***“It’s not yours if you can’t get there”:* Modern Roads, Mobile Subjects**

In 1945, Ibrahim Yasa of Ankara University penned a monograph examining the effects of railroads on the tempo-spatial perceptions of the inhabitants of Hasanoğlan village. Prior to the extension of the railway system, explained Yasa, it took the villagers eight to twelve hours to commute to Ankara by donkey and up to fourteen hours by ox-cart in wintertime: “Today he can reach Ankara by horse-cart in three to four hours, and by train in one hour. Trucks and cars cover the same distance in three-quarters of an hour.”[[1]](#footnote-1) The railway, accompanied with the proliferation of other means of communication, such as “letters, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, newspapers and magazines” facilitated immediate contact with the outside world, and led the villagers to “reevaluate their idea of time and space.”[[2]](#footnote-2) Fifteen years later, sociologist Cavit Orhan Tütengil conducted a similar study, identifying the changing perceptions of time, measurement, and space among the population of Adapazarı, which, in his view, was transitioning from a “closed society” to an open one. In Tütengil’s text, the impetus for change was the building of highways, which enabled an unprecedented ease of travel, and brought about a “new conception of time and space. In villages and towns which are close to highways, and in places where means of transportation are punctual, ‘alaturka’ time is being forgotten. The speed with which papers spread the news is an accessory to the way in which the radio is making Turkey and the world smaller.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

The fifteen years that lapsed between the two studies saw the provision of American funding, machinery, and expertise for a highway network in Turkey. Highways initiated a sweeping reconfiguration of the countryside, facilitating a vast urban migration that resulted in a seventy-five percent increase in the population of the four largest cities of Turkey, and in the process, introduced “a mentality of geographical and social mobility which cannot easily be captured in statistics.”[[4]](#footnote-4) This unprecedented sense of mobility captured the imagination of social scientists, who treated highways as their object of inquiry and the conduit for their theories of modernization alike. Modernization was a potent historical imaginary in this usage—a way of evaluating the world in novel political terms, as well as epistemic ones.

A product of the Cold War social scientific laboratory, modernization theory required, inspired, and propelled traveling mindsets, bodies, and artifacts. It invoked mobile subjects, in physical, as well as imaginary, terms: if its recipients could not literally undertake travel, they should be able to psychically accommodate the vision of self-chosen, voluntary movement. The modern self was expected to travel, imagine, and imagine travel. Ease of travel would not only occasion the emergence of new conceptions of time and sense of measurement (of self, distance, and objects), but would also aid the cultivation of skills like empathy and hospitality. As the theories and methods of the social scientists traveled, their locus of application, in particular, the masses of peasants residing in rural Turkey, were expected to envision themselves as subjects of mobility and receptivity. Thus designated as the recipients of an epistemological preoccupation with movement, these subjects relied on a set of material conditions that would facilitate their re-making-in-motion. The implementation of a vast highway network was a concrete measure taken to ensure the conceptualization of traveling selves and to promulgate the means, standards, and objectives of modern mobility and mobile modernity alike.

Highways were also believed to grant access to otherwise remote corners of the nation, provide mobility to its members, and in doing so, shrink the distances between them, thereby allowing them to participate in a shared national space and economy alike. The primary subject of circulation was the figure of the peasant as an object of intervention—one whose mobility marked him as the model subject for a new political economy. The spatio-temporal and cognitive predicates of the roads project, as Yasa and Tütengil observed, were also a corollary to piecemeal celebrations hailing the birth of the “new peasant,” now fully integrated into the national economy. Recently politicized as the participatory units of an expanded field of multiparty politics, rural populations were also expected to produce for an increasingly unified market, at the same time as they became the consumers of commodities previously unavailable in villages and smaller towns. Unlike railroads that privileged timetables for centralized production and regimented subjectivities, highways were believed to accommodate flexible schedules for volitional travel through a national space increasingly organized around the figure of the individual consumer.

In the discussions of the experts and the policymakers, as well as the writings of the social scientists, highways were imbued with the ability to remake the peasantry precisely because they occasioned the possibility for modes of liberal governance. Roads were capable of remaking the territory, demarcating *and* merging its discrete regions, at the same time as they induced attitudinal change for their beneficiaries. The technical andpolitical work performed by infrastructure can be located within broader and spatialized technologies of security in this scheme. As governmental practice, roads forced otherwise disparate units of governance into its space of circulation, whereby pervasiveness of travel would make it easier to manage the territory of the nation, as well as arrange the circulation and disposal of populations and things therein.[[5]](#footnote-5) As an exercise in liberal governmentality, the “political economy” and the “representational logic” of roads facilitate, at the same time as they intervene in the movement of people and goods alike, thereby conditioning the possibility of the emergence of new subjects, amenable to regulation, leisure, and measurement alike.[[6]](#footnote-6) While the new rural figure was deemed to be no longer sequestered in isolated units dispersed across the country, however, depictions of the highway initiative were nonetheless propelled by attendant discourses about regional backwardness and civilization.

Roads, after all, could also be mobilized in the exercise of classification, control, and policing on account of their presumed civilizing import—not unlike the work they performed in colonial settings.[[7]](#footnote-7) The delivery of civilization and democratic ideals was deemed to be particularly urgent for the remaining outposts of the country, particularly those villages in eastern provinces that denied access and defied homogenization in physical, political, and linguistic terms. Insofar as the imperative for the erasure of difference required remaking the nation’s tempo-spatial coordinates, the highway project was to pick up where Kemalist nation-building had left off with its railway-led offense into the dark corners of the country. Discourses of enlightenment thus designated the least accessible members of the nation as the primary beneficiaries of roads. The task of folding the nation into one proceeded along tangible and material registers, as well as discursive and ideological ones, insofar as the attendant project of highway-led modernization was predicated on the physical re-making of the landscape.

The aim of this article is to detail the modernizing, civilizing, and democratizing tasks assigned to highways, while not losing sight of their unexpected consequences and unforeseen usages. As with other material mediators that were crucial in the assemblage of modernization theory, such as surveys and machinery, roads, maps, and buses were capable of exceeding the intentions of their makers and overflowing their expectations.[[8]](#footnote-8) Themselves in motion and prone to movement, these artifacts are the subjects and “actants” of this paper, in addition to the social scientists and officials who ascribed functions of modernization to them.[[9]](#footnote-9)

*The Path to Democracy: Rural Roads Program*

During the second annual United Nations Highway Training Center which convened in Ankara in 1955, Charles Weitz, resident representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board, delivered a speech to an international group of engineers. Weitz suggested that the ease of movement of people, material goods, and ideas was one of the reasons why highways, as well as the engineers who designed and built them, could be seen as the purveyors of development: “Men and machinery must move to the sources of raw materials, goods must move freely from city to city and to all the villages as well and the produce of the farms must reach the market. Men must be able to associate freely for trade and commerce and for social and cultural ends.”[[10]](#footnote-10) Two years later, Weitz elaborated on the benefits of mobility enabled by the extension of highways:

Your roads are changing the face of your own country not because you are cutting down mountains and filling in valleys but because you are opening paths of communications between your own peoples. Health, education, economic activity—progress—are theoretical concepts so long as people are land-locked and unable to come together and move freely. You are offering to the remote villages and towns of your own countries a host and range of social activities which were feared and impossible before people could move easily to and from the villages.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Weitz’s speeches exemplify the ways in which connotations of “modernity” and the construction of roads were coupled in the reports, accounts, and publications of Turkish and American experts and officials alike. The provision of roads, in particular to the countryside, was construed as a civilizational necessity, one that would deliver increase in education and access to an “open society.”[[12]](#footnote-12) Highways were framed as the “blood vessels” of the nation and the “coil spring” of economic movement, facilitating the creation of national markets and the uplift of culture alike.[[13]](#footnote-13) Roads were the conduit for national unity, as well as commercial, economic, and agricultural development, an overall increase in life standards and tourism flows.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Highway engineers themselves postulated a conception of roads as the solution to all problems ailing developing countries: “every nation wants to attain prosperity. It is now understood everywhere and by everyone that the fastest and surest way of delivering prosperity and accomplishment to nations is via roads.”[[15]](#footnote-15) Conjured as indices of progress and modernity, roads “broke down barriers of time and distance,” and “hastened man’s progress by promoting the exchange of ideas and making the movement of goods easier and cheaper.”[[16]](#footnote-16)

If the road industry was “one of the prizes of our present day civilization,” they could also be invoked in forging a democratic people.[[17]](#footnote-17) This was particularly evident in the dissemination of the highway network in the context of the transition to a multi-party regime, whereby the nation’s “democratic will” became the foremost “guarantee that the road cause will be completed.”[[18]](#footnote-18) Thus, an engineer explained, it made sense for the highway project to come at the expense of railroads, which had been emblematic of the landscape under the Kemalist nation-building process (exemplified in the popularized phrase, “Demir ağlarla ördük bu vatanı”/“We wove this country with webs of iron”), but had failed to complete the task of democratization.[[19]](#footnote-19) It was roads that ensured the travels of “civilization,” which was, after all, suffused with “ideas of democracy”: “Countries without roads, where cities, towns, villages are not connected, and where the people do not engage in close relations with one another, can never become forward nations, and democracy will not develop in such places either.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

A tangible component of the democratizing thrust attributed to roads was the emergence of the peasantry as a decisive political contingent during this period. While the US-aided highway project was initiated when the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) was still in power, its expansion continued under the reign of the Democratic Party (DP, 1950-1960) when “party politics [were] frequently tailored to woo the agrarian sector.”[[21]](#footnote-21) In that regard, the politicization of the peasantry not only coincided with but was also the crucial impetus behind DP’s rise to political power. Self-avowedly attuned to the “ideological and economic aspirations in the countryside,” and in particular, the rich and middle strata of the peasantry, DP could readily fault their predecessor for having failed to fulfill the promise of the Kemalist maxim, “the peasant is the master of the country.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

The alleged relationship between roads and the march of democracy mapped onto the seeming contrast between the DP populism which relied (and thrived) on rural votes and the CHP legacy of paternalistic nation-building. DP’s populism, in turn, was faulted with a tendency to “exploit village romanticism” which exacerbated “the division borne by the expressions, villager and urban.”[[23]](#footnote-23) A more sinister expression of this romanticism, according to Aydın Yalçın of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University, was its failure to provide rational solutions to the “village cause”: “Instead of providing coolheaded explanations, objective analyses or realistic measures, they settle for fanciful commentary, imputations, and utopian advice…Our task is to leave aside fantasy and utopia; to abandon the vulgar and cursory solutions offered to this problem; to start benefiting from the lessons of science and experience.”[[24]](#footnote-24) Scientific thought demanded that barriers between the village and the city be removed, by means of “a government policy that is supported and driven by an enlightened public opinion,” and in particular, by speeding up urbanization through an improved transportation system.[[25]](#footnote-25) The extension of an all-weather road network was imperative for “[shortening] the distance between the townsman and the villager;” a process intimately linked to democratization, which ensured that the latter would be “respected, taken into account, and have his ideas inquired after.”[[26]](#footnote-26) Frequent contact with the “outside world” would reduce the discrepancy between urban and rural populations, expediting the urbanization of the villager.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The persistent divergence between the rural and the urban, hallmark of theories of modernization, was a customary item in Parliamentary debates about administrative issues pertaining to road building. The Law for the Department of Highways and Bridges, which delegated the building and maintenance of rural roads to their recipients, for instance, came under attack for leaving the great masses “to their own devices.”[[28]](#footnote-28) This abandonment, according to Kemal Özçoban, would necessarily result in a mass exodus from villages that lacked “hygiene and cultural opportunities”: “I have traveled a lot and have never seen prosperous villagers. Their life standards are much lower than those of civilized people; they are sick and in pain. They are far from levels of civilization.”[[29]](#footnote-29) According to Kemal Zeytinoğlu, the Minister of Public Works, the villagers were actually willing participants in a division of labor that accorded them the task of building their own roads so they may attain levels of prosperity comparable to their urban counterparts: “On the contrary, they [the villagers] tell me that the province offices are late in delivering technical and material aid and they entreat me to mediate on their behalf so that assistance can be delivered. The truth of the matter is that we are unable to provide the necessary personnel, equipment and machinery to meet our villagers’ desire to build the village roads.”[[30]](#footnote-30) Regardless of these pledges, the “village roads program” that both parties seemingly committed to during their terms in power remained incomplete: by 1960, only 11,000 kilometers out of the goal of 150,000 kilometer-long rural roads had been built.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Despite continuing derailments in their delivery, roads were nonetheless believed to posit a corrective to the dearth of “civilization” characterizing rural settings. It was highways, so enthusiastically coveted by villagers according to the Minister of Public Works, which were capable of transmitting “culture, democracy, and technology” to villages: Ignorance would leave the countryside traversing the same paths that carried teachers, medicine, and books.[[32]](#footnote-32) The extension of the “road network” was not only inseparable from “social and economic development,” after all, but also had to be “coupled with efforts for national education.”[[33]](#footnote-33) Villagers, otherwise, were doomed to remain “outside of time”: “Thanks to the development of transportation means, all nations benefit from new discoveries immediately but in our villages, the years go by without a trace.”[[34]](#footnote-34) Since problems of backwardness, ignorance, and disease were linked in the minds of policymakers, the civilizing thrust of roads also pertained to their capacity to purvey immediate benefits, such as “modern instruments and machines, which are the boons of the civilized world.”[[35]](#footnote-35) Access to “better schools, better medical and hospital care,” as well as “better seeds and improved farm implements” via roads was bound to render the villagers grateful: “to him good roads constitute a new horizon; and his hopes for a better future, at least for his children, have been aroused.”[[36]](#footnote-36) Generational overturn would ensure continuity between a recently democratizing landscape and promises of mechanization, hygiene, and education, projected onto times to come.

The modernizing thrust of roads was thus crucial for providing outreach to rural populations, particularly those secluded in the less developed outposts of the country. In addition to breaching the gap between urban and rural settings, highways were to “bring the isolated rural villages and provincial towns into direct contact with the national or ‘great’ society.”[[37]](#footnote-37) This entailed attunement to and an identification of the parts of the country that otherwise appeared to be “social oases,” waiting to be integrated with the rest of the nation.[[38]](#footnote-38) It was the “breakthrough” in transportation that would generate the “final change from one thousand Turkeys to one,” liberating these “severed cells” from the remote lives they were otherwise doomed to lead.[[39]](#footnote-39) Capable of providing “access to areas that had been isolated both economically and culturally,” roads would also facilitate their possession, categorization, and regulation.[[40]](#footnote-40)

*Of Maps and Regions*

A publication commemorating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Directorate of Highways (KGM) includes an anecdote by Tahsin Önalp, a mechanical engineer who accompanied Ralph Agnew of the American Bureau of Public Roads on a trip across Van and Hakkari in Eastern Turkey during the early phases of the highway initiative. During a stop at a coffeehouse, Önalp recounts, Agnew overheard a conversation and inquired as to its contents:

I did not know how to respond, and blushing I said: ‘Mr. Agnew, I could only understand what you understood.’ Our citizens in that neighborhood spoke every language but Turkish (Arabic, Farsi, Kurdish) and yet they did not understand Turkish. This truth made me realize what Halil Rifat Pasha, the Governor of Sivas, meant when he said ‘it’s not yours if you can’t get there,’ and why it was that we of the Highway Administration have chosen this meaningful maxim as our motto. Years later, when I visited Hakkari again, I saw that our highway district facilities were the most valuable work of art in that magical and beautiful corner of the nation and hearing that Turkish was also being spoken in the streets, I was delivered from a great embarrassment.[[41]](#footnote-41)

The colonial undertones of the roads project is palpable in Önalp’s account, and is further encapsulated in the KGM motto, “it’s not yours if you can’t get there,” which often decorated the header of the *Highway Bulletin*, their monthly publication*.* The statement is predicated on an assumption of possession: the ease of travel to otherwise inaccessible regions of the country will ensure their ownership. Yet, curiously, the negation entailed in the statement suggests a degree of recognition, perhaps resignation, with regards to an originary state of lack that interferes with access and ownership. Önalp’s concession to his personal embarrassment is also telling in this regard: his own modernity, premised on the possession of modern state territory, is revealed to be hollow, at the same time as he remains cognizant of the fraught and uncertain status of his standing as a modern subject. Given the prevalence of incomprehensible and foreign (perhaps even archaic, in the modern(izing) engineer’s mind) languages, the motto opens with a concession to that which refuses to be folded into the nation. The present tense of the formulation is a statement to the expediency of that refusal, but also an indication of the engineer’s certitude in the success of his task. The scheme of possession cannot be postponed to a future time: the urgency is pressing; the unruly persistence of difference a problem to be tackled in the present moment.

The irreconcilable differences that characterized “Eastern Turkey,” with its foreign populations, customs, and languages, loomed large in the minds of those who envisioned highways as equipped with the power of social transformation. The persistence of difference was particularly urgent in contexts where “Turkish culture, even Turkish language have not penetrated.”[[42]](#footnote-42) These areas presented a glitch in “the solid linguistic uniformity of the rest of the country,” and would have to be brought back into the nation.[[43]](#footnote-43) Roads, after all, were conceived not only as an infrastructural service to the people but an investment in the creation of a new Turkey: “the road has a remarkable role in eliminating the spirit of resignation, scant living, separatist differences, backwardness, and sectionalism, in short, our social and economic contrasts.”[[44]](#footnote-44) It was for this reason that the Directorate of Highways should set an example to other “government agencies” in the country: “From the laborers to the high ranking engineers, all the members of this organization share an enthusiasm that comes from the knowledge of working with modern techniques, and they have a work ethic that conquers Anatolia again.”[[45]](#footnote-45)

As the engineers, too, reconciled themselves with the task of assimilating wayward portions of the country, the kinship between their task and military conquest came to characterize depictions of new highway projects, such as the road between Rize and İspir along the northeastern coast: “In our national struggle, we were saved from enemy servitude. In this new struggle, the great men of the highways have introduced the automobile from Rize to İspir and have gained a new victory. In this great war with mountains, we move closer to our target each day, thanks to our compressors which sound like rifles.”[[46]](#footnote-46) The building of highways, especially in the Eastern provinces of the nation, was often framed in terms of forays into foreign territory; an imagery that was also confirmed by American observers readily proffering points of comparison: “A road linking the eastern border provinces with the open Mediterranean ports of Mersin and Iskenderun would, for example, be of great value by either yardstick. East Turkey is, like the old American West, a pioneer region less developed than the rest of the country.”[[47]](#footnote-47)

If Eastern Turkey was open territory waiting to be acquired, its conquest necessitated the creation of new spatial structures, namely roads.[[48]](#footnote-48) Given their designation as alien territory, eastern provinces were to be rendered accessible, knowable, and controllable. The planning unit at the Directorate of Highways, for instance, carefully studied the population density and economic values of each region of the country; studies that were dispatched to the eleven regional divisions within the Directorate.[[49]](#footnote-49) The ordering of the material landscape was occasioned through a series of representational practices, such as maps that identified areas of economic interest in the country.[[50]](#footnote-50) The demarcation of the country into regions entailed their classification and comparison in terms of developmental progress. Regional categorizations were accompanied with the ranking of different sections of the landscape, as well as its transformation along conceptual and material registers. If regional maps were productive of “spaces of modernity,” their circulation also entailed the making *and* application of knowledge pertaining to spatial units.[[51]](#footnote-51) Knowledge of space, in turn, assigned regions to designated grades within a developmental scheme. The task of these maps surpassed that of supplemental mediums necessary to secure and display the authority of the governing apparatus: they were classificatory exercises that occasioned the possibility for the crafting of such authority in the first place. Conjured as efforts to conceptualize space as “abstract, homogeneous, and universal in its qualities,” the effects of these maps amounted to a spatial and social ordering with material and palpable consequences.[[52]](#footnote-52)

One such map that functioned as an exercise in cartographic ranking was a byproduct of the Rural Development Research Project of USAID and the Turkish State Planning Organization. A report associated with this project aimed to gauge the existence of “attitudinal regions” within “several Turkeys.”[[53]](#footnote-53) The behavioral units, compiled through indices such as relative isolation and living conditions, broadly overlapped with the geographical regions of the country, at the same time as they imposed a developmental scale between them.[[54]](#footnote-54) “Region,” explained the main rapporteur of the survey, is a “concept that in some ways has more interest for the policy-maker than it does for the social scientist.”[[55]](#footnote-55) It was for this reason that an account of regional differences, pertaining not merely to “a different topography, different climate, and different level of economic development,” but also “a different psychological atmosphere” would prove to be “critical for the policymaker.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Of particular concern to the policymaker invested in the developmental progress of rural populations should be “the village’s remoteness from the nearest regularly travelled road, the nearest kaza (prefectorial) center, the nearest railway station,” as well as “proximity to the west and coastal location.”[[57]](#footnote-57) Given these distinctly spatial measures of development, persistent underperformance of Eastern regions, particularly the Southeast, was troubling for those surveying regional development in conceptual and concrete terms alike.

Mastery over space was thus predicated on identifying and measuring the developmental gap between different parts of the country, given “centuries of difference” between eastern provinces and their western counterparts.[[58]](#footnote-58) If this time lag meant that Eastern Turkey was backwards in terms of its hygiene, civilization, and economic development, highways were once again conjured as the solution to the region’s distinct lack of development—hence the investment of more than 55 million liras by the three eastern highway administrative units and the building of 2,451 kilometers of roads in the region between 1950 and 1953.[[59]](#footnote-59) As one engineer explained: “This is a numerical harbinger of the social and economic development of the East…The East, in a nearby future, will stop being the subject of gloom and grief, and will become a new source of respite in our hearts.”[[60]](#footnote-60)

One way to ensure and accelerate the progress of the region was the short-lived “Eastern development project,” which was approved by the Cabinet on May 10, 1949, with a budget of 10 million Turkish liras allocated to the Ministries of Public Works, Education, and Health.[[61]](#footnote-61) Though the three Ministries prepared separate reports on the region in the period building up to the project’s implementation, not only were their responsibilities seen as interrelated, but priority was accorded to all-weather road networks in quantitative, as well as qualitative terms.[[62]](#footnote-62) In the words of Tahsin Banguoğlu, the Minister of Education: “As you know, our eastern provinces are backwards in terms of civilization and economic development. A primary cause is the scarcity of means of transportation. The first condition for assessing land productivity and for establishing civilized institutions and facilities in these regions is building roads.”[[63]](#footnote-63) Once again, the provision of roads would by necessity precede the delivery of hospitals, schools, and agricultural organization.[[64]](#footnote-64)

As with charges of romanticism against DP’s populist rhetoric, however, regionally specific policies were seen as the culprit for exacerbating, rather than erasing the differences between urban and rural, western and eastern parts of the country. If the latter was crippled with obscure “ways of thinking, traditions, and value orientations,” at best frozen in time, the timeless remedy of roads could readily be summoned by policymakers.[[65]](#footnote-65) Against the charges that the Eastern development project was merely a ruse to console the people of that region, “whose lives of neglect, injustice, and cruelty is reminiscent of the Middle Ages,” DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes demurred: “as long as roads are extended, electricity and water are delivered to villages, as long as tractors and other machines enter the villager’s life, these people will no longer get carried away with superstition.”[[66]](#footnote-66) Leaving the realm of superstition, in turn, amounted to entering the space of the nation: DP’s 1951-54 cabinet program identified rural roads and schools, especially in Eastern Turkey, as the government’s “locus of action,” given the imperative of “mobilizing our youth around the ideal of ‘Nation.’”[[67]](#footnote-67)

The debates about the delivery of highways thus unfolded during a time when mainstream, official, and social scientific discourse addressed the imperative for uniting different portions of the country. That unification required not only the elimination but also the discursive delineation of particular “problems” or “issues”—hence the widespread circulation of phrases such as the “Eastern issue” or the “rural problem,” themselves counterparts to and rendering necessary “causes” to rally behind, be that of tourism or highways, as we have seen. Allusions to the Eastern issue were markedly elliptical in nature, with occasional acknowledgment of linguistic difference substituting for the otherwise unspoken (and unspeakable) “problem” of Kurdish populations. The ineffability of the “Kurdish question” necessitated that it be cast in terms of regional underdevelopment in lieu of ethnic difference—a gesture of erasure that would characterize intellectual and public discourse throughout the following decades.[[68]](#footnote-68) The seeming abstraction that characterized the delineation of such problems was leveled with the particularity and materiality of the solutions proposed to counteract them. The increasingly spatial and regional nature of the “problems” carved up by journalists, policymakers, and experts led to the depiction of roads as fulfilling the promise of moral hygiene and uplift, as well as the possession of otherwise inaccessible parts of the country. “It’s not yours if you can’t get there,” the highway motto read. The “there” was a region marked by inscrutability but one that could nonetheless be folded back into the nation, contingent on the ease of travel and access.

It was expected, then, that villagers, especially those residing in the East, would be greeting their saviors with open arms and tears of joy, given the promise of modernity, democracy, and prosperity associated with roads. That promise, in turn, was contingent upon the assumption of a profound lack characterizing those regions—a lack so patent and pressing that parliamentary records, newspaper editorials, and academic publications were devoted to its articulation and elaboration alike, even in circuitous terms if necessary. Villages were accordingly depicted as the dark corners of civilization, desperately in need of reform and progress by way of their inclusion in the nation—especially in regions where difference in identity and language persevered and was deemed to be in need of erasure. The efforts to tame, civilize, and enlighten particular segments of the population thus required a project of unification that was increasingly conceived in terms of spatial and colonial conquest. The foremost expression of that unification was in the realm of the market.

*A New Type of Farmer*

On August 24, 1950, Jesse Williams, head of the American Roads Group in Turkey, enclosed a booklet in a dispatch to Harold Hilts, the Deputy Chief of the Federal Bureau of Highways in Washington. The booklet was a companion piece to the highway pavilion on display during the 1950 Istanbul Fair and depicted the unprecedented flow of goods and people across the country, marveling that “it is full of hidden meanings.”[[69]](#footnote-69) The pavilion, which was a source of fascination and item of correspondence between the American engineers, was unambiguous about at least one function assigned to roads: their invocation and delivery of prosperity “in the economic, social, cultural, and military development of the country, the increase of passable roads increases exchange—the increase of exchange increases consumption and the increase in consumption brings about prosperity.”[[70]](#footnote-70)

The promise of prosperity, so intimately identified with the extension of the highway network, took on particular import in the milieu of drastic transformations in the political economic landscape of the country. Deeply rooted in DP’s move towards a liberal restructuring of the economy under the auspices of American advice was the belief that “the market was the mechanism to deliver material benefits” and “transportation facilitated market access.”[[71]](#footnote-71) Highway transportation would increase the distribution of production across space, guaranteeing the “development of the internal market”: “Not only did this programme accelerate the marketing of peasant production, but it also helped create a new concentration of small non-urban capital around the leading sector of automotive transport.”[[72]](#footnote-72) Capitalist expansion, however, remained distinctly rural in character, with highways operating as the “infrastructure through which the positive externalities of state expenditures were distributed to rural interests with sufficient economic base,” thus aiding “the birth of a [class] of capitalists in agriculture.”[[73]](#footnote-73)

The broader context for the emergence of this agrarian mode of capitalism was a period of unprecedented exchange between Turkey and the United States. The aid agreement following the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine addressed the need for “the movement of agricultural, mineral, and other products to domestic markets and to Turkish ports for export to countries in urgent need of such Turkish surpluses as food and coal.”[[74]](#footnote-74) The postwar economic reconstruction of Europe within the purview of the Marshall Plan also required Turkey to become a source of agricultural goods, further necessitating the development of highways. Insofar as American aid itself “carried specific instructions extolling the virtues of a market-based world division of labor,” then, “both American aid officials and DP politicians aimed at complementing rural development with a road network designed to facilitate the marketization of agricultural products. The government invested in infrastructure, and the motor car was to integrate the national market.”[[75]](#footnote-75)

The roads project was viewed as not only an indispensable component of Europe’s economic reconstruction, but also a “test of Turkey’s real intentions about economic development”: “A simple all-weather road, adequately maintained, between a fruit and sugar growing area and a preserving and shipping point might in one season return more foreign exchange than would be needed to pay the whole cost of the road and the vehicles which used it.”[[76]](#footnote-76) Roads were expected to raise levels of productivity, public purchasing power and consumption of goods, in addition to “strengthen bands of interest and understanding between city and country dwellers.”[[77]](#footnote-77) They would grant access to the nation’s hitherto “unprocessed sources of fortune,” opening up new regions with rich sources to habitation.[[78]](#footnote-78)

The “peaceful economic revolution” spawned by all-weather highways was most visible at the rural level: “More and more the peasants of the interior are able to bring their products to market and thus to obtain money with which to buy the manufactured goods from the cities to raise their own standards of living.”[[79]](#footnote-79) Opening up the country to “the benefits of modern commerce” was a palpable consequence of “this penetration” in a setting where “82 per cent” of the population lived in “small villages.”[[80]](#footnote-80) Problems of isolation, lack of access, and integration in physical and linguistic terms would thus be addressed by increasing networks of commercial connectivity. Given the incentive to grow crops for the rest of the country, the villager would be invested in other parts of Turkey: the crafting of a national imaginary, discussed in the previous section in terms of regional unification, also entailed investment in one’s neighbors through the terms of production.[[81]](#footnote-81)

The imagery of villagers producing “cash crops for distant markets” in the midst of this sweeping economic integration was one that captured the imagination of social scientists and policymakers alike. The heightened degree of connectivity facilitated price uniformity and an unprecedented sense of speed in the circulation of staples and commodities, at the same time as this mobility remained circumscribed in regionally differentiated terms.[[82]](#footnote-82) In the midst of dizzying rates of transportation, the historically “bashful peasant” was “awakening” and “demanding service in return for his vote;” his entry into the “money economy for the first time” would prompt accounts of the emergence of a “new type of farmer.”[[83]](#footnote-83)

The most arresting depictions detailing the emergence of the national market were accordingly postulated at the level of the new farmer. Journalist Robert Hartmann, who mainly reported about Turkish-American military cooperation during the Korean War, recounted a specific encounter with a peasant whose life was seemingly transformed by roads: “One such beneficiary is Gazi Esen, a 32-year-old farmer who works 100 acres of wheatland along the highway. Gazi owns his land and hires a couple of hands for the harvest, now in full swing all over Turkey. His house of mud-plastered adobe brick stands at the edge of the new road…With the new road, he can easily transport his surplus melons to market not only in the nearest village, Ahiboz, but also to Ankara.”[[84]](#footnote-84) By another account, the sale of surplus produce was not only made easier by relatively swift access to wholesale markets in nearby cities, but also through wholesalers’ increased ability to drive their citrus fruit-loaded trucks to distant villages in spite of previously debilitating weather conditions.[[85]](#footnote-85)

A speech delivered by Russell Dorr, ECA Chief of Mission, on the occasion of his departure from Turkey, summed up the effects of the “expanding economy” in the “hypothetical case of a peasant in Central Anatolia”:

For the first time a year-round highway has penetrated his region. Three years ago it would have taken him days of difficult travel to reach a city. That made the idea of selling food to the city a little remote, if not possible, for him. Therefore there was no incentive for him to raise more than his own needs and those of his immediate community. Now he can get to the city or he can send his crops there more easily. He can get money in exchange for his crops. With the money he can buy household utensils, tools, furniture—any of the things that put together add up to a higher standard of living for himself and his family. Therefore he has the incentive to grow more, to open up new fields if necessary or to try to raise the yield of his present land. Along with the incentive, he now has the means to grow more—the agricultural tools provided through the agricultural banks at low interest rates….raises standard of living.[[86]](#footnote-86)

In Dorr’s account, the extent and pace of roads’ transformative powers is indistinguishable from other dimensions of the American aid program. In the case of the hypothetical Central Anatolian peasant, the specific benefits of the highway project are palpable: a new capacity for incentive, investment, and possibility of movement is bestowed upon him. All-weather roads enlarge the scope of movement not only for his crop, but also the goods he has acquired, goods that will spell higher standards of living upon his return to the village. Though the acquisition of agricultural tools and furniture is primarily intended for his family, the peasant’s face is also turned outward, whereby the barriers between him and the rest of the nation are seemingly surmounted. The unprecedented sense of mobility is not only posed as a corrective to previous problems of isolation and self-interest, but also occasions the emergence of a new type of farmer. Now deemed a force of democracy, and no longer sequestered in the outposts of the country, the new peasant is also marked by the changes in the tools he acquires and uses. The homogenization of the space of production and circulation, in turn, is reflected in the material reconfiguration of the country, given the simultaneity in the “accelerated temporal circulation of capital,” and of “cultural imaginaries.”[[87]](#footnote-87) One measure of that acceleration in material and conceptual terms was its expression in terms of savings and efficiency, mediated, in turn, through new means of transportation such as the truck and the bus.

*Trains, Trucks, and Buses*

In 1939, geographer John Morrison prepared a monograph on the village of Alişar in Central Anatolia, a text that would serve as a model for the conduct of rural sociology in Turkey throughout the following decades.[[88]](#footnote-88) The newly launched railway line, Morrison explained, transformed Alişar’s “external relationships,” drawing the village “into the national economy.”[[89]](#footnote-89) Morrison added that an “all-weather highway from Şefaatli eastward through the middle of the Kanak Su basin” was now a growing necessity due to the development of the grain trade; yet the primary task of such a highway would be to “expedite the movement of grain to the railway.”[[90]](#footnote-90) In the period that preceded the implementation of the roads project in 1948, Morrison was not alone in depicting highways as a “supplement” to railroads in a division of labor that accorded the latter the task of long-distance haulage.[[91]](#footnote-91) The portrayal of roads as appendages to the main mode of transportation in the country was a recurrent formulation in law proposals that depicted them as “arteries” or “tributaries nourishing the railways.”[[92]](#footnote-92)

The relegation of roads to a subsidiary role was customary practice throughout the 1920s and 1930s when the railway network functioned as an “infrastructural element for the Etatist economic program.”[[93]](#footnote-93) The valorization of highways as singularly equipped with the task of national and economic unification was not one that resonated in official and public discourse at the time. The budget set aside for railways in a 1947 economic development plan which was prepared with the aim of securing Marshall Plan funds, for instance, exceeded the funds for roads by four times.[[94]](#footnote-94) The proposal was consistent with the commonly held view that it was railways that would ensure national integration and “congruity of the national economy.”[[95]](#footnote-95) According to one account that otherwise hailed the development of roads, railways were equally capable of “spreading science, wisdom and civilization to the dens of ignorance in the nation,” and in particular of contributing to the reconstruction of Eastern Anatolia by removing the ongoing lack of order in that region.[[96]](#footnote-96) Bill proposals regarding the extension of railways into Eastern territories emphasized that it was through this mode of transportation that “the difference between eastern and western provinces [would] disappear.”[[97]](#footnote-97)

The relatively abrupt reversal in the favored mode of transportation was accompanied with the assignation of new tasks and capabilities to highways.[[98]](#footnote-98) This was partly due to recent changes in the political economic landscape, wherein highway construction was deemed to be to the new “organizational form of capitalist accumulation,” “what railways had been to the Etatist expansion.”[[99]](#footnote-99) Another reason for the increasing popularity of highways was their association with speed, savings, and efficiency, especially when it came to intraregional circulation within the country, given their ability to transport perishable goods, minimize distribution costs, and offer wider geographical coverage than trains.[[100]](#footnote-100) In his 1948 report which spearheaded the highway initiative, Harold Hilts of the Federal Bureau of Roads explained that highways could not only be built for lower costs, but would also ensure door-to-door delivery and faster haulage relative to railroads.[[101]](#footnote-101) The claim, popularized by the reports of the American experts, that railways somehow lacked the “flexibility and extensiveness of highway transportation” now found expression in Parliamentary debates: if priority had been given to roads during the early days of the Republic, some argued, the nation’s “economic visage” would be much more developed by the 1950s.[[102]](#footnote-102)

The truck was the primary medium for this rhetoric of efficiency in the context of rural marketization: as the purveyor of “material and moral values alike,” it indexed the renewal of the country.[[103]](#footnote-103) If the truck was the symbol of economic unification, enabling the likes of Gazi to bring his surplus melon to the nearest city, the task of transporting people in an equally orderly manner fell to the bus. Like the truck, which displaced the train and the obsolete oxcart that preceded it, the bus became the unmistakable means of reduction for intra-city travel time and costs alike.[[104]](#footnote-104) The relatively frequent departure time for buses, as well as more convenient routes for pick-up and drop-off, increasingly made them the preferred mode of transportation, at the same time as they contributed to the shrinking of distances across the country.[[105]](#footnote-105) One consequence of the growing visibility of trucks and buses was the expression of distance in terms of temporal categories.[[106]](#footnote-106) Travel time between Ankara and Istanbul was reduced from 15 to 6 hours between 1948 and 1959; that between Ankara and Iskenderun from 21 to 9 hours.[[107]](#footnote-107) The assessment of distance in terms of hours and prices can be considered within the purview of what Harvey has termed “space-time compression,” the increasing temporalization of space taking on an ephemeral anddilated nature alike.[[108]](#footnote-108)

Though the compression of time and space would appear to be imbued with a sense of acceleration beyond comprehension, otherwise mystifying rates of speed remained tempered and subject to measurement in terms of duration.[[109]](#footnote-109) That certitude is predicated on the mastery over nature and the prospect of territorial stability alike: remote corners of the nation, otherwise impenetrable over lengthy stretches of wintry months, are now permeated with the imperative for openness and swift exposure. The contraction of the landscape is instigated by the mounting circulation of goods, people, and capital insofar as proximity itself is measured in terms of efficiency. The people of Balgat finally attain the bus service to Ankara they have been coveting. Coal uncovered in Ereğli reaches its destination in Zonguldak. Newspapers of Istanbul are delivered to the denizens of Edirne.[[110]](#footnote-110) Each novelty is a step towards condensing andcommanding the space of the nation. But the conviction and expansive logic of modernizing roads (simultaneously upgrading the methods of road building and administration, and imbuing roads themselves with a distinct civilizing capacity) readily exceed regional and temporal circumscription. Measures of space are formulated not merely in terms of travel time, but also in terms of the tonnage of material atop trucks, the cost of inter-city bus transportation, and profit-generating capacities of door-to-door delivery, presumed, in turn, to exceed the abilities of railway haulage. At the level of individual perception, the compression of space is presumed to have the effect of telescoping the layout of the nation. Once unable to identify the neighboring cities within one’s province, residents will now be able to accommodate far-flung regions within their dreamscape. That dreamscape, in turn, will be rendered amenable to leisure, travel, and amusement, as well as greater familiarity with other members of the nation.

*Leisurely Times*

The discourse about the efficiency of the new buses readily morphed into discussions about their comfort. The *Highway Bulletin* acclaimed the ease of newly launched bus services between Izmit and Istanbul.[[111]](#footnote-111) Members of Parliament marveled at the smoothness of the ride: “There was a time when I considered myself fortunate when it took me eight hours to commute between Antalya and Burdur. There were times when the driver would curse the day he was born and sob. The last time I traveled, it took me 50 minutes, not a single jolt.”[[112]](#footnote-112) Even Eastern provinces benefited from the transformation, according to Feridun Fikri Düşünsel’s account of the trip he took between Bingöl and Elazığ: “I did not feel a single jolt; if it were possible I would have been able to drink tea on the bus.”[[113]](#footnote-113)

The smoothness of the bus ride was no doubt permeated with connotations of access and uplift in the minds of policymakers. The convenience of travel indicated that provinces previously deemed to be frozen in the Middle Ages could now be targeted for moral and temporal reform. Consider Rudolph Mrázek’s depiction of colonial road building in Indonesia: “The newness, the hardness and cleanness—it was the roads’ modernity. Cleanness of the roads, in this logic, was purity of times, democracy even, we might say…New roads through Java and in the whole colony, to Kartini, were to be fully made of progress, and, as long as they were made of that hard and clean stuff, nothing could stop the wheels.”[[114]](#footnote-114) The jolt-free ride and the attendant promise of cleanliness would deliver the peasants from filth, backwardness, and slavish deference to the authority of tradition. The lack of bumps on the trip, the reduction of agony for the driver, and the desire to consume tea on the ride were also indicative of a novel sense of pleasure associated with travel. Signs of comfort accompanied this new conception of leisure, crucial in the context of the initiative for a tourism industry.[[115]](#footnote-115)

 The awakened peasantry was thus to cultivate a penchant for spare time activities, rather than passively await the delivery of doctors, medicine, books or manufactured goods to their village: hence romanticized depictions of the peasant traveling in his free time in order “simply to pass the time of day,” “go to a motion picture” or “see wrestling matches” thanks to the dissemination of highways.[[116]](#footnote-116) The desire to travel and “investigate new avenues for pleasure and enjoyment” would eventually lead to the building of “bars, restaurants, and tea gardens,” especially in prosperous rural regions.[[117]](#footnote-117) For those with “extra time and income,” amusement was no longer at the exclusive disposal of the city dweller.[[118]](#footnote-118) The mobile farmer, who found his way to the market thanks to his newly acquired truck, was also expected to participate in the exercise of this novel and self-chosen leisure. It was for this reason that inquiries after spare-time activities began to populate surveys targeting rural populations, as well as students and administrators.[[119]](#footnote-119)

Leisurely conduct was necessarily coupled with conspicuous practices in consumption. Social scientists carefully chronicled the new items decorating the shelves of the new grocery stores in villages and small towns. Peasants, now equipped with the means to transport their excess produce, also had access to commodities previously deemed unimaginable in rural settings. A geographer studying Boğaçay recorded the array of items that arrived from the neighboring city of Antalya by way of peddlers and artisans: “cotton seed, fertilizers, silkworms, bread, fuel, tools, clay, hardware, tiles, window glass, candy, dry goods, cotton cloth and so forth.”[[120]](#footnote-120) Tütengil, the sociologist of highways, observed new brands of cigarettes, margarine, soda, canned and baby food, bar soaps and toothpaste, among others in Şile outside of Istanbul.[[121]](#footnote-121) Lerner’s Balgat boasted not only of its infamous grocery store, but also a clothing shop in the “newer part of the village, just across the new road from the ‘bus station’”: it displayed “dungarees, levis, coveralls,” and “ready-made suits, shirts, even a rack of neckties.”[[122]](#footnote-122) As the tangible benefits associated with roads broadened to include luxury items, depictions of the peasantry, too, came to address their covetous and curious conduct.

 The villager, otherwise deemed to be “intuitively distrustful of the ‘outsider,’” appeared to acquire a “yearning for communication,” surely “a symptom, too, of a nascent confidence in life and people.”[[123]](#footnote-123) The frequency and regularity with which he could visit town, after all, brought him into “weekly contact with the Westernized ways of the urban population,” whereby “the terminal of the overland bus lines at the cobble-stone corner has joined the bazaar, and in part replaced it, as a center for urban-rural communication.”[[124]](#footnote-124) The transformative effect of highways exceeded that of other means of communication in this scheme:

Railways, airplanes, the telegraph and telephone, the press, and even radio seem to have been trivial in their force compared to the real revolution created by the motor vehicle. The peasant appears to need tangible evidence of previously unexperienced and strange phenomena introduced to him from outside his environment—to need to see and touch—before he believes. Moreover, the ideas emanating from the newspaper that is read to him or from the radio on the coffee house wall are always very strongly filtered through a cognitive screen manufactured from his own limited experience…such selective interpretation is much less able to mitigate the impression that visiting the town or city and seeing things with his own eyes, feeling it with his own hands, and stumbling over it with his own feet make on him. The development of road transportation in the past decade or so has made this experience possible for untold villagers who formerly remained immured behind mud-brick walls even though only five miles from town. This change in road transport may be the real heart of the communications revolution that has unquestionably struck Turkey in the last few years.[[125]](#footnote-125)

Functioning as the vessel of unmediated contact, roads broadened the peasant’s vision by enabling the sensory experience of novelty items. Familiarization with foreign phenomena, lifestyles, and consumption habits removed the barrier of otherwise insurmountable mud-brick walls. Visual and physical interaction with neighboring towns was the true measure of mobility, which could be exercised in cognitive and affective terms as well. Unlike the train which remained sluggish and inconvenient by comparison, or the radio which merely served as a “one-way street,” highways facilitated intimate and immediate encounters, making it possible for “villagers to get to the cities and at the same bring city people, especially politicians and civil servants, to the villages.”[[126]](#footnote-126)

*Familiar Places*

The farmers’ desire to visit neighboring towns and cities, “whenever they have time or pretext to do so,” was viewed as a further testament to the modernizing thrust of highways.[[127]](#footnote-127) Roads were capable of introducing urban ways to rural populations by rendering such trips easier and more alluring than before. Given increasing familiarity with novel means of transportation, peasants could display andact on their curiosity about foreign places. The punctuality of the bus rendered it a recognizable item, which could then be employed at the service of discovering other novelties. In Lerner’s account:

Tosun’s words of 1950 returned to us: ‘It could have been half an hour to Ankara if it had a road.’ Now it did have a road. What was more, a bus was coming down the road. As it passed, jammed full, none of the passengers waved or even so much as stuck out a tongue at us. Without these unfailing signs of villagers out on a rare chartered bus, to celebrate a great occasion of some sort, we could only make the wild guess that Balgat had acquired a regular bus service.[[128]](#footnote-128)

No longer an occasion for playful or festive behavior, the sighting of the bus is an unmistakably pedestrian incident. The prevalence of travel, its frequent and punctual nature, is not limited to the circulation of agricultural produce or consumer goods. Itinerant demeanor becomes a feature of the landscape, eliminating “Turkey’s fundamental problems,” such as “‘inertia’ on the part of the peasantry,” “a lethargic state of mind, and a stagnant life.”[[129]](#footnote-129) “Suddenly faced with the technology of the twentieth century in its most appealing aspects,” idleness is a thing of the past.[[130]](#footnote-130) As the bus and the tractor become familiar sights, the physical mobility they facilitate is inscribed on rural mindsets, imbuing them with a cognitive capacity ineluctably linked to psychic movement and empathy, seeing as how “*mobility tends to be systemic*, i.e., physical, social and psychic mobility ‘go together’ in every village.”[[131]](#footnote-131)

The “mobile person,” after all, is one who is capable of “identification with new aspects of his environment,” and putting himself in the place of the other.[[132]](#footnote-132) Empathy itself, as the foremost signifier of modernity for the Cold War social scientist, does not only entail a flair for answering survey questions or displaying hospitable behavior to guests, but also a desire to travel to otherwise alien settings. Anticipating the other’s needs and wishes is akin to an ability to imagine the nation as compact and easy to traverse. Given the ease and speed of travel, the shrinking of physical space is subsumed within the psychic imaginary. Spatial (and interpersonal) proximity, in turn, is one of scale, prevailing at the local, national, and global level alike. In Tütengil’s Adapazarı, increased opportunities for travel generate attitudinal change in domestic interactions: children learn to speak directly to their fathers without fear, husbands and wives refer to each other on a first-name basis.[[133]](#footnote-133) The removal of psychic barriers at home is inevitable in “the age of Sputnik,” when the “world itself is shrinking,” and “the stereotyped notion of the peasant as a man unaware of the world beyond his horizon” is beginning to erode.[[134]](#footnote-134)

Familiarity with an increasingly condensed landscape also leads to changes in the “sense of space, distance, time—the geotemporal universe”: “Only in the measure that they come into contact with urban society do villagers acquire the concepts, indeed the language, of precise and standard units.”[[135]](#footnote-135) Accuracy in measurement will bring the peasants not just into the space, but also the time of the nation; time that encapsulates constancy and precision, as well as leisure within its dimensions. Orderly bus schedules and punctual delivery times for trucks are one way of ensuring this mode of predictability. Seasonal and cyclical conceptions of time, where the “day’s activities are regulated by the rising and setting of the sun,” the shadows, the farming routine or the call to prayer are supplanted by synchronized and linear accounts of temporality in the social scientists’ writings.[[136]](#footnote-136) The division of the day into standardized units is accompanied with changes in perceptions of space and measurement: “the ‘step’ as a measure for length, the ‘height of a man or a minaret’ as a measure for depth…are things of the past.”[[137]](#footnote-137) Distances will no longer be formulated as “within a bullet’s reach, ‘as far as my voice can go,’ ‘as far as (it takes) to smoke a cigarette.”[[138]](#footnote-138) The dissemination of standards in precision and scope is also a measure of “what is familiar and what is ‘strange.’”[[139]](#footnote-139) The evenness of time and space is readily comprehended across the country, wherein their “objectification, abstraction and standardization” have “come to mark modern life,” as well as “modern governance.”[[140]](#footnote-140) The “new vehicles,” after all, “do not only ‘change the conception of time and space’ and lead to the forgetting of the old clock, but also increase the field of movement for people…Contact between people increases in intensity, public opinion is born, etiquette and experience spread in a larger field.”[[141]](#footnote-141) As units of time and measures of distance are rendered orderly, attitudes, too, are presumed to be normalized and increasingly open to regulation.

In Mübeccel Kıray’s study of Ereğli, a coastal town on the Black Sea, it is changing means of communication and transportation that inform the questionnaires gauging the worldviews, behaviors, and perceptions of time and space on the part of its inhabitants.[[142]](#footnote-142) Kıray attempts to discern the contours of the shrinking geotemporal universe by probing the respondents’ conceptions of Turkey and the world. Asked to identify the farthest place from Ereğli in the country, those who are able to identify regions other than their own (almost half the respondents who cite Eastern Turkey) are hailed as the fortunate beneficiaries of the expanding steel industry in the adjacent city of Zonguldak.[[143]](#footnote-143) Knowledge of Hakkari’s location in Southeastern Turkey and that of Berlin, London, Tokyo and New York are evaluated on the same terrain, as indications of the urbanization of Ereğli and its “openness to the outside world.”[[144]](#footnote-144) Ereğli’s inhabitants are reconciled with and cognizant of their place in an exceedingly mobile and connected world. While fewer people use their hands to indicate the size of objects or rely on prayer times to regulate their sleep schedule, however, the recently launched bus service to Zonguldak has curiously failed to standardize conceptions of space: more accuracy is observed in measurement of distance by sea, rather than by land.[[145]](#footnote-145)

Even if the regularization of spatial perceptions took on a gradual nature, the desire for travel was now deemed to be a prominent feature of the landscape. Lerner’s fascination with Balgat’s Grocer, at once the ideal survey respondent and the modernizing subject, for instance, stemmed from the latter’s simultaneous appreciation for physical andpsychic mobility: “As president of Turkey, he said: ‘I would make roads for the villagers to come to towns to see the world and would not let them stay in their holes all their life.”[[146]](#footnote-146) Capable of envisioning himself as the purveyor of infrastructural modernity, the Grocer hoped to instill a similar sense of wanderlust in his fellow Balgati. According to the reports of social scientists and policymakers, in fact, the peasants’ demand for roads did not merely derive from an urge to leave their villages:

As related by Niyazi Aki, the governor of Antalya, villagers themselves come to the district seat and propose road-building projects in their respective areas, offering to pay whatever is necessary. In one village visited during the trip, peasants demanded that a small hill obstructing the view from the highway be removed, so that everyone could ‘see that we also live in this world.’[[147]](#footnote-147)

At first sight, the governor’s proclamation amounts to official propaganda, echoing the Minister of Public Works in its conviction of the ostensibly insatiable desire for roads on the part of the peasantry. Yet the account culminates in the suggestion that the villagers’ longing to see other places, to be closer to their neighbors (on a physical and psychic plane alike) was also motivated by a drive to be seen. The demand for visibility unhinges the certitude of the roads project that was to render eastern regions more western, rural populations more urban, and the peasantry eager participants in market practices. Roads, otherwise expressive of technologies of liberal governance, could readily exceed the intentions of their makers. The request for their delivery, at the expense of conquering and drastically remaking the physical landscape, was also a means to overcome the obscurity associated with mud-brick walls and hills along the highway. Roads could convey a plea for recognition, providing visual and concrete proof that “we also live in this world.” It may be suggested, of course, that ruminations on the peasant’s desire to be seen are consistent with romanticized depictions of the “new type of farmer,” one who is “enlarging his horizon of ideas and wants…bestirring himself and working hard to satisfy these wants.”[[148]](#footnote-148) By the same account, however, “Turkey’s new man—Mehmet the peasant” also happened to be “her oldest citizen.”[[149]](#footnote-149) The span of Mehmet’s occupancy suggested that he could do as he wished with the new roads, machinery, and objects at his disposal.

*Wayward Subjects*

Between 1948 and 1957, Richard D. Robinson, working as an area specialist for the American Universities Field Staff, dispatched a series of letters detailing the various changes he observed across rural Turkey.[[150]](#footnote-150) The content of his missives ranged from the physical features of Turkish people (“all physical types from out and out Oriental complete with slanting eyes to what is generally called Nordic or North European, blonde and blue-eyed”) to detailed descriptions of village houses, dietary habits, and clothing.[[151]](#footnote-151) On the subject of the rapid onset of agricultural mechanization, Robinson adopted a wary tone:

I have always raised a skeptical eyebrow at the manner in which some would bring ‘help’ to primitive and semi-primitive peoples. It seems to me that bringing only an isolated feature of 20th century civilization—such as farm machinery—into a primitive society is lifting something from context and turning it into a dangerous weapon for destruction. Lacking the prerequisite philosophical, educational, and socio-political structure to control and condition the manner in which modern machines will be used to shape the lives and destinies of men, I would hesitate to wish those machines on my worst enemy—let alone, my friends. And yet, that is just what some would have us do. A somewhat similar case would have existed if the atom bomb had suddenly been presented to the America of 1776, by some super-intelligence. I doubt that the world would still be in one piece.[[152]](#footnote-152)

Robinson’s hesitant stance would be reiterated in increasingly skeptical accounts of the pace of modernization in Turkey and elsewhere in the developing world throughout the following decades.[[153]](#footnote-153) American experts involved in building highways or the Hilton hotel viewed the speed with which such projects were embarked upon as indicative of an impatient mindset on the part of their Turkish counterparts. For some, the incessant demands for agricultural or road building machinery were suggestive of intellectual limitations on the part of the recipients: “The desire to move directly from ox-cart to jet airplane, ignoring the intervening steps or, at best, compressing them into too short a period, exemplifies this inability to grasp the nature of growth.”[[154]](#footnote-154) According to the ever-cautious Robinson, however, those who dispatched the machinery were equally culpable, at the same time as they continued to “doubt that a machine such as the tractor can be a weapon.”[[155]](#footnote-155)

The expansion of the road network, Robinson argued elsewhere, joined forces with the perilous tractor, resulting in uninhibited levels of urbanization.[[156]](#footnote-156) Highways in fact facilitated the vast urban migration that resulted in the seventy-five percent increase in the population of the four largest cities of Turkey in the decade of the 1950s.[[157]](#footnote-157) Given the growth of squatter colonies in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Izmir, a series of experts were summoned by the DP government in order to investigate means to ameliorate the pressing housing shortage.[[158]](#footnote-158) If the truck and the tractor were potential weapons of destruction, rural displacement, and urban overpopulation, however, they could also be put to use for purposes that exceeded the original intent of their creators.

Social scientists and policymakers apprehensive of increasing rates of urban migration were nonetheless celebratory of leisurely visits into town or the city. It was the means by which such trips were undertaken that continued to be a matter of debate. By one account, transportation between “country seats and the capital” was pregnant with ingenuity, evident in the implementation of a daily truck service: “This latter service is a matter of local entrepreneurship and usually consists of a large flat-bed truck into which all the travelers crowd for their trip to town. Trucks leave the villages early in the morning, and return from the town by four or five o’clock in the afternoon. Fares depend roughly upon the distance traveled, but no schedule of rates is enforced by the local government.”[[159]](#footnote-159) Freed from official regulation, villagers devised their own times and costs for travel, at the same time as they reappropriated the truck (and the tractor) as the vehicle for passenger transportation—a misuse that could spell more than mere mischief if engaged in excessive terms:

The tremendously increased number of inter-city buses are still packed to the luggage racks, and the number of extra passengers hitching rides on trucks mounts daily. Even remote villages are within striking distance of roads along which come two or three trucks per day which will let them clamber aboard. Moreover, most of the 40,000 tractors which have been wisely or unwisely injected into the Turkish economy by American aid are used for regular excursions from villages to towns and cities—though most peasants still refrain from taking their relatives to Germany on the family tractor as one atavistically bold Turk did not long ago.[[160]](#footnote-160)

No longer confined to its designated terms of use within the village boundaries, the tractor readily becomes a mark of unmanageable behavior. Innocuous curiosity about foreign places is undercut by innovative excess—excess that reverts the villager back to obsolete audacity, rather than advance him into the future. The use of tractors to commute to “weddings or even movies” is also suggestive of a sinister materialism in this scheme: “The satisfaction derived from the tractor is not an indirect one related to the increase in production, but a direct satisfaction connected with the form and size of the machine.”[[161]](#footnote-161)

Familiarity with the material dimensions of travel, furthermore, results in corporeal playfulness, rather than the proper units of measurement and gesture it was expected to inculcate: “Instead of pulling a bell, conductors shout at the top of their voices when somebody wants to get off the bus. Drivers use their hands and arms; taxi drivers keep their left arms outside the car to be able to make any signs required by the traffic rules or not.”[[162]](#footnote-162) It was not just traffic rules that physical demeanor defied. Despite accolades for the peasant deemed to be eagerly anticipating the delivery of roads, there were those who feigned ignorance about the Village Law which required that each village “construct its own feeder road to connect it to the nearest highway or to the next village”: “Many peasants questioned on this point grinned and replied that they ‘hadn’t read’ the law, although failure to know its provisions is an offence.”[[163]](#footnote-163) The peasants’ refusal to abide by law and their proclivity to replace it with their own set of rules (in physical, temporal, and material terms) led to further ambivalence in assessments of the “far-reaching effects the highways are having”: “The old Turkish custom of free hospitality to the stranger cannot survive beside a busy highway, and with the developing commercialisms this and other virtues of the old way of life are passing.”[[164]](#footnote-164) Mobility could undercut, rather than induce empathy, it seems, thus exceeding, if not altogether unraveling the expectations of its adherents.

It is in the “chronotope of the road,” Bakhtin has suggested, that “the unity of time and space markers is exhibited with exceptional precision and clarity.”[[165]](#footnote-165) Insofar as the trope of roads occasions encounters between people by collapsing “social distances,” its temporal dimensions also incorporate chance, contingency, and accident.[[166]](#footnote-166) The fortuitous implications of the highway program were not limited to the willful misuse of vehicles or the seeming erosion of traditional values (or their relentless return in the form of primal impertinence, as in the case of the peasant who drove his tractor all the way to Germany). The forward march of roads in enabling circulation and demarcation alike, in designating some sections of the population as filthy or backwards could be hindered by an unforeseen turn of events. Resilient subjects refused to be accessed and digested by the infrastructural state. Mountains, relentlessly inaccessible by highways, became the venue for the flourishing of prohibited languages and identities, in lieu of their eradication. The very democratic process that was seen as the hallmark of the roads project was curtailed by a military coup in 1960, which saw the hanging of four DP leaders, as well as a return to etatist measures in economic development. Such detours accompanied the delivery of highways, further rendering them seminal, if unpredictable, exercises in representation and governance alike.

1. İbrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan: Socio-Economic Structure of a Turkish Village* (Ankara: Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 1957 [1945]), p. 30 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Ibid*., p. 34 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları* Turkey’s Highways from a Sociological and Economic Perspective (Istanbul: Elif Kitabevi, 1961), p. 97 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), p. 135 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Patrick Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City* (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 11-12; Larkin, *Signal and Noise*, p. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Rudolph Mrázek, *Engineers of Happyland: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Patrick Carroll, *Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Jo Guldi, *Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). For similar work undertaken by the extension of railways, see Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); On Barak, *Egyptian Times: Temporality, Personhood, and the Technopolitical making of Modern Egypt, 1830-1930,* Unpublished PhD dissertation, New York University, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 85 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. On non/human actants as sources of action with the ability to produce material effects, see Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 5 (55), May 1955 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 7 (83), September 1957 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Karayolları Çalışmaları” Work on Highways, *Arkitekt* (Volume 253-4), 1954, p. 245 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Yol Davamız: 9 Yılda 23000 Kilometre* Our Road Cause: 23000 Kilometers in 9 Years (Ankara: Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1948), p. 13; “Yollarımız ve Amerikalı Uzmanlar” Our Roads and the American Experts, *Ulus,* March 16, 1948; *Yol Davamız* Our Road Cause, Prepared for the Izmir International Fair (1949) and *1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor* Report on the work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records), p. 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Yavuz Abadan, “Yol Siyasetimiz” Our Road Politics *Ulus* September 5, 1948; *1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor*, pp. 8-9 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 6 (70), August 1956 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Highway Transportation in Turkey* (Ankara: Turkish General Directorate of Highways, 1957), p. 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid; *1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor* Report on the work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records), p. 49 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Kemal Cündübeyoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Yol Davası” The Road Cause of Turkey, *Karayollari Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 5 (50), October 1955 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Şevket Rado, “Türkiye’nin yol davası hal yoluna girmiştir” Turkey’s Road Cause is on its way to being solved. *Akşam*, October 12, 1950 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 132 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Çağlar Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” *New Left Review* (115), 1979, pp. 16-7 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. “Şehirli ve Köylü Hakkında” About the Urbanite and the Villager *Forum* 4 (47), March 1, 1956, p. 5. The bimonthly journal *Forum*, which was published by a group from the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University between 1954 and 1970, and followed a pro-CHP line, frequently addressed the “villager problem.” [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Aydın Yalçın, “Köyü Kalkındırma Muamması” The Village Development Conundrum, *Forum*, 4 (43), January 1, 1956, p. 13-4 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid*.,* p. 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Aydın Yalçın, “Türkiye’de Demokrasi” Democracy in Turkey. Speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University. *Forum*, 10 (119), March 1, 1959, pp. 7-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 116 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Parliamentary Records, Dönem 9, Cilt 3, December 11, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 3, 1950 (Ankara, Turkey) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları,* Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 3, 1950 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları,* Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. A new organization called The General Directorate of Road, Water, and Electricity took over the task of building and maintaining rural roads in 1965. Şen, *Tükriye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci*, p. 169 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. “Köye Gidecek Yol” The Road to the Village, *Hürriyet,* September 2, 1950 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 161 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Süha Somer, “Ana Davalarımız” Our Primary Causes, *Vatan,* March 6, 1948 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. “Yol Davasının Gerçek Manası” The True Meaning of the Road Cause *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 3 (30), April 1953 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Herbert J. Cummings, “Turkish Highway Program—An Interim Economic Appraisal” *Foreign Commerce Weekly* 45 (8), November 19, 1951, p. 32 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Haluk Űlman and Frank Tachau, “Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy” *Middle East Journal* 19 (2), 1965, p. 154 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 131 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Frederick Frey, “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey” in Lucian Pye, ed. *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 319; Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Robert Kerwin, *Etatism in Turkey, 1933-50.* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), p. 249 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü 25 Yaşında* The Highway Directorate is 25 Years Old, eds. Mustafa Babur, İsmet İlter, Nevzat Erdoğdu (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1975), p. 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Turhan Feyzioğlu, “Iki Türkiye” Two Turkeys, *Forum,* 1 (7), July 1, 1954, p. 8. By one account, this was particularly true of regions to the east of Euphrates, with Kurdish being spoken by 65% of the people, followed by Turkish at 27% and other languages at 8% (Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 134). See Figure 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Barbara Helling and George Helling, *Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1958), p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 163 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Ibid*., p. 136 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Lütfi Yeleşen, *Karayolları Bülteni* 4 (38), December 1953 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Robert Hartmann, “Turkish Production Boosted by ECA” in *Uncle Sam in Turkey* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1951), p. 29 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), p. 232 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor* Report on the work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records), p. 26 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. See Figures 2 and 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*, p. 191. For more on the work maps do in terms of representation, classification, and control, see James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* and Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts* [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 254 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Frederick Frey, *Regional Variations in Rural Turkey* (Cambridge: CENIS, 1966), pp. 4 and 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. “Usually the Aegean and Marmara Regions display the greatest degrees of village development or modernity, followed by the South Central, Mediterranean, North Central and Black Sea Regions in an intermediate position, with the Northeastern, East Central and Southeastern Regions generally being in the least developed or least modern position.” *Ibid*., p. 9. See Figure 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Frey, *Regional Variations*, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. *Ibid*., p. 34 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. *Ibid*., pp. 11, 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Kemal Cündübeyoğlu, “Şark, Garp, Şimal, Cenup Hepsi Vatan” East, West, North, South, All is Our Land *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 3 (36), October 1953 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. “Doğudaki İllerimizin Kalkındırılması İçin” In order for our Eastern Provinces to Develop, *Ulus*, September 3, 1948 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Cündübeyoğlu, “Şark, Garp, Şimal, Cenup Hepsi Vatan” [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Leyla Şen, *Tükriye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci* The Development of Railroads and Highways in Turkey (Ankara: Tesav Yayınları, 2003), p. 145 [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Out of that 10 million, the Ministry of Education was allocated 1,940,000 Liras (for school buildings and teacher housing), the Ministry of Public Works 5,260,000 Liras (for all-weather roads between Nizip and Silvan, Rize and Erzurum, Bitlis, Hakkari, and Ağrı, among others), and the remaining 1,200,000 was given to the Ministry of Health (for local health centers and a traveling hospital). *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Dönem 8, Cilt 19, May 9, 1949 (Parliamentary Records). Some of the money appears to have been spent on housing for civil servants in Diyarbakir, Mardin and Urfa. See “Doğu Kalkınma Planı Gerçekleşiyor” The Eastern Development Plan is Implemented, *Ulus*, January 1, 1950 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. “Doğudaki İllerimizin Kalkındırılması İçin” For Our Eastern Provinces to Develop, *Ulus,* September 3, 1948 [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Doğuda Yapılacak Yeni Yollar” New Roads to be Built in the East, *Vatan,* October 21, 1948 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 134 [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Dönem 9, Cilt 14, June 28, 1950 (Parliamentary Records); Menderes’ statement to the Press, December 21, 1952, cited in Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)* A Chronological Account of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey (Ankara: Bilgi, 1976), p. 105 [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Kırbaşlı, *1920-1972 Döneminde Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler*, p. 111 [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. For early formulations of regional underdevelopment, see Ruşen Keleş *Türkiye’de Bölgeler Arası Dengesizlikler* Interregional Imbalances in Turkey (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1964); Özer Ozankaya, “Doğu Anadolu Sorunu” The Eastern Anatolia Problem *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 24 (3) 1969; Cavit Tütengil, “Bölgesel Az Gelişme ve Bölgeler Arası Dengesizlik Sorunu” Regional Underdevelopment and the Problem of Interregional Imbalance *Sosyoloji Konferansları Dergisi* (15) 1977. For a relatively early and sympathetic account that formulates the problem in terms of an “imbalance in social justice” stemming from the uneven distribution of public services, see İsmail Beşikçi *Doğuda Değişim ve Yapısal Sorunlar* Change and Structural Problems in the East (Ankara: Sevinç, 1969), p. 5. I would like to thank Brendan O’Leary for alerting me to Beşikçi’s work. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “The State Highways: A Report from the Highway Pavilion,” enclosed in Williams to Hilts, August 24, 1950, RG 30, Box 507 [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Ibid*. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 120 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” p. 22 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Faruk Birtek, “The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950,” pp. 435-6; Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” p. 19. In fact, the marketization of certain segments of the peasantry dated back to the 1920s, when the “middle farmer stratum was beginning to grow a surplus, and the large farmers were tightly integrated into the world markets.” (Birtek and Keyder, “Agriculture and the State,” p. 451). Nevertheless, this was a low-level marketization and the “entire period between 1929 and 1945 may be characterized by the closure of isolated villages when agricultural stagnation implied a substantially decreased level of economic integration with both national and world markets” (Keyder, *State and Class* *in Turkey*, p. 129) [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. United States Department of State, *Aid to Turkey: Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey*. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Keyder, *State and Class*, pp. 127-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Thornburg, *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal*, p. 86 [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. “Karayolları Çalışmaları” Work on Highways, *Arkitekt* (Volume 253-4), 1954, p. 249 [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ibid.; Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 344 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Russell Dorr’s speech in the wake of his departure from Turkey. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 41, Folder: Russell Dorr Speeches. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. *Highway Transportation in Turkey*, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. *Ibid*. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Helling and Helling, *Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach*, p. 10. Priority in extending the road network was in fact accorded to areas of concentration of economic activity across Western Turkey. Reports on early project completion dates included the road between Pendik, Gebze and Izmit, just outside of Istanbul or the road between Akhisar and Gördes, which would deliver the industrial and agricultural goods of Izmir and the Aegean region to Central Anatolia and back to the port of Izmir (*Karayollari Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 1(3), January 1951). For a more detailed account of the prioritized roads in Western and Central Anatolia in the initial 9-year program, see Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, pp. 34-7 and Şen, *Tükriye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci*, pp. 130-33. Also see Figures 5 through 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Howard Reed, “A New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey” *Middle East Journal* 7 (1), 1953, p. 35; Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 50; Edwin Cohn, “Turkish Development 1922-57,” Background Paper for the First Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, October 14, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records); Űlman and Tachau, “Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy,” p. 154 [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Robert Hartmann, “Turkish Farming Being Modernized” in *Uncle Sam in Turkey* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1951), pp. 25-6 [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. John Kolars, *Tradition, Season, and Change in a Turkish Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 113-4 and 187 [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Russell Dorr’s speech in the wake of his departure from Turkey. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 41, Folder: Russell Dorr Speeches. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Manu Goswami, *Producing India,* pp. 39 and 106 [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. John Morrison, *Alişar: A Unit of Land Occupancy in the Kanak Su Basin of Central Anatolia*. (A dissertation submitted to the Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1939). On the influential nature of this text, see Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, “Sosyal İlim Metodolojisi: Köy ve Nüfus Araştırmaları, İzmir Araştırması” (*Social Science Methodology: The Village and Population Studies, the Izmir Study)* in *Türkiye’de Sosyal Araştırmaların Gelişmesi: Hacettepe Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü ve Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği Seminerinde Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara: Hacettepe Ünivresitesi Yayınları: 1971), p. 178; Sinan Yıldırmaz, *From “Imaginary” to “Real”: A Social History of the Peasantry in Turkey (1945-1960)*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Morrison, *Alişar*, p. 104 [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. *Ibid*., p. 105 [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 381 [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Law Proposal 1/979 Regarding the Administration of the Ministry of Public Works, May 9, 1934, cited in Bilsay Kuruç, *Belgelerle Türkiye İktisat Politikası 2. Cilt*, pp. 531-2; Law Proposal 1/431 Regarding Roads and Bridges, April 10, 1929 cited in Bilsay Kuruç, *Belgelerle Türkiye İktisat Politikası 1. Cilt (1929-1932)* Turkey’s Political Economy with Documents Volumes 1 and 2 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1988), p. 337 [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Birtek, “The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950,” p. 412 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* Turkey’s 1947 Economic Development Plan in the Postwar Context (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1974), p. 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Mühendis Nazır, “Demiryollarımızda Nakil Ücretleri” Transportation Costs in Our Railroads *Kadro* (32), August 1934, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, pp. 28-9 [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Meeting on the Law Proposal for a Railway to Connect the Sivas-Erzurum Line with Malatya, Parliamentary Debate on May 20, 1933 cited in Bilsay Kuruç, *Belgelerle Türkiye İktisat Politikası 2. Cilt (1933-1935)* Turkey’s Political Economy with Documents (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1988), p. 41 [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. It should be noted that comparisons between the capabilities of trucks, buses, and trains were being debated as early as the 1930s. See Muhlis Etem, “Otobüs ve Kamyon Nakliyatı ve Bunların Demiryolu Nakliyatile Mukayesesi” Bus and Truck Transportation and Their Comparison with Railroad Transportation, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası,* 10 (61), 1933 and Vedat Nedim, “Demiryolu Tarife Siyasetimizde Inkilap” A Revolution in our Railway Pricing Policy *Kadro* (32), August 1934, p. 13. I would like to thank Selim Karlıtekin for drawing my attention to these texts. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Birtek, “The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey,” p. 436 [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Wilfred Owen, *Strategy for Mobility* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 93-100. For similar accounts, see *1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor* Report on the work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records); “Yollarımız ve Amerikalı Uzmanlar” Our Roads and the American Experts, *Ulus,* March 16, 1948; *Yol Davamız* Our Road Cause, Prepared for the Izmir International Fair (1949) and “Functions of the Divisions and Offices of the General Directorate of Highways,” March 1, 1950 (report circulated to deputy directors and division engineers) (KGM Records). [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Harold Hilts, *Türkiye’nin Yol Durumu*, Turkey’s Highway Situation, p. 26 (Report delivered to the Ministry of Public Works, February 1948, Ankara, KGM Records). [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Edwin Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change: The Development of a more Prosperous and Open Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 55; *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951. Proponents of this view of belatedness were MP’s Himmet Őlçmen and Ahmet Tokuş [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Tütengil*, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. While the express train took 23 hours to travel between Ankara and Istanbul, the truck covered the same distance in10 hours. Haulage costs, in turn, were 13 and 8 Kuruş for the train and the truck respectively. As for passenger trasnportation, the bus cost 25 Lira as against the first class train rate of 85 Liras, with travel times of 8 and 14 hours respectively. Ireland, *Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi*, pp. 254-5 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 79 [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Between 1948 and 1959, the number of buses increased from 2,198 to 8,291 and trucks from 10,596 to 36,919. Planlama Fen Heyeti Müdürlüğü cited in Ireland, *Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi*, p. 262. See Figures 9 through 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. *Ibid*., p. 258 [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Virilio, Paul, *Speed and Politics*. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1977) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. The daily *Hürriyet* started the first distribution service in 1955—a truck would leave Istanbul at 3 am and deliver copies of the newspaper to Edirne by 7 am. Tekeli, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 423 [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. *Karayollari Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 5 (52), April 1954 [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951 [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre 9, Cilt 28, February 25, 1954 [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Mrázek, *Engineers of Happyland*, p. 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. The Directorate of Highways was quick to perform its part in the immediate aftermath of the passing of the Law for the Encouragement of Tourism, publishing a bulletin called the *Touristic Roads Program*. The extension of all-weather roads was promoted as a precondition for the spread of hotels, restaurants, and service stations given the nascent transcontinental, as well as domestic tourism industry. See *Turistik Yollar Programı* Touristic Roads Program (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1951) (KGM Records) [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,” *World Politics* 13 (1), 1960, p. 35; Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 140; Kolars, *Tradition, Season, and Change*, p. 112 [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Kemal Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages” *Social Research* 27 (1) 1960, p. 95 [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. *Ibid.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Nermin Abadan, *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri: Ankara Yüksek Öğrenim Gençliği Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* The Spare-Time Activities of University Students: A Study of Ankara Higher Education Youth(Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1962); A. T. J. Matthews, *Emergent Turkish Administrators: A Study of the Vocational and Social Attitudes of Junior and Potential Administrators* (Ankara: Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1955); Mübeccel Kıray, *Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası* A Coastal Town Prior to Heavy Industry (Ankara: TC Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1964) [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Kolars, *Tradition, Season, and Change,* p. 111 [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, pp. 125-6 [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Lerner, *Passing*, pp. 39-40 [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Morrison, *Alişar*, p. ii; Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 87 [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Politics of the Near East: Southwest Asia and Northern Africa” *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 442 [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Frey, “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey,” pp. 321-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change*, p. 56 [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 88 [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Lerner, *Passing,* p. 29 [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. İlhan Özdil, *A Causative-Diagnostic Analysis of Turkey’s Major Problems and a Communicative Approach to their Solution* (Dissertation submitted to Ohio State University, 1954), p. 20; Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 103 [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. *Ibid.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Emphasis in the original. Lerner, *Passing*, p. 132 [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. *Ibid.,* p. 49 [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Tütengil*, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 143 [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Aydın Yalçın, “Türkiye’de Demokrasi” Democracy in Turkey. Speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University. *Forum* 10 (119), March 1, 1959, p. 8; Kolars, *Tradition, Season, and Change in a Turkish Village*, p. 110 [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Lerner, *Passing,* p. 132 [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Edwin Cohn, “Time, the Future and Economic Development” Background Paper for the Second Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, November 12, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records); Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, p. 34; Niyazi Berkes, *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* Research on Some Ankara Villages (Ankara: Uzluk Basımevi, 1942), pp. 58-9; Lerner, *Passing,* p. 133; Mahmut Makal, *A Village in Anatolia*, trans. Wyndham Deedes (London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1954), p. 58 [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Yasa, *Hasanoğlan: Socio-Economic Structure of a Turkish Village,* p. 180 [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Muzafer Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology* (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 692-3 [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. *Ibid.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Joyce, *Rule of Freedom,* pp. 13-4 [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 100 [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Kıray, *Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası*, p. 165 [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. *Ibid.,* p. 168 [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. *Ibid*. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. *Ibid*., pp. 173-6 [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Lerner, *Passing*, p. 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 88 [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Reed, “A New Force at Work,” p. 44 [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Robinson’s initial assignment had been with the Institute of Current World Affairs. For an overview of his career which culminated in a joint appointment at the Harvard Business School and the Middle East Center, see Richard Robinson, “A Personal Journey through Time and Space” *Journal of International Business Studies* 25 (3), 1994 [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Robinson to Walter S. Rogers, December 15, 1948; March 1, 1949; October 25, 1949; March 15, 1949; *Letters from Turkey*, (Reprinted for the Peace Corps by Permission of the Institute for Current World Affairs), (Istanbul: Robert College, 1965) [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Robinson to Rogers, August 8, 1949, *Letters from Turkey* [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967); Lerner, “Towards a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of Considerations” in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*; Samuel Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” *World Politics* 17 (3), 1965 [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Cohn, “Some Propositions Concerning the Role of Human Factors in Economic Development,” Background Paper for the First Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, October 14, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records) [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Robinson to Rogers, August 8, 1949, *Letters from Turkey* [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 22 (3), 1958; “Tractors in the Village: A Study in Turkey” *Journal of Farm Economics* 34 (4), 1952 [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Keyder, *State and Class*, p. 135 [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Abrams, “The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning”; Bernard Wagner, Housing Advisor, “Housing in Turkey” (Ankara, October 1955). Abrams’ report included the recommendation to breed “in-perts,” in lieu of experts, resulting in the founding of the Middle East Technical University (METU) through the sponsorship of UN Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA), and later, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as an advisory committee from the University of Pennsylvania. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Kolars, *Tradition, Season, and Change*, pp. 16-7 [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Frey, “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey,” p. 322. Frey seems to have been made aware of this particular peasant through Karpat’s article: “Tractors are being extensively used for transportation between villages and towns; the extreme example concerns a peasant from Pamukova, a village in western Anatolia, who used his tractor for a family trip to Germany” (“Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 92) [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Sabri Űlgener, “Value Patterns of Traditional Societies: Turkish Experience” *Social Aspects of Economic Development: A report of the international conference on social aspects of economic development held at Istanbul, August 4-24, 1963, sponsored by the Economic and Social Studies Conference Board*, p. 128 [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. *Ibid.,* p. 129 [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Reed, “A New Force at Work,” p. 42 [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Helling and Helling, *Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach*, p. 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008 [1981]), p. 98 [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-4 [↑](#footnote-ref-166)