

**“Who Will Tell the Story?: Terrorism’s Relationship with
the Global Media”**

Kate Eugenis

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
March 14, 2013

Introduction

Nearly every day Americans, and others around the globe, read news articles about the destruction and horror committed by groups fighting against the status quo. While random acts of violence have a direct and immediate impact on those affected, their influence cannot spread beyond the vicinity of the attack without the assistance of news media reporting on the event. Without the news media, those fighting using asymmetrical warfare cannot communicate their messages to the central government or the greater population. If the goal of terrorism is to spread widespread fear and uncertainty (as the public has no knowledge of when or where the next attack will occur) then terrorists need the media to report on their activities to the general public. The terrorist organization remains salient to both the people it claims to represent and to those who live in fear only so long as the news media continues to broadcast the terrorist attacks to the public. However, as soon as the media loses interest and ceases reporting on the topic, the organization loses its ability to communicate to its intended audience – whether that be the global population, those the group claims to be fighting for, the government, or the international leaders who might become involved. When random acts of violence no longer attract the attention of the media, terrorist groups are without a way to communication to the mass public, leaving them no choice but to find either another way to obtain that necessary media attention or to search for other, perhaps legitimate, tactics in order to enact change.

Fortunately for terrorists, there is a propensity for traditional media to focus on the violent events that happen around the world. The journalistic motto, ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ has done much to inform the public of the conflict, terrorism, and other violence that occurs both close to home and in distant countries – even to the skewing of public perceptions regarding

global rates of these attacks¹. However, the mass media has a short attention span and what is prominent and newsworthy one day is often irrelevant the next. In the case of global terrorism, it is one thing to attract the attention of the global news media; it is an altogether different thing to keep that attention for any length of time. Therefore notwithstanding the media's propensity to publish stories about violence and death, should other global happenings take precedence over a terrorist attack in a country that has limited strategic importance to the great powers, the news media would be less inclined to devote large amounts of space to the terrorist group's issue -- regardless of the size of the attack or the number of casualties.

This paper seeks to establish a relationship between the number of articles written regarding a particular terrorist organization and the number of subsequent attacks the organization commits. In this case, the independent variable is the number of news articles that mention a terrorist organization, while the dependent variable is represented by the actions of the terrorist groups, as measured by a change in the number of terrorist attacks that the organizations engage in against their respective targets. If the terrorist group experiences a significant decline in media coverage, followed by a decline in terrorist attacks, which is then proceeded by an observable change in the tactic of the group then the theory holds that, while it may not be the only contributing factor, a lack of media coverage plays a role in the declining influence of a terrorist group.

Conflict Studies

Although there have been many studies on the topic of terrorism spanning the motivations, psychological makeup of the individuals, methods, and differences among and

¹ This is known as Cultivation Theory in which people who are exposed to more media violence in the form of television or print news believe that the rates of global violence and crime are higher than they are in actuality (Shanahan and Morgan 1999; Ridout et al 2008).

between groups, there is still yet to be a consensus in the academic or policy communities as to what constitutes a terrorist organization (Conteh-Morgan 2004; Crenshaw 1987; Gibbs 2012; Jenkins 1975; Rapoport 2012). The old adage, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ highlights the largest debate regarding who is classified as a terrorist. The obstacles in defining the term ‘terrorism’ are well documented. According to Jackson (2008) it is a political science cliché to note that at one count there were more than 200 separate and distinct definitions of the term – all of them lacking, none of them universally applied. However, this cliché illustrates one of the largest difficulties in studying the terrorism phenomenon. The term poses a problem for policy makers and academics alike because slightly different wording of the definition can change the database of terrorist attacks. Without an accepted definition of terrorism, is the term useful in studying the phenomenon? Can one compare studies that employ different definitions and, therefore, different universes of case studies?

Scholars have largely accepted that a universal definition of the term is not forthcoming and that devoting more paper and ink to debating the topic does not advance knowledge that will be useful in studying the phenomenon (Badey 1998; Ganor 2002; Gupta 2008; Schmid 2004 B). In keeping with that tradition, this paper defines terrorism as a campaign of asymmetric warfare in which violence is utilized in order to both create an atmosphere of widespread fear and uncertainty and push for a political goal. This definition is loosely based on the work of Jenkins (2003)². While his original definition was broad in order to encompass as many forms of political violence as possible, this paper utilizes a more narrow definition in which terrorism must be part of a campaign and be a form of asymmetrical warfare (Jenkins 2003).

² Jenkins’ definition reads: “Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm – in a word, to terrorize – and thereby bring about some social or political change” (Jenkins 2003, 16).

According to some scholars, terrorists participate in violent acts for the sole purpose of gaining media attention as a way of communicating with audiences that they would otherwise not have access to in order to eventually enact desired changes in society (Jenkins 1975; Juergensmeyer 2003; Laqueur 1978; Nacos 2007). This theory of how terrorism reaches a mass audience is often called ‘Terrorism as Theater’ or ‘Terrorism as Communication’ and scholars in both the fields of political science and communications converge to examine the ways terrorist groups use and manipulate the mass media in order to communicate messages of terror to their intended audience. Terrorists know that, if pressed, their audience will eventually influence powerful decision-makers to take action to stop the attacks, and the group will be able to achieve some of their strategic long-term goals.

It should be understood that terrorist groups have many goals, and gaining the attention of the international mass media, while a goal of the terrorist group, is largely a secondary goal in that it is a stepping stone on the way to achieving the greater aims of the group. The only way to obtain greater equality, autonomy, or international intervention is by first becoming a player on the international stage. Only after using terror to make an impression on the citizens of the globe can the group hope to put enough pressure on either their own government to make redress, or on powerful international actors to intervene. However, utilizing the media is just one of many goals, and media attention is, again, one of many factors that determine the longevity of a terrorist group. This work looks specifically at this relationship, as one of many contributors to terrorists’ motivations, in order to demonstrate that there is a correlation between the amount of media attention a terrorist group receives and the number of attacks they commit.

Terrorism as Theater/Communication

Violent acts have the ability to inspire shock and fear among those who witness them,

which is why many groups with radical objectives use violence as a means of influencing a specific audience. While acts such as bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and hostage situations impact all those directly affected through the death of a loved one as well as any witnesses to the event, they are restricted to a relatively small geographical area. This limitation impedes the ability of the group utilizing terrorist methods to leave a large enough impression on the required amount of people to force a change in the status quo. By the time a group reaches the point where they feel terrorism is the best option for achieving their aims, other, more diplomatic, solutions have generally failed and intervention by a third party is usually required to resolve the differences between the state and those engaged in terrorism. As a weapon of the weak, terrorism is a method used to communicate specifics of a particular situation to the international community and to impress upon decision-makers the potential need for outside intervention. In addition, terrorism also communicates to the domestic audience that the group is willing to utilize whatever means necessary.

In order to overcome geographical limitations, violence must be broadcast to a large group of people who, while not directly impacted, will internalize the threat and respond by demanding action from those in power. Cited by many as the first to use the ‘terrorism as theater’ metaphor in 1975, Jenkins said it most concisely when he stated, “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins 1975, 5). In order to garner the amount of attention needed to force change, or the consideration of the authorities, terrorists must first capture the attention of the news media. Jenkins also asserts that terrorists commit attacks for the international press in order to stimulate international pressure on an issue (Jenkins 1975). However, for terrorists with a political motivation, Laqueur (1978), like Jenkins (1975) and Juergensmeyer (2003), argues that the violent act itself means nothing, but rather it is

the publicity that follows such an act that makes the difference between success and failure for a terrorist group (Laqueur 1978, 62).

One aspect of terrorism that sets it apart from other violent acts (such as hate crimes and war), is that those who engage in these acts are expressly looking for attention from the broader public. Rather than use violence to primarily injure, destroy, or kill, these groups use violence to send a message to people and leaders who are possibly a city, a country, or a continent away. As Bruce Klopfenstein (2006, 107) states, “One cannot divorce communication from terrorism. Without communication of the terrorists' message ... the corresponding impact would be greatly reduced.” Therefore, terrorists need the mass media to spread the news of attacks, and by extension, the message motivating the acts to the greater public, thus making terrorism a form of “performance violence” (Juergensmeyer 2003, 126). Using this theory, the terrorist engages in a performance, one that he or she hopes the mass media will broadcast around the globe.

This sentiment is echoed by other scholars such as Nacos (2007) who not only believes that terrorists need the media but also outlines the four media-centered goals of terrorists. She claims that at the most basic level terrorists want the following: 1) name recognition so that people know to be afraid of this group, 2) an investigation of their motives so that the world knows why the group is choosing to engage in violence, 3) respect and sympathy from their domestic constituents, and 4) a form of quasi-legitimate status in which the media gives the terrorist group equal treatment to legitimate political entities and actors (Nacos 2007, 20). Dowling (1986) takes a similar stance in that he believes that terrorists communicate to different audiences; however, he only differentiates between messages to insiders — those who support the terrorist group, and outsiders — or everyone else. While a terrorist’s primary goal is to support their cause, fight for freedom and autonomy, or to react against an oppressive state

apparatus, they also recognize that the means to accomplish that goal is rooted in attracting the coverage of the news media.

Despite all of the evidence suggesting that terrorists are able to manipulate the mass media into communicating their message to the global public, there are several studies that show the media is not always a willing participant in aiding terrorists in the quest for publicity. Schaffert (1992) claims, despite having the ability to kill mass numbers of people at random and at will, terrorists do not have the ability to transmit images of that destruction to a target population. He states that “it remains for the media to transmit effectively the terror of violence, [...] only that worldwide network can sufficiently penetrate the very large audiences” that are the target for terrorists (Schaffert 1992, 47). With the news media acting as the gatekeeper of information, it has the capacity to distill the message of the terrorist group and present it to the target population in a way that the people will take notice and comprehend.

While theories regarding the relationship between the media and terrorism are widely studied, one of the most ardent skeptics of the terrorism as theater theory is Robert Picard (1986). In his article titled “News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous Charges backed by Dubious Science,” he argues against imposing legal restrictions on the media or encouraging the media to self-censor or adopt voluntary guidelines because the literature on the relationship between the media and terrorism is circumstantial at best. Claiming there has been little in the way of actual scholarship using recognized quantitative or qualitative practices to study this relationship and prove its validity, he states that “what should only be hypotheses about media and terrorism have been accepted as fact” (Picard 1986, 388). While Picard criticizes scholars who accept this theory without testing it, the lack of empirical support does not make this theory completely irrelevant. Instead, scholars should devote time to studying the nuanced relationship

between the media and terrorism in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the two entities (Crelinsten 1989; Stohl 2008; Wittebols 1991).

In order to reach and impact the greatest number of people, committing violent acts alone is not enough, there must be someone to witness these acts, record them, and report the images to the world. One violent act will impact those in the immediate vicinity and the families of the injured and killed, but an act widely broadcast via the media has the potential to impact millions, if not billions, of people who would otherwise have known nothing about the incident. Terrorists know this and they use the media to further accomplish their goals. Due to the fact that the media can and does influence the mass public and policymakers, terrorist groups need exposure in order to put pressure on governments and to incite fear in people. However, while much is known about the media's influence on both their audience and decision-makers, there is little known on the influence that the media has on a terrorist organization (Eke and Alali 1991). In this relationship, it is the members of the news media who have the power, as terrorist organizations need media coverage in order to communicate with the people who can enact real change in their situations. While violence is easy and sensational to report on, the news media is never at a loss for newsworthy events to fill the space and does not need a terrorist attack in order to sell papers.

However, terrorists do need the agenda setting functions of the news media. As previously mentioned, studies show that what receives a lot of time in the press is also perceived as salient, or important, even if the issue is one of little relevance to the interests of the United States or other great powers. If the media begins devoting a lot of time to a particular issue, despite its relative unimportance, people will believe that it is of critical value and will pressure decision-makers to take action intervening in the conflict (Baum 2008; Cook et al 1983; Hawkins

2002; Naveh 2002; Robinson 1999; Soroka 2003). Because the media has this agenda setting function, and terrorists need to go through the channels of the news media in order to better communicate their message to the widest audience possible, the media can have a profound influence on the trajectory of a terrorist group, and on the way that other international actors interact with that group.

Without media attention, the terrorist group is unable to fulfill any of its four objectives:

1) It cannot achieve name or cause recognition among citizens of countries who are located far away, 2) It cannot communicate with supporters 3) It cannot communicate with members of the domestic government, and 4) It cannot portray itself as a legitimate political alternative to the current administration. Through the agenda-setting powers of the international media, if a terrorist has media saliency, it is possible that the general public will push their elected leaders to intervene in the conflict – leading to a possible resolution or improvement in conditions.

However, unless the terrorist group has the ability to communicate and broadcast its message to the greater public, it is largely irrelevant to the international community and powerful decision-makers will have no incentive to push for a resolution of the conflict.

Drawing on these theories, this paper goes one step further and claims that without sustained media attention the public will see a terrorist group as neither salient nor relevant, which will result in the group either changing its tactics to become a legitimate political actor or slowly disappearing and disbanding. Therefore, in order to remain active, terrorist groups are forced to ensure that they maintain sustained media attention by planning large attacks or marked resurgences in violence. Without disputing the evidence that explains how terrorist groups use the media to record and report violent acts to the greater public, this paper evaluates the relationship between terrorist groups and the media as being one where the media attention, or

lack thereof, can have a profound influence on the actions of terrorist groups.

Case Studies

This thesis examines the influence the media has had on two different terrorist organizations. In order, these groups are Hezbollah and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). The case studies chosen for this work were selected because of their differences in geographical location, motivation, time periods active, notoriety, and relevance to the international media. In order for this theory to be valid, it must hold across each of these different variables. The case studies have been separated by whether or not the organization can be classified as religiously motivated or as a secular group. This is due to one aspect of the theory as pointed out by Spencer (2006) who claims that while secular organizations need to use the media for propaganda purposes, religious organizations do not because, after all, God is always watching (Spencer, 2006). This work contends, however, that both types of organizations need the constant attention of the media in order to communicate with the international community and remain relevant to their domestic constituency. In order to gain a better understanding of the ways that the international mass media influences the actions of a terrorist organization, the media attention given to four different terrorist organizations over the lifetime of that group through December 2011 will be studied.

Methods/Hypotheses

Although the theory of terrorism as a form of communication between the terrorist organization and the global audience has been widely cited and used often in both political science and communications studies by noted scholars in each field, there is a lack of scholarly support for the claims. This paper takes the assumptions made by these scholars and tests them using available data regarding the frequency of attacks and the numbers of news articles that

precede and follow each attack. In order to sufficiently test the theory of terrorism as a form of theater, or that terrorists rely on the media coverage of their attacks to raise awareness of their agenda, there must be a demonstrated connection between patterns of media attention and attacks.

This work utilizes a qualitative case study approach as it looks in depth at the coverage given to the four terrorist organizations in this study. In this instance, this methodological approach allows for a more nuanced observation of the decline in coverage that precedes a large terrorist attack. A qualitative case study approach to this research is beneficial in that applying this level of detail to the, sometimes incremental and gradual, changes in coverage that precedes an attack or an increase in the number or lethality of attacks allows for the capture of even the most minuscule changes. This method of study will be supported by the use of descriptive statistics in order to better explain the patterns and trends in the level of media coverage and number of terrorist attacks.

Data for this paper comes from several sources. First, data regarding the timing and frequency of terrorist attacks are provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a dataset built using records from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service, a private security agency. The GTD is compiled and maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and the University of Maryland. This is the most complete dataset regarding global terrorism and it includes the active years for all of the case studies. The largest weakness in using this dataset is that it lacks attack data for 1993³; however, that being said, there are no other available sources that have terrorism data for the necessary time frame.

The news data consists of print articles that can be found online. In this case, that

³ The Global Terrorism Database states: “The original PGIS data, upon which the 1970-1997 GTD data are based, consisted of hard-copy index cards, which were subsequently coded electronically by START researchers. Unfortunately, the set of cards for 1993 was lost prior to PGIS handing the data over to START” (START 2012).

includes articles that originally appeared in a physical print news outlet before being transferred to either an online database or, in the case of articles published in the mid to late 2000s, simultaneously published online. In order to measure the international coverage of a particular terrorist attack, news archives from *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *The Guardian* will be analyzed. These three papers are all excellent representations of international news coverage because they are considered part of the prestige press, written in English, and widely circulated both domestically and internationally with measured circulation exceeding 3.1 million households (not counting internet readers and audiences reached by syndicated articles) (ABC 2012; Guardian 2012; Los Angeles Times 2012; Tal 1995).

In an effort to capture the level of domestic coverage that a terrorist group receives, the archives of *The Jerusalem Post* are analyzed to determine the number of articles devoted to Hamas and Hezbollah on a monthly basis. Domestic coverage is important because terrorists do not use the media to *just* communicate to an international audience. The domestic audience is also important in distributing messages, albeit different ones. A terrorist can use the domestic media in order to communicate to their state leadership, or to communicate messages of solidarity to other oppressed people within the state.

Data for these four newspapers will be aggregated by month, thereby allowing for a comparison between the number of terrorist attacks committed by an organization and the total number of articles written about that same group⁴ with limited time interference. Month-long data increments are a manageable way to show the connection between the number of attacks and articles as the lifespan of an attack in the news media is generally limited to the first 48-72 hours immediately following the event. It is also less cumbersome when working with data that

⁴ Included are all articles written about the group, not just the articles written in conjunction with, or about a terrorist attack.

stretches in excess of twenty years.

The hypotheses tested in this paper are:

Hypothesis 1: As long as news coverage on a particular terrorist group and their issue remains consistent, then attacks will also remain consistent.

Hypothesis 2: When media coverage begins to wane regarding the issue, despite continued attacks, there will be a marked decrease in attacks for a short period of time, followed by a dramatic resurgence in violence as the group attempts to regain international attention.

Hypothesis 3: As the media continues to focus on other, more timely, events, the terrorist group will take longer breaks between violent attacks and eventually cease the practice of violence altogether due to the lack of an international audience for the issue.

Hypothesis 4: If the group can gain international media attention by using other means, they will utilize those means⁵.

Hezbollah

Intro and History

Operating out of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah (also known as Hizbullah or Hizballah) is a radical Shia group that utilizes both terrorism and legitimate political tactics in order to further their agenda. Currently, it is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States, Australia, Israel, and Canada, but not Western Europe due to the fact that it does hold and maintain legitimate political power (Asseraf 2007). However, there have been several attempts to pass legislation in the European Union that would lead to the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization despite their legitimate political ties. Much like Hamas, an organization that turned to political means when they won the 2006 election for political control over the Gaza Strip,

⁵ There are two methods a group can utilize to obtain media attention. 1. They can engage in ceasefires and peace talks and 2. They can start formal armed conflicts.

Hezbollah is also a political party as several of their members ran for political office during the 1992 elections and, since that time, Hezbollah has wed terror and politics with their social assistance programs in order to assist the Shia Muslims in the communities of southern Lebanon while also subverting the legitimacy of Israel (Norton 2007, 100).

Lebanon, located just north of Israel, has not been immune to the destabilization of the region that has occurred since 1948 with the official creation of Israel. Granted territorial independence in 1943 by the French, Lebanon was carved out of the Ottoman province of Syria in order to reward the Maronite Christians living in that region for their loyalty to France (Norton 2007). For many years, this small country has had to deal with not only Israel's territorial ambitions, but also Syria's, and the destabilization that comes with repeated military and political skirmishes with neighbors as well as the influx of over 150,000 Palestinian refugees from Israel (Avon and Khatchadourian 2012). In addition, Lebanon is internally divided among the Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Christians and, until 1989, the power division kept the three groups in unequal standing economically and politically with the Christians assured the President, the Sunnis given the Prime Minister, and the Shia given the Speaker of Parliament, a position with less power (Norton 2007). Yet, despite the turmoil that has challenged the state for several decades, Hezbollah did not come into being until 1982—in response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, domestic pressures such as the Lebanese Civil War, and the success of the Shia-dominated Iranian Revolution.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent conflicts with the neighboring Arab states led to a flood of Palestinian refugees fleeing to different locations in the Arab world. Many of these Palestinians migrated to refugee camps located in southern Lebanon, near the northern border with Israel. There, Palestinian youth organized and made alliances with

other radical Palestinian organizations such as the PLO and began attacking the northern border of Israel. These small, but organized, attacks eventually prompted the full invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 as the Israeli government tried to decrease the number of militant Palestinians at the border (Fetini 2009).

However, the invasion and subsequent occupation had long-term consequences for the native Lebanese who also inhabited the region and who were not originally part of the conflict. The native locals were the ones who suffered the most from the prolonged occupation with hundreds of thousands of people being displaced during the fighting (Deeb 2006). In September 1982, Israeli and Lebanese troops acting under the direction of the Israeli military, entered a refugee camp where Lebanese refugees were residing and raped, killed, and terrorized thousands (Deeb 2006). This action inflamed the passions of residents and led to the growth of small groups of young men dedicated to fighting the Israeli troops occupying Lebanon. Many of these small groups shared a common religious affiliation, Shia Islam, and were supported and trained by the newly formed Islamic government in Iran (Deeb 2006). In the early 1980s several of these groups combined into what is now known as Hezbollah, and announced their existence as a unified front to the world in what they called the “Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World” on February 16, 1985 (Deeb 2006).

Far from being just a terrorist organization that currently has one hand in politics, Hezbollah does much more for the Shia communities in southern Lebanon. Whereas some terrorist organizations merely use displays of violence in order to communicate to a mass audience or draw foreign attention to their cause, Hezbollah is also a social organization that provides for the communities that it claims to represent. Born out of a time of great inequality between the Shia Muslims and their fellow citizens, the organization provides clean water, house

construction for those whose homes have been destroyed, education, healthcare, and financial aid to individuals in the community (Gleis and Berti 2012). Hezbollah often provides these services specifically to the Shia community, but also the entire Lebanese community, at little to no cost as a way of making up for deficiencies in the government's social spending.

Although Hezbollah has assisted the communities of southern Lebanon, in the thirty years since their inception, the group has also engaged in over 360 terrorist incidents in Lebanon and across the globe. Most of these attacks target military forces or private citizens and property either in Lebanon or in the state of Israel; however, some attacks have taken place as far away as Tunisia, Denmark, Spain, and Argentina, as the terrorists attempt to broaden the audience for their message and to turn what is essentially a regional dispute into a conflict deserving of international intervention from the international community (START 2012). While attacks originating from the group have declined in recent years, that is not an indication that the strength of the group has also waned. Rather, their power has shifted from a reliance on the use of terror and the media to communicate to the world, to using legitimate political means in order to influence internal politics. Although it may seem like having seats in parliament is only a solution for domestic grievances, scholars have suggested recently that Hezbollah is now strong enough to engage the entire country in an open war with Israel (or any other opponent) without the consent of the sovereign government (Council on Foreign Relations 2010; Gleis and Berti 2012; Norton 2007). Evidence for this can be seen in 2006 with the Lebanon War, when Hezbollah's forces sparked a 34 day conflict with Israel over the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Analysis of Data

Like the other terrorist organizations analyzed in this paper, Hezbollah begins by only committing a few attacks a year. The first attack occurred in March 1983, but the first news

article published about the organization did not reach the international audience until October 1983 — after the fourth attack. While this was the international press' introduction to the group, it is not known how long or what kind of coverage the domestic audience received regarding the beginning of Hezbollah as archives of *The Jerusalem Post* only extend back to 1989. Therefore, analysis of news coverage for this group will only include the major international papers: *The Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, and *The Guardian* until 1989 when data from *The Jerusalem Post* will also be analyzed in conjunction with the international papers.

The first time Hezbollah obtains and maintains steady news coverage occurs in March 1985, after a series of five terrorist attacks during that month, and three attacks the previous month. This spurred a series of twelve articles in *The Los Angeles Times* and three in *The New York Times*. Finally able to communicate with the international community, in June 1985 Hezbollah orchestrated an attack in Athens, followed by an attack in Madrid the next month. By attacking, supposedly safe, Western Europe, Hezbollah was able to communicate messages of strength, seriousness, and intent to Israel, and, more pointedly, the rest of the world with a combined total of 87 news articles written in the months of the attacks (June/July) as seen in Figure 5. These attacks put Hezbollah on the map, so to speak, and separated them from the many other groups originating in the Middle East. Thus, it is Hezbollah's media coverage that has provided them with greater influence, legitimacy, and power when compared to lesser known groups in the region, such as Palestinian Jihad, Palestinian Liberation Front, or the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.

However, while these attacks did cause an immediate and dramatic increase in media coverage for the group as international news sources and the international community realized that targets were no longer limited to the border between Lebanon and Israel, the media coverage

did not last long. In July 1985, *The Los Angeles Times* and *The New York Times* published 28 and 18 articles on Hezbollah respectively; yet, these numbers dropped to two and one for the month of August 1985 — revealing that the coverage, while serving to communicate to the international community, was not sustained over time. While *The Guardian* also saw a spike in coverage (up to 8 articles in July 1985) this does not represent as dramatic of an increase in coverage as that witnessed in the other two papers, the following month coverage returned to 2 articles. The two attacks committed in September 1985 also failed to attract a large amount of attention, with only six total articles being published about the attacks between the three international papers. This began a period of lower, yet steady coverage stemming from *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian* with *The New York Times* publishing articles about the group intermittently.




Figure 5

Interestingly enough, despite being the farthest away from the conflict, as they are on the literal opposite sides of the world, *The Los Angeles Times* published the most articles about Hezbollah with a total of 552 between January 1985 and December 1989. This is a significant

amount of coverage when compared to *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, which only published 86 and 351 articles, respectively, in the same time period. This averages to 9.2 articles a month for *The Los Angeles Times*, 1.43 for *The New York Times*, and 5.85 for *The Guardian* during a five-year period in which Hezbollah only averaged just shy of one attack a month (.98). However, these averages do not reveal the entire picture, as the number of articles fluctuated wildly based on several factors, including the presence of an attack in that month or the number of months since an attack occurred. Hezbollah goes through several cycles or high periods of media attention, followed by several months of low, albeit steady, media attention before staging another attack.

Following the four attacks in July 1985 (two of which were in Madrid), media coverage for Hezbollah remained in the single digits until September 1986, when an attack in Istanbul killed 21 people and once again attracted the attention of the international news media. In instances such as this, it is obvious that Hezbollah is willing to use the media to make a point. It is only after several months of limited media coverage that operatives go outside of their immediate conflict area to attack regions and groups of people that they know the international media will be forced to report on. In this case, the death of 21 people led to a total of 22 articles in the three newspapers with 11 of those coming from *The Los Angeles Times*, 9 from *The Guardian*, and the remaining two coming from *The New York Times*. Yet, that media coverage did not last into the next month. Despite two additional attacks in Lebanon, international news only published 12 articles on the group, with only seven articles published by the three international papers during the third month (November 1986). Coverage again picked up to the double digits in January 1987 following the hijacking of a Saudi Arabian plane that killed over 60 people during the last days of December 1986. January 1987 also saw two attacks in Beirut

that served to maintain coverage. Coverage remained at high levels through August 1987 due to attacks located in Tunisia, another location far from the normal battlegrounds of the group.

However, once again, in September 1987 coverage began to wane with *The Los Angeles Times* falling from an average of 12.3 articles a month (from January through August 1987) to a mere 5.75 articles a month from September 1987 through April 1988. Likewise, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* coverage fell from 1.63 and 9.63 to .75 and 4.88 respectively for the same time periods (Figure 6). In response to this decline in media attention and opportunities for communication to the international community, in May 1988 Hezbollah engaged in one terrorist attack, but also began participating in peace talks, in conjunction with their ally Syria, in order to start moving in the direction of peace between Lebanon/Hezbollah and Israel over the border region between the two states. In this instance, when media attention began to wane using terrorism, the group switched tactics in order to gain even more media attention by participating in peace talks (although they ultimately failed). During the peace talks, media coverage in *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian* remained high, averaging 13.33 and 9.67 articles per month between May 1988 and January 1989.



Figure 6

January, though, began a six month stretch during which there was only one terrorist attack. Predictably, this period in the first half on 1989, saw a dramatic decrease in articles written about the group as media outlets focused their attention on other events unfolding in the world. The average number of articles written about Hezbollah from February through June 1989 for *The Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Jerusalem Post* were: 4.2, 0.4, 5, and 0. All of this changed in July and August 1989 when there were a combined total of 4 attacks and 255 articles over that 2 month timespan. The attack that occurred during August 1989, in Israel, in particular attracted a lot of media attention partially due to its location, the Galilee, and the fact that this was the first time Hezbollah had been able to engage in an attack on Israeli soil. While previous attacks crossed state lines into Turkey, Spain, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, and Tunisia, most attacks occurred against Israeli targets within Lebanon. By attacking the Galilee, and Israel proper, Hezbollah was able to attract significant media attention from inside and outside of Israel.

While this one attack led to a copious amount of media attention and opportunities for the

group to communicate with the international community, media attention dropped from 74 articles to seven the following month in *The Los Angeles Times* and from 100 articles to 15 in *The Jerusalem Post*. *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* also saw reductions, with coverage of the group falling to zero and six respectively in September 1989.

These levels of coverage remain typical throughout the remainder of the decade and into the beginning of the 1990s. During the entire decade of the 1990s, the frequency of attacks remains relatively stable as well. The steady amount of media coverage, even when Hezbollah is not participating in attacks, means that when there is an attack, coverage does not increase exponentially. Therefore, fewer attacks are needed overall in order to keep the group's name and message in the international press. Much like Hamas, a group that gets many articles, even when there are no attacks, when Hezbollah does commit an attack, the few additional articles that are written do not add much to the near constant coverage that they already receive.

During the 1990s, the decade-long average number of attacks per month was 1.82 (excluding 1993), while articles written per month average: 5.6; 2.87; 5.3; and 31.97 for *The Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Jerusalem Post* in that order⁶. When there are several consecutive months of news coverage where the number of articles is significantly lower than these stated averages, then as hypothesized, Hezbollah responds by attempting to regain attention through either a large number of attacks in one month, a particularly deadly attack, or by orchestrating an attack in an unusual location such as Spain, Turkey, or Greece. As previously illustrated, unlike other terrorist groups that are geographically bound to a specific region, while Hezbollah's stated goals are to help the Lebanese people, they are willing to take their war outside of Lebanon and the disputed border region with Israel in

⁶ As before, the decade averages are the sum of the monthly article counts divided by 120. Due to the differences in coverage between the papers, they are all calculated differently.

order to gain an international audience. It is their intent that these international attacks bring greater attention to Hezbollah, and their cause of serving the political interests of the Lebanese people, specifically, the Shia Muslims located in southern Lebanon.

The early 1990s saw monthly coverage amounts in the three international newspapers largely below the decade-long average. Therefore, while coverage for the first 18 months was low, attacks also remained low as the group made plans for a resurgence of violence. However, that changed in August 1991 when Hezbollah began negotiating with the United States and Israel for a hostage exchange that included at least one American. This generated a lot of media coverage for the group's cause that lasted for several months as in-depth articles analyzed responses to the prisoner exchange and things that could have been done differently. In order to maintain those above average levels of media attention, attacks began to escalate. These elevated levels of attacks starting in August 1991 remained through December 1992 with a monthly average of 2.71. During this time (see Figure 7) the elevated attacks kept the number of articles high as well. *The Los Angeles Times* published 27 articles in August 1991 and averaged 8.06 articles a month from August '91-December '92. *The Guardian* averaged 8.24, well over the decade average of 1.82.




Figure 7

Strangely enough, *The Jerusalem Post* did not write any articles about Hezbollah for the six months beginning in July 1991 through December 1991. This is one of only two time series when *The Jerusalem Post* did not write any articles at all about the activities of the group. This is particularly unusual given that during August 1991 Hezbollah was working with Israel on a mutual prisoner release. However, Israel has a stated policy of not negotiating or acknowledging terrorists. While it is not known if this was the reason for the silence of *The Jerusalem Post* regarding Hezbollah during this time, it seems likely that Israeli media, whether by their own volition or through government imposed silence, did not want to reveal who the Israeli government was negotiating with, given their policy of not further legitimizing the acts of terrorists with sensational media coverage.

While media coverage spiked in July through August 1993, but began to wane again in October 1993. By January 1994, there were no reported attacks, and only one article was published mentioning Hezbollah in each of the three international papers, while 28 articles were published in *The Jerusalem Post*. In response to this waning media attention, Hezbollah

orchestrated nine individual attacks in March 1994, yet they still did not receive a significant response in media attention, with the international papers only publishing 2-3 articles apiece. Even *The Jerusalem Post* only published 16 articles, nearly half the decade average of 31.97 in March 1994. Later that year, in October 1994, the group executed seven attacks, and while media attention did increase slightly with *The Los Angeles Times* publishing 7 articles and *The Jerusalem Post* publishing 47 articles, the other international papers continued to publish at well below the average levels of 2.4-5.6 articles per month. Overall, these two spikes, while they represent significant increases in terrorism activity, they did not produce any substantive increases in media coverage.

Media attention continued to gradually fall until April 1996 when Hezbollah and Israeli soldiers exchanged fire across the border in a skirmish that began when Hezbollah engaged in two terrorist attacks on Israeli soil. This skirmish soon transformed into military action between the two, which led to a total of 338 articles in one month. Since the international media averaged 2.31 articles per month (for the three papers combined) from April 1995 through March 1996 and *The Jerusalem Post* averaged 38.25 articles per month, this skirmish served to exponentially increase the level of media attention Hezbollah received. However, again, in a repeat of what occurred several times before, that coverage did not last more than two months after the border war and attacks. This skirmish occurred in April 1996, yet by May 1996 the news reports had significantly declined to half that of the number of articles published in April, and by June media coverage was nearly back to its former levels when the group was inactive. In an attempt to once again increase media coverage, June 1996 saw the group implement six separate terrorist incidents, but it was to no avail, as levels of news coverage still continued to drop that month (Figure 8).




Figure 8⁷

The years following this attack, from July 1996 through April 1999, were much the same as the years in the early to mid- 1990s when attacks stayed at average levels, with no month exceeding three attacks, and media coverage remained at average levels. This pattern where both media coverage and attacks seemed to remain at a constant level support hypothesis two, which states that so long as media coverage remains the same the amount of attacks committed will also remain the same. In this instance, the media coverage did remain at average levels for years on end without any drastic changes on a monthly basis, meaning that the level of attacks needed to maintain this amount of coverage were minimal and also remained steady. In the last eight months of the decade, after several months of waning media coverage, and as the once steady coverage began to slowly drop to levels that were well below average, Hezbollah once again increased attacks to 4-6 a month for the months of May, June, and July 1999. While these

⁷ *The Jerusalem Post* published 190 articles in April 1996 and 108 articles in May 1996. This data was cut off the graph in order to better see the relationship between the terrorist attacks and levels of news coverage in the international papers.

attacks, which in some cases were more than triple the decade average of 1.82 attacks per month, did serve to elevate media attention to levels slightly, they did not lead to any significant surges in the level of media attention.

With regards to Hezbollah, events that occurred near the beginning of the new millennium suddenly made terrorism, particularly terrorism originating in the Middle East, a more relevant and newsworthy event worldwide. The first decade of the 2000s averaged at 11.3 and 11.25 articles per month for *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian*, both of which were nearly double the decade averages of the '90s. The increase in articles for *The New York Times* was greater as well, from 2.87 articles per month in the 1990s to 16.38 articles per month during the 2000s. Finally, *The Jerusalem Post* averaged 78.1 articles per month, more than double the decade average of 31.97 during the 1990s. All of this despite the fact that between January 2000 and December 2009, the group participated in less than 30 attacks total.

Yet, even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States made terrorism suddenly relevant to the American public, during the first months of the new millennium news outlets reported on the peace talks between Israel, Iran, Syria, and what that would mean for Lebanon and the interests of all the players in that region. Consistent, but relatively few attacks from Hezbollah, served as a backdrop to the increased media attention that followed the peace talks and led to even more news articles about the potential unwillingness of Hezbollah to abide by any peace treaty that might come to fruition. The Second Intifada, an uprising involving the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in October 2000, and the subsequent peace talks that followed between Israel and its neighbors led to the same result — an increase in media attention for all of the groups in the region, including Hezbollah.

Up until 2005, on average, the international papers published 11-16 articles per month on

Hezbollah, but for the year between April 2005 and June 2006 the international papers only averaged 4-7 articles per month. *The Jerusalem Post* also drastically reduced their coverage on the group, while the decade average is around 71 articles per month on Hezbollah, the average for this time period was less than 30 articles per month. As it had been 18 months since the last terrorist attack from the group (January 2005), it is possible that the media began to see the group as losing its relevancy on the international stage, or other more timely events took the place of this group in the media. Regardless, in July 2006, Hezbollah chose to engage in three acts of terrorism in Israel, sparking the Lebanon War which lasted 34 days between the forces of Hezbollah and the Israeli army.

This war, started by Hezbollah, led to a total of 2028 articles published over the two month time period (July/August 2006). Across the two month period, an average of 158.17 articles were published about Hezbollah for the international papers combined, and 539.5 articles were published across the same two month period for *The Jerusalem Post*. These elevated levels of coverage lasted for approximately a year before monthly coverage began, once again, to return to levels approximating the decade averages of 11-16 in the international papers and about 78 in *The Jerusalem Post*. For that entire time of elevated coverage, Hezbollah did not orchestrate any attacks. Rather, it was not until May 2008, after coverage had returned to average levels and after one month of particularly low coverage (single digit coverage in the three international papers occurring in April 2008), that Hezbollah once again sought the attention of the media by engaging in six attacks. However, while media coverage did triple in some of the international papers (*The Los Angeles Times* ran 27 articles in May 2008, after the attack; likewise *The New York Times* ran 36 articles in May), the group did not receive the coverage witnessed in 2006 during the Lebanon War when the international papers averaged 158 articles a month (see Figure

9).




Figure 9⁸

Since May 2008 coverage has only decreased for this group in all of the papers with the single exception being January 2009. This is when the group received a slight increase in coverage across all four papers due to their involvement and support of the Gaza War between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. June 2008 also marked the last, confirmed or otherwise, terrorist attack originating from Hezbollah. It is possible that as media declined, and further terrorist attacks were unable to either re-attract the media attention that Hezbollah has now been forced to turn to other means. Much like Hamas, Hezbollah is now working within the government of Lebanon as a legitimate political party.

In order to assist the people living in refugee camps on the border or in cities near where Israeli soldiers once invaded, Hezbollah once needed the media attention that came from

⁸ *The Jerusalem Post* published 467 articles about the conflict in July 2006 and 612 articles in August 2006. Again, the graph was cut in order to better view the media/terror relationship exhibited between the international papers and the group.

violence to motivate their own government and the international community to intervene. Now much of that can be accomplished by representatives within Parliament. Hezbollah has always been more than just a terrorist organization as it has always provided social services such as education, medical assistance, and other services to those under its protection. Now, as then, these services are still being provided. The military wing of Hezbollah is still armed, much to the dismay of the international community and Israel; however, it would appear that due to a lack of audience for terrorist attacks, the group has turned to legitimate means in order to achieve the same ends.

Over its 30-year tenure, Hezbollah has shown its willingness to use the media by carefully timing its large attacks to occur after periods of declining media activity on the group. Some of the large attacks with the most impact happened in foreign countries after long periods of declining media attention. In a similar vein, so long as the media coverage on the group remained consistent, so too did the attacks. Yet, when media attention began to wane, whether due to other international events, or because Hezbollah began taking longer breaks between attacks, the group began orchestrating large revivals in order to regain the media attention needed in order to stay relevant. When that tactic stopped working, the group was forced to find other means to assist their people, namely, by becoming a legitimate political party and influencing the government. However, like Hamas, although the group has been silent for nearly five years, there is still the potential for a return to violence as the territorial conflict with Israel has yet to meet a peaceful resolution.

ETA

Intro and History

When one thinks of widespread terrorism several regions of the world immediately spring

to mind: the Middle East and Central Asia, which the media portray as powder kegs of conflicting religions, ethnicities, and political interests; the Caucasus, where those fighting and dying for separation from Russia reside; Sri Lanka, home to the Tamil Tigers, known to be one of the first terrorist groups to use female suicide bombers; and, South America, where paramilitary guerrilla organizations fight for Marxist ideals. Typically not on that list is Western Europe, a region that is often viewed as the victim of terrorism and never as the origin of terrorist groups. However, in reality this is not the case. There are several terrorist groups that began and operate in countries of Western Europe. One such group, located in northern Spain, is the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which translates to Basque Homeland and Freedom (Bhattacharji 2012). The ETA operated in northern Spain and southern France from 1959 to 2011 and utilized terrorist methods, killing 850 people over the lifetime of the group, in order to further their goal of an independent state for the Basque people in that region (The Telegraph 2004).

As an ethnic group, very little is known about the origins of the Basque people, culture, or language. They are known to be descendants of one of the native populations that resisted the takeover of Roman culture in ancient times (Payne 1971). Since then, they have managed to hold on to their distinct ethnic traditions and language despite the land being ruled by several successive waves of outsiders. To this day the language of the Basques has not been linked to any other known language on earth, making it one of the only unique languages left (Payne 1971). Despite living in a modern, western European state, the Basques have managed to maintain a greater level of autonomy under Spanish rule than many other ethnically distinct groups in Europe. Regardless of this relative autonomy, there still remain several champions for complete independence from Spain.

Despite many gains in autonomy throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the

Basque people lost all that they had gained after the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) when General Franco seized power. Franco's regime, a fascist military dictatorship, emphasized a Spanish identity as one that the people should represent with pride (Muro 2005). In order to solidify this belief, all languages other than Spanish were banned and the autonomous regions of Basque and Catalan were abolished (Muro 2005). Instead, all decision making for the country came from Madrid with no regard for the different ethnicities and distinct cultural groups that resided within the country. It was during this period that the vanguard of the ETA, emerged from EGIN, a small student group. Despite the heavy government censorship under which they lived, this group of students utilized family libraries to create a movement keeping with the original Basque nationalist movement (Muro 2005). They called this new group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, and began their fight by first engaging in small acts of civil disobedience and illegality such as: graffiti, flying the Basque flag, and destroying nationalist Spanish propaganda. At first, authorities took this as the misbehavior of disenfranchised youth, and not as the beginnings of what would become a terrorist organization. This belief was reinforced by the group's founding charter in which "the organization defines itself as a patriotic, non-religious, non-political group with the goal of 'saving the Basque soul' and 'the self-determination of our homeland's destiny'" (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008, 5).

In its first years, the group experienced many ideological growing pains and splits as members struggled to define what they were fighting for. All knew they wanted greater Basque autonomy, but, while the charter was inspired by Marxist teachings, the peasants of the land were not quite ready to begin a revolution. It was not until 1970 when ETA shed its first blood and employed new tactics to fight the Spanish, in an organized and strategic terrorist campaign that would last for the next 40 years (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008).

Although the ETA was built on many of the same principles that motivated and drove the previous Basque autonomy movements of the 1800s and onwards, it also had some very distinct differences from its predecessors. One of those differences was the willingness to use any means necessary — including violence — in order to wound the state and/or to further the cause of Basque nationalism. Despite continuously working for a national homeland, the ETA has experienced several swings in public opinion regarding its tactics. While the Spanish and the citizens of the European Union disapprove of terrorism and the use of kidnappings and murder to advance political goals, there has also been some resistance by the Basques themselves at different periods in the history of the organization (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). During Franco's regime, the ETA had a certain degree of legitimacy both among the Basque people and throughout Spain because of its success in fighting the military dictatorship. While the ETA mainly fought for the Basques and their cause, it also represented a large number of people who, while not Basque, also opposed the military dictatorship and the repressive policies that Franco enacted within the state. In fact, the group obtained support from outside the country after Franco put several activists on trial. This trial focused the lens of the international media on the excesses of the Spanish government in dealing with dissent — publicity that the ETA exploited in order to reach sympathetic audiences outside of Spain (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008).

However, following Franco's death in 1975 when the country returned to a democratic system of governance, the ETA received less support from both the Basques and the country as a whole because of their violent tactics and because the movement simply did not represent as diverse a group of people as it had in the past. While it could once garner support from outside of the Basque community in a united opposition against Franco, the organization now had to focus its aims solely on the issue of Basque independence and appeal to a much smaller segment of the

population.

Although the group continued to fight for the Basques, these swings in public opinion occurred when the ETA was viewed as either helping the cause by motivating the Spanish government to enter into negotiations with the more moderate Basques or hindering the cause by motivating the Spanish to treat all Basques as terrorists (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). Despite the fluctuating public perception of the organization, the ETA continued to employ violent methods of conveying its demands for autonomy and independence to the Spanish government and the European Union as a whole. After over fifty years of fighting for Basque independence, truncated by failed peace talks, the ETA formally declared the latest permanent ceasefire in October 2011 (BBC 2011).

Analysis of Data

As the oldest, and longest running terrorist group featured in this thesis, there is a lot that the ETA can reveal about the ways the media, specifically the international media, can influence the actions of a terrorist group. However, this case study does not have the additional support of data regarding domestic news coverage due to the unavailability of data at that level. While the other groups studied in this work all came into existence in the mid to late '80s and had largely given up the practice of terrorism a decade later, the ETA has utilized the practice of terrorism for nearly 40 years. Longevity of this nature suggests that the ETA has managed to inspire and motivate followers for several generations. Like with the other terrorist organizations, the first few years that the Basques were in existence were marked with few media articles and even fewer attacks until one large attack spurred consistent media coverage.

Although the organization began many years before, the first attack did not occur until December 1970. That being said, ETA received nine articles of coverage in the time from

January through November 1970 before the attack. The attack in December 1970, neither killed nor injured anyone, but it did target a government building, causing a large amount of outcry and international attention. This increased attention was partially because of the chosen target and partially due to the fact that this was the first attack originating from the Basque Fatherland and Freedom. This attack received a total of 61 articles from the three international paper newspapers combined: 16 of those articles were written by *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 were written by *The New York Times*, and the final 25 came from *The Guardian*. However, while these articles served as an introduction for the group to the international audience, the coverage did not last, with the ETA only getting a total of four articles in January 1971 and one in February.

Nevertheless, despite the decrease in coverage in the months following the December 1970 attack, this marked the beginning of steady coverage regarding the group. Although coverage dropped off almost completely in *The Los Angeles Times* and *The New York Times*, perhaps unsurprisingly it is *The Guardian* that continues the coverage at consistent, albeit, low levels. As the newspaper located closest to the attacks in Spain, *The Guardian* provides the most coverage about the group and their motivations. While all international coverage is beneficial to the group, it is the audience reached by *The Guardian* that has the potential to press for and enact the most change in Spain and southern France. As a baseline number for future comparisons, during the first active decade of the ETA, (1970-1979), the group averaged 3.55 attacks a month, and *The Los Angeles Times* wrote an average of 1.34 articles a month, *The New York Times* wrote an average of .33 articles a month, and *The Guardian* wrote an average of 4 articles per month. However, these averages do not reveal the patterns of waning media attention that precedes a large number of the attacks. In this decade, the media attention given to the ETA by

the American papers, or *The Los Angeles Times* and *The New York Times*, was minuscule so it was mostly the coverage, or lack thereof, from *The Guardian* that drove the attacks in this decade.

Following the attack in 1970, the ETA does not reach levels of coverage in the double digits again until December 1973, despite 10 attacks taking place in the interim time period. Each attack was preceded by several months of either no coverage, in the case of the American papers, or little coverage in *The Guardian*. However, this one attack in December 1973 did lead to a notable increase in international media attention with 16 articles published on the topic across the three papers. Unlike other months with terrorist attacks, levels of attention on the group remained high the following month, before dropping in February. It is at this time in 1974 that attacks began to occur more frequently. However, despite these more frequent attacks, levels of coverage in the international news media remained low with *The New York Times* not publishing any articles on the ETA between January 1974 and October 1975. Perhaps in an effort to begin attracting more media attention, in March 1975 ETA began engaging in more attacks per month, every month, rather than engaging in sporadic attacks.

Previously, from January 1970 through February 1975, the group averaged .37 attacks per month; however, between March 1975 and March 1976 the per-month average was 3.25 attacks. In response, the news media also increased coverage for this year of increased attacks. *The Guardian* published a total of 81 articles for an average of 6.75 articles per month for this 12-month period and *The Los Angeles Times* published an average of 2.17 articles a month on the topic. However, the increased numbers of attacks were still not enough to attract the attention of *The New York Times* as the paper only published a total of two articles during this 12-month period on the topic despite the increased number of attacks and the greater amounts of

attention that other news outlets were giving the group. Following this year-long period, and even nearing the end of the 12 months, media coverage in *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian* began to decline again. Attacks also began to decline during this period, but January 1977 saw five attacks, the greatest number in any single month since May 1975, without a corresponding rise in media attention as seen in Figure 10. In fact, attention continued to decline with *The Guardian* only writing two articles about the group and the American papers completely ignoring the attacks.




Figure 10

Six months later, in June 1977, the ETA attempted to regain the media attention that had all but disappeared by engaging in an astounding 20 attacks in a single month. While this display of violence should have prompted an international outcry as it signaled an almost indiscriminate willingness to use terrorist attacks, not just on occasion or to make a particular point, but as a near daily tactic in order to attract the attention of the Spanish government, the international community, and supporters both in the Basque territories and beyond. This month of 20 attacks also marked the beginning of heightened attacks for the remainder of the decade

with the average number of attacks per month increasing to 11.06 from this point (June 1977) until December 1979. Some months during this time period had no attacks, but in the majority of months when there were attacks, particularly nearing the end of 1978 through 1979, the number of attacks per month ranged between 11 and 26. This sustained increase in attacks through the end of the decade had the effect of increasing the number of articles written about the group in both *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian*. The average number of articles written per month for the time beginning in June 1977 through December 1979 was 7.48 articles — nearly double the decade average for *The Guardian* at 4.0. Likewise, a similar pattern occurs with media coverage from *The Los Angeles Times*; the decade-long average for this paper is 1.34 articles per month, and the average for this time period is 2.23 articles. The only paper that did not have a corresponding increase in media coverage was *The New York Times* where coverage for the last 18 months of the decade was actually lower (.29 articles per month) than the average for the entire decade (.33 articles per month).

The 1980s began in much the same way that the 1970s ended with attacks averaging 9.92 per month for the first year and coverage in *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Guardian* averaging 1.5 and 6.25 articles per month, respectively. However, beginning in 1981, both the number of articles and the number of attacks written per month began to achieve stability. The average number of attacks per month for the entire decade is 6.8; but this number also reflects the spikes in attacks committed by the group. The attacks of the entire decade can be described as a series of waves where there were periods of time where, like the year 1981, there was an average of 4.25 attacks a month, followed by a short period of heightened activity, such as June and July 1982 in which there were 34 attacks, before numbers returned to a consistent level. The international media largely ignored the spikes in attacks that occurred in the summer of 1982 and

news articles actually decreased during those months when compared to the number of articles per month that were written in the previous months. In that instance the spike in attacks to regain dwindling media attention did not work. Likewise, with the 19 attacks that occurred in October 1982, despite the high number of attacks, the international press only wrote three articles about the group or the violence.

From the end of 1982 through the first half of 1983, news articles continued to decline below the decade averages, prompting the group to increase their average number of attacks from 5.14 between November 1982 and May 1983 to 9.44 attacks per month between June 1983 and February 1984. However, this increase in attacks did not prompt an equal increase in media coverage until February 1984 when *The Guardian* wrote 11 articles and *The Los Angeles Times* and *The New York Times* wrote 3 and 1 articles respectively on the 15 attacks that occurred during that month (See Figure 11).




Figure 11

However this is the last time the group received double-digit news coverage until May 1985, despite months with more than ten attacks (August 1984 and November 1984). It is not

until May 1985, when the group orchestrated 27 separate attacks, that *The Guardian* published 12 articles in a single month. While the 27 attacks increased the presence of the group in European media, it did not serve the same purpose in American newspapers. Coverage actually decreased from two articles to one in *The Los Angeles Times* and the attacks were still not enough for *The New York Times* to publish any articles mentioning the ETA. The next month, June 1985, also had an above average number of attacks with 11 being committed in that month; however, coverage returned to below average levels with only three total articles published.

Following the decrease in media relevance, the attacks also plummeted to an average of 3.5 attacks per month between July 1985 and April 1986. During this same time period *The Guardian* averaged 3.1 articles a month while *The Los Angeles Times* averaged .9 articles a month – both lower than the 4.49 and 1.54 respective averages for the decade. In response, from May 1986 through July 1986, the group had three months of above average numbers of attacks (10 attacks in May and 18 in both June and July). This surge in violence after nearly a year of below average attacks suggests that the group was looking for attention from groups both within the country and in the greater international community. In response, *The Guardian* wrote a total of 60 articles between June and October 1986, with an average of 12 articles per month. The coverage in this newspaper remained at levels well above the decade average of 4.49 until April 1988. During this time, between August 1986 and April 1988, attack levels remained at levels below the decade average of 6.98 as the terrorist organization was able to maintain steady levels of media coverage and did not need to engage in a large number of terrorist attacks in order to regain media attention.

It was only after the average number of articles written about the group by *The Guardian* dropped to 2.9 articles per month between May 1988 and the remainder of the decade (December

1989) that the group once again planned two months of elevated attacks. While the average number of attacks per month for the entire decade was 6.98, during the months of April and May 1989 there were 29 and 34 attacks respectively. However, these attacks did not have any significant communicative value. In this instance, the increase in violent terrorist attacks did nothing to draw the eye of the international media back to the issues and situation of the Basques in northern Spain (See Figure 12). The group was apparently beginning to lose its relevancy to the international media. The decline of media attention at this time could be partially due to the fact that terrorism in other parts of the globe, such as Israel, was beginning to rise. Both Hamas and Hezbollah were beginning to become more active in their fight against the state of Israel. The actions of these two groups in the Middle East served to distract the international news media from the issue of Basque separatism rather than bring to light issues of terrorism as a greater systemic problem.




Figure 12

In many respects, the 1990s saw the continued decline of this organization that once captured the attention of the citizens of Europe. Throughout the decade as a whole, attacks

continued to decline from an average of 4.31 attacks per month during the first half of the decade to 2.07 during the second half. However, despite the decline in terrorist attacks, the number of articles written about the organization, while still lower than in previous decades, did not reflect the diminishing levels of violence. Instead, *The Guardian* averaged 2.52 articles a month during the first half of the decade when the ETA participated in more terrorist attacks, but averaged 4.37 articles per month during the second half of the decade when the number of attacks declined sharply. Thus, making it appear as though the ETA was able to maintain a steady media presence utilizing other means; thereby diminishing the necessity of violence as a tool of communication.

Media coverage remained low, but steady, throughout the entire first half of the decade (January 1990 through December 1994). The number of articles published in *The Guardian* mentioning ETA never broke double digits during this entire time period, despite months in which attacks exceeded 13; and *The Los Angeles Times*, which had previously written the most articles about the group of the two American papers, never wrote more than two articles in any given month. ETA did not receive coverage in the American papers at all in several months during the first half of this decade, despite engaging in multiple attacks on a monthly basis. On several occasions during this time period, the Basques had isolated months in which terrorist attacks far exceeded the normal average, yet despite these surges in violence, the group still could not gain the attention of the international news media — possibly because their attention was focused elsewhere on terrorism in the Middle East or other parts of the globe.

With the ETA seemingly about to lose their domestic and international relevance, at it appeared that journalists and editors were no longer interested in publishing articles regarding the plight of the Basques in northern Spain, the group began to engage in different tactics in

order to regain the attention of the media during the second half of the decade. July 1996 marked the second time that decade that ETA obtained more than ten articles in a single month (the first being in February 1996 when 4 attacks caused two casualties and 12 articles). Yet, as in previous waves of increased attacks, the media coverage fell back to levels below average (down to two articles) the following month, despite five attacks. It was shortly after April 1997, when 14 attacks only attracted three articles, one from each of the newspapers that the group chose to change their tactics in an effort to gain more media attention without the use of violence as the press had largely become disinterested in the terrorist activities of the ETA.

The Basque cause had a renaissance of relevance in the international press in July 1997 when two prisoners of the ETA were released, followed by a resurgence in targeted violence against specific members of the Spanish political system. This conflict, just another play in a game that had been going on for nearly 30 years at this point, garnered enough media attention on the ETA, and the violence taking place in the region, to force the Spanish government to sit down with the ETA in 1998 in order to come to a formal agreement with Sinn Fein acting as a mediator between the two groups. These talks led to the first ever ceasefire agreed to by the ETA, and the first time this group used threats of peace as a way of garnering additional media attention after it became clear that 30 years of violence had accomplished little, if anything at all. The ceasefire heralded a (temporary) era of peace as both sides of the conflict enjoyed the longest stretch of time without an attack since the group embraced violence in 1970. Despite the complete cessation of terrorist activities, media attention remained high, as the international papers continued to report on the state of the peace, and to speculate on whether ETA could control the young factions of the group who wished for a return to violent revolutionary means as a method of both making a statement and communicating with the world.

The ceasefire was ultimately temporary, and media coverage increased as ETA resumed acts of violence against the Spanish government and people. During the ceasefire (July 1998-April 2000), *The Guardian* wrote an average of 4.06 articles per month on the group, however, in the two years immediately following the resumption of violence (May 2000 through April 2002) that same newspaper averaged 7.33 articles per month. These trends also hold consistent when analyzing coverage from *The Los Angeles Times*, which increased from .67 articles per month during the ceasefire to 2.75 articles per month in the two years after the ceasefire ended. Part of the increase in articles may have been due to the changing relevance of the topic to audiences in the post-September 11 world. Whereas terrorism might have been seen as something that only happens to other people in other places, after September 11, 2001, terrorism suddenly became more relevant to the American audience.

However, most of the increase in articles can be attributed to a new tactic the ETA began to employ beginning in 2002. Rather than engage in consistent, monthly terrorist attacks, like the group did throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s, they instead decided to engage in fewer attacks, and in so doing allow those fewer attacks to stand out and attract more attention. As a rarer event, the media is more likely to cover the attacks, than they are to cover violence that happens on a daily or otherwise frequent basis. It is during this time, beginning in the early-2000s that patterns of declining media influence were followed by a “reminder attack” after 4-7 months of silence in order to regain media attention. In August 2002, the group engaged in three terrorist attacks, leading to the publication of 16 articles from *The Guardian* and five articles from *The Los Angeles Times*. Coverage decreased the following months until November 2002 when neither *The Guardian* nor *The Los Angeles Times* wrote any articles on the group. The following month, in December 2002, the group staged one attack, and thereby regained media attention in

these two newspapers (See Figure 13).

At the surface this does not prove a correlation. However, in this case there were three months without attacks before the group felt the need to again remind the world of their presence. The next cycle lasted six months as it took that long before that group only received one article for a given month. In July 2003, the month immediately following the one in which the group lost news coverage, there were two attacks. In so doing, ETA again regained the attention of the international media and kept their cause relevant to citizens in their own territory and to those in the international community.




Figure 13

Ironically, the ETA received the most news coverage for a terrorist attack that they did not commit. Many suspected that the 2004 Madrid subway bombings were the work of the Basque group. While they did not have a hand in this attack, they also did not make any moves to dispel the rumors of their involvement, thereby benefitting from the media attention which reached record numbers. To illustrate, during March 2004, the month of the attack, *The Guardian* wrote 54 articles about the ETA while *The Los Angeles Times* and *The New York*

Times wrote 12 and 23 articles, respectively. It was not until later, when the true perpetrators of the attack were discovered that the media buzz about the group began to diminish and the ETA was once again forced to resort to violent actions in order to maintain relevance; thereby continuing the cycles of violence.

While this cycle continued several more times, near the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the most obvious stretch occurs in 2006. In February 2006, the group engaged in 5 attacks and in the months afterward saw a moderate increase in media coverage with 14 total articles published in March 2006. However, coverage gradually began to decrease as the year wore on so that by August 2006, only one article mentioning the group made it to the international audience. After two months of this level of coverage, ETA responded by engaging in an attack in October 2006. Despite the violence, media outlets still did not pick up the story, and in November coverage dropped to zero total articles — prompting another attack in December of that same year. Both attacks and articles began to increase again in 2007 as first the group announced the ending of a ceasefire and also resumed the practice of violence. Both of these actions prompted media attention as the international community was forced to face, again, the near 40 year old threat coming out of this region.

Another example of this behavior occurs in 2009. In February, the group engaged in a terrorist attack, but only two total articles were written about it in all of the media outlets combined. As media attention continued to remain stagnant and eventually dropped to one total article in June 2009, the group decided to change their tactics again. In July, members of ETA used a car bomb to blow up a portion of the police barracks. This attack, using a car bomb, a weapon used by many Islamist militants in the Middle East, against the police forces, sparked national outrage and large amounts of international press (2 articles in *The Los Angeles Times*, 2

in *The New York Times*, and 10 in *The Guardian*). This was not the last attack claimed by ETA, but shortly after this attack, the group once again changed their tactics in response to both waning media interest, and domestic as well as international pressures.

The last recorded attack by the ETA occurred in August 2009. Since that time, the group has declared several ceasefires with the first official one occurring in September 2010. This announcement was met with several articles detailing the nature of the ceasefire and a background on the group and their history. Months later, in January 2011, as media attention was beginning to wane, the ETA donned their masks and released a video statement declaring a permanent ceasefire — despite never having broken their previous ceasefire. This was thought to be the end of the ETA until 10 months later in October 2011, when the group staged a press conference in order to announce what they called “a definitive end” to the violence. Recognizing that there had not been an attack originating from the group since 2009, these continued reminders of the peace agreement were largely ploys to attract media attention. While the ETA is no longer using violence and is instead negotiating with the Spanish government in order to bargain for political concessions, they still stage these media shows in order to remind the international community that they are a relevant player in Spanish politics. This illustrates the fourth hypothesis, namely that if a terrorist group can obtain media attention without using violent means, and then they will use those means so long as they are effective. Continually reminding the international community of the peace agreement does nothing but keep the group in the press (See Figure 14)




Figure 14

Currently Spain, the European Union, and the rest of the world are operating under the pretense that the ceasefire declared by the ETA will, in fact, be permanent, despite the fact that these ceasefires have been declared and broken in the past. However, the decision to declare a ceasefire and enter into negotiation, while partially a function of the changing times and possibly a new generation's willingness to negotiate with the prevailing powers, it is also a strategic decision for maintaining the necessary media attention in order to survive as a viable representative of the Basque people. After utilizing terrorist attacks and other such methods for several decades, the Basque, Spanish, and European people have apparently grown weary of the conflict, leading to the ETA to changing its strategies in order to maintain international political relevance.

Implications

The aim of this paper is not to say that the international news media is the only factor in determining the actions of a terrorist organization. There are other concerns such as political

climate, means, public perception and support, as well as the international factors that an organization must consider before deciding to engage in an act of terrorism. However, this paper shows that the news media is one factor in determining the timing and magnitude of an attack; therefore, the implications of this study on the news media are profound.

First, it is important to highlight what this study does not reveal. As of yet, it is not possible to predict the frequency, severity, or number of attacks in the next wave of terrorism. However, it does reveal a relationship between an organization and the news media in which the organization needs a certain amount of coverage in order to maintain international and domestic relevance. The evidence also suggests that after prolonged periods of media neglect, certain behaviors are more likely than others. Namely, that the terrorist organization will attempt to regain media attention by orchestrating larger and more deadly attacks, and if that fails to attract sufficient attention, they will either turn to legitimate political means in order to resolve their grievances or gradually disappear. In the case of Hezbollah, their political position gives them the strength and the ability to force Lebanon into outright war without the use of terrorist or guerilla tactics. Nevertheless, while military action is not a peaceful reduction in hostilities, it does represent a marked departure from terrorism.

Knowing that a relationship exists between the international news media and a terrorist group raises interesting implications about how the media should address a terrorist event. Media coverage of a terrorist attack only adds fuel to the fire in that it plays into the desires of the terrorist. If the news media covers an event, not only can the terrorists broadcast their message, but they also have the ability to foment fear in the population – thereby fulfilling both of their aims. The logical solution to this problem is to forbid journalists from reporting on terrorist attacks. In this way, the effects of the attack are limited to those who witnessed and

experienced the attack and their families. While people will tell others about their experience, spreading fear and panic, the impact will be less than if the mass media broadcasts the story and the accompanying images of violence around the world.

However, herein represents the conundrum when looking at the implications of this research. Many Western countries, the United States included, and perhaps most especially, regard a free and open press as one of the fundamental rights of a functioning democracy. Restricting the rights of the press would be seen as the first step to totalitarianism and would spark mass uprising among journalists and citizens alike. The belief that the public has the right to know is so ingrained in Western democratic societies that legally restricting the media from reporting on certain terrorist activities, even with the argument that it would prevent more deaths in the long-run, would be viewed as a dishonest move on the part of the government.

Another viable solution would be to rely on the international news media to “self-censor.” In this case, the government would not legislate the content published in the pages of the major news outlets, but rather editors and publishers would make those decisions in-house and simply prevent those stories from running, or if they must still run, prevent them from running on the front page. However, again, those in the news industry are both protective of their right to publish anything they deem newsworthy, and they are in the business to make money and cannot risk being “scooped” by another paper that may not self-censor as rigorously.

Therefore, governments are at an impasse on this issue. The evidence suggests that less media coverage would lead to less terrorism in the long-run as terrorists lose their ability to both instill fear in a large group of people and communicate their message to the international community. There are notable surges in violence as the organization tries to maintain international coverage and relevance, however, when this fails, individual terrorist attacks

overwhelmingly decrease as the terrorist organization must search for another means of capturing media attention. However, in the United States world, governments are currently unwilling or unable to legislate the media due to the rights of the free press and cannot rely on the media to regulate themselves, even if it means saving more lives.

Conclusions

In all aspects of his or her relationship with the world, the terrorist is powerless. It is a lack of power, opportunity, or openness in the political system, which motivates the terrorist to begin to seek change within a country (or a neighboring country) through asymmetrical warfare. This form of asymmetrical warfare gives the illusion of power to the terrorist as the public lives in fear of the next attack. The element of shock, horror, and terror makes it appear as though the terrorist group holds the government hostage to its demands; however, even in this environment the terrorist is powerless as they are dependent on the attention of the news media to broadcast their performance of terror to a larger audience. While large acts of violence are designed to attract the attention of the news media, and often do, this attention is fleeting — resulting in the need for more and grander acts of violence.

Eventually, even these grand acts of violence will not be enough to sustain the attention of the news media and terrorists will need to turn to other means of generating media attention. That can be through staged press conferences announcing, and reaffirming, ceasefires, or the group will need to find another way to broadcast their message to the international community. Sometimes those means are political in nature with terrorist organizations eventually becoming strong and popular enough to get elected to political office and use legitimate means in order to affect political change.

As one of the first studies on this topic, further research on the direct effects of the

media's influence on the behavior of terrorist organizations is, of course, necessary in order to further validate these theories that have long been accepted without empirical evidence. To rectify the accusations levied against the field for employing what Picard (1986) called "dubious science," the fields of political science and communications must work together in order to achieve a greater understanding of this relationship. This initial study confirms the theories presented by scholars regarding the ways that terrorists need the media; however, far from being the last word on this topic, this is, in fact, one of the first.

References

- Ader, Christine R. 1995. "A Longitudinal Study of Agenda Setting for the Issue of Environmental Pollution." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*. 72(2): 300-311.
- Anderson, Roy R.; Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner. 2008. *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation*. 9th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Althaus, Scott L. and David Tewksbury. 2000. "Patterns of Internet and Traditional News Media Use in a Networked Community." *Political Communication*. 17(1): 21-45.
- Asseraf, Muriel. 2007. "Prospects for Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List" *Global Jewish Advocacy* September.
<http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=1323269&ct=4490703> (Accessed: February 20, 2013).
- Australian Government. Australian National Security. 2012. *Listing of Terrorist Organisations*.
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingListing_of_Terrorism_Organisations (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Avon, Dominique and Anais-Trissa Khatchadourian. 2012. *Hezbollah: A History of the 'Party of God'*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Badey, Thomas J. 1998. "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 10(1): 90-107.
- BBC. 2011. "What is Eta?" 20 October.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11183574> (Accessed: February 20, 2013).
- Bennett, W. Lance. 2003. "New Media Power: The Internet and Global Activism" in *Contesting Media Power* ed. Nick Couldry and James Curran . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland.
- Bhattacharji, Preeti. 2012. "Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) (Spain, Separatists, Euskadi ta Askatasuna)" *Council on Foreign Relations* Accessed on 8 March, 2012.
<http://www.cfr.org/france/basque-fatherland-liberty-eta-spain-separatists-euskadi-ta-askatasuna/p9271>
- Bloom, Mia. 2005. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Borum, Randy. 2004. *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

- Brush, Stephen G. 1996. "Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 40(4): 523-545.
- Caplan, Bryan. 2006. "Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model." *Public Choice*. 128(1/2): 91-107.
- Conteh-Morgan, Earl. 2004. *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts*. New York: Routledge.
- Cook, Fay Lomax Et Al. 1983. "Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. 47(1): 16-35.
- Council on Foreign Relations. 2010. "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)" *Council on Foreign Relations* 15 July. <http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155> (Accessed: February 20, 2013).
- Crenlinsten, Ronald D. 1989. "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems." *Political Communication*. 6(4): 311-339.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism" *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379- 399.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1987. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10(4):13-31.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1992. "Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 15(1): 1-11.
- Deeb, Lara. 2006. "Hizballah: A Primer" *Middle East Research and Information (MERIP)* 31 July. <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106> (Accessed: February 20, 2013).
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. 2007. *Spectrum of Terror*. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Dennen, Steve. 2009. "As Print Newspapers Decline, How Does Digital Fill the Void." 23 July. *comScore Insights Blog*. http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/As_Print_Newspapers_Decline_How_Does_Digital_Fill_the_Void (Accessed: February 26, 2013).
- Didi, Arvind and Robert LaRose. 2006. "Getting Hooked on News: Uses and Gratifications and the Formation of News Habits Among College Students in an Internet Environment." *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*. 50(2): 193-210.
- Douglass, William A. and Joseba Zulaika. 1990. "On the Interpretation of Terrorist

- Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 32 (2): 238-257.
- Dowling, Ralph E. 1986. “Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre” *Journal of Communication*. 36 (1): 12-24.
- Edmonds, Rick. 2012. “Newspapers: By the Numbers.” *The State of the News Media 2012 Annual Report on American Journalism*.
<http://stateofthemedias.org/2012/newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-the-numbers/> (Accessed: February 26, 2013).
- Eke, Kenoye Kelvin and A. Odasuo Alali. 1991. “Introduction: Critical Issues in Media Coverage of Terrorism.” *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion* eds. A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Erbring, Lutz; Edie N. Goldenberg, and Arthur H. Miller. 1980. “Front-Page News and Real-World Cues: A New Look at Agenda- Setting by the Media.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 24(1): 16-49.
- European Union EurLex 2011. *Council Decision 2011/70/CFSP of 31 January 2011 Updating the List of Persons, Groups and Entities Subject to Articles 2, 3, and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism*. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:028:0057:01:EN:HTML> (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Eyeman, Joe. 1998. “Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems.” *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*. 24(2): 151-170.
- Fetini, Alyssa 2009. “A Brief History of: Hizballah” *Time Magazine* 8 June.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903301,00.html> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*. 3(4): 287-304.
- Ghanem, Salma. 1997. “Filling in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda Setting.” *Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda- Setting Theory* eds. Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, and David Weaver. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- Gibbs, Jack P. 2012. “Conceptualization of Terrorism.” *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. Eds. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London: Routledge. 63-75.
- Gilboa, Eytan. 2002. “Global Communication and Foreign Policy” *Journal of*

- Communication*. 52 (December): 731-48.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin; Theodore J. Lowi, and Margaret Weir. 2011. *We the People: An Introduction to American Politics*. 8th ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Gleis, Joshua L. and Benedetta Berti. 2012. *Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Goodman, Seymour E.; Jessica C. Kirk and Megan H. Kirk. 2006. "Cyberspace as a Medium for Terrorists." *Technological Forecasting & Social Change*. 74: 193-210.
- Guardian, The. 2012a. "ABCs: National Daily Newspaper Circulation September 2012" 12 October. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/table/2012/oct/12/abcs-national-newspapers> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Guardian, The. 2012b. "The Guardian is Now the World's Third Most Read Newspaper Website." <http://www.guardian.co.uk/gnm-press-office/8> (Accessed: February 26, 2013).
- Gunter, Barrie. 2008. "Media Violence: Is There a Case for Causality?" *American Behavioral Scientist*. 51(8): 1061-1122.
- Gupta, Dipak K. 2004. "Exploring Roots of Terrorism." *Root Causes of Terrorism*. Ed Tore Bjorgo. London: Routledge.
- Gupta, Dipak K. 2008. *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hawkins, Virgil. 2002. "The Other Side of the CNN Factor: The Media and Conflict" *Journalism Studies*. 3(2): 225-240.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 1988. "Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s." *Rand Corporation*. P-7416.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. "Terrorism Trends and Prospects." *Countering the New Terrorism*. Eds. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini. Washington D.C.: Rand Corporation.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon. 1993. "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing." *Communication Research*. 20(3): 365-383.
- Jackson, Richard. 2008. "An Argument for Terrorism" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2(2).

- <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/27> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Jenkins, Brian. 1975. "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. 17(4): 158-164.
- Jenkins, Brian. 2003. "International Terrorism: The Other World War." *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls*. Ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Jones, Adam. 2011. *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* 2nd Ed. New York: Routledge.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Klopfenstein, Bruce. 2006. "Terrorism and the Exploitation of New Media" in *Media, Terrorism, and Theory*. ed Kavoori, Anandam and Todd Fraley. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc: New York. 107-120.
- Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* (No. w9074). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Lathwaite, Cara. 2012. "The Guardian" *Journalism Now: University of Winchester*. <http://journalism.winchester.ac.uk/?page=369> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Lia, Brynjar; Katja Skjolberg. 2000. "Why Terrorism Occurs – A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism" *Norwegian Defense Research Establishment FFI/RAPPORT-2000/02769*
- Laqueur, Walter. 1978. "Terrorism Makes a Tremendous Noise" *Across the Board* 15 (1): 57-67.
- Lippman, Walter. [1922] 1998. *Public Opinion*. Ed. Michael Curtis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1990. "Will Rational People Rebel Against Inequality? Samson's Choice." *American Journal of Political Science*. 34(4): 1049-1076.
- Los Angeles Times. 2012. "Circulation." <http://www.latimes.com/about/mediagroup/latimes/circulation/> (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Los Angeles Times. 2013. "Facts About the Times." <http://www.latimes.com/about/mediagroup/latimes/> (Accessed: February 28,

2013).

- Lowndes, Joseph E. 2008. *From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lulofs, Neal. 2012. "The Top U.S. Newspapers for September 2012." *Audit Bureau of Circulations*. <http://accessabc.wordpress.com/2012/10/30/the-top-u-s-newspapers-for-september-2012/> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- McCombs, Maxwell; Donald L. Shaw. 1972. "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(2):176-187.
- McCombs, Maxwell. 2002. "The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion" Presented at the Mass Media Economics 2002 Conference.
- McCombs, Maxwell; Amy Reynolds. 2002. "News Influence on Our Pictures of the World" in *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research* eds Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 1-19.
- McLeod, Jack M.; Lee B. Becker, and James E. Byrnes. 1974. "Another Look at the Agenda-Setting Function of the Press." *Communication Research*. 1(2): 131-166.
- Moghaddam, Fathali M. 2005. "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration" *American Psychologist* 60(2): 161-169.
- Morrison, Robert. 2011. "Seeing Red at the Reagan library" in *American Thinker* 8 September. Retrieved from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/09/seeing_red_at_the_reagan_library.html (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Muller, Edward N. and Erich Weede. 1994. "Theories of Rebellion: Relative Deprivation and Power Contention." *Rationality and Society*. 6(1): 40- 57.
- Muro, Diego. 2005. "Nationalism and Nostalgia: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism" *Nations and Nationalism*. 11(4): 571-589.
- Nacos, Brigitte L. 1994. *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Nacos, Brigitte L. 2007. *Mess-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. 2nd ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2012. Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).

- Naveh, Chanan. 2002. "The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework" *Conflict and Communication Online*. [Http://www.cco.regener-online.de](http://www.cco.regener-online.de). 1(2).
- Norton, Augustus. 2007. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pape, Robert A. 2005. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House Inc.
- Payne, Stanley. 1971. "Catalan and Basque Nationalism" *Journal of Contemporary History*. 6(1): 15-51.
- Pedahzur, Ami. 2005. *Suicide Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Piazza, James A. 2006. "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18: 159-177.
- Piazza, James A. 2009. "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 21(1): 62-88.
- Picard, Robert G. 1986. "News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous Charges Backed by Dubious Science" *Political Communication* 3(4): 385-400.
- Post, Jerrold M. 2005. "The New Face of Terrorism: Socio-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism." *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*. 23:451-465.
- Post, Jerrold M. 2009. "Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide Terrorists." *Political Psychology*. 30(3): 381-385.
- Public Safety Canada. National Security. 2012. *Currently Listed Entities*. <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx> (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Purcell, Kristen. Et al. 2010. "Understanding the Participatory News Consumer: How Internet and Cell Phone Users have Turned News into a Social Experience." *PewInternet: Project for Excellence in Journalism*. <http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Online-News.aspx>
- Qin, Jialun. Et al. 2007. "Analyzing Terror Campaigns on the Internet: Technical Sophistication, Content Richness, and Web Interactivity." *International Journal of Human- Computer Studies*. 65: 74-84.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. 1996. "Terrorism in the Name of Religion." *Journal of International Affairs*. 50(1): 41-63.

- Rapoport, David C. 2012. "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism." *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. Eds. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London: Routledge. 41-61.
- Reese, Stephen D. Et al. 2007. "Mapping the Blogosphere: Professional and Citizen-Based Media in the Global News Arena." *Journalism*. 8(3): 235-261.
- Ridout, Travis N. Ashley C. Grosse and Andrew M. Appleton. 2008. "News Media Use and Americans' Perceptions of Global Threat." *British Journal of Political Science*. 38(4): 575-593.
- Robinson, Glenn E. 2004. " Hamas as a Social Movement" in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Robinson, Piers. 1999. "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies*. 25 (April) 301-309.
- Ross, Jeffrey, Ian. 2007. "Deconstructing the Terrorism – News Media Relationship." *Crime Media Culture*. 3 (2). 215-225.
- Roth, Mitchel P. and Murat Sever. 2007. "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study." *Conflict and Terrorism*, 30(10): 901-920.
- Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 2007. "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 19(3): 289-306.
- Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 2008. "The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA." *Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics*. ed. Kledja Mulaj. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schaffert, Richard W. 1992. *Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis*. New York: Praeger.
- Scheufele, Dietram A. 2000. "Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication." *Mass Communication & Society*. 3(2&3): 297-316.
- Scheufele, Dietram A. and David Tewksbury. 2007. "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models." *Journal of Communication*. 57: 9-20.
- Schmid, Alex P. 2004. A. "Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 16(2): 197-221.
- Schmid, Alex P. 2004. B. "Terrorism- The Definitional Problem." *Case Western Reserve*

Journal of International Law. 36(2/3): 375-419.

- Shanahan, James and Michael Morgan. 1999. *Television and its Viewers: Cultivation Theory and Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Simmons, Brian K. 1991. "U.S. Newsmagazines' Labeling of Terrorists" in *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion*. Edited by Alali, A. and Kenoye Eke. Newbury Park, CT: Sage Publications.
- Soroka, Stuart N. 2003. "Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy" *The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics* 8 (January) 27-48.
- Spencer, Alexander. 2006. "Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism'." *Peace, Conflict, & Development* 8 (January): 1-33.
- Sprinzak, Ehud. 1991. "The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3(1): 50-68.
- Stewart, Frances. 2008. "Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and some Hypotheses." *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Stohl, Michael. 2008. "Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism." *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. 1(1): 5-16.
- Tal, Rami. 1995. "The Israeli Press" *Ariel – The Israel Review of Arts and Letters*. 99- 100 (July). http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/press.html (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Taylor, Max and John Horgan. 2006. "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 18(4): 585-601.
- The Telegraph 2004. "Eta's bloody history" 11 March. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1456546/Etas-bloody-history.html> (Accessed: February 21, 2013).
- Tessler, Mark. 2009. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Torres Soriano, Manuel R. 2008. "Terrorism and the Mass Media after Al Qaeda: A Change of Course?" *Athena Intelligence Journal*. 3(2): 1-20.
- Tosini, Domenico. 2007. "Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat." *Sociology Compass*. 1(2): 664-681.

- Tuman, Joseph S. 2010. *Communicating Terror: Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Turkish National Police. 2012. *Terrorist Organizations in Turkey*.
http://www.turkishnationalpolice.gov.tr/terrorist_organizations.html (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- United Kingdom Home Office. 2012. *List of Proscribed International Terrorist Groups*.
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/terror-groups-proscribed?view=Binary> (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Uras, Umut. 2013. "Turkey Continues Peace Talks with the PKK." *Al Jazeera English*. 10 January.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013110153318352861.html>
 (Accessed: February 19, 2013)
- U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism. 2012. *Foreign Terrorism Organizations*.
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (Accessed: February 18, 2013).
- Wanta, Wayne; Guy Golan, Cheolhan Lee. 2004. "Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations" *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*. 81 (August) 364-377.
- Weber, Max. 1972. *Politics as a Vocation*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Weimann, Gabriel and Conrad Winn. 1994. *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*. New York: Longman.
- Weinberg, Leonard et al. 2003. "The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and Their Victims." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 15(3): 139-153.
- Weinberg, Leonard et al. 2012. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism." *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. Eds. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London: Routledge. 76-90.
- White, Jonathan R. 2008. *Terrorism and Homeland Security*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- White, Paul. 2000. *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*. London: Zed Books.
- Wilson, Scott. 2006. " Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast," *Washington Post*, Jan 27.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html>

- Winter, James P. and Chaim H. Eyal. 1981. "Agenda Setting for the Civil Right Issue." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. 45(3): 376-383.
- Wittebols, James H. 1991. "The Politics and Coverage of Terrorism: From Media Images to Public Consciousness." *Communication Theory*. 1(3): 253-266.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion Cambridge University Press: New York.
- Zhu, Jian-Hua, and William Boroson. 1997. "Susceptibility to Agenda-Setting: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of Individual Differences." *Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory* eds. Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, and David Weaver. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.