No Justice, No Peace: Cognitive Dissonance In Foreign Policy

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Introduction

I attempt in this paper to understand some of the reasons political outcomes often seem unfulfilling to those who sought them. For example, ousting the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe went quickly among pro-democracy crowds, but actual democratic institutions have proven uneven and unsteady there. For while the people knew they no longer wanted communist-style oppression, they have been less clear about what they do want. Often the people may think they desire what change brings only to find that what they get is not what they wanted. Sometimes this is because they themselves are unsure what they want; sometimes it because the people is actually a complex of competing interests. In the pages the follow, I offer a simple encapsulation of this phenomenon, and then flesh it out in more detail.

I start with the basic premise that what people want from their political outcomes is predictability, fairness, order, and stability. (In other writing, I call these desires conservative.) A more compact term for such goals might be security, or, when writ larger, national security, which includes the interests of both a people and their state. Governments act, or should act, to promote the national security interests of the people. Naturally, leaders and their political opponents will have different opinions about what those policies should be, and they disagree often about the very nature of security. In other words, we can say that there are substantial disagreements about what constitutes the national interest. This murky concept can be defined as what is good for the state or for the people. More broadly, it is a term meant to encompass what the people need or want, or what leaders think they want. Perhaps there is no national interest, only competing views about what the people want at any one time.

These kinds of disagreements — over what is in the country’s best interest — extend from policy elites down to the masses they govern. While there may be consensus on some
general values, there is often no broad agreement on how to rank those values, let alone what policies would be proper to fulfill value desires on which people disagree.

So it may not be possible to know what a people wants even if individuals think they do. It is difficult, therefore, to come up with policies that truly reflect the national interest — because there may not be any such thing, and because even if there is, it is hard to know what it is. Apart from the people, it is also the case that individual persons may not be fully aware of they want, or may be lying to themselves.\(^1\) In other words, people often do not know what they want; they only think they know.

However, it is the job of leaders to decide what the national interest is, and the best way to achieve it. They may assume that they know what it is and which policies are best, and to accomplish their goals, they try to convince others that their policy choices are correct.

The process of policy formation thus includes attempts to convince others to go in a particular direction: the electorate in a democracy, a faction or network in other types of government. Because that path may not have a solid consensus behind it — and there may be no way of getting a consensus if people are themselves unsure or incorrect about what they want — the policy is an incomplete representation of national purpose, an inaccurate expression of popular (or factional) will.

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There may be an actual policy or set of policies that would give the people what they want. However, because if it is not knowable, then attempts to achieve it will lead to policies that are incomplete or downright wrong.

Similarly, in our responses to others (people and peoples), we act based on what they say. Of course, there are well-known perception biases that suggest we hear what they say through our own filters, and do not recognize that we do the same. But more to the point, they, too, may be wrong about how they perceive their own interests. As a result, our response to their statements may be technically correct in what it addresses but ultimately unsatisfying to both sides in what it accomplishes. They suffer from the same malady: what we say may not be what we want. And that means that even when they get everything they are asking for, it will not be enough.

Some People are not Satisfied When They Get What They Want

Thus I propose a simple rule of political outcomes: Some people are not satisfied when they get what they want. To some, this may imply a kind of cognitive dissonance, the term used to describe believing two contradictory ideas simultaneously — and seeing nothing wrong with it. In fact, it makes perfect sense. The ideas are contradictory because just as someone’s declared aspirations are not really what they want, so, too, are the beliefs they hold probably not really what they value.

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History

There are, to be sure, cases where statements are outright falsehoods, or, at the very least, misrepresent a state’s true interests. Hitler’s Germany expressed *irredentism*: a desire to reclaim territory perceived as rightfully part of the homeland but located in another state. After World War I, ethnic German regions that had been part of the German-dominated Austrian empire found themselves living in Czechoslovakia following World War I. Those areas, which Germans called the *Sudetenland*, were the subject of 1938 negotiations among the European powers (but nobody from Czechoslovakia) in which they acceded to Germany’s demand that Berlin should take control of the territories, and occupy them militarily. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain came away from the talks with Hitler certain that he had achieved what everybody wanted: “peace for our time.”³ However, it became clear that Germany was not seeking peace and Hitler’s ambition did not end with the *Sudetenland*.⁴ A few months later, Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. It is not likely that Hitler actually thought he would be satisfied after being given the Sudetenland, and seizing the rest of the country. More probable is that his statements to the English and French were outright lies. The case is a reminder, though, that direct statements of political goals are not always what they seem, giving some people what they say they want may not address the real issue. German aggrandizement was not undertaken for peaceful motives, but in search of Hitler’s conception of justice for German aims.

That direct statements are not always to be taken as permanently “true” is also a feature of democracies, especially systems with stark political divisions. The replacement of one party in

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³ The text of the Munich Agreement is online through Yale University, The Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp
⁴ Hitler’s ultimate goals for Germany are examined well by Milan Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 13, No 1 (Jan. 1978), 15-32.
power by another can result in a dramatic swing in policy. And because elected officials must answer to their constituencies, fluctuations in public opinion can influence political views. As the United States went to war with Spain in 1898 over Cuba, Congress added an amendment to the war resolution promising to “leave the government and control of the island to its people.” After the war, however, members seemed to change their minds and added various terms that guaranteed US dominion. Whereas the war had been fought with the explicit guarantee of Cuban independence, once the United States had achieved what it wanted, Washington’s view of what it wanted changed. In the interim, American politics shifted from the anti-imperialist camp to the pro-expansionist sentiment represented by Theodore Roosevelt. The United States was not hypocritical; its shift in policy preference was a consequence of the democratic process. Similarly, in the 1990s, the United States got exactly what it wanted — a halt to North Korea’s uranium enrichment in exchange for oil — but did not completely uphold its side of the deal because of Congressional opposition. It is, then, problematic to speak of what Americans want in their foreign policy over the long term, unless there is a period of unprecedented consensus, as in the first decades of the Cold War. It seemed, though, that with a Cuba liberated from Spanish control, Americans were not satisfied even though they got exactly what they wanted.

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6 This was the Platt Amendment to an Army appropriation measure that passed in 1901. For an early analysis, see Cosme de la Torriente, “The Platt Amendment, “ Foreign Affairs, Vol 8, No 3 (Apr 1930), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/69057/cosme-de-la-torriente/the-platt-amendment.
But this simple rule means more than just a failure to keep promises made under false pretenses. It reflects the fact that those pretenses, even when they are false, may not be recognized as such. It indicates a departure from the state goals, or dissatisfaction or disillusionment with them, once they have been achieved. Even so, the rule serves as a warning to negotiators to beware the stated objectives — even of one’s own side.

So whereas leaders often say they want peace—and may actually think they do—they often pursue security policies that lead to war. In reality, sometimes what they seek is vengeance, retribution or reparation. In some cases, they may seek to inflict a level of harm on a (former) adversary commensurate with their own perceived experience of tragedy or injustice. This creates a first corollary to the rule: Some people don’t want peace; they want justice.

Negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians to resolve issues between them is usually referred to, in the United States at least, as the peace process. Occasionally, talks do center on ending a specific instance of combat, like the 2014 missile strikes and resulting intervention into Gaza. However, neither side is content with a mere cessation of violence, and the stoppage of violence in Gaza was a truce, not a resolution, and a fragile truce at that. Israel wants an end to the pursuit of its overthrow and guarantees of its security; Palestinians want a return of (all) their land, which would mean the destruction of the Jewish state. Those goals are fundamentally irreconcilable. The peace process consists of attempts to get both sides to compromise on their

10 For example, Geoff Dyer, “John Kerry Tries to Negotiate Gaza Ceasefire with Israel,” Financial Times, July 25, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb5ee64e-1416-11e4-9acb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Nsm2SLEF. Kerry’s attempt was futile and the conflict continued until a truce was finally reached weeks later.
conceptions of justice. Some Palestinians may be willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and some Israelis may allow for an equal Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{12} However, few of either want a simple peace.\textsuperscript{13} They want what they deem fair for their side.

Most ethnic rivalries—of which there are many—display the same ideas. The sides involved may say they want peace but their actions often reveal otherwise. Genocide, cleansing, and segregation occur more frequently than the world would admit. If they do have a desire for peace, it is only a peace based on the elimination of a whole group. Like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, attempts to bring peace to ethnic conflict are short sighted. Even if some sort of calm can be established, and if it is what the two groups, particularly the dominant group, think they want, peace is unlikely to last. They will not be satisfied because it is not what they want.

In South Sudan, the United Nations has tried to broker a lasting settlement in the tribal-based conflict between the government and opposition forces, but various past agreements could not be maintained. The trigger, or excuse, for violence may be a political rivalry, but ethnic tension between supporters of the two sides and the resulting accusations of atrocities have made


\textsuperscript{13} Hamas, the more violent Palestinian political group, champions the anti-Israeli cause in the name of the Palestinian people. According to US negotiator Dennis Ross, however, Hamas’s leaders “have never been concerned” about the condition of the Palestinians: “For them, Palestinians’ pain and suffering are tools to exploit, not conditions to end.” Dennis Ross, “Hamas Could Have Chosen Peace. Instead, it Made Gaza Suffer,” \textit{The Washington Post}, August 8, 2014. For that reason, Hamas and others are not truly interested in making Palestine better, only in attacking Israel. On the other hand, the idea that Israeli leaders are interested in peace above other interests is challenged by the policy of approving the construction of new settlements in disputed territory. One Israeli politician noted “This kind of decision distances us from any chance of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians.” Quoted in “Israel Approves 380 New East Jerusalem Settler Homes,” \textit{AFP}, December 24, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/israel-approves-380-east-jerusalem-settler-homes-142759939.html.
peace difficult to achieve. Where there is hate, there can be no peace. So while negotiators insist they want to end the fighting, and maybe they do, what each side really wants is justice from the other.

Similarly, in Ukraine, a peace deal forged between the government in Kyiv and separatists in the East—ostensibly with the blessing of Russian President Vladimir Putin—failed not long after it was signed. Neither side, it seems, ever intended to keep to it but instead each has sought to achieve its goals, not peace.

The United States is also not immune to this phenomenon. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, American forces entered Afghanistan to punish the Taliban regime there for its support of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. The emotional nature of the mission and the responsibility for securing the new government kept US troops in place long after the Taliban had been overthrown. At various times over the years, rumors emerged of peace offers, but Americans generally opposed such talk: Any peace that did not involve the total destruction of the enemy seemed like a waste of the human sacrifices and financial cost the war had incurred. The American sense of justice prohibited any accommodation with those whose ideology had supported the terrorist act and killed Americans on the battlefield for more than a decade. Americans take seriously their protest chant, “No justice, no peace.” When the last US forces

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15 Indicative is this quotation from two policy analysts: “Washington’s attempts to forge a peace agreement with the Taliban are likely to fail because there is no way to peacefully reconcile the movement's brutal and barbaric vision with any hope for a modern and moderate Afghanistan.” Patrick Christy and Evan Moore, “Talking with the Taliban?” US News & World Report, July 2, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/07/02/obama-wrong-to-negotiate-with-taliban-in-afghanistan; and Hillary Clinton noted that “opening the door to negotiations with the Taliban would be hard to swallow for many Americans after so many years of war.” Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 163.
leave, it will be because the desire for peace stemmed from a country grown weary of a war without end. ¹⁶ And yet, despite their war weariness, an overwhelming majority of Americans would support sending US troops to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, should diplomacy fail.¹⁷ Americans may want peace, but they want something else, too.

Other types of agreements are also a façade. They buy time for one side or the other to build or rearm, or as a platform.¹⁸ In so many instances, then, when people get the peace they want they are not satisfied. What they really wanted was something else, whether they knew it or not. When some people say they want peace, in fact they want justice.

The Limitations of Policy and its Instruments

A second corollary arises: *Justice is difficult to negotiate.* The obvious reason is that justice is abstract and subjective; it is an emotional concept that cannot always be achieved through the concrete process of intellectual compromise. This is all the more true when the conception of justice being sought is in the form of revenge for some past wrong. The deeper in history that wrong occurred, the less the present can make up for it. Moreover, it may be impossible to


¹⁸ The Soviet Union, especially in its early years, engaged in “demonstrative diplomacy”: the use of the diplomatic instrument “not to promote freely accepted and mutually profitable agreement as between governments, but rather to embarrass other governments and to stir up opposition among their own people.” George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1921, Volume I: Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 75-76.
redress some past responsibility because actors in the present may not even agree on the actions and period they are arguing about. History has no beginning, and, therefore, for some, retribution has no end.

In some cases, once a conflict is over, it has been possible to establish truth and reconciliation commissions. In South Africa, after the fall of the apartheid regime, or in post-conflict Liberia, efforts were made to establish justice rather than sanction revenge. In cases such as these, an enemy has been defeated, and the population is weary and ready for tranquility. In South Africa, this was accomplished by mostly ignoring the human rights abuses of the apartheid regime. By contrast, in Rwanda, a concerted effort at healing the wounds of genocide led to forgiveness for some perpetrators by some of the victims of the horrendous genocide of the 1990s. After genocide, some people do want peace, although that may be all they accomplish.

Others, though, want reparations or an adjudicated (legal) punishment. After World War II, for example, the trials in Nuremberg were a kind of truth commission that established the culpability of certain Nazi actors. The Allied powers got exactly what they set out to accomplish: Many of the major defendants were convicted of war crimes and some were sentenced to death. However, even after firmly establishing guilt, those verdicts were insufficient for some. The Soviet Union exacted heavy punishment, either in the form of “military trophies” or reparations (compensation for the wrongs of the war) from its sector of Germany, in some cases forcing

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20 Noted international legal scholar Quincy Wright, who was there for portions of the trials, observed that they “gave publicity to thousands of documents discovered by the prosecution and over 17,000 pages of oral evidence and argument of great historic and educational value in establishing the activities of the Nazis and the origins of the war.” Quincy Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol 41, No 1 (Jan 1947), 42. Much of that material was made public by the United States in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vols I-VIII, Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1946), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_Nazi-conspiracy.html.

21 The Soviet representative at Nuremberg, for example, complained that not enough defendants received the death sentence. Quincy Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol 41, No 1 (Jan 1947), 43.
people to work under conditions of “quasi-slave labor,” in others dismantling factories brick by brick and rebuilding them in the USSR.\textsuperscript{22} French authorities mistreated their German prisoners so badly that American Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, representing the United States, accused them of violating the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{23} A sense of justice cannot be negotiated because it cannot be written down: it is a feeling, a standard that can only be met through a legal process when the system exacts the highest punishment possible.

Even so, these processes occur after some conflict has ended, when the desire for justice has already been either achieved or outlasted and people may really want peace. Until that point, and sometimes afterward, justice remains something to be seized by wrapping your hands around someone’s throat. They may declare and actually think that they want peace, but what they really want is vengeance.

For those reasons, when peace is negotiated among actors who really want something else, it will not last. Too many things had to be swept under in order to arrive at an agreement. I have already mentioned some examples of peace agreements that did not last (in South Sudan and Ukraine) but there are many more.

I should also point out that there many examples of peace agreements that have lasted, where people really were satisfied when they got what they wanted. A US-sponsored arrangement between Israel and Egypt, for example, has mostly kept the peace between them since 1978.\textsuperscript{24} Of course, this was a partial measure to address instability in the region that has

\textsuperscript{22} Peter Nettl, “German Reparations in the Soviet Empire,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} (January 1951), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70871/peter-nettl/german-reparations-in-the-soviet-empire. Nettl reports: “From the narrow economic angle Soviet reparations have been a great success for the USSR. They have been an essential part of the Soviet plan for domestic reconstruction ....”

\textsuperscript{23} Jackson is quoted in Robert E. Conot, \textit{Justice at Nuremberg} (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1984), 68.

been made to last (I will say more about temporary solutions below). It also resulted three years later in the assassination of Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat, who negotiated the agreement, by those who wanted justice against Israel, not peace. Fourteen years later, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated after agreeing to Palestinian autonomy in the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. In South Africa, the transition from white dominance to majority rule led to the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the call for reparations (which were not really paid out). Basically, all this meant was that the crimes of the past apartheid regime were ignored in order to concentrate on building a common future. To the extent that race relations have shown some overall improvement, this was a successful strategy. However, racism has not gone away merely because the laws of changed: Only around half of white youths, for example, think that “national unity across historical divides” is desirable, and 20 percent of the population overall would disapprove of “taking instructions from someone of another race.” And, as time passes, many there are minimizing the extreme nature of apartheid even when they think reconciliation is possible.

I conclude from all this that while some people are satisfied when they get what they want, others are not, and it is not because they do not want it. Moreover, the consequences of such a split can be deadly. In order for Arabs and Israelis to negotiate a peace agreement, the opposition was ignored. Two leaders paid for such choices with their lives, but the political
consequences ran deeper: No significant progress has been made toward achieving a lasting resolution of Middle East issues.\textsuperscript{27} In fact, opposition to the basic premises of both Camp David and Oslo has hardened, and the interim measures and temporary procedures they established were never replaced by the permanent peace the agreements envisioned.

Opposition to any agreement is not the only issue ignored when peace is negotiated. In fact, smaller problems are often put on hold in order to arrive at a consensus that many do not want. Once they have done that, there is a sense that other issues either can wait or need not be addressed. The hard work is done: There is peace. For that reason, when a temporary solution can be found that is even somewhat acceptable, it is seized on and locked in. And this is the third corollary to our rule: \textit{Temporary solutions tend to become permanent}.\textsuperscript{28} For those who do want peace, they work — but work, as opposed to real resolutions, may be all they accomplish.

Troubled circumstances continue, and sometimes worse, long after it was thought they would abate. Sometimes people become invested in the provisional fix, and profit from their stake.\textsuperscript{29}


\textsuperscript{29} In 1995, for example, the peace negotiated among factions fighting in Bosnia stopped the violence, but it also “sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state's authority” and led to an increase in “ethnic nationalist rhetoric.” Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, “The Death of Dayton,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Sep/Oct 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65352/patrice-c-mcmahon-and-jon-
Another reason people grasp the temporary fixes is the penchant for *satisficing*. When competing desires are emotional and mutually exclusive, it unrealistic to expect adversaries to sort rationally through all available options, and mutually agree to the best possibility for all concerned (*optimizing*). Instead, when people really do want peace but cannot let go of their other aspirations, they accept the first proposal that meets the bare minimum for acceptability. And then, because they are committed to it, they have to make it stick.

Thus the Korean War never officially ended. The problems that led to fighting emerged at the end of the Second World War as the Cold War superpowers sponsored two competing Korean states, each claiming sole legitimacy on the peninsula. The Soviet-backed state in the north invaded the US-backed south in 1950, and a truce was negotiated in 1953, after three years of combat. It was only designed to stop the fighting, to last until the sides could negotiate a definitive peace treaty. However, that final settlement never emerged. How could it, when the real issue was the existence of the two states themselves? The dividing line and demilitarized zone that the cease-fire put in place have become permanent. Over the years, the truce has been violated numerous times and threatened many more, but it has survived—if only because of the presence of US troops, millions of landmines, and most importantly, the desire to avoid another

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30 The Korean armistice was signed July 27, 1953. However, it was only supposed to stop fighting long enough for a true peace to be negotiated. According to Gen. Mark Clark, the United Nations commanding officer, “The conflict will not be over until the Governments concerned have reached a firm political settlement.” Quoted in Lindesay Parrott, “Truce is Signed, Ending the Fighting in Korea; POW Exchange Near; Rhee Gets US Pledge; Eisenhower Bids Free World Stay Vigilant,” *The New York Times*, July 27, 1953, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0727.html.
war.\textsuperscript{31} It is perceived as working, even if it has not resolved any underlying issues, and therefore became permanent.

The temporary solution of the Korean armistice has lasted more than 50 years. Some of the other temporary solutions that have become more or less permanent involve the stationing of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones. A United Nations “Disengagement Force” has been stationed in the Golan Heights since 1974 to maintain a ceasefire between Syria and Israel, its mandate renewed every six months. Since 1964, a UN peacekeeping mission has been operative in Cyprus, to prevent fighting between island Greeks and Turks. And the mission in Lebanon has not only been active since 1978, it has even seen its mandate expanded.\textsuperscript{32} All of these continue to be necessary because the sides cannot find a political solution to the tension. In other words, tension exists despite the absence of actual fighting. If peace were the ultimate goal, there would be no further need of UN forces. Instead, aware that some people do not want peace (or not only peace), those who do latch on to the temporary fix and make it last.

These examples also point to another observation about temporary solutions. When a formula is found for a difficult situation, it can work so well that it creates its own rationale, and becomes entrenched, outlasting the situation that caused its creation. NATO was constructed as a way to ensure a continued US presence in Europe following World War II to confront a perceived Russian threat. After the Cold War, when Russia was no longer seen as a threat, NATO was not disbanded, but, in fact, expanded. Some in the West thought Russia would not disappear as a security rival, while others saw a continuing value in the collective security regime apart from anything Moscow might undertake. However, NATO’s enlargement appeared


\textsuperscript{32} Information on UN peacekeeping operations can be found on the UN website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/.
threatening to Russia, which responded with actions to bolster its own security. This was an odd security dilemma, a situation in which defensive moves look threatening to a rival, prompting further moves that look even more threatening. Such a setting has the potential to lead to war.

In short, NATO leaders got exactly what they wanted: the collapse of the USSR and the elimination of Russia’s threat to Europe. But by the time it happened, they wanted something else, and expanded the organization. Years later, when relations with Russia turned sour over Georgia and Ukraine, some NATO backers said I told you so, without seeing how telling us so had contributed to the very problem they were warning about.

Other Applications

Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina begins with the famous line “All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Similarly, the people who are unhappy when they get what they want may have various different reasons.

Anna Karenina was published during a time of populist movements in Russia dedicated to empowering the lower classes. One group succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II. This seemed ironic because Alexander was known as the Tsar Liberator. He had instituted sweeping reforms that led to abolition of serfdom, as well as dramatic societal and political changes. His regime had taken the first steps toward making the lives of ordinary people better.

That, of course, was not what the revolutionaries really wanted; they wanted not piecemeal changes and revisions that might one day lead to something good, but the absolute elimination of tsarism and the complete metamorphosis of Russian society. Reform is the enemy

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of revolution because it maintains the existing structure. But what if careful and gradual reform is a sound way to accomplish the ultimate purpose (making lives better)? Alexander’s reforms were not the end, but could be considered a beginning. However, when he was murdered, his son became tsar, and as Alexander III, he reversed many of the more liberal policies of his father.\textsuperscript{35} The revolutionaries, then, got what they really wanted: a repressive regime that worsened the lives of its people, thus proving their point.\textsuperscript{36} If the people are downtrodden enough, they will rebel. Very few revolutionaries actually said this, however.\textsuperscript{37} Most continued to say they wanted to improve the lives of the people, and some obviously did.\textsuperscript{38} 

So the assassination of the tsar was what they wanted, but some were not happy because it led to even worse conditions. Others were not satisfied because the system still existed. And then there were those whose individual character predisposed them to violence, whatever its manifestation. For them, nothing is enough.\textsuperscript{39} 

Even better-intentioned people can be impossible to satisfy. As an example, efforts at securing the United States and its citizens after September 11, 2001, have been virtually limitless.

\textsuperscript{35} Alexander III was not without opposition in reversing the reforms. See Heide W. Whelan, \textit{Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform in Late Imperial Russia} (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982).

\textsuperscript{36} Contrary to popular belief, the revolutionary movements continued under the intensified repression of Alexander III, adapting and evolving. See Norman M. Naimark, \textit{Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

\textsuperscript{37} One who did was Sergei Nechayev, whose life is chronicled in Philip Pomper, \textit{Sergei Nechaev} (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1979).


\textsuperscript{39} For example, the jihadist gunman in a February 2015 attack in Denmark was gang member with a violent past. Ralph Ellis, Holly Yan, and Susanne Gargiulo, “Denmark Terror Suspect Swore Fidelity to ISIS Leader on Facebook Page,” \textit{CNN}, February 17, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/16/europe/denmark-shootings/index.html. The literature on the psychological motivations of terrorists is summarized in Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” \textit{American Psychologist}, Vol 60, No 2 (2005), 161-169; Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution}, Vol 49, No 1 (Feb 2005), 3-42; Tori DeAngelis, “Understanding Terrorism,” \textit{Monitor on Psychology}, Vol 40, No 10 (November 2009), http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx. According to these authors, there is little evidence, by the methods of contemporary psychology, supporting the idea that terrorists are deranged. I would argue, by contrast, that the terrorist act itself is the evidence. This, of course, implies a judgment about the morality of terrorism, and the type of person who would commit this sort of immoral act.
Governments at all levels have spent billions of dollars, created new agencies, and enacted countless policies to deal with the terrorist threat. However, even when these policies are successful in their immediate goals (securing a facility, searching passengers, reading e-mails), they are not going to satisfy those who propose them. First, the policies tend to generate the very fear they are supposed to address. The mere existence of such policies reminds people just how insecure they are — if there were no danger, extreme security measures would not exist. They exist, so there is danger, and people continue to live in fear. The more policies, the more fear. The more fear, the more policies.

Second, there is no way to know whether security measures are actually successful. With certain specific exceptions, we do not know what, out of everything we do, is actually working to prevent attack. Therefore, the tendency is to pile on, err on the side of caution: more heavy equipment for local police, more cameras on street corners, more intrusive airport screenings, and so on.41

Third, even if security policies mitigate the risk of attack at home, they do not address the underlying roots of the threat. They deal only with consequences, not causes. Security policies take aim at perpetrators of terrorist crimes instead of the foundation of the system that produces and sustains them. So, no matter what we do to be safe, the threat goes on, if unaddressed elsewhere. It is right to stop terrorists; but for every terrorist stopped, we have no idea how many more are rising up to take his place.

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For these reasons, security policies have no natural limit. They generate more fear because, paradoxically, rather than reassuring people, each new policy reminds them how insecure they are, which leads to more measures. We might call this an *internal security dilemma*: actions designed to increase safety tend to have the opposite effect, at least on the public mood. And once in place, these measures, like NATO, can become entrenched and used for other purposes. We do not know what is actually working, so we continue to be afraid no matter how excessive the policies, because they do not address the underlying situation. Therefore, it is precisely because security advocates get what they want that they will continue to want more.

It may be that people do not know what they want, only what they don’t want. So when mass revolts rocked the Middle East, in what was (unfortunately) named the Arab Spring, the overthrow of dictatorships was taken as a sign of the desire for freedom. In Egypt, however, the almost immediate rise to power of Muslim fundamentalists indicated that the liberty many had desired was only a freedom to practice an extreme form of Islam, including the butchering of those who dissented. They all had wanted Hosni Mubarak deposed; but there were factions competing to establish the new order, and the competition came to a bad end. The eventual winner, abolishing the short-lived fundamentalist government, was a military regime not unlike the one the people had abolished. As I pointed out earlier, the United States may seem

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42 I am indebted to Brian Barton for suggesting the link between domestic insecurity and the classic security dilemma. Taken further, an international security dilemma creates instability because it increases the possibility for accident, miscalculation, and misperception, and thus makes war ever more likely. The analogy to the domestic situation contains no war, but I would suggest there may be some sort of connection to increasing violations of civil rights and liberties, which I would characterize as miscalculations based on the insecurity generated by efforts to be secure (perhaps a war on the people).


schizophrenic because it gets exactly what it wants and then, when an election intervenes, it wants sometimes else; in Egypt, the different ideologies competed in a more differentiated and violent framework, but the result was similar. Egyptians were not satisfied when they got the fall of Mubarak because the differences among them were too stark, and because the thaw-like loosening of society that they had championed was not what some people wanted.  

So, for a variety of reasons, some people are still deeply unhappy when they get what they want. Still another factor in their disappointment is the focus on the process of getting it. Whether negotiations or war, the instruments of policy often determine what can be achieved. Generals and strategists know that combat destroys as much as it seizes. Similarly, diplomacy can only accomplish what can be negotiated: an agreement.

There is, then, a tendency on the part of those who wield the tools to focus on what they think they can achieve. It may strike them as the best that can be hoped for, or as something really worthwhile and they may buy into its value. But it may not be what the people or their leaders really desire, and, thus, once accomplished, may be unsatisfying, no matter how much effort it expended in trying to get it. Negotiations are the method of choice for those who want peace (and those who only say they do), but talking cannot accomplish some goals, particularly those held by people who do not want peace. They may be pressured to talk, forced to by powerful actors who value peaceful dialogue; such talking is doomed to failure. For this reason,

46 The utility of warfare to accomplish political objectives was best covered in the classic by Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process,” for example, is doomed as long as the true goals of either side cannot be accomplished through negotiation — and as long as there are actors on either side who do not want peace.

However, for those who are sincere about trying to accomplish something, maybe anything, through peaceful means, the ultimate goal becomes what they think they can attain through the preferred mechanism. And the more a goal seems possible, the stronger the determination to achieve it. What’s more, once the goal has been accomplished, even if it is insufficient (i.e., not really want is wanted or needed), it becomes necessary to sustain it at all costs.

Therefore, we have a fourth corollary to the rule: What’s possible becomes necessary. Just as temporary solutions tend to become permanent, anything that is possible is perceived as desirable. If it can be accomplished, it must be accomplished. The old adage “if your only tool is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail” describes a similar problem: the outcome is often determined by the choice of instrument.

Take the concept of peacekeeping. Once it was shown that the United Nations could send in observers, monitors that would serve as a temporary workaround to a complex problem, not only did such missions end up lasting much longer than anticipated, but the idea caught on. The idea has been used dozens of times. Sometimes the missions are successful in keeping the peace long enough for a longer-term solution to emerge; but other times the two sides cannot even agree on the mandate of a UN taskforce. This is particularly true of the UN mission in Jammu and Kashmir, observing a truce between India and Pakistan.\(^\text{47}\) And yet that operation continues.

Some people, then, do not or cannot know what they want, or perhaps they cannot express it because it has no name, no format, no structure. Therefore, they adhere to the structures they have, grab what is possible, even if it does not fit, whether they know it fits or not. It becomes possible, and, therefore, necessary.

Conclusion

The danger inherent in such thinking is actually the lack of thinking. Policymakers get locked into a narrow range of options because they see only what is possible, and this becomes necessary to achieve. If it is accomplished, it may not be what they really wanted. It may be what they say they wanted, or what they think they wanted, but what they want may nebulous, or hidden, or secretive, or based only what is possible given the instrument of choice. Whatever possibilities exist, one of those things has to become real. This is true even if it does not actually solve the problem at hand.

There can be, then, a lack of creative thinking as people get locked into their patterns. Things get stuck. Conflicts freeze. Ironically, though, in such situations, sometimes unexpected breakthroughs can occur: After all, Richard Nixon, the extreme anti-communist, created détente with the USSR and rapprochement with China. It may not be true that “only Nixon could go to China,” but he did go. And it was his reputation as a solid anti-communist that prevented any derogatory talk of weakness or compromise. When Ronald Reagan similarly proposed an agreement with the USSR to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons, the strength of his anti-Soviet reputation imbued the idea with necessity. By that logic, only Benjamin Netanyahu (or the like) can foster peace for Israel. However, breaking out of rigid thinking and processes takes creativity, and often leadership, and the courage to go into the unknown, to take a chance.
Netanyahu may have the credibility but lack the skills. And very often policymakers do not or cannot anticipate the consequences of their actions. It may be that fear of the unknown that keeps them locked into solutions that solve nothing, another reason they are dissatisfied with getting exactly what they want.