Polarization of Candidate Quality Perceptions:
Evidence of Ideological Bias in Voters’ Evaluations of Candidates’ Competence

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Abstract: Candidate valence and ideology often are considered separate, although equally important, dimensions of voters’ evaluations of candidates. Yet in the polarized environment of U.S. House elections, voters do not separate candidates’ ideology from quality. I hypothesize voters exhibit consistency or assimilation bias, rating candidates ideologically similar to themselves as higher quality than candidates ideologically dissimilar. Using a survey of voters and experts from recent U.S. House elections, I find that as voters’ ideological distance from a candidate increases, voters’ rating of a candidate’s competency decreases. However, this relationship between ideological distance and candidate quality rating is conditioned on party identification for incumbents, with opposing partisanship amplifying the negative effect of ideological distance on incumbent quality rating. Experimental evidence shows that if provided only policy, party, or ideology information regarding a candidate, participants who disagree with the candidate’s preferences attach negative quality assessments to the candidate. These results imply that polarization runs deeper than partisan or ideological differences – it is personal.

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Political polarization in the United States typically is considered on partisan or ideological dimensions (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams 2008, Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Scholars point to many ramifications of polarization, including, but not limited to, legislative gridlock (Binder 2003), increasing importance of parties for voters (Hetherington 2001), and clearer cues and ideological choices for voters (Burden 2004). As the differences between candidates on ideological and party dimensions increase, I contend that political polarization has another ramification: polarization of candidate quality ratings.

I argue that political polarization also is personal: voters have polarized views of candidates’ quality and competency, aligning with their ideological and partisan distances from candidates. Rather than using ideology and valence as separate dimensions to evaluate candidates, voters exhibit assimilation or consistency bias, rating candidates ideologically similar to themselves as higher quality than candidates ideologically dissimilar. This study uses a survey of voters and experts from the 2010 U.S. House elections to test the expectation that individuals ideologically more distant from a candidate rate the candidate as less competent for office than individuals ideologically closer to a candidate, finding support for this expectation among both incumbents and challengers. Among incumbents, however, evidence indicates that shared partisanship between an individual and the incumbent mitigates the relationship between ideological distance and candidate competency rating, while differing partisanship amplifies the relationship between ideological distance and incumbent competency rating. Experimental evidence bolsters these findings, showing that even when individuals are presented only with policy, party, or ideological information for a candidate, they infer positive or negative personal quality ratings of the candidate based on whether they agree or disagree with the candidate.
Overall these results indicate that individuals have politically polarized assessments of candidate competence.

**Evaluating candidates through a biased lens**

Voters evaluate candidates on multiple dimensions, most prominently party identification, ideology, issue positions, and valence. Valence – non-policy personal qualities (Stokes 1963) – is important to voters in its own right (McCurley and Mondak 1995, Mondak 1995) and often is considered as separate from political considerations of partisanship and ideology.¹ Yet in an increasingly polarized environment, I argue that valence ratings of candidates also are politically motivated.

Theories of assimilation or consistency bias posit that individuals are more likely to remember policy positions consistent with preexisting notions (e.g., Lodge and Hamill 1986, Huckfeldt et al. 1998), and use shortcuts to make conjectures about candidates’ policy positions (e.g., Brady and Sniderman 1985, Kinder 1978). Kinder (1978), for example, finds individuals assume shared policy preferences with candidates they like (assimilation or positive projection), but contrasting policy preferences for candidates they dislike (contrast or negative projection).²

Theories of assimilation or projection bias propose voters assume candidate policy positions based on whether they like or dislike a candidate, but how do candidate policy positions influence voters’ ratings of candidate quality?

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¹ Note, however, studies of candidate positioning which explicitly consider valence and ideology together as dimensions which jointly affect candidate positioning and success (e.g., Adams et al. 2011, Burden 2004, Buttice and Stone 2012, Stone and Simas 2010).

² Judd, Kenny, and Krosnick (1983) reach similar conclusions, but, in contrast, Krosnick (1990) finds support for neither positive nor negative projection.
Theoretically, a candidate’s valence – competency for office, integrity, and leadership skills – could be evaluated objectively, and separate from feelings for a candidate. But based on theories of assimilation or consistency bias, voters may evaluate candidate quality through politically biased lenses. Rather than evaluate candidates’ quality objectively, voters may assume they do not like candidates with divergent policy preferences, but like candidates with similar policy preferences. Even beyond feelings of like or dislike for a candidate, individuals may assume that candidates with opposing policy preferences or ideologies are not fit for office while candidates with similar ideologies are more fit for office. Particularly in a politically polarized environment, individuals may believe that candidates with opposing ideologies must also lack valence qualities desired in elected officials: integrity, leadership skills, ability to work well with others, competence, etc. In contrast, a candidate on a voter’s ideological side may assume the candidate rates highly on valence qualities such as integrity, leadership, and ability to work well with others. I expect individuals make politically biased assumptions about a candidate’s personal qualities based on their ideological distance from the candidate:

**Ideological distance hypothesis**: In a comparison of individuals, individuals ideologically more distant from a candidate will rate the candidate as less competent for office than individuals ideologically closer to a candidate.

Particularly in the polarized environment of U.S. politics, partisanship will also play a role in evaluations of candidate quality. I hypothesize that candidate quality rating is conditioned on party identification, with opposing partisanship amplifying the negative effect of ideological distance on candidate quality rating. Individuals within the same party as a candidate will give the candidate the benefit of the doubt, assuming higher quality than would otherwise assume based on ideological distance. Conversely, individuals with partisanship opposite a candidate will rate the candidate’s quality even more poorly than they would otherwise based solely on
ideological distance. I expect the magnitude of the ideological distance effect on ratings of
candidate quality is conditioned on shared partisanship:

**Partisanship interaction hypothesis**: Shared partisanship between an individual and a candidate
mitigates the relationship between ideological distance and candidate competency rating.
Differing partisanship amplifies the relationship between ideological distance and candidate
competency rating.

**Model and data**

To test these hypotheses I employ a model predicting an individual’s rating of candidate
competency, estimated using ordered logistic regression (Equation 1). To test the ideological
distance hypothesis, I include ideological distance between the individual and candidate ($\beta_1$) as a
predictor of an individual’s rating of candidate competency. I expect $\beta_1$ to be negative, indicating
that the ideologically further from the candidate an individual is, the lower he or she will rate the
candidate’s competency. The model also includes shared party identification ($\beta_2$), which I expect
to be positive – if an individual and candidate have the same party affiliation, the individual will
rate the candidate’s competency higher than if they were from opposite political parties.

\[
\text{Candidate competency rating} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Ideological distance between individual and candidate}) \\
+ \beta_2 (\text{Shared partisanship}) \\
+ \theta (\text{Control variables}) + \epsilon
\] (1)

To test the partisanship interaction hypothesis, I include an interaction between shared party
identification and ideological distance between the individual and candidate (Equation 2). I
expect the interaction ($\beta_3$) will be positive, suggesting shared partisanship mitigates the negative
effect of ideological distance on candidate competency ratings.
Candidate competency rating $= \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Ideological distance between individual and candidate})$

$+ \beta_2 (\text{Shared partisanship})$

$+ \beta_3 (\text{Ideological distance} \times \text{Shared partisanship})$

$+ \theta (\text{Control variables}) + \epsilon \quad (2)$

For these models I employ ordered logistic regression, clustering on district and estimated separately for incumbents and challengers.

I test these hypotheses using individual-level survey data from the 2010 Congressional Cooperative Election Study (CCES), coupled with expert ratings of U.S. House candidates from the 2010 UC Davis Congressional Election Study. The 2010 CCES survey is composed of 20,000 respondents, selected from among 155 districts in 2010.$^3$ The UC Davis Congressional Election Study surveyed political experts these 155 congressional districts to estimate ideological positions and valence of House incumbents and challengers in the 2010 elections. Expert respondents were delegates to the 2008 national convention, county chairs, state legislators resident in the districts, and constituents who scored above a certain threshold on a knowledge battery. Experts were from both political parties, permitting the estimation and correction for partisan bias in individual experts’ candidate placements.$^4$ District expert samples averaged approximately 31 respondents per district, so the candidate placement measures are district means of adjusted individual expert ratings.$^5$

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$^3$ The district sample is composed of a random cross-section of 100 districts, supplemented with a sample of 55 districts anticipated in the summer of 2006 to be competitive and/or open.

$^4$ Individual experts’ ratings were corrected for partisan bias by regressing the candidate rating on the partisanship of the expert, relative to the candidate (‘same party’ = 1; ‘independent’ = 0; “opposite party” = -1). The coefficient indicates the degree of partisan bias across the sample; ratings were corrected by subtracting the coefficient from the individual expert’s rating of the candidate.

$^5$ Note that the reliability and validity of district expert ratings of candidate ideological placements has been investigated in depth (Maestas, Buttice, and Stone 2014), and found to be highly reliable and valid by several standards.
The dependent variable is an individual’s rating of a candidate’s competency. Survey respondents were asked to “rate the following characteristics of the Democratic [Republican] candidate for the U.S. House in your district” with “Competence” as one of the characteristics. Response options ranged from “Extremely weak” (0) to “Fair” (3) to “Extremely strong” (6) with each response option labeled and a “Not sure” option available. Responses were recoded to correspond to ratings of the incumbent or challenger in each district.

The primary independent variable of interest is ideological distance between the candidate and individual respondent. Ideological distance between candidate and individual is the absolute value of the difference between the individual’s ideological self-placement and the district experts’ corrected average placement of the candidate. Higher values indicate the candidate and individual are farther apart ideologically; closer values indicate greater ideological similarity. I use district experts’ ratings of candidate ideological positions to mitigate a possible endogeneity issue that might arise if I used respondents’ own placements of candidates’ ideological positions. Using respondents’ own perceptions of candidates’ ideological locations would be problematic if respondents rate a candidate as more competent if they perceive the candidate to be ideologically closer to their own preferences, regardless of how ideologically close or far a candidate actually is. Similarly, a respondent may rate a candidate as less competent if they perceive the candidate to be ideologically distant from their preferences. By using an objective, expert rating of candidates’ ideological locations, I can estimate the effect of respondents’ ‘true’ objective ideological distance from candidates.

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6 Respondents and district experts were asked to place themselves and the candidates on the same ideological scale ranging from “Very liberal” (1) to “Middle of the road” (4) to “Very conservative” (7), with each scale option labeled and a “Not sure” option available.
Shared partisanship is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the candidate and respondent have the same party identification and 0 otherwise.\textsuperscript{7} I estimated these models including the following control variables:

- **Expert competency rating**: while I expect individuals’ ratings of candidate competency to be biased based on their ideological distance from the candidate, how competent the candidate objectively is also plays a role. Expert competency rating is the district experts’ mean rating of the candidate, measured on the same scale as individuals rated the candidate. The competency scale ranges from extremely weak (0) to extremely strong (6).

- **Incumbent vote**: vote for the incumbent is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for respondents who state they will vote for the incumbent and 0 otherwise. As part of justification for their choice of candidate, voters who report supporting the incumbent likely will rate the incumbent as more competent than the challenger, and vice versa for voters who support the challenger.

- **Campaign spending ratio**: to account for the competitiveness of the congressional district race, I include a measure of campaign spending. More competitive races raise the stakes of an election outcome and potentially the level of partisan and ideological tension, which may, in turn, cause voters’ ratings of candidates to be more ideologically charged. Campaign spending ratio is measured as the logged ratio of incumbent spending to challenger spending in the congressional district.

\textsuperscript{7} Respondents who identify as Independent are coded as 0 on the shared partisanship variable. While identifying with neither party may be substantively different than identifying with the opposite party of the candidate, results from analysis excluding independents is not substantively different than results presented here.
• Political sophistication: individual respondents’ political knowledge is calculated as the count of the number of knowledge questions related to current national and state political environment that respondents answered correctly.\textsuperscript{8}

• Political interest: interest in politics is assessed using respondents’ answer to the question of how interested they are in news and public affairs. Interest is measured on a four-point scale ranging from interested in news and public affairs most of the time (3), and interested in news and public affairs hardly at all (0).

• Media attention: attention to media is measured using a battery of four yes/no questions asking respondents whether they receive news or information via blogs, television, newspaper or radio. Responses are summed as a count of the number of outlets from which a respondent receives information. Responses range from receiving news or information from zero media outlets to four media outlets.

Results

Table 1 presents results for the unconditional model predicting incumbent competency ratings and challenger competency ratings (Equation 1). As seen in the table, respondents’ ideological distance from the candidate negatively impacts their competency ratings of both incumbents and challengers – respondents ideologically further from the candidate evaluate the candidate’s competence lower than respondents ideologically closer to the candidate. The magnitude of the effect of ideological distance is larger for challengers than incumbents, likely a reflection of respondents being less familiar with the challenger, thus using ideological distance as a heuristic

\textsuperscript{8} Political knowledge questions include whether the respondent knows which party controls the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, state senate and state lower house, and whether the respondent can identify the name and political party of his/her two U.S. Senators, U.S. House member, and state governor.
for other evaluations of the challenger. Shared partisanship is positive and significant for both incumbents and challengers, indicating, as expected, that respondents identifying with the candidate’s party report higher competency ratings for the candidate.

Incumbent vote is positive and significant for incumbents and negative and significant for challengers – those voting for the incumbent rate the incumbent’s competency higher and the challenger’s competency lower. This result indicates, as we would expect, that individuals’ support for a candidate likely is tied to their evaluations of candidate’s fitness for office. Expert competency rating is positive and significant, reassuring evidence that respondents are responsive to objective ratings of candidates’ competency. Candidates whose objective competency scores, as rated by district experts, are higher receive higher competency ratings from constituents. Neither political sophistication, media attention, nor interest in politics are statistically significant. Overall, evidence in Table 1 supports the ideological distance hypothesis: individuals ideologically more distant from a candidate will rate the candidate as less competent for office than individuals ideologically closer to a candidate.

[Table 1 here]

Table 2 presents results from the model including the interaction between ideological distance and shared partisanship (Equation 2). As in the unconditional model, the constituent effect of ideological distance is negative and significant for both incumbents and challengers, with a larger effect for challengers than incumbents. Shared partisanship and the interaction between shared partisanship and ideological distance, however, are only significant for incumbents. Figure 1 visually represents the results in Table 2 for incumbents.

[Table 2 and Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 plots the probability of the highest competency rating (extremely strong competence) by ideological distance between the incumbent and respondent for respondents with shared partisanship with and different partisanship from the incumbent. Regardless of shared partisanship or not, individuals ideologically farther from the incumbent are less likely to rate the incumbent as extremely competent than those ideologically closer to the incumbent. This relationship between ideological distance and competency rating, however, is stronger for respondents not from the same party as the incumbent. Respondents with shared partisanship are more likely to give the incumbent the benefit of the doubt with a higher competency rating, regardless of ideological distance – the relationship between ideological distance and competency rating is weaker for those with shared partisanship. In contrast, the relationship between ideological distance and competency rating is stronger for respondents who do not share the incumbent’s partisanship – as ideological distance increases, respondents of differing partisanship punish incumbents more severely in how they rate the incumbent’s competence. For incumbents there is support for the partisanship interaction hypothesis: shared partisanship between an individual and the incumbent mitigates the relationship between ideological distance and candidate competency rating, while differing partisanship amplifies the relationship between ideological distance and candidate competency rating.

**Experimental evidence**

To further explore how a candidate’s ideology and party affiliation bias individuals’ ratings of the candidate’s personal qualities, I briefly summarize experimental evidence showing that even when presented with only policy, ideology, or party information for candidates, respondents rate candidates’ quality in a politically biased manner. This experimental analysis also addresses
concerns that respondents’ familiarity with a candidate affects their ratings of the candidate’s quality separate from ideological distance and shared partisanship. An experiment allows me to isolate the effects of ideology and partisanship on candidate quality ratings.

The experiment included three hundred sixteen participants, recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents participated via an online survey and were compensated through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The experimental prompt presented participants with information regarding hypothetical candidates, labeled as Candidate A and Candidate B, considering running for congress. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups which varied the type of candidate information provided: policy positions (group 1), ideology (group 2), party identification (group 3), or valence information (group 4). All groups saw identical biographical, experience, and occupation information for the candidates. After the treatment, participants evaluated candidates on a series of quality traits, such as competence, honesty, and likeability. Then participants reported their own ideology, party identification, and preferences on a series of policy issues. Since participants have no other previous biases toward or information for the candidates, any effect I see in terms of quality ratings is due to participants’ reactions to candidates’ policy positions, ideology, or party affiliation.

Although participants rated the candidates on multiple valence measures, here I only present the results related to ratings of competency to align with observational results presented above. For the competency measure, participants rated the candidate’s competency as weak (0), fair (1), or strong (2). To see the differences in competency ratings based on whether the

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9 The sample leans Democratic (50.1 percent Democrat) and liberal (44.6 percent liberal), the majority of participants are Caucasian (80.5 percent), and a large percent report they are very interested in politics and public affairs (40.5 percent). Although the sample is not representative of the U.S. population, it still is useful to use this experimental evidence to isolate and explore the effect of ideology and partisanship on candidate quality ratings.
participant agreed or disagreed with the candidate’s ideology, policy positions, or party, I pooled
participants into two groups based on whether they agree or disagree with the candidate based on
their reported ideology, policy preferences, and partisanship.

[Figure 2 and Table 3 here]

Figure 2 presents the mean competency score for Candidates A and B based on whether
participants agree or disagree with the candidate’s ideology, party, or policy preferences. For
both Candidate A and Candidate B, competency ratings are significantly higher ($p = 0.000$)
among participants who agree with the candidate’s policy, party or ideology than among
participants who disagree with the candidate. Table 3 presents these results in a different manner,
as a cross-tabulation of competency ratings and whether the participant agrees with the candidate
for both Candidates A and B. Examining those who agree with Candidate A, only 7.2 percent
rated Candidate A’s competence as weak while 48.5 percent rated the candidate’s competence as
strong. A higher percentage of those who agree with the candidate rate the candidate’s
competence as high, and we see a similar pattern among Candidate B supporters. Comparing
those who agree with Candidate A to those who disagree with Candidate A, 26.8 percent of those
who disagree with the candidate rated the candidate’s competence as weak, compared to only 7.2
percent of those who agree with the candidate. We see a similar pattern comparing those who
agree and disagree with Candidate B: a higher percentage of those who disagree with the
candidate rate the candidate’s competence as weak compared to those who agree with the
candidate. This difference between agreeing or disagreeing with the candidate and competency
rating is statistically significant (chi-square = 22.11 for Candidate A and 24.21 for Candidate B;
$p = 0.000$).
It should be noted, however, that the sample size within each subgroup presented in Table 3 and Figure 2 is small, and I hesitate to make much of this statistically significant finding. Nevertheless, this experimental evidence suggests that even when participants have no information regarding a candidate’s personal qualities, participants base candidate competency ratings on whether they share the candidate’s ideology, partisanship, or policy preferences. Participants who share a candidate’s ideology, party, or policy preferences rate the candidate as more competent than candidate’s with whom they disagree. When no valence or quality information is available, participants rate candidate competency in a politically biased manner, indicating that individuals make inferences about candidate quality based on partisanship, ideology and policy positions.

There also is anecdotal experimental evidence that participants infer positive or negative valence information, even if only presented issue or ideology information for a candidate. When asked to describe their first impressions of a candidate they were presented only policy or ideology information for, open-ended responses from participants included: “reliable,” “an honest man,” “Grade-A political hack,” “hardworking,” “another fat cat,” “down to earth,” “reasonable person,” “he is the cancer,” “bad person and immoral,” “unlikeable,” “competent and capable of doing the duties that are required to hold a seat in politics,” “scumbag,” “not nearly as dirt as the many that are currently in power,” “genuine,” “kind to say the least,” “probably actually awful,” “likeable and honest person,” “a qualified candidate,” “sounds like a good guy,” and “the guy is a jerk.” These responses range from very positive to very negative, and often are personal attacks or praise based solely on knowledge of the candidate’s ideology or policy preferences. While anecdotal evidence, these valence-related responses, even when only
presented policy information, indicate that individuals evaluate candidate’s personal qualities and valence with politically biased lenses.

Discussion

There are many future avenues for this research, including evaluating other measures of valence, such as integrity, leadership skills, and likeability, and using experimental data to explore how different types of information may lead to more or less politically polarized assessments of candidate valence. Yet overall, observational and experimental evidence presented here demonstrate that individuals have politically polarized assessments of candidate competence. Survey data shows that as voters’ ideological distance from a candidate increases, voters’ rating of a candidate’s competence decreases. However, this relationship between ideological distance and candidate quality rating is conditioned on party identification for incumbents, with opposing partisanship amplifying the negative effect of ideological distance on incumbent quality rating. Experimental evidence reveals that if provided only policy, party, or ideology information regarding a candidate, participants who disagree with the candidate’s preferences rate the candidate’s competence as weaker than participants who agree with the candidate.

Rather than using ideology and valence as separate dimensions to evaluate candidates, voters exhibit assimilation or consistency bias, rating candidates ideologically similar to themselves as higher quality than candidates ideologically dissimilar. Among the many other consequences of political polarization, this study adds the polarization of candidate quality assessments as another ramification. Voters have polarized views of candidates’ quality, aligning with their ideological and partisan distances from candidates. These results imply that polarization runs deeper than partisan or ideological differences – it is personal.
Figure 1

Probability of High Competency Rating for Incumbent by Ideological Distance and Shared Partisanship

Notes: Estimates from Table 2 for incumbents; 95% confidence intervals

Figure 2

Experimental Evidence: Candidate Competency Rating by whether participant agrees or disagrees with candidate

Agree indicates the participant shares the candidate’s party affiliation, ideology, or policy preferences; disagree indicates the candidate and participant do not share these political preferences. Sample size = 305 for Candidate A and 220 for Candidate B.
### Table 1

**Ideological Distance and Candidate Competency Ratings for Incumbents and Challengers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency Rating</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological distance</td>
<td>-0.199 *** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.265 *** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared partisanship</td>
<td>0.406 *** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.455 ** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert competency rating</td>
<td>0.529 *** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.520 *** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent vote</td>
<td>3.184 *** (0.13)</td>
<td>-1.992 *** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign spending ratio</td>
<td>0.018 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Sophistication</td>
<td>0.023 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.089 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.057 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media attention</td>
<td>0.016 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1</td>
<td>1.176 (0.46)</td>
<td>-2.028 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
<td>2.183 (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.945 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 3</td>
<td>2.819 (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.342 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 4</td>
<td>4.332 (0.47)</td>
<td>1.167 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 5</td>
<td>5.466 (0.47)</td>
<td>2.235 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 6</td>
<td>7.079 (0.47)</td>
<td>3.947 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 11,390 | 5,061 |
| Log-likelihood | -14384.10 | -6609.43 |
| Pseudo R² | 0.193 | 0.144 |

Significance levels: *: 10%  **: 5%  ***: 1%

Ordered logistic regression coefficient estimates and robust standard errors clustering on district in parentheses. Data: 2010 Congressional Cooperative Election Study, coupled with the UC Davis Congressional Election Study.
Table 2  
**Ideological Distance and Candidate Competency Ratings for Incumbents and Challengers, Conditioned on Shared Partisanship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency Rating</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological distance</td>
<td>-0.250 *** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.311 *** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared partisanship</td>
<td>0.192 * (0.10)</td>
<td>0.210 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological distance X Shared partisanship</td>
<td>0.171 ** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.136 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert competency rating</td>
<td>0.518 *** (0.09)</td>
<td>0.518 *** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent vote</td>
<td>3.118 *** (0.13)</td>
<td>-2.004 *** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign spending ratio</td>
<td>0.018 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.015 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Sophistication</td>
<td>0.024 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.105 * (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media attention</td>
<td>0.019 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.052 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1</td>
<td>1.035 (0.47)</td>
<td>-2.111 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
<td>2.047 (0.47)</td>
<td>-1.023 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 3</td>
<td>2.685 (0.47)</td>
<td>-0.418 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 4</td>
<td>4.202 (0.48)</td>
<td>1.092 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 5</td>
<td>5.336 (0.48)</td>
<td>2.157 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 6</td>
<td>6.946 (0.48)</td>
<td>3.866 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 11,390 5,061  
Log-likelihood -14374.18 -6606.68  
Pseudo R² 0.194 0.144

Significance levels: * : 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1%

Ordered logistic regression coefficient estimates and robust standard errors clustering on district in parentheses. Data: 2010 Congressional Cooperative Election Study, coupled with the UC Davis Congressional Election Study.
Table 3
Experimental Evidence: Competency Ratings and Agreement between Candidates and Participants on Partisanship, Ideology, and Policy Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency rating</th>
<th>Candidate A Agreement between Candidate A and participant</th>
<th>Candidate B Agreement between Candidate B and participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(167)</td>
<td>(138)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column percentages presented in each cell with frequency in parentheses.
Bibliography


Binder 2003. Legislative gridlock due to polarization


