

Ethnonationalism and White Immigration Attitudes¹

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore how much of White Americans' opposition to immigration – opposition that is often grounded in fears of the threat that immigration poses to the robustness of America's national identity – is shaped by ethnonationalism, a set of beliefs concerning which traits are important for being a “true” American. Drawing on data from the 2016 ANES, I examine how ethnonationalism shapes White Americans attitudes towards immigrants. I find that ethnonationalism is positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites, with the effect size of my ethnonationalism measure being larger than that of any other variable in my OLS model. Critically this includes a number of variables that are already known to be strongly predictive of White attitudes towards immigration, such as Republican partisanship. Beyond anti-immigrant attitudes, I also find that ethnonationalism also predicts support for policies that would restriction immigration. Finally, I also present evidence that ethnonationalism is an important moderator of the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and favorable estimations of Trump.

¹ Thanks to Tyler Reny for his useful comments on a previous version of this paper. All errors are my own.

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Introduction

The literature on White immigration opinion is no stranger to the salient factors that motivate xenophobic attitudes. Scholars have correlated Whites' negative attitudes towards immigrants with a host of factors, including fears of labor-market competition with immigrants (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006), the belief that immigrants are a drain on the fiscal capacity of the US (Hanson et al. 2007), generalized ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010), animus towards Latinos (Valentino et al. 2013; Pérez 2016), and White consciousness (Jardina 2019). This debate has become even more important since Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 election, with a number of studies noting the salient relationships between anti-immigrant sentiment and higher levels of support for Trump among White voters (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides et al. 2019). The crux of the debate in the immigration literature is whether the immigration policies championed by Trump, and that some Whites voters with latent xenophobic attitudes ostensibly endorsed, is motivated by economic anxiety, or whether Trump and the current immigration attitudes of White base of support are products of a "cultural backlash" (Mutz 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

In this paper, I build on the existing corpus of White immigration opinion by offering an additional explanation for White opposition to immigration. A hypothesis I seek to explore is whether anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites in the Trump era are shaped by a set of pervasive beliefs concerning the robustness of America's national identity. The pervasive set of beliefs concerning which traits are important for being "truly" American is defined as ethnonationalism (Thompson 2020). I theorize that ethnonationalism is a predictor of White opposition to immigration that is related to – although one that is not necessarily reflective of – other predictors of White opposition to immigration, including ethnocentrism, White consciousness, Latino affect, and negative economic evaluations.

In this respect, I seek to make two contributions to the existing scholarship. First, despite the fact that scholars have previously correlated beliefs concerning what it means to be “truly” American with higher level of opposition to immigration,³ there are no analyses that synthesize these beliefs into a broader framework and test their robustness as a predictor of immigration opinion. I argue that this is a critically important lacuna in the existing scholarship, given that traits such as ancestry, nativity, language, and participation in the customs and traditions of the nation state are all important “ethnosymbolic” markers of national identity (Smith 2009). I address this important lacuna by combining four items concerning the importance of various cultural markers for being a “true American” into a measure of ethnonationalism. Second, because my modelling strategy involves controlling for a number of other predictors that are already known to be associated with White opposition to immigration, I will be able to better-discern the effects of ethnonationalism on White immigration opinion. As such, it will be clear if ethnonationalism is a predictor of White immigration opinion that functions independently of the effects of these other predictors, or, indeed, whether the effects of ethnonationalism are mediated by something more proximate to anti-immigrant attitudes in my models.

To test these expectations, I use data from the 2016 ANES to explore the relative power and influence of ethnonationalism as a predictor of White immigration opinion. My findings are consistent across a variety of model specifications. Overall, I find that ethnonationalism is a robust predictor of negative attitudes towards immigrants themselves, with the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnonationalism being larger than a number of variables that are known to be substantively associated with such attitudes. I also find that ethnonationalism is strongly associated with support for policies advocated for by Trump that would restrict immigration, including support for building a wall along the US-Mexico

³ For instance, being born in the US and speaking English (Schildkraut 2005; Wong 2010).

border. Finally, I find evidence that high levels of ethnonationalism make the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on favorable estimations of Trump himself more salient. These findings suggest that ethnonationalism is a potentially important moderator when it comes to understanding how xenophobic attitudes lead White majorities to exhibit positive feelings towards radical political actors such as Trump.

The paper is structured as follows. I begin with a review of the extant literature, outlining a number of factors that are already known to shape opposition to immigration. Next, I define the ethnonationalist belief system and outline its hypothetical relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes. I then operationalize ethnonationalism into a statistically measurable construct using items from the 2016 ANES. With this measure, I proceed to test the relative power and influence of ethnonationalism as a predictor of White opposition to immigration in a series of additive and interactive regression models. I close with a reflection of how the findings build on our existing understanding of White opposition to immigration.

Explaining White Opposition to Immigration

White Americans exhibit higher levels of opposition relative to other racial and ethnic groups (Abrajano and Hajnal 2014). A large amount of the literature on White opposition to immigration has focused on the effects of “economic anxiety” as predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes. The “economic anxiety” thesis offers two rationales for why material self-interest predicts opposition to immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The first of these rationales focuses on the hypothesized effects of immigration on the real wages of White individuals. This labor-market competition hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that the income received from work is a substantive factor in individual wellbeing. In the US context, individuals are likely to believe that immigrants increase the relative supply of low skilled labor, which resultingly leads to lower wages for native workers in manual occupations

(Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Given that native workers in manual occupations are especially likely to be vulnerable to these effects, they are thus likely to prefer restricting immigration for fear of how immigrant workers increase competition for their employment and wages (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

Consistent with this hypothesis, some research has found that individuals employed in occupational sectors are the most vulnerable to greater economic competition from immigrants and are thus the most likely to oppose immigration (Mayda 2006). Despite these works, however, the evidence in support of the labor-market competition hypothesis has been somewhat mixed. A multitude of studies find little evidence that individuals who are more likely to experience labor market competition exhibit higher levels of opposition to immigration (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Valentino et al. 2019). Though these studies cast doubt on the robustness of the labor market competition hypothesis, recent literature indicates that this hypothesis should not be dismissed outright. For instance, Pardos-Prado and Xeno (2019) find that individuals with low transferable skills in the labor market articulate a subjective sense of job insecurity, and higher levels of hostility towards immigrants.

The second of these rationales is known as the fiscal burden hypothesis. The fiscal burden hypothesis focuses on the fiscal impacts of immigration (Campbell et al. 2006; Dustmann and Preston 2006). A particularly influential study from this body of literature comes from Hanson et al. (2007). In Hanson et al.'s (2007) theoretical model, low-skilled immigrants are assumed by natives to be a net burden on the public finances. Consequently, increases in low-skilled immigration also increases fiscal pressure to raise taxes or reduce per-capita transfers for public spending. These effects are likely to be especially apparent in a federal system such as the US, where some states have generous public services and a large number of immigrants. Consistent with this hypothesis, Hanson et al. (2007) find that native

workers with higher incomes are more opposed to immigration. Despite these findings, it is important to qualify that there is disagreement within the immigration literature about the fiscal contributions of immigrants themselves (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Moreover, evidence indicates that US states with the fastest growing immigrant populations experienced lower increases in state income taxes and smaller increases in per-capita welfare expenditures (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). As such, these findings suggest that native workers should be more concerned about an immigration reduced erosion in public spending.

Another paradigm for explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites places a greater emphasis on the additional importance of cultural factors as opposed to purely material self-interest. This particular body of literature posits that negative evaluations of groups that motivate attitudes in separate domains of White public opinion apply to attitudes towards immigration, too. Most notably, Citrin et al. (1997) found that negative national economic evaluations and unfavorable feelings towards Hispanics and Asians – the main immigrant groups in the US – are more substantive predictors of White opposition to immigration than negative personal economic evaluations.

A number of studies indicate that anti-immigrant hostility can be relatively undifferentiated across groups (Sniderman et al. 2000). Kam and Kinder (2010) make a such an argument using their generalized measure of ethnocentrism in the landmark *Us Against Them*. Kam and Kinder (2010) posit that ethnocentrism is a psychological predisposition in which Whites divide the world into ingroups versus outgroups. In this model, the bifurcation of ingroups and outgroups are not neutral. Rather, Whites assign virtuous assessments to ingroup members (i.e., other Whites), while evaluating outgroup members as dangerous and untrustworthy. This generalized predisposition towards outgroups (i.e., ethnocentrism) has been found to be a robust predictor of White opposition to immigration in a number of recent studies (Brader 2016; Miller 2020).

Notwithstanding, generalized outgroup prejudice or ethnocentrism can also be expressed through specific outgroup attitudes that also motivate White opposition to immigration (Ford 2011; Hellwig and Sinno 2017). That is, when Whites dislike the specific groups that they believe comprise the immigrant population (for instance, Latinos), they are more likely to oppose immigration. Valentino et al. (2013) note that media attention on Latino immigration began to outpace that of other groups from the mid-Nineties onwards. This attention has focused the effects of prejudiced attitudes towards Latinos in particular. Largely in line with these trends, Valentino et al. (2013) find that their controls for negative attitudes towards Hispanics are far more powerful predictors of support for restrictionist immigration policies than those of other groups, including Asians and Blacks. Building on these findings, Konitzer et al. (2019) demonstrate that group-specific attitudes are equally powerful as ethnocentrism when it comes to gauging the predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Finally, Jardina (2019) posits that Whites' anxiety and concern for their ingroup plays an important role in shaping White opposition to immigration. In this model, Jardina (2019: 164) hypothesizes that Whites do not simply express a greater preference for restricting immigration because of group-specific outgroup attitudes (for instance, White animus towards Latinos). While these attitudes may certainly be a factor in opposing immigration, Jardina's (2019) primary argument is that Whites are concerned that the large influxes of non-White immigration threaten their dominance over America's culture and its political and economic institutions (164). Using multiple sources of data, Jardina (2019) finds that her measures of White identity and White consciousness predict White opposition to immigration across a variety of measures, including negative attitudes towards immigrants themselves, as well a greater preference for immigration reduction and support for specific policies and would restrict immigration.

Ethnonationalism and the Threat to “Americanness”

A substantial body of literature indicates that many individuals also view immigration as a threat to the robustness of America’s national identity (Citrin et al. 1990a; 2007; Wong 2017). Some conceptualizations of the national *ethnos*⁴ and its boundaries can easily accommodate immigrants, while others draw a tight boundary around what it means to be “true” members of the national *ethnos*, meaning that immigrants are not so easily subsumed into the national fold. The concept of American *ethnos* is thus the set of ideas and sentiments that form the conceptual framework of US nationhood.

Most accounts of nationalism in the US literature aim to gauge the specific set of criteria as to what it means to be a “true” American. The crux of the debate in the literature has been between creedal (or civic) forms of nationalism on the hand, and those rooted in ethnocultural understandings of American national identity, on the other (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Lieven 2004; Smith 1997; Walzer 1990). Civic nationalism embraces the liberal tradition of tolerance and universalism. By contrast, ethnic nationalism (or ethnonationalism) draws strong boundaries around what it means to be “truly” American by emphasizing the importance of characteristics such as ancestry, birthplace, language, and shared customs and traditions. These civic and ethnic conceptualizations of nationhood and American national identity have been in a state of flux throughout the history of the Republic, with the US often oscillating between the openness to newcomers inscribed on the

⁴ *Ethnos* is interwoven with the notion of the nation-state. The Greek word *ethnos* embraced a wide variety of meanings in Ancient times. While it was translated as “the people,” it also described the inhabitants of a “polis” (city-state), or even a larger population in which people formed several “polies” (Hall 1997, 34). Therefore, the idea of “a people” and that of a state were seen as deeply intertwined. Herodotus, the Greek historian, defined Greek *ethnos* as a form of kinship of ‘blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common and the likeness of our way of life’ (Kohn 1967, 52). In order to exist, therefore, an *ethnos* “must have a name expressing group identity and a self-awareness of that identity as a group” (Smith 2003, p. 10). National identity is thus an integral part of national *ethnos*.

Statue of Liberty, to patterns of nativist exclusion (Higham 2002). Americans have also expressed support for both varieties of American nationalism. For instance, in a study of the subjective characteristics defined national identity, Citrin et al. (1990) found that a sample of Californians expressed strong support for civic conceptualizations of American national identity, but also exhibited high levels of support for linguistic criteria.

Ethnonationalism is grounded in Smith's (2009) theory of ethnosymbolism. Smith (2009) posits that nationhood cannot be understood without taking into account their ethnic compositions. Smith (2009) therefore proposes an ideal-typical theory of nationhood, where members of the national *ethnos* share a number of important attributes, including a "myth" of common ancestry, and an association with a specific "homeland." In addition to these ethnic traits, Smith (2009) notes that there are a number of mechanisms that engender ethnic self-renewal. One of these mechanisms is what Smith (2009) refers to as cultural borrowing, which may entail co-ethnics learning the language of the host country. Another of these is popular participation (Smith 2009), which is exemplified in participation in the customs and traditions of the nation state. Smith's (2009) ethnosymbolism theory thus provides us with a specific set of criteria for understanding what it means to be "truly" American. Consistent with these criteria, those with salient levels of ethnonationalism believe that having "American" ancestry⁵ and being born in the US are important markers of Americanness, while speaking English and participation in America's customs and traditions are important mechanisms for the renewal of American *ethnos*.

Scholars have found that individuals who subscribe to elements of the ethnonationalist belief system are more likely to oppose immigration. A substantial majority

⁵ An emphasis on the importance of American ancestry distinguishes ethnonationalism from older forms of "WASP" nationalism that were rooted in the importance of having Western or Northern European ancestry for being "truly" American (Kaufmann 1999; 2004; 2018; Lind 2010). As noted by Alba (1990), these ancestral distinctions among Whites faded over the course of the 20th Century, meaning that subsequent generations of Whites simplified their ethnic identities, often with little understanding or appreciation of the complexity of their full ancestry (Perez and Hirschman 2009).

of these studies use data from the 1996 and 2004 waves of the University of Chicago/NORC General Social Study (GSS). These waves of the GSS contained a number of items that asked respondents whether a wide-ranging criterion were important for being “truly” American. For instance, Schildkraut’s (2005) analysis of the 1996 GSS data found that individuals who thought that being born in the US was an important marker for being “truly” American were more likely to support restricting immigration. Moreover, this relationship held despite controlling for a number of socio-political and demographic variables that are known to be predictive of opposition to immigration, including Republican partisanship (Hajnal and Rivera 2014). Similarly, using both the 1996 and 2004 waves of the GSS, Wong (2010) found that those who thought nativity was important for being “truly” American were also more likely to oppose birthright citizenship and oppose giving citizenship to legal permanent residents.⁶

It is not surprising to find that those who place an emphasis on the importance of English are also likely to oppose immigration. As Schildkraut observes (2005) if assimilation into the host society is a central norm that immigrants are often perceived as violating, language is perhaps *the* most visible signal of that norm. Theiss-Morse (2009) finds that more than 90 percent of the American public agree that one must speak English if they are to be “truly” American. Consistent with these trends, some experimental studies have tested the effects of incidental exposure to Spanish among English-speaking White Americans. For instance, Newman et al. (2012) found that exposure to Spanish increased perceptions of cultural threat among White participants, leading them to express negative attitudes towards immigrants. The influence of these beliefs is also reflected in a large literature that speaks to

⁶ It is important to note that conceptualizations of American national identity are theoretically distinct from constructs such as patriotism (Schildkraut 2014). Scholars have also found that those who express nationalistic sentiments exhibit higher levels of opposition to immigrants, while those who are patriotic do not (de Figueiredo Jr and Elkins 2003).

the success of the “English only” movement in shaping policy towards immigrants over the last few decades, with a number of states passing statues or amending their state constitutions to mandate monolingualism (Citrin et al. 1990b; Tatalovich 2014). As noted by Piatt (1990), supporting the “English only” movement became a socially acceptable way of tapping into Whites’ fears about being outnumbered by immigrants.

As these studies demonstrate, the prevailing trend in the existing scholarship has been to examine one component of the broader ethnonationalist belief system (for instance, nativity or language) and test its robustness as a predictor of opposition to immigration. On the one hand, this approach has been useful in helping us better understand which of these respective components may have the greatest amount of explanatory power when we aim to understand why so many Whites express a robust opposition to immigration. However, and consistent with ethnosymbolism theory (Smith 2009) it is critically important to note that ancestry, nativity, language, and participation in customs and traditions of the nation state are markers that are thought to function as part of a broader belief system pertaining to what it means to be a “true” member of the nation state. Therefore, while it is useful to be aware of the relative power and influence of each these traits on Whites’ attitudes towards immigrants, we nonetheless need to account for the possibility that, taken together, they are tapping into a set of broader popular attitudes towards US nationhood and America national identity.

There are a number of important steps to understanding the ethnonationalism -> anti-immigrant attitudes relationship. First, those with salient levels of ethnonationalism use a distinct set of criteria (American ancestry, being born in the US, speaking English, and participation in American customs/traditions) to make sense of what it means to be “truly” American. Second, individuals with these beliefs, but who would otherwise not hold a distinct set of views towards immigrants need a salient set of issues to emerge to fill that gap. Third, political elites frame issues such as immigration in a manner that appeals to these

ethnonationalist beliefs (Zaller 1992) – in the case of radical political actors such as Trump, this includes the perceived threat that immigrants or other ethnic outsiders pose to the robustness of American *ethnos* (Thompson 2020). In this way, ethnonationalist beliefs are activated by a specific frame regarding the “threat” immigration promoted by elites, with the activation of these frames being dependent on the degree of resonance between the latent beliefs themselves and support for a popular message (Bonikowski 2017).

In sum, my claim that ethnonationalism is a substantive predictor of White opposition to immigration requires three types of evidence. The first is that ethnonationalism should be a predictor of negative attitudes towards immigrants themselves (**H1**). Importantly, these hypothetical effects through ethnonationalism should be independent of the effects of other broad measures of White group attitudes that are likewise known to shape attitudes towards immigrants, especially ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010), and White consciousness (Jardina 2019). Perhaps unsurprisingly given its hypothetical associations with xenophobic attitudes, ethnonationalism was a robust predictor of White vote choice for Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election (Thompson 2020). This also suggests a potential connection between the tendency of the ethnonationalist belief system to draw rigid boundaries around what it means to be “true” members of the American *ethnos* and support for policies advocated by Trump that would exclude those (i.e., immigrants) who do not meet the criteria for being “truly” American. In substantive terms, this should equate to higher levels of support for policies such as deporting migrant children and building a wall along the US-Mexico border (**H2**). Finally, A robust literature speaks to the powerful effects of anti-immigrant attitudes on support for Trump (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides et al. 2019). However, little is known about the conditions in which the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on support for radical political actors such as Trump is made more salient. Bonikowski (2017) posits that the xenophobic attitudes -> radical political actor support

relationship is likely to be moderated by concerns about the robustness of the national *ethnos*. In this way, the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on more favorable estimations of Trump should be especially potent for Whites with the most salient ethnonationalist beliefs (**H3**).

Data and Methods

To test these theoretical expectations, data are taken from the 2016 ANES Time Series Study. The 2016 ANES is nationally-representative, dual-mode survey, conducted between November 7, 2016 and January 8, 2017, that was designed to collect data on US voter behavior and public opinion in time for the 2016 US Presidential election. The face-to-face component of the study used a stratified, clustered address-based sampling design to recruit $N = 1,181$ participants, while the online component used a similar address-based sampling design to recruit a total of $N = 3,090$ participants. Altogether, a total of $N = 4271$ participants were recruited. Because the objective of the paper is to gauge whether ethnonationalism is a substantive correlate of the immigration attitudes of White Americans, I selected a subsample of respondents who identified as White and non-Hispanic only ($N = 3,030$).

Estimation Strategy

Dependent measures. To measure negative attitudes towards immigrants themselves, I construct an index of anti-immigrant attitudes using survey items from the 2016 ANES (Sides et al. 2019). The first item asked respondents whether they thought that immigrants were generally for America's economy. The second item asked respondents whether they thought that immigrants increased crime rates in the US. And the third item asked whether they thought that immigrants generally harm American's culture. The second and third items were reverse coded such that higher values were indicative of negative attitudes towards the

effects of immigration on US crime rates and culture. After recoding, the items were competed into a single index ranging between 0 and 1 (Cronbach's $\alpha = .79$).

To measure support for restrictionist immigration policies, I use survey items about immigrant-targeted policies. The 2016 ANES contains a number of items that ask respondents whether they favor or oppose certain policies for immigrants in the US. Specifically, I include items for whether a White respondent favors 1) building a wall along the US-Mexico border, 2) sending back children who were brought to the US illegally, and 3) ending birthright citizenship. Items are coded such that higher values correspond to higher levels of opposition to birthright citizenship, higher levels of support for sending back immigrant children and building a wall with Mexico, and higher levels of support for ending birthright citizenship.

To measure affect for Trump, I use the standard feeling 101-point feeling thermometer. The thermometer ranges between 0 and 100, with a minimum score of 0 indicating "very cool or unfavorable" estimations of Trump, and a maximum score of 100 indicating "very warm or favorable" estimations.

Ethnonationalism. The key independent measure is ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism is an additive index made of four items that ask how important a number of traits are for being "truly American." The four traits were "to have been born in the US," "to have American ancestry," "to speak English," and "to follow America's customs and traditions." Possible responses for each item ranged from 1 = "very important," to 4 = "not important at all."⁷ The four items were reverse coded so that higher values were indicative of a respondent placing greater emphasis on the importance on each trait for being "truly

⁷ Distributions of responses to all four ethnonationalism items are presented in section A1 of the Supplemental Information file.

American.” The items exhibited correlations with one another.⁸ The rescaled index ranges between 0 and 1 and has a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .77$.

Ethnocentrism. To measure ethnocentrism, I rely on a series of items concerning group stereotypes from the 2016 ANES (Kinder and Kam 2010).⁹ A single measure of ethnocentrism was computed out of the group stereotype items. The variable was constructed as:

$$\text{Ethnocentrism} = \text{in-group favouritism}^{10} + \text{out-group negativity}^{11}$$

White Consciousness. To measure White consciousness, I rely on the same three items used by Jardina (2019). The first item asked how important being White was to a

⁸ Bivariate correlations for the ethnonationalism items are presented in section **A2** of the Supplemental Information file.

⁹ In these items, White respondents were presented with a seven-point scale on which they had to rate the characteristics of a given ethnoracial group. The scales were based on a series of paired antonyms. The first antonym was hardworking versus lazy. A score of 1 indicated that respondents thought all the people in a given ethnoracial group were hardworking. A score of 4 indicated that most people in the group were not particularly close to one end or the other. And a score of 7 indicated that most people in the group were lazy. White respondents were first asked to rate themselves on this scale. Afterward, Whites were presented with the same scale again, but were instead asked to rate African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. This process was then repeated for the second antonym – peaceful versus violent.

¹⁰ In-group favouritism was calculated by summing the scores for the two ANES items in which White respondents had to rate their own group on the hardworking/lazy scale and peaceful/violent scale. The two items have a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76$. This summed score was then divided by two to create an average score. Responses for the items in which Whites had to rate their own group were reverse coded so that a higher score responded to a higher rate of perceived in-group virtuousness. The formula for calculating the in-group favouritism score is:

$$\text{In-group favouritism} = (\text{trait}_1 \text{ in-group score} + \text{trait}_2 \text{ in-group score}) / 2$$

¹¹ Out-group negativity was calculated by summing the average scores for the six ANES items in which White respondents had to rate African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans on the hardworking/lazy scale and the peaceful/violent scale. Whites’ ratings of non-White ethnoracial groups were averaged to create a single score for all out-groups across both scales. The two average scores were then summed and divided by 2 to create an average score that represented out-group negativity. Thus, the formula for calculating the out-group negativity score is:

$$\text{Out-group negativity} = (\text{trait}_1 \text{ average outgroup score} + \text{trait}_2 \text{ average out-group score}) / 2$$

respondent's identity. The second item asked how important it is for Whites to work together to change laws that are unfair to Whites. And the third item asked how likely it is that many Whites are unable to find jobs due to employers hiring minorities instead. Possible responses for the first two items ranged between 1 = "extremely important," to 5 = "not at all important," while possible responses for the third item ranged from 1 = "extremely likely," to 5 = "not at all likely." All three items were reverse coded and then computed into a single index (Cronbach's $\alpha = .68$).

In order to assess the degree of similarity between ethnonationalism, ethnocentrism, and White consciousness, I performed a correlation analysis. The correlation analysis indicated moderate correlations between the three measures of White ingroup attitudes. However, the magnitude of these correlations was not sufficiently high enough to introduce concerns related to multicollinearity.¹²

Additional explanatory variables include a number of measures that are known to be associated with White attitudes towards immigration, negative economic evaluations (Miller 2020; Hickel Jr and Bredbenner 2020), and authoritarianism (Craig and Richeson 2014).¹³ Negative personal economic evaluations are measured using a 5-point ordinal item that asks how worried a respondent is about their own financial situation, with possible responses

¹² Bivariate correlations for the three measures of White ingroup attitudes are presented in section **A3** of the Supplemental Information file.

¹³ While Hispanic and undocumented immigrant affect are measures that are both known to be associated with higher levels of opposition to immigration among Whites (Jardina et al. 2013; Ramirez and Peterson 2020), I do not account for these factors in my estimation strategy because both measures are likely to function as posttreatment variables (Montgomery et al. 2018). That is, how people feel towards Hispanics and undocumented migrants is likely to exist as a function of ethnonationalist attitudes. As such, to avoid introducing significant bias into my coefficient for the ethnonationalism term, models are estimated without controlling for Whites' feelings towards Hispanics and undocumented immigrants. To account for the possibility of these items introducing posttreatment bias, I performed ancillary analysis where models were estimated with additional controls for Hispanic and undocumented immigrant affect. Ancillary models are presented in section **A4** of the Supplemental Information file.

ranging between 1 = “extremely worried,” to 5 = “not at all worried.”¹⁴ Negative national economic evaluations are measured using a 5-point ordinal item that asks whether the current national economy is good or bad, with possible responses ranging between 1 = “very good,” to 5 = “very bad.” Lastly, authoritarianism is an additive index ranging between 0 and 1. Items included in the index measure which traits respondents believe to be more important for a child to have for four trait pairs.

Controls. Models are also estimated with a number of socio-political, demographic, and structural covariates. Party ID is a seven-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = “strong Democrat,” to 7 = “strong Republican.” Ideology is a seven-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = “extremely liberal,” to 7 = “extremely conservative.” Age is measured continuously in years. Females are coded as 1 and males as 0. Education is a 16-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = “less than first grade,” to 16 = “doctorate degree.” Family income is a 28-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = “under \$5,000,” to 28 = “\$250,000 or more.”¹⁵ Respondents who are unemployed are coded as 1, and those otherwise as 0. Respondents who identity as “born again” Christians are coded as 1, and other otherwise as 0. Respondents residing in the South are coded as 1, and those residing elsewhere as 0.

Results

Ethnonationalism and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes


The first step is to assess whether ethnonationalism is a substantive predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes. **Figure 1** depicts the results of a linear model estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which the anti-immigrant index is regressed against the ethnonationalism, the set of explanatory variables, and the socio-political and demographic

¹⁴ The item is reverse coded such that higher values are indicative of negative personal economic evaluations.

¹⁵ Respondents who refused to provide their incomes were omitted from the analysis.

covariates. Points to the right of the reference line along the x axis in **Figure 1** indicate a positive relationship between a variable of interest and the dependent measure, or more salient anti-immigrant attitudes, while points to the left of the reference line indicate a negative relationship, or less salient anti-immigrant attitudes.

Figure 1: Ethnonationalism and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes among Whites



Notes: Points represent the size of each standardized OLS coefficient. The capped lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$. Full model estimates presented in section **A5** of the Supplemental Information file.

Source: 2016 ANES


As indicated by **Figure 1**, ethnonationalism is positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites ($p < .001$). The magnitude of this relationship is also substantial, with the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnonationalism being larger than that of ethnocentrism and White consciousness. It is also noteworthy how ethnonationalism exhibits a larger effect size than other variables that are similarly known to

be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites, including negative economic evaluations (Miller 2020; Hickel Jr and Bredbenner 2020), authoritarian attitudes (Craig and Richeson 2014), and Republican partisanship (Hajnal and Rivera 2014).

To get a more substantive approximation of the magnitude of these effects, I use postestimation. **Figure 2** graphs the results of this postestimation in which Whites' anti-immigrant attitudes are modelled as a function of ethnonationalism, ethnocentrism and White consciousness. The top-left panel in **Figure 2** indicates that, at the lowest level of the ethnonationalism scale, a White individual scores just .22 on the normalized anti-immigrant scale. That same individual scores .51 on the anti-immigrant scale if he or she exhibited the highest levels of ethnonationalism. Thus, moving from least to most ethnonationalist on the ethnonationalism scale is associated with a 29-point increase in anti-immigrant attitudes among Whites. As indicated by the top-left panel in **Figure 2**, we observe a similar pattern when moving along the ethnocentrism scale. Specifically, moving from least to most ethnocentric is associated with a 46-point increase in anti-immigrant attitudes.

Finally, the bottom panel in **Figure 2** indicates that an individual with the lowest levels of White consciousness scores .34 on the normalized anti-immigrant scale. By contrast, that same individual scores .46 on the anti-immigrant scale at the highest levels of White consciousness. Therefore, moving from least to most conscious on the White consciousness scale is associated with just a .11 increase in anti-immigrant attitudes. In sum, the results of the postestimation point to ethnonationalism being a more substantive predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes than White consciousness among Whites, and its effect being smaller than that of ethnocentrism.

Figure 2: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes as a Function of Ethnonationalism, Ethnocentrism, and White Consciousness



Notes: Points represent the predicted opinion on immigration at each level of the ethnonationalism, ethnocentrism, and White consciousness scales. The capped lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Predicted probabilities calculated by holding all other variables in OLS model constant or at their respective mean values.

Source: 2016 ANES

These effects through ethnonationalism are also robust to a host of alternative model specifications. A contemporary debate in the literature concerns the effects of perceived job insecurity and Whites’ negative attitudes towards immigration (Melcher 2020). To account for these effects, I limit my sample to Whites in employment only, and include additional controls for perceived job insecurity and for whether a respondent reported having a cut to

their working hours or pay.¹⁶ In this model, the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnonationalism is actually larger than that in the OLS model in **Figure 1** and remains significant at the $p < .001$ level. Another debate in the literature concerns the effects of class identity on negative attitudes towards immigrants, with working-class Whites feeling as though they have the most to lose from greater competition (Gest 2016). To account for the effects of class ID, I control for a respondents' subjective class identification.¹⁷ In this model, the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnonationalism is once again larger than that in the OLS model in Figure 2 and exhibits the same level of statistical significance ($p < .001$). Full estimates of the alternative models are presented in section **A6** of the Supplemental Information file.


Ethnonationalism and Support for Restrictionist Immigration Policies

In the next analysis, I estimate the relationship between ethnonationalism and support for restrictionist immigration policies among Whites. **Figure 3** depicts the results of three ordered probit models in which the dependent measures are again regressed against the ethnonationalism measure, each of the explanatory variables, and the socio-political and demographic covariates. Points to the right of the reference line on the x axis indicate a positive relationship between a variable of interest and a greater preference for a given policy of immigration restriction, while points to the left of the reference line indicate a negative relationship, or a lower preference.

¹⁶ Perceived job insecurity is a 5-point ordinal item that asks employed respondents how worried they are about losing their job in the future, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "not at all," to 5 = "extremely." The latter variable is a dichotomous variable where a value of 1 indicates that an employed respondent has had their working hours or pay cut by their employer, and 0 for otherwise.

¹⁷ Class ID is a constructed dichotomous variable where a value of 1 indicates that a respondent identifies as working-class, and 0 for otherwise.

Figure 3: Ethnonationalism and White Support for Restrictionist Immigration Policies



Notes: Points represent the size of each the ordered probit coefficient. The capped lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. Full estimates presented in section A7 of the Supplemental Information file.

Source: 2016 ANES

As indicated by **Figure 3**, the ethnonationalism measure is positively associated with White support for building a wall along the US-Mexico border ($p < .001$), for sending back individuals brought to the US illegally as children ($p < .001$), and for ending birthright citizenship ($p < .001$). **Figure 3** also suggests that Kinder and Kam’s (2010) construct is a stronger predictor of White support for restrictionist immigration policies than ethnonationalism. However, ethnonationalism appears to be a stronger predictor of support for restrictionist immigration policies than Jardina’s (2019) measure of White consciousness.

As indicated here, the coefficients sit close to the reference line across models, suggests that the effects of White consciousness are not distinguishable from zero.

To ensure that ethnonationalism is primarily tapping into attitudes towards immigration and not some other latent trait such as a general, negative, disposition towards marginalized groups, it is also worth considering support for policies where ethnonationalism *should not* exhibit a substantive effect among Whites. One area of public opinion where we should not expect ethnonationalism to exhibit substantive effects is when it comes to understanding support for policies that would discriminate against LGBTQI+ individuals. Rather than being shaped by beliefs about American national identity, the literature instead indicates that support for anti-LGBTQI+ policies is likely to be driven by factors such as moral traditionalism, contact with LGBTQI+ individuals, and religiosity (Brewer 2003; Merino 2013; van der Toorn et al., 2017).

To test this possibility, I estimate two models gauging Whites' support for allowing business owners to refuse service to same sex couples, and support for mandating that transgender individuals use the bathroom of the gender that they were assigned at birth. Consistent with the literature on LGBTQI policy attitudes, these models also control for moral traditionalism and intergroup contact.¹⁸ Across both models, the coefficient for ethnonationalism does not exhibit the conventional $p < .05$ level of statistical significance. The results of the alternative models thus lend weight to the assumption that ethnonationalism is tapping into salient attitudes towards immigrants, but not other

¹⁸ Moral traditionalism is an additive index of four items that asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with a number of statements concerning societal adherence to variety of "traditional" norms. These statements were 1) the world is changing and we should adjust, 2) newer lifestyles are breaking down society, 3) we should be more tolerant of other moral standards, and 4) there should be more emphasis on traditional family values. The second and fourth items were reverse coded such that higher values were indicative of respondents agreeing that newer lifestyles break down society, and that there should be more emphasis on traditional family values. After recoding, the items were computed into a single index ranging between 0 and 1 (Cronbach's $\alpha = .73$). The latter variable is a dichotomous variable where a value of 1 indicates that a respondent knows a friend or family member who is LGBTQI+, and 0 for otherwise.

marginalized groups such as LGBTQI+ individuals. Full estimates of these models are presented in section **A8** of the Supplemental Information file.

The Political Activation of Ethnonationalism


We have seen thus far that ethnonationalism is substantively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as specific support for policies that would restrict immigration. However, it is also worth investigating whether the effects of ethnonationalism on White immigration opinion are politically consequential. We already know that negative attitudes towards immigrants were substantively associated with greater support for Trump in the 2016 election among Whites (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides et al. 2019). However, we know little about the conditions under which the effects of anti-immigrant attitudes on positive feelings towards Trump are likely to be made especially potent. If ethnonationalism is a robust predictor of negative attitudes towards immigrants, then the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on more favorable estimations of Trump should be more likely to persist among Whites who exhibit the highest levels of ethnonationalism.

To test the nature of this interaction on feelings towards Trump, estimated a final OLS model. In this model, the Trump feeling thermometer was regressed against the normalized anti-immigrant scale, which was then interacted with the ethnonationalism scale. As was the case with the previous models, I also control my set of explanatory variables, and the socio-political and demographic covariates. The model found significant main effects for anti-immigrant sentiment ($p < .001$), and ethnonationalism ($p < .001$) on affect for Trump, will the anti-immigrant x ethnonationalism interaction was also significant ($p < .05$).

Does the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on favorable estimations of Trump become more salient as Whites exhibit increasingly higher levels of ethnonationalism? **Figure 4** provides some indication that this is the case. **Figure 4** graphs the marginal effect of anti-

immigrant attitudes on feelings towards Trump by levels of the ethnonationalism scale. To assess for sparsity in the data in the event that there are no observations across certain values of the moderator (Hainmueller et al. 2018), **Figure 4** also includes a histogram that shows the distribution of the ethnonationalism scale. The positive slope of the line in **Figure 4** suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is made more salient by ethnonationalism. In other words, the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on feelings towards Trump differs across White respondents, depending on their level of ethnonationalism.

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes on Whites’ Feelings Towards



Notes: Points represent the marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on feelings towards Trump across levels of the ethnonationalism scale. The dashed lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Estimates based on an OLS model controlling for the interaction between ethnonationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes. All other variables in OLS model are either held constant or set to their respective mean values. Full model estimates presented in section **A9** of the Supplemental Information file.

Source: 2016 ANES.

I begin with Whites who exhibited the lowest levels of ethnonationalism. Among Whites who thought that none of the traits were at all important for being “truly” American, anti-immigrant sentiment is associated with an increase in warm feelings towards Trump of 10 points on the thermometer scale, though the marginal effect does not exhibit conventional levels of statistical significance. As indicated by the histogram in **Figure 4**, one likely explanation for this insignificant result is the low number of observations at the lowest level of the ethnonationalism scale. Contrastingly, among Whites who exhibited the highest levels of ethnonationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment is associated with an increase in warm feelings towards Trump of 22 points on the thermometer scale ($p < .001$). This finding suggests that the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on favorable feelings towards Trump are likely to be most salient among those with the highest levels of ethnonationalism.

Discussion and Conclusion

Is ethnonationalism a robust predictor of immigration attitudes that is independent of the effects of other measures of White group attitudes such as ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010), and White consciousness (Jardina 2019)? Does ethnonationalism have significant implications for Whites’ immigration policy preferences? And are the effects of ethnonationalism politically consequential? The answer to all three of these questions is yes. The findings demonstrate that ethnonationalism is a distinct and substantive correlate of White opposition to immigration. Ethnonationalism is a statistically measurable construct, and its influence is not diminished by a number of measures that are already known to be substantively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes.

These findings contribute to our existing understanding of White opposition to immigration in a number of important ways. First, much of the previous work on White opposition to immigration focuses on the effects of factors such as ethnocentrism (Kinder and

Kam 2010), White consciousness (Jardina 2019), negative economic evaluations (Miller 2020; Hickel Jr and Bredbenner 2020), and authoritarian attitudes (Craig and Richeson 2014), but ignores the influence of individuals' concerns with the robustness of America's national identity altogether. Moreover, the few studies that have explored whether ethnonationalist beliefs are predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes have only explored the effects of one component at a time (Schildkraut 2005; Wong 2010). However, and consistent with Smith's (2009) theory of ethnosymbolism, I have argued that it is critically important that we see factors such as ancestry, nativity, language, and participation in the customs and traditions of the nation state as a set of markers that together form part of a wider belief system that pertain to what it means to be a "true" American. In line with Smith's (2009) theorizing, I have shown that these ethnonationalist beliefs all exhibit correlations with one another and load onto the same factor, indicating that they are tapping into the same latent set of beliefs. Furthermore, as evidenced by the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnonationalism in **Figure 1**, this set of beliefs appears to be *the strongest* predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes for Whites. Importantly, ethnonationalism was a stronger predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes than a number of variables that have long been known to shape Whites' opposition to immigration, including Republican partisanship (Hajnal and Rivera 2014).

Second, my finding that ethnonationalism is associated with higher levels of support for Trump-era policies that would restrict immigration builds upon our existing understanding of why so many Whites increasingly favor a change in direction to post-1965 national policymaking on immigration. To understand this contemporary opposition, it is useful to point out that current debates regarding immigration policy are reflective of the nativist sentiment that has usually followed after large waves of immigration to the US (Higham 2002). In the early 20th Century, for instance, those who viewed immigrants as a threat to the

robustness of America's national identity cloaked their support for policies that would restrict immigration in the rhetoric of "preserving" national homogeneity (Grant 1916; Ross 1914). Similarly, those who have been the most fervent supporters of policies such as deporting migrant children and building a wall along the US-Mexico border today fear a further decline in national homogeneity which may only be halted if current demographic trends are reversed by enacting policies that would restrict immigration. To those with salient ethnonationalist beliefs, then, support for these policies functions as a means of reversing America's post-1965 tradition of being an ethnoculturally plural nation.

Finally, the findings contribute to the existing scholarship by demonstrating that ethnonationalism is an important moderator of the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and support for Trump among Whites. Previous studies had noted an important link between xenophobic attitudes and higher levels of support for Trump in the 2016 election (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides et al. 2019). Despite these contributions, little was known about the conditions under which the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on greater levels of support for Trump among Whites was likely to be especially salient. However, as I have shown ethnonationalism to be a robust predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as support for specific policies championed by Trump that would restrict immigration, I posited that there was further reason to suspect that ethnonationalism was influencing this relationship.

Consistent with this expectation, I found that the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment on favorable estimations of Trump were likely to be especially salient among Whites who exhibited the most ethnonationalist beliefs. The findings thus lend empirical weight to the theoretical model outlined by Bonikowski (2017), where he posits that the political activation of ethnonationalist beliefs is likely to be dependent on the manner in which political elites frame immigration. In other words, when Whites who possess a salient set of beliefs

concerning what it means to be a “true” American are exposed to frames from Trump, which convey immigration a threat to America’s national identity, they make the connection between their latent beliefs and their fears of those (i.e., immigrants) who do not meet the criterion for being “true” members of national *ethnos*. Thus, when it comes to gauging the effects of anti-immigrant attitudes on favorable estimations of Trump, it is not surprising to find that these effects are made more salient by higher levels of ethnonationalism.

In sum, the findings presented here offer an additional explanation for why so many Whites continue exhibit robust levels of opposition to immigration. While concerns related to the robustness of America’s national identity have not played a focal role in the contemporary literature on White immigration opinion, a centerpiece of Trump’s campaign and subsequent Presidency has been to denigrate those that he does not see as “true” Americans, whether it be by calling Ted Cruz an ‘anchor baby’ during the 2016 Republican primaries (Diamond 2016), or Tweeting at four Democratic Congresswomen to ‘go back to their own countries’ (Yglesias 2019). Beliefs regarding whether criteria such as being born in the US make one “truly American” appear to be similarly distributed among the broader White adult populace and have been shown in this paper to be strongly predictive of White opposition to immigration across a variety of measures. While Whites with salient levels of ethnonationalism exhibit high levels of generalized anti-immigrant sentiment and are more supportive of policies that would restrict immigration, this belief system also influences favorable estimations of Trump himself. This may seem to indicate that frames promoted by radical actors such as Trump are proving increasingly successful at mobilizing Whites concerned about the threat that immigration poses to the robustness of American national identity.

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

Supplemental Information for Ethnonationalism and White Immigration



Attitudes

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Figures A1.1-4: Distribution of Responses to Ethnonationalism Items from 2016 ANES

(Whites Only)





Source: 2016 ANES

A2: Bivariate Correlations for Ethnonationalism Items

Table A2: Bivariate Correlations for Ethnonationalism Items

	Truly American: Born in US	Truly American: American ancestry	Truly American: Speak English	Truly American: US customs and traditions
Truly American: Born in US	1			
Truly American: American ancestry	.715***	1		
Truly American: Speak English	.419***	.406***	1	
Truly American: US customs and traditions	.444***	.454***	.580***	1

Notes: Table entries are Pearson's pairwise correlation coefficient estimates. Asterisks indicate a statistically significant pairwise correlation (***) $p < .001$. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are unweighted.

Source: 2016 ANES

A3: Bivariate Correlations for Ethnonationalism, Ethnocentrism, and White Consciousness Measures

Table A4: Bivariate Correlations for Ethnonationalism, Ethnocentrism, and White Consciousness Measures

	Ethnonationalism	Ethnocentrism	White consciousness
Ethnonationalism	1		
Ethnocentrism	.420***	1	
White consciousness	.485***	.431***	1

Notes: Table entries are Pearson's pairwise correlation coefficient estimates. Asterisks indicate a statistically significant pairwise correlation (***) $p < .001$. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are unweighted.

Source: 2016 ANES

A4: Assessing Posttreatment Bias with Inclusion of Controls for Hispanic and Undocumented Immigrant Affect

Table A4.1: OLS Estimates of Ethnonationalism on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (Checks for Posttreatment Bias)

	Anti-immigrant index
Ethnonationalism	.056*** (.006)
Ethnocentrism	.028*** (.006)
White consciousness	.028*** (.005)
Feeling thermometer: Hispanics	-.039*** (.005)
Feeling thermometer: Illegal immigrants	-.025*** (.006)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.011* (.005)
Negative national economic evaluations	.026*** (.005)
Authoritarianism	.015** (.004)
Party ID	.021** (.007)
Ideology (conservative)	.024** (.007)
Age	-.014** (.004)
Female	-.001 (.004)
Education	-.024*** (.005)
Income	-.001 (.005)
Unemployed	-.007 (.006)
Born again	.010* (.005)
South	-.007 (.004)
Constant	.391*** (.004)
R²	.556
N	2,011

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES.

A4.2: Ordered Probit Estimates of Ethnonationalism and Support for Restrictionist

Immigration Policies (Checks for Posttreatment Bias)

	Build wall with Mexico	Send back children brought illegally to US	End birthright citizenship
Ethnonationalism	.828*** (.179)	.335* (.137)	.378* (.156)
Ethnocentrism	1.603*** (.464)	1.231** (.098)	.821* (.400)
White consciousness	.069 (.159)	-.007 (.147)	.242 (.154)
Feeling thermometer: Hispanics	-.054 (.192)	-.672*** (.170)	-.467** (.158)
Feeling thermometer: Illegal immigrants	-.853*** (.170)	-1.073*** (.173)	-.780*** (.141)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.041 (.031)	.030 (.030)	.041 (.029)
Negative national economic evaluations	.240*** (.039)	.097* (.038)	.049 (.036)
Authoritarianism	.272 (.148)	.506*** (.143)	-.030 (.142)
Party ID	1.065*** (.138)	.188 (.135)	.333** (.121)
Ideology (conservative)	.798*** (.193)	.702** (.208)	.516** (.186)
Age	.498*** (.134)	-.334* (.135)	.420** (.125)
Female	-.185** (.063)	-.089 (.059)	-.047 (.057)
Education	-.729** (.241)	-.492* (.238)	-.037 (.227)
Income	-.054 (.135)	.200 (.130)	.201 (.131)
Unemployed	-.604** (.178)	-.082 (.157)	-.129 (.166)
Born again	.139 (.072)	.015 (.070)	-.024 (.067)
South	-.013 (.065)	-.015 (.063)	-.037 (.063)
/cut1	2.048 [.381]	.201 [.367]	.171 [.343]
/cut2	2.412 [.380]	1.365 [.366]	.635 [.342]
/cut3	2.494 [.381]	1.797 [.366]	.744 [.342]
/cut4	3.246 [.380]	1.938 [.367]	1.562 [.344]
/cut5	3.336 [.381]	2.503 [.367]	1.642 [.344]
/cut6	3.787 [.383]	.	2.088 [.344]
Pseudo R^2	.213	.126	.079
N	2,010	1,996	2,013

Notes: Table entries are ordered probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

Table A4.3: OLS Estimates of the Interaction Between Anti-Immigrant and Ethnonationalism Scales on Feelings Towards Trump (Checks for Posttreatment Bias)

	Trump thermometer
Anti-immigrant	.040*** (.008)
Ethnonationalism	.024* (.009)
Ethnonationalism x anti-immigrant	.008* (.005)
Ethnocentrism	.023* (.011)
White consciousness	.010 (.008)
Feeling thermometer: Hispanics	.016* (.007)
Feeling thermometer: Illegal immigrants	-.035*** (.008)
Negative personal economic evaluations	-.003 (.006)
Negative national economic evaluations	.047*** (.007)
Authoritarianism	.006 (.006)
Party ID	.115*** (.010)
Ideology (conservative)	.070*** (.010)
Age	.005 (.006)
Female	-.014* (.005)
Education	-.017* (.006)
Income	-.015* (.007)
Unemployed	-.010 (.008)
Born again	.012 (.006)
South	.015** (.005)
Constant	.432*** (.008)
Adjusted R^2	.644
N	2,005

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

A5: Full Model Estimates for Relationship Between Ethnonationalism and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Table A5: OLS Estimates of Ethnonationalism on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

	Anti-immigrant index
Ethnonationalism	.072*** (.006)
Ethnocentrism	.047*** (.006)
White consciousness	.026*** (.005)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.011 (.005)
Negative national economic evaluations	.032*** (.005)
Authoritarianism	.017** (.005)
Party ID	.023** (.007)
Ideology (conservative)	.028*** (.007)
Age	-.014** (.005)
Female	-.005 (.004)
Education	-.025*** (.005)
Income	-.002 (.006)
Unemployed	-.007 (.006)
Born again	.007 (.005)
South	-.007 (.004)
Constant	.393*** (.005)
R²	.523
N	2,107

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$
** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

A6: Robustness Test for Effects of Ethnonationalism on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Table A6.1: Controls for Perceived Job Insecurity and Cut to Working Hours/Pay

	Anti-immigrant index
Ethnonationalism	.078*** (.007)
Ethnocentrism	.048*** (.006)
White consciousness	.030*** (.006)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.007 (.007)
Negative national economic evaluations	.034*** (.006)
Authoritarianism	.012 (.006)
Party ID	.021* (.009)
Ideology (conservative)	.025** (.009)
Age	-.019** (.007)
Female	-.005 (.005)
Education	-.030*** (.007)
Income	-.002 (.007)
Perceived job insecurity	.003 (.007)
Had working hours/pay cut	.003 (.006)
Born again	.001 (.006)
South	-.004 (.005)
Constant	.395*** (.007)
R²	.551
N	1,338

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites in employment only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

Table A6.2: Controls for Subjective Class ID

	Anti-immigrant index
Ethnonationalism	.072*** (.006)
Ethnocentrism	.047*** (.006)
White consciousness	.026*** (.005)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.010 (.005)
Negative national economic evaluations	.032*** (.005)
Authoritarianism	.017** (.005)
Party ID	.023** (.007)
Ideology (conservative)	.028*** (.007)
Age	-.014** (.005)
Female	-.005 (.004)
Education	-.024*** (.005)
Income	-.001 (.006)
Unemployed	-.007 (.006)
Working-class	.003 (.005)
Born again	.007 (.005)
South	-.007 (.004)
Constant	.392*** (.005)
R²	.523
N	2,017

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites in employment only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

A7: Full Model Estimates for Relationship Between Ethnonationalism and Support for Restrictionist Immigration Policies

A7: Ordered Probit Estimates of Ethnonationalism and Support for Restrictionist

Immigration Policies

	Build wall with Mexico	Send back children brought illegally to US	End birthright citizenship
Ethnonationalism	1.059*** (.174)	.723*** (.158)	.648*** (.149)
Ethnocentrism	2.221*** (.475)	2.368*** (.391)	1.616*** (.406)
White consciousness	.026 (.158)	-.062 (.147)	.197 (.153)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.039 (.030)	.032 (.030)	.035 (.029)
Negative national economic evaluations	.264*** (.038)	.141*** (.038)	.076* (.036)
Authoritarianism	.309* (.147)	.560*** (.142)	.031 (.141)
Party ID	1.107*** (.135)	.236 (.132)	.377** (.122)
Ideology (conservative)	.924*** (.191)	.847*** (.198)	.627** (.182)
Age	.477*** (.129)	-.336** (.127)	.397** (.124)
Female	-.191** (.062)	-.119* (.058)	-.069 (.056)
Education	-.756** (.235)	-.537* (.232)	-.085 (.225)
Income	-.049 (.130)	.171 (.126)	.193 (.129)
Unemployed	-.619*** (.172)	-.105 (.158)	-.145 (.160)
Born again	.103 (.071)	-.037 (.070)	-.059 (.067)
South	-.007 (.065)	-.020 (.063)	-.045 (.062)
/cut1	3.030 [.352]	2.087 [.299]	1.506 [.296]
/cut2	3.388 [.353]	3.214 [.302]	1.962 [.295]
/cut3	3.468 [.354]	3.630 [.303]	2.069 [.295]
/cut4	4.213 [.354]	3.765 [.304]	2.879 [.298]
/cut5	4.301 [.354]	4.324 [.308]	2.957 [.299]
/cut6	4.746 [.357]	.	3.390 [.300]
Pseudo R^2	.207	.105	.068
N	2,016	2,002	2,019

Notes: Table entries are ordered probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

A8: Robustness Test for Effects of Ethnonationalism on Support for Restrictionist

Immigration Policies

Table A9: Support for Anti-LGBT Policies

	Right to deny service to same sex couples	Transgender individuals should use bathroom of gender born with
Ethnonationalism	-.126 (.162)	.062 (.166)
Ethnocentrism	.375 (.472)	1.398*** (.496)
White consciousness	-.237 (.171)	-.048 (.165)
Negative personal economic evaluations	.044 (.030)	.018 (.032)
Negative national economic evaluations	.024 (.040)	.110** (.041)
Authoritarianism	-.310* (.153)	.024 (.152)
Moral traditionalism	1.874*** (.190)	1.936*** (.190)
LGBTQI+ family member or friend	-.248*** (.064)	-.313*** (.065)
Party ID	.795*** (.138)	.506*** (.136)
Ideology (conservative)	.842*** (.210)	.772*** (.214)
Age	-.161 (.137)	-.229 (.139)
Female	-.131* (.061)	-.248*** (.063)
Education	.235 (.238)	-.425 (.235)
Income	.129 (.132)	-.094 (.121)
Unemployed	-.087 (.179)	-.181 (.155)
Born again	.434*** (.078)	.339*** (.081)
South	.107 (.066)	.064 (.069)
/cut1	1.144 [.338]	1.388 [.343]
/cut2	1.643 [.337]	2.200 [.343]
/cut3	1.767 [.336]	2.566 [.342]
/cut4	2.038 [.336]	2.724 [.342]
/cut5	2.694 [.335]	3.202 [.345]
Pseudo R^2	.180	.211
N	1,990	1,954

Notes: Table entries are ordered probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

A9: Full Model Estimates for Interaction Between Anti-Immigrant and Ethnonationalist Attitudes on Feelings Towards Trump

Table A9: OLS Estimates of the Interaction Between Anti-Immigrant and Ethnonationalism Scales on Feelings Towards Trump

	Trump thermometer
Anti-immigrant	.042*** (.009)
Ethnonationalism	.030*** (.008)
Ethnonationalism x anti-immigrant	.006* (.002)
Ethnocentrism	.027* (.012)
White consciousness	.009 (.008)
Negative personal economic evaluations	-.004 (.007)
Negative national economic evaluations	.050*** (.007)
Authoritarianism	.008 (.006)
Party ID	.118*** (.010)
Ideology (conservative)	.075*** (.010)
Age	.009 (.006)
Female	-.014* (.005)
Education	-.017** (.006)
Income	-.013 (.007)
Unemployed	-.011 (.008)
Born again	.010 (.006)
South	.015** (.005)
Constant	.436*** (.008)
Adjusted R^2	.639
N	2,011

Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted. * $p < .05$
** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Source: 2016 ANES

