Social and Political Obstacles to Just Integration

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Abstract

International migration has increased the ethnic and racial diversity in the host countries that are generally assumed to damage social cohesion of the receiving societies. Thus, the integration of immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds has become a central issue. Historically, the policy strategies for the integration of immigrants have congregated around the debate between two opposing poles namely assimilation and multiculturalism. The assimilation and multiculturalism axis approaches the problem of integration of immigrants by a concern for social cohesion, stability and security of the host country. I believe that this perspective generates false problems and diverts our gaze from the structural problems of inequality, discrimination and political exclusion. In this paper, first, I analyze the term integration' as commonly acknowledged ideal for the immigrants' status after the long process of settlement in the host country. Second, I evaluate economic, socio-political and psychological problems that Canadian immigrants face in a framework of social pathologies, which impede immigrant integration and self-formation. Finally, I claim that these pathologies emanate from misrecognition of immigrant self-formation. Specifically, I take integration neither as assimilation nor as an adaptation but as a process of recognition where immigrants' self-formation results in self-respect and self-esteem.
Introduction

For the last two decades, the trends of globalization, namely economic liberalization, the demand for cheap labor, and the advancements in communication and transportation, have improved human mobility remarkably. Today, “the total number of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from an estimated 150 million in 2000 to 214 million persons” (United Nations' Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision). As a matter of fact, one of every thirty-five persons in the world is a migrant because about 192 million people are living outside their place of birth.

The growing number of immigrants in the Western countries will continue in the future because the above mentioned economic and socio-political trends of globalization are not foreseen to perish anytime soon. To illustrate, low fertility rates in western countries together with stable economic growth and constant changes in labor market demand increase the economic necessity of immigrants. In this sense, many western countries started to perceive the immigrant population as an asset for their economy. “This view, combined with the recognition that migration flows cannot be stopped, has helped fuel the perception that a more pragmatic approach to managing (as opposed to controlling) migration is required” (Lacroix 2010, 4). Thus the market-oriented approach to migration policies will likely welcome more immigrants in the future.

While international migration brings tangible economic benefits, it has also increased the ethnic and racial diversity. The liberalization of pre-immigration laws has reduced the legal obstacles to South to North and East to West migration. Moreover, the greater ease in transportation in addition to the increased awareness about the opportunities abroad and political conflict in some areas of the world have led the way to the increase levels of international migration flow (Reitz 2009, 4). Hence the composition of immigrant population has changed dramatically for the last two decades. For example, while approximately 68.5% of recent immigrants to Canada were born in regions other than Europe in 1981, this number has increased to 83.9% in 2006 (Census Canada, 2006). The majority of immigrant population in western countries can be identified as ethnically and racially different from host country nationals.

With this regard, the reality of ethnic and racial diversity has raised serious concerns about the national security, identity and social cohesion of the host societies. In the 2008 Austrian and United States elections and the 2012 French presidential elections, “the challenge of integrating immigrants loom[ed] high in national public debates and the issue of social cohesion caused headaches for many politicians and policy makers” (Lacroix 2010, 2). In a sense, today “immigration is to modern politics what violent crime was in the 1980s: an apparently marginal issue that can swiftly overwhelm a campaign” (Economist, 10 October 2008).

Ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism have been perceived as threats in policy and academic circles for several reasons. First, majority of immigrants do not look, speak or in general live like nationals in the host society. There is an unwavering belief among nationals that most of the immigrant cultural values are irreconcilable with liberal values.
that western societies identify with. This common opinion crystallizes when it comes to the issue of integration of Muslim immigrants in Western European countries.

The Rushdie affair and the Dutch cartoon affair are exemplary in terms of how Muslim cultural values can clash with liberal rights such as freedom of expression. These events hardened the belief that immigrant cultures will eventually undermine western value structures. The perception is that these groups because of their different culture would never integrate to the host society and will constitute a marginalized and perhaps violent minority, which would breed hatred for western liberal values. Thus, different value systems of immigrant groups do not only pose challenges to the western values but also turns the very existence of immigrant groups into a threat to national security. This discourse of national security has been at the forefront after especially 9/11 and 2005 London metro bombings.

In addition to the concerns for national security, the debates around immigration have also revolved around the issue of the future of national identity in the face of cultural and ethnic diversity. While host countries expect their immigrants to adopt the host culture in time, they also came to recognize that the adaptation is not a one-way street, but requires the host society to change as well. As the numbers and concentration increases and the visibility of ethnic immigrants intensifies, the perceived threat to national identity and social cohesion of the host society also increases. The connection between national identity and social cohesion can be explained in terms of western understanding of citizenship based on national identity and commonality as the foundation of democracy.

Universally valued liberal rights are in danger; the binding force of nation is diminishing and the enemy to the national security lives within the society. No wonder why western liberal states are alarmed by the very existence of their immigrant population and try to find solutions to mitigate these threats. The term “integration” has come to the forefront as a prominent solution for these problems. In this sense, the integration of immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds has become a central issue for both policy makers and academics in western democracies.

Integration as a Solution

Integration is a very hard concept to define. For example, Banton (2001) refers to integration as a “treacherous concept”, which offers no sensible criteria for operation and measurement (151, 152). Nonetheless, the term “integration” holds its popularity among academics and policy makers perhaps due to its highly abstract meaning which makes the term suitable for variety of policy projects (Hamberger 2009, 2). As a result, integration has become a widely used concept for the portrayal of the aim of post-immigration policies throughout Western Europe and Canada (Favell 2003, 14).

When we look at the discourse of these post-immigration policies, we can conclude that even though the term integration has been used in different ways, it still
holds a connotation of social cohesion, unification of a diverse population through constructing a common identity and “structuring a “common ground” of institutions and services for civic engagement of diverse communities” (Qadeer 2003, 29; Reitz et al. 2009, Favell 2003, 14). The main question is how the host state can manage the diversity that the immigrant population brings for the protection of social cohesion and the preservation of liberal values.

Social and political integration of immigrants into their host country is taken as a “collective goal” for policy makers and academics. However, there is not a common agreement on how to accomplish this collective goal. Historically, the policy strategies for the social and political integration of immigrants have congregated around the debate between two opposing poles namely assimilation and multiculturalism. The pendulum swings between these two extremes in the social policy debate are witnessed because the historical conjecture has been changed by contemporary socio-economic and political events concerning the relationship between immigrant groups and their host societies (Cheong et al. 2007, 28).

On the one hand, assimilationists have argued that immigrants can only integrate to the host society and become full members if they leave their ethno-cultural identities behind and identify as the nationals of the host country. On the other hand, multiculturalists assume that the integration of immigrants can only be possible through respecting and tolerating ethno-cultural identities of immigrants. Only in this way can immigrants embrace a common identity with the nationals and become full members of the host society. The assimilation and multiculturalism debate is an ongoing one within literature and policy circlesii. Below, I will give a brief historical background to circumscribe the flux that the notion of integration went through between these two opposite strategies.

Historical Background

Historically, in the host countries, both state institutions and some sections of the society have perceived immigrants as undesirable, but also as an economic necessity. Until the 1960s, the policy of “Anglo-conformity” was the model for immigration in the United States, Canada, and Australia. These countries simply demanded their immigrants to assimilate into the host culture (Kymlicka 1995, 14). The expectation was that, after residing in the country for a long period of time, immigrants would automatically internalize the host society’s culture and values. In this sense, integration was understood as assimilation.

To illustrate, Ålund and Schierup (1986) point out that in European immigration literature, integration has been treated as identical with assimilation since the end result of integration of an immigrant is expected to bring out an agent who behaves and speaks exactly the same way as the host country nationals. The most vivid example of this would be the French official discourse on immigration till the 1970s. Accordingly, the ideal outcome of immigration referred to “the idea of unilateral adaptation of the immigrant to the laws and the customs of France and of the French, the superiority of French culture
Nevertheless, during the 1970s, “under pressure from immigrant groups, all three countries [United States, Canada and Australia] rejected assimilationist models and adapted a more tolerant and pluralistic policy which allows and indeed encourages immigrants to maintain various aspects of their ethnic heritage” (Kymlicka 1995, 14). Moreover, in 1964, the British government accepted the notion of integration. Roy Jenkins, back then Home Secretary, defined the term “integration” as “not a flattening process of uniformity but cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Rex and Tomlinson 1979).

Canada responded to the separatist movement in Quebec and the demands of its ethnic minorities by embracing multiculturalism. “In 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau proclaimed Canada a bilingual and multicultural nation, where multiculturalism means the acceptance and recognition of ethno-cultural minorities. To promote acceptance of differences, the government aimed at supporting ethnic organizations, making use of ethnic press as a standard part of government communication and at encouraging institutions and organizations to explore areas of common concerns such as rights and racism” (Heisler 1992, 633-634).

In this sense, integration is associated with multiculturalism. Canadian policy discourse is based on the idea that multiculturalism instead of assimilation is the right way to achieve the ideal of integration. These multicultural policies aim in the long run to “connect minority groups to the whole, through contribution, participation, interchange, and language acquisition” (Reitz, 2009, 19). To illustrate, the prominent advocate of multicultural policies from a liberal perspective, Will Kymlicka, suggests four criteria for integration of immigrants into Canadian society: “adopting a Canadian identity, participating in Canadian institutions, learning an official language, and having inter-ethnic friendships” (Reitz 2009, 14). Hence if an immigrant feels socially and politically invested in Canadian society, it means she is an integrated immigrant.

Thus after 1970s, the notion of integration was reconstructed in terms of a bidirectional process of multicultural adaptation by the host society and its immigrant communities. In general, multiculturalism suggests that the recognition of cultural diversity of immigrants will better provide an environment for the integration of immigrants. In this context, multicultural policies came out as a well-grounded solution to the possible problems emanate from cultural pluralism. Most of the western liberal states have embraced multicultural policies, in the hopes of building pathways to integrate immigrant groups with the larger community.

However, especially after 9/11, in the countries where once multiculturalism was embraced, many have started to reconsider these policies and the theory behind them due to the significant inter-ethnic tension (Reitz 2009, 1). Many policy makers have argued that tolerating cultural differences leads to marginalization and radicalization of immigrants and it is better to demand immigrants to assimilate within a liberal framework for the sake of national security. To illustrate, “in recent years, Australia has witnessed
the revision of multicultural and immigration policies which have led to more narrowly defined notions of belonging and a mono-cultural, if not to say paranoid, nationalism. The implementation of tougher immigration and citizenship policies has gained general acceptance as a result of national security concerns which emerged after the 9/11 and Bali bombings” (Chiro 12).v

“In Canada, a parallel controversy arose following the arrest of 17 alleged members of a purported Islamic terrorist cell in June 2006” (The Economist 2006a cited by Reitz 2009, 9). The 2006 Toronto Community Foundation survey shows that approximately two-thirds of Canadians have reported an increased anxiety over the cultural integration of newcomers. Accordingly, Michael Adams concludes “Canadians more often think that something about multiculturalism is broken and that immigrants aren’t adequately adapting to life in Canada” (Reitz 2009, 9). In conclusion, the international concerns over national security have started to frame migration in terms of problems of unemployment and religious fundamentalism. As a result, “migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem” which needs to be solved by ensuring social cohesion through assimilation (Bigo 2002, 63).vi

As can be seen from this brief historical construction of the term “integration”, the assimilation and multiculturalism axis approaches the problem of integration of immigrants through a concern for social cohesion, national identity and security of the host country. I believe that this perspective understands the issue of integration of immigrants based on false presuppositions about these abstract terms. This generates fictitious problems and diverts our gaze from the structural problems of inequality, discrimination and political exclusion. Overall, it does not provide us a robust analytical framework for addressing the issues of justice in the study of immigrant integration. Below, I will try to reveal these problems by reconfiguring our perspective on the relationship of national identity and social cohesion.

To begin with, the universal idea of citizenship has always been actualized within the context of nation state and national identity. In practice, the ideal of universal citizenship “conflicts with the reality of nation state formation, in which becoming a citizen has depended on membership in a community. A citizen is always also a member of a nation” (Castles and Davidson 2000, 12). Thus citizenship as an ideal is meant to be a universal identity however “it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural society—on the belief in being different from other nations” (Castles and Davidson 2000, 12).

This paradox emanates from the common understanding that “the idea of democracy requires some structures of integration, some cultural capacity for internal communication and some social solidarity of the people” (Calhoun 2007, 154). After the establishment of the Westphalia order, national identity has been employed to satisfy this alleged necessity. From this perspective, sharing a common primordial ethnic identity is the binding force between citizens. This national homogenization was believed to generate a common value structure that is necessary for building trust between citizens who share equal rights and obligations within the confines of the nation state. However,
while “this homogenization process produced equality in sharing rights to citizenship [in an abstract way], it leveled down differences through internal colonization” (Munch 2001, 1). Thus, for the integration of immigrants, assimilation had been understood as the natural outcome of this process for several decades.

Nevertheless, with the struggles of emancipation of minorities and the increase of the immigrant population for the last three decades, the binding force of nation has started to disappear. What is the alternative to national identity? This question has been persistently asked by many political theorists because it does not only point out the paradoxical nature of the universal assumptions about equal citizenship, but also reveals the injustices that have been done to the groups that do not belong to the majority’s national identity in a community. Many argue that the emphasis on national homogeneity has caused discrimination and segregation of immigrants in western countries.

If the emphasis on national identity continues, it will not only perpetuate the unjust treatment of minorities specifically immigrants but it will also continue to generate conflict between ethnically different groups. As long as nationality is understood as the sole civic tie between citizens, immigrants will be perceived as highly threatening potential invaders. In 1992, Jack Miles cried out: “when the barbarians sacked Rome in 410, the Romans thought it was the end of the civilization. You smile—but what followed was the dark ages” to warn Americans against the dangers of these violent and irrational people living next door (Bach 1993, 156). Nonetheless, “this barbarian vision shows deep-seated stereotypical understanding of outsiders” from whom nationals need absolute protection (Alexander et al. 2005, 782).

In the same vein, the socio-economic problems that the majority population faces have been blamed on the very existence of immigrants. However, the argument that ethnic diversity of immigrants will damage the social cohesion of the host country depends on an underlying assumption on the existence of the unity of nationals in the host country. This directs not only politicians but also political theory research to an impossible ambition: to recover a lost order that actually never was: social cohesion. Vertovec (1999) rightly argues that “social cohesion is only invoked by its absence: that is, while we are rarely presented with views of what a high degree of social cohesion might look like, we are bombarded with descriptions of the lack of social cohesion in contemporary society” (xii).

The lack of social cohesion is an abstract term which is employed to refer to the socio-economic problems that society faces such as “high incidence of crime, joblessness and homelessness, growing mistrust of neighbors and of government, worsening quality of social services, new manifestations of racism and xenophobia, an entrenchment of political apathy, and more” (Vertovec 1999, xi). Thus, the immigrant population instantaneously becomes the scapegoat since it is perceived as the reason why society lacks cohesion and suffers these socio-economic problems.

I believe that the dependency on national ties for social cohesion will eventually propagate segregation of ethnically different groups. Nationalistic movements, which are
trying to restore national solidarity, increase ethnic conflict (Munch 2001, 1). Thus in 
many ways the immigrant threat to national security is being fabricated through the false 
presumption about the status of national solidarity in the face of ethnic diversity. For 
reasons like these, I argue that the issue of social and political integration of immigrants 
should be understood beyond the borders of the national identity.

Therefore, I argue that the concern for the marginalization of immigrant groups is 
valid in so far as the existence of immigrants is perceived as a threat to the stability of the 
host country. In this debate, the connection between culture and individual identity has 
been questioned based on a rigid understanding of cultural differences. Ethnic identities 
of immigrants have been treated as something either to be assimilated or to be flourished. 
Thus, the demand for recognition by immigrant groups has been approached from a 
group identity perspective. The basic question to be answered has become the degree and 
the scope of toleration that the liberal states can show to the rigid and most of the time 
opposing cultural practices of their immigrants. The main focus is usually on the 
compatibility between liberal values attached to the national identity of western countries 
and ethno-cultural identities of immigrant groups. As a result, this approach to integration 
has diverted our attention from the social pathologies that immigrants suffer in the host 
country.

So far, first I showed how the problem of integration of immigrants have been 
approached from an assimilation and multiculturalism axis with a concern for social 
cohesion, national identity and security. Then, I offered a critical analysis of this 
approach to redirect our attention to a different way of looking at the immigration 
problem. I argue that integration of immigrants should be approached from a justice 
perspective. The normative problem that political theory faces today is not about the 
accommodation of the differences that immigrants bring for the sake of preservation of 
liberal values but the course that the transformation of the political institutions and 
societal values of the host country will take in the face of the cultural pluralism for the 
sake of justice, freedom and equality.

**Just Integration**

In the *Struggle for Recognition*, Axel Honneth (1995) introduces a critical theory 
of recognition, in order to locate emancipatory movements in the justice claims of 
misrecognized groups and their efforts for reconstructing a more equal integrated society. 
According to Honneth, “social integration no longer occurs along with the hierarchical 
scale of values and norms, but through value representations vying for their recognition 
as valid ways of achieving the general ethical aims [in modern societies]” (Deranty 2009, 
284). Because of the open and non-hierarchical mechanism of social integration, conflict 
appears as an imminent possibility in the modern society. Accordingly, struggles of 
recognition break out when misrecognized minorities do not agree with the justification 
of dominant societal values.

Thus by looking at emancipation from this perspective, our focus shifts away 
from the concerns for stability and elimination of conflict in society. Since the process of
mutual recognition in the face of disrespect motivates social struggles, “[they] could become a structuring force in the moral development of society” (Honneth 1996, 93). After each struggle, society will be more free and just for individual self-realization (Honneth 1996, 129). Because misrecognition is strongly related with feelings of injustice, what self-realization demands is a just society where individuals reciprocally recognize each other’s similarities and differences. Thus, social resistance becomes something not to be avoided but embraced for the common good of the society.

In the same vein, I approach the ideal of integration as for not the sake of security or the preservation of liberal values, which may be achieved through implementation of specific immigration policies but as an a concrete process, through which collective individuals change societal values as equal members of society in the face of misrecognition. Specifically, I take integration neither as assimilation nor as an adaptation but as a process of recognition where immigrants’ self-formation results in self-respect and self-esteemvii.

Moreover, I believe that integration of immigrants should also be perceived as a normative goal. The normative criterion for this should be the degree of their capacity to make informed choices among given contents. Utilizing a Hegelian perspective, I claim that the individual freedom is only possible through social and political institutions that allow each individual subject to enter into communicative relationships that would result in mutual recognition, a quality necessary for the self-realization of each individual. In this sense, individual autonomy should be understood inter-subjectively and in terms of the constitutive conditions that are necessary for the healthy self-formation of individuals.

These constitutive conditions are social and political institutions, which could provide equal conditions for individuals to be mutually recognized. In the following section, I will demonstrate that in the absence of the mutual-recognition institutions, immigrants suffer from the feelings of indeterminacy. These feelings affect immigrants’ perception of the self and the host community, which, in turn, may cause marginalization, discrimination and isolation. In this sense, the problem of the social integration of immigrants is strongly related to the feelings of misrecognition and “the success of the normative integration of societies depends on their potential to create stable structures of social recognition” (Honneth 2002, 271).

To conclude this introductory paper, next, I will approach the term integration from a negative perspective and will analyze the social pathologies that create barriers to social integration of immigrants. I will focus on pathological tendencies of modern society that make immigrant self-realization nearly impossible. My aim is to show that social pathologies hold immigrants back from obtaining or securing a good life. Eventually, these problems can create isolation, marginalization and discrimination of immigrants and obstruct their social integration. I will treat socio-economic and political challenges that immigrants face as the consequences of misrecognition that is caused by domination and exclusion that leads to the disintegration of society in the face of value pluralism, which emanates from the very existence of immigrants.
Social Pathologies

Introduction

Under this heading, I will be talking about the socio-economic and political problems of immigrants. Obviously, “immigrant” is an umbrella term. Not all immigrant experiences are the same. One needs to qualify the half empty signifier “immigrant” with the country of origin, the ethnicity and the race etc. Indeed, in the literature, immigrants are usually treated in terms of their ethnicity or race such as African or Turkish immigrants. This categorization of immigrants may change with regard to the context in which we analyze the problems of one particular immigrant groups. The basic claim in this paper is that immigrants in general suffer from misrecognition in an abstract sense. Albeit, the form that misrecognition takes for the specific individual or group of immigrants and the consequence of it may vary. For example, while visible minorities may complain more about discrimination because of their race, an invisible minority may feel excluded because of her educational background.

However, the conditions of being a foreigner and having an accent can be counted as the common ground/characteristics of all immigrants around the world. My main argument in this paper will be that the conditions of being a newcomer immigrant should be studied because it has effects on immigrant identity formation. I believe that there is a common problem of identifying immigrants within the context of their ethnic identities in the political theory literature. The political theorists who study the social pathologies emanated from socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities treat the problems of immigrants under the problems of ethnic minority groups. As a result, the issue of political inclusion of immigrants has been approached as a problem of under representation of different ethnic groups in the democratic deliberation processes. In this sense, the conditions of being an immigrant should be studied because they have effects on immigrant identity formation. For this reason, immigrants should not be treated as theoretically same as other underrepresented groups within the host country.

Immigrants in general newcomer immigrants in particular are in a unique position in society. On the one hand, newcomer immigrant has the opportunity to recreate herself and her family from scratch in a new country where possibilities in theory seem endless. On the other hand, newcomer immigrants face many difficulties in this self-making project. The aim of this paper is to pinpoint these difficulties and come up with a framework where a theory of immigrant integration can be worked through. In order to accomplish this, I will focus on pathological tendencies of modern western society specifically Canadian society that make immigrant self-realization impossible.

The Canadian Case

In the discussion of the socio-economic, psychological and political challenges that immigrants are facing, I will focus on the Canadian case. However this case is unique because of the composition of immigrant groups and immigrant policies in Canada, I
believe that it is one of the most suitable cases for the discussion of disintegration effects of social pathologies on immigrant identity.

To begin with, the composition of immigrants in Canada has been changed after the 1967 Immigration Act. Before the policy change, more than 80 percent of immigrants to Canada came from European countries. After the implementation of the point system and the removal of preference based on country of origin, the composition of immigrant population has changed considerably. “By 2001, the proportion of immigrants of European origin had fallen to 17 percent. While immigration from Asia accounted for less than 10 percent of all immigrants in 1966, it is now by far the largest category, with more than 63 percent of all newcomers coming from the region. The vast majority of immigrants are thus, according to Canadian discourse, “visible minorities” (Papillion 2002, 9,10). Therefore, the majority of immigrants in Canada are stereotypically put into the immigrant category because of their racial markers. That is the reason why, Canadian case is a good representative of overall immigrant experience I want to focus on this paper.

Although most of the immigrants in Canada belongs to visible minorities, the concentration of immigrant groups in three of the major Canadian cities namely Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal is not as dense as their counterparts in Western European countries. To illustrate, “in Europe, non-European migrants tend to come from a small number of origins in the Middle East and North Africa. In Canada’s most populous city Toronto, by contrast, although immigrants are quite numerous overall (45% of the population is foreign-born), and although there are also large groups that predominate – the Chinese, South Asian and blacks are comparable in relative size to the three largest groups in Amsterdam, each of the groups is characterized by considerable internal diversity” (Reitz 2009, 16). This means that the problems that Canadian immigrants face mostly emanate from their condition of being an immigrant rather than belonging to a specific religious or ethnic group which has racial visibility.

Secondly, Canadian immigration policy is based on a point system, which favors highly skilled foreigners through assigning points for education and work experience and accepting those who earn high scores. According to the point system, “the applicants must attain a specified minimum number of points to gain entry. The point system gives a concrete form to immigration policy goals and as such is a potentially powerful tool for steering the composition of the inflow towards those occupations and skills believed to be in high demand in Canada” (Green et al. 1995, 1008). This means that excluding family class applicants, the primary applicants for immigration are being chosen on the basis of their merit defined by Canadian institutions.

One can make two important inferences with regard to the Canadian immigration system. First, immigrants are necessary for the well-being of Canadian economy and desired by both Canadian society and state because of their economic value. Second, this system creates a legitimate expectation about the economic opportunities that Canadian immigrants will take advantage of. It is absolutely understandable why immigrants have high expectations for their socio-economic well-being even before settling in Canada.
Although the composition of immigrant population, immigration policies based on merit, and multicultural/integration post-immigration policies are designed for immigrants to have fewer challenges in term of economic and social integration into Canada, economic exploitation, racial discrimination and political exclusion still continue to haunt recent immigrants to Canada.

According to statistical studies, the average poverty rate especially among recent immigrants is significantly higher than the average poverty rates of Canadian population. On urban level, “the poverty rate of immigrants is 52.1 percent compared with 24.5 percent for all residents in Toronto” (Lee 2000, 82). These findings are particularly valid for visible minorities, who comprise the majority of recent immigrants. Kazemipur and Halli (2001) found that “a significantly higher poverty rate for newcomers from South-East Asian (30.8%), Arab (40.9%), Latin American (38.8%) and Black/Caribbean (29.4%) countries than for the Canadian average” (1143). To illustrate, “in relation to the national mean individual-equivalent household income of $41,330, the gap [between Whites and visible minorities] is 23.2%” (Reitz et al., 2009, 124).

However, opposite to common opinion, the recent immigrants in Canada do not rely on the social welfare programs; even though, they live in poverty. “In 1990, the net contribution (all taxes paid minus all social programs used) of a “foreign-born” household was $11,970, compared to $10,157 for a Canadian-born household” (Papillion 2002, 10).

The reason why poverty rate is significantly high among immigrants is that they are either unemployed or stuck with the low paid jobs “survival jobs” viii. “Recent immigrants’ unemployment rates in Canada compared to similarly-aged non-immigrants are almost twice as high, and median wages of recent immigrant workers are also about 49 percent lower compared to native-born workers” (Canadian Census 2006). According to Chung and Cheong’s research on immigrants’ economic status, “despite differences regarding national origins and length of tenure in Canada, immigrants had become “stuck” in low-paying jobs — such as cashiering, house-keeping, janitorial work, and dishwashing — or were currently unemployed” (Chung et al. 2011, 4).

In the immigration literature, scholars argue that there are several barriers “to finding higher-paid work, such as the non-recognition of foreign credentials, the lack of “Canadian experience,” and limited English skills” (Chung et al. 2011; Kazemipur and Halli, 2001, 1134). Therefore, there appears an apparent disconnect between Canadian immigration policy and the labor market. When we consider that each and every immigrant lack these qualifications, hiring practices of employers can be defined in terms of discrimination. These practices marginalize a large portion of immigrant population by devaluing the contributions they may bring through their economic and social participation in the host society. In turn, immigrants in general not only suffer from material deprivation due to the nature/income of the work they do but also experience feelings of misrecognition because of the disregard of their esteem in the host country.
To begin with, the majority of participants in Chung et al.’s study claim that the reference to the lack of “Canadian experience” is being used by the employers to cover discriminatory hiring practices and to “create unnecessary obstacles to finding even the lowest-paid jobs” (Chung et al. 2011, 7). This discriminatory practice has been revealed by the recent study of Oerapolus et al. (2011) which found that “Canadian-born individuals with English-sounding names are significantly more likely to receive a callback for a job interview after sending their resumes, compared to internationally-born individuals, even among those with international degrees from highly ranked schools or among those with the same listed job experience” (43).\textsuperscript{xix} In order to eliminate this discriminatory practice, many immigrants especially from Asian countries have been using nicknames in their job applications. In this sense, immigrants are put in a position where they have to disidentify themselves in a literal sense.

Moreover, the non-recognition of foreign credentials can be justified in terms of the cost and benefit calculation of employers about the training of their employees. However, the point system, which gives priority to the educational and occupational experiences of immigration applicants, creates a mismatch between the expectations of highly skilled immigrants and the restrictive labor market policies and practices. Hence, while unable to find a suitable job matching their credentials, highly skilled immigrants have to downgrade their work experience to appear less “skilled” to find a “survival job” (Chung et al. 2011, 7). Therefore, most of the recent immigrants have to lie about their experiences, which can be identified as the major source for building their self-esteem.

Finally, limited English skills appear as one of the most valid reasons why immigrants are not able to find jobs in their caliber. It is realistic in an English spoken country to expect employees to have a good command of the national language. However, one must accept the fact that most of the immigrants are not native English speakers and they will never be able to speak English without accent\textsuperscript{x}. Most of the high skilled, immigrants realize that not their English-language ability but their native accent is preventing them from finding decent paying jobs (Chung et al. 2011, 10). Generally, immigrants report that they face discrimination in phone interviews for employment or other activities such as finding housing. According to Creese and Kambere (2003)’s study, employers in Vancouver discriminate against language accents and re-assess the employment competency of African immigrant women during job interviews. In this sense, extra-local accents are perceived as the markers of immigrant status and cause barriers for immigrants to find decent jobs and integrate into Canadian job market.

In the face of misrecognition of their self-esteem, immigrants usually take refuge in their ethnic enclaves. While the question that whether ethnic enclaves have positive effects on immigrants’ integration into host society or not is an ongoing discussion in the literature (Qadeer and Kumar, 2006; Wu et al 2011), some immigrants simply choose to live in these ethnic neighborhoods because of the above-mentioned barriers to entering Canadian job market. Most of the immigrants lack networks to find an appropriate job for their skills and education. They seek help from their ethnic networks which also limits the opportunities that Canada has to offer for its citizens because ethnic networks are usually embedded in an economic sector such as convenience stores owned by Koreans.
or construction jobs populated by Ghanaians etc. leaving no diversity of options for the immigrant job seekers.

According to Mwarigha (2002), the first stage in the settlement process of newcomer immigrants is to find an employment, housing and satisfy basic desires such as food, orientation to the new city, language interpretation, and language instruction”(9). As can be seen from the above discussion, the barriers to finding employment for immigrants mostly emanate from the marginalization and discrimination of immigrants in Canadian job market. This economic condition of immigrants in Canada causes other problems such as difficulties in providing for children, in finding housing and in their health care etc. (Chung et al. 2011, 4). These distributive harms that immigrants experience are related to the misrecognition of the societal value of their labor and life experiences in their origin country. The lack of self-esteem created by the economic injustices that immigrants suffer can be understood through the psychological and social problems that immigrants face in Canada. These social pathologies in turn have disintegrating effects on immigrant identity.

To illustrate, from a psychological perspective, immigrants experience more work related anxiety. The unemployment related “discrimination is a psycho-social stressor [for newcomer immigrants], with implications for social inclusion and belonging. In this respect the feelings of threat slow the processes of integration into society” (Reitz 2009, 161). Furthermore, immigrants are in a transition stage. As Honig points out, newcomer immigrants generally go through a stage of mourning for the ones they have left behind. In addition to the feelings of grief, loss, and separation, newcomer immigrants also suffer from indeterminacy, because of the lengthy process of adaptation to the new socio-economic and political environment of the host country. Unlike other misrecognized groups within the host society, newcomer immigrants voluntarily put themselves in a position where they need to create a new understanding of themselves. These psychological feelings may effect immigrant self-formation and ability to integrate into the host society.

Moreover, according to many empirical findings (Bloemraad 2006, Reitz et al. 2009, Gidengil et al. 2004), immigrants have lower political trust compared to other nationals. Reitz and Banerjee (2007) showed that visible minorities generally express lower generalized trust than whites with the exception that among recent immigrants Moreover, immigrant naturalization rates in Canada is relatively higher than United States, “voting rates for visible minorities are below expectation based on that citizenship” (Reitz 2009, 23). “It is well known that homeland-centered politics has always been a major component of Canadian participation, occurring mostly in the context of pressure aimed at influencing political developments in the homeland”(Balck 2011, 1172) xi. Finally, visible minorities are underrepresented in Canadian politics. Political participation is one of the most important indicators of the integration of immigrants and misrecognition of immigrant identity seems to hold immigrants back from participating in Canadian politics.
With this preliminary examination of social pathologies that immigrants face in Canada, one can arrive some conclusions for the improvement of immigrant integration within the host society. To illustrate, the ethical order within the society has an unequal and rather minimal connection with its immigrants. Deprived of the environment where they exercise mutual recognition, immigrants invent a culture, which broadens the gap between immigrants and host community further by marginalizing immigrant identity. This process should be understood as interactive. It is not the product of immigrant actions per se, but rather, the product of the conditions created by the official language and general perception of immigrants. This condition is unique with regard to the socio-economic conditions that other underrepresented groups suffer.

In conclusion, immigrants may have “less of a sense of belonging” to Canadian society (Reitz 2009, 23). Feeling of belonging is strongly associated with feelings of recognition, freedom and equality. “Sense of belonging to Canada is a barometer of social cohesion and social integration. It embodies whether that person feels accepted, secure, and at home there” (Wu et al. 2011, 374). While feelings of belonging are related to integration and social cohesion, feelings of exclusion, discrimination and marginalization discourages political participation, social commitments to common goals.

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1 In empirical studies, the measurement of integration has also been highly contentious. Penninx has categorized dimensions of integration policies based on the concept of citizenship. According to Penninx (2004), three dimensions of integration are legal/political (immigrants' political rights and duties), socio/economic (social/economic rights, irrespective of citizenship), cultural-religious (immigrants' cultural rights to organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups). These categories may be useful for measurement problems, however their content should still be identified by certain priorities.

2 Parekh (2008) argues that “prima facie, integration appears to be a perfectly sensible goal, as immigrants should be encouraged to become an integral part of the society, and should have the same rights, opportunities and obligations as the rest, but probed deeper, integration involves a particular way of incorporating outsiders into the prevailing social structure, and is sometimes either indistinguishable or only marginally different from assimilation….integration is most of the time seen as a one way process but it, frustrated as much by segregation as by rejection, is a two way process, requiring both immigrants and the wider society to adjust to each other” (85).

3 Joppke and Morawska (2003) argue that the popularity of multiculturalism is exaggerated in its public and academic reception. They believe that even countries like France, which is accused of having assimilationist post-immigration policies, have de facto multiculturalism on local level invented for “the sheer need to find ethnic interlocutors and sounding boards for their policies” (7). They believe that if one disregards the misleading national model talk, one can “rediscover rather thin and uniform “integration” requisites of liberal states [(acquisition of official language and respect for the liberal constitution)] plus a plethora of context-specific ad hoc policies, utterly devoid of an underlying philosophy of integration” (Joppke et al. 2003, 8). They argue that as soon as an immigrant set foot in the host country, she has already integrated to main institutions of the society. Therefore, they argue that there is a turn away from multiculturalism to assimilation and the integration of immigrants has not been actually a contestable issue, which has normative value in most of the immigrant receiving countries.
Instead, integration has a connection with the universal understanding of citizenship. They also claim that the world leader of multiculturalism, Canada spends so less money on distinctively multicultural policies that it is nearly impossible to differentiate her from other countries. “It may be unrealistic to expect a major social impact for such a small program, the annual budget for which has been on the order of $21 \text{ million per year, or about } 0.01\% \text{ of total government expenditures (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritages 2005, p. 91). (Reitz 14).}"

iv To illustrate, in 2011 at a security conference in Munich, David Cameron declared that multiculturalism has failed. He continued:

We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values... Building a stronger sense of national and local identity holds the key to achieving true cohesion by allowing people to say, "I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am a Christian, but I am a Londoner, too" (BBC, 5 February 2011).

v Moreover, in Britain, New Labour social policy has shifted from the defense of tolerating cultural differences to a demand to create social cohesion and commonality between host society and immigrant groups. “David Goodhart’s essay, for example, posits ethnic diversity against ‘high social cohesion’ and argues for social policies to be based on integration through a greater acceptance of shared national values and history. Goodhart’s views echo the views of Ray Honeyford (1988) that multiculturalism leads to social disintegration and that multiculturalism produces a collapse of moral values. In this context, Trevor Phillips’ comments calling for an end to a preoccupation with multiculturalism understandably unleashed panic and fear that he was endorsing the arguments of the right and playing to the moral panics centring on Islam, asylum seekers and migration from an expanded EU” (Shukra et al, 2004, 190). Moreover, “Immigration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem and the practice of prejudice and suspicion in relation to new immigrants has been exacerbated by new policies and practices. For example, the immigration approach expressed in the British government’s White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity (Home Office, 2002), reinforces various exclusionary practices and policies towards certain groups of new immigrants and refugees. More recent legislature, including the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill introduced in June 2005 (and passed as an Act on March 2006), implements further controls on immigrants via an integrated pre-entry and in-country security ‘E-borders’ and Border Management Programme” (Cheong et al. 2007, 41). The situation begs the question “could social cohesion be used for progressive ends or was it inherently assimilationist?” (Shukra et al. 2004, 188).

vi Moreover, Castles (1995) argue that “integration policies are often simply a weaker form of assimilation, based on the idea that adaptation is a gradual process in which group cohesion and interaction play an important part. Nonetheless, the final goal is complete absorption into the dominant culture” (298). 

vii Tully’s understanding of integration is somewhat close to Honneth’s term. Tully argues that the norms of integration have taken two different discursive forms: “of interpreting and following the norms differently in practice without challenging the norms directly; and of questioning, challenging, agreeing and disagreeing, negotiating modifications or reaffirming the existing norms, implementing and experimenting with a modified regime of integration norms, acting in accordance with it and testing it in turn” (Tully 2008, 228). Tully claims that the current practice of integration should be called anti-democratic because the process of integration is imposed upon immigrants and other diverse groups from top through minority right regimes implemented by political elites for the security concerns. Tully then introduces two new approaches to the integration namely a “restricted” and a ‘non-restricted’ democratic one. “The major differences between the restricted and non-restricted approaches can be seen clearly by comparing them
across four aspects of democratic negotiation of integration regimes. The restricted approach is ‘restricted’ in that it places limits on all four aspects of democratic negotiation: 1. The democratic negotiation of norms of integration takes place only in what we might call the official institutions of the public sphere. Furthermore, official representatives of the people subject to the norm in question usually partake in the negotiations. 2. Democratic negotiation takes place within a set of pre-established procedures, and having a say within them usually consists in saying YES or NO to a proposed norm developed elsewhere (as, for example, in the vote on the constitution). 3. The general outline of what a norm of integration must look like at the end of the negotiations is given at the beginning. It is usually given as beyond question by some grand narrative of global processes of modernization, good governance, democratization, human rights or civilization. 4. The discursive practices of norm negotiation are seen as a discrete step in a larger process of norm generation that comes to an end” (Tully, 2008, 229). “On the open-ended view, a multicultural, multinational and multi-civilizational association is not held together by some definitive set of public institutions of discussion, procedures of negotiation, shared narratives, or final norms of integration on which all must agree and that set the limits to democratic negotiation. While the restricted approach allows for inclusion in democratic negotiations over norms of integration, in contrast to the anti-democratic exclusionary approach, it places four assimilative limits on democratic negotiation precisely where disagreement is most likely to irrupt in diverse societies, and thus displaces rather than faces the urgent conflicts over integration today. Rather, the answer is found in the contrasting and quotidian democratic attitude that none of these four features is ever beyond question or the subject of unconditional agreement. What holds the diverse members together and generates bonds of belonging to the community as a whole across continuing differences and disagreements is that the prevailing institutions, procedures and norms of integration are always open to free and democratic negotiation and experimentation with alternatives by those subject to them. Finally, the term ‘democratic negotiation’ comprises two distinct forms of negotiation involved in integration. The first involves the activities of challenging a prevailing norm of recognition and integration, calling it into question, entering into negotiations and, if successful, modifying the prevailing norm, and implementing and experimenting with the modified norm. This form of democratic negotiation, at least in its more public and official instances, has received the lion’s share of attention by researchers of deliberative and agonistic democracy. The second form of democratic negotiation occurs where diverse members share the same norm of integration yet act differently in accord with it. They interpret and practice norm-following in a variety of different ways, yet all can be seen, from their diverse cultural, national, civilizational or creative perspectives, to be acting in accord with the norms of integration they share with others. We might call this diversity of practices within a field of shared rules diversity of ‘ethical substance’ or ‘democratic ethos’”. (Tully, vol2, 228-230).

viii “Survival employment” is, jobs that support basic livelihood needs for oneself and one’s family rather than jobs that utilize one’s educational and skill level”(Chung et al. 2011, 4).

ix They find that “applicants with English names about 45 percent more likely to receive a callback from an application than resumes with Chinese or Indian names” (Oerapoulos et al. 2011, 7-43).

x “English accent marks the speaker as either local or extra-local, and thus Canadian or immigrant. In the Canadian imaginary, as we have seen, these are constituted as mutually exclusive entities” (Creese and Kambere 2003, 10).

xi Other case studies that suggest a positive linkage include Sarah Wayland’s (2007) analysis of the Tamil diaspora’s strong support of the liberation movement against the Sri Lankan government; it was built on networks that served information exchange and fund-raising purposes and as well reached out to the Canadian mainstream and the state, most often through public demonstrations and lobbying. Of course, the massive and energetic rallies by the Tamils in the
spring of 2009 to urge action by the Canadian state to help stave off the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers provided powerful visuals of the connection between Canadian and homeland politics” (Black 2011, 1172).

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