Despite a growing interest in terrorism’s effectiveness in shaping government policy, four obstacles have hindered empirical research from arriving at satisfactory conclusions: definitional ambiguity of the dependent variable, collinearity, strategic selection effects, and neglect of the causal mechanism, public opinion. I overcome these challenges by conducting two randomized survey experiments in Lebanon and the United States. The findings support several assumptions in the literature, including the high domestic cost of appeasement and escalating violence to leaders. They also demonstrate that party dynamics are extremely important in mediating public approval in terrorist crises. There are no conditions, however, that provide a strong incentive to Lebanese or U.S. leaders to make a concession to an aggrieved group even in the face of increasing violence. As the specter of terrorism looms in the post-9/11 world, its consequences on government policy might not be as large as commonly thought.
Extremists often use terrorism for coercive purposes—to convince a government to take (or not take) a particular course of action. The coercive mechanism is explicit. Terrorist attacks are supposed to decrease popular support for the incumbent government and its policies because of the government’s failure to protect the public. This gives the government an incentive to comply with terrorist demands and objectives in order to stop future attacks and maintain public confidence.

As the specter of terrorism looms over the post-9/11 world, few policy issues are more pressing to understand than the consequences of coercive terrorism on public opinion and government policy. Yet, four major obstacles have hindered existing empirical research on the topic from arriving at satisfactory conclusions: definitional ambiguity of the dependent variable, collinearity, strategic selection effects, and neglect of the causal mechanism, public opinion. In particular, no study to date has systematically examined the extent to which coercive terrorism

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2 I define terrorism as the use or threat of politically motivated violence against non-combatants by an organization other than a state to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience. This definition is similar to how American law defines terrorism, as “premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” U.S. Department of State 2001.

shapes public opinion and how mass approval generates coercive pressure on leaders to change their policies.

This paper overcomes these challenges with two randomized survey experiments administered on large, nation-wide representative samples of the Lebanese and U.S. adult populations. In the survey vignettes, respondents learn about a terrorist attack in their respective country. The perpetrator demands the release of one of its leaders from prison or it will commit more terrorist attacks if the government does not release him. I then independently and randomly vary three potential sources of public approval in coercive terrorist crises: (1) the government’s policy response regarding appeasement; (2) the aggrieved group’s decision to execute more terrorist attacks; and (3) the political opposition’s reaction in parliament. After respondents read about the crisis and outcome, they were asked whether they approved or disapproved of how their democratic leader handled the situation.

The experiments make four major contributions to our understanding of coercive terrorism. First, the findings support several assumptions in the international relations literature about the domestic costs of appeasement and escalating violence to leaders. A concession decreases leader approval by over 40% and a sustained terrorist campaign decreases approval by more than 10%. Second, they demonstrate that partisanship is extremely important in mediating public approval in terrorist crises. Lebanese respondents who support the same coalition as the incumbent are 15% more likely to approve of government decision making across all crisis outcomes. American respondents who support the president’s party are 8% more likely to approve. Third, opposition praise has a dramatic effect on public perceptions in terrorist crises, boosting public approval by 10% in Lebanon and 4% in the United States. This effect is particularly strong in building support when a leader makes a concession. Lastly, and most importantly, there are no
conditions that provide a strong political incentive for Lebanese or U.S. leaders to make a concession to extremists even in the face of increasing violence. The consequences of terrorism on government policy might not be as large as commonly thought.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing the importance of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises and explore common theoretical and methodological shortcomings in the extant literature. I then introduce two sets of hypotheses, “event-driven” and “elite-driven,” on what shapes public approval in coercive terrorist crises and present the experimental research design. The subsequent section reports the results about the effect of terrorism and party dynamics on public opinion. I conclude with the implications of the findings on our understanding of coercive terrorism.4

The Mechanism of Public Opinion

Terrorist organizations are not strong enough to coerce governments by force of arms. They can, however, try to increase coercive pressure on leaders to change (or not change) their policies by using indiscriminate violence against civilians. For example, Osama Bin Laden, the former leader of Al-Qaeda, highlighted this approach in a statement justifying the group’s need to target American civilians:

“It is a fundamental principle of any democracy that the people choose their leaders, and as such, approve and are party to the actions of their elected leaders.... By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes

4 All supporting data and online appendices will be available on the author’s website.
and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. The American people have the ability and choice to refuse the policies of their government and even to change their government, yet time and time again, polls show that the American people support the policies of the elected government….This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.”

Three major factors allow extremists to gain access to public opinion. First, they directly affect the victims in proximity to the violence. Indeed, surviving or witnessing a terrorist attack can have a profound effect on the psychology of any individual. Second, terrorism is able to reach people beyond the immediate victims because it provides a sensational news story. Advances in literacy and mass communication have greatly empowered terrorist groups by facilitating a much more extensive reach to the public. This is especially true today as the internet, 24-hour cable news stations, and social media provide viewership with constant access to shocking imagery and details about terrorist violence. Lastly, terrorism has a strong agenda-setting function by making the claims of the aggrieved salient to public political discourse.

Having access to public opinion, however, is not enough to generate coercive pressure on leaders. It can only create bargaining leverage if (1) mass opinion changes and (2) leaders care about such changes. Putting aside the first condition for a moment, since it is the focus of this paper, it is germane to consider the second. At the most basic level, leaders often strive to

5 Bin Ladin 2002.
7 Schmid and de Graaf 1982.
8 Crenshaw 1990.
remain in power. As a result, their preferences are strongly influenced by the preferences of the “selectorate,” the subset of the population that sustains a leader in office. In democratic societies, this influence derives from the opinion of voters and manifests in the form of electoral reprisal. Public opinion also takes on an even greater role when international agreements require a popular referendum for ratification and implementation, an important dimension to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks for instance. A number of studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that public approval and disapproval matter to democratic decision makers.

Of course, political leaders do not blindly follow opinion polls. It is one of many considerations that they take into account while gauging policy options. But—and this is the key point—if decision-makers neglect significant changes in public opinion on highly salient policy issues such as national security in a time of crisis, they become susceptible to domestic costs that could jeopardize their political survival or disrupt fulfillment of their domestic and international agendas. In this way, mass opinion incentivizes decision-making even if it does not fully characterize leader preferences. It is through this mechanism that terrorist groups hope to coerce governments. This research, therefore, explores the extent to which terrorism generates political incentives for leaders to change government policy by creating shifts in public approval, which

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9 Downs 1957.

10 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.


has been shown to correlate with the probabilities of winning elections. This approach is identical to a growing number of experimental studies and formal models.

The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism

Scholars have long debated the extent to which terrorism is an effective political strategy. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the prevailing view was that terrorists groups fail to obtain their stated political demands. Following the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, scholars began to reevaluate the political utility of terrorism. Indeed, if terrorism is a strategy of futility, why would extremist groups continue to engage in such violent activity? This empirical puzzle has led many scholars to conclude that they have learned that it “pays.” Yet, several recent studies have found empirical evidence consistent with the earlier scholarship that rejects the conclusion that terrorism is effective.

Studies on the topic of coercive terrorism often rely on a research design that correlates outcome, usually “success” or “failure,” with the use of political violence. This approach,

15 Tomz 2007; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Horowitz and Levendusky 2012
16 Schultz 2001; Ramsay 2004; Leventoglu and Tarar 2005
17 Gurr 1979; Cordes and Hoffman 1984; Laquer 1987; Freedman and Hill 1986; Wilkinson 1986; Schelling 1991; but see Michael Stohl’s (1979) interpretation of Palestinian terrorism.
20 Gurr 1979; Pape 2005; Abrahms 2006; Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009; and many more.
however, introduces serious obstacles that have impeded previous research from arriving at satisfactory conclusions. The first major obstacle is definitional ambiguity of the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{21} Researchers tend to define “success” according to their own criteria—typically whether the terrorist group obtained \textit{some} or \textit{all} of its demands—thereby inviting allegations of confirmation bias. Without a universally accepted standard, the dependent variable “success” is an arbitrary threshold, and many of the empirical findings on the efficacy of terrorism are contingent on how the researcher defines it.

Terrorism studies also tend to measure “success” according to whether the terrorist group obtained some or all of its demands across time. The problem is that terrorist groups often change their demands with time, or issue ambiguous demands or none at all, at least publically. In some instances, the stated demands do not even meet the expectations of the aggrieved group. For instance, they might issue maximalist demands in hope of getting more from the government than limited demands would otherwise achieve. As a result, it becomes difficult to pin down an appropriate metric of “success” or “failure” based solely on terrorist demands.

The second obstacle is collinearity. Researchers often allow terrorist groups to operate under an indefinite time horizon. As long as an aggrieved group publicized a demand at some point in time, any movement on that issue area irrespective of how long it took or why it occurred becomes a terrorist success. Yet, it is difficult to determine if an apparent concession was the

\textsuperscript{21} A similar challenge, but less detrimental in my opinion, arises over how scholars define the independent variable, terrorism. For example, in a very important study, Schmid and Jongman (1988) recorded 109 different definitions. Some experts even suggest that if an energetic researcher updated this study, it is likely that there would be nearly twice as many definitions today. Also see Silke 2004.
result of terrorist violence or spurious with some other exogenous phenomenon.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, we do not know how much of an effect should be attributed to terrorism, or to what extent the relationships are coincidental.

The third major obstacle is strategic selection bias. In the real world, we cannot test for counterfactuals, and the observable decisions of terrorist groups likely depend on political context. Extremists might resort to terrorism only when they think it will be successful or when they have no other option available and thus most likely will fail anyway. The former would inflate the strategic value of terrorism while the latter would deflate it. If terrorist tactics are not the only option available, a comparison between terrorism and alternative strategies such as civil resistance provides valuable insight—that is, it answers the question effective compared to what.\textsuperscript{23} While this approach creates an important benchmark, the design is still vulnerable to selection bias issues because the choice of strategy, violence or non-violence, is still endogenous. Without both strategies being tried under identical conditions, it is difficult to ascertain their true political utility.\textsuperscript{24}

The unobservable introduces another serious challenge. Terrorism might be most effective when it is not used, similar to nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{25} If the threat of terrorism is credible, extremist groups might not have to use it. Concerned governments might reason that it is best to appease the extremists \textit{ex ante} rather than risk serious domestic costs \textit{ex post}. Therefore, the threat alone could be enough to coerce government appeasement assuming the domestic costs of terrorism

\textsuperscript{22} Freedman 1986.

\textsuperscript{23} Chenoweth and Stephan 2011.

\textsuperscript{24} Gould and Klor 2010.

\textsuperscript{25} Schelling 1966.
are high enough. If terrorist demands and government concessions are made in private, however, this outcome would not be observable. By excluding these unobservable incidents, a researcher biases the success rate of terrorism downward.

Lastly, observational studies on coercive terrorism often do not examine public opinion at all even though its influence is central to their claims. Studies that do cite public opinion tend to draw on ad hoc polling data to suggest shifts in public opinion without systematically analyzing the data across time or assessing the impact of terrorism in relation to other exogenous factors. A few exceptions do a better job examining public opinion, but they still do not overcome selection bias issues or address terrorism in a coercion framework. Their conclusions also tend to be applicable to one specific case, without providing any sense of how their results are externally valid. For example, terrorism greatly elevated George W. Bush’s approval following the September 11 attacks. In contrast, the Madrid Train bombings seemed to have decreased public support for the incumbent party in Spain, the Popular Party. Studies that investigate terrorism in Israel reveal mixed and contradictory results. What is missing is a strong theoretical basis to explain what and why certain variables influence shifts in foreign policy preferences and leader approval ratings in coercive terrorist crises.


What Shapes Public Approval in Terrorist-Related Crises?

This section discusses two general types of hypotheses on what likely shapes public opinion in coercive terrorist crises: “event-driven” hypotheses and “elite-cue” hypotheses.\(^{30}\) The event-driven hypotheses suggest that the nature of international events directly determine mass opinion in terrorist crises. There are two important, but countervailing mechanisms embedded in the event-driven tradition. The first mechanism, the *costliness of attacks*, underscores the conventional view that publics are highly sensitive to the number of attacks and casualties. As attacks and causalities mount, publics become conciliatory and disapproving of the status quo.\(^{31}\) Indeed, this argument is not just theoretical, but also is found within statements of the aggrieved. For example, Marwan Barghouti, one of the most prominent leaders of Fatah’s young guard, saw violence as a means to restart negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. In a 2001 interview with Ben Caspit, Barghouti asserted “Our challenge is to prove to you [Israelis] that there will be no security without peace. Only an agreement, and nothing else….We will continue our struggle, until you understand….This Intifada will lead to peace in the end. We need to escalate the conflict.”\(^{32}\)

The second mechanism, the *costliness of appeasement*, emphasizes that publics are disapproving of government appeasement of terrorism. This can be due to four main reasons. First, concessions are inherently costly because the state is giving up something that its citizens

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\(^{30}\) Berinsky (2010) makes a similar distinction while discussing American views of war.

\(^{31}\) See Pape 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006. Scholars have also discussed this mechanism in the context of nuclear weapons (Schelling 1966), and public views of war (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 2000; Feaver and Gelpi 2004).

\(^{32}\) Barghouti 2001.
prefer to possess. The public’s desire for the disputed good might be based on its strategic, monetary, spiritual or ancestral worth, but in all cases the population believes it is worse off without it. Second, a concession in the near-term could increase the capability of the group allowing it to commit more attacks in the future. Ceded territory, for instance, could be used as a staging ground to launch more attacks against the state. On a smaller scale, monetary-based concessions could be used to fund the group’s armed struggle. Third, government appeasement could create a reputation that the state is a weak actor. Common knowledge of this sort could encourage other aggrieved groups to adopt similar tactics against the state. Lastly, governments and publics might believe that terrorist groups are simply insatiable and thus appeasement would provide no benefits, only costs as the previous reasons explicate. According to the “commitment problem,” for example, uncertainty about whether terrorist groups will uphold their end of a deal—stopping future attacks in exchange for a concession—can prevent leaders from negotiating with terrorist groups.

Overall, it is likely that both of these event-driven mechanisms, the costliness of attacks and the costliness of appeasement, are at least partly right. That is, publics will react negatively to

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33 Fearon 1995.

34 Abrahms (2006; 2008) argues that this uncertainty can occur because of a psychological heuristic—people tend to draw a direct correspondence between the extremeness of terrorist acts and its desired ends, associating violence with enmity toward the population rather than the legitimacy of the demand or grievance of the extremist group. Consequently, the targeted public believes that appeasing the terrorist group by making a concession will not stop future attacks since the attacks are perceptibly about hatred.
concessions and will react negatively to terrorist violence. Thus, the Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis and Appeasement Hypothesis are quite straightforward.

**Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis:** A terrorist campaign will decrease democratic leader approval.

**Appeasement Hypothesis:** Government concessions to an aggrieved group will decrease democratic leader approval.

Yet, a leader has an incentive to make a concession if and only if a terrorist campaign proves to be more costly than granting a concession. Thus, the issue of whether terrorist violence is coercive depends entirely on whether the public reacts more negatively to concessions or terrorist attacks. It becomes imperative to investigate when each mechanism is likely to take a dominant role in shaping mass opinion. Therefore, we must explore other factors that shape voter perceptions in coercive terrorist crises.

In contrast to the event-driven hypotheses, the elite-cue hypotheses suggest that the impact of events depends less on the viewer’s direct interpretation, and far more on the interpretations offered by political elites as carried in the media. Studies in American political behavior have long found that party identification has a strong bearing on political attitudes.\(^{35}\) When individuals have very little information, as they usually do on foreign policy issues,\(^{36}\) they often

\(^{35}\) Campbell et al. 1960, but see Kelley, Jr. and Mirer 1974.

\(^{36}\) Holsti 1996; Baum and Groeling 2010.
adopt the positions of their political party rather than independently forming their own judgment. This insight generates the *Partisanship Hypothesis*.

**Partisanship Hypothesis:** Democratic Approval in all outcomes of a coercive terrorist crisis will be higher among individuals affiliating with the same party or political coalition as the incumbent government than those who do not affiliate with it.

More recent trends in the public opinion literature focus less on blind partisan voting and much more on the degree of opposition party support and the balance of elite rhetoric—the ratio of positive messages to negative messages coming from the political elites. According to this body of scholarship, if political elites from the opposition approve of a leader during a foreign policy crisis the attentive public, those who receive new political messages, will likely agree with that message. This has long been cited as the source of “rally around the flag” events. If opposition elites disapprove, the attentive public will mirror that split along partisan lines. Thus, both party alignment and elite cues can influence public perceptions regarding appeasement and terrorist attacks. The *Opposition Praise Hypothesis* explicates this dynamic more formally.

**Opposition Praise Hypothesis:** Political opposition praise of the incumbent’s decision making in a terrorist crisis will increase approval relative to criticism by the opposition.

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38 See Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2010.

**Research Design**

Following the convention of experimental survey research on foreign policy issues, the survey begins by telling respondents that “The following questions are about [Lebanese or U.S.] foreign policy. You will read about a hypothetical situation similar to situations our country has faced in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. I will describe one approach [Lebanese or U.S.] leaders have taken and ask whether you approve or disapprove of that approach.” All respondents are then presented a vignette about a deadly car bomb attack in their respective country killing 10 people and injuring others. They learn that the perpetrator, a group with possible links to Al-Qaeda, demands the release of one of its leaders from prison or it will commit more attacks if the government does not release him.

Respondents then receive several independently and randomly assigned treatments embedded in the vignette: (1) the incumbent does or does not concede to the perpetrator’s demand, (2) the extremist group does or does not engage in a terrorist campaign of 9 additional attacks killing a total of 100 people in one year, and (3) the political opposition praises or criticizes the

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40 Tomz 2007; Trager and Vaverick 2011

41 In Lebanon, the Prime Minister was affiliated with the March 14th coalition and the opposition was from the March 8th alliance. In the United States, the president was from the Democratic or Republican Party and the opposition was from the non-incumbent party. Because I found no statistical difference between presidential parties in the United States, the analysis below aggregates the parties into incumbent supporters and opposition supporters.

42 This represents a significant escalation of violence in a short period of time and reflects a plausible turn of events based on the history of terrorism in Lebanon and the United States.
incumbent’s conduct of foreign policy.⁴³ Thus, the research design creates a fully crossed 2 X 2 X 2 experiment generating 8 distinct treatment groups in each country. After reading the vignette, respondents are asked whether they approve or disapprove of how their leader handled the coercive terrorist crisis.⁴⁴ To help respondents digest the information, I provided bullet point summaries for reference as they answered the questions. I also asked several open-ended questions to help confirm that respondents fully considered the vignette information while answering. Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design. Online Appendix A provides the text of a sample survey.

[Figure 1 about here]

There are several fundamental advantages of this research design. First, randomized experimental manipulation guarantees statistical control and isolates the causal effect of all the independent variables. Thus, we know that the effects are not spurious. Second, the research design focuses on the coercive mechanism of terrorism, public approval, rather than on so-called terrorist “successes” or “failures,” a common dependent variable in terrorism research that is highly vulnerable to confirmation bias. Third, we observe all possible outcomes in the crisis.

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⁴³ It is important to note that the word “terrorism” or “concession” does not appear anywhere in the vignette or survey questions in order to avoid priming respondents with highly pejorative terms. Instead, I adopt neutral language that simply describes the actions.

⁴⁴ Respondents gauged approval according to a 5 point ordinal scale. In the analysis below, I transform approval into a binary variable in which approval includes those who “strongly approve” and “somewhat approve.”
including those that real-life leaders may choose to avoid. This allows us to make unbiased estimates of the coercive pressures leaders face and avoid bias from selection effects.

Lastly, Lebanon and the United States are ideal research sites. The American and Lebanese cases represent two very different security environments with respect to terrorism thereby making the results more generalizable. Figure 2 helps to show this difference by displaying the ratio of fatalities from terrorist attacks per 100,000 people in each population. With exception to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States has had few incidences of political terrorism or major threats to its national security. In contrast, Lebanon underwent a very violent civil war lasting from 1975 to 1990 killing more than 150,000 Lebanese and injuring over 200,000 others. During the 1980s, it was a lightning rod of terrorist activities, mostly in the form of assassinations, bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings, and car bombings, and terrorist activities still persist today. In addition to different security environments, both countries have democratically elected leaders and parliaments with opposition coalitions. This allows us to study how partisanship and opposition reactions influence public views in terrorist crises.

[Figure 2 about here]

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45 START 2012.

46 The United States has faced sporadic periods of low intensity terrorism since the end of the American Civil War. For an excellent overview, see Blin 2007 and Lutz and Lutz 2007. While the September 11 terrorist attacks were the worst in human history, it was quite small when considering the proportion of the U.S. population directly victimized.


48 For a good discussion of terrorism in Lebanon during this period, see Wills 2003.
Survey experiments are excellent tools to identify causal relationships. At the same time, they do have their limitations. They can lack realism or the treatment manipulations may not be strong enough to produce the expected effect. Pessimists might also question the extent to which the results are externally valid. I have adopted several strategies to help minimize these complications. First, I crafted the vignettes to describe an event similar to those found in International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2005 (ITERATE 5), which contains detailed information from over a thousand international terrorist incidents. This dataset demonstrates that prisoner release, a plausible demand that could made in both Lebanon and the United States, was the third most common demand following money and country-specific political demands. Second, the language, syntax and tone of the terrorist demand in the vignette come from a real terrorist statement. Third, I described additional actions that democratic leaders would likely take in terrorist crises such as increasing security at airports, train stations, government buildings and other major public spaces. This is important because

49 Drunkman et al. 2006.
50 Barabas and Jerit 2010.
51 Mickolus et al. 2006. Although it is possible that the nature of the terrorist demand could have an impact on the dynamics previously discussed (DeNardo 1985; Pape 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006), it is important to emphasize that this would only affect the absolute measurements rather than the comparisons across treatment groups and countries. Moreover, this demand might not be as perceptibly costly relative to others, such as moving military forces or relinquishing territory. Therefore, prisoner release acts as a “hard” test if terrorism is not coercive because individuals could be more willing to concede to such a relatively modest demand than endure increasing violence.
leaders adopt a package of responses, not just one such as making a concession. Finally, all respondents were shown an identical image of an actual terrorist attack to evoke emotions related to coercive terrorist crises. In combination, these strategies arguably generate more realism and external validity than many survey experiments in the international relations literature.

I fielded the surveys on 1,000 Lebanese adults from July 20 to August 5, 2011 and on 2,794 U.S. adults from July 21 to July 3, 2012. Information International, an independent regional research and consultancy firm based in Beirut, administered the Lebanese study. To obtain nationwide representation, the firm randomly distributed the questionnaires in person across 26 Lebanese qadas or “districts” according to the number of registered voters and confessional distribution in each qada as per the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities for the year 2010. The multistage probability sample ensured that every voting-age Lebanese adult had an equal chance of inclusion and placement into one of the treatment groups, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample. Online Appendix B provides a demographical breakdown of the Lebanese sample.52

SM Audience, a new Internet-based panel highly reflective of the U.S. population, administered the U.S. study. The sample closely matches the U.S. Census stratification on gender, age, and geographic region, more so than many high-quality Internet-based panels. It is also well-balanced on political ideology and partisanship.53 The subject-pool does slightly skew

52 Because Lebanon has not taken a national census since 1932, a sensitive issue that lies at the heart of Lebanon’s political instability, I cannot compare the survey sample to a census.

53 On ideology, 41% self-identified as liberal and 39% as conservative. On partisanship, the mean score on a 5-point scale (Republican = 5) was 2.8. As a point of comparison, the Annual National election 2008-9 Panel was 2.9.
on Internet usage, income and education, but no more than other frequently employed Internet-based panels. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis below confirms that these differences, while small, have no bearing on the results. Online Appendix C provides comparative demographic breakdown between the U.S. sample, the U.S. Census, and the un-weighted Annual National Election 2008-9 Panel, which provides a useful benchmark for high quality Internet-based samples.54

**Experimental Results**

**The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism**

I begin by considering how government appeasement and terrorism affect approval of the Lebanese and U.S. leaders. Figure 3 shows the levels of Lebanese and U.S. leader approval at all outcomes of the terrorist crisis. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals.

![Figure 3 about here](image)

As Figure 3 demonstrates, approval is high when the leader does not make a concession, the attacks stop, and the leader receives praise from the opposition elites, a situation similar to the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In contrast, approval is low when the government makes a concession and when the aggrieved group executes a terrorist campaign against civilians. Averaging across all outcomes when the leader makes a concession, approval for the Lebanese Prime Minister is 25.4% and approval for the American President is 29.6%.

54 Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012.
When the leader does not make a concession, approval is much higher for the Lebanese Prime Minister and American President, 70% and 73.6% respectively. Yet, the aggrieved group’s decision to execute a terrorist campaign is also costly. If the leader makes a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval plummets by 19.8% (from 33% to 13.5%) for the Lebanese Prime Minister and 12.8% (from 33.8% to 20.9%) for the American president. If the leader does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval declines by 14.2% (from 78.5% to 64.3%) for the Lebanese Prime Minister and 13.3% (from 82.1 to 68.8%) for the American president. All of these differences are highly significant at the 0.001 level.

To more formally test the hypotheses, I employ regression analysis on the data. I model the binary measure of democratic leader approval as a function of the experimental manipulations and a series of demographic control variables—gender, age, education, income, perception of the national economy,\(^{55}\) political ideology, and partisanship. As is true with virtually all survey data, Lebanese and American respondents did not always answer every question in the questionnaire, which leads to a loss of valuable information and potentially could bias the estimates and inferences (King et al. 2001).\(^{56}\) To account for these non-responses, I multiply imputed the missing values with a bootstrapping algorithm that imputes \(m=5\) values for each missing cell in

\(^{55}\) Scholars have long found that perceptions of the national economy, so-called “sociotropic judgments,” often influence political attitudes. See Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lau and Sears 1981; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Markus 1988; Mutz 1992, 1994; and Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997.

\(^{56}\) I have complete data on 97.5 % of the Lebanon data and 93.5 % of the U.S. data.
the data matrix, reflecting the uncertainty about the missing data. By doing so, I was able to preserve all observations and avoid non-response estimation bias.

Table 1 provides the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors from four separate logistic regressions. The results demonstrate that each of the experimental manipulations have a strong statistically significant effect on approval, all in the expected direction. To interpret the substantive impact, Figure 4 provides the marginal effects for each of the main independent variables. Controlling for all other variables, model 1 reveals that a concession decreases approval of the Lebanese Prime Minister by 47% and approval of the American President by 42%. Similarly, the extremist group’s decision to execute a terrorist campaign decreases leader approval by 16% in Lebanon and 11% in the United States. Thus, the data provide overwhelming support for the Appeasement Hypothesis and Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis.

57 I used Amelia II to generate five imputed data sets with no missing records. See Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2009.

58 Regression analysis without multiple imputations does not affect the findings.

59 I calculated all expected first differences by simulating changes in the expected value of each variable of interest while holding all other variables constant at their mean, E(Y|X1)-E(Y|X). See King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000.
The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise

Turning to the elite-cue hypotheses, the regression results in Model 1 demonstrate that partisanship and opposition praise play a very important role in shaping public perceptions in coercive terrorist crises. Lebanese respondents who support the Prime Minister’s governing coalition are 15% more likely to approve of the Prime Minister in all outcomes of the terrorist crisis. Likewise, American respondents who support the President’s party are 7.8% more likely to approve of presidential decision making in the crisis. In fact, these swings in approval are nearly as large as the effect of a terrorist campaign in each country. Several respondents succinctly voiced the importance of partisanship on the open-ended question portion of the survey that asked why they approved or disapproved of how their leader handled the situation. One Lebanese male respondent from Zahlé stated that “Everything [the incumbent coalition] does serves the benefit of Lebanon.” Another Lebanese respondent, a female from Tripoli, put it in even more straightforward terms, “We are with [the incumbent coalition] to death, even if they are wrong!” A Democratic respondent from California did not approve of the U.S. president, even in the absence of government appeasement and a terrorist campaign, because of party politics. In his words, “I hate [the opposition]!” Thus, these findings provide strong support for the Partisanship Hypothesis.

The data also reveal that opposition praise provides leaders with a boost in popular support. Model 1 predicts that when the opposition responds favorably to the incumbent’s decision making, leader approval increases by 10% in Lebanon and 4% in the United States. To better interpret these results, it is important to determine what constituency is most likely to be affected by opposition praise. As we have just seen, party alignment between the incumbent and
respondent provides an increase in approval across all crisis outcomes. Consequently, opposition praise is most likely to affect respondents who associate with the opposition party or coalition.

Model 2 reanalyzes the relationships in Model 1, but adds an important interaction variable: opposition praise multiplied by respondent party affiliation with the opposition. This variable tells us if opposition praise specifically affects individuals who affiliate with the opposition party or coalition. As the regression results demonstrate, the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant. Holding opposition praise constant, Lebanese respondents who affiliate with the opposition coalition are 16% more likely to approve of the Prime Minister in all outcomes of the terrorist crisis. American respondents who affiliate the opposition party are 8.1% more likely to approve of the president. It is important to emphasize that this is a segment of a population generally unsupportive of the incumbent, and its aggregate effect largely depends on the proportional size of the opposition affiliates. Thus, an argument can be made that opposition praise is much more substantively important than its coefficient size suggests.

In addition, the data demonstrate that opposition praise operates in another very important way. It mediates public evaluations of government appeasement when it stops extremist violence. This finding can be seen very clearly in Figure 3. If the leader makes a concession and the group does not engage in more attacks, approval of the Lebanese Prime Minister increases by 18.7% (from 24% to 42.7%) when the opposition praises the policy. Under the same scenario, approval of the American President increases by 12.1% (from 26.5% to 38.6%). These results are highly significant at the 0.001 level. As an American female from Ohio put it, “The [opposition] leaders’ support did not fall on party lines but aligned for the greater good of the country.” Similarly, a Lebanese female from El Metn explained, “I generally agree with [the incumbent party], and what the [opposition] leaders declared is a start for the stability in
Lebanon, where both sides can finally agree.” Overall, these findings confirm the opposition praise hypothesis.

Given the importance of opposition praise when a concession is made, it is important to consider if these elites ever have an incentive to praise the leader in this scenario. To get a handle on this issue, I asked respondents to gauge approval of how the opposition elites handled the crisis since they are office-seeking as well. The data reveal a clear distinction between the United States and Lebanon. Although the Lebanese value unity, opposition approval decreased by 18.7% (from 54.7% to 36%) when they supported the Prime Minister after he made a concession. In contrast, opposition approval increased by 7.4% (from 31.2 to 39%) when they praised the American President after he made a concession. These differences are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. Thus, opposition elites have an incentive to support the leader’s decision to make a concession if it stops the violence in the United States, but not in Lebanon.

The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited

The data confirm that government appeasement and terrorism are very costly to leaders in political terms, and at the same time, partisanship and elite cues mediate public reactions in terrorist crises. This section now considers the extent to which terrorism is coercive. For terrorism to be coercive, a leader needs to have an incentive to make a concession to the aggrieved group. The costs of a terrorist campaign must outweigh the costs of government appeasement.

[Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 compares leader approval following a concession to leader approval following a terrorist campaign. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure provides two important insights. First, the domestic costs from a terrorist campaign are higher in Lebanon than in the United States. Averaging across all outcomes with a terrorist campaign, approval for the Lebanese Prime Minister is 44% and approval for the American President is 51.3%, a difference of 7.3% (p < 0.01). This suggests that populations highly exposed to terrorism, like in Lebanon, become sensitized to it. The second insight is that the domestic costs of a concession are higher than the costs of a terrorist campaign in both Lebanon and the United States. Averaging across these outcomes, approval for the Lebanese Prime Minister is 18.6% lower if he makes a concession than incurring a terrorist campaign (from 44% to 25.4%). Approval for the American President is 21.7% lower (from 51.3 to 30%). These differences are highly significant at the 0.001 level. Thus, Lebanese and American leaders do not face strenuous coercive pressure to make a concession to extremists.

This finding is robust, even when taking into account the possibility that a concession will end future violence. If the leader makes a concession and the group does not engage in more attacks, expected approval is 33.3% for the Lebanese Prime Minister and 33.8% for the American president. If the leader does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval is 64.3% for the Lebanese Prime Minister and 68.8% for the American president. Furthermore, taking opposition elite cues into account, approval following a concession, cessation of violence and opposition praise is still lower than approval following no concession, an escalation of terrorist violence and opposition criticism. This can be seen in Figure 3 by comparing the far left and far right columns. What this demonstrates is that a

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60 These differences are all highly significant beyond the 0.01 level.
commitment problem between leaders and terrorist groups does not necessarily prevent leaders from granting concessions or negotiating with extremists. This outcome would occur anyway because approval of concessions is still comparatively lower than approval after a terrorist campaign even when terrorists credibly commit to a ceasefire.

Discussion

Overall, the results from the experiments demonstrate that voter evaluations of leader performance are highly dependent on government appeasement, the level of terrorism, partisanship and the reactions of the opposition elites in parliament. These factors structure the incentives of leaders in terrorist crises. They also help to reveal the effectiveness of terrorism as a coercive strategy.

Current research on coercive terrorism tends to focus on the costliness of terrorist violence or the costliness of appeasement without fully exploring how both mechanisms simultaneously structure leader incentives through public opinion. This research sought to bridge these approaches into one analytical framework. It finds that, as expected, both factors negatively affect government approval in coercive terrorist crises. Yet, it sheds light on what is more costly. The costs of appeasement far outweigh the costs of a terrorist campaign, even when taking population exposure levels of terrorism into consideration. Thus, terrorism is not a very effective coercive strategy, and its impact on government policy should not be as large as commonly thought.

Two important caveats warrant further discussion. First, although the experiments did not reveal any condition by which terrorism can be said to be coercive, it does not mean that terrorism can never be coercive. Theoretically, there could have been a much more dramatic
effect on public opinion if a terrorist campaign was more destructive than what was described in the survey vignettes. If we assume, for instance, a linear impact on public opinion, the experimental results suggest that it would take a terrorist campaign three times more intense in Lebanon and four times more intense in the United States before the costs of terrorism surpass the costs of appeasement. If the effect of each terrorist attack monotonically decreases (i.e. diminishing marginal returns), it would take substantially more attacks.\textsuperscript{61} While this may be possible, even the most powerful terrorist organizations lack the capability or reach to produce such chaos.\textsuperscript{62} The historical record simply does not present a parallel scenario. At the very least this research reveals that the costs of a very intense and plausible terrorist campaign do not exceed the costs of government appeasement in both Lebanon and the United States.

Second, terrorism could be coercive if the costs of appeasement are somehow diminished. As the experimental results indicate, terrorism is still costly for leaders, and it very well could be the difference between a leader winning and losing an election.\textsuperscript{63} Consequently, it is in their political interest to prevent a terrorist campaign from happening, and a concession may be one

\textsuperscript{61} The experimental results demonstrate a difference between an isolated terrorist attack and a terrorist campaign. Leader approval was the highest when violence stopped after one attack, reaching 81\% in the United States and 78\% in Lebanon. This situation resembles the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and helps to explain the unprecedented high presidential approval for George W. Bush. Investigation into the cost functions of terrorism is a promising avenue of future experimental research.

\textsuperscript{62} Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups, however, would dramatically change this calculation. See Allison 2004.

\textsuperscript{63} Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008.
way to do that if the costs of appeasement are low enough. It might be possible, for example, to spin the policy of appeasement and make it seem that the government is not relinquishing to terrorist threats. A government might also be able to hide a concession from the public eye, which may help to explain why terrorist groups often do not issue public demands. Many concessions, however, are difficult to spin or keep quiet, especially if it involves major shifts in foreign policy, such as the redeployment of military troops. Well known terrorist groups, the type that would have the capability to execute a sustained terrorist campaign, probably could not hide their demands even if they wanted to by the mere fact that they are known. Moreover, it is doubtful that terrorist groups would not want to publicize their victory as a way to help with membership recruitment. If the public were to learn that a concession was in fact made, it would become a clear political liability and the opposition would likely seize on this vulnerability.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the significant role of partisanship and the reactions of the opposition elites in shaping public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises. Coalition alignment between voters and the incumbent government guarantees some approval even if there is an escalation of terrorist violence or if the leader makes a concession. Similarly, opposition praise provides a boost in approval, especially when leaders accommodate the demands of the aggrieved. This demonstrates that beliefs, particularly toward appeasement, are malleable, and they are not uniformly distributed across all individuals. This finding, for example, helps to

\[64\] An alternative explanation is that terrorist groups are just using terrorism as a punitive measure, out of revenge for example, and therefore do not need to ask for anything in exchange for a cessation of future violence. Of course, this would not qualify as coercive terrorism.

\[65\] Lake 2002; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011.
explain Israeli attitudes toward the 2011 agreement between Hamas and Israel to exchange over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for Gilad Shalit, a captured Israeli soldier held in Gaza since June 2006. The political elites on the right and left were nearly united in support of the deal, and Israeli public opinion reflected this sentiment. In a poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute, 79% of Israelis supported the prisoner exchange and only 15% opposed it.

Conclusion

Despite a growing interest in coercive terrorism, definitional ambiguity, collinearity, strategic selection effects, and neglect of the causal mechanism of public opinion have hindered current research on the topic. In particular, no study to date has systematically examined the extent to which coercive terrorism shapes public opinion and how mass approval generates coercive pressure on leaders to change their policies. In this article, I addressed these issues through two randomized survey experiments administered on 1,000 Lebanese adults and 2,794 U.S. adults. I find that concessions and terrorist campaigns are both costly for political leaders. At the same time, partisanship and elite cues mediate public perceptions in coercive terrorist crises. Overall, however, there are no conditions that provide leaders with a political incentive to appease extremist groups who employ terrorist tactics.

66 The leadership of the Kadima party was split over the agreement. Tzipi Livni, the Kadima leader at the time, made several criticisms about the timing and conduct of the deal whereas her main opponent in the party, Shaul Mofaz, supported it. Livni’s reaction was highly criticized and contributed to her losing the party leadership position to Mofaz.

67 Ynetnews 2012.
These findings speak directly to scholars who have made strong competing arguments for whether and why terrorism is effective or ineffective. This research asserts that both groups reveal some truth. It is certainly the case that no leader prefers to make concessions. Similarly, no leader who values political survival or life would eagerly await a terrorist campaign. When thinking about the coercive effectiveness of terrorism, however, we need to keep in mind how both sets of variables are costly for leaders, and how party dynamics mediate public reactions.

These results also have important implications on international security. Groups who choose to adopt terrorist tactics are unlikely to succeed because the domestic cost of government appeasement is incredibly high relative to the costs of terrorism. In this way, and contrary to conventional wisdom, public opinion proves to be incredibly resilient to the coercive pressures of extremists. One would hope that extremists would recognize this reality, and try to find more moderate means to express their grievances.
References


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Honaker, James, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell. 2009. AMELIA II: A Program for Missing Data.


Figure 1: Experimental Research Design

```
First Attack
  ▼
Incumbent
  ▼
Concession  No Concession
  ▼
Aggrieved Group
  ▼
No Terrorist Campaign  Terrorist Campaign
  ▼
Opposition
  ▼
Praise  Criticism
```

```
Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```

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Public Reaction
```

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Public Reaction
```

```
Public Reaction
```
Figure 2. Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States

Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

September 11, 2001
Figure 3. Leader Approval in Terrorist Crisis

![Bar chart showing leader approval in different scenarios in Lebanon and the United States.](chart_image)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Lebanon $\beta / (SE)$</th>
<th>Model 1 United States $\beta / (SE)$</th>
<th>Model 2 Lebanon $\beta / (SE)$</th>
<th>Model 2 United States $\beta / (SE)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concession</td>
<td>-2.33*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-1.89*** (0.1)</td>
<td>-2.36*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-1.89*** (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.94*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.57*** (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.95*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.58*** (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Campaign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise</td>
<td>0.55*** (0.15)</td>
<td>0.19* (0.09)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.31** (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.31** (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.13* (0.06)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.14* (0.06)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.01 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pessimism</td>
<td>-0.11* (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.11* (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Supporter</td>
<td>0.82*** (0.21)</td>
<td>0.38** (0.14)</td>
<td>0.83*** (0.2)</td>
<td>0.39** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Supporter</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.48* (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.43** (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Praise * Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.35 (0.53)</td>
<td>1.41*** (0.37)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.53)</td>
<td>1.49 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the binary measure of leader approval in each respective country. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

‘***’ $p < 0.001$; ‘**’ $p < 0.01$; ‘*’ $p < 0.05$; ‘.’ $p < 0.1$.
Figure 4: Substantive Effect on Approval
Figure 5. The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism

![Bar Chart]

- Concession:
  - Lebanon: 25.4%
  - United States: 29.6%

- Terrorist Campaign:
  - Lebanon: 44%
  - United States: 52.1%
Online Appendix A. Sample Survey (Original in Arabic)

The following questions are about Lebanese foreign policy. You will read about a hypothetical situation similar to situations our country has faced in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. I will describe one approach Lebanese leaders have taken and ask whether you approve or disapprove of that approach.

The Situation:

A car bomb exploded in Beirut at lunchtime, killing 10 people and injuring others [Picture of Terrorist Attack shown to respondent]. A group affiliated with Al-Qaeda immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, and issued the following statement:

“Pull back your dogs from our people, and release our leader from your prison—or else there will be no safe place for anyone in Lebanon. If you do not free him, we will continue to tear your hearts out with explosives, and surround your every post with our bombs. We give you this final warning that an ocean of blood will be spilled.”

The authorities confirmed that this movement was indeed responsible for the attack. Following the attack, the Prime Minister, who is affiliated with the March 14th Coalition, immediately

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increased security forces at the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, government buildings and other major public spaces. The Prime Minister stated that additional intelligence and military resources would be brought to bear against this group and related threats. The Prime Minister also released the leader of this group from prison and exiled him. “The people of Lebanon should go about their daily business,” the Prime Minister declared. “These measures will keep this country safe.”

Over the course of the next year, this group did not carry out any other attack in Lebanon. Leaders of the March 8th Alliance strongly supported the Prime Minister’s conduct of foreign policy, saying that he “strengthened Lebanese national security.”

**Summary:**

- A group with links to Al-Qaeda exploded a car bomb killing 10 people and injuring others.
- The group demanded the release of its leader from prison.
- The March 14th Prime Minister increased security at airports, train stations, government buildings and major public spaces. He also released the leader of this group and exiled him.
- The group did not carry out any other attack in Lebanon.
- Leaders of the March 8th Alliance strongly supported the Prime Minister’s conduct of foreign policy.
# Online Appendix B. Lebanon Survey Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Demographics (Cont’d)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.1 %</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>5.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alawi</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-29</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-60</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;60</td>
<td>(Mean on 3-point scale, 3 = &gt;60)</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
<td>Extremely Conservative</td>
<td>6.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>9.9 %</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Education</td>
<td>20.3 %</td>
<td>Slightly Conservative</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>25.5 %</td>
<td>Moderate, In the Middle</td>
<td>31.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Studies/Technical School</td>
<td>5.2 %</td>
<td>Slightly Liberal</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University (BA/BS)</td>
<td>30.8 %</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>16.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Studies (MA or Higher)</td>
<td>5.5 %</td>
<td>Extremely Liberal</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mean on 7-point scale)</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>(Mean on 7-point scale, 7 = Extremely Liberal)</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (Monthly)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $333</td>
<td>3.9 %</td>
<td>March 14th Coalition</td>
<td>29.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$333 - 500</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
<td>Independent, Leans March 14th Coalition</td>
<td>4.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$501 - 1,000</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>25.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001 - 1,500</td>
<td>23.2 %</td>
<td>Independent, Leans March 8th Alliance</td>
<td>6.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,501 - 3,000</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>March 8th Alliance</td>
<td>30.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,001 - 5,000</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
<td>(Mean on 5-point scale, 5 = March 8th Alliance)</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000 or more</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>Region / Governorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confession</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>13.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’i</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>Békaa</td>
<td>16.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>24.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>Nabatiyé</td>
<td>11.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>23.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>11.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: A comparison with census data is not possible in Lebanon because the government has not taken a census since 1932. Political ideology does not have exactly the same meaning in Lebanon as it does in the United States.*
### Online Appendix C. Comparing U.S. Sample “Audience” to ANESP and U.S. Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>ANESP</th>
<th>U.S. Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>47.6 %</td>
<td>57.9 %</td>
<td>51.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>10.7 %</td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
<td>22.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-60</td>
<td>45.5 %</td>
<td>62.1 %</td>
<td>44.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;60</td>
<td>30.3 %</td>
<td>29.6 %</td>
<td>23.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mean on 3-point scale, 3 = &gt;60)</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a High School Graduate</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
<td>12.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>9.7 %</td>
<td>15.6 %</td>
<td>31.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College, but No Degree</td>
<td>25.4 %</td>
<td>36.9 %</td>
<td>16.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate’s or Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>24.6 %</td>
<td>28.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Degree</td>
<td>28.3 %</td>
<td>19.6 %</td>
<td>10.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mean on 5-point scale)</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $15,000</td>
<td>5.5 %</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Less Than $20,000</td>
<td>7.2 %</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 - $24,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.9 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000- $29,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.7 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 - $34,999</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 - $34,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000 - $49,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.7 %</td>
<td></td>
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<td>$75,000 - $99,999</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 or more</td>
<td>31.1 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Conservative</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>19.9 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Conservative</td>
<td>15.1 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate, In the Middle</td>
<td>14.5 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Liberal</td>
<td>15.1 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>19.2 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Liberal</td>
<td>6.8 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mean on 7-point scale, 7 = Extremely Liberal)</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party ID</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Vote Cast for President Obama (Democrat)</td>
<td>65 %</td>
<td>52.9 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>33.8 %</td>
<td>34.2 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent, Leans Democrat</td>
<td>15.9 %</td>
<td>10.6 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14.5 %</td>
<td>15.1 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent, Leans Republican</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
<td>10.4 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>24.3 %</td>
<td>29.8 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mean on 5-point scale, 5 = Republican)</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>20.5 %</td>
<td>16.9 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>21.4 %</td>
<td>28.3 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>31.6 %</td>
<td>31.4 %</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>24.4 %</td>
<td>23.4 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Age and Party ID were aggregated on common components to generate comparable scales.*