Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Policy and Ethnic Cues on Vote Choice

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Abstract: Given that the number of ethnic minority candidates is rising, understanding how voters respond to minority candidates and how minority voters behave at the ballot box is important for understanding election outcomes. Survey evidence indicates that minority voters prefer minority candidates, and that minority voters respond to ethnic cues. But how voters respond to ethnic cues in the context of other campaign information, specifically the policy positions of candidates, is less clear. Using experimental evidence, we address this question of how ethnic and policy cues interact to influence political behavior. Experiment participants were presented with varying combinations of ethnic cues (Latino and Asian) and policy cues, including candidates whose ethnic cue seemed inconsistent with their policy position cue. We find that utilization of these cues is moderated by individual characteristics. Political sophistication enhances policy voting among all participants. Ethnic affinity mitigates policy voting for Asian participants, but not for Latino participants. Overall, our experimental evidence shows that individual characteristics moderate the use of cues in ways that vary by ethnic group, implying that we cannot assume all minority groups behave in a similar manner in political contexts.

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One of the most important tasks for citizens in representative democracies is choosing a candidate who best represents their preferences and interests. Yet given that citizens in the United States are generally regarded as politically unsophisticated and uninterested (e.g., Converse 1964, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991), this may be a tall order for citizens to fill, and it is unclear how voters determine which candidate will best represent their interests. We explore voters' decision making process when provided ethnic cues and policy positions, specifically examining how individual characteristics, such as political sophistication and ethnic affinity, condition their vote choice. Given the weight of individual's voting decisions, the growing minority population, and increased number of minority political candidates, it is important to understand this intersection where ethnic candidates and voters' decision making processes meet at the ballot booth.

Using experimental evidence, we address this question of how ethnic and policy cues interact to influence political behavior. We find that individual characteristics such as political sophistication and ethnic affinity moderate the use of policy and ethnic cues. Political sophistication enhances policy voting among all participants. Ethnic affinity mitigates policy voting for Asian participants, but not for Latino participants. Overall, our experimental evidence shows that individual characteristics moderate the use of cues in ways that vary by ethnic group, implying that we cannot assume all minority groups behave in a similar manner in political contexts.

We use an experimental design to combine three distinct lines of political science research: issue voting, descriptive representation, and voting cues. The descriptive representation literature suggests an ethnic cue(s) may represent a mutual tie between the representative and the community, fostering or hindering issue voting. The voting cues literature provides theoretical predictions for when, and for whom, cues are most likely to be utilized, which we use in our investigation of how individual-level characteristics such as political sophistication and ethnic affinity condition the affects of ethnic and policy cues.

Our conclusions have important implications for elections in the United States. Minority

groups are becoming an important and growing voting bloc in U.S. elections.¹ Additionally, there are an increasing number of minority candidates on ballots at all levels, particularly state, local, and congressional elections. It is critical to gain a better understanding of how voters, both minority and non-minority voters, respond to minority candidates and their policy positions. More generally, we need to have a better understanding of how politically unsophisticated voters behave and use cues as part of their voting decision process.

The intersection of issue voting and ethnic cues

Issue voting and the influence of ethnic cues are typically examined in isolation, with little consideration for how they may interact to affect vote choice. Yet, during campaigns voters are presented with candidates' ethnic backgrounds and policy positions. Voters may simultaneously consider policy and ethnic cues to arrive at their vote choice.

Issue voting, when a voter considers how candidates' policy positions line up with their own policy preferences when making a vote choice, is one way for citizens to determine which candidate best represents their interests. Generations of scholars have assumed awareness of candidates' or parties' positions on the issues was a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for issue voting (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, Erikson and Tedin 2011, 267). A natural extension of this assumption is that issue voting is more accessible to politically sophisticated and interested individuals, so we expect politically sophisticated individuals are more likely to engage in issue voting than politically unsophisticated individuals. Particularly in state and local elections characterized as low-salience, low-visibility elections, citizens may not be familiar with the candidates' issue positions, and therefore would be unable to engage in issue voting. To compensate for a lack of information related to candidates and their policy positions, voters may utilize cues or heuristics (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 2000, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991), a variety of which voters are exposed to in their daily lives (Popkin

¹For example, according to the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), Latino voters played a "decisive impact" in the 2012 presidential election.

 $1991).^2$

Ethnic cues are hypothesized to influence the preferences and behaviors of co-ethnic individuals. In particular, ethnic cues may serve as an effective approximation of issue voting for individuals who are not familiar with a candidate's policy position. The influence of ethnic cues has been examined in the descriptive representation and voting cues literature. Researchers typically rely on a dichotomous operationalization of an ethnic cue, using ethnic surnames, or another ascribed characteristic such as skin color. Much of this previous research provided contradictory evidence about the influence and salience of ethnic cues to voters (Espino 2004, Griffin and Keane 2006, McConnaughy et al. 2010). However, more recent research shows a wide-spread mobilization effect when there are co-ethnics on the ballot (Barreto 2010).³

Our experimental test builds on recent experimental research testing the causal relationship proposed by Barreto (2010), and expands the conception of an ethnic cue(s) by utilizing Dovi's (2002) theory of descriptive representation. For co-ethnics the ethnic cue(s) may signal a mutual tie between the representative and the community. For co-ethnics the ethnic cue(s) represents: (1) shared interests, (2) similar policy preferences, and (3) shared long-term goals for the community. To formulate a more accurate operationalization of the ethnic cues, language and common background are combined with an ethnic surname. Ethnic cues are most salient for co-ethnic voters when the cues are layered – when a candidate has an ethnic surname and references shared language and a common background (Victor 2012). In the experimental setting, Latino participants prefer a co-ethnic candidate even in the presence of a party label cue (Victor 2012). Compared to individuals who do not share the candidate's ethnic background, we expect that ethnic cues are more salient and effective for co-ethnic voters. From the voting cues and ethnic cues literatures we develop three hypotheses: (1) ethnicity hypothesis, (2) affinity hypothesis, and (3) sophistication

²Voters utilize cues such as party identification (Popkin 1991, Rahn 1993, Kam 2005), ideology (Downs 1957), endorsements (Lupia 1994, Boudreau 2009), polls (Boudreau and McCubbins 2010), and the demographic characteristics and appearance of candidates (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994, Druckman 2003).

³Particularly in local and state elections with Latinos.

hypothesis.

 H_1 : Co-ethnic participants are more likely to vote for the co-ethnic candidate compared to participants who do not share a candidate's ethnicity.

The ethnicity hypothesis will be tested when policy cues are available, and when policy cues are absent. When policy cues are absent, we predict co-ethnic participants will prefer co-ethnic candidates over other types of candidates. When policy cues are available the cue may either (1) align, or (2) conflict with an individual's previously held policy preferences. When the policy cue aligns with the previously held preferences of an individual, ethnic cues enhance policy voting among co-ethnics. However, not all co-ethnic candidates espouse the same policy preferences as the majority of the ethnic community, and policy cues may contradict the previously held preferences of an individual. In this case the ethnic cue may decrease policy voting among co-ethnics. For instance, if a ideologically conservative Latino candidate advocates against the DREAM act, a Latino voter, whose community typically supports the DREAM Act, may vote based on the ethnic cue and therefore choose a candidate who does not represent his policy interests. As such, it is possible for ethnic cues to cause co-ethnics to vote contrary to their issue preferences. To summarize the ethnicity hypothesis, we claim ethnic cues help co-ethnic individuals vote consistent with their issue preferences when the candidates' preferences are stereotypically in-line with the minority groups' interests. However, when a minority candidate's position is contrary to the majority of the minority group's preferences, ethnic cues can lead co-ethnic individuals to vote contrary to their interests and preferences.⁴

When co-ethnic candidates present policy cues inconsistent with voters' policy preferences, individual characteristics may moderate cue taking. Individual characteristics, such as ethnic affinity and political sophistication, may play a role in determining which cue – an

⁴This line of reasoning is consistent with research indicating that when heuristics are not stereotypically consistent with expectations, cues can lead certain voters astray, and that individual characteristics, such as interest in politics and political sophistication, condition how voters respond to conflicting information and non-stereotypical cues (Dancey and Sheagley 2012, Lau and Redlawsk 2001, Rahn 1993).

ethnic cue or policy cue – is most compelling for a voter. For instance, a voter with a higher level of ethnic affinity may weigh a candidate's ethnicity more than the candidate's policy position because the shared background, language, or mutual tie between the candidate and ethnic community is more important to the voter than a specific policy position. We believe cue taking will be moderated by individual level characteristics, leading to the following two hypotheses:

- H_2 : Participants with higher levels of ethnic affinity are more likely to utilize an ethnic cue over a policy cue.
- H_3 : Politically sophisticated participants are more likely to vote consistent with their policy preferences compared to politically unsophisticated participants.

In H_2 , the affinity hypothesis, we hypothesize individuals with higher levels of ethnic affinity will be more likely to utilize an ethnic cue. Our measurement of ethnic affinity is an index of six questions about individuals' preferences for language, media, culture, and identity.⁵ However Nicholson, Pantoja and Segura's (2006) research implies that the affinity hypothesis should only hold for politically unsophisticated ethnic voters. Comparing ethnic symbolism and policy preferences in the 2000 presidential election, Nicholson, Pantoja and Segura find that politically unsophisticated Latino voters rely on partisanship attachments and ethnic symbolism while politically sophisticated Latino voters utilize policy issues to formulate their vote choice. Therefore, we propose H_3 , the sophistication hypothesis, predicting politically sophisticated minority participants are more likely to rely on policy positions in their evaluation of candidates. Furthermore, we predict that affinity and sophistication will interact with one another. As stated in H_4 , we claim that when individuals are presented with conflicting ethnic and policy cues, the individuals who are politically sophisticated and have a high level of ethnic affinity will vote consistent with their policy preferences rather than shared ethnic identity.

⁵The results are robust, whether we use an index of ethnic affinity or the individual measures. The affinity index has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.81, and is discussed in more detail in the following section.

 H_4 : Politically sophisticated participants with a high level of ethnic affinity utilize policy cues over ethnic cues.

Experimental Design

Experiments offer an ideal way to examine individuals' voting decisions, because we can manipulate candidates' policy positions and ethnic cues – manipulations that are difficult with real candidates. For this experiment 335 student participants were recruited from undergraduate political science courses at a large, public university. Participants were shown a fictional online newspaper article about four fictional candidates running for a state legislative office (see Appendix for an example of website treatments). Each participant viewed four candidates: an Anglo male, an Asian male, a Latino male, and an Anglo female. The online articles provided participants with brief biographical information about each candidate along with the a quote from the candidate regarding their position on affirmative action.⁶ Participants were then presented two head-to-head match-ups between candidates, and asked to make vote choices between the candidates.⁷ Participants were asked to place themselves on a seven-point ideological scale, then place themselves on a series of five issues⁸ to assess their ideological position and policy positions.⁹ The participants were also asked political sophistication and ethnic affinity questions. This additional information allows tests for moderation of vote choice by political sophistication, ethnic affinity, and the interaction of these two indicators.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups, two control conditions and

 $^{^{6}}$ We chose to present the issue of affirmative action because it is likely to be a salient issue for university students, and it is an issue that has identifiable consistent and inconsistent positions for ethnic candidates.

⁷The Anglo female was presented in the initial introduction to the candidates, but is never presented in the head-to-head match-ups.

 $^{^{8}}$ The five issues are affirmative action, same-sex marriage, the environment, immigration, and the economy/jobs.

⁹We are most interested in participants' position on affirmative action. Participants were asked "Where would you place yourself on the issue of affirmative action?" and presented with a seven-point scale. Each point on the scale was labeled ranging from "Strongly support continuing affirmative action" to "Neither support continuing nor support repealing affirmative action" to "Strongly support repealing affirmative action."

two treatment conditions. The first control group is exposed to candidates with ethnic cues and no policy cues. The second control group is exposed to candidates with policy cues, but no ethnic cues. The two treatment groups include an ethnic cue and a policy cue. The first treatment group is exposed to a Latino candidate with an inconsistent policy cue and an Asian candidate with a consistent policy cue. An inconsistent policy position is when the Latino or Asian candidate are opposed to affirmative action; a consistent policy position is when the Latino or Asian candidate are in favor of affirmative action. The second treatment group is exposed to an Asian candidate with an inconsistent policy cue and a Latino candidate with a consistent policy cue. The experimental design allows for the comparison of candidates with and without ethnic cues, as well as candidates with and without policy cues.

Testing our Hypotheses

To test our ethnicity hypothesis, we first present simple difference of means tests by experimental condition for Asian participants and for Latino participants. From these tests we see the overall pattern of behavior among Latino participants and Asian participants when they are exposed to candidates with ethnic cues only, policy cues only, and with consistent and inconsistent policy cues. Since the difference of means tests do not show which participants select the candidate based on the policy versus the ethnic cue, we employ a logistic regression model of policy vote to test our affinity, sophistication, and interaction hypotheses. The dependent variable is a policy vote, measured 1 if the participant voted for the candidate who shared his or her policy preference on affirmative action, and 0 otherwise. To test our sophistication hypothesis, we include a measure of political sophistication in the model. Political sophistication is measured using a four question knowledge battery, with four indicating the respondent answered all four questions correctly and 0 indicating the respondent did not answer any of the questions correctly.¹⁰

¹⁰The four sophistication questions ask for how many years a U.S. Senator is elected, to identify the official positions of Barbara Boxer and John Roberts, and identify which party is currently in control of the U.S.

To test our affinity hypothesis, we include a measure of ethnic affinity in our policy vote model. The ethnic affinity index is the sum of indicators asking respondents questions such as how often they read the news in their ethnic language, eat their ethnic food, how many people in their network of friends are co-ethnics, and how they identify themselves.¹¹ There are questions for Latinos to create the Latino affinity index, and corresponding questions for Asians to create the Asian affinity index. Higher values on these ethnic affinity indices indicate a higher level of ethnic affinity; 0 indicates the respondent is not of that ethnicity. To test the interaction hypothesis, we include an interaction between political knowledge and Latino affinity in one model, and an interaction between political knowledge and Asian affinity in a second model.

Our policy vote models include controls for ethnic identity, party identification, ideology, and the treatment group. Ethnic identity is an indicator for whether the respondent identifies as an Anglo, Asian, or Latino. Ethnic identity is not included in models that include the ethnic affinity indices. Party identification is a seven-point scale ranging from strong democrat to strong republican. Ideology is a seven-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Treatment group is an indicator for which treatment condition the respondent was randomly assigned.

Results


There are 335 participants in this part of the study.¹² As seen in Figure 1, the sample is composed of 39% Anglos, 31% Asians, 21% Latinos, and 11% identifying as another ethnicity.


House of Representatives.

¹¹The ethnic affinity questions include: how often do you read Spanish (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian) news; how often do you watch TV and movies in Spanish (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian); how often to do you eat Mexican or Hispanic (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian) food; how often do you speak Spanish (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian) with friends or family; what percentage of your friends are Latino or Mexican (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian); what is your language of choice for information on politics and public affairs – Spanish, English, both equally (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian) language in your family; what is your first identity – Latino, Hispanic, Mexican (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Asian); how strongly do you identify as American.

 $^{^{12}}$ A second experiment was conducted during the winter of 2013, using immigration as the policy issue.

The sample is skewed toward the Democratic party (66% Democrats) and a liberal ideology (66% Liberal). This liberal skew is reflected in participants' opinion on affirmative action, although opinion on affirmative action varies by ethnicity, as seen in Figure 2. Compared to Anglo participants, a greater percentage of Asian participants and Latino participants favor affirmative action policies.









Figure 2: Opinion on Affirmative Action by Ethnicity

Initial analysis of the experimental data provides preliminary support for the ethnicity and sophistication hypotheses, but mixed support for the affinity and interaction hypotheses. The between condition effects for Latino and Asian participants are shown in Figures 3 and 4. In the first control condition the Latino participants overwhelmingly prefer the co-ethnic candidate when the Latino candidate is presented with the Anglo candidate. Similarly, the Latino participants strongly prefer the Asian candidate when he is presented with the Anglo candidate. When the Latino candidate is presented with the Asian candidate, Latinos still prefer the co-ethnic candidate, but less than when he is presented with the Anglo candidate. In the second control condition the Latino participants prefer whichever candidate presents a pro-affirmative action cue. In the first treatment condition the Latino participants strongly prefer the Latino pro-affirmative action candidate. The Latino participants show decreased support for the Asian candidate when he presents an anti-affirmative action cue, voting for the Anglo with the pro-affirmative action cue. In the second treatment condition, when the Latino candidate is anti-affirmative action cue. In the second treatment condition, when the Latino candidate is anti-affirmative action cue. In the second treatment condition, when the Latino candidate is anti-affirmative action cue. In the second treatment condition, when the Latino candidate is anti-affirmative action cue. In the second treatment condition, when the Latino candidate. The differences between the control group and the second treatment group are statistically significant.





An analysis of the Asian participants, shown in Figure 4, shows similarities and important differences between the Latino and Asian participants. In the first control condition the Asian participants clearly prefer the co-ethnic candidate in each of the match-ups. Similar to the Latino participants, the Asian participants prefer the co-ethnic candidate the most when he is presented with the Anglo candidate, and slightly less when he is presented with the Latino candidate. Also, the Asian participants prefer the Latino candidate to the Anglo candidate when they are presented as a match-up. In the second control condition, similar to the Latinos, the Asian participants prefer the pro-affirmative action candidate in each of the match-ups. In the first treatment condition, when the co-ethnic candidate is presented with an anti-affirmative action cue, the Asian participants still show preferences for the Asian candidate in both of the match-ups presented, although less than the first control condition. In the second treatment condition, when the co-ethnic candidate is presented with a pro-affirmative action cue, the Asian participants prefer the co-ethnic candidate when he is presented with the Latino candidate, and they prefer the Latino candidate when he is presented with the Anglo candidate. There is no statistically significant difference between the first control condition, and the first and the second treatment conditions when the co-ethnic candidate is presented with the Latino candidate.

From the experimental results it is clear minority participants have preferences for coethnic candidates. Additionally, minority participants show decreased support for co-ethnic candidates with the introduction of conflicting policy cues; Latinos much more than Asian participants. Finally, minority participants show strong preferences for any minority candidate over the Anglo candidate in the match-ups.




Figure 4: Mean Vote Choice among Asian Participants by Condition

The difference in means across treatment groups is a simple test of the effect of the experimental treatment. However we are also interested in the possible mediating effect of ethnic affinity and political sophistication. We test the affinity and sophistication hypotheses using logistic regression. The logistic regression results presented in Table 1 show that politically

DV: Policy Vote	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Sophistication	0.31	0.15	0.036
Ethnic Identity	0.23	0.23	0.327
Party Identification	0.01	0.10	0.908
Ideology	-0.03	0.13	0.845
Treatment Group	0.38	0.36	0.295
Constant	-2.54	1.43	0.075
Observations	135		

Table 1: Sophistication and Policy Voting

sophisticated participants are more likely to vote consistent with their policy preferences than unsophisticated participants. Even when we introduce the Latino affinity index and an interaction between affinity and sophistication (Table 2), we see that political sophistication continues to play a role in the likelihood that a participant votes consistent with her policy views. Neither participants' level of Latino affinity nor the interaction between affinity and sophistication are a statistically significant predictor of policy voting.

	0	1	
DV: Policy Vote	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Latino Affinity	0.01	0.05	0.877
Sophistication	0.26	0.16	0.092
Sophistication * Affinity	0.01	0.02	0.647
Party Identification	-0.01	0.10	0.999
Ideology	-0.01	0.13	0.923
Treatment Group	0.20	0.34	0.549
Constant	-1.39	1.27	0.276
Observations	152		

Table 2: Latino Affinity Index and Sophistication


Yet in Table 3 we see that the Asian affinity index and its interaction with sophistication behave differently than the Latino affinity index. The negative constituent effect of the Asian affinity index shows that participants with a high level of Asian affinity are less likely to cast a policy vote. The interaction between political sophistication and Asian affinity is positive, indicating that high levels of sophistication dampen the negative effect of high levels of Asian affinity. But the net effect of Asian affinity, even with the positive influence of high sophistication, is negative.

DV: Policy Vote	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Asian Affinity	-0.11	0.05	0.016
Sophistication	0.04	0.17	0.820
Sophistication * Affinity	0.03	0.02	0.062
Party Identification	-0.01	0.10	0.915
Ideology	0.03	0.13	0.821
Treatment Group	0.27	0.35	0.435
Constant	-0.77	1.30	0.555
Observations	152		

Table 3: Asian Affinity Index and Sophistication

Figure 5 displays the predictive margins of policy voting by Asian affinity and political sophistication. As evidenced by the flat dashed line at the bottom of the plot, Figure 5 shows that sophistication has little, if any, influence on participants with low Asian affinity index scores. For participants with high Asian affinity scores (top solid line in Figure 5), political sophistication has an impact on their likelihood of voting consistent with their policy preference. Participants with high levels of Asian affinity and higher levels of political sophistication are more likely to vote consistent with their policy preferences than participants with high levels of political sophistication.


Figure 5: Predictive Margins of Policy Vote by Asian Affinity and Sophistication



Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, these preliminary results show that when individuals have limited information, both Asian and Latino participants respond to ethnic cues by voting for the co-ethnic candidate. However, when candidates present more information, here in the form of policy cues, Asian participants tend to utilize the ethnic cue while Latino participants tend to utilize the policy cue. Furthermore, utilization of these cues is moderated by individual characteristics. Political sophistication enhances policy voting among all participants. Ethnic affinity mitigates policy voting for Asian participants, but not for Latino participants. This initial analysis implies that we cannot assume all minority groups behave in a similar manner in political contexts. Reasons for why Latino and Asian participants respond to conflicting policy and ethnic cues differently requires further exploration, but it is possible that individual characteristics moderate the use of cues in ways that vary by ethnic group. Further exploration into this puzzle requires more analysis.

Appendix: Website Treatment Examples



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