Growth Machine or Pluralism?
Referenda Politics at the Local Level

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ABSTRACT

Within the policy arena of economic development policy, Growth Machine Theory posits “the domination of a disorganized majority by an organized minority” (Harding 36). This elitist theory of urban politics takes as a given what scholars know as the paradox of collective action, i.e., that minorities will be more successful in mobilizing for their interests than majorities because minorities are better funded and better organized. Some state and local arenas in the United States offer an institution that can provide a mechanism for transforming policy regimes that were skewed against the majority. This article will demonstrate that at the local level, the direct democracy institutions of the initiative and referendum are resources that inadequately organized majorities can use to create pluralist competition against all too typically dominant minority factions. In the urban arena where growth-oriented coalitions are so frequently dominant, these institutions can aggregate and mobilize the countervailing power of an otherwise latent majority. This article will use case studies of sports stadia politics to demonstrate this argument, that direct democracy institutions are an intervening variable that can transform growth machine politics into pluralist politics.

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Within the policy arena of economic development policy, Growth Machine Theory posits “the domination of a disorganized majority by an organized minority” (Harding 36). Coalitions of real estate entrepreneurs, bankers, corporate leaders, politicians and the media create growth policies that benefit their narrow interests but employ a value-free growth ideology to suggest that the entire city receives distributed benefits from growth (Logan and Molotch). This elitist theory of urban politics draws heavily from the paradox of collective action, i.e., that minorities will be more successful in mobilizing for their interests than majorities because minorities are better funded and better organized. Logan and Molotch specified sports team owners and the politics
surrounding the financing of stadium politics as an example of the workings of growth machines and numerous scholars have empirically corroborated the utility of growth machine theory for sports stadium development policy (Euchner 1993; Rosentraub 1997; Cagan and DeMause 1998).

Some state and local arenas in the United States offer an institution that can provide a mechanism for transforming policy regimes that were skewed against the majority. Though much maligned by analysts of state politics (Broder 2000), this article will demonstrate that at the local level the direct democracy institutions of the initiative and referendum are among the few resources that inadequately organized majorities have for creating pluralist competition against all too typically dominant minority factions. In the urban arena where growth-oriented coalitions are so frequently dominant, these institutions can aggregate and mobilize the countervailing power of an otherwise latent majority. This article will use case studies of sports stadia politics to demonstrate this argument, that direct democracy institutions are an intervening variable that can transform growth machine politics into pluralist politics.

**Overcoming Collective Action Paralysis**

Collective action theory teaches us that small groups that share a common interest can more easily communicate among group members and coordinate activity than can larger, more diffuse groups. Small groups are more likely to be motivated by the material benefits of action (and costs of inaction) than are large groups because the division of these benefits among only a few makes it more likely that these benefits will justify substantial costs. In contrast, members of large groups are tempted by the logic of being a free rider and they believe that they can gain the benefits of a new policy while leaving
the costs of participation to others. Hence Olson’s paradox of collective action: small
groups are likely to be better organized and, therefore, more powerful in a mass
democracy based on group politics than are large groups (Olson 1965).

Both Growth Machine (Logan and Molotch 1988) and Urban Regime (Stone
1993) analyses (notably the urban developmental variant of the latter) are premised on
the power that concentrated groups of growth-oriented elites have over local citizenry.
For instance, when urban politics pits big box developers against an anti-sprawl citizenry,
we see a smaller, well-funded group against a larger but disorganized citizenry. In the
research that is reported herein, a narrow coalition of professional sports team owners and
real estate interests that want the public to finance a new stadium attempts to dictate
policy to dispersed citizens who repeatedly voice opposition to such a policy. Again, the
same pattern of anti-majoritarian policy-making is evident. But, we also see, as an
intervening variable, the institutions of direct democracy.

Where does direct democracy enter the paradox of collective action? The
institutions of direct democracy reduce the typical barriers to collective action that
enhance the power of small groups and often make latent majorities impotent. One does
not need to join an organization, take valuable time out of a busy schedule for meetings,
pay membership fees, search for fugitive information on an issue expending further time,
or even have interactions with others. Information is typically readily available as are
cues from a host of recognized sources that are more trusted (certainly more familiar) and
accessible than would be true if the policy arena was the state (including referenda at the
state level) or national levels. Furthermore, this information is typically not presented in
the allegedly neutral way that the average newspaper or network news presents it
(typically boosterish), but in an advocacy manner by local cue-givers, that enables voters
to connect some of their core beliefs to positions in the policy debate (Bowler and Donovan 1994).

As many scholars of urban political economy have demonstrated, cities are in a weak negotiating position versus sports team owners. Sports teams are a form of mobile capital, capital that exists in an environment where many states and cities are competing to lure few teams (Euchner 1993). The leverage is in the hands of capital; states bid to attract capital because of the belief that these enterprises will provide jobs for residents and revenues from taxation. An increased tax base will allow a state or city to provide the same level of services at a lower tax rate or to increase the level of services without increasing taxation; both outcomes should aid in the attraction of future mobile capital (Peterson 1981). Elected officials have additional incentives for attracting teams or other forms of capital and enticing them to not relocate. With an eye toward higher office, they seek to claim credit and avoid the hostility of voters who blame them for departures. Hence, cities and states compete to attract capital and the standard public policy strategy is to offer incentives to sports teams to relocate or stay, and to participate in bidding wars that involve additional offers of incentives (e.g., tax abatements on team revenues, discounted land, infrastructure, publicly subsidized stadiums) that benefit the team ownership (Rosentraub 1997). Business leaders exercise significant preemptive power through their ability to frame the response of politicians as indicative of the overall business climate of the city (Swanstrom 1985). Real estate interests, bonding law firms, construction companies and other businesses that stand to benefit directly from the construction of a new stadium line up as major campaign donors to mayors, their parties, and to the challengers of uncooperative mayors. The response of mayors, as Mayhew argued about Congress (1974), is to claim credit and avoid blame, in this case by doing
whatever is necessary to finance a new stadium that will prevent a team from moving. Typically, this has meant the formulation of strategies for the public financing of the stadium. It is here that the narrowly focused interests of the team, the mayor and others in the narrow developmental coalition can conflict with the interests of the diffuse majority of taxpayers, because paying for a new stadium, the financial benefits of which will disproportionately redound to the team ownership, may not be a high priority of the public. The case studies that follow demonstrate the utility of the institutions of direct democracy for transforming the policy regime and creating patterns of distributive outcomes that are more democratic than the growth machine status quo.

The next two sections of this paper present detailed case studies of stadium politics in San Francisco and Minneapolis. Examining the efforts that the San Francisco Giants and the Minnesota Twins organizations have made to secure financing for new baseball stadiums gives us a look at eight iterations of public policy making on the construction of new baseball stadiums. Moreover, both of these cities involve change over a period of time circumscribed enough for us to intuitively accept the assumption that many antecedent variables remained constant. For both teams, the iterations of policy making went from repeated defeat to victory for new stadium construction.

This research design should not be misconstrued as driven by a normative agenda. Our research is not focused on the political activists’ concern about whether new stadia are built with public vs. private dollars. Nor is our research concerned with the question of whether these new stadiums are a wise investment of public dollars, judged economically or psychologically. Rather the focus of this article is whether the outcome is democratic, specifically whether the voice of the citizenry, when articulated clearly, is
represented or has no influence on policy. Is the policy outcome in accord with the principle that majorities should rule except when they threaten minority rights?

Our research contributes to the long-standing debate between Pluralist and Elitist theories of governance (Dye and Ziegler 2006). For urban scholars this debate has remained vibrant because of the empirically based work of Growth Machine and Regime Theory scholars. In fact, the conventional wisdom in the field of urban studies reflects the influence of both of these theories and argues that relatively small coalitions of political and economic elites shape urban land use policies and public spending decisions. These policy outcomes not only deliver disproportionate benefits to the few who are members of these policy regimes but, more importantly for our purposes, they disregard the coherent, informed and articulated view of the majority of the citizenry. The case studies of this process demonstrate the financial benefits accrued by team owners, land owners, construction companies, and other members of a stadium-led, economic growth elite (Euchner 1993; Delaney and Eckstein 2003; Rosentraub 1997). Often these studies demonstrate the political capital gained by complicit elected officials. But these studies do not demonstrate the kind of delivery of benefits to the broad citizenry that might justify elite actions that are so contrary to the expressed demands of the voters they represent. Such promises of broad benefits are, of course, regularly made; however, citizens appear to discount these promises when they articulate opposition to the investment of public dollars in new stadiums. This pattern of policy outcomes in which the preference of the majority is disregarded and the preference of the few captures the support of elected decision makers has delivered a sharp rebuke to the Pluralist perspective in the field of Urban Politics (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995).
This article offers a Pluralist exception to the dominant Growth Machine view. Rather than suggesting that Pluralism is a more accurate theory, we offer a caveat to Growth Machine theory and to Regime Theory’s developmental regime (which we collapse together for purposes of this article). We will argue that institutions can play a decisive role in determining whether the policy outcome reflects the will of a powerful, well-funded minority or a disorganized and relatively poorly funded majority. We hypothesize that the institutions of direct democracy, specifically the popular referendum, enable the majority to overcome its disorganization and deficit of financial resources and make policy that elites must implement. In the absence of such institutions, or when they are bypassed, decisions are far more likely to favor the well-organized minority. Referenda quite often become a slingshot for the urban David.

With respect to method, the case studies presented in this article have been selected because they allow us to test an intervening variable, the institution of the referendum. The data are drawn from two very detailed case studies and a larger set of case summaries of policies that typically illustrate Growth Machine outcomes. The independent variables are a narrow coalition of growth and sports team elites who seek to build a new stadium that promises to advance their interests as well as those of supportive, boosterish elected officials (i.e., a growth machine), and a much larger group of citizens who oppose this policy. An antecedent variable is the local environment (in contradistinction to the state-level environment) in which issues like these draw considerable attention from the media, interest groups, and political elites. This is a high-information environment that provides lots of cues to voters and reduces costs of information to negligible levels. The dependent variable is the passage of policies that reflect the will of the public to pay fewer of the costs of financing a stadium for a
professional sports team than the Growth Machine coalition proposed; in the absence of
the intervening variable, we expect minimal opportunities for representation of majority
views and outcomes that show no bargaining impact or countervailing power of the
opposition. The indicator of a Pluralist process is an outcome that reflects bargaining
between the growth coalition and a countervailing coalition of citizens and yields
outcomes that are actively embraced by the majority of the population rather than
assumed to be in their favor because of the alleged trickle-down benefits of growth.
Growth Machine theory posits that the public is powerless on development policy;
powerless people do not have bargaining power. The model presented here illustrates
that the referendum provides both the power to veto the preferences of the Growth
Machine and the power to entice alternative policy proposals with greater distributed
benefits (or lower distributed costs) from politicians working with growth machine elites.

**Calling a Giant Bluff**

Millionaire Bob Lurie had purchased the San Francisco Giants baseball team in 1976. By the early 1980s, Lurie was regularly complaining to Mayor Dianne Feinstein
and other elected officials about his inability to earn adequate revenues due to the
outdated design of Candlestick Park and its vulnerability to inclement weather. Lurie
demanded a new park in downtown San Francisco with luxury boxes and other revenue
generating amenities (DeLeon 1992). The Feinstein administration issued a report that
lauded the cost-effectiveness of a new stadium over the option of renovation of
Candlestick. The report was sharply criticized by the City Council Budget Analyst and
others for relying on data provided by the Giants (Hartman 2002).
The Feinstein administration selected a site and delivered an estimate for construction with an $80 million price tag to be paid by user fees, private funds, donated land and tourist taxes. Her plan drew support from a majority of the Board of Supervisors (City Council) and the Chamber of Commerce. At the behest of Lurie who sought public endorsement of this plan, Feinstein and the Board of Supervisors placed an advisory measure, Proposition W, on the ballot in November 1987. It read: "Shall a baseball park be built at 7th and Townsend on land at no cost to the city with no increases in taxes and all debt repaid with non-tax money?"

The most outspoken opponent of Proposition W was liberal state legislator Art Agnos who was campaigning to be the city's next mayor. Agnos identified traffic congestion, an absence of parking, and hidden costs as the reasons why Feinstein's plan deserved to be defeated. These criticisms echoed the organized opposition that emerged from San Francisco Tomorrow and San Franciscans for Planning Priorities, two small citizen groups with overlapping memberships that were generally concerned with environmental and traffic issues. These groups warned that although the land for the stadium would be donated gratis by a major land developer, subsidies or abatements to that corporation from the city would be forthcoming as part of some quid pro quo (DeLeon 1993).

Other analyses of the battle over a new stadium for the San Francisco Giants have not given enough attention to the opposition that emerged from State Senator Quentin Kopp, a long-serving, erudite public servant with a reputation for representing the city's fiscally conservative, moderate-income homeowners. Kopp had a regular call-in show on AM talk radio that enabled him to have personal communication with his supporters and continue to burnish his reputation as a fiscal conservative beholden to no one. He warned
that the bonds issued to finance the stadium would be sold to private investors but they were guaranteed by the city, which left taxpayers exposed. He drew attention to the absence of any cost estimates for the toxic clean up of the land that would be the responsibility of the city. Finally, although the proposition precluded tax increases, the use of current tax proceeds from sources such as the city’s hotel tax was not preempted and, in fact, was openly acknowledged. Known locally as a watchdog against frivolous city spending, Kopp’s opposition spoke to different sensibilities than those opposed to either aesthetic degradation or corporate welfare for billionaires (Kopp Interview).

All of these arguments were articulated and disseminated broadly. Voters became familiar with them through pamphlets produced by the opposition groups, in meetings held in the neighborhoods, in numerous news stories on the front page of the city’s newspapers, in exposés in the ultra-liberal alternative press, from speeches by candidate Agnos, from Kopp’s conservative AM radio show, and in the detailed voters guide published by the city. Voters in the 49 square miles of San Francisco had easy access to lots of information from sources whose ideological predisposition was well known.

San Francisco voters surprised Lurie and Feinstein. They approved $99 million for police stations, health centers and infrastructure improvements on the same ballot that Proposition W was rejected with 53 percent of the vote (Agostini, Quigley and Smolensky 1997).

About a month after the defeat of the stadium initiative, Art Agnos was elected mayor. The future looked bleak for the Giants in San Francisco and Lurie announced that he was intent on moving the Giants. Burgeoning suburban cities to the south of San Francisco, such as Santa Clara and San Jose, had lots of untapped wealth (Godfrey 1997).
South Bay political leaders showed significant interest and feasibility studies were conducted. To the surprise of his core supporters, Mayor Agnos began courting Lurie.

As Rich DeLeon (1992) has described in detail, candidate Agnos was a progressive advocate of the neighborhoods but Mayor Agnos became a booster of downtown expansion and a bitter disappointment to progressives. Just like Feinstein, Agnos also was unwilling to be "the mayor who lost the Giants." In his second year in office, Agnos and Lurie presented a plan to build a stadium in the China Basin waterfront section of the city. Mayor Agnos claimed that his agreement committed only $30 million of city funds, including $10 million in loans.

Kopp expressed skepticism about these estimates and believed that his taxpayer constituents would be saddled with cost overruns “shortly after the shovels break ground” (Kopp Interview). Kopp’s years on talk radio had demonstrated to both conservative supporters and liberal opponents that he was well-versed in city and state finances and quite knowledgeable about economic development. He received hundreds of calls and many letters from those who agreed with his opposition to the stadium deal (Kopp Interview 2004). The opposition drew support not just from the air-waves but also from grassroots organization.

In contrast to Kopp’s homeowner/tax-sensitive constituents, Joel Ventresca, an activist member of San Franciscans for Planning Priorities, was a leader of the anti-growth and environmentalist activists. They had honed their skills in a number of successful ballot proposition battles that limited the height of downtown skyscrapers. Some knew each other from these previous experiences and believed that they could mobilize more than fifty percent of the voters. They were angry because they felt betrayed by Agnos, whom they had helped to elect and counted as one of their own
(Ventresca Interview). Ventresca and his allies assailed the mayor's figures claiming that the city stood to spend far more than this due to foregone property taxes on the land, the costs of preparing the land including toxic cleanup, the costs of a parking garage, and liability for up to $10 million in cost overruns. They also argued that the China Basin area had previously been designated as a site for the development of new housing for downtown workers (Bodovitz 1989a). Speaking for voters who prioritized a new stadium below funding for education, transportation, and housing, Ventresca’s coalition urged the Giants to repair and landscape Candlestick Park.

Ventresca had founded San Franciscans for Planning Priorities in 1987 to fight Feinstein’s referendum; its membership included environmental organizations, neighborhood organizations, housing advocates, and anti-sprawl groups. Ventresca was a particularly effective leader for two reasons. First, he never tired of debating on the radio, television or at a community meeting. Second, as confirmed during our interviews, Ventresca was familiar with the scholarly literature on sports-led economic development. He knew that, beyond temporary construction jobs, the employment generated by ballparks was low wage; moreover, high paid ballplayers rarely lived or paid taxes in the city in which they played. He also knew that consultants hired by the teams usually inflated the estimated positive economic impact of a new stadium – what scholars call the multiplier – on local restaurants and retail. He knew that economists agreed that consumer spending was finite and that much of the consumer spending that the stadium generated was the result of a shift away from theater, movies, and restaurants located elsewhere in the metro area. In interviews Ventresca repeatedly claimed that the appearance of prosperity around a new stadium was an ephemeral gain for a city’s tax base because it was the result of this transfer. Ventresca waved pages of data in front of
audiences and effectively challenged the rosy economic forecasts put forward by teams; because of his leadership with planning organizations, these rebuttals to Growth Machine arguments about the broad benefits of a new stadium were in the voter handbook that explained ballot propositions. His friends from various land use organizations, whom he referred to as “the usual suspects,” spread the word a bit further and did quite a bit of the legwork (Ventresca Interview). Scholars have labeled such cadres “efficacious subgroups” and noted that they rely on face-to-face communication and social connectedness that is more likely to exist in cities rather than at the state level (Granovetter 1978). In the terminology of collective action theory, the organization “centraliz[ed] network ties” and helped generate a “critical mass” (Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988, 532). This critical mass of no more than thirty experienced activists brings support or opposition to a referendum close to a tipping point much sooner than would otherwise be the case because of their willingness to bear the costs of convincing the dispersed, latent opposition that they were indeed a majority that could make policy.

The mayor opted to bring his plan to the voters in order to reverse their 1987 verdict. Debate over Proposition P -- approval of the Agnos-Lurie Memoranda of Understanding-- was intense and by late September of 1989 polls showed the ballpark plan trailing by about five percent with at least ten percent of those polled undecided. The city's elected leadership, both parties, the major media, the Chamber of Commerce and the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR), an umbrella organization promoting downtown development, supported the plan (Keep the Giants 1989). Although there was no evidence of a grassroots affinity between gays and baseball fanatics, prominent gay organizations also endorsed Proposition P after Mayor Agnos agreed to support another proposition on the ballot that would have granted legal
status to non-married partners. African-American and Latino social service elites broke with their clientele and accepted the mayor's assertions that the new stadium would be a source of revenue that would buttress funding for social services (Bodovitz 1989b). The heavenly chorus of business leaders and Giants lobbyists had won the support of a range of community leaders (DeLeon 1993).

Defeat of the stadium initiative was insured rather dramatically a month before the vote when the Loma Prieta earthquake struck during the World Series between the Giants and their cross-bay rivals, the Oakland Athletics. Suddenly the need for a new stadium was dwarfed by the need to rebuild the city and house the newly homeless. Proposition P lost by the narrow margin of less than 1,100 votes. Art Agnos believed that the earthquake cost him a victory. Peter Magowan offered a different view: “The only reason that the results of the vote were that close was that support for the Giants was reaching new highs because of the great run to the World Series” (Magowan Interview 2004).

Bob Lurie was not particularly impressed with the workings of local democracy, referendum-style. Lurie believed that he deserved better, much better, because he had been the white knight who bought the team in 1976 and kept it from moving to Toronto (Kopp 2004; Hartman 2002). Lurie returned his attention to the rapidly growing cities of the Silicon Valley. Stealing the Giants would enable residents of the South Bay to poke a finger in the eyes of snooty San Franciscans who refused to recognize that the Silicon Valley had eclipsed San Francisco in both economy and population (DeLeon 1993). But in Santa Clara in 1990 and San Jose in 1992 voters rejected ballot measures that would have increased utility taxes to subsidize the costs of a new stadium. With four referendum defeats in five years, Lurie finally took steps to leave the state. He began
negotiations in earnest with the city of St. Petersburg where a stadium had already been built as an enticement to a team (Sandalow and Sylvester 1992).

In 1992 Lurie took a major step by signing a letter of intent to sell the team to a group of Florida investors for $113 million, a healthy increase over the $8-10 million he paid in 1976 (Hartman 2002, 175). This reality stimulated some unprecedented activity in the San Francisco business community; Jordan helped to bring together a group of “blue chippers,” men like real estate magnate Walter Shorenstein, Charles Schwab, Peter Magowan, the CEOs of Levi Strauss and the Gap, the top lawyer from a locally based mutual fund and a number of others who could pony up at least $1 million to buy the team (Baer Interview 2004; Carlsen 1992). The leadership of baseball wanted to keep the Giants in San Francisco not only because it was one of the game’s top five media markets but because stability was beneficial to a game that had suffered a loss of public support after strike-interrupted seasons and spiraling salaries. The new ownership team, led by Magowan’s right hand man Larry Baer, joined with Mayor Jordan and Giants’ Attorney Jack Bair to present to National League President Bill White, the stand in for the Commissioner, a plan in which Lurie would sell the team to new owners who would keep the team in San Francisco and work diligently to solve the problem that Candlestick represented (Bair Interview 2004). St. Petersburg could be used yet again by some other owner as a prod. Magowan’s group was prepared to offer Lurie $100 million, or $13 million less than Florida (Sandalow and Lynch 1992). Lurie could not negotiate with this group because the letter of intent that he had signed with St. Petersburg gave them an exclusive first shot. But when the Commissioner’s office rejected the St. Petersburg deal in favor of the San Francisco group, Lurie reached an agreement that helped him keep the Giants in San Francisco for a second time in his life. He even agreed to a small
ownership stake in the new group, just as he had with the Florida group (Bair Interview 2004). By January 1993, the transaction was closed. The new ownership team had raised about $65 million and borrowed another $35 million. The new ownership agreed that staying in Candlestick was not a viable solution but their polling told them that fans were sick of stadium politics (Magowan Interview 2004). For the time being, the Giants would switch the focus to baseball and community service.

In some cities, replacement of the old owner with a new face can increase public support for a new stadium. Years of threats to leave and multiple stories about the net worth of the owner can combine to sour the public. But Lurie’s wealth and his flirting with other cities were not the reasons why San Franciscans had twice voted against new ballparks. Even after the team was sold by Lurie and kept in San Francisco, public opinion polls showed unaltered opposition to concessions to the team (Matier and Ross 1996).

One of the biggest accomplishments of Mayor Jordan's administration was that it prodded the business leadership to organize itself and purchase the Giants. There were not many other achievements, however, to counter the perceptions of inadequacy in the areas of police-civilian relations, crime reduction and reduction of the homelessness problem, areas in which voters had high expectations of the former police chief. Thus it was not surprising that Mayor Jordan lost his reelection bid to longtime Speaker of the California Assembly Willie Brown in December 1995.

Brown kept a low profile in the stadium process, limiting himself to an endorsement of the China Basin site and the provision of clout in overcoming environmental and other local regulatory hurdles to rapid construction. The ownership of the Giants begrudgingly realized that the voters of the city would not approve of spending
public dollars on a new stadium. Once they agreed that the $255 million ballpark would be built with no public subsidy, the Giants “made it a top priority” to enlist the public support of state Senator Quentin Kopp (Baer 2004). Kopp became one of the official co-chairs of the effort, joining former state representative and lesbian community leader Roberta Achtenberg, a woman with progressive credentials, and African-American leader and advocate for the city poor, Rev. Cecil Williams. Achtenberg and Williams represented constituencies that were important to any citywide electoral effort, but both of these co-chairs of the new effort had been visible supporters of previous stadium efforts. In contrast, Kopp represented tax-sensitive, conservative homeowners for two decades and he had opposed both Propositions W and P. His vocal support of the ballpark plan that ultimately became Proposition B sent an unmistakable message, what scholars refer to as a cue, to voters that they could believe claims that the Giants were not going to pick their pockets (Lupia 1994).

Proponents of the stadium plan pointed out that the 13 acres of land would not be donated by the city; instead, the Giants would rent the site at "fair market value" from its owner, the Port of San Francisco. The Giants also agreed to pay property taxes; however, 60 percent of the tax money would be used, in a tax-increment financing arrangement, for physical improvements around the park. Glossy reports of estimates of jobs that would be created and revenues that would be collected in excess of what existed at Candlestick were also produced. Boosters raised $800,000, once again dramatically outspending opponents of the stadium who collected less than $15,000 (Epstein 1996a; Epstein and King 1996).

The opposition argued that there were still a few public subsidies inherent in the plan, such as the expansion of public rail and ferry lines to the ballpark. San Franciscans
for Planning Priorities ’96 once again raised the salient issue of the lack of parking in the South Beach neighborhood. Neighborhood residents were bitter about a perceived lack of consultation by the Giants with local homeowners (Ventresca Interview 2004). Opponents also pointed out that nobody was sure what lay beneath the ground of the proposed site and the bill for clean up of toxics could represent another hidden cost for which taxpayers would pay (Leibovitz Interview 2004). Finally, they objected to the exemption from a 40-foot height limit on waterfront property that the new ballpark would require (Epstein 1996b). The requirement for public approval of this change in zoning rules to accommodate the height of the stadium necessitated a referendum on the stadium issue, Proposition B. On March 26, 1996, San Franciscans passed a stadium initiative, with 66 percent of the city's voters approving of the height limit exemption and thereby giving their approval of a new baseball stadium built almost completely with private funds. The Giants’ owners suffered the enmity of owners across the league, and encountered hostility at meetings of team executives because they admitted that a new state-of-the-art stadium could be built without public funds even after the team had purchased the most expensive free agent on the market, Barry Bonds (Magowan 2004).

More importantly for our purposes, San Francisco voters had pushed back against the power of the Growth Machine. Rather than cave in to the demands of team owners and politicians using Neoliberal governance strategies that attempted to eviscerate public participation, voters made a choice that articulated a position, in this case, against public financing of a stadium. They set public policy not by writing huge checks or by spending endless hours away from family. Rather, they used the tool of the referendum to overcome their dispersion across the city and turned a latent opposition into a manifest
policy-making actor. In this very salient issue area, collective action problems had been overcome and pluralism had triumphed over a narrow developmental elite.

In a lengthy interview, Ventresca (2004) responded to a question about whether he was proud to be one of the leaders of such an accomplishment: “I don’t really consider myself a leader as much as a legitimator,” he said. “If people actually feel that they can beat developers and City Hall, they will fight. Participation is going down everywhere. I’m willing to be one of the first. So me and the rest of us who are the core of SFPP and the Committee to Stop the Giveaway take the first steps and make everybody else feel like they are not tilting at windmills.”

Ventresca’s comments are illustrative of a phenomenon that has drawn the attention of political scientists and sociologists who believe that cost-benefit analyses produce different results when the individual doing the calculation has ties to a group, even a very informal group. Granovetter uses the example of riots (and strikes, beliefs in rumors, and even leaving cocktail parties) and points out that individuals are increasingly likely to join a riot as the numbers involved grow “since the probability of being apprehended is smaller the larger the number involved” (1978, 1422). Rioters don’t even know each other, yet when a critical mass of individuals does riot, others will join in; how each person defines a critical mass differs. Granovetter notes that if a non-participant has friends who are participating, then the threshold for joining – that person’s critical mass number – will probably be lower. Thus the thirty or so activists that form “the usual suspects” trigger the participation of both acquaintances and strangers who are willing to join as long as others have already joined the fight against the Giants and their political and real estate allies.
The institution of the referendum meant that Ventresca and his allies needed only to gather the signatures to get referenda on the ballots and expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960) from those who sat in the legislature or the City Council to the universe of voters willing to show up. While there were many reasons for voters to oppose the earlier referenda and approve Proposition B, the role of Quentin Kopp, radio host, state Senator, City Supervisor, preeminent cue-giver, and ultimately Co-chair of the Yes on Proposition B effort has not been appreciated in previous scholarship.

But San Francisco is an unusual city, some would even say unique. Observers are often tempted to dismiss what happens in San Francisco as the peculiar behavior of an outlier that is not replicable in other cities. Even though the foregoing analysis of San Francisco provided three instances of initiatives that enabled voters to overcome collective action problems and shape policy in a pluralist manner for an outcome that was much less costly to taxpaying citizens, some might discount the role of direct democracy institutions because of a belief that San Francisco’s political culture produces aberrant levels of populism and consequent participation. For this reason, the story of sports stadium politics in the more “normal,” Midwestern Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul takes on great significance.

Battle for a New Stadium for the Minnesota Twins

Minnesota banker and billionaire Carl Pohlad bought the Minnesota Twins major league baseball team from Calvin Griffith in 1984. He inherited problems of low attendance and the use of a facility, the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome, which was primarily designed for the professional football Vikings. Even after a 1987 World Series victory, the Twins still failed to draw above the league average in attendance. Pohlad
won concessions from the state that eliminated rent payments on the Dome for the Twins, increased their take of concession revenues, and advertising fees. The Twins won the World Series again in 1991; yet Pohlad, who refused to open his books, claimed that the team was continuing to lose money. From 1997 to 2007 the Twins vigorously sought public financing of a new baseball stadium, turning at times to the state legislature, the city of Minneapolis, the city of St. Paul, and Hennepin County. They have been repeatedly unsuccessful in manufacturing the support of enough citizens willing to be taxed to build a stadium. The team also failed to persuade a majority of elected officials to pass legislation mandating some public financing scheme, though they tried assiduously. Finally, the team found success by persuading a small group of elected officials to deny their constituents a direct voice in the policymaking process.

**Strike One Against the Twins**

In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of cities constructed smaller and more intimate baseball-only stadiums that hearkened back to the cozier fields of baseball’s golden years. These stadiums had revenue-generating amenities such as luxury seating, corporate suites, and a range of restaurants. Although the multipurpose Metrodome was hardly an old stadium, having been built in 1982, it did not contain these cash streams; moreover, many baseball fans believed that an indoor stadium that precluded views of the sky and real grass was too sterile of an environment for baseball. Carl Pohlad, in the early 1990s, declared that the Twins could not remain a viable enterprise in the small market of Minnesota without a new stadium.

Pohlad’s most steadfast ally in this process was moderate Republican Governor Arne Carlson. Carlson was a sports enthusiast and an unabashed spokesman for growth
regimes throughout the state. His position was that the Twins were an asset that the Twin Cities could not lose without risking a demotion from the ranks of major cities to “a cold Omaha.” Carlson’s ideal solution involved a small contribution from the Twins and the Pohlad family as a gesture of good will, a sizable contribution from business leaders in the Twin Cities, and a legislatively engineered plan for taxpayers to pay the majority of the costs of a new stadium (Weiner 2000).

During this period, Carl Pohlad began negotiations with a North Carolina businessman who was trying to purchase a team to bring to the Triad area of Greensboro-Winston-Salem. A letter of intent to sell the team was signed, contingent on the failure of the citizens and legislators of Minnesota to reach an agreement with Pohlad by November 30, 1997. The gauntlet was thrown down – if the legislature did not capitulate to the demands of Carlson and Pohlad, the Twins would leave town just as the hockey North Stars had done (Cagan and deMause 1998).

All the while community groups had been organizing to voice opposition to the public financing of a new baseball stadium. These organizations, such as the Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action and Progressive Minnesota (MAPA), were comprised of liberal citizens who sought to use government policy as a way of reducing inequality. These groups had mobilized repeatedly in the past; they had fought for increased dollars for affordable housing and (along with ACORN and local unions) had been part of the victorious battle for local living wage ordinances in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Given the bottomless needs of the public education system, the meager funds available for job training, child care, and housing for the poor and those being pushed off the welfare system, there were many policy areas that these groups felt were more deserving than billionaire Carl Pohlad and his team of well paid entertainers (Duncan Interview 2007).
As in so many other cities and states, the stage seemed to be set for a David vs. Goliath battle in which Goliath, the growth machine comprised of Governor Carlson, Pohlad, downtown business leaders and real estate interests, the *Star Tribune* newspaper, and Minneapolis leaders like the mayor and president of the city council overwhelmed the opposition and forged a deal that financed stadium construction with public funds.

**Strike Two Against the Twins**

Like the biblical David with his slingshot that felled Goliath, the oppositional forces made excellent use of the tools they had. The first tool that opponents of public financing of the new stadium had was expertise that undermined the claims of stadium proponents that jobs and revenues would be created that would justify a huge public investment. Activists like Jon Commers challenged the claim that sports teams and stadia are good economic investments that would produce benefits that dwarf their costs. Fresh out of college where he had studied the politics and economics of sports-led development, Commers founded a group called Fans Advocating iNtelligent Spending (FANS). Commers worked with other activists and spoke to legislators, advancing an argument that was well established in the scholarly literature (Logan and Molotch 1988; Cagan and deMause 1998; Euchner 1993). He asserted that new stadiums benefit team owners, bankers who finance the project, owners of real estate that will dramatically increase in value because it is proximate to the new stadium, construction companies and unions that gain lucrative contracts to build the stadium, and media that attract a sports audience by reporting on local teams. FANS did not merely assert these conclusions, which contradicted the rosy predictions found in glossy reports produced for the Twins and the Chamber of Commerce (Riess 2000); they marshaled quantitative evidence from
independent economists and the Brookings Institution that concluded that new stadiums did not significantly impact economic development (Baade and Dye 1990; Quirk and Fort 1992).

Another source of opposition to the stadium proposals came from clergywoman Reverend Ricky Rask who formed an organization called “Fund Kids First.” Rask was a member of a state Department of Human Services task force on improving the lives of Minnesota children when she saw a newspaper account of the Twins’ efforts to get $320 million from the state for a new stadium. At public meetings and on local radio, she challenged the state’s priorities and asserted that funding for education and housing and against hunger and abuse was more important than a new stadium. With the help of the progressive organization, MAPA, she produced newsletters and pamphlets (e.g., “What can you buy with $300 million dollars besides a new outdoor stadium?”) that were distributed to legislators (Weiner 2000; Squeeze Play 1998).

The anti-stadium arguments drew the attention of state legislators who had previously heard only from Governor Carlson and the Twins’ lobbyists. Commers also organized a panel of economists from respected institutions like the Congressional Research Service, Northwestern University and the University of Minnesota. Citing factors like the low paying jobs of a stadium and that those who attended games largely were shifting preexisting entertainment spending, they unequivocally concluded that public financing of a stadium did not represent a wise economic investment (Coates and Humphreys 2008). The panelists garnered the kind of media attention that the cash poor opposition groups could never have dreamed of financing. They were interviewed on major radio and television stations in the Twin Cities, disseminating the views of the opposition to more than 60,000 audience members across the state. The credibility of the
message and the authority of the messengers helped Minnesota legislators and members of the attentive public to loose themselves from the solution set that equated public financing of a stadium with an investment in economic development (McCartney 1994; Squeeze Play 1998). Rep. Dee Long (D-Minneapolis) who was chair of the House Local Government and Metropolitan Affairs Committee, took note of the public knowledge and awareness on the stadium issue: “This is one issue where I think the public has to be behind anything that the Legislature does. But that seems to be the opposite of what the promoters want” (Yewell 1996). In contrast, as Growth Machine theory predicts, the Star Tribune editorialized “Twins Yes, referendum no,” instructing that “Legislative leaders and Gov. Carlson should forget the referendum and do what they know needs to be done” (Stadium Truths 1996).

Yet even if claims about the economic rationality of public financing of a stadium no longer were greeted with genuflection, legislators might still be anxious about the potentially negative impact of the team’s departure. The growth coalition had reasons to promote fear of decline. Suburban Bloomington had the major airport and a burgeoning shopping strip along Interstate 494 that included the mega-sized Mall of America. The population of the metropolitan region was growing, but as early as the 1970s the core was declining and the suburbs were expanding rapidly. The same was true for the economy; corporate headquarters were relocating from the cities to the suburbs, and although the southwestern suburbs housed only 27 percent of the region’s population, more than 60 percent of the new jobs were located there (Orfield 1997). Losing the professional baseball team would be another symbol of decline for the downtowns.

The efforts to highlight threats of exit and fear of decline were well-funded. The Twins’ lobbying organization, Minnesota Wins, raised more than 100 times as much as
the groups seeking to inform and mobilize against a taxpayer-financed stadium. Minnesota Wins raised $1.6 million for the pivotal 1997 legislative season (largely from the Twins, the football Vikings, the parent company of the Star Tribune, a few large banks, and the Minneapolis Building and Construction Trades Council) while the anti-stadium forces raised about $16,000 (Weiner 1997a, 1997b). Much of that huge war chest went to pay for focus groups and polling that suggested that voters might seek retribution against legislators whose opposition to a new stadium would force the Twins to leave the state (Weiner 1997c).

The wording of the referendum was meant to regulate the spending of city officials on a sports facility. The Minneapolis referendum of November 4, 1997 stipulated that prior to the spending of more than $10 million by the city or “any city department, agency, commission, or board” for any professional sports facility, a future referendum must be held.\(^1\) The referendum passed by a vote of 70 percent (in favor of restricting spending) to 30 percent. Unlike polls conducted by interested parties in the debate, referenda in both Minneapolis and St. Paul sent an unequivocal message of rejection of public financing of a new stadium by voters in the only two cities in the state that may have been seriously considered by the team. Even though Governor Carlson, Mayor Sharon Sayles-Belton of Minneapolis and St. Paul’s Mayor Norm Coleman all supported a publicly financed stadium package, and even after stadium supporters had outspent opponents by a ratio of more than 100-to-1, the public was still opposed. The distributed cost-payers, in Wilson’s language, had collectively mobilized to pass legislation that required their consent prior to the passage of any legislation that would levy taxes on city residents for the building of a new stadium (Wilson 1973). In a triumph for pluralism, Commers, Rast, and some long-standing progressive citizen
organizations had offered alternative information and policy stories and, using the intervening institutional variable of the referendum to dramatically reduce the costs of mobilization, citizens had prevailed against a smaller group of concentrated beneficiaries.

Two years later, voters in St. Paul rejected a plan that would have imposed a half-percent city sales tax designed to fund one-third of the cost of a proposed $325 million stadium. The remainder would have come from equal shares contributed by the state and the Twins. Approval of the referendum would also have allowed the purchase of the Twins from Carl Pohlad by the owners of the Minnesota Wild hockey team and the Timberwolves basketball team. With the referendum going down to defeat by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent, Pohlad remained the owner of the Twins (Duchschere and Brown 1999).

Voters of both cities had spoken in ways that differed from their elected leaders and could only be interpreted as hostile to public financing of a new baseball stadium.

The Ventura Administration

After Arne Carlson retired, Jesse Ventura was elected as governor. Ventura made it clear from the start of his administration that although he felt the Twins were an asset to the state, the team did not merit the kind of financial support that was sought for a new stadium. During Ventura’s four-year term, the stadium battle was largely on hold. In 2002 the legislature passed, and Governor Ventura signed, a bill that gave cities in the state the opportunity to increase lodging, food and liquor taxes up to 5 percent, to pay for stadium financing bonds. It also allowed a $2 surcharge on parking on game days. The legislature stipulated that any city would be required to win a referendum approving of new taxes before proceeding.
Tax rates on Minneapolis’ downtown hotels and restaurants were already prohibitively high. Diners in downtown restaurants paid a sales tax of ten percent, an excess of 3.5 percent over the rest of the city. Similarly, hotel rooms in the downtown carried an additional 5.5 percent tax (totaling 12 percent) compared to other hotels because of taxes generated by big downtown projects like the Convention Center. Minneapolis Mayor R. T. Rybak believed that if the city could share the financing burden with the larger, less tax-heavy suburban neighbors that surrounded it – Hennepin County – adequate funds could probably be raised to publicly finance a new stadium. But Rybak and Hennepin County Board Chairman Mike Opat were unable to persuade the Ventura administration to extend additional tax capacity to counties (Kennedy 2002b; Grow 2002). At this point Opat had no objections to a local referendum (Kennedy 2002a).

The other option was private financing. The chair of the Tax Committee of the Minnesota House publicly endorsed the San Francisco model of private funding, calling on the “corporate community” to “step up if they believe that this is an amenity that’s important to these businesses” (Khoo 1999). The final report of a citizens committee created by Mayor Sayles-Belton in 2001 recommended that the mayor and city council “support efforts to finance and build a privately-funded baseball park in Minneapolis…. We do believe that a private option is possible, however, and point your attention to the plan conceived and developed in San Francisco” (New Ballpark 2001). In 2004 a delegation of Minnesota legislators traveled to San Francisco to learn about the financing arrangements that enabled the Giants to build a new stadium with private funding (Bair Interview 2004). Little would be heard again about this policy alternative that was not part of the standard Growth Machine solution set (Bachelor 1998).
Major League baseball did not respond well to the lack of progress in Minnesota. The league officially warned the state that the Twins and Montreal Expos might simply be eliminated (in baseball-speak, contraction of the size of the league) because of their inability to compete given the revenue handicaps that are a product of being in a smaller media market and having a stadium lacking in the most lucrative revenue streams. These threats were made as the Twins’ payroll was producing winning teams; in 2002 they won the American League Central Division title and advanced to the American League championship series. The team continued to lobby legislators for a new stadium; in 2002, the Twins spent more than twice as many dollars lobbying the legislature as any other organized interest (Kennedy 2002d).

In step with the declining economy, Minnesotans elected Republican Tim Pawlenty, as governor in 2003. During the campaign he took a no-new-taxes approach across the board and ruled out use of general funds for a new baseball stadium, as well as for new stadiums for the football Vikings and the University of Minnesota. As a state senator, Pawlenty had opposed public funding for stadiums but he changed his perspective once he became governor, a shift that some attribute to campaign donations from the owner of the land soon to be bought as the site of the stadium (Robson 2005). Pawlenty took a most crucial step that no other state or local leader had done – he rejected the claim that state law mandated a referendum for this tax increase. This policy shift began when the governor’s 2004 Stadium Screening Committee recommended, “taxes imposed by host committees to finance stadiums should not be subject to voter referendum.” This seven page, single-spaced report offers explanation and elaboration of each of its recommendations, but adds only the following for this particular recommendation: “After thorough discussion of this topic, the Committee recommends
that a referendum not be required for local taxes levied to finance stadiums” (Stadium Screening Committee 2004, 4). Given that it came within yet another stadium report, it is not surprising that this break from previous understanding about the imperative of the institution of direct democracy generated so little attention. But, by April 2005 the Governor was publicly declaring that the absence of a referendum in stadium legislation was “not a deal breaker” and this interpretation was going unchallenged on legal grounds (Olson, Kaszuba and deFiebre 2005).

By late 2005 Hennepin County and Minneapolis had crafted the plan that ultimately succeeded in gaining public financing of a new baseball stadium. The total cost of the stadium would be $522 million, split 25 percent from the team and 75 percent from public dollars. Carl Pohlad and the Twins would pay $130 million and cover all stadium cost overruns and Hennepin County would finance $392 million through bonds to be paid back through a .15 percent sales tax that exempted food, clothing, medical supplies, motor vehicles and most services. The Twins would receive all revenues from stadium naming rights, luxury seats, club seats, restaurants and concessions and be obligated to stay at the new stadium for thirty years (Minnesota Senate 2006). Hennepin County would receive from the Twins $2 million per year dedicated to youth activities and expanded library hours and the city of Minneapolis would continue to receive the approximately $250,000/yr. for amateur sports from the Twins that they received when the team played in the Metrodome (Kahn 2006). The Hennepin County Board, comprised of three Democrats, three Republicans and one Independent voted 4-3 to approve this plan which also requested the legislature and governor grant an exemption from the state law that required a referendum for local sales taxes. At least thirteen proposed amendments failed to delay or derail the approval. The 4-3 split did not fall
along party or geographic lines; the Board was divided on the issue of dropping the referendum requirement, not the economic or psychological benefits of the investment. At the three public hearings held prior to the vote, citizens packed the proceedings and opponents outnumbered supporters by at least 2-1.

The law mandating a referendum for local tax increases had passed in 1999 after Duluth, Minneapolis and St. Paul each added to the tax burden of residents to finance projects that the legislature balked at, for instance, the purchase of the Target Center basketball arena in Minneapolis. Since 1999, almost thirty municipalities attempted to levy sales taxes for special projects and all were required to hold referenda. The only exceptions to the law were three instances in which cities were allowed to hold the referenda on a date other than the “general election” day.ii

Pawlenty’s abandonment of both referenda requirements (the specific stadium tax referendum and the local tax increase referendum) came in an environment in which pollsters repeatedly found 68 percent of voters statewide voiced disapproval of public funding for a Twins stadium, and 59 percent were strongly opposed. Moreover, 78 percent believed that there should be a referendum on taxes levied on the residents of Hennepin County to pay for a new stadium (Kaszuba 2006; Marty 2006; Parry 2006).

Given the governor’s support of the plan, the legislature remained the final hurdle. In the House, multiple amendments to require a referendum were defeated in the Local Government, Taxes and the Ways and Means Committees (deFiebre 2005; Cook 2006). The full body passed the legislation by a vote of 71-61 and the Senate voted 34-32 in favor (Stassen-Berger 2006).

Support and opposition for the bill were bipartisan. The most significant divide in the voting was between Hennepin County representatives, who represented about 22
percent of the state’s residents, and those from the rest of the state. Eighty-two percent
(27 of 33) of the representatives whose districts included part of Hennepin County
opposed the stadium legislation and voted for a separate amendment that would have
required a Hennepin County referendum. Both they and their constituents (71 percent of
whom believed a referendum should be mandatory) were unable to use the tools of
democracy, indirect and direct, to stop a tyranny of the majority that levied taxes on them
and them alone. Conversely, 66 percent of the representatives from the state’s 86 other
counties voted in favor of the legislation that empowered county officials to circumvent
state law to levy a sales tax without voter approval (calculations by author).

Rep. Al Juhnke had voted against new stadium taxes in 1997 and 2002 but this
time he supported the legislation. His explanation echoed that of many others: “There is
no statewide tax this time. For Kandiyohi County, it’s great” (deFiebre 2006). Senior
statesman Alice Hausman (D – St. Paul), a member of the legislature since 1989, offered
a more critical perspective on the policy making process (Hausman 2006):

> We have discovered that this no new taxes era really means no new taxes for my
> constituents but only for Hennepin County. That's what we have discovered today. This is
> passing, and everyone knows it, only because members can say to their constituents,
you're not paying for it. Only the taxpayers of Hennepin County are paying for it. That is
> the only way this has been able to be packaged to pass. Everyone admits that. Not only
> that, we have been told very clearly over and over, if there is a referendum, it will be
defeated. So we even know, everyone is acknowledging, that local taxpayers don't
> support this. And yet we are proceeding as if we are doing a great thing today.

According to Twins data buried in a 2004 stadium proposal, 47 percent of 2003
season ticket holders were from Hennepin County and 48 percent were from the rest of
the state. Among ticket sales other than season tickets, only 55 percent were purchased
by residents of Hennepin County (Proposal 2004, 6). Therefore, it is incorrect to suggest
that taxes were levied only on the beneficiaries of the team, the residents of Hennepin
County. As Rep. Juhnke and Hausman suggested, the majority was using the institution of the legislature, with the approval of the executive, to tyrannize the minority, i.e., Twins fans statewide would keep the benefit of their team without cost and residents and visitors to Hennepin County would pay the cost in increased taxes.

Even more significant than the question of whether costs are concentrated or distributed (who pays and who benefits) is the question of who decides or who governs. First, four of the seven elected members of the county board recommended that the decision about taxation be taken out of the hands of the many, the citizenry, where state law had previously placed it. Then, the legislature and the governor also stripped authority from the citizenry and allowed the divided county board and the Twins to craft a policy that voters had opposed in each opportunity they were given. Rep. Mary Liz Holberg (R – Lakeville) articulated the feelings of those non-Hennepin County representatives who voted against the stadium bill:

So what I am going to say to today, I am going to say to the taxpayers of Hennepin County, I'm sorry. I'm sorry that the whole of this body will likely ignore the wishes of your representatives and impose upon you against their wishes. I am sorry that four of your seven commissioners are completely comfortable in ignoring state law and imposing a sales tax on you against your wishes. And because the Lenczewski amendment failed [to reinstate the referendum requirement], you will not have an opportunity to vote on this sales tax. But you will have an opportunity to vote in November and I recommend that you use that opportunity (Holberg 2006).

There was no retribution, however. All of the Hennepin County legislators and County Board members who voted contrary to the 71 percent of county residents that wanted a referendum, and then sought reelection, won with nary a close call (Kaszuba and Levy 2006).

Are there alternative hypotheses that explain why the Minnesota Twins were able to pass legislation that obligated the team to pay one-quarter of the cost of a new stadium,
taxpayers to pay three-quarters, and sent nearly all revenue to the Twins when all previous attempts at financing a new Twins stadium had failed?

One factor that merits consideration as a “focusing event” for state legislators and city and county leaders was the ruling by a Minnesota judge that the Twins could legally abrogate their lease of the Metrodome in 2006 (Kingdon 1995). Although Pohlad and the Twins organization had made many threats to leave the state, the team had always been bound by lease to the Metrodome. This was confirmed in a 2002 court ruling that held that the Twins were obligated to play, not merely pay rent, at the Metrodome (Furst 2002). But the lease ended, and by 2006 another state court ruled that the Twins could leave the state (Thesier 2006). No city that major league baseball took seriously was wooing the Twins aggressively. But the knowledge that Pohlad could now move the team or sell it to an owner that wanted to move it was an intervening variable that made political actors, starting with Governor Pawlenty, a bit more focused on finding a way to keep the Twins in the state.

Another alternative hypothesis that might help explain why stadium efforts succeeded in 2006 after so many years of failure was the fatigue of opponents. It is true that the “usual cast” of opposition leaders dreaded another fight over the same issues on which they had previously prevailed. But Reverend Ricky Rask, the Progressive Minnesota organization, Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action, state legislators John Marty and Phil Krinkie, a few vociferous members of the media and even a new organization called Citizens for a Stadium Tax Referendum all were ready and willing for another fight; the previous victories had been membership and fundraising bonanzas for the organizations and an opportunity for meaningful bonding in the lives of all the leaders. Carl Pohlad, owner of the Twins, remained the wealthiest man in the state and
an easy target against which voters educated enough to say that they were fed up with “corporate welfare” could rally (Usual Cast 2004; Kaszuba 2006).

We reject this hypothesis. Rather than a cause, the opposition’s weakness was a symptom of stripping the opposition of their institutional slingshot. The opposition was weakened because it was deprived of the institutional veto point – the referendum - around which it mobilized its resources of rhetoric about corporate welfare for billionaire owners and millionaire players. State Senator John Marty explained, “There was no steady drumbeat of outrage on public and commercial talk radio about how the three cents of sales tax on every twenty dollars of purchases was really $500 million for a stadium that with interest payments would be a $1 billion cost to taxpayers. There wasn’t a one to two month campaign of a referendum” (Marty 2007). During a referendum campaign the public would have been reminded that one of the few things economists agree on is that there are few if any discernible benefits for the public from new stadiums. The director of the grassroots organization Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action offered a similar perspective when he said, “During the previous referendum campaigns, we were very successful at turning out people for a vote in their class interest. Instead, the decision was made by the Hennepin County Board and legislators who had nothing to fear from county voters” (Duncan 2007). The new crop of fresh-out-of-college activists and the meagerly financed staff of Progressive Minnesota had much less influence with state legislators than they had with urban mayors who had witnessed previous referenda mobilizations. Meager budgets and an army of volunteers were adequate for gathering signatures for a referendum, staffing phone banks and supplying doorknockers with coffee and clipboards. Eliminating the local referendum was tantamount to a regime change because it dramatically changed the cost-benefit calculus for the participation of a
wide range of citizens, reduced pluralist competition, and facilitated concentration of power in four out of seven votes on the Hennepin County Board (Keiser 2015).

David’s slingshot in other cities

In Columbus, Ohio, the Growth Machine sought to build new stadiums to attract a National Hockey League team and a franchise of major league soccer. Issue 1 was a referendum that called for a three year, half-percent, countywide sales tax to support the two stadium project. Of the projects total costs, 85 percent would come from public dollars and private, corporate interests that would own the teams would contribute 15 percent of the total costs. The downtown leadership spent $1.2 million on the referendum while the opposition raised “a few thousand” (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004, 83). The referendum won only 44 percent of the vote, losing in the city, the suburbs and the outlying areas. After the failure, one of the city’s largest corporations and downtown land owners, Nationwide Insurance, stepped forward and paid for 90 percent of the costs of a hockey arena with the remainder coming from a local media company that was also part of the ownership team (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004, 87). The city paid for infrastructure, a lease on some centrally located land, eminent domain acquisition of other land, exemption from real estate taxes on the land, and environmental cleanup of the land. In other words, taxpayers paid a very small price after the referendum when they had been slated to pick up an enormous bill originally. Scholars have made Nationwide the hero of this story but the institution of the referendum is what enabled a small group of activists to collectively organize the voters of Columbus on a shoestring budget and produce an outcome that yields benefits that were widely distributed rather than narrowly concentrated.
In Cleveland, an initial stadium referendum that called for new property taxes to pay for a domed baseball stadium was rejected in 1984. The exact cost of the stadium was not specified nor was the contribution of the Cleveland Indians (Rosentraub 1997). The growth machine came back with a 50/50 public/private partnership to build a stadium in an area that would be a downtown tourism and shopping zone. The public half was comprised of already existing revenue that would be used to acquire land and an excise tax on alcohol and cigarettes, known as a sin tax. This vote included all of the residents of Cuyahoga County, the city and suburbs of Cleveland. City voters opposed the tax, suburban voters favored the tax, and the referendum was passed, narrowly. This pattern was very similar to the vote in Denver for the construction of a baseball stadium, except there the citizens approved a less equitable deal on the first referendum. As Rosentraub noted, “Ironically, in both Denver and Cleveland, each city’s mayor was a strong advocate for the new facilities, but neither could convince his own electorate to support his concept. In both areas suburban voters made the difference in terms of securing passage of the proposals for the public’s support of sports facilities” (Rosentraub 1997, 263-64). The fact that the actual costs of projects in Cleveland and Columbus exceeded the estimates should not be gainsaid. But from our perspective, the most significant points are (1) the public had agency in the policy process by rejecting a first proposal, and (2) this action prompted the growth machine to produce a second proposal that shifted most of the tax burden to consumers of cigarettes and alcohol, and forced the team owners to pay close to half of the project, and (3) to the extent that the public was exposed due to overruns or additional post-hoc costs, that public included the wealthier suburbs as well as Cleveland.
In Pittsburgh, a half-cent tax to pay for two new stadiums, one for the MLB Pirates and one for the NFL Steelers was defeated in a referendum of voters in Pittsburgh and the ten surrounding counties. At first blush it appears that elected officials simply ignored the voters and formulated Plan B, a plan to draw from funds from existing budgets dedicated to parks, museums, libraries, community cultural events, and an annual $10 million subsidy that had gone to the previous stadium that served both teams. No new taxes were being levied, proponents argued; opponents observed that this was still a form of corporate welfare paid by taxpayers. These funds, about $13.4 million annually, along with additional surcharges on tickets and parking, would service bonds for the construction of new stadiums. Both teams also increased their contributions to the new plan after the defeat of the referendum (Beaver 2001). But the biggest change came from the state level. Governor Tom Ridge had run for reelection on a platform of supporting Pittsburgh and Philadelphia by providing one-third of the funds for new stadiums, two for each city as it turned out. After much legislative sausage-making, this would be an interest-free, thirty-year loan plan in which increased tax revenues from the stadiums would count toward repayment of the loans. In early 1999 the Pennsylvania legislature approved of a debt-ceiling hike that enabled the state to allocate about $325 million in loans to the teams for the stadiums and a sprinkling of funds to legislative districts across the rest of the state (Groothius, Johnson, and Whitehead 2004). To say that this shows the failure of the referendum process is an overstatement. Already facing the fourth highest tax rate among cities in the US and burdened with the second highest percent of elderly residents in the nation, Pittsburgh voters successfully avoided new taxes (Beaver 2001). The teams rather than the city were responsible for loan payments to the state, and both the risk of default and the costs of making interest-free loans (opportunity costs and
inflationary costs) would be socialized across the entire state of Pennsylvania rather than among the taxpayers of the eleven counties in and around Pittsburgh. To the extent that one chooses to see public funding of sports stadia as corporate welfare, taxpayers of the entire state were now paying this subsidy. The referendum defeat without a doubt forced politicians and the teams to produce a new plan that was far safer and less expensive for those who voted in the referendum. The injustice was that there was no statewide referendum (Loux 1998).

Still other cases, such as the Seattle baseball stadium initiatives, could serve as further data to illustrate the same pattern. In 1995, the referendum was used to bring the voices of a disorganized public to bear on public policy, voices that were not represented by public officials who supported the stadium-growth solution set (Bachelor 1998). Significant spending advantages again proved to be less important (Paul and Brown 2001), and opponents of the growth machine managed to narrowly win a referendum. Less than a month later, Governor Mike Lowry called a special session of the state legislature. The result was a new set of policy proposals that produced lower total costs for the public and increased the share paid by the team. Rather than a new countywide sales tax as in the defeated proposal, the state’s plan was funded by diversion of sales taxes collected by the state in King County, sales of baseball-themed license plates, sports-themed state lottery games, hospitality taxes in King County and a contribution of $75 million from the team, $30 million more than in the referendum (Reich 2001). Due to cost overruns, the team ultimately contributed $145 million. The voters in King County had won a better deal, but it was not an outcome for which they had an opportunity to express their approval or rejection. In all of these cases, excepting the Twins stadium, a referendum sent the growth machine back to revise its proposal and
produce plans that forced team owners to pay more, reduced costs to taxpayers and spread those costs across more counties or the entire state. In some of these cases, including San Francisco, Cleveland, Denver, the voters exercised decision making authority by approving of the stadium financing in a referendum.

Rather than continuing to discuss stadium cases, it may be more persuasive to offer evidence of the same majoritarian empowerment at the local level via the initiative in different policy arenas. In their examination of the broader range of growth oriented economic policy, Gerber and Phillips concluded that, “developers changed the way they interacted with interest groups in the community. The need to obtain majority voter support forced developers to negotiate directly with interest groups, particularly local community planning boards and environmental organisations, over the terms of development. Interest groups endorsed the resulting measures and these endorsements provided powerful signals to voters. In return for these interest group endorsements, developers provided a range of local public goods that the community and environmental organisations demanded on behalf of their constituents… [V]oter requirements empowered different interests and created different political processes from the traditional city hall land use process” (2004, 469). Calavita’s research illustrated the impact of a ballot proposition in San Diego in 1985. There the city council was repeatedly supportive of unmanaged growth and expansion into preserved land; growth proponents outspent the opposition by a 10-1 margin. Yet voters rallied around the referendum and prevailed. Caves’ research on Seattle and scholarship on Austin illustrate very similar patterns in which a growth machine with support from the mayor and city council majorities was defeated by referenda in which the opposition was massively outspent (Caves 1992; Swearingen 2010).
Living wage referenda represent another battleground between well-funded growth interests and diffuse supporters seeking a greater share of the benefits of growth. The hotel and tourism industry promoted Proposition KK in Santa Monica, California, in November 2000, in an attempt to water down a living wage ordinance that included the private sector hospitality corridor along the beachfront that had been passed by the city council. The tourism interests raised $1 million and outspent the living wage forces by a 5 to 1 ratio yet they lost the referendum with a 79 percent to 21 percent vote. Raises in the minimum wage and creation of living wage laws were passed by referendum vote, overcoming similar funding advantages, in Long Beach, Albuquerque, San Jose, SeaTac and San Francisco between 2012 and 2014 (Major Victory for Workers 2012; Dreier 2014). A decade earlier referenda in New Orleans and Oakland were successful in extending living wage coverage beyond narrow sectors of the public work force, bringing together the kind of diverse coalition of labor, religious organizations and community groups that rarely can unify around candidates or mobilize for collective action efforts against neoliberal urban policies (Olson and Steinman 2004). Because the mayor and auto companies stymied efforts in Detroit, the citizens turned to the referendum to pass a living wage ordinance with 80 percent of the vote in 1998 (Levin-Waldman 2005, 151). The significance of the antecedent variable of urban rather than state politics is given further salience in the fact that, in response to the living wage movement, at least seven states have passed laws that bar cities from establishing their own wage laws (Freeman 2005). Freeman concluded, “The most important lesson I draw from the living wage campaigns is the seemingly greater potential for reforms at the local level than at the national level” (Freeman 2005, 28). Living wage laws certainly have been passed at the local level by city councils, indicating that referenda are not a requirement for policy
success in the battle between the many and the few, modestly paid workers and
employers. These cases do, however, demonstrate that in the presence of direct
democracy institutions, grass roots organizations can overcome the resistance of mayors,
city councils, chambers of commerce, businesses and other sources of resistance that are
quite powerful yet only a numerical minority.

Conclusion

The power exerted by the public in the foregoing analysis of local referenda is far
more significant than the power exerted by urban residents in the face of industrial plant
closings or mass layoffs, the sale of public utilities, tax abatement decisions that are
equated with corporate welfare, or the destruction of neighborhoods for urban removal or
Olympics site preparation. Corporate power is not the only resource of consequence in
these cases; cue-giving leadership, community organization networks, and grass roots
collective action all are important resources as well. Moreover, these cases are about
economic development policy and, more broadly, the business climate of the city
(Swanstrom 1985); powerful economic elites do have a stake in these outcomes and are
not sitting on the sidelines as they might be for social issues. Based on the foregoing
analysis, a Pluralist might respond to the Growth Machine perspective that “It’s the
Institutions, Stupid!” (Steinmo and Watts). That is, in urban politics the answers to the
questions of “Who Governs?” and “Who Benefits?” may be very different when the
initiative and referendum are available to assist latent majorities in aggregating and
articulating positions that are at odds with local growth elites.

For scholars who analyze the politics of local participation from lenses other than
Growth Machine, Regime Theory or Pluralism, our findings should be significant. A
framework of exceptionality, or exempting large scale development projects from both typical community vetting as well as state regulations pervades neoliberal urban regeneration policies across the democracies of Europe. Exceptionality is “accompanied by tendencies towards the exclusion of certain groups and collectives from participating in the decision-making process. A democratic deficit emerges as a central element of this strategic approach” (Swyngedouw 2002, 573). For example, the exemption of the Formula One Australian Grand Prix and its track construction from “all the usual checks and balances which normally protect the public” including environmental, pollution and planning controls as well as abrogation of the right to protest in the public park that was the site of the race (Lowes 2004, 77). Lowes (84) concluded, “Whatever one thinks of the decision to hold the event at Albert Park, the problem for democracy has been a matter of the process used to first secure and then implement the event. Citizen’s rights were suspended the name of boosterist agenda that has benefited entrepreneurial interest (both local and international) much more than it has benefited anyone else (and has seriously affected many local residents, either by damaging their homes or pre-empting formerly public spaces where they used to be able to pursue non-commercial leisure pursuits in the park).” Hackworth’s description of the Neoliberal city also points to institutional arrangements in democracies that limit participatory policy making in the “recent growth of bond-issuing special districts … for quasi-public entities such as housing authorities, sewage districts, and airport authorities – often led by unelected decision-makers – to issue debt without a formal referendum” (21).

Although neoliberal policy prescriptions like stadium-led growth still remain the starting point for discussions of regeneration, resistance and agency in the formulation of alternative patterns of distribution of costs and benefits can be achieved. Scholars like
Taylor, seeking some countervailing power to the local state through “community participation in the real world” will find useful data in our analysis of the ability of the referendum to assist in collective action (Taylor 2007).

Whether in US cities or other democracies, whether concepts like Growth Machine or Neoliberalism are deployed, our study indicates a significant number of instances in which referenda at the local level deliver victories for majorities with ample access to information, and these victories come against growth coalitions that are viewed by Growth Machine theory as privileged and hegemonic. These cases argue for a Pluralist caveat to the typical Growth Machine and Regime Theory pattern of urban politics. Specifically, this research responds to Rast (2005, 56) who admonished Regime theorists that, “It is not enough to raise questions about the merits of the corporate-center strategy and to identify potential alternatives. We need to know how, in a fragmented world, new political actors will coalesce around development strategies and policy initiatives that point in more democratic directions.”

The initiative and referenda can destabilize or displace existing growth regimes and replace them with more pluralistic processes. Jones and Bachelor argued that, “New regimes emerge when new participants are attracted to the policy arena. New participants are attracted through new ideas, fresh policy proposals that appeal to them” (1993, 16). Direct democracy institutions can certainly challenge solution sets that have gone too long without reexamination (Bachelor 1998). We have shown that in the battle between well-financed, organized concentrated beneficiaries and disparate, relatively disorganized and weakly-financed latent majorities, the referendum can serve as a mechanism for making manifest those majorities, particularly when trusted local grass-roots organizations and policy entrepreneurs communicate cues through their social
networks. This research offers empirical illustrations and a theoretical formulation of how political actors engaged in development policy can produce more democratic outcomes.

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* The referendum was worded this way to deter an end-run process that had developed. The city charter already required the city to hold a referendum if it proposed to spend more than $15 million on any city project that would use general obligation funds issued by the Board of Estimate and Taxation. Stadium building was specifically singled out in the 1973 referendum that amended the charter. Yet, city officials circumvented this check on their power by using the bonding power of other agencies, e.g., the Minnesota Community Development Agency and the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, to spend taxpayer dollars on stadium financing (for the Metrodome and Target Center) and other tourist projects (Convention Center).

* The key sentence in the law reads, “Imposition of a local sales tax is subject to approval by voters of the political subdivision at a general election.” Opponents of the referendum, like Hennepin County Commissioner Mike Opat, believed that the law did not preempt special legislation that sought an exemption to the referendum requirement.