between regime type and UNPKO contributions.

I include a number of additional variables in each of the component parts of the two-step model. In the logit equation, I include variables reflecting the willingness and capability of states to participate in UNPKOs at all. *Mission host* is a binary measure of whether or not the state currently has its own UNPKO, which would be highly likely to preclude it from contributing troops to missions in other countries. I include a binary measure *military*, indicating whether or not a state has standing armed forces. This measure is composed from Singer, Bremer & Stuckey's (1972) measure of total standing armed forces personnel in a country in a given year. Naturally, a state without a military would not have the capacity to contribute uniformed soldiers to a mission,



although may still contribute in other ways, such as sending police. *Contributors* is the total number of countries contributing personnel to a mission in a given year. A high number of contributors may inhibit involvement as a state might perceive its presence is less needed, that reputational rewards are more diffuse, or that it can simply free ride on the efforts of others. Alternately, fewer contributors might simultaneously inhibit participation, since states may feel there is less “safety in numbers.” *Relative power* is a measure of the state’s proportion of total capabilities in the global system. For this variable, I use the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), which takes a state’s capabilities in six areas covering military, economic, and demographic categories, as a proportion of the world total. The resulting measure is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. I then take the log of this score, since the distribution is highly skewed due to a small number of states accounting for a large degree of power. I include this variable because it is possible that states with greater relative power will refrain from participating in peacekeeping since they prefer to pursue more unilateral means of diplomacy and intervention. Alternately, more powerful states may see it as a duty to lead the way in promoting peace in conflict areas, particularly if it bears significant repercussions for that state’s economic or security interests. Finally, I include dummy variables for the region to account for any other region-specific factors not accounted for in the models.

The count equation contains predictors that might affect the size of the contribution made by states. Such a decision is likely to be influenced by military capacity: states with more available personnel or that spend more on military training may be better able to send personnel to a mission. On the other hand, states that have low military expenditure may be more likely to contribute in larger numbers so as to reap the benefits of UN remuneration for services (Gaibullov et al. 2015). However, if such UN payments are incorporated into a state’s military expenditure, this

endogeneity may cloud any such inference. The above measures are reflected in the variables *military size* and *military expenditure* and data come from the CINC/Correlates of War Project (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972). To account for skewness in these variables, I use the natural log of both. Since these variables share a high correlation (0.78), I include them in models separate from one another. I include the natural log of a country's per capita gross domestic product, *GDPpc*. Since evidence suggests that poorer countries are those that support UNPKOs more than others, it is necessary to ensure that contribution behavior can be attributed directly to democracy, rather than the country's wealth, since the two variables are highly correlated.

*UN missions* is a count of the total number of UNPKOs taking place around the world in a given year. A greater global demand for peacekeepers may place downward pressure on the number of personnel a country can give to any one mission. As with the logit equation, *contributors* counts the number of states contributing to that mission-year (Kathman 2013). With more states involved, there will likely be a ceiling on the contribution a state can make. Moreover, evidence suggests that with more contributors present, states are more prone to free-riding behavior such that they make suboptimal contributions even if they have decided to participate (Passmore, Shannon & Hart, Forthcoming).

I include a binary measure, *contiguity*, which indicates if the potential contributor shares a border with the conflict country. This comes from the Correlates of War's Direct Contiguity data (Stinnett et al. 2002). Contiguous states should have a higher interest in procuring peace in a neighboring country in order to prevent spillover effects such as violence and refugees (Uzonyi 2015). Similarly, *colony* indicates if the conflict country is a former colonial territory of the contributor (Hensel 2014). States with such historic ties to a country in conflict may feel a sense of responsibility to intervene. *Contiguity* and *colony* are included in the count equation, but not the

logit equation. This is because it is unlikely there are separate processes affecting such states decision to participate in a mission and then the contribution they decide to make. More likely, the serious implications of a contiguous state or a former colony being involved in a conflict would likely lead a state to make a substantial contribution of personnel, thus tying the two decisions together.

I include the variable *South Asia* to denote whether or not a contributor is one of three countries: India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. Since these three countries have dominated personnel contributions in recent years, both in numbers and frequency of contribution, they may bias the estimates. Finally, I include the dependent variable lagged by one year to account for autocorrelation, since it is highly probable that a state's contribution in year  $t$  is correlated with its contribution in year  $t-1$ . I also include *participate*, a binary measure of whether or not a country contributes any personnel at all, lagged by one year in the inflation equation, similarly to account for autocorrelation within the logit portion of the test. All time-variant independent variables are also lagged by one year.

It is important to note that I do not include *democracy* in the inflation equation. It might be argued that a country's regime type may play a role in its decision to be involved in peacekeeping in any capacity, before considering its contribution size. However, my theory argues that the motivations behind contributions as they relate to democracy (reducing the threat of the military and subsidizing the military budget) are directly tied to the size of the contribution that state will make: larger contributions provide greater returns on these intended outcomes. I therefore argue that such states do not contribute to UNPKOs with any motivation other than to send a sizable portion of their militaries into the field (as opposed to sending only a nominal contribution for

Table 2. Effect of regime type on UN peacekeeping personnel contributions using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression

	Model 1: Polity		Model 2: Polity		Model 3: FH/Polity	
	Stage 1: Never Participate	Stage 2: Contribution	Stage 1: Never Participate	Stage 2: Contribution	Stage 1: Never Participate	Stage 2: Contribution
Contribution <sup>-1</sup>		.005* (.001)		.005* (.001)		.005* (.001)
Democracy <sup>-1</sup>		.176* (.085)		.154* (.075)		.311* (.124)
Democracy <sup>2</sup> <sup>-1</sup>		-.006 (.004)		-.006 (.003)		-.024* (.011)
In GDPpc <sup>-1</sup>		-.087 (.073)		-.156 (.083)		-.123 (.084)
In mil. size <sup>-1</sup>		.130* (.030)				
In mil. expenditure <sup>-1</sup>				.101* (.025)		.102* (.021)
Contributors <sup>-1</sup>		-.018* (.005)		-.019* (.005)		-.019* (.005)
UN missions <sup>-1</sup>		-.006 (.010)		-.007 (.010)		-.008 (.009)
Contiguous		.172 (.279)		.193 (.268)		.233 (.271)
Colony		.621* (.202)		.611* (.211)		.611* (.216)
South Asia		.339* (.141)		.411* (.138)		.399* (.134)
Participate <sup>-1</sup>						
Military <sup>-1</sup>		-26.408* (.859)		-25.613* (.927)		-25.563* (1.173)
Mission host <sup>-1</sup>		-3.666* (1.025)		-3.403* (1.027)		-1.105 (.823)
In relative power <sup>-1</sup>		30.084* (.302)		29.846* (.301)		29.688* (.287)
Contributors <sup>-1</sup>		-.364* (.055)		-.367* (.055)		-.353* (.054)
Africa		-.043* (.003)		-.044* (.003)		-.045* (.003)
Americas		.375* (.147)		.378* (.148)		.371* (.148)
Europe		.332 (.194)		.329 (.194)		.311 (.194)
M. East/N. Africa		.053 (.154)		.060 (.155)		.049 (.154)
Constant		.386* (.142)		.377* (.143)		.384* (.143)
		4.063* (1.097)		3.776* (1.104)		1.544 (.910)
N		49,444		47,637		47,232
alpha		2.167*		2.159*		2.148***
Wald $\chi^2$		7281.44*		8151.56*		8510.41*
Log pseudolikelihood		-52968.37		-52412.06		-52397.56

Robust standard errors clustered by contributor appear in parentheses. Mission dummy variables are not shown.

For regions, Asia is the comparison. \*p ≤ 0.05

reputational purposes, for example), and thus the decision to participate is not separate from the decision on what contribution to make.<sup>5</sup>

## **Results and discussion**

The results from a selection of models are shown in Table 2. Each model is displayed as two separate stages: the logit/inflation equation and the count equation. Models 1 and 2 use the standard Polity measure as the dependent variable. I show two models with this outcome, one using *military size* as a predictor and one using *military expenditure*, which are kept separate due to high collinearity. Model 3 is the same as Model 2 but with the Freedom House/Polity measure of *democracy* replacing the standard Polity measure as the dependent variable. Various other models were run omitting different variables and the results for the key predictors remained robust in each of them. The models shown are those that include the mission dummy variables in lieu of fixed effects, although these variables are not shown in the results table.

It is first worth noting that the regression choice of a zero-inflated negative binomial was confirmed by two tests. First, a ZIP test examines the choice of a ZINB over a zero-inflated Poisson model. Looking at the baseline model (which includes all variables but cannot include clustered standard errors), the alpha value of 3.165 is found to be statistically significantly different from zero, indicating the presence of overdispersion in the data and thus the need for a ZINB modelling technique. Second, a Vuong test gives a z-score of 33.46, which is highly statistically significant.

---

<sup>5</sup> After completion of the analysis in this study, I realized the model as presented omits the potentially important predictor of violence/severity of the conflict. States may be less likely to contribute to a UNPKO if they perceive it is an unsafe environment for their personnel. Using a measure of civilian deaths (UCPD's one-sided violence measure), I include this in all the models in the inflation equation, and find that it is highly insignificant and does not affect the inferences for the rest of the model. However, this will be included in future iterations of this paper.


This indicates that the ZINB regression is preferable to simply using a negative binomial test without a preceding inflation portion.

Looking at the results, I first address the inflation stage, showing factors that lead states to never participate in UNPKOs. All predictors behave fairly similarly across the three models. It is immediately apparent that the decision to never participate is heavily informed by two factors: whether or not that state participated in the previous year, and whether or not the state is hosting its own UNPKO. The result for the lagged variable *participate* in Model 3 indicates that a state that did not participate at all in a given UNPKO the year before is highly unlikely to participate in that mission in the current year. The predicted probability of not contributing due to not contributing the year before is 83.8%. Looking at *mission host* in Model 3, the large coefficient indicates that a state that has a UNPKO occurring in its own country is much more likely not to participate in a given mission-year than states without their own UNPKOs. The predicted probability that not participating is due to hosting a mission is 78.9%. Looking at other variables of note, states with more relative power are more likely to participate in a given mission-year, perhaps suggesting that capacity plays a role, or rather that powerful states see it as their responsibility to be involved in peace operations in some way. The presence of a greater number of contributors also encourages more participation from states, indicating that states are more willing to be involved in such ventures when a greater number of others are doing the same. *Military* is significant in Models 1 and 2, indicating that countries with no standing armed forces are more likely to not participate in UNPKOs in any way, including sending non-military personnel such as police.

Turning to the count model, it should first be noted that the results show support for my argument that democracy plays a non-linear role in the size of personnel contribution states make

to UNPKOs. The positive coefficient on *democracy* is statistically significant across all models. Moreover, the negative coefficient sign for *democracy*<sup>2</sup> indicates that the relationship between democracy and contributions follows the expected inverse-U pattern. Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of the curvilinear relationship for Model 3. Two things are of particular interests here: identifying the democracy scores around the peak of the curve, and looking at the difference in contributions between different democracy scores. The marginal effects indicate that the curve peaks at a score of approximately 6.5 (Freedom House/Polity scale). In the period covered, 47 states at one time had a score ranging from 6.25 to 6.75. Of these 47, 16 gave more than 100 personnel in a given month at some point during the time period covered. Of these, notable contributors include Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ghana, Kenya, and Nepal. To understand the composite score in more familiar terms, we can compare all instances where states receive a score of around 6.5 on this scale to the more traditional Polity scale. 42% of observations in this range had a corresponding Polity score of 15 (or 5 on the original form of the scale). 26% had a score of 16 (or 6, the typical cut off for a democracy), and 17% scored 17 (or 7). Therefore, 85% of states in the range of interest had a Polity score ranging from 5 to 7 on the original scale. This is particularly interesting since it appears that states making the largest contributions to UNPKOs are clustered around the point of transition from an anocracy to a democracy (or vice versa). This lends strong support to the argument underlying my test: not only do weaker democracies contribute more to UNPKOs, but in particular, it is states straddling the line between democracy and non-democracy that are the biggest contributors.

Figure 3. Predicted values of personnel contributions versus democracy score (95% confidence interval is indicated by the shaded area)



The second point of interest is looking at the relative change in average contribution when moving along the democracy scale. The average monthly contribution for a perfect autocracy when holding all other factors at their mean is 3.4. Increasing the democracy score corresponds with an increase in contributions until the peak, where a borderline democracy (score of 6.5 on the composite scale) contributes an average of 11.1 personnel. As the democracy score increases from here, contributions decline, such that a perfect democracy sends an average of 7.7 personnel per month. While this may not appear to be a huge difference, it should be remembered that the average monthly contribution in any given month is 18.4, which factors in the huge number of zero contributions made every month. Moreover, since missions typically last for multiple years, this difference in contribution size will add up over time. Comparing borderline democracies to perfect



democracies, giving an average extra 3.4 personnel per month, for a mission such as UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, which lasted 6 years, the borderline democracy would give approximately 245 more personnel over the life of the mission. Not only is this substantial in raw numbers, but is impressive given that such states often have much lower capacity to send peacekeepers than wealthy democracies.

Looking at the control variables, the size of a country's contribution increases with its military capacity. Countries with more standing armed forces and that spend more on the military tend to contribute more personnel. This offers some early support for my proposed mechanism, since a government has more to fear from a larger army, and thus may seek to send it to UNPKOs in larger numbers. However, it is also intuitive that countries with larger militaries can simply spare more personnel for such ventures. The fact that countries that spend more on the military contribute more is also somewhat intuitive, and may also support my proposed mechanism. If it is a nascent democracy that is under pressure to reduce military spending, particularly where that spending is high, it may opt to use peacekeeping as a means by which to substitute that budget in future years. Further research is required, however, to identify if peacekeeping remuneration is incorporated into data measuring states' military expenditure.

In all models, a greater number of other contributors leads to lower average personnel contributions, supporting my expectation. It is certainly true that more countries involved means the relative size of the contribution needed from each is reduced. However, this also supports the finding of Passmore, Shannon & Hart (Forthcoming) that when there are more contributors, those countries are prone to making suboptimal contributions, as reflected in collective action theory (Olson 1965), and so when more contributors are present, overall mission shortfalls actually

increase. Finally, states that are the former colonial power of the conflict country make more sizable contributions than others.

The results show no significant effect of GDP per capita, an interesting finding that challenges the argument that poorer countries contribute more personnel to reap the benefits of salaries paid for each soldier. Future work would look at an interaction of regime type and income to see if weak democracies are more likely to give large contributions when they have greater economic needs to do so. Similarly, there is no significant effect stemming from the number of other missions taking place around the world, or from a state sharing a border with the conflict country.

## **Conclusion**

The finding that the most significant contributors to UN peacekeeping missions are those states that are borderline democracies challenges much of what was previously thought about the relationship between regime type and UNPKO participation. This raises some important questions. First, why is it that states experiencing (or most likely to experience) a transition towards or away from democracy contribute the most to UNPKOs? Follow on projects to this one will examine in greater detail the mechanisms offered: that states seeking to shore up democratic institutions see contributing military personnel to UNPKOs as a means by which to reduce the domestic threat of the military in the short and long term, appease societal demands for public spending, and simultaneously sustain the capacity to address internal and external threats to national security. A second question arising from these findings is this: why have strong democracies played an inferior role in supporting UNPKOs than weaker democracies in recent decades, and how does this challenge our understanding of the importance of democracy for international peace and security?

Merely providing the funding and equipment for missions is not a substitute for having democratic militaries on the ground working to implement peace agreements, separate combatants, oversee election, and train local police and soldiers. Perhaps, then, the findings above highlight the fact that while peacekeeping mission compositions may offer benefits for the sending state in terms of domestic political stabilization, it may simultaneously be hampering the effectiveness of those missions in stabilizing the countries where they are taking place.

## References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2010. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2 (1): 1-42.
- Alvarez, Michael, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski. 1996. "Classifying Political Regimes." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31:3-6.
- Andersson, Andreas. 2002. "United Nations Intervention by United Democracies? State Commitment to UN Interventions 1991-99." *Cooperation and Conflict* 37(4): 363-386.
- Babst, Dean. 1972. "A Force for Peace." *Industrial Research* 14:55-58.
- Belkin, Aaron, and Evan Schofer. 2003. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(5): 594: 620.
- Binder, Martin. 2015. "Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN's Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?" *Journal of Peace Research* 52(6): 712-726.

- Blum, Andrew. 2000. "Blue Helmets from the South: Accounting for the Participation of Weaker States in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 20(1): 1-22.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. and Robert W. Jackman. 1989. *American Sociological Review* 54(Aug):612-621.
- Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia. 2011. "Supplying Peace: Participation In and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(6): 699–714.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 791-808.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2004. "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War." *World Politics* 56(3): 363-388.
- Carment, David, and Patrick James. 2000. "Explaining Third-Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence." *Nations and Nationalism* 6(2): 173-202.
- Chan, Steve. 1984. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4): 617–48.
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coleman, Katharina P. 2014. "The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation." New York: International Peace Institute.
- Collier, David, and Robert Adcock. 1999. "Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts." *American Review of Political Science* 2:537-565.

- Cunliffe, Philip. 2013. *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Diehl, Paul. 1993. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diehl, Paul F., Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel. 1996. "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict." *International Organization* 50(4): 683–700.
- Dorn, Walter. 1998. "Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way." *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 27(2): 1-3.
- Doyle, Michael. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part I." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12(3): 205-235.
- Doyle, Michael. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80(4): 1151-1169.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 779–801.
- Durch, William J. 1993. "Paying the Tab: Financial Crisis." In *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. William J. Durch, ed. New York: St Martin's.
- Elkins, Zachary. 2000. "Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 293-300.
- Evans, Gareth. 1994. "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict." *Foreign Policy* 96: 3–20.

- Finer, Samuel E. 1976. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Fearon, James D. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-92.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269-292.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gaibullov, Khusrav; Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu. 2009. Demand for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary Versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6): 827-852.
- Gaibullov, Khusrav, Justin George, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu. 2015. "Personnel Contributions to UN and non-UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Public Goods Approach." *Journal of Peace Research*. 1-16.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Jaroslav Tir. 2014. "Territorial Peace and Democratic Clustering." *The Journal of Politics* 76(1): 27-40.
- Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference". *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 89-122.
- Gilligan, Michael, and Stephen J. Stedman. 2003. "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5 (4): 37-54.

- Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2005. "Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy." *Concepts and Methods Working Papers* 6, IPSA, August 2005.
- Heldt, Birger. 2008. "Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities." In D. Daniel, P. Taft, and S. Wiharta (eds), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Henke, Marina E. 2016. "Great Powers and UN Force Generation: A Case Study of UNAMID." *International Peacekeeping* DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1154460
- Hensel, Paul R. 2014. "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0." Available at <<http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html>>.
- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil Wars." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (4): 875–91.
- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108 (4): 737-753.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jett, Dennis C. 2001. *Why Peacekeeping Fails*. New York: Palgrave.
- Jones, Bruce D. 2001. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Kathman, Jacob, and Molly Melin. 2016. "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations." *International Studies Quarterly* 0:1-13.

- Kathman, Jacob D (2013) United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990–2011. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 532–49.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2007. “When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference.” *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 183–210.
- Layne, Christopher. 1994. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” *International Security* 19: 5-49.
- Lebovic, James H. 2004. “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 910-936.
- Lebovic, James. 2010. “Passing the Burden: Contributions to UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era.” Paper presented at the 2010 International Studies Association Annual Meeting in New Orleans, LA.
- Linz, Juan. 1975. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.” In *Handbook of Political Science*, F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley: 175-353.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” *International Security* 20(1): 5-38.
- Maoz, Zeev. 1998. “Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-assessment.” *International Interactions* 24:3-89.
- Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jagers. 2010. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006.” (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>).
- Marten, Kimberly. 2004. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1990. “Back to the Future.” *International Security* 15(1): 5-56.



- Needler, Martin C. 1987. *The Problem of Democracy in Latin America*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. "Opening Authoritarian Regimes." In Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 15-36.
- Passmore, Timothy J.A., Megan L. Shannon, and Andrew F. Hart. "Rallying the Troops: Collective Action and Self-Interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions." Forthcoming at *Journal of Peace Research*.
- Passmore, Timothy J.A., Andrew F. Hart, and Megan L. Shannon. "Buying Peace: Security Council Interests and Personnel Support for Peacekeeping Missions." Paper presented at the 2015 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco, CA.
- Perkins, Richard, and Eric Neumayer. 2008. "Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping." *Political Geography* 27 (8): 895–914.
- Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49(2): 155-83.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press.

- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi. 1996. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 39-55.
- Rasler, Karen, and Willam R. Thompson. 2004. "The Democratic Peace and a Sequential, Reciprocal, Causal Arrow Hypothesis." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 879-908.
- Ray, James Lee. 1995. *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 586-602.
- Russett, Bruce. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace*. New York: Norton.
- Russett, Bruce, and Harvey Starr. 2000. "From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International System." In M. Midlarsky (ed), *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 93-128.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." *American Political Science Review* 2(4): 829-844.
- Shimizu, Hirofumi & Todd Sandler (2002) Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing: 1994-2000. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(6): 651-668.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 19-48.

Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002.

"The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58-66.

Stojek, Szymon and Jaroslav Tir. 2015. "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and Locations of UN Led Deployments." *Forthcoming in the European Journal of International Relations*.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>.

Uzonyi, Gary. 2015. "Refugee Flows and State Contributions to Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Missions." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(6): 743-57.

Victor, Jonah. 2010. "African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State Legitimacy." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 217-229.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>.