Embedding Neoliberalism in Greece: the Transformation of Collective Bargaining and Labour Market Policy in Greece during the Eurozone Crisis


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Abstract:
This paper examines the current struggles between labour and capital in Greece within the broader context of attempts to integrate Southern Europe into the neoliberal project of European integration (EMU). In the absence of institutional mechanisms – such as institutions of ‘competitive corporatism’ – to restrain organized labour and embed neoliberalism in Greece, the austerity measures imposed on Greece by the Troika of the EU, ECB and the IMF are precipitating an internal devaluation of labour costs through the institution transformation of collective bargaining institutions, the flexibilization of labour markets and further embedding neoliberalism through the creation of National Competitiveness Boards.

Introduction

As a macro-economic policy paradigm oriented towards the strengthening of competitive market forces, neoliberalism entails a degree of institutionalization that shields economic policy making from democratic pressures. As Cahill (2014, 106) points out, the ‘process of de-democratisation is at the heart of the socially embedded nature of neoliberalism and is central to its reproduction and durability.’ In this sense, neoliberalism is not so much about de-regulation as it is about ‘pro-market reregulation’ (Soederberg, Menz and Cerny 2011). The neoliberal project of European integration initially sought to ‘reregulate’ industrial relations through arrangements of ‘competitive corporatism’ in which ‘social partnerships’ between capital and labour were erected in order to subordinate labour’s demands to the imperatives of neoliberal competitiveness. In the countries of Southern Europe – in this case Greece – the institutions of collective bargaining that form the context of ‘social partnership’ are being ‘de-democratized’ by way of extensive state interference on the side of capital, and new institutions of governance are being erected to further institutionalize neoliberalism. Section one of this paper discusses the emergence of ‘competitive corporatism’ as a means of institutionalizing wage restraint by linking wage increases to increases in productivity. The ability of competitive corporatism to succeed in this regard varied across the Eurozone. Section two examines the failure of competitive corporatism in Greece during the late 1990s and early 2000s, when successive Greek governments attempted to introduce reforms to increase labour market flexibility. Section three examines the extent to which Troika-imposed austerity measures during the Eurozone crisis have succeeded in radically transforming labour markets and collective bargaining institutions in Greece. The final section discusses the new institutions of economic governance – in particular, the proposal to create National...
Competitiveness Boards – that are designed to embed neoliberalism in ways that have implications for the existence of social partnerships as well as the ability to move beyond neoliberalism.

1. Competitive Corporatism and Labor Market Reform in the Eurozone

The Eurozone crisis is playing out within a larger context of the contested processes of labor market reform that were introduced as part of European Monetary Union (EMU). In the 1980s and 1990s, the economies of Southern Europe witnessed the emergence of ‘social pacts’ or ‘social partnerships’ between capital and labour, seemingly reminiscent of the corporatist arrangements of Central and Northern Europe during the post-war period (Rhodes 1998; Pochet, Keune and Natali 2010; Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser 2011). Despite these formal similarities, however, the context of monetarist macro-economic policy ensured that such corporatist arrangements would remain oriented to a neoliberal, rather than Keynesian, set of policy objectives. The purpose of the renewed social pacts, however, was not to ‘guarantee a smooth interaction of macroeconomic policy (as in the Keynesian concept) but to increase the overall national competitiveness [of the economy] (Beiling and Schulten 2003, 239).’ Full employment in exchange for wage moderation was not, in other words, the goal of such corporatist arrangements. Instead, such ‘competitive corporatism’ was intended to ensure labour’s commitment to structural reforms – that is, labour market flexibilization – deemed necessary to increase the national competitiveness of individual European economies. Competitive corporatism is therefore part of a larger European agenda aimed at liberalizing labor markets with the stated goal of increasing European competitiveness.

The move towards competitive corporatism occurred in the context of the policy developments related to monetary union. In 1993, the Delors White Paper on Employment (DWP) was produced which outlined a commitment to create ‘double flexibilty’ in European labor markets in order to address the problem of chronic unemployment that had emerged in Europe over the course of the 1980s (European Commission 1993). In particular, the economies of Southern Europe needed to orient themselves toward the emerging ‘knowledge economy’ that was the objective of European economic policy by lowering the social security contributions of employers, enabling employers to hire workers on part-time and temporary bases, and ‘modernizing’ the forms of social protection that were characteristic of the Mediterranean variant of the European Social Model (Amable 2003). The high threshold of employment protection – both in terms of the costs as well as the labor market ‘rigidities’ they create – was considered an impediment to increasing the competitiveness of Southern European economies (Talani and Cervino 2003). In particular, the paper stated that ‘the laws on the conditions under which workers on unlimited contracts may be laid off need to be made more flexible’ (European Commission 1993, 17). Over the course of the 1990s, unions across Europe had to adjust to the changing macro-economic context of post-Maastricht integration, high unemployment, diminishing union capacities and a renewed employer offensive seeking greater labor flexibility (Martin and Ross 1999).

The commitment to create flexible labor markets was to be compensated for by a renewed commitment to social policy as outlined in the White Paper on Social Policy (WPSP) (European Commission 1994). The WPSP re-iterated the DWP’s commitment to ‘improving flexibility within enterprises and in the labour market’ and ‘targeted reductions in the indirect costs of labour (statutory contributions)’, but sought to compensate this increasing flexibility with improvements in ‘education and training systems, especially continuing training’ as well as the development of ‘measures concerning young people without adequate training’ (EC 1994, 9). Labor market flexibility would therefore be supplemented not with new social protection, but rather, with active
labor market policies geared towards enhancing skills development and competitiveness. Such measures, it was argued, would increase the ‘fit’ between unemployed workers and the changing nature of the labor market by enhancing the ‘human capital’ of the former in order to adapt more effectively to the latter. The underlying belief was that flexible labor markets would solve the bottlenecks that had come to plague the ‘Bismarckian’ welfare states of the continent (Palier 2010). Under the guise of ‘progressive competitiveness’, Social Democratic parties embraced the push towards labour market flexibility, considering it to be the most effective means of preserving the European Social Model (Albo 1997). However, in their ‘emphasis on ‘reform’ of benefit systems towards ‘active measures’, and their assumption of an immutable trade-off between job growth and labour flexibility or labour costs and the growth of jobs, both the DWP and WPSP echoed the neo-liberal positions expressed in OECD policy papers of the early 1990s (Gray 2004, 66).’

The neo-liberal commitment to labour market flexibility was carried over in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 despite the push by Sweden and the Netherlands for the inclusion of an ‘employment chapter’ to commit the EU to the policy objective of a ‘high level’ of employment (but not full employment). The employment chapter called for greater coordination between member states regarding employment policies, the creation of National Action Plans for Employment by member states and the development of ‘exchanges of information and best practices’. It was noted, however, that this process of coordination ‘shall not include harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States (European Commission 1997, 34).’

The emphasis on labour market reform also formed a significant element of the Lisbon Programme. Lisbon sought to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’. In regard to this, the 2003 report of the Employment Taskforce suggested that the discourse of Lisbon has ‘not been accompanied by the structural reforms needed for stable growth’ (Kok 2003, 3). With the impending incorporation of a number of semi-peripheral states into the Eurozone in 2004 (including Greece), this raised significant problems regarding balanced growth that the report sought to address. At the European level, the report urged governments to increase competitiveness by creating ‘business environments that support entrepreneurship, innovation and encourage investment in R&D and sufficient flexibility while ensuring genuine security on the labour market (Employment Taskforce 2003, 18).’ This would require processes of ‘social mobilisation’ around reform agendas, and require all relevant actors to make concessions and contributions to the reform process. In particular, workers would have to ‘agree to more diversified contractual and working arrangements, increased mobility, deferred exit from the labour market, wage moderation and differentiation (Employment Taskforce 2003, 57).’ For Greece in particular, the report proposed a further reduction of its non-wage labour costs and the elimination of obstacles to part-time work. By 2005, the policy objective of labour market reform had moved from an implicit objective to a policy priority. Yet, the EU lacked the institutional mechanisms to enforce convergence around labour market flexibility. In the absence of such mechanisms, labour market reform remained the prerogative of national governments. It is in this context of the European push towards neoliberal labour market policies that Greece enters into a period of attempted reforms.

2. Collective Bargaining and Labour Market Reform in Pre-Crisis Greece

By the mid-1990s, Greece was registering levels of economic growth well above the Eurozone average and labour costs were among the lowest in the Eurozone. However, unemployment levels continued to rise, peaking at just under 12 per cent in 1999, and while labour productivity was on
the rise, Greek workers still lagged behind their German counterparts. As such, the decade of 1994-2004 signified an attempt to liberalize the Greek economy – particularly through labour market reforms, pension reforms and reforms to collective bargaining – through the establishment of a social partnership between the state, capital and labour. In other Southern European countries – Spain, Portugal and Italy for example – social pacts were the basis of liberalization; they were the means of getting organized labour to consent to the dismantling of the forms of employment protection that had come to characterize the Mediterranean model (Locke and Baccaro 1999; Fraile 1999; Rhodes 2001; Pochet, Keune and Natali 2010). In Greece, despite the growing consensus amongst employers that greater labour market flexibility was desirable, liberalization met with resistance from both the unions and inaction by PASOK governments. Lavdas attributes this to the ‘disjointed’ nature of Greek corporatism, in which the labour movement remains internally divided within its peak associations. Pagoulatos (2003) prefers to characterize Greek political economy in pluralist terms – identifying it as a form of ‘parentela pluralism’ characterized by highly fragmented and rent-seeking forms of interest mediation. Regardless of how we characterize the terrain of interest mediation, the fact remains that attempts to create a form of competitive corporatism that would oversee the liberalization process failed, thereby frustrating attempts at reform.

In an attempt to meet the Maastricht criteria for entering the EMU, a new series of reforms was put on the agenda by the newly elected PASOK government in 1996. The Confidence Pact of 1997 established a tripartite process of social dialogue between representatives from the private sector trade unions, employer associations and the state. On the agenda were a series of labor market reforms aimed at reducing unemployment, improving social protection and increasing competitiveness. The most controversial proposals related to the introduction of part-time labor in the public sector, the recalculation of working time and the introduction of Territorial Employment Pacts (TEPs) that could set wages below the standards established in the National Collective Agreement. Private sector unions opposed the proposal that TEPs could undermine national wage levels while public sector unions in the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY) opposed the increase in part-time employment. Both unions advocated the creation of a 35 hour work week with no cut in pay and sought new restrictions on compulsory and voluntary overtime. The employer associations, in contrast, sought more radical moves towards part-time employment as well as reductions in employer contributions to national insurance. The Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) sought a lower threshold on collective redundancies, a reduction in severance payments and the weakening of the favorability principle embedded in the TEPs. In the course of the negotiations, it became apparent that ‘the employers regarded high unit costs and the inflexibilities of the Greek labour market as a brake on the competitiveness of Greek businesses’, while the unions ‘argued that the cost of employment in Greece was among the lowest in the EU and that the competitiveness of the Greek economy would be better served through increased productivity, not the deregulation of Greek labour market’ (Featherstone and Papdimitriou 2008: 129).

The government struggled to reach a consensus between the social partners. In the end, the GSEE signed the Pact only after the PASOK-affiliated president of the confederation (and head of the PASKE union) employed his double vote. Among the employer groups, the GSEVEE refused to sign. As a result, the Pact remained a vague agreement regarding some very general targets. The issue of working time was dropped from the final document, and part-time public sector employment was re-cast to refer to ‘voluntary’ part-time work. The TEPs were prevented from

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1 ILO KILM index.
weakening the favourability principle established by the national collective agreements. At the end of the process, therefore, the Pact failed to substantively push forward the policy objectives of labour market flexibility.

In 1998, shortly after GSEE elections resulted in the narrow re-election of PASKE’s president as president of the confederation, new proposals for labour market reforms were unveiled by the Ministry of Labour. The proposals signified a return to policy proposals that were rejected in the Confidence Pact: a two hour extension of the work-day (albeit with the consent of the unions, as opposed to the managerial prerogative proposed by SEV); a reintroduction of TEPs; unlimited part-time employment (against the 20% limit proposed by the GSEE); and the creation of private employment agencies. Against the wishes of SEV, there was no reintroduction of the lowering of the threshold of collective dismissals. This move towards greater flexibility was to be compensated by greater ‘security’ in the form of limited social protection. Predictably, the unions were enraged that the new law either contravened to Confidence Pact or introduced new measures that were absent in the pact. On the other hand, employers’ associations – particularly SEV – felt that the reforms did not go far enough to satisfy their interests.

More labour market reforms were tabled by PASOK in 2000 that sought to abolish union consent regarding increases in working time, lower the threshold of collective dismissals, and reduce employer contributions to social insurance. The social dialogue was to be considerably shortened and assume the form of bilateral discussions with unions and employer associations (as opposed to the tripartite arrangement of 1997). These proposals were met with hostility by the unions. The GSEE resisted the dialogue on grounds of both the process and the content of the reforms and promised a ‘hot autumn’. Government attempts at salvaging the talks by moderating its reform agenda were unsuccessful as the GSEE abandoned the dialogue and held a one day general strike on 10 October 2000. Once again, the attempt at compromise failed to impress SEV, which argued that the government’s moderated proposals would result in a significant rise in labour costs. The government revisited its agenda in the context of the strike and invited the social partners for another round of dialogue, again to no avail. In the context of failed social dialogue, the government went ahead and pushed its labour market reforms through parliament, ‘with the initial proposals slightly amended in order to take into account the diverging views of the social partners (Ioannou, 2010: 90).’ In response, the unions held another 24 hour general strike on 7 December 2000 – the day of the parliamentary debate. The outcome of the legislative process was mixed, due to revisions to the bill suggested by the Economic and Social Committee (OKE). Collective redundancies and part-time employment survived the changes proposed by OKE, but changes to overtime bonuses and working time regulation provisions did not. At the end of the process, relations between the PASOK government and the social partners had been significantly damaged, as evidenced by the government’s embarrassing failure to broker a reform of the pension system the following year and their subsequent defeat to New Democracy in 2004. New Democracy sought prioritize the interests of employers’ associations by increasing managerial prerogative over the calculation of working time, a move that alienated even the New Democracy faction within the leadership of the GSEE.

In the end, attempts at liberalization through concertation – despite the existence of tripartite arrangements like the OKE, and national pacts such as the Confidence Pact of 1997 and the social dialogue of 2000 and 2001 – were widely regarded as a failure. The reform process alienated the labour movement, failed to fully appease the employers’ associations, and left the structural features of the Greek political economy relatively untouched. At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, then, the Greek economy, despite demonstrating levels of growth
above the EU average, was characterized by persistently high unemployment, rising labour costs, and a failed and increasingly antagonistic process of labour market reform that would set the stage for the conflict to come.


The European response to the Eurozone crisis saw a renewed commitment to austerity through the development of economic ‘governance’. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), announced in December 2011 and signed in March 2012, signified a commitment by member states to ‘strengthen the economic pillar of the economic and monetary union’ by demonstrating fiscal discipline as well as increasing the coordination of the economic policies of member states (TSCG 2012, article 1). The treaty bolstered the previous constraints embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact by committing signatory governments to eliminating what economists have called the ‘structural deficit.’ As a medium-term objective, the new pact required member states to have a budget either in balance or in surplus, defined in terms of a ‘lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices (TSCG 2012, article 3.1(b)).’ While this is not the place to explore the mechanics of the structural deficit, critics have argued that the TSCG acts to further lock in constraints intended to keep governments on the path of austerity (Radice 2014). What is clear is that the treaty binds contracting states to ‘take the necessary actions and measures in all the areas which are essential to the proper functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability (Title IV, article 9).’ This requires a renewed commitment to economic coordination.

In regards to peripheral countries like Greece, the strategy of European elites has been to use the crisis as a means of transforming debtor economies into more competitive market performers. As the promised ‘convergence’ of the EMU has not materialized, structural adjustment policies have been formulated to radically transform labour and product markets, resulting in the weakening of organized labour vis-à-vis Greek and European capital. As mentioned above, Eurozone elites have been pushing an agenda of labour market flexibility since the 1990s. So too has the IMF. As early as 2000, the IMF, while lauding the reform efforts in Greece at the time, lamented the ‘poor performance of the [Greek] labor market’, emphasizing that while the reforms of the period were ‘welcome’, they ‘have not led to the hoped for turnaround, in particular for the segments most affected by very high unemployment rates (the young and women) and for the long-term unemployed (IMF 2000).’ In light of this poor performance, the IMF proposed, among other measures, ‘a reduction in the relatively severe firing restrictions and sometimes overly bureaucratic hiring regulations – which hamper employment chances especially for new market entrants’ (IMF 2000). In other words, according to the IMF, employment protection characteristic of ‘rigid’ Greek labour markets impeded economic growth and job creation.

In the early stages of the reform process, the Fund predictably noted that labour market reforms were crucial to ‘restoring competitiveness and boosting potential growth’. It also noted, however, that the primary challenges that the government would face in implementing its program was to be able to ‘overcome resistance from entrenched vested interests to opening-up of closed professions, deregulation, implementation of the services directive, and elimination of barriers to development of tourism and retail (IMF 2010a).’ By November 2010, the IMF re-iterated its call for Greece to make further progress on labour market and collective bargaining reforms in order
to enhance ‘competitiveness, reinvigorate output, and increase employment’, noting that the reform movement had reached a ‘critical juncture’ and that, in order for Greece to be transformed into a ‘dynamic and export-driven economy…skillful design and political resolve’ would be required ‘to overcome entrenched interests (IMF 2010b).’ Almost five years later, in its April 2015 World Economic Outlook, the IMF continued to promote the line that increasing the flexibility of labor markets would ‘strengthen external competitiveness’ in the EU’s debtor economies, while strengthening investment and employment in the EU’s creditor economies.

A key ingredient in the liberalization of Greek labour markets, therefore, is a transformation of the institutions and practices of collective bargaining. In this regard, Greece is not exceptional; the attack on established institutions and practices of collective bargaining has occurred across the Eurozone throughout the period of the crisis (Eurofound, 2014; Hermann, 2014; Keune 2015). Greece is perhaps merely the most contested case of neoliberal transformation. The Eurozone crisis has thus affected Greek collective bargaining practices and institutions in a number of significant ways. First, the hierarchy of multi-level wage setting based on the favourability clause in Law 1867/1990 – stipulating that regional and firm level wage bargaining could not fall below the levels agreed to at the national and sectoral levels – has been progressively undermined to increase the fragmentation of wage setting practices. Since the onset of the crisis, a process of ‘derogation’, in which firm level agreements increasingly diverge from sectoral standards, has taken place. Secondly, the power to determine the minimum wage has been taken away from the social partners and has become a matter of government legislation, rendering the social partnership increasingly meaningless. Thirdly, existing collective agreements have been subject to arbitrary legislative annulment – particularly as a means of enforcing public sector wage freezes. Fourthly, the extent of collective bargaining coverage has declined. Fifthly, the length of time in which an expired collective agreement remains in force has been reduced. And lastly, the rights of unions to collectively bargain at the firm level have been progressively weakened.

**Collective Bargaining and Wage Setting**

In terms of wage bargaining mechanisms, the process of undermining the nationally established ‘favourability clause’ through a process of ‘derogation’ has occurred through a number of progressive stages. Since 1990, Greek industrial relations were governed by multi-level collective wage bargaining in which firm and sectoral collective agreements could not deviate from nationally established standards if the former resulted in a deterioration of the gains won by workers. On 17 December 2010, the PASOK government passed Law 3899/2010, an aspect of which brought in ‘special company collective agreements’ that weakened nationally established labor standards under the rubric of increasing ‘competitiveness’ and reducing unemployment. Law 3899/2010 amended 1876/1990 by stipulating that, under special company collective agreements ‘remuneration and working conditions may deviate from the relevant sector collective agreement up to the level of the general national collective agreement (ILO 1990).’

With this amendment, article 10 of 1876/1990, – the ‘favourability clause’ – as well as other articles referring to the scope of collective agreements ‘do not apply’ to special company collective agreements.’ This suspension of the favourability clause will be in place ‘until at least end-2015, [sic] in such a manner that firm-level agreements take precedence over sectoral and occupational agreements (Greece 2011b, 16).’ The stated purpose of such ‘derogation’, the amendment states, is to enable firm level collective agreements to ‘take into account the necessity
of improving firms’ adaptability to market conditions, with a view to create or preserve jobs and improve the firm’s competitiveness (ILO 1990).’ In 2011, the government sought to assess the performance of the new special firm-level collective agreements and ensure that they ‘contribute to align wage developments with productivity developments at firm level, thereby promoting competitiveness and creating and preserving jobs (Greece 2011a, 51).’

The politics of the crisis have also undermined what existed of the social partnership. Since the 1950s, General National Collective Agreements (EGSEEs) have traditionally been negotiated between the national level peak associations of labour (GSEE) and capital (SEV and ESEE). One of the key areas of this bargaining process is the minimum wage. In November 2012, however, the coalition government of New Democracy-PASOK-DIMAR passed law 4093/2012 that granted to government the power of determining the minimum wage. At the beginning of 2013, the government reduced the monthly minimum wage by 22% (32% for those under 25 years of age) and either abolished or froze all allowances – such as marriage, education, children’s, etc. – that had previously been the basis of collective bargaining (Eurofound, 2013b: 25). As a result, the significance of the EGSEE has greatly deteriorated. While still serving – in principle – as the floor beneath which sectoral, occupational and enterprise level collective agreements cannot fall, the substance of the EGSEE has been significantly gutted due to legislative interference in the ability of the social partners to negotiate. In July 2013, a new EGSSE was agreed between most of the social partners (GSEE, GSEVEE, ESEE and SETE). SEV refused to sign the agreement, stating that the ESEE had no ‘legal foundation’ due to the current legislative changes and therefore did not provide any benefits to employees. This represents the first time that a national agreement has not incorporated the minimum wage; and never before has a national agreement had such limited content.

Trade Union Rights of Representation

On 25 October 2011, the PASOK government passed Law 4024/2011, introducing further amendments that undermine the rights of unions to represent workers in collective bargaining. First, the ‘special enterprise collective agreements’ were silently abolished, due to their limited uptake. Nikolopoulos and Patra (2012) suggest that one of the reasons for the failure of the special enterprise collective agreement was the costly and bureaucratic process of creating enterprise level trade unions – where none previously existed – in order to negotiate such agreements. The new law makes it easier for employers in firms employing less than fifty workers, where no unions are present, to enter into collective agreements with ‘associations of persons’, thereby allowing them to bypass unions altogether and undermine the principle of democratic, collective representation. Legislation from the 1980s (Law 1264/1982) enabled employers to conclude agreements with ‘associations of persons’, but only under certain conditions: they could be concluded only in the absence of a labour union; pertain to the resolution of a specific issue; and exist for a limited period of time. Law 4024/2011 significantly weakens the criteria that must be met in order to conclude these non-union based collective agreements. Most important, the law eliminated previous limits to the lifespan of such associations of persons, turning them into ‘nebulous non-elected’ entities that facilitate the ability of employers to drive down wages and benefits in an attempt to increase competitiveness through a reduction in labour costs – which is, of course, the intention of the structural reform process (Lanara, 2012: 8). Indeed, evidence suggests that small business has

\footnote{SETE is the newly formed Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises.}
One commentator has characterized Law 4024/2011 as ‘one more step toward the demolition of two of the most powerful pieces of legislation to be enacted in Greece since 1974: laws 1264/82 and 1876/90 (Kopsini 2011).’

Expansion and extension of Collective Agreements

Article 11 of 1876/1990 includes provisions for the joint ‘accession’ of workers and employers to pre-existing collective agreements that pertain to them. Sections 2 and 3 of the same article also contain provisions for the extension of the scope of collective agreements, determined by the Minister of Labour in consultation with the High Council of Labour, to include workers and employers in an entire sector or occupation regardless of whether or not they were unionized. In a communication to the IMF in the autumn of 2011, the government indicated that ‘the possibility to extend sectoral agreements to those not represented in the negotiations will be suspended for a period until at least end-2014 [the duration of the Medium Term Financial Strategy] (Greece 2011b, 16).’ Secondly, the duration in which the terms of a collective agreement remain in force upon expiration of the agreement have also been reduced. Under previous legislation, the terms of an expired agreement remained in force for six months; and even after the six month period, the conditions of work stipulated in the collective agreement continued to apply ‘until the termination or amendment of individual employment contracts (Papadimitriou 2013, 16).’ Law 4046/2012 reduces the extension period to three months, and the continuation of the conditions of work after the expiration of the three month period does not include all work conditions, but only a portion of the salary. On 2 July, 2015, the Syriza government passed Law 4331/2015 which repealed the amendments of 4046/2012, effectively restoring the provisions of 1876/1990. However, the Euro Summit statement of 12 July 2015 – after the capitulation of Syriza after their resounding ‘victory’ in the 5 July austerity referendum – demanded a return to the austerity legislation of 4046/2012 by 15 September 2015.

Labour Market Flexibility

On 11 May 2010, the government passed Law 3846/2010. This act legalized new ‘flexible’ labour arrangements, such as part-time work, telework, and the use of temporary employment agencies. Much of this falls outside the purview of collective bargaining and furthers the development of ‘precariousness’ and was intended to reduce unemployment under the neoliberal belief that unemployment is the result of labour market ‘rigidities’. Law 3899/2010, passed in December 2010, contains measures that significantly increase the power of employers over workers, thereby magnifying the problems of precariousness in the Greek economy. The bill extends probationary periods from 2 to 12 months, increasing the amount of time in which workers can be arbitrarily dismissed without compensation; it extends the duration of temporary contract work from 18 to 36 months, thereby reducing the incentives for employers to hire workers on a permanent basis; and the bill lengthens the period of time in which the employer possesses unilateral power over labour time flexibility from six to nine months.
Law 3863/2010, passed on 15 July 2010, weakens the restrictions of collective dismissals, making it easier for employers to lay off workers. Previous legislation allowed employers to dismiss up to 4 workers per month in firms employing between 20 and 200 workers (and up to 2 per cent of the workforce for larger firms). The new law raises the threshold to 6 for firms employing between 20 and 150 employees, and 5 per cent of the workforce for firms employing more than 150 workers. Greece’s ranking in the OECD index of employment protection legislation for individual and collective dismissals has registered a decline from 2.80 (out of 5) in 2010 to 2.11 by 2013. It also shortens the duration of the layoff notification period and reduces the amount of severance pay for laid off workers. The special company collective agreements legalized by 3899/2010 in December 2010 also increased the power of employers over workers in terms of their control over the working time – an issue that, as we have seen, was a contentious issue during the reform processes of the early 2000s. The special firm-level collective agreement ‘may regulate the number of employment positions, the conditions of part-time work, shift part-time work, suspension of work, and any other terms of implementation including its duration term (ILO 1990).’

The State of Collective Bargaining in Greece

All of these changes have had a severe impact on collective bargaining in Greece. On the one hand, the number of national, sectoral and occupation collective agreements has declined. In 2014, only 11 such agreements were in place, representing between 7 to 10 per cent of the private sector workforce, compared to 161, covering almost all of Greek private sector workers in 2008. As one commentator pointed out, those collective agreements that do remain in force, ‘foresee significant reductions to salaries, to say nothing of any bonuses or special salaries that used to be the norm in the past (Salourou 2014).’ In contrast to this, the number of firm level collective agreements has significantly increased since 2012. According to Eurofound, 976 business level Collective Employment Agreements were signed in 2012, compared to 179 in 2011 and 238 in 2010. This represents a 75.6% increase in firm level agreements between 2010 and 2012.3

The decline of sectoral and occupational collective agreements, the disempowerment of trade unions as the representatives of workers, the abolition of the favourability clause, the amendment of the extension of collective agreements to non-unionized workers and the limiting of the duration of expired collective agreements has put significant downward pressure on the levels of remuneration and the working conditions of workers. A 2013 Eurofound report indicates that agreements signed since 2012 ‘were mainly signed following the termination by the employers of the previous collective agreements and contained provisions that were more disadvantageous for workers as regards wages and employment conditions (especially in relation to working time) (Eurofound 2013a, 74).’ As a result of these reforms, Greece has experienced the greatest decline in collective bargaining coverage of any OECD country. OECD data indicates that collective bargaining coverage in Greece has declined to just over 40% of the workforce in 2013, down from just over 80% in 2008 prior to the imposition of austerity measures (OECD 2016). This represents the greatest decline in collective bargaining coverage in the OECD over this period of time.

4. Institutionalizing Competitiveness: National Competitiveness Authorities

Attempts by the newly elected Syriza government to reverse the reforms to collective bargaining have been strenuously opposed by the Troika. After the resounding ‘No’ vote in the July referendum on the bailout agreement, the Troika called Syriza’s bluff and imposed even more stringent conditions on Greece. In May 2015, Minister of Labour Panagiotis Skourletis put together a series of proposals that would abolish the legislative mechanisms for determining the minimum wage, effectively giving back to the social partners the power to establish the minimum wage through national level bargaining; return the minimum wage to the level agreed in the 2010-2012 national collective agreement; re-instate the collective agreement extension mechanisms as well as the pre-existing provisions for prolonging the duration of existing collective agreements in the event of their non-renewal through bargaining; and a return to the pre-crisis status quo regarding mediation. Such reforms, however, were precluded by the language of the third bailout agreement signed by Syriza in the aftermath of the referendum, an agreement that gave the Troika the power to review all legislation before being submitted to parliament. As a result, the proposals never made it to the parliament.

In turn, the EU began developing new mechanisms of economic governance to further embed neoliberalism in each member state and preclude threats to austerity from left-wing governments like Syriza. The EU has initiated a renewed integration process that seeks to achieve a ‘genuine’ economic union by creating new institutions designed to institutionalize ‘competitiveness’ and enhance the ‘resilience’ of national economies. National Competitiveness Boards (NCBs) will be established in all Eurozone member states to act as ‘independent entities’ mandated to surveil policies related to national economic competitiveness. Such bodies will be comprised of ‘unbiased’ technocrats providing ‘high quality’ advice on economic policy. In this regard, the recommendation adopted by the EU proposes that ‘the scope of intervention of competitiveness boards should span a comprehensive notion of competitiveness (EC 2015, 3).’ In the initial report, the ‘five presidents’ suggest that the NCBs be mandated to ‘assess whether wages are evolving in line with productivity’ and to potentially ‘enhance competitiveness more generally (EC 2015, 8).’ In the broader context of neoliberalism, and the longer term trends in collective bargaining in Europe, ensuring that wages ‘evolve’ in line with productivity means ensuring that wages gains lag behind productivity gains. An important political dimension of the NCAs is to augment what the EU refers to as national ‘ownership’ for the structural reforms for the enhancement of competitiveness.

There are a number of potential contradictions in the stated goals of the Competitiveness Authorities. According to the proposals, they are not intended to result in the harmonization of wage setting mechanisms or collective bargaining institutions. The adopted recommendation states that the NCAs ‘should not affect the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels or to take collective action in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices (EC 2015, 3).’ Each member state will have the space to retain their distinctive institutions and arrangements. The first thing to point out is that, in the more severely affected economies of the Eurozone – Greece in particular – free collective bargaining has either been effectively suspended or has been significantly curtailed and restrained under the auspices of austerity politics. At the same time, however, the NCAs are intended to ensure a harmonization of outcomes – that is, to ensure that wage increases lag behind productivity increases. This effectively ‘embeds’ the neoliberal logic of ‘competitiveness’ that was supposed to be institutionalized by the transformation of social
partnerships along the lines of ‘competitive corporatism’ (Bieling and Schulten). Secondly, NCAs are intended to be ‘democratically’ accountable; and it is proposed that they should include the social partners in the surveillance process to preserve the tradition of ‘social dialogue’. Yet, at the same time, they are intended to be ‘independent’ bodies that are ‘independent from the ministries or public authorities that deal with competitiveness-related issues (European Commission 2015, 3).’ There is, therefore, significant potential that the NCAs possess a mandate to enforce the EU level commitment to ‘competitiveness’ in ways that preclude alternatives that break from the neoliberal framework.

Conclusion

The failure of competitive corporatism in Greece as a means of subordinating labour to the dictates of neoliberal competitiveness has resulted in a dramatic process of ‘internal devaluation’ in the context of the Eurozone crisis. This process of internal devaluation has led to a radical assault on the institutions of Greek collective bargaining and a weakening of employment protection legislation. The goal is to drive down labour costs and strengthen the power of capital vis-à-vis labour. The contentious nature of the so-called reform process, and the attempts by Syriza to roll back austerity, has prompted Euro elites to construct new institutions of ‘economic governance’ as a means of institutionally embedding neoliberalism in Greece. National Competitiveness Boards – politically ‘independent’ and technocratic – are being developed that will intervene in the process of collective bargaining in order to ensure that, regardless of electoral outcomes, no government will be able to chart a path away from neoliberalism.

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