Black Poverty, Hannah Arendt and Political Freedom: Toward an Antiracist Approach to Poverty

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Abstract
This paper rethinks black poverty as an effect of “natal alienation,” the trans-generational condemnation to invisibility that slavery initiated but that neither emancipation nor the Civil Rights Movement fully eradicated. In expanding our understanding of black poverty, this paper examines Hannah Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty, which hinges on Arendt’s understanding of slavery and its relationship to the foundation of political freedom in the United States. As Arendt’s political theory reveals, the institution of racial slavery blinded white Americans to black poverty such that poverty itself never appeared as a public concern. The continued omission of black poverty from the public debate compromises the practice of democratic freedom that is central to Arendt’s political theory. In considering black poverty as a concern for political freedom, this paper invokes Arendt’s concept of natality, which refers to the capacity for beginning and newness, a capacity that is more concerned with public participation than it is with delivering goods. An antiracist approach to poverty might redefine black poverty as the deprivation of not only goods but also participatory capacity, which produces invisibility and alienation – the obscurity that helped to construct “blackness” as an impoverished racial category.
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the poverty rate in the United States has soared, reaching a twenty-year high with 15 percent of Americans currently living in poverty. Among the newly impoverished are an increasing number of white, middle-class Americans, who had previously reaped the benefits of the American Dream but now find themselves struggling to make ends meet. The new emphasis on middle-class poverty, perhaps an oxymoron, treats poverty as representative of the post-racial landscape of contemporary America. The post-racial narrative suggests that if whites are equally susceptible to poverty, then poverty is no longer a racialized phenomenon. The fact remains, however, that almost 27% of African Americans live in poverty today, compared to 25% of Latinos and 13% of whites. Moreover, black poverty has seen a slight increase in the last year, while white and Latino poverty have experienced small decreases. More troubling still is wealth disparity: white households have at least 20 times the wealth of African American households (and 18 times that of Latino households), which suggests that even as the economy improves, African Americans will find it more difficult to escape the poverty trap.

In this paper, I argue that an antiracist politics should be wary of efforts to not only whiten the face of poverty but also construct poverty as a middle-class interest. Although these efforts are largely undertaken as a way to make anti-poverty politics more inclusive, they ultimately do a disservice to the black poor, whose poverty is often chronic and with different existential implications than the “new poverty” of the Great Recession. I suggest that we regard black poverty as a legacy of slavery, rethinking black poverty as an effect of “natal alienation,” the trans-generational condemnation to invisibility that slavery initiated but that neither emancipation nor the Civil Rights Movement fully eradicated. In expanding
our understanding of black poverty, I examine Hannah Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty, which hinges on her understanding of slavery and its relationship to the foundation of political freedom in the United States. In reconstructing Arendt’s reading of the American founding, I conclude that race plays a critical role in the fundamental exclusion of poverty from American politics. As Arendt’s political theory reveals, the institution of racial slavery blinded white Americans to black poverty such that poverty itself never appeared as a public concern.

I suggest, however, that the continued omission of black poverty from the public debate compromises the practice of democratic freedom that Arendt identifies with the American founding. In considering black poverty as a concern for political freedom, I invoke Arendt’s concept of natality, which refers to the capacity for beginning and newness, a capacity that is more concerned with public participation than it is with delivering goods. An antiracist approach to poverty might redefine black poverty as the deprivation of not only goods but also participatory capacity, which produces invisibility and alienation – the obscurity that helped to construct “blackness” as an impoverished racial category. Although black poverty is foundational to American life, the concept of natality emerges as a way to challenge the invisibility associated with black poverty. By linking human dignity to public participation, natality emphasizes how the struggle inherent in public participation undermines racial domination.

**Freedom vs. Necessity: Hannah Arendt’s Critique of the Politicization of Poverty**

The economic boom following World War II generated a newfound interest in the question of poverty, with intellectuals and policy-makers puzzling over poverty’s ability to survive despite increasing material abundance. In 1963, the year after journalist Michael
Harrington published his landmark book on American poverty, *The Other America*, and the year before the US government declared its short-lived War on Poverty, Hannah Arendt published *On Revolution*. In its time, *On Revolution* was not regarded as part of the new literature on poverty, since its primary aim was to consider the role of revolution in modern life. Nonetheless, poverty figures strongly into Arendt’s understanding of modernity and revolution. While many of Arendt’s contemporaries draw attention to the ways that affluence further entrenches poverty by rendering it invisible and more difficult to combat, Arendt argues that poverty becomes visible only in an affluent society.\(^4\) In other words, affluence creates the conditions whereby poverty appears as a problem. Arendt posits that for most of human history and in much of the world, scarcity, not affluence, has been the status quo, and the poverty that accompanies scarcity has been accepted as a natural fact. Only when a significant segment of society achieves material abundance do people begin to question the necessity of poverty, turning poverty into a “social question,” a product of social organization rather than an effect of nature’s vicissitudes. Arendt’s point, however, is not to question whether poverty is a social construct or a natural fact. On the contrary, Arendt views society and nature in similar terms: both are governed by necessity rather than freedom. Both society and nature cater to the needs of living bodies, and as such, both are concerned with economics, with the production and distribution of resources. What distinguishes society from nature is that society is the human endeavor to appropriate natural processes, to bring necessity under the human will, and to produce and distribute resources along different lines than might “naturally” occur. Thus, for Arendt, the distinction between nature and society is less relevant than the distinction between society and politics. While nature and society are concerned with producing and
distributing resources, the already-defined goods of life, politics is an activity that illuminates excellence through speech and action. The difference between the squabble over goods and the illumination of excellence is tantamount for Arendt, as the former represents our attachment to necessity while the latter reveals our capacity for freedom, our ability to transform given conditions.

Arendt’s understanding of poverty hinges on the distinction between freedom and necessity. While politics expands human freedom by proliferating opinions and points of view, poverty binds its victims to necessity, to a “state of constant want and acute misery,” which “puts men under the absolute dictate of their bodies.”

Rather than inciting human beings to excellence, as politics does, poverty reduces human beings to physiological functioning. As such, poverty reveals bodies rather than distinct human personalities and “never can produce ‘free-minded people.’” Accordingly, Arendt defines poverty as a social, not a political question, a question concerning not how to define the good or goods, but how to distribute the already-defined goods of life. Arendt traces distribution to production, to how much a society is able to produce, which she sees as a technical endeavor guided by necessity, and thus apolitical. Although production may call upon a collectivity like politics does, the relationships of production do not involve “the specifically political forms of being together with others, acting in concert and speaking with each other.”

Production treats others as instruments to a common goal, asking workers to produce according to a single vision—a vision determined by human need—and to subsume their wills under that vision. In contrast, political relationships are not only instrumental. People come together in political life not only to achieve particular ends, not only out of necessity, since the original intention of political actors is never what results
from political action. Rather, political relationships witness people coming together simply to be seen and to see others. In this way, political relationships are, foremost, neither useful nor necessary relationships; they are meaningful ones.

Arendt argues that the challenge to poverty first emerged in Western culture not as a result of political freedom, of people coming together in the public sphere to discuss poverty as a matter of worldly import. Instead, the challenge to poverty arose in response to the development of productive forces in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a development that Arendt understands as a mechanistic response to necessity. In particular, Arendt situates the challenge to poverty in the experience of American colonialism, which, she suggests, was so productive that it generated wealth that human society had never before experienced, wealth that, although not equally distributed, permeated the social fabric such that even “the laborious in America were poor but not miserable... they were not driven by want.” In Arendt’s reading, the prosperity of colonial America extended to all segments of society such that the machinery of colonialism solved the social question. Moreover, by eradicating poverty from the American experience, American colonialism spawned a doubt about whether poverty must exist at all, a doubt that permeated European society, which had not yet “discovered the means to abolish that abject misery of sheer want which had always been held to be eternal.” Although eighteenth-century Europe lacked the productive machinery to eliminate poverty, Europeans began to imagine a society whereby equality was not a political right of citizens, endowed by participation in the polis, but a natural right of men, endowed by birth.

The social contract tradition popularized the ideal of natural equality, constructing natural equality out of a state of nature, a hypothetical site of human origin modeled after
colonial America and its perceived abundance of material resources. Being born into a state of nature with unlimited resources—a situation that existed only in the colonial world (and perhaps only in the imaginations of those viewing the colonial world)—leveled the playing field such that anyone was capable of achieving success.\textsuperscript{10} The success that natural equality makes possible, however, is distinct from the excellence that political equality enables. While success suggests a continued ability to advance, an ability to accrue status and resources that secure future survival, excellence is a more fluid marker that adheres to an action rather than a state of being. In contrast to success, excellence does not predict future survival. Instead, excellence is ephemeral, indicating simply a heightened presence.

The shift from excellence to success and survival, from political equality to natural equality engendered the problematization of poverty, since natural equality constructs poverty as a violation of nature’s intention and thus a problem that human beings not only created but also can treat. In Arendt’s thinking, however, the \textit{treatment} of problems, although they may be collective, is not an inherently political activity. Politics is about defining problems and transforming discourses. Society, on the other hand, treats the already-defined. The confusion between politics and society stems from the character of society, which is collective yet anti-political. Society, which emerged with the modern age, deals with people as a mass such that our social relationships are marked by common needs rather than common aspirations. The confusion between politics and society is most acute when it comes to poverty, and Arendt credits this confusion with devastating the French Revolution. Confronted by widespread poverty and inspired by the ideal of natural equality, the French Revolutionaries turned to politics, to constituting “the people” around the needs of the poor. Rather than harnessing nature by intensifying production and
investing in technology and labor, the appropriate avenue for social endeavors, the French Revolutionaries turned to the political realm as a means to return to the poor their natural rights.

Arendt, however, is critical of efforts to use the public sphere to “restore” a natural order. For Arendt, equality is a political construct, one that has no basis in nature. In order to justify equality, we have to be willing to exercise political freedom, to take the risks inherent in speaking, in giving language to what we want and listening to what other people want. Natural equality, on the contrary, constructs equality as a product of nature, as necessary to human survival such that equality no longer needs to be justified through speech and action. As such, the French Revolutionaries saw speech and action as obstacles to what nature commanded and attempted to push them aside to let nature take its course. Arendt argues that in place of speech and action, the French Revolutionaries promoted compassion as a public virtue. Compassion, which is stirred only by “the predicament of poverty, and not either individual frustration or social ambitions,” strives to articulate suffering in public.¹¹ In Arendt’s view, compassion “can comprehend only the particular” and “cannot reach out farther than what is suffered by one person.”¹² When compassion, whose language “consists in gestures and expressions of countenance rather than words,” tries to capture the suffering of an entire group of people, it loses its authenticity and “speaks” with an urgency that sacrifices speech, the medium of public life and political freedom, on the altar of necessity. On the public stage, the urgency with which compassion speaks quickly destroys “the distance, the worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located.”¹³ Thus, Arendt sees compassion as anti-political.
In describing compassion as anti-political, however, Arendt does not exclude it from collective life. In fact, compassion may play an important role in social life. Although Arendt is critical of the social sphere, charging it with depoliticizing modern life and undermining freedom, she does not suggest that we can return to a pre-social way of life. Rather, the challenge that Arendt’s political theory poses is how to make the most of what society has to offer while also carving out a space for freedom. In this spirit, we can consider the efficient treatment of collective problems as a virtue of the social sphere, which enables us to channel resources in order to address already-defined problems. Compassion may enhance this endeavor by regulating the social realm, ensuring that the treatment of collective problems is carried out with an eye toward minimizing, even alleviating, suffering. The bonds that compassion cultivates ensure that efficiency does not drive social endeavors to the point that such endeavors forget the people they aim to help.

But while compassion nurtures bonds that benefit social endeavors, these bonds may undermine political life. Society treats problems and thus sustains populations by conditioning us to *behave* according to norms that regulate and define those populations. Politics, on the other hand, challenges norms and disrupts routines through action. As such, politics does not sustain populations; it sustains the world that gives rise to populations, to different and always-changing groupings of people. Unlike behavior, which is routinized and self-perpetuating, political action is fleeting. While political action may bring new norms or identities into existence, it lacks the means to guarantee the survival of those norms or identities, to sustain populations. Compassion, on the other hand, strives to endow political action with the means to sustain populations. Although compassion may disrupt the current state of affairs if that state of affairs causes unwarranted suffering,
compassion disrupts in order to ensure survival, in order to meet need, which is insatiable. Thus, compassion “acts” by calling for permanent disruption, which ultimately distorts political action.

**Poverty: What’s Slavery Got to Do with It?**

The distinction that Arendt draws between necessity and freedom informs her desire to exclude poverty from political life. This distinction, however, relies on a troubled reading of the American founding. For Arendt, the primary difference between the American and French Revolutions is the presence of the social question in the latter and its absence in the former. Poverty, argues Arendt, plagued pre-Revolutionary France such that the French Revolutionaries succumbed to “the urgent needs of the people,” which “sent the Revolution to its doom.”14 On the other hand, colonial America, she suggests, was blessed with the absence of poverty, which blocked compassion from entering the revolutionary scene and allowed the American Revolutionaries to focus not on restoring a natural order but on creating a political one.15

A closer reading of Arendt’s discussion of the American founding, however, reveals that what protected the Americans from poverty was African slavery. To her credit, Arendt recognizes that the absence of poverty in colonial America “was, after all, quite deceptive, and that abject and degrading misery was present everywhere in the form of slavery and Negro labour.”16 African slavery, which was fundamental to the mechanics of American colonialism, allowed the American colonists to create the wealth that gave rise to the ideal of natural equality, which encouraged Europeans to question the necessity of poverty. Moreover, African slavery relieved the American colonists of the burden of poverty such that they could concentrate on political freedom. Despite acknowledging the role that
African slavery played in facilitating political freedom during the American Revolution, an acknowledgment that sets Arendt apart from many of her contemporaries who remained silent about this point, Arendt is not particularly troubled by the American colonists’ reliance on slaves. In fact, Arendt excuses the American colonists for ignoring the condition of African slaves, suggesting that this ignorance was peculiar to the institution of slavery rather than the result of “any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest” among the Americans. According to Arendt, slavery condemns the enslaved to “an obscurity even blacker than the obscurity of poverty,” rendering slaves completely invisible to their masters. Consequently, the American colonists were unable to even see African slaves as worthy of the social question. Arendt writes, “‘It is as though the American Revolution was achieved in a kind of ivory tower into which the fearful spectacle of human misery, the haunting voices of abject poverty, never penetrated.’” Perhaps the ivory tower to which Arendt refers is the institution of slavery, which simultaneously racialized American poverty while protecting the American colonists from recognizing (black) poverty. So, although African slavery helped to create the wealth that enabled the social question to emerge in Western culture, it also shielded its practitioners from seeing African slaves as worthy of the social question.

Although many contemporary scholars criticize the epistemologies of ignorance that slavery unleashed, Arendt appreciates the shielding effects of slavery, specifically, slavery’s ability to protect its practitioners from compassion. Slavery, which precedes the economy of natural equality, denies a common humanity to the slave, who is usually an outsider, a stranger to the master’s community. As such, slavery shields the master from feeling the slave’s suffering in the same way he might feel his own or that of his neighbor.
While slavery marks its victims as strangers, poverty, which coincides with the economy of natural equality, reveals in its victims something familiar, which is why it arouses both compassion and discomfort. Through poverty, one recognizes one’s own flesh in the suffering of another, and one is naturally moved by that recognition. Unlike slavery, which befalls those outside a community or constructs those it befalls as outsiders, poverty can afflict anyone, which makes poverty so much more discomforting than slavery. As such, poverty does not shield us from suffering like slavery does; rather, poverty exposes a common humanity and thus provokes compassion. Arendt’s vision of politics, however, does not sit well with the concept of humanity and the tools for preserving it, like compassion. Arendt identifies humanity with bodily need, which is relentless, overwhelming everything it encounters and extinguishing any space where non-necessary relationships might thrive. Grounding politics in a common humanity risks converting politics from a debate about how we want to live into a formula for what we need to survive. In contrast, slavery, which denies humanity to the slave, does not appeal to a common humanity, to natural equality. The slave societies of antiquity and of colonial America were based on particular ways of life rather than a universal sense of humanity. Slaves may have had needs in common with their masters, but they did not share their master’s way of life.

While Arendt concedes that slavery violates human life, her appreciation of slavery stems from the fact that it does not violate the public world, which requires protection from life’s exigencies. Slavery degrades life at the expense of the world, but the effort to politicize poverty, to turn the social question into a public concern, defends humanity and bodily life at the expense of the world. It is on these grounds that Arendt challenges Marx’s
effort to liken capitalism to slavery and to equate the bourgeoisie with slave-owners.\textsuperscript{21} Under slavery, a class of slave-owners compels slave labor in order to liberate itself from necessity. Capitalism, on the other hand, liberates laborers “from their masters only to put them under a stronger taskmaster, their daily needs and wants, the force, in other words, with which necessity drives and compels men and which is more compelling than violence.”\textsuperscript{22} Ownership exercises a different effect on the bourgeois owner than it does on the slave-owner. The bourgeois owner does not own the means of production in order to liberate himself from labor and the necessity that compels labor. Instead, the bourgeois owner aims to expand production through labor, and the desire to expand production binds the bourgeois owner to necessity as much as it binds the worker to him. Accordingly, while Marx is more concerned with how capitalism renders the worker dependent on the capitalist and thus embodies a form of slavery, Arendt points out that capitalism shackles both the worker and the owner to the production process, to necessity. Slavery, on the other hand, liberates masters from production such that they might entertain another form of existence, apart from necessity. It is this form of existence – free from necessity—that Arendt identifies with political freedom.

Not all forms of slavery are compatible with political freedom, however. Arendt’s treatment of American slavery stands in stark contrast to her indictment of Boer slavery in \textit{The Origins of Totalitarianism}. While Arendt forgives the “criminal and even beastly... deeds... that helped colonize the American continent,” she argues that slavery corrupted the Boers, who

\text{[L]ived on their slaves exactly the way natives had lived on an unprepared and unchanged nature. When the Boers, in their fright and misery, decided to use these savages as though they were just another form of animal life, they embarked upon a process which could only end with their own degeneration into a white race living}
beside and together with black races from whom in the end they would differ only in
the color of their skin.23 Arendt’s disparate treatment of American and Boer slaveries stems from the distinction
she draws between imperialism and colonialism. Arendt identifies Boer slavery with
imperialism, which she recognizes as a form of domination specific to the modern
bourgeoisie. Through imperialism, the bourgeoisie converted expansion, which “has its
origin in the realm of business and speculation, where expansion meant the permanent
broadening of industrial production and economic transactions characteristic of the
nineteenth century,” into a political concept.24 While expansion might be an appropriate
concept for economic production, because the “processes of production are as unlimited as
the capacity of man to produce for, establish, furnish, and improve on the human world,” its
political consequences are disastrous. Under the logic of expansion, the drive for wealth is
unquenchable such that wealth becomes the goal of not only economic life but political life
as well. As such, imperial slave-owners like the Boers produced for the sake of production
rather than for political freedom. Moreover, Arendt links imperial domination to the
concept of race. Race naturalizes power, converting power—which Arendt sees as a
political phenomenon, one dependent on speech and action—into natural authority, which
is speechless and does not require justification. Arendt charges imperial slavery with
corrupting the Boers by racializing (i.e. naturalizing) their authority, which made them
lazy, not toward production, but toward the challenges of public life—namely, engaging
one’s equals through speech.

Arendt contrasts imperialism’s effort to rule a subject population according to the
logic of economic expansion with colonialism, whose roots she traces to ancient Greece and
whose modern practice she identifies with the British, who “[i]nstead of conquering and
imposing their own law upon foreign peoples... settled on newly won territory in the four corners of the world and remained members of the same British nation.”25 While colonialism may seek to produce a surplus and to organize tools and people for this purpose, expansion is not its governing principle. As such, colonists are not corrupted by the penchant for wealth acquisition and domination and can instead acquire a taste for public participation. Consequently, colonial slavery, of which Arendt sees American slavery as an example, is neither expansionist nor racially motivated. As Arendt argues, slavery “did not make the slave-holding peoples race-conscious before the nineteenth century. Throughout the eighteenth century, American slave-holders themselves considered it a temporary institution and wanted to abolish it gradually. Most of them probably would have said with Jefferson: ‘I tremble when I think that God is just.’”26 Arendt’s characterization of American slave-owners, including Jefferson, is somewhat inaccurate, since race-consciousness was developing in the eighteenth century, with Jefferson himself contributing to that development through his comments on the differences between blacks and whites in his 1781 Notes on the State of Virginia.27 Nonetheless, many historians agree that Africans in America were not uniquely identified with the condition of inheritable servitude until the nineteenth century, after which blackness became a marker of slavery.28 Arendt, however, reads American slavery as pre-racial and as such, she does not see it as a crime against humanity. In fact, Arendt argues that slavery became a crime against humanity only when it became racialized, when “some men were ‘born’ free and others slave, when it was forgotten that it was man who had deprived his fellow-men of freedom, and when the sanction of the crime was attributed to nature.”29
The racialization of slavery, which began at the end of the eighteenth century, invested masters with a naturalized sense of entitlement such that they began to conflate mastery with freedom. Moreover, the racialization of slavery coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie, who, by the end of the nineteenth century, had transformed wealth production into the ultimate good such that slavery was no longer capable of maintaining the divide between necessity and freedom. While slavery sheltered the American colonists from poverty, it was the American colonists’ ties to antiquity that shielded them from both race-thinking and bourgeois expansionism. On the other hand, although slavery guarded the Boers from poverty, it did not protect them from the drive for wealth, which is as detrimental to public life as the pursuit of the social question. Thus, Arendt’s denunciation of the French Revolutionaries for squandering political freedom in their effort to abolish poverty equally applies to imperialists like the Boers, who sacrificed public life for economic expansion and the creation of wealth. In this way, poverty and wealth constitute two sides of the same coin: both poverty and wealth stem from the pursuit of necessity, while neither results from the pursuit of freedom.

**Natality vs. Necessity**

As others have pointed out, Arendt’s treatment of slavery emphasizes slavery’s impact on slave-owners while saying little about slavery’s effects on the enslaved. Arendt acknowledges, however, in both *Origins* and *On Revolution*, that slavery denies human dignity to slaves. As she writes in *Origins*, “Slavery’s fundamental offense against human rights was not that it took liberty away (which can happen in many other situations), but that it excluded a certain category of people even from the possibility of fighting for freedom.” For Arendt, human dignity is founded upon the possibility of fighting for
freedom, and this possibility stems from belonging to a community, or polity. The crime of slavery, suggests Arendt, is “the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.” It is precisely this loss that Orlando Patterson identifies as a constitutive feature of slavery. Patterson argues that slavery suspends the physical death of the slave by requiring the slave’s social death. He offers the concept of “natal alienation” to describe how slavery transforms the slave into a social nonperson or a socially dead person: “Alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth, he ceased to belong in his own right to any legitimate social order. All slaves experienced, at the very least, a secular excommunication.” Patterson’s usage of the term “social” is less distinctive (some might say less rarefied) than Arendt’s. When Patterson invokes society, he is not speaking of the specifically modern phenomenon of public housekeeping that Arendt’s concept of society conjures. For Patterson, society simply refers to community, whose contours are socio-political, since it is through community that we experience both the social and the political dimensions of collective life.

This notion of community is intimately related to Arendt’s concept of natality, a concept that she had yet to develop when she wrote Origins, but which later became critical to her understanding of human existence. In its most general sense, natality refers to birth, but Arendt understands it more precisely as the capacity for political action that arises with birth. As Arendt writes in The Human Condition, “the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.” Thus, natality does not simply refer to biological birth, to the initiation of the life process, since life itself does not make action possible. Rather, political action requires that one be born into a community, into a
particular way of life. In this way, natality, as Miguel Vatter posits, marks “the transition from life as object of power to life as subject of freedom.” In other words, natality links necessity to freedom, the life process to the public sphere. As such, natality is “an entirely world-oriented (that is, worldly) phenomenon whose capacity for beginning anew ideally is for the sake of the durability and futurity of the world we hold in common.”

While the concept of natality draws attention to birth as a world-orientation, slavery denies this world-orientation to the slave. Through natal alienation, slavery exchanges a particular way of life for bodily life, preserving the body of the slave while severing the slave’s ties to her community, and thus the world. Consequently, slavery atomizes the slave to the point that her context, her source of meaning, is the master. The practice of naming best captures how natal alienation works. In slaveholding societies like that of colonial America, the master chooses a name for his slave, thus rupturing the slave’s independent ties to her past as well as her independent claim to the world. In contrast, in non-slave communities, representatives of the community, often parents or other family members, confer a name on the child as a rite of initiation. The name integrates the child into the community as one who not only receives names but also may name in the future. In other words, the name simultaneously subordinates the child while also enabling her agency, a dual action that the concept of natality captures. In the case of slavery, however, naming only subordinates, since it is through naming that the master dissolves the slave’s independent ties to her past and constitutes the slave as wholly dependent on him. As Patterson writes, “Slaves differed from other human beings in that they were not allowed to freely integrate the experience of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to
anchor the living present in any conscious community of memory.”38 In this way, slavery divests the slave of her inheritance, which is simultaneously material and symbolic. Slavery undermines a community’s efforts to not only pass on material resources to its descendants but also to perpetuate the bonds of the community. Thus, while slaves often forged powerful relationships among themselves, “these relationships were never recognized as legitimate or binding.”39 As countless American slave narratives reveal, masters often split up slave communities, separating parents from children, brothers from sisters, and wives from husbands, thus evincing an unwillingness to recognize the independent relationships that African Americans established among themselves.

Regarding slavery as an assault on natality offers a different vantage point from which to consider slavery, one that is distinct from more common interpretations of slavery as a violation of natural law. According to the logic of natural law, the fact of creation—of being created—invests one with rights, such that creation becomes the source of human dignity. Slavery violates natural law, because slaves are created like everyone else and to deny them the rights that creation endows is unjust. Creation, however, is simultaneously singular and passive. On one hand, one is created in the singular; while on the other hand, one is created by another(s). Moreover, natural law separates creation from community. The act of creation, not the entry into community, invests one with natural rights. Although proponents of natural law argue that natural law is foundational to human communities, natural law operates independently of human communities: natural law derives from creation in order to govern communities. In contrast, the concept of natality rests not on creation, but on eruption: the eruption of human energy into a world. Within the logic of natality, creation does not impose its rule on a community, nor
does a community perfectly absorb the creature. Rather, natality emphasizes the possibility for action, which depends on the fact that human birth energizes the community in unanticipated ways. In this way, natality is intimately related to plurality, “to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.” Natality locates human potential not in the singularity of creation, but in the plurality of the world—the potential that human energy achieves via the community. We can only act because we are part of a world, and the world can only exist because new actors are constantly born.

Slavery, then, is not only an attack on creation; it is also, and perhaps more importantly, an attack on the world, because it robs the world of new actors. Racial slavery is particularly devastating, because it excludes an entire category of people from participating in the world, which diminishes the plural character of the world. In the American context, racial slavery thwarted African Americans’ claims to the world. This is not to deny that a variety of black counterpublics emerged within the experience of slavery. But while slavery did not entirely repress black political agency, it forced that agency underground, thus making it largely invisible in the mainstream, white world. As such, the metaphor of invisibility is a persistent theme in African American thought, appearing most notably in Ralph Ellison’s 1952 novel Invisible Man. Ellison’s protagonist, a black man who remains nameless throughout the entire story, proclaims at the beginning of the novel: “I am invisible… I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me… because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact.” The nameless invisibility in which Ellison cloaks his protagonist emerges as a legacy of slavery, as the result of natal alienation, which sentenced millions of black men and women to the dark trenches of the American experience. Ellison’s protagonist inhabits
a forgotten New York City basement, reminding us that the blackness that racial slavery
attached to Africans in America, which prevented them from being seen, continues to haunt
American life. Moreover, the two worlds—the one of light and the other of shadows—that
racial slavery created did not disappear with emancipation in the nineteenth century nor
with the Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth century. Emancipation from slavery may
have severed the chains between former slaves and their masters, but it did not abolish
white supremacy. Rather, white supremacy took the form of legalized segregation, which
crumbled with the victories of the Civil Rights Movement, only to persist as black poverty.43

Aware of the poverty that engulfs him, Ellison’s protagonist challenges the darkness
to which he is condemned by warring with the electric company, siphoning power into his
basement, which he floods with light—“an act of sabotage,” he alleges. Light,” he claims,
“confirms my reality, gives birth to my form.”44 In other words, light allows Ellison’s
protagonist to be born, to begin to speak before an audience. Arendt’s concept of natality
captures the nexus between light and birth, which is present in Central and South American
Spanish, where “dar a luz,” or “give to light” is the term used for giving birth. The concept
of natality unsettles the distinction between freedom and necessity that grounds Arendt’s
critique of the politicization of poverty. While Arendt understands poverty as an
expression of necessity, the rubric of necessity fails to encapsulate the existential dilemma
that black poverty presents, namely the dilemma of invisibility. By situating invisibility at
the heart of the black experience, Ellison reveals that light is as central to existence as is
food and shelter. To reduce black poverty to the material needs of black bodies is to
continue to relegate African Americans to darkness and invisibility, to fail to recognize
black poverty as one of the trans-generational effects of slavery.
An Antiracist Approach to Poverty

Although Arendt understands poverty as an expression of necessity and shies away from considering the political implications of poverty, I propose that we use the distinction between freedom and necessity that her political theory presents to reconstruct poverty as a political problem. I suggest that ignoring poverty compromises the practice of democratic freedom in two significant ways. First, poverty threatens the general practice of freedom by holding it hostage to necessity. As Arendt posits, the modern age has empowered the ideal of natural equality such that the presence of poverty is regarded as an injustice rather than a misfortune. Consequently, the mere existence of poverty in modern life incites compassion and authorizes necessity to dictate the terms of the public sphere. In other words, by constituting poverty as an assault on justice, modernity ensures that wherever poverty exists, a call to end poverty will emerge. Although the call to end poverty may not arise from or be heeded by the majority, the desperation that drives this call—desperation informed by the needs of the poor—is often so forceful that it takes over the terms of public debate. For example, when someone enters a conversation and says, “I need X,” it is almost impossible to respond to that person without invoking the language of need. One might respond by agreeing to meet the person’s need, or by asserting, “I need X too,” “I need X more,” or “they need X the most.” But ultimately, competing claims of need replace visions for the world, and the conversation lapses into a clinical comparison of symptoms of deprivation.

Such is the constitution of need, which, although contextual and constantly changing, is linked to survival and thus difficult to negotiate. In the moment at which need is expressed, it appears objective, a matter of life and death, something that cannot be
moved. The essence of political freedom, on the other hand, lies in an openness to being moved. It is this openness that characterizes public life and enables the transformation, the sweeping changes, that can occur through politics. The problem that anti-poverty rhetorics pose to the practice of political freedom is that they are likely to make sense of collective existence through the matrix of need, positing access to material resources as more central to existence than public participation. As such, anti-poverty rhetorics threaten to render existence shallow and uniform, a reflection of need, rather than complex and plural, a reflection of freedom. The solution, however, is not to exclude poverty as a collective concern simply because poverty jeopardizes political freedom. Instead, the challenge is to commit enough of our collective energies to society such that society is well-equipped to address poverty and other expressions of human need, while also recognizing two things: first, that need is infinite and will demand more and more of our collective energies unless we erect a boundary against it; and second, that social life does not address all dimensions of collective existence. Thus, from the perspective of political freedom, poverty is a problem not because it degrades life (which may be more a concern for justice than it is for freedom), but because it prevents public participation. A freedom-centered approach to poverty might seek to end poverty with an eye toward enhancing public participation rather than promoting rampant consumption.

The second threat that poverty poses to democratic freedom is that poverty deprives the world of potential actors, weakening the plural character of the public sphere. By translating material dispossession into political dispossession, poverty excludes the poor from the public sphere, from the conversations that make sense of the world and define what we want. As Harrington writes, “[T]he poor are politically invisible. It is one of
the cruelest ironies of social life in advanced countries that the dispossessed at the bottom of society are unable to speak for themselves... As a group, they are atomized. They have no face; they have no voice...”45 Poverty imprisons the poor in an existence characterized by necessity, whereby their experience with collective life is entirely passive, via the social sphere, rather than active, via the public sphere. Most anti-poverty rhetorics, however, emphasize resources over relationships and downplay the important role that participating in collective meaning-making plays in fostering human dignity. Part of the reason, perhaps, is that it is easier to measure resource deprivation, an ease that enables measurement to define poverty. For example, a common definition of poverty is living on less than a designated number of dollars per day. Even most conceptions of homelessness define poverty as lacking access to housing. In forwarding such definitions of poverty, however, anti-poverty rhetorics construct the poor as recipients of the already-defined goods of life (such as dollars and permanent housing) rather than participants in the conversations that define those goods. As participants in the public conversation, those experiencing homelessness might challenge the norm of permanent housing, giving voice to alternative conceptions of “home” that may prove as meaningful as bourgeois notions of housing.

In this way, black poverty is particularly threatening to democratic freedom, because it not only excludes the black poor from public life by chaining them to necessity; it also undermines the very capacity of the black poor to participate. Although Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty does not adequately consider the racialization of American poverty that resulted from slavery, slavery simultaneously constructed American poverty as a predominantly black phenomenon, while rendering black poverty invisible. As such, the genealogy of black poverty is distinct, since black poverty traces its origins to
slavery and the deprivations that slavery entailed, namely natal alienation. While poverty prevents the poor from participating in public life, slavery denies the slave natality, the *capacity* for participating in public life. The difference between the poor and the black poor, then, is that the black poor are not simply subject to necessity, to the deprivation of material resources. Black poverty represents a combination of material and relational deprivation, which generates black invisibility. By “relational deprivation,” I do not mean the “decline of the black family” that many conservative commentators point to as the source of black poverty. Rather, relational deprivation refers to the genealogical isolation experienced by the black underclass, an isolation that subjects the black poor to necessity in the present, but that is a product of a history of white supremacy. White supremacy, which began with the institution of slavery, which gave way to de jure segregation, and persists as de facto ghettoization, frustrates black efforts to create inheritances, both economic and cultural, that can be passed on to future generations. Sociologist Thomas M. Shapiro attributes black disinheritance to not only perpetuating but also worsening racial equality. He argues, “it is virtually impossible for people of color to earn their way to equal wealth through wages. No matter how much blacks earn, they cannot preserve their occupational status for their children; they cannot outearn the wealth gap.”46 In other words, simply leveling the current playing field, which is often the proposed solution for tackling economic inequality, will challenge neither racial inequality nor black poverty. These phenomena are conditioned by a history of white supremacy, which has made it difficult for blacks to claim their economic and cultural birthright.

The Arendtian challenge to black poverty, I suggest, stems from the concept of natality, which posits inheritance, one's connectedness to a trans-generational community,
as a fundamental aspect of human dignity. The concept of natality resists the treatment of black poverty as a problem of the individual. Although individuals experience poverty, poverty operates in part through atomization, and in the case of black poverty, through alienating the individual from a trans-generational community. In this way, the concept of natality encourages us to scrutinize programs that provide material assistance to individuals who meet the measurement of poverty while neglecting to foster community ties. Such programs threaten to empower the State or other agency, while reiterating the poor as passive (yet satiated) subjects rather than active, aspiring citizens. In contrast, a natality-centered approach to poverty might emphasize connectedness in addition to material assistance. It is this connectedness that the Black Power theorists Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton refer to as “cultural integrity” and which they cite as vital to an active practice of freedom. They write, “The racial and cultural personality of the black community must be preserved and that community must win its freedom while preserving its cultural integrity. Integrity includes a pride—in the sense of self-acceptance, not chauvinism—in being black, in the historical attainments and contributions of black people.”47 For Carmichael and Hamilton, the possibility for freedom is rooted in reclaiming black natality, and this is precisely what their concept of Black Power aims to do.

Admittedly, Black Power has lost traction in the post-racial/identity landscape of contemporary America. Even in its heyday, it faced severe criticism from those both inside and outside of the Civil Rights Movement.48 Arendt herself was among its critics, as she blamed Black Power activists for the violent turn in the student movement of the 1960s.49 At its worst, Black Power lives up to its critics’ depiction as politically irresponsible, a crude form of identity politics that, as Harold Cruse writes, condemns “any effort on the part of
the American Negro to seek racial equality within the American system.”

It was this side of Black Power that appealed to the more militant elements of the black community, who invoked the needs of the black poor as an excuse by which to bypass politics in favor of revolutionary violence.

Although the concept of Black Power has had many interlocutors, whose ideologies represent the spectrum of radical political theorizing, the concept of Black Power that Carmichael and Hamilton put forward is particularly helpful because it pursues Arendt’s vision of political freedom—although with the black underclass in mind. As such, the concept of Black Power may offer guidance to an antiracist approach to poverty. As Winston Van Horne suggests, Black Power embodies an ethic of openness, which “allows a range of friendships to be formed,” even, and perhaps especially, friendships between blacks and whites. Black Power, however, distinguishes friendship from the relationships of subordination and mastery that have traditionally characterized relationships between whites and non-whites, and it is this distinction that sets Black Power apart from the paradigm of racial integration. Carmichael argues that from the perspective of Black Power, racial integration “speaks not at all to the problem of poverty—only to the problem of blackness. Integration today means the man who ‘makes it,’ leaving his black brothers behind in the ghetto... This reinforces, among both black and white, the idea that ‘white’ is automatically better and ‘black’ is by definition inferior.”

Separation, however, is not the ultimate goal of Black Power. Nor is domination or exploitation. Rather, Black Power, at its best, seeks for African Americans “an effective share in the total power of the society,” which is possible only when blacks begin to claim their inheritance, to recover natality.

Natality, then, is the vehicle through which African Americans regenerate their capacity for
participation. The brand of participation that Black Power endorses, however, is not
identitarian, rooted in a fixed notion of blackness. Rather, a trans-generational sense of
black identity is the launching point for an antiracist practice of participation, oriented
toward destabilizing oppressive racial identities and relationships in order to create space
for political friendships.

By identifying the struggle against black poverty with the sharing of public power,
Carmichael and Hamilton evince an understanding of poverty that is distinct from Arendt’s.
While Arendt views poverty as the result of production and distribution, which she
distinguishes from political participation, Carmichael and Hamilton cannot separate
poverty from participation. For them, black poverty is not just a resource problem, one
that will be answered with “money and jobs,” through economistic machinations. Rather,
Carmichael and Hamilton encourage us to consider black poverty as a participatory
problem, writing: “We do not seek to be mere recipients from the decision-making process
but participants in it.”

The concept of Black Power situates the capacity for public
participation in belonging to a trans-generational community. Creating a historical
consciousness among the black poor, connecting African Americans to a black diaspora, is
as central to fighting poverty as providing material assistance to black individuals.

In this view, black poverty is a culmination of practices geared toward constructing
African Americans as passive recipients rather than as active participants in American life.
It is these practices that Carmichael and Hamilton assemble under the heading of
“institutional racism,” whose backbone, they contend, is the American middle class. The
racism that Carmichael and Hamilton identify with the middle class is an expansive racism,
one that is inclusive of a range of phenotypes and that operates by whitening those it
incorporates. The content of institutional racism is focused on private consumption rather than public participation; it is a self-orientation rather than a world-orientation, to use Arendt's language. As Carmichael and Hamilton suggest, the middle class “manifests a sense of superior group position in regard to race. This class wants ‘good government’ for *themselves*; it wants good schools *for its children*.”56 As such, Carmichael and Hamilton warn that the expansiveness of the middle class should not be mistaken for public-spiritedness, since middle class values “are based on material aggrandizement, not the expansion of humanity.”57 In other words, the expansionary whiteness of the middle class cannot capture everyone, and those who remain in the shadows of whiteness are blackened by poverty and invisibility.

Although the Great Recession has heightened class-consciousness among Americans, and the distinction between “the one percent” and the “99 percent” has become familiar to many of us in the wake of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, the newfound attention to inequality focuses largely on the middle class and its diminished prospects for prosperity. As such, even the renewed interest in poverty reflects a middle-class bias, as it seeks to restore to the middle class their birthright of upward mobility (through homeownership, small business ownership, and higher education), which, as the current debate suggests, has been thwarted by Wall Street and its allies in Washington. Although many economists as well as the Obama Administration criticize “trickle-down economics” for the ravages it has wreaked on the middle class, few have questioned how policies that favor the middle class will impact the chronically poor, a disproportionate number of whom are African American.
I conclude with the proposition that founding an anti-poverty politics on middle-class values will do little to contest the racialization of poverty that has haunted us since the American founding. The middle class is a segregating class. In other words, the middle class deals with poverty—which, as Arendt suggests, *demands* attention when one encounters it—by turning away from it, by constructing, as Carmichael and Hamilton write, “cloistered little closed societies tucked away neatly in tree-lined suburbia.”58 Or today, in gentrified urban centers. While segregating themselves in gated communities or gentrified urban neighborhoods protects the middle class from having to consider poverty as a public problem, it further entrenches whiteness while perpetuating black invisibility, and does little to expand spaces for public participation. Thus, although poverty may be of public interest, it is not of middle-class interest, since the middle-class is worried primarily about slipping into poverty rather than contesting poverty in toto, as that might also require contesting affluence, which is a central ideal of the middle class. An anti-racist approach to poverty might challenge the segregating practices of the middle class, linking them to not only the racialization of poverty but also an impoverished public life.

**Notes**

3 Pew Social and Demographic Trends, *Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics*, July 26, 2011,


6 Arendt, On Revolution, 63.
8 Arendt, On Revolution, 68.
11 Arendt, On Revolution, 73.
12 Arendt, On Revolution, 85.
13 Arendt, On Revolution, 86.
14 Arendt, On Revolution, 60.
15 It is notable that absent from Arendt’s discussion of modern revolutions is the Haitian Revolution. For a discussion of this omission, see David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 211-218.
16 Arendt, On Revolution, 70.
17 Arendt, On Revolution, 71.
19 Arendt, On Revolution, 95.
22 Arendt, On Revolution, 63.
23 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 194.
24 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 126.
25 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 128.
26 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 177.
27 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Forgotten Books, 2012), 143-151
29 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297.

31 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297.
32 Ibid.
33 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 5.
36 Vatter, "Natality and Biopolitics in Hannah Arendt," 146.
38 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 5.
39 Patterson, 6.
40 Arendt, The Human Condition, 7.
43 Black poverty in the post-Civil Rights era is in no small part perpetuated by the politics of mass incarceration, which, since the mid-1970s has helped to create the black underclass. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2012).
44 Ellison, Invisible Man, 6-7.
45 Harrington, The Other America, 6.
50 Cruse, Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, 552.