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Who Supports Radical Right Parties and Where Do Radical Right Parties Succeed: Multi-level Analysis of Radical Right Parties' Success

University of Iowa

Jungmin Song

Abstract

The existing studies of electoral success of radical right parties (RRPs) can be classified into two major approaches: the supply side and the demand side. For the supply side factor, scholars have focused on the political opportunity structure given to radical parties, such as electoral system and party system. On the other hand, demand-side approaches focus on who supports RRPs, and why. Starting from the questions "who supports RRPs" and "where do RRPs succeed," this paper tests several hypotheses regarding the demand-side of determinants, which have been relatively neglected so far. Using the multi-level data from the 2014 European Election Study and Eurostat Database with 28 European countries, I conducted the mixed-effects multi-level logistic regression analysis to test whether the existing theories that have focused on the impact of an anti-EU stance and an anti-immigrant attitude can be applied to RRPs in the 2014 EU Parliament Election, which showed the exceptional success of RRPs. Results suggest the significant impact of socio-economic variables, such as negative economic evaluation, redistributive preferences, and material deprivation, on the support for RRPs. Even though an anti-EU stance and an anti-immigrant attitude showed stronger substantial effects than socio-economic variables, I found that RRPs could enlarge their popular support by appealing to socio-economic rightist voters. I revealed that as the vote share of radical right parties surpasses 10%, the determinants of RRPs' electoral successes become more similar to those of traditional right parties that focus on the socio-economic dimension, not the post-materialist dimension (immigrant issue).

Forty years ago, Sartori (1976) argued that the polarized pluralist party systems can threaten the stability of democratic regimes because irresponsible small parties with extreme ideologies are more likely to generate centrifugal tendencies in the programmatic positions. His argument was supported by the ample historical evidence: the collapse of the Weimar Republic of Germany, the Fourth Republic of France, and the Chilean party system before September 1973. Sartori's concern about the polarized party systems has influenced the general tendency of our discipline that favors the two-party system for the stable democracy. This is why many researchers were alerted when they encountered the emergence of radical parties in Western Europe in the 1980s.

After the breakthrough in the 1980s, the rise of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) extended from France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and Netherlands to northern European countries and eastern European countries (Carvalho 2014; Jungar and Jupskas 2014; Pirro 2014). In 2000-2011, the average support of parliamentary RRPs Europe-wide 9.6 percent (March and Rommerskirchen 2015). However, until recently, the growth of RRPs was not enough to threaten the existing democracies. Despite the increased concern about RRPs, they have not significantly changed party systems in Western Europe (Mudde 2014). Also, even though most RRPs represent the ideas of anti-immigrants and ethno-nationalism, empirical evidence shows that RRPs have no discernible effect on individual levels of intolerance (Dunn and Singh 2011). In most democracies, radical parties cannot become a major actor in party system, and their status remains as "Pariah parties" (Downs 2012).

However, recent changes in two countries disturb our former understanding of the impact of RRPs on contemporary democracies. In contrast to other radical parties that have been limited

up to 15 percent of vote share, RRPs in Hungary and France became the largest party in the parliamentary elections recently. In the 2014 Hungarian Parliamentary election, the Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ), which not only represents xenophobic Hungarian nationalism but also anti-European Union (EU) sentiments, won 133 out of 199 seats, and the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), another far-right party with a more radicalized ideological stance, also won 23 seats (Carr 2015). Similarly, in the 2014 European Union Parliament Election, the Front National (FN), a radical right party with anti-EU and anti-immigrant campaigns, became the largest party by winning 23 out of 74 seats (Russo 2014). Lastly, the Law and Justice Party in Poland, which urges a "strong Poland" and represents the Euro-sceptic stance, won the recent parliamentary election in October 2015, and now there are large concerns that the Law and Justice Party might follow the example of the FIDESZ of Hungary (The Telegraph 2015a; The Economist 2015). They are no longer pariah parties that could be isolated from the existing party system. Now, they entirely transform the party system and threaten the existing democratic rule by populism and rabid nationalism.

How can we explain these new phenomena? Even though there have been numerous studies on the success of RRPs in European countries, we have never encountered cases like these countries where RRPs have come into power. How could they get extensive support from electorates? What causes over fifty percent of voters to support radical parties? This paper approaches answer for these questions by focusing on the "demand-side factors" for RRPs' success, using the multi-level data including both individual-level election survey data and matched country-level data. First, this paper investigates the relationship between individual political attitudes (i.e., Euroscepticism, anti-immigrant attitudes, and anti-democratic attitudes) and voting for radical parties in twenty-eight European countries. Second, this paper tests the impact of the

country-level variables related to the recent rise of RRPs (the number of immigrants, the degree of economic adversity, crime rates, and income inequality). In the following sections, I review the existing studies on the success of RRPs, and build the theoretical arguments to explain how RRPs in European countries could get extensive support from citizens. After that, I test whether the demand-side explanations for the success of RRPs are appropriate for understanding their recent success.

How to Explain Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties

The existing studies of electoral success of radical right parties can be classified into two major approaches: the supply side and the demand side (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Van Der Brug and Fennema 2007). For the supply side factor, scholars have focused on the political opportunity structure (POS) given to radical parties (Mudde 2007). The electoral system is the most important factor that determines the POS of radical parties. Generally, following Duverger (1951), scholars argue that the proportional representation system (PR system) with low electoral threshold rather than the plurality system has a positive effect on the electoral success of RRPs (Golder 2003; Norris 2005; March and Rommerskirchen 2015). However, the relationship between the electoral system and electoral success of radical parties is still an issue of academic debate (Mudde 2007). For instance, Arzheimer & Carter (2006) found that the disproportionality of an electoral system has a positive effect on the electoral success of radical parties. Norris (2005) also showed that the PR system and legal thresholds actually do not affect the share of the *vote* for the radical right, but affect the share of the *seats* for the radical right.

In addition to the electoral system, scholars have investigated the impact of party system variables. Kitschelt and McGann (1997) argue that ideological convergence between the existing main parties can give RRPs political opportunities to enter the electoral competition. To be specific, Kitschelt and McGann show that if the distance between moderate left and moderate right parties is relatively small, political entrepreneurs have a chance to build a successful electoral coalition with a radical agenda. For instance, the Grand Coalition of Austria in 1986 offered a unique opportunity for the construction of new populist antistatist parties in the late 1980s. However, in contrast to this "convergence hypothesis," Ignazi (1992) argued that polarization rather than convergence between the existing parties favor the electoral success of RRPs.

In contrast to vast studies on the supply-side factor, the demand-side factors have been relatively neglected in the literature (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007). Demand-side approaches focus on who supports RRPs, and why. Even though there have been differences among the findings, much of the existing literature indicates that men, manual workers, the unemployed, the low-educated, and younger generations are more likely support RRPs (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Kehrberg 2014). Then, why do these people support RRPs?

Even though there are diverse definitions for RRPs, the general characteristics are nationalism, nativism, and anti-democratic attitudes (Mudde 2007). In this sense, first, most scholars of RRPs have focused on the impact of increased immigration on the electoral success of RRPs. The immigration thesis shows that as the number of immigrants increases, RRPs get more support from voters who perceive immigrants as "ethnic threats" who threaten public safety and job security (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Van der Brug and Fennema 2007). Men, manual workers, the unemployed, the low-educated, and younger generations are more likely to perceive

immigrants and asylum-seekers as direct competitors both in the workplace and in access to social services and housing (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Second, scholars expect that "Eurosceptic" voters are more likely to support RRPs. Recent studies have shown that RRPs and supporters are hostile to the European Union: RRPs oppose European integration by defending national sovereignty and identity (Mudde 2007; Mudde 2013; Kehrberg 2014). Third, some scholars have contended that support for RRPs reflects the protest politics against the status quo (Schedler 1996; Norris 2005; Downs 2012). Norris (2005) shows that alienated and socially intolerant citizens who are dissatisfied with the current status of democratic regime are more likely to cast their ballots for RRPs.

Even though there have been a number of studies focusing on the impact of the demand-side factors, there are still some limitations in existing literature. First, empirically, it is still unclear whether the demand-side factors, such as anti-immigration, anti-EU stances and economic adversity, are the main factors that influence the electoral success of RRPs. The scholars now agree that the platforms of RRPs can be characterized as anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment. However, there is no clear evidence that the anti-immigrant stance is the main reason for voters to support them. Rather, a number of studies have reported that they could not find any evidence that RRPs have influenced the increase of anti-immigrant attitudes or intolerance of minorities (Dunn and Singh 2011; Mudde 2013). Moreover, when scholars investigate the relationship in the aggregate-level, such as the impact of high-levels of migration on the support for RRPs, the evidence produced so far is still inconclusive (Knigge 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005; Mudde 2007). Second, the recent electoral success of RRPs needs new explanations. So far, many scholars have argued that RRPs are not related to the traditional socio-economic ideological dimension (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). But the existing

explanations are based on the findings from elections when RRPs could get limited support in a few countries. Now, we can see RRPs that became the governing party in some nations, so it is unrealistic that they are gaining the support solely due to anti-immigrant issues without appealing to economic issues. In this sense, even though economic issues were not the significant factor for explaining the electoral success of RRPs in the 1990s and the early 2000s, we cannot exclude them anymore for the current situation.

Following this reasoning, this paper tests the following questions. First, do anti-immigrant stance and Euroscepticism really affect RRPs' success? Second, are economic factors still negligible in the recent electoral success of RRPs? Third, are the findings at the individual-level consistent with the aggregate-level findings?

Recent Success of RRPs: FIDESZ in Hungary and FN (Front National) in France

FIDESZ and FN are the examples of RRPs that have moved from the periphery to the core of political systems. Again, it has been assumed that economics is not a core feature of the RRPs' ideology. For example, Mudde (2007) argued that their economic program is not neoliberal, and economics is always a secondary issue for them. If RRPs follow the traditional socio-economic dimension, they should present neo-liberal economic policies with less regulation by governments and less redistributive policies, but so far, there is no clear evidence that they represent those neo-liberal policies.

In the Hungarian political spectrum where the socioeconomic left/right dimension is less developed, FIDESZ represents the cultural-ideological right (Körösényi 1999). Starting out as a radical alternative youth movement, FIDESZ continuously has transformed its political position from the "social-liberal" to the far-right authoritarian party (Batory 2008; Pappas 2014). FIDESZ toned down the party's pro-market stance and devoted a substantial section to the party's own definition of what constituted 'Hungarianness' (Batory 2008). Now, FIDESZ leader Prime Minister Viktor Orban overtly argues that only FIDESZ truly represents the nation; to be against FIDESZ is not to be properly Hungarian (The Guardian 2014).

According to Mudde (2007), Front National was initially "not much more than a confederation of extreme and radical right" under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Like FIDESZ in Hungary that has moved from the less-radical stance to the radical right stance, FN initially started with a neo-liberal xenophobic model but shifted into "an authoritarian xenophobic" RRP model (Carter 2005). FN's electoral manifesto stated that increase of immigrants in France is a threat against national identity (Carvalho 2014). Also, FN started out as "Euroenthusiasts," but now they are leading the anti-EU sentiment all over European countries (Davies 1999; The Wall Street Journal 2014). Now, as the most successful RRP in European countries so far, the most important value of FN is nationalism.

The recent impressive electoral successes of RRPs in Hungary and France could be traced to the 2008 Economic Crisis and following the 2012 Eurozone Crisis and the national reaction against the economic system under the EU. In 2008, Hungary experienced almost seven percent of economic shrinkage, and was compelled to reach an agreement with the IMF and EU for a bailout with an austerity package (Schleifer 2014). Even though the economic shock was less

severe in France than in Hungary, France has also experienced a rise in unemployment, lagging economic growth, and staggering debt since 2008 (The Telegraph 2015b). However, the economic crisis gave FIDESZ and FN the opportunity to break the existing party system. Based on the anti-EU sentiment and nationalism, both parties led the movement against the EU (for FN, they led the movement against the incumbent party), and in the following elections, the former major parties which relatively had supported the EU's remedies were defeated by these RRPs. In the 2010 Hungarian election, MSZP, the moderate socialist party that had constituted the two party-system with FIDESZ since 1998, saw its strength plummet to less than half its previous support (from 43.21% in 2006 to 19.30% in 2010). FIDESZ secured almost two-thirds of the seats in the 2010 election, and paved the way to one-party rule (European Election Database 2015). Also, from the 2012 presidential election, FN has shown consecutive successes in all following elections: the 2014 municipal elections, the 2014 European Parliament Election, and the 2015 departmental elections (Ivaldi 2015).

Hypotheses

These radical right parties' electoral success so far leads us to generate multiple hypotheses. First, given the anti-EU and anti-immigrant rhetoric they have represented so far, I hypothesize that voters with stronger Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant stance are more likely to support radical parties.

H1: Individuals with an anti-immigrant stance are more likely to support radical right parties.

H2: Individuals that perceive EU membership as being harmful are more likely to support radical right parties.

Second, existing studies indicate that the electoral success of RRPs are not related to economic factors. However, given that RRPs have enlarged their supporting bases since the 2008 Economic Crisis and the 2012 Eurozone Crisis, economic hardships are not negligible anymore. In this sense, it is a timely and important question whether the traditional socio-economic ideological dimension - the stance toward redistributive policies and the evaluation of current economic hardship - can explain the electoral success of RRPs.

H3: Individuals who negatively evaluate the current economic situation are more likely to support radical right parties.

H4: Individuals who prefer less redistributive economic policies are more likely to support radical right parties.

Third, as some RRPs have acquired the status of "major party", the anti-democratic and authoritarian stance of RRPs should not be ignored anymore. Scholars have already shown concerns about the anti-liberal or anti-democratic stance of radical right parties (Schedler 1996; Pappas 2014). Given the recent democratic backsliding in Hungary, we need to investigate the

relationship between the anti-liberal stance of voters and support for RRPs. Specifically, we expect that an anti-liberal stance is positively related to electoral support for RRPs.

H5: Individuals who are in favor of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime are more likely to support radical right parties.

In addition to these independent variables, the impact of the country-level variables on the RRPs' success should be tested, too. As mentioned above, even though RRPs have represented the anti-immigrant stance, the increase in the number of immigrants has not shown a statistically significant impact. Similarly, increasing unemployment rate also did not show a significant influence (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). To fully understand the electoral success of RRPs recently, the impact of these variables on RRPs should be revisited. From this reasoning, this paper tests whether the number of incoming migrants and the degree of economic adversity (measured by material deprivation) affect the electoral success of RRPs.

H6: Individuals who live in countries with high number of migrants are more likely to support RRPs.

H7: Individuals who live in countries with high material deprivation rates are more likely to support RRPs.

Lastly, given that RRPs are largely emerging from "grievance" against the current economic system, the impact of income inequality should be tested, too. The degree of income inequality has increased rapidly since the 1990s, paralleling with the rise of RRPs, and furthermore, the positive relationship between inequality and nationalism is also reported by Solt (2011). From this reasoning, this paper tests the relationship between country-level income inequality and electoral support of RRPs.

H8: Individuals who live in countries with high income inequality are more likely to support RRPs.

Data and Methods

The data used for this analysis come from two different sources. First, for the individual-level data, the 2014 European Election Study (EES) Voter Study for the 2014 EU Parliament Election conducted in 28 EU member countries is used. As a Comparative Opinion Survey (COS) that has become the essential research data in contemporary comparative politics, the EES data enables us to generalize a finding in a single country to different contexts of other countries because all countries included in the data share the same format of questionnaires. The EES data for all countries provide a large enough sample size,, at least 1,000, which is sufficient to test multi-level hypotheses that investigate the impact of aggregate-level contextual variables on the

individual-level voting behavior. Moreover, the 2014 EU Parliament Election data help us to eradicate the difference across countries due to different election times because all countries had the EU Parliament Elections in the same year.

Second, for the country-level data, this paper uses the data from the Eurostat Database, the official database of the European Union for statistics regarding EU member countries. As a credible data source governed by the EU, the Eurostat Database provides a wide range of national-level data including basic economic indicators, immigrants, income inequality, and other social environment variables. By using the "matching" command that connects two different datasets with a shared variable (for this case, I used "countrycode" variable) in Stata, the statistical package I used in this paper, I combined these datasets.

The dependent variable of this paper is the support for RRPs. To be specific, this variable is a binary variable, which consists of two different values: if a respondent voted for any radical right parties in the 2014 EU Parliament Election, he is coded as 1 (one), and 0 (zero) for otherwise. If a respondent did not participate in the election, he is coded as missing, not zero. For example, if a voter in Hungary voted for FIDESZ, he is coded as 1. To identify RRPs in each country, I followed the classification of Immerzeel et al.'s (2011) Expert Judgement Survey for European Political Parties from 2010. The Expert Judgement Survey for European Political Parties is "a data set consisting of scores of various characteristics of political parties given by political scientists and other experts of political parties in 38 European countries, including both West and East European countries, Turkey and Israel" (Immerzeel et al. 2011). Even though there are some concerns regarding the inter-expert reliability for these kinds of expert judgement surveys, the inter-expert reliability of this data is quite high for all dimensions. Because this data does not

reflect the emergence of new RRPs since 2010, however, I added two notable cases in the RRP group because they transformed themselves as anti-immigrant and anti-democratic RRPs after they acquired broad support from electorates: FIDESZ in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland.

I measure the independent variables as follows. First, for anti-immigration attitude, I used the question asking, "Are you in favor of (or opposed to) a restrictive policy on immigration (0 – 10 point range)." Higher values indicate higher support for a restrictive immigration policy. Second, for anti-EU sentiment, the question "Generally speaking, do you think that (our country)'s membership of the EU is a good thing/a bad thing/neutral" is used. I recoded this variable into 2 for "a bad thing", 1 for "neutral", and 0 for "a good thing." Third, for retrospective economic evaluation, the question "What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in (our country) is a lot better/is a little better/has stayed the same/is a little worse/is a lot worse" is used. Following the original order, I assigned higher values for more negative evaluation (from 1 to 5). Fourth, for redistributive preferences, the question asking "Are you fully in favor of (or opposed to) the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (0-10 point range)" is employed. Higher values indicate higher opposition for the redistribution of wealth. Fifth, for anti-democratic stance, the question asking "Do you fully support restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime (from 0 to 10)" is employed. Higher values represent more support for anti-democratic policies.

For the country-level variables, first, the number of migrants who came in that country in 2013 is employed for measuring the saliency of immigrants in countries. Second, for measuring economic adversity, material deprivation rate is used. The reason why I employ this measure is that it captures more tangible evidence of economic adversity in real life. According to Eurostat

Database (2015), this indicator "measures the percentage of the population that cannot afford at least three of the following nine items: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately warm; to face unexpected expenses; to eat meat or proteins regularly; to go on holiday; a television set; a washing machine; a car; a telephone." Third, for income inequality, I employed the GINI Index, the most prominent measure for income inequality.

Other control variables, such as gender (1 = male, 0 = female), age, education (5-categories), employment status (0 = employed, 1 = unemployed), size of town (0 = rural, 1 = middle, 2 = large), and income (10-categories) are included in the model. Even though there have been some findings that voters with low-socio-economic-status (SES) – low income, less-educated, and unemployed - are more likely to support RRPs, the evidence is still inconclusive. In this sense, I will include these variables in the models and test whether the traditional assumption about the affinity of low-SES voters toward RRPs can be applied to the recent rise of RRPs, too. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and all independent variables are summarized in the Appendix.

For missing values, the Tobit regression model is used. Income variable has a large number of missing values in this dataset (884 missing observations). Because these missing observations might distort my findings, I used the Tobit regression model to deal with the censored variable. Given the notion that poor people are less likely to report their income, I assumed that this data is left-censored. Using variables that influence on income, such as gender, age, education, and employment status (unemployed, managers, and white-collars are included), I estimated linear relationships between income and other variables. Through this process of imputation, the imputed values from the Tobit regression model are assigned to 884 missing observations.

To test the above hypotheses, this paper employs the multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression model. First, given the binary characteristic of the dependent variable, the logistic regression model is appropriate. Second, the characteristic of this dataset, the combined dataset with both individual-level data and country-level data should be considered. If I run the logistic regression model for this dataset, it violates the basic assumption of the linear regression model (e.g., statistical independence of the errors, homoskedasticity) because observations are actually clustered by nations in the dataset. Observations that belong to the same nation will share similar characteristics, and it will lead to underestimation of standard errors. In this sense, even when a researcher tests an individual-level hypothesis without the aggregate-level context variables, the mixed-effects logistic regression model should be employed to deal with these problems. Also, as Angrist and Pischke (2008) suggested, the source of omitted variable bias cannot be observed without multi-level analysis that captures the impact of variables at the nation-level on the support for RRPs. Given that many previous studies have neglected this potential problem of multi-level dataset, I expect that employing the multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression model would be a big improvement for explaining RRPs in multiple European countries. Furthermore, to test Hypotheses 6, 7, and 8, the multilevel mixed-effect model is definitely needed because those hypotheses investigate the impact of country-level variables on the individual-level voting behavior.

Results

Using the mixed-effects multi-level logistic regression model, Models 1 through 6 in Table 1 test the individual-level hypotheses from H1 to H5. Surprisingly, H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 are all supported. First, from Model 1, voters who support restrictive immigration policies are more likely to support RRPs ($p<0.001$). Substantially, for every one unit increase in the support for restrictive immigration policies, the log odds of supporting RRPs increases by 0.20. Second, from Model 2, voters who have an anti-EU stance are more likely to support RRPs ($p<0.001$), and the log odds of supporting RRPs increases by 0.94 for every one unit increase in anti-EU stance. The results of Model 1 and 2 lead me to conclude that anti-immigrant and anti-EU stance of RRPs are really appealing to voters who have similar policy attitudes like RRPs.

Third, from Model 3, voters who have evaluated the past 12 months' economic performance negatively are more likely to support RRPs. Substantially, for every one unit increase in the negative economic evaluation, the log odds of supporting RRPs increases by 0.29 ($p<0.001$). Fourth, from Model 4, voters who oppose redistributive policies are also more likely to support RRPs. The size of the effect is smaller than the effect of anti-immigrant stance, but it still leads to 0.06 increase in the log odds of supporting RRPs for every one unit increase in the opposition to redistributive policies ($p<0.001$). The results of Model 3 and Model 4 are noteworthy. As mentioned above, the traditional socio-economic ideological dimension has been ignored when scholars investigate the electoral success of RRPs. However, in the 2014 Parliament Election, I found that voters chose RRPs because of their economic grievance and their conservative stance regarding redistribution policies. The effects of these variables are still significant in Model 6, the

full model which includes all independent variables. The results of Model 3 and Model 4 suggest that RRPs have broadened their supporting base by incorporating the traditional socio-economic right with their original base, anti-immigration stance. This might be the reason why they could move from the periphery to the core of party systems in some countries.

Lastly, anti-democratic attitude also boosts the support for RRPs. In Model 5, for every one unit increase in support for restriction on civil liberties, the log odds of supporting RRPs increases by 0.08 ($p<0.001$). As many scholars have been concerned, RRPs are gaining support from voters who do not support the value of democracy. This result indicates that RRPs can push their anti-establishment and anti-democratic policies more strongly in the future because there would be less resistance from voters. For control variables, male, age, education, and income have shown statistically significant impact on the support for RRPs. First, men are more likely to support RRPs than women ($p<0.001$). Second, younger voters are more likely to support RRPs ($p=0.002$). Third, low-educated voters are more likely to support RRPs ($p=0.009$). Fourth, low-income voters are more likely to support RRPs ($p=0.068$). In sum, voters with low-SES are more likely to support RRPs, as expected. Also, the strong support from male voters for RRPs is again confirmed.

Table 1. Testing the Individual-level Hypotheses: Mixed-effects Multi-level Logistic Regression Model Predicting Individual Support for Radical Right Parties in the 2014 EU Parliament Election

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coefficient (S.E)	Coefficient (S.E)	Coefficient (S.E)	Coefficient (S.E)	Coefficient (S.E)	Coefficient (S.E)
Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies	0.20*** (0.01)					0.16*** (0.01)
Anti-EU Stance		0.94*** (0.05)				0.83*** (0.05)
Negative Economic Evaluation			0.29*** (0.04)			0.16*** (0.04)
Oppose to Redistributive Policies				0.06*** (0.01)		0.05*** (0.01)
Support for Restriction on Civil Liberties					0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.37*** (0.07)	0.44*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.42*** (0.07)	0.43*** (0.07)
Age	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Education	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.16 (0.13)	0.05 (0.14)	0.04 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)	0.12 (0.13)	0.07 (0.14)
Large Town	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Income	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Constant	-4.79*** (0.75)	-5.21*** (0.75)	-4.20*** (0.74)	-3.34*** (0.73)	-3.62*** (0.74)	-7.53*** (0.78)
N	14484	14484	14484	14484	14484	14484
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01						
Data Source: Schmitt, Popa, Hobolt, and Teperoglou (2015); Immerzeel T, Lubbers M and Coffé H (2011)						

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of Voting for RRPs from Model 6



Note 1. The values are predicted probabilities based on the unstandardized mixed-effects multi-level logistic regression coefficients using Monte Carlo simulations with other variables in the model held constant at mean values.
Note 2. Whiskers give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 1 shows predicted probabilities of voting for RRPs for key independent variables from Model 6. This figure enables researchers to compare substantial significance of independent variables. To compare substantial impact of variables, I moved the value of independent variable from the mean to minus one standard deviation and to plus one standard deviation. Among five variables, anti-EU stance showed the largest effect. When I held values of other variables at means, as anti-EU stance moves from 0.9 to 2.3, the probability increases by 0.12 percentage points (0.005 – 0.017) Also, support for restrictive immigration policies showed strong effects. As support for restrictive immigration policies moves from 3 to 9, the probability of voting for RRPs increases by 0.8 percentage points (0.005 – 0.013). For other three variables, the size of effects is smaller

than those of the previous two. This result suggests that even though the socio-economic dimension showed statically significant impact on the support for RRPs, anti-immigration and anti-EU stance are the main predictors of voting for RRPs.

From the results of Model 1 through 6, I found evidence of random effects, which means that there are differences of support for RRPs across countries (LR Test: $p<0.001$). This means that the country-level variables are needed for further explanations. Model 7, 8, 9, and 10 in Table 2 test Hypothesis 6, 7, and 8. From Model 10, Hypothesis 7 (economic adversity) and Hypothesis 8 (income inequality) are supported. For Hypothesis 7, as material deprivation increases in a country, individuals in that country are more likely to support RRPs. Substantially, for every one unit increase in country-level material deprivation, the log odds of voting for RRPs increases by 0.15 ($p=0.094$). Consistent with the finding from the previous model with negative economic evaluation, economic adversity (measured by material deprivation) makes a breeding ground for the electoral success of RRPs. For Hypothesis 8, as the GINI Index decreases in a country, individuals in that country are more likely to support RRPs ($p=0.027$). For every one unit increase in the GINI Index, the log odds of voting for RRPs decreases by 0.53. This result indicates that in countries without pressures for income redistribution, RRPs can get more support from voters because they do not represent any class-based policy agendas. Lastly, the number of migrants who came in 2013 does not show statistical significance ($p=0.441$), so Hypothesis 6 is rejected. Considering the results from individual-level hypotheses, this might mean that there is no relationship between the number of migrants and anti-immigrant attitudes of voters. In other words,

an individual living with a large number of migrants is not necessarily likely to develop anti-immigrant attitudes.

Table 2. Testing the Country-level Hypotheses: Mixed-effects Multi-level Logistic Regression Model Predicting Individual Support for Radical Right Parties in the 2014 EU Parliament Election

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
The Number of Migrants in 2013	-0.00			0.00
	(0.00)			(0.00)
Material Deprivation in 2013		0.02		0.15*
		(0.07)		(0.09)
GINI in 2013			-0.27	-0.53**
			(0.18)	(0.24)
Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Anti-EU Stance	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Oppose to Redistributive Policies	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for Restriction on Civil Liberties	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Unemployed	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Large Town	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-7.53***	-7.72***	0.51	6.21
	(0.91)	(1.13)	(5.39)	(6.31)
N	14484	14484	14484	14484
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01				
Data Source: Schmitt, Popa, Hobolt, and Teperoglou (2015); Immerzeel T, Lubbers M and Coffé H (2011); Eurostat Database (2015).				

Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Voting for RRPs from Model 10



Note 1. The values are predicted probabilities based on the unstandardized mixed-effects multi-level logistic regression coefficients using Monte Carlo simulations with other variables in the model held constant at mean values.
Note 2. Whiskers give 95% confidence interval.

Another important point is that even after the country-level variables are included in the model, all the individual-level variables are still showing statistically significant impact on the support for RRPs. As mentioned above, a mixed-effects multi-level model enables us to observe the source of omitted variable bias (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Now we are more confident regarding the findings from the individual-level variables. Figure 2 shows predicted probabilities of voting for RRPs as values of two country-level independent variables change. First, when other variables in the model are held constant, as the value of material deprivation changes from 2 to 20 (minus one s.d. – plus one s.d.), the predicted probability of voting for RRPs also increases by 3.5 percentage points (0.002 – 0.037), even though the range of 95% confidence interval is too broad.

Next, for the GINI Index, as the index changes from 30 to 36 (more unequal), the predicted probability decreases by 0.72 percentage points (0.0075 – 0.0003). In sum, material deprivation showed much stronger substantial effects on RRP voting.

Conclusion

Starting from the questions "who supports radical right parties" and "where do radical right parties succeed," I tested the several hypotheses regarding the demand-side of determinants for electoral success of radical right parties. Using the multi-level data from the 2014 European Parliament Election Study and Eurostat Database, I conducted the mixed-effects multi-level logistic regression analysis to find out the determinants of the support for RRPs. Theoretically, the main objective of this paper is to test whether the existing theories focusing on anti-EU and anti-immigrant stance can be applied to RRPs in the 2014 EU Parliament Election, which showed the exceptional success of RRPs in the electoral arena. The most important finding of this paper is the significant impact of socio-economic variables, including negative economic evaluation, redistributive preferences, and country-level economic adversity (measured by material deprivation). Even though anti-EU stance and anti-immigrant attitude showed stronger substantial effects, I found RRPs could enlarge their popular support by appealing to socio-economic rightist voters. Overall, the existing theories about radical parties' success are not enough to explain the recent successes of RRPs.

These findings have several implications both for researchers who focus on the success of RRPs and for citizens who are concerned by the anti-democratic characteristics of RRPs. First, we

need to distinguish RRPs with over 20% of the vote share from those with below 10% of the vote share. In general, researchers have defined the electoral success of radical parties as over 5% or 10% of total votes. However, as we can see in Hungary, Poland, and France, some RRPs recently gained over 20% of total votes and became the ruling parties of those nations. I revealed that as the vote share of RRPs increases, the determinants of radical parties' electoral success become more similar to those of traditional right parties that focus on the socio-economic dimension. In other words, the supporters for RRPs with high popularity show similar characteristics to those for traditional right parties. Second, the empirical results of this paper lead us to the pessimistic prediction for democracy in countries with RRPs. Results show that supporters of RRPs are more likely to have anti-democratic attitudes. Even though the substantial impact is relatively small, democratic citizens need to stay tuned to the status of democracies like Hungary and Poland.

Actually, this paper is a stepping stone for understanding the electoral success of RRPs in European countries. Even though this paper tests three hypotheses regarding country-level contextual variables, we still do not know much about why some countries are showing the exceptional success of RRPs. In future studies, the interaction between nation-level context and individual-level attitudes should be investigated more thoroughly.

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Web Resources

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Appendix. Descriptive Statistics of Variables included in analysis and Data Source

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote for RRP	14484	.1005247	.3007087	0	1
Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies	30064	6.467469	3.0473	1	11
Anti-EU Stance	30064	1.600286	.718913	1	3
Negative Economic Evaluation	30064	3.203034	.9974635	1	5
Oppose to Redistributive Policies	30064	4.830894	2.861319	1	11
Support for Restriction on Civil Liberties	30064	6.368813	2.883555	1	11
The Number of Migrants in 2013	30064	57440.27	81177.37	507	252122
Material Deprivation in 2013	30064	11.43106	9.539481	1.4	43
GINI in 2013	30064	29.78909	3.694339	24.2	35.4
male (gender: 0=female, 1=male)	30064	.4507717	.4975789	0	1
age	30064	51.05721	17.91979	16	99
education	30064	2.305648	.840751	1	5
income	30064	5.386025	1.564376	1	10
Unemployed (0=employed, 1=employed)	30064	.0918042	.2887541	0	1
large_town (size of town: 0=rural, 1=middle size, 2=large size)	30042	1.940983	.7774655	1	3

Data Source

Eurostat Database. 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

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