DOMINANT DECLINE AND REVISIONIST RISE: MODELS OF US-JAPAN ALIGNMENT AGAINST CHINA

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Abstract

Models of US-Japan alignment against China narrates postwar precedents pragmatically since hegemony hedges future threats to the power-transition. The power-transition—dominant decline unto revisionist rise—simply complicates interdependence amid Americanization. Americanization entices enmity whilst coopting coalitions. Coalitions—horizontal, diagonal, vertical—direct different units unto similar levels of analysis structuring strength with weakness against the power-transition. The power-transition thus models polarity by "calculated concentration" from " discernible distribution" beside "popular perception" so that empiricism establishes dominant decline ordinally to measure the threat of rising revisionism. Revisionism relevant to China chastises The US decline despite despotic desires preserving power amid Japan through The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game generally specifies asymmetric unilateralism by revisionist rise from Challenger China against dominant decline of Mediator US before Defender Japan thereafter through several sequential scenarios—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—intensifying escalation since outcomes originate ordinal Perfect Bayesian Equilibria despite Incomplete Information. Incomplete Information induces deductive discretion of "rational-choice" or "reckless-chance" over "loss-aversion" under "expected utility" threatening stability. Stability, or the lack thereof, fatefully foreshadows dominant decline and revisionist rise.

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Models of US-Japan alignment against China truly lie somewhere between historically hyped hysteria (Bernstein and Munro 1997; Lafeber 1997) unto formal formulations (Hayashi 2022; Honda 2017) amid the power-transition. The power-transition—between dominant decline and revisionist rise—readily available elsewhere eludes elucidation (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1988) since simultaneous stipulated static similarities (Honda 2013) despite dynamic differentials (Copeland 1996) defer defensiveness to offensive offers over more expected utility under less loss aversion on or off the world-system of units that structures analysis around inequalities by the core from periphery through the amorphous semi-peripheral equilibrium (Honda 2006). Semi-peripheral equilibrium—what literally lies true to form figurative core and periphery amidst—transcends theorization thus realized by economizing politics from some diabolical dialectic discoursing descriptive synthesis such that the power-transition transpositions new or old either way with realist revelations beside marxist messages already apparent beforehand hereafter.

Hereafter, elsewhere, *Theory of International Politics* structures analysis amid units traditionally economizing the modern world-system (Waltz 1979:38) with which discrepancies discern foretold fungibility by power from wealth (Baldwin 1993:20-22) whilst criticism also abounds even earlier through the odd latent attempts at atonement (Cox 1986; Keohane 1986) toward restatement or renewal (Frankel 1996). Renewal, renown, renounces reconciliation rather than thoughtful forbearance forbidden because bilateral belligerence beguiles the power-transition transduced amid dominant decline and rising revisionism in which wherewithal all around out of offense centers defense defunct through the uncertain perilous parity. Parity parlays *War and Change* (Gilpin 1981) challenging the power-transition noteworthy by rise from fall all the while what transpires transforms the world system structured amid analysis of levels under units unto core correlatives over peripheral perceptions or imaginary images that reflect reality.

Reality relays history theoretically through the furtive future forthright toward waywardness stipulating the power-transition. The power-transition traditionally traduced amid dominant decline and rising revisionism modernizes modality at attrition attributable to The Three United (Shannon 1996). The Three United—Provinces, Kingdom, States—situate sequential hegemonies hedging grudges since The Dutch East India Company onward aloof off The British Empire unto Postwar Americanization amidst disproportionate distribution describes deterministic dependent development throughout waves within cyclical concentration.

Cyclical concentration connotes delineative distribution discretionarily discerned despite dominant decline and rising revisionism much to the power-transition since slight trajectories stratify stability in that waves waver reality rather than theorize themes through truth out of folklore. Folklore foretells forsaken forbearance because bilateral belligerence between dominant decline and rising revisionism reveals reverence for ideology to justify materialistic motivations that sustain or

supplant the balance of power. The balance of power—almost always asymmetric—challenges stability stipulating polarity. Polarity—uni, bi, tri, multi—mitigates anarchy anachronistically amid *War and Change* (Gilpin 1981) despite "dynamic differentials" deferring static similarity simulcast at the beginning to *The End of History* (Fukuyama 1992).

History—previous, prevalent, present, presumptive—iterates idolatry idling the power-transition traditionally modernized amid and against liberalism (Honda 2019). Liberalism—classical, neoclassical, Fabian, Keynesian, Neo—literally economizes the figurative "Three United" whether Provinces or Kingdom unto States stipulating the power-transition across time/space. Time/space speculates that the power-transition transforms traditional modern world-systems analysis structuring units since statecraft stipulates rightward realist reaction rather than the theorized leftism of liberal liabilities. Liabilities assets the power-transition transforming markets made amid hegemony.

Hegemony hedges the rise and fall of great powers already alluded despite descriptive discernment to tell the truth with what lies betwixt beguiling bilateral belligerence. Bilateral belligerence belittles besieged grievances gravitating great power politics. Power politics tragically traditionalizes modernist melodramatic antics at attrition attributable to toppling top positions posited amid disparate desperation descriptive of measurable response by ambiguous strategies from extreme moderation. Moderation modulates the power-transition transposed amid dominant decline and rising revisionism much to the dismay of offense-defense deficiency. Deficiency—defective, defunct, defiled—defies definitions over the power-transition under rising revisionism amid dominant decline descriptive of effective effervescence necessary for force.

Force—functionality, fungibility, futility—fulfills fuel for dynamic differentials despite simultaneous static similarities accelerating rated rise or fall that slights great powers prolifically perfunctory per polarity. Polarity—analysis over the number of units under systems structured—dependently determines dominant decline amid rising revisionism reverently rational rather emotive since situation stipulates strategy such that the power-transition transpositions or ordains ordinal preferences. Preferences prescribe rising revisionism and dominant decline despite disposed opposition inherent in the power-transition existentially extractive out of offense-defense balances.

Balances—power, threat, interest—beguiles belligerence because international relations reveals relative gains rather than absolute loss all the while diminishing returns increase cost and risk to wage war without assurance or insurance inherent in indiscretion out of rational-recklessness. Rational-recklessness transpositions expected utility with realities of "prospect theory" by risk-aversion since "the last-resort" typifies "the first-response" reposing deficient technology at home beside uncertain alignments abroad necessary for complimentary "balance" apart from supplemental "dependence" in which secondary states situate unconventional usurpations—namely nuclear nonsense—against primary powers (Honda 2007; 2009a, 2009b; 2022) to influence and disrupt distribution or concentration. Distribution or concentration compels competition concomitant to the power-transition in which dominant decline insidiously inspires rising revisionism reveled out of the security dilemma (Wheeler 2008).

The security dilemma—dilatory, disparate, desperate—deludes the power-transition between dominant decline and rising revisionism reveals stratified strategy. Strategy—Battle, Bail, Bandwagon, Balance—stipulates situations out of dominant decline despite rising revisionism since the power-transition theorized distorts reality quite counterintuitive in that the stronger side strikes first beheld to the second-measurable-response over the weaker position under more losses with less gains so ironic irrespective.

Irrespective then, the power-transition transmits transposition now that the weaker concentration under rising revisionism now threatens the stronger distribution over dominant decline due to loss aversion by primary poles however hegemonic or ordinal rather than any secondary states curiously content all the while expected utility from replacement abates as such henceforth for functionary force. Functionary force—offense, defense, deterrence, compliance—somewhat modified (Art 1980:5) imprudently renders rising revisionism irrelevant irrespective of dominant decline by which the power-transition befalls from alternative alignment. Alignment likens the power-transition to center dissimilar dominant decline around horizontal bandwagons directly with the threat of rising revisionism rather than vertical balances by cooption from any available primary poles albeit somewhat limited amid much measurement (Sampanis 2003). Measurement expresses concentration versus distribution within the power-transition.

Measurement Expresses Concentration versus Distribution within The Power-Transition

Measurement expresses concentration versus distribution within the power-transition. The power-transition transcribes polarity. Polarity between distribution versus concentration involves some calculations through the Composite Index of National Capabilities (Singer et al 1973). The Composite Index of National Capabilities [CINC] calculates polarity by simply summing the mean from complex ratios—total population, urban densities, steel production, energy consumption, defense expenditure, military personnel—to establish concentrated-unit-power versus distributional-system-capabilities (Mansfield 1993; Moul 1993; Waltz 1993). Concentrated-unit-power versus distributional-system-capabilities, however, also misleads directionality in which exclusionary income integrates common distinctions between strong and weak by military power apart from industrial wealth as the basis for polarity.

As the basis for polarity, the Composite Index of National Capabilities so defined defies what constitutes great powers systemically through correlate rankings attributable to weak units with bare power projection or income influence beyond immediate frontiers at regional reach rather than international intake either way. Either way, any short list of units that correlate poles actually elongates normative parameters insofar as the system immediately includes wealth and power where the industrious advanced supercede subsequent developmental economies when income incites influence beside potential power projection for military might. For military might, the small number of great powers oddly leaves the system uncertain unless the absolute maximum available minimizes relative imbalances such that normative distribution imparts actual polarity even while knowing what units possess or project apparently. Apparently then, impairment rather than imparting now expresses the correlation between distribution unto polarity through inverse directionality where larger

concentrations lower the structure when relevant units responsible for stability structures systemic size and scope so inline with *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz 1979).

So inline with *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz 1979), the least existent units available amid the most systemic potential for stability incidentally presents absent conditions to indicate rather than inquest which polarity actuates the best or worst structure available (Copeland 2001) at any time observed. At any time observed, great powers with more than half the total of all capabilities among units yields bipolarity while anything less equals multipolar systems (Wayman 1984) rather invariably through determinant dependency. Determinant dependency of polarity presumes that the least distributions among great powers must eliminate most units until two contenders balance the system—as simple majorities against complex pluralities—that actuate conceivable structure between hegemonic relativity versus oligarchic absolutism through political structure at the economic framework. The economic framework fundamental to political structure (Waltz 1979) falters where ideal terms beside realist conditions moderate extremes when monopoly versus perfect competition precludes dualism and oligopoly—by which gains from expected utility never incites loss aversion (Honda 2012) respectively—just as counting units or firms presumes polarity without proven power through market shares reminiscent of distributional concentrations (Mansfield 1993:109) to measure the concentration.

To measure concentration (CON), the Correlates of War (Singer et al 1973) formulates an equation that roots squared sums (S) indexing (i) power distributions at a certain time (t) minus the divisor ratio under the great powers available (N) over a difference expressing similar values. Values, in turn, means that the low ends possible (0) even out distributions where ranges between forty to twenty percent signify dualistic (bi) or oligarchic (multi) polarities against the oddly high extremes realized (1) when proportions over half the total capabilities initiate inequality. Inequality without the Composite Index of National Capabilities—total population, urban densities, steel production, energy consumption, defense expenditure, military service personnel—to plug variables for the Sum (S) and Number (N) expressing proportionate power split among available poles as concentration (CON) cannot consequently determine dependent imbalances over units under the system that requires a simple square-rooted complex. A simple square-rooted complex fraction expressing antecedent power with subsequent poles expresses valuations that equal concentration in international relations as formula (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Concentration in International Relations as Formula

$$\text{CON}_t = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_t}(S_{it})^2 - \frac{1}{N_t}}{1 - \frac{1}{N_t}}}$$

Concentration in International Relations as Formula that simplify complex fractions replete with symbols and terms ironically sustains the exact opposite around the unresolved debate across big units unto small systems (Mansfield 1993:111). Big units unto small systems, however, need just square root a denominator from the pole numbers (N) minus one atop the Standard Deviation (Vt) divided by the mean Sum (S) of distributional capabilities that correlate proportionately with imbalances throughout the system to yield Concentration in International Relations as Function (See

Figure 2).

Figure 2. Concentration in International Relations as Function

$$CON_t = \frac{V_t}{\sqrt{N_t - 1}}$$

Concentration in International relations as Function dispersed modifies measurement modification (Mansfield 1993:111) since not knowing the Sum (S) or Number (N) to express distributive power across poles amid the Composite Index of National Capabilities precludes the mean and variance necessary for the Standard Deviation shortcut against complex functions. Complex functions that simplify the original equation through the Correlates of War to measure concentration between poles proves equally difficult by old formulae from new fractions either way.

Either way, measuring concentration in international relations must analytically structure across units and system synonymous with pole numbers relative to absolute positions distributed (Gilpin 1981:88; Measheimer 1990; Snyder and Diesing 1977:419) by sufficient estimates establishing recurrent relevance from The Composite Index of National Capabilities dispensing previous presumptions that formulate functions for statistical calculation amid almost no mathematical symbols. Mathematical symbols, thus removed, reveal reformulation rationalizing Ratio over *Country* under *World* (See Figure 3).

Figure 3. Ratio over Country under World

$$Ratio = \frac{Country}{World}$$

Ratio over *Country* under *World* consequently create quotients which equalize six variables—*Total Population*, *Urban Population*, *Iron Steel Production*, *Energy Consumption*, *Military Expenditure*, *Military Personnel*—albeit abbreviated whilst theorizing realistic disproportionate dispersions internationally by the crude Composite Index of National Capabilities from deficient measurements (Singer et al 1973). Measurements estimate the power-transition indirectly in which dominant decline reformulates rising revisionism relayed through Dispersion amid The Composite Index of National Capabilities.

Figure 4. Dispersion amid The Composite Index of National Capabilities

$$CINC = \frac{TP + UP + ISP + EC + ME + MP}{6}$$

Dispersion amid The Composite Index of National Capabilities [CINC] creates curious combinations centered around the power-transition over dominant decline under rising revisionism that bisect bilateral belligerence between the two top contenders for first place with the second third position (See Table 1).

Table 1. The Two Top Contenders for First Place with the Second Third Position

Country	Complex Index of National Capabilities
China	0.230618
US	0.133057
Japan	0.032968

The Two Top Contenders for First Place with the Second Third Position discursively discords the Composite Index of National Capabilities that reveals rising revisionism relative to dominant decline by The US from China centered around Japan amid the power-transition replete (Singer et al 1973:MNC v6). The power-transition replete repels rising revisionism since dominant decline decries disproportionate distribution of capabilities centered around concentration on China relative to absolute offense off The US between balance with Japan as the potential reality.

The potential reality, though, theorizes that the power-transition traduced by dominant decline from The US unto relative rising revisionism of China absolutely abjures or obscures Japan betwixt with alignment already (Brown 1993; Bernstein and Munro 1997:185; Christensen 1999; Hanami 1993; Huntington 1996:236-237, 245; Garrett and Glasser 1997; Johnson 1995; Kih 2022; Song 1995) . Already, and elsewhere, elusive alignment bisects bilateral belligerence between dominant decline of The US under China over rising revisionism since simultaneous exogenous-third-party-intervention on either side off Japan jeopardizes stability that play out in 2 vs 3 games (Honda 2009a) mathematically quite counterintuitive to reality theorized (Allison 2017:244; Copeland 2001; Schweller 1998; Waltz 1979:163) through the power-transition. The power-transition balances The US and Japan against bandwagons with China (See Table 2).

Table 2. The Power-Transition Balances The US and Japan against Bandwagons with China

Country	Complex Index of National Capabilities
The US and Japan	0.166025
China	0.230618

The power-transition balances The US and Japan against bandwagons with China despite disproportionate distribution of capabilities quite quintessential for any atypical hegemony. Hegemony hedges dominant decline and rising revisionism now occupied by China relative to any absolute absence of The US from which Japan consequently contemplates commensurate measurable response henceforth hereafter. Hereafter, however, the power-transition between dominant decline and rising revisionism remains remiss unless supplemental supposition complements composite calculable conception by positivist postulates from empirical emblems elsewhere apparent already since "Rigged Games or Fair Play" (Honda 2021) wages war with trade twofold off dynamic differentials on static similarity such that bilateral belligerence of The US unto China reveals requisite popular perception through *American National Election Study* (ANES 2017; 2021).

American National Election Study—albeit never designed to cover the power-transition let alone international relations—relays ways which impart imperatives estimating absolute decline off The US relative to other poles on the rise with actual potential for threat such as China. China thus threatens The US under the power-transition over hegemonic-replacement. Hegemonic-replacement relays rising revisionism amid dominant decline due to the power-transition transcribed by empirical imperatives from ordinal variables that literally hypothesize China fourfold—*Slight*, *Somewhat*, *Significant*, *Severe*—forthright at the threat threshold against The US so evidentiary with what the *American National Election Study* (ANES 2021) stipulates.

The *American National Election Study* (ANES 2021) stipulates several Independents—Decline, Quotas, Free Trade, Interdependence, Structural Adjustment, Global Unemployment, Minimum Wage, Immigration, Essential Labor, Undocumented, Defense, Expenditures—consecutively concomitant with inverse path-dependence since the first variable expresses the last result realizing the power-transition by downward causation from upward effectuation forthright that theorizes haphazard hegemony. Hegemony hedges the power-transition asymmetrically since US decline misconstrues China. (See Table 3).

Table 3. US Decline Misconstrues China

	China [*Slight*]	*China* [*Somewhat*]	*China* [*Significant*]	*China* [*Severe*]
Decline	.009	.030**	.008	-.025**
	(.009)	(.013)	(.012)	(.012)
Quotas	.022***	.034***	-.007	-.055***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Free Trade	.026***	.015**	.006	-.057***
	(.005)	(.007)	(.006)	(.006)
Interdependence	-.007	.017**	-.024***	-.001
	(.005)	(.007)	(.006)	(.006)
Trade Adjustment	-.013**	-.017	.017**	.011**
	(.004)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Global Unemployment	.009**	.025***	-.010	-.027***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)
Minimum Wage	-.023***	.003	-.011	.036***
	(.005)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)
Immigration	-.011**	-.015**	.001	.029***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Essential Labor	.001	.030	.007	-.052***
	(.005)	(.007)	(.006)	(.007)
Undocumented	.000	.000*	.000	-.001***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

Defense	.000	.000	.000	-.001***
	(000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Expenditures	.001	.001**	.001	-.002***
	(000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Constant	.087**	-.005	.232***	.678***
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)	(.044)
R-Squared	.024	.029	.006	.106
N	6,687	6,687	6,687	6,678

Note: Parentheses express robust standard errors with all independent variables standardized to report values between 0-1. *p < .10 **p < .05, *** p < .001

US Decline misconstrues China amid mixed results revealing rather dubious duality empirically between Somewhat and Severe at moderate with opposite significance now positive then negative for the power-transition. The power-transition thereafter theorizes realities of Quotas concerning trade that indicates very high alpha levels despite low valuations though positive whilst also negative intermittently since *Slight* sleights *Somewhat* almost abrupt then resumes with Severe classification. Classification cannot capture, though, the power-transition empirically eluding regression results since further confounds contort control for Decline in that free trade traces correspondent results already aforementioned amid very high alpha levels despite low valuations though positive whilst negative intermittently since Slight unto Somewhat stop almost abrupt then resumes with Severe severance. Severance serves the power-transition that theorizes realities of Interdependence since Somewhat moderate positive relationships revert to Significant negative results despite equally low valuation of coefficients. Coefficients correlate confounds that depict moderate alpha levels intermittently through negative relationships unto inversion at the end concerning China [*Severe*]. China [*Severe*] severs the power-transition traducing Trade Adjustment, for unemployment, which withers with low coefficients amid moderate relationships both negative and positive almost replete. Replete reposits regression results such that Global Unemployment sustains low coefficients throughout within moderate to strong relationships also intermittent economically. Economically, assessing Minimum Wage amid the power-transition transcribes the two extremes by Slight from *Severe* valuations that retain low coefficients with high significance despite opposite relationships all around. All around, Immigration imparts intermittence inconsistently in that *Slight* and *Somewhat* showcase low coefficients with moderate significance relative to absolute positive reversion out of *Severe*. *Severe* sequesters questionable answers asking the retention of moderate coefficients with high negative significance for Essential Labor. Essential Labor relays relatable results under Undocumented over extremely low coefficients despite high significance straightforward whilst negative as the trend transcribes thereafter for Defense unto Expenditures. Expenditures expel expectations exacting that path-dependence determines detrimental detour by more "confounds" from less "control" contrary to what the power-transition theorizes realistically. Realistically then, the power-transition theorized between dominant decline versus and revisionism reveals revaluation of disproportionate distribution to which concomitant concentration channels China against The US-Japan Alliance (See Table 4).

Table 4. China against The US-Japan Alliance

	China [Slight]	China [Somewhat]	China [Significant]	China [Severe]
Decline	.030**	.079***	.015	-.089***
	(.014)	(.018)	(.017)	(.017)
Quotas	.023***	.024**	-.006	-.056***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Free Trade	.028***	.001	-.013	-.053***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)
Interdependence	-.016**	-.017*	.008	.004
	(.007)	(.009)	(.007)	(.009)
Trade Adjustment	-.014**	.022**	-.016**	.006
	(.006)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
Global Unemployment	.001	.025**	-.005	-.028***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.010)	(.007)
Minimum Wage	-.028***	.014	-.008	.026**
	(.008)	(.010)	(.008)	(.010)
Immigration	.002	-.019**	.006	.023**
	(.006)	(.008)	(.010)	(.008)
Essential Labor	.010	.017*	-.005	-.048***
	(.008)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Undocumented	.000	.000	.000	-.001**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)
Defense	.001***	-.001***	.000	-.001**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Expenditures	.001	.001	.002**	-.001***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
Constant	.054	.014	.256***	-.001
	(.048)	(.063)	(.061)	(.001)
R-Squared	.031	.038	.004	.125
N	3,654	3,654	3,654	3,654

Note: Parentheses express robust standard errors with all independent variables standardized to report values between 0-1. *p < .10 **p < .05, *** p < .001

China against The US-Japan Alliance alters almost nothing noteworthy amid the same mixed results despite lower sampled size due to "filters" for further "control" of Decline. Decline, though, shows sparse intermittent results that start at *Somewhat* with positive moderate alpha-levels only to start and resume inversely amid Severe through high negative relationships ahead of Quotas. Quotas begin consecutively consistent through high with moderate positive relationships between *Slight* and

Somewhat albeit diminished that cease before strong negative results resume for *Severe* ahead of Free Trade. Free Trade transcribes the two extremes equally strong between positive *Slight* and negative *Severe* ahead of Interdependence. Interdependence intercedes moderate to low negative results between *Slight* and *Somewhat* ahead of Trade Adjustment. Trade Adjustment toggles results intermittently consecutive confounds of negative *Slight* to positive *Somewhat* that then inverse with *Significant* all depicting moderate relationships before extrapolations inference Global Unemployment. Global Unemployment imparts intermittent results also albeit amid moderate positive *Somewhat* with high negative *Severe* ahead of Minimum Wage. Minimum Wage resembles Free Trade transcribing the two extremes through high negative *Slight* beside moderate positive *Severe* departed thereafter before arrival at Immigration. Immigration imparts intermittent results reminiscent of Global Unemployment with moderate relationships for negative *Somewhat* and positive *Severe* prior to Essential Labor. Essential Labor lays out similar indications in intermittent results despite low positive *Somewhat* with high negative *Severe* ahead of Undocumented. Undocumented depicts almost nothing through extremely low coefficients at moderate negative *Severe* prior to Defense. Defense sustains similarly low coefficients all around amid positive *Slight* and negative *Somewhat* that stops then resumes results at *Severe* before finalizing Expenditures. Expenditures exact almost the same low trend despite relevant results for only moderate positive *Significant* unto high negative *Severe*. *Severe* severs the power-transition between China and The US-Japan Alliance. China and The US-Japan Alliance also suggests the very inconsistencies that test the power-transition transcribed amid Formal Modeling of The Three-Player Decision Game.

Formal Modeling of The Three-Player Decision Game

The Three-Player Decision Game (Honda 2008a) demonstrates the way with which bilateral conflict begins or ends as a result of third-party-exogenous-imperatives reminiscent to what *Destined for War* and *The Coming with China* suggest through mathematical-simulation rather than hypothetical simulation-scenario already apparent. Already apparent, previous models of The Three-Player Decision Game done elsewhere actually evaluated the terms that condition bilateral belligerence between The US and China (Honda 2008b, 2008c, 2015a) either way. Either way, serious conflict to the brink of war between The US and China only emerges internationally rather than anywhere else despite what the Asian Pivot purports. What the Asian Pivot purports also allures any third-party-exogenous-intervention that puts the US and China at odds. At odds then, now involves such places as the South China Sea or even the Korean Peninsula that also expresses potential for models and simulation of The Three-Player Decision Game (Honda 2007) quite relevant here. Relevant here, however, looks specifically at The US and Japan to generalize the terms and conditions for conflict with China long apparent despite no real simulation modeled through The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game depicts dualistic deterrence amid a modified model that originates outcomes by the success or failure of Mediator to simultaneously check Challenger and dissuade Defender from altering the Status-Quo through modular modification. Modular modification, in turn, renames the position of Defender all the while adding Mediator to act as third-party under conditions of loss aversion over such terms for expected utility (Honda 2008a) either way.

Either way, much like the typical Three-Player Decision Game, the modified model retains the mutual uncertainty extrinsically inherent to incomplete information such that all positions proceed with caution unless perceptions of threat arise and rationalize recklessness. Recklessness, or rather the absence thereof, immobilizes The Three-Player Decision Game since Challenger lacks the materialist motivations to provoke Defender and prompt potential involvement by Mediator such that dualistic deterrence must succeed from the outset despite presumptuous perceptions. Presumptuous perceptions of automatic alignment between Defender and Mediator sustains an imbalanced Status-Quo detrimental to Challenger in which insecurity initiates the Three-Player Decision Game despite such risk or cost.

Such risk or cost through less abstraction with more absolution requires that the Three-Player Decision Game characterize countries in accordance to positions out of Challenger amid Defender and Mediator just as previous versions establish extrapolated inference. Extrapolated inference regulates rules outlining The Three-Player Decision Game between China versus Japan and The US.

Figure 5. The Three-Player Decision Game between China versus Japan and The US

China   Round 1

Defaults   Demands
$(1-x)$ (x)

Status Quo   Japan   Round 2

Concede   Concur
$(1-y)$ (y)

China Gains   US   Round 3

Abandonment   Aid
$(1-z)$ (z)

Round 4a   Japan   China   Round 4b

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    Assessment   Appeasement      Accept     Accost
         /              \            /          \
      Japan           Japan    China Loses   Crisis
     Balances         Loses
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The Three-Player Decision Game now begins after China makes Demands rather than Defaults at which point Japan Concedes or Consults with the US under uncertainties over Abandonment or Aid despite dualistic dilemmas since what results increases diminished returns on reputation from nonintervention unto resources by engagement either way. Either way, the US risks the most losses ahead of Japan unto China with the least expenditures and relative gains incurred once the Three-Player Decision Game commences. Once the Three-Player Decision Game commences, China does reap substantial gains insofar as Japan or the US succumb to incredulous intentions. Incredulous intentions allow several opportunities for China to gain something throughout the Three-Player Decision Game such that neither Japan nor the US can afford undue hesitation since resistance reduces the already limited avenues at avoiding absolute losses incidentally. Incidentally then, China gains relative to Japan and The US irrespective of intent or extent concerning the Three-Player Decision Game that almost always yields immediate and imminent losses amid any such resistance against revisionism. Against revisionism, the logic that averts the Three-Player Decision Game over more risk under less returns paradoxically allows fatalistic means and ends since existent asymmetries assay initiated contestation to test or task reliable resistence amid personal prestige.

Personal prestige projecting postwar perceptions at national unity amid legalistic legacies of dynastic despotism rationalize revisionism by China in the effort to dominate and isolate The US from Japan through realities amid the power-transition either way. Either way, the rate of actual power-transition between China and the US dependently determines what Japan does amid any Asian Pivot. Any Asian Pivot sequentially makes Japan covet the first response before the last resort by the US since neither the Three-Player Decision Game nor dualistic deterrence need happen unless China digresses despite asymmetries that remain acquiescent from the start rather than at the end. An the end, what initiates The Three-Player Decision Game now then means that inequalities with uncertainties assure bimodal behaviors between rational-choice versus rash-chance concerning China and Japan relative to the US insofar as immediate intentions prejudice preferences (See Table 5).

Table 5. Immediate Intentions Prejudice Preferences between China versus Japan and The US

Positions	Preferences	Opportunity Costs					
		China Gains	Japan Loses	Japan Balances	Status Quo	China Loses	Crisis
	Incremental	$c_{CG} = 10$	$c_{JL} = 8$	$c_{JB} = 6$	$c_{SQ} = 4$	$c_{CL} = 0$	$c_{C^-} = -1$
China		China Gains	Japan Loses	Japan Balances	Status Quo	Crisis	China Loses
	Incredulous						

		$c_{CG}=10$	$c_{JL}=8$	$c_{JB}=6$	$c_{SQ}=4$	$c_C+=1$	$c_{CL}=0$
Japan	Compliant	*Status Quo*	*China Loses*	*Crisis*	*China Gains*	*Japan Loses*	*Japan Balances*
		$j_{SQ}=10$	$j_{CL}=8$	$j_C=4$	$j_{CG}=2$	$j_{JL}=0$	$j_{JB}-=-1$
	Complacent	*Status Quo*	*China Loses*	*Crisis*	*China Gains*	*Japan Balances*	*Japan Loses*
		$j_{SQ}=10$	$j_{CL}=8$	$j_C=4$	$j_{CG}=2$	$j_{JB}+=1$	$j_{JL}=0$
US	Resolute	*Status Quo*	*China Loses*	*China Gains*	*Japan Loses*	*Crisis*	*Japan Balances*
		$u_{SQ}=10$	$u_{CL}=8$	$u_{CG}=4$	$u_{JL}=2$	$u_C+=1$	$u_{JB}=0$
	Reluctant	*Status Quo*	*China Loses*	*China Gains*	*Japan Loses*	*Japan Balances*	*Crisis*
		$u_{SQ}=10$	$u_{CL}=8$	$u_{CG}=4$	$u_{JL}=2$	$u_{JB}=0$	$u_C-=-1$

Immediate intentions prejudice preferences between China versus Japan and The US since The Three-Player Decision Game incur costs of *Gains* favorable for only Challenger relative to the absolute *Status Quo* insofar as Defender and Mediator avail amid the imminent diminished returns. Diminished returns thus make the opportunity costs of Japan and the US intentionally omit any such gains to express implicit concerns over loss under the Three-Player Decision Game with China theretofore and hereafter. Hereafter, already, Japan and the US equally pay the literal price of the figurative opportunity cost through the best possible terms amid the worst realized conditions unless China channels Challenger since neither Defender nor Mediator can cut losses by avoiding the Three-Player Decision Game from dualistic-deterrence. Dualistic-deterrence ideally idles China and Japan from rather reckless rationalization by imparting interventionism on the part of The US from within or throughout the Three-Player Decision Game either way. Either way, since *Status Quo* exerts extrinsic inherence to the balance of power, common concerns also reflect realpolitik insofar as immediate insecurity instigates mutual mistrust between Japan and The US while forgetting that China makes or breaks the Three-Player Decision Game.

The Three-Player Decision Game with China makes similar situations oddly partition positions by preferences from subsequent opportunity costs even though Japan and The US covet *Status Quo* ahead of exploiting apparent alignments amid aggregated aggression. Aggregated aggression now then means the initial ends at collective-security by which neither Japan nor the US can deter China from tempting The Three-Player Decision Game as an alternative. As an alternative to the threat of China, Japan and The US endanger said positions such that defection replaces deterrence through buck-passing amid the Three-Player Decision Game. Buck-passing amid the Three-Player Decision Game happens at the last possible moment that contingently convenes the preferences of all positions from the exact opposite options expressed by the opportunity costs. The

opportunity costs never payoff all the while prejudicial preference price incremental and incredulous China with compliant or complacent Japan beside reluctant versus resolute US curiously channel consistency despite diminished returns rationalizing restraint rather than egoistic engagement since The Three-Player Decision Game incurs incomplete information.

Incomplete information assays adversarial preferences until diversion occurs at which point rationality reveals recklessness of opportunity cost penalizing Japan and the US rather than China within or throughout The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game minimizes losses on diminishing returns rationalized rather minimal losses on diminishing returns after such realization reifies maximum security egoistically off maximum security amid the incidental extemporaneous benefits since Japan and The US avoid risk of Crisis despite what China channels against the *Status Quo*. The *Status Quo* so given in incomplete information by which to take from position out of The Three-Player Decision Game specifies generalized preferences through opportunity costs that now digress then remain inconstant or inverse at the end. At the end, such expressions of position over which preferences under what opportunity costs ultimately relays recklessness restraint in accordance with the next best options to limit diminishing returns throughout the Three-Player Decision Game since China need not commence contestation amid Japan and The US already satisfied despite discernible disproportions. Discernible dispositions concern credibility coveting capability such that all positions yield equal valuations of opportunity cost when preferences iterate irrelevance where China versus Japan and The US assure dissuasion amid The Three-Player Decision Game quite paradoxically. Quite paradoxically, any logic to The Three-Player Decision Game invalidates instigation insofar as asymmetries assay prestige personalizing precarious perceptions of The power-transition such that Challenger China confronts Defender Japan with potential intervention from Mediator US by exogenous-third-party-involvement.

Exogenous-third-party-involvement amid The Three-Player Decision Game channels China since initial instigation means the ends to slight or significant revisionism such that the only uncertainty here evokes whether Japan and The US convene concomitance either way. Either way, China gains beforehand amid any such risk that concerns uncertainty with the know diminished returns since such preferences over position raise the opportunity cost for Japan and the US under The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game makes Challenger China not really lose nor risk unless Defender Japan and Mediator US presuppose preferences that assuage alignment against realist revisionism quite unexpected. Quite unexpected then, The Three-Player Decision Game demonstrates distrustful disruptions between Defender Japan and Mediator US such that Challenger China now places losses before gains whether relative or absolute also after balance beside because of credible commitment so extrinsically inherent to dualistic deterrence.

To dualistic deterrence, the utmost implications of resolute rather than reluctant preferences that position The US leaves uncertain the opportunity costs valued by both China and Japan from incomplete information throughout the Three-Player Decision Game somewhat esoteric or astrally abstract either way. Either way, each position remains aware of coexistence within The Three-Player Decision Game despite uncertainty digressing over preferences under opportunity costs beyond

immediate suspicions toward egoism and loss aversion against expected utility.

Against expected utility, such figurative formulations initiated express that The US opportunity costs covet *Crisis* before *Japan Balances* because the literal ends of The Three-Player Decision Game means China probabilistically goes the distance rather than coming to an immediate halt from severe loss aversion by realistic threat perceptions. Realistic threat perceptions consequently make rash-chance rather than rational-choice justify reckless-restraint expressing the dualistic-deterrence-dilemma between Japan and China that now intensifies due to the desperation and uncertainty within or throughout the Three-Player Decision Game irrespective. Irrespective, the failure or success of Mediator US to check Challenger China and Defender Japan by dualistic-deterrence requires utility valuations that yield preferences from the opportunity costs expressed throughout positions within The Three-Player Decision Game accounting for position. Accounting for position, preferences and opportunity costs also requires boolean operators or bimodal pathways that express said utility valuations as the worst-case-scenario after all next-best-options elapse though fourfold—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—formulation (See Table 6).

Table 6. **Fourfold—Settlement**, **Separation**, **Standby**, **Strike—Formulation**

	China			Japan			US
	x_{I1} = incredulous	x_{I2} = incremental	i	y_{C1} = compliant	y_{C1} = complacent	q	z = resolute
Settlement	0	0		1	1	p_J	1
Separation	1	0	1	1	$\dfrac{p_J}{1-p_J}$	1/2	1/2
Standby	1	$0 < x_{I2} < 1$	$p_C < i < 1$	1	$0 < y_{C1} < 1$	$p_J < q < 1$	$0 < z < 1$
Strike	1	1	p_C	1	$\dfrac{p_J(1-q)}{q(1-p_J)}$	$\dfrac{7\,p_C(1-q)}{2}$	$\dfrac{1}{4-2p_C}$

Fourfold—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—formulations formalizes matrices summarizing positions of The Three-Player Decision Game amid Five Probabilities.

Five probabilities—x_{I1}, x_{I2}, y_{C1}, y_{C2}, z—express variables that denote preferences ahead of potential intervention henceforth. Henceforth only one out of two probabilities remain—r and q—conveying contingencies through alternate avenues quite detrimental or determinant for The US that moves after Japan and China in The Three-Player Decision Game through the worst-case-scenario. The worst-case-scenario presuming probabilities p_C and p_J posit incredulous China against complacent Japan since $0 < p_J < 1$ stipulates $0 < p_C < 1$ such that valuations cannot also axiomatically preclude preferences of resolute US either way. Either way, the worst-case-scenario involving potential intervention from the US implies explicit threats to the *Status Quo* since subsequent moves by both Japan and China risk readjustments that destabilize the balance of power through both probabilities. Both probabilities expressed also measure the credible commitment

concerning China and Japan to defy The US such that higher utility valuations diminish returns on the *Status Quo* unless The Three-Player Decision Game never commences.

Unless The Three-Player Decision Game never commences, the next-best-option against the worst-case-scenario yields *Settlement* since China never Demands so long as Japan remains secure subsequently rendering any preference of The US however irrelevant. However irrelevant, personal prestige amid asymmetric alignments favor Japan and The US such that China Demands hence instigating The Three-Player Decision Game. Instigating The Three-Player Decision Game makes the preferences of China clarify incomplete information all the while Japan remains unclear amid The US despite inclinations toward Aid against Abandonment either way. Either way, not knowing what Japan covets against China yields *Separation* since uncertainty over compliant and complacent preferences fall just under *Settlement* such that The US must Aid to credibly reconcile the dualistic-deterrence-dilemma.

To credibly reconcile the dualistic-deterrence-dilemma, in turn, realizes possibility of *Crisis* since higher-loss-aversion-concerns motivate escalation. Escalation thus resulting after The Three-Player Decision Game begins makes incomplete information reiterate restraint rather than recklessness for The US which must defend the *Status Quo* best as possible. Best as possible then, herein lies the true manifestation of "Strategic Ambiguity" which the Three-Player Decision Game now attributes to *Standby*. *Standby* involves dualistic-deterrence because what The US truly covets cannot happen without knowing the preference of Japan relative to China which requires credible commitment. Credible commitment, in this case, goes through Japan before coming to The US after China commences The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game makes the preferences of China toggle between incremental and incredulous since restraint over recklessness increases the likelihood for *Standby* insofar as such motivations under loss aversion remain rather low relative to what Japan beside The US might do in response thus ensuring that all positions proceed with caution throughout The Three-Player Decision Game. Caution throughout the Three-Player Decision Game, in turn, also paradoxically yields the exact opposite because incomplete information with known asymmetries that favor Japan and the US channel incredulous preferences motivating China to challenge the *Status Quo* irrespective of incremental or incredulous. Irrespective of incremental or incredulous now makes *Strike* quite plausible because such outcomes reduce the probability for compliant Japan which inversely increases inclinations toward resolute US to maintain the *Status Quo* best as possible even with potential *Crisis* looming. Potential *Crisis* looming makes probabilistic outcomes originate the difference between *Standby* versus *Strike* that expresses a positive-upward-slope that veers toward the right as the literal slope. The literal slope thus postulates that increased credible commitment of China and Japan makes *Strike* more likely just as lower levels limit successful dualistic-deterrence while endangering The US either way. Either way, *Strike* literally expresses the worst-case-scenario against the next-best-option amid The Three-Player Decision Game somewhat out of order. Somewhat out of order then, amid adverse diminishing returns, the resultant Equilibria now expresses the greater likelihood for *Settlement* prior to the slightly equal *Standby* with *Separation* quite minimal beside the rather remote and skewed *Strike* of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—orders risk (See Figure 7).

Figure 7. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—Orders Risk

p_J

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—orders risk rather rationally per preferences since intermittence intercedes incomplete information within and throughout The Three-Player Decision Game due to loss aversion against expected utility. Loss aversion against expected utility ultimately suggests *Settlement* or *Standby* positing probabilities between China and Japan ahead of the remote *Separation* unto *Strike* involving The US so irrespective. Irrespective, *Settlement* and *Standby* sufficiently reconciles relations in ways that exogenous-third-party-interventions expect since reluctant realizations of mutual coexistence yield "strategic ambiguity" despite The Three-Player Decision Game precluding Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium alternatives over *Separation* and *Strike* under incomplete information. Incomplete information, in turn, curiously closes the discursive disconnect between theory and reality of current events evincing idealized conflict resolution to the power-transition as the preliminary conclusion.

Conflict Resolution to The Power-Transition at The Preliminary Conclusion

Conflict resolution to the power-transition at the preliminary conclusion over dominant decline by The US under rising revisionism from China afterwards jeopardizes Japan beforehand because bilateral belligerence belies The Three-Player Decision Game. The Three-Player Decision Game goes at *The Coming Conflict with China* (Bernstein and Munro 1997) literally by *The Clash* (LaFeber 1997) from The US to Japan two decades ahead of the latent figurative "Thucydides Trap" that eludes *Destined for War* (Allison 2017) theretofore or hereafter. Theretofore or hereafter, however, hedges hegemony in which dominant decline by The US out of rising revisionism from China calculates considerable conceptual concentration noteworthy for Japan despite disproportionate distribution disturbed amid perceptual popularization necessary to falsify true empirical imperatives. Empirical imperatives implore inference extrapolated discursively. Discursively disconnecting Composite Index of National Capabilities (Singer et al 1973) calculates "polarity" such that China tops The US and Japan either alone or together below the threshold for threat by measurable estimation from *American National Election Study* (ANES 2021).

American National Election Study (ANES 2021) stipulates the power-transition incidentally in which what variables exist extract exact estimations out of multivariate regression runs revealing results rather mixed amid more confounds with less control. More confounds with less control contravenes intervening "independents" intermittently by determinist "dependents" from cross-sectional analysis structured such that Decline correlates threat—*Slight*, *Somewhat*, *Significant*, *Severe*—so synonymous since The US misconstrues China amid positive unto negative results irrespective both beforehand and ahead of "filters." "Filters" further "control""confounds" conspicuously all the while what results retains intermittent inferences extrapolated amid similar simulative stipulations despite different deferential distortion by rising revisionism from dominant decline that theorize reality over equalization under unattainable balance to neutralize China against The US-Japan Alliance. China against The US-Japan Alliance alters the power-transition in that rising revisionism out of dominant decline discernibly belays bilateral belligerence betwixt through The Three-Player Decision Game.

The Three-Player Decision Game generally specifies asymmetric unilateralism by revisionist rise from Challenger against dominant decline of Mediator to target Defender disarrayed amid alignment almost always all the whilst what transpires traduces several sequential scenarios—Settlement, Separation, Standby, Strike—intensifying escalation since outcomes originate ordinal Perfect Bayesian Equilibria despite Incomplete Information noteworthy for "rational-choice" and "reckless-chance" nonchalant over relative gains under absolute loss that threatens the power-transition. The power-transition—between dominant decline and revisionist rise— rationalizes The Three-Player Decision Game emotively erratic relative to China Challenger absolute against The US Mediator ahead of Japan Defender beforehand because breakdown over alignments setup suspicion under reassessment at current history. Current History theorizes reality—previous, present, predestined—despite discrepancies discerning what truly lies between dominant decline and revisionist rise.

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