

Are There Really "Ties That Bind"? Core Values and Common Beliefs Among Latinx, Black, and Asian Pacific Americans¹

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In a recent *Washington Post* editorial, political scientists Viet Thanh Nguyen and Janelle S. Wong placed the current wave of anti-Asian violence in historical context, showing how the U.S. has long demonstrated a tragic bipartisan consensus around anti-Asian rhetoric, violence, and policymaking. The Atlanta spa murders fit this pattern. "The alleged killer told police that race wasn't a motive," Nguyen and Wong wrote, "But given his targets, that is just not credible." The authors also remind us that anti-Asian violence has targeted all of the nation's AAPI national origin groups:

Anti-Asian bias extends beyond people of Chinese origin. [...] Data from the Asian American Voter Survey shows that, last summer, more than half of all Asian Americans, regardless of national origin, worried about pandemic-related hate crimes, harassment and discrimination.²

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, April 2, 2021. Copyright © 2021 by Tony Affigne and Valerie Martinez-Ebers. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 52nd Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, March 12, 2021.

In days after the attacks, a broad coalition of AAPI advocacy groups launched a national campaign to publicize the extent of anti-Asian violence and press for \$100 million to go to AAPI groups to develop programs that address discrimination against Asian people, with an additional \$200 million requested in the next federal budget for "longer-term community safety, recovery and resilience," including:

- Funding to help hate-crime victims report incidents in their language, receive mental health support, and navigate government resources;
- Funding to help organizations advocate for victims and survivors;
- Creating alternatives to law enforcement, such as violence prevention, crisis intervention and transformative justice programs that are culturally and linguistically accessible;
- Funding to help AAPI essential workers and low-wage workers "confronting the twin pandemics of COVID-19 and systemic racism," especially immigrants;
- Establishing a White-House-level interagency task force to coordinate federal efforts with AAPI advocates;
- Supporting community-based organizations that are on the frontlines of crisis response and recovery to build community infrastructure over the long term; and
- Disaggregating resources to ensure they are appropriately directed to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander communities and organizations.³

Pan-racial cooperation against racial violence. Significantly, all of the nation's premier Black and Latinx civil rights and advocacy organizations, have expressed strong support for the AAPI community, and the outlines of an enduring alliance can be seen. For example, on March 19, 2021, the Racial Equity Anchor Collaborative — a diverse coalition of national social justice and civil rights organizations representing more than 53 million people in the United States— issued a statement condemning in the strongest language the horrific murders of the six Asian American women and one Asian American man on March 16 in Atlanta. At the local level, following the rash of brutal attacks against elderly Chinese Americans in the San Francisco Bay area in February of 2021, a multiracial coalition of community groups and independent activists organized solidarity rallies, mutual aid campaigns and community-led public safety initiatives to both support Asian Americans and also help illuminate the systemic violence afflicting all racial

minorities. Similar initiatives have formed in other cities in the wake of assaults on Asian residents.⁴

Racialized populations in the U.S. exhibit distinctive ideological profiles. But it's reasonable to ask whether an ideological foundation exists for these alliances, which might be durable enough to last beyond the current crisis? After all, the nation's Black, Latinx, AAPI, and Indigenous peoples are each distributed along the ideological spectra, so that understanding where their profiles intersect, or diverge, may offer important information to researchers. For Black America, Michael Dawson's *Black Visions* (2001) described a complex ideological profile, identifying and naming discrete currents of contemporary political thought, linking Black political thought to the Black historical experience. Dawson found six "historically important" Black ideologies, including radical egalitarianism, disillusioned liberalism, Marxism, nationalism, feminism, and conservatism.⁵ As in more recent work by Pinder (2019), and Rogers and Turner (2021),⁶ Dawson's account of political consciousness was grounded in deep respect for the humanity and the diversity of Black people—and not the crude lumping seen in conventional discourses. Moreover, his analysis of survey findings from the 1993-1994 National Black Politics Study (NBPS)⁷ revealed that while Black ideologies may differ on many grounds, they are in agreement that white supremacy is a myth. In fact, Black ideologies of all sorts share a core aspiration to overcome or dismantle the white racial grip on American society—and they inspire political action towards that end.

Among studies of Latinx and AAPI politics, no such thorough analysis of contemporary ideologies in historical context has yet been published. Numerous pieces of the puzzle have been reported, and large datasets are now available for analysis, but scholars have not yet produced a comprehensive typology and genealogy of Latinx and Asian American ideological frames comparable to Dawson. Recent years have witnessed greater awareness of the complexity which characterizes those communities' politics, including the Latinx population's 20 or more ethno-national subgroups, and an equal number of Asian and Pacific Islander groups, with a wide diversity of racial, religious, and cultural identities. But a comprehensive view of racialized groups' ideological commonalities and differences has been elusive.

It was not until 1989, for example, that a major social science survey was completed in which Latinx national-origin groups were treated as distinct communities, measuring and comparing public policy preferences, electoral and organizational behavior, media usage, and more, for separate samples of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and non-Latinos.⁸ From the time of that Latino National Political Survey to the present, scholars have located ideological differences among Latinx people, loosely linked to national origin but along other dimensions as well. Cuban Americans, for example, have tended towards conservatism and support for the Republican Party, while Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have tended to be more liberal, and more Democratic in partisanship.⁹

In Pei-te Lien's 2000-2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), we find the earliest political behavior dataset for the AAPI population. Lien's findings depicted a broad diversity—but with significant linked fate—among Asian Americans. Her work found strong ethno-national identifications, mediated somewhat by immigrant generation, and she also identified pan-ethnic (“Asian American”) consciousness, especially among the U.S. born. Political engagement, she found, varied according to length of residence, as well as to respondents' level of interest in U.S. politics. But most importantly for our purposes, Lien found that Asian Americans located themselves across the ideological spectrum.¹⁰ More recent surveys, including Ramakrishnan et al.'s National Asian American Survey in 2008,¹¹ and National Asian American Survey (NAAS) Pre-Election Survey in 2016¹² continued this work, following Lien's lead and adding significant new data for social and political attitudes.

The need for understanding how Black, Latinx, and Asian American ideologies intersect—or not. It's clear from the 2020 presidential and congressional elections that the racialized electorates have become powerful participants in national and sub-national electoral politics, and their ideological profiles, policy preferences, partisan identities, and political participation have drawn unprecedented attention from political actors across the national landscape. Not all of this attention has been positive. The imminent prospect of a minority-majority U.S. population, or more immediate effects seen in swing states during the 2020 presidential election, and Georgia's 2021 elections for U.S. Senate, which gave Democrats control of the White House and both houses of Congress, have inspired

renewed conflict over vote-suppression and voting rights bills in state legislatures and Congress.¹³

Because the Black and Latinx electorates comprise the largest “minority” voting blocs, future prospects for emancipatory politics may depend on whether these two powerful groups maintain intra-group and inter-group cohesion, or pursue group-specific goals which undermine their potential alliance and perpetuate white power, even as white population shares continue to fall.¹⁴ For this reason we believe there is now an urgent need to map the terrain of Black and Latinx ideologies, identifying areas of emphasis, self-interest, and shared interest. At the same time, racially marginalized Asian and Pacific Islander communities are facing continuing attacks and mounting strong resistance. Their ideological profiles must also be part of our analysis.

We don’t presume to offer the kind of richly historical, nuanced, and theoretically erudite analysis found in *Black Visions*, as that is far beyond what we are able to do. But we do hope to sketch the outlines of an analysis inspired by Dawson, using multiple survey sources to map Black, Latinx, and Asian & Pacific Islander ideological profiles. We will report the scope and location of key ideological frames. This paper is the first step in what promises to be a long journey of discovery, and we beg our readers’ indulgence as we work through a new and somewhat uncharted approach to these questions. In the next few pages, we will describe our premises and research plan, after first framing this ongoing project in the context of recent political developments. You’ll be disappointed if you’re looking for comprehensive typologies, complex statistical tests, or firm conclusions; we don’t have any of those (yet). You will find a discussion of our goals and aspirations, our prospective sources, and the framework of future analyses as the project proceeds. But first, we begin with a brief look at a question relevant to our discussion of ideologies, a question much on the minds of race, ethnicity, and politics researchers: Who *were* those millions of Black and Latinx voters who cast ballots for a man who is arguably the nation’s most racist president ever?

Practical implications: Who are the Black and Latinx voters who voted for Trump? When 2020 pre-election polls reported that Black and Latinx support for Donald Trump was somewhat stronger than in 2016, we and many others began to wonder what lessons

should be drawn from the visibility of “Black Voters for Trump” and “Latinos por Trump.” After all, although comparatively few in number, Trump-supporting Black and Latinx voters could influence a tight election.¹⁵ On one hand, the very existence of Black and Latinx voters willing to vote for Trump confirms yet again that ideologies and political interests within these groups are diverse. On the other hand, that same reality presents paradoxes, in which Black people voted for a man who openly encouraged white supremacists, Nazis, and neo-Confederates; and Latinx people voted for a man who began (and ended) his campaign with explicitly racist appeals to voters who were xenophobic and anti-Latino.

After four years spent demonizing Latinx people and embracing white nationalists, how could Trump be *more* popular than before—among the very people he had most enthusiastically victimized? Among the answers that have been proposed, we favor one which says we should actually not be very surprised.¹⁶ In fact, Trump’s 12% of the Black vote in 2020 reveals weaker Black support than for Ford in 1976 (17%) or Reagan in 1980 (14%), and is no greater than Dole’s 12% in 1996. Among the Latinx electorate, Trump’s 2020 support at 32% was also unimpressive in historical terms, falling well below Reagan in 1980 and 1984 (37% and 34%), Bush in 2000 and 2004 (35% and 44%), and was barely more than McCain in 2008 (31%).¹⁷ In other words, Black and Latinx voter support for conservative, even racist politicians is nothing new.

Ideology and politics. Of course, partisan identity is just one measure of an individual’s ideology, however. To understand Trump’s rising support among Black and Latinx voters, despite having governed as a racist, we believe that deeper analysis of attitudes and identities, beyond vote choice alone, can be helpful. There is a broader context for all of this, of course. Changing racial demographics and the imminence of a minority-majority nation are stress-testing a political system whose roots include traditions and institutions of white supremacy.¹⁸ After all, whites-only politics were the norm from the 1600s to the late 20th century, and racial stratification continues to shape both policy and politics.

It’s important to note, moreover, that federal elections like the presidency are just one part of the nation’s racially-ordered politics. At the levels of local and state governments, racial differences in attitudes towards policing, education, housing, taxation, elections, criminal

justice, and economic development, are also part of the ideological terrain. In fact, we believe that opinions about key *public policies* can be seen as building blocks of individuals' ideological frames. In addition, personal and social *worldviews* constitute key ideological factors as well, and can also help explain partisan identities and vote choice.

Outliers, divergent views, and unexpected behavior. When we look at the *distribution* of attitudes within the Black and Latinx publics, we can see how core values and views may support or discourage political cooperation in pursuit of common aspirations. How? Because central tendencies (mode, median, mean) for any one factor of opinion, such as on immigration policy, police violence, threats to identity, and the like, can tell us which views predominate within the group. Further, when the policy preferences of groups differ, comparing the overall shape of the distributions will show areas of overlapping views at one end, and extreme divergence at the other, which could represent opportunities for cooperation, or conflict. Knowing where and how strongly two groups converge or diverge on policies and worldviews, can guide alliance strategies and enhance understanding of potential points of tension. This may be important strategic information for electoral campaigns and issue alliances. After all, it won't matter whether the combined Black, Latinx, Asian, and Indigenous populations come to be the majority, if they cannot find bases for common ground which transcend their differences.

Our research premises. In this project we are most interested in underlying political attitudes which shape political behavior, and what those say about the terrain of ideological commonalities and differences between the Black and Latinx publics. We want to know whether there are persistent core values among each group, which may explain voting and other political trends over time. We seek to understand whether levels of support for key policies can identify those core values. We wonder whether childhood experiences; attitudes about life and death; perceptions of social status; views on the roles of destiny, spirituality, and personal responsibility, are elements of consciousness which can help forecast the nature of political engagement.

Our approach, then, is based on three main premises:

Modeling ideological diversity. First, we recognize that ideological clusters among Black, Latinx, and Asian and Pacific American publics have always been diverse, within and between the two groups. We are interested in the shape and strength of overall ideological distributions, including outliers and unconventional views, as well as central tendency, consensus, or majority positions.

Mapping policy views as surrogates for ideology. Second, we posit that opinions about key *public policies* can be ideological surrogates, useful in mapping ideological distributions and pointing to areas of potential alliance-building or political competition. Around immigration policy, for example, we may find significant divergence among Black, Latinx, and Asian opinion, while at the same time, on questions of racial violence, we may find substantial agreement.

Incorporating socialization and spirituality. Third, we look to formative experiences, including those which set deeply-held views on life and death, destiny, and personal responsibility, as potential determinants of political consciousness and predictors of political engagement.

Mapping and comparing policy views. For a moment, let's take a closer look at findings from two previous studies, which measured and compared policy preferences among the nation's Black, Latinx, and Asian and Pacific American populations using the White population as a control group.

In 2004, utilizing data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 1992-1994, Linda Lopez and Adrian Pantoja examined support for race-conscious policies, specifically job training and educational assistance and affirmative preferences in hiring and promotion.¹⁹ Even after controlling for socioeconomic status, demographic factors, political ideology, and perceptions of discrimination, significant intergroup differences remained with Blacks strongly supporting both policies and Whites being the least supportive. Latinos and Asian Americans to varying degrees took intermediate positions with Latinos being closer to Blacks and Asians being closer to Whites. After race, the strongest predictor for both policies were perceptions of general discrimination. One interesting finding is that political ideology had no discernable impact in structuring attitudes toward either policy.

More than 10 years later, Jennifer Lee and Van Tran reexamined support for affirmative action using a novel three-way framing experiment embedded in the 2016 National Asian American Survey.²⁰ In the 1st frame (the control condition) Asians are not mentioned: “Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?” In the 2nd frame, Asians are presented as aggrieved victims alongside Whites: “Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against groups like whites and Asian Americans. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?” In the 3rd frame, Asians are presented as aggrieved minorities alongside blacks: “Some people say that because of past discrimination, groups like blacks and Asian Americans should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of groups like blacks and Asian Americans is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?”

Their multivariate analysis reveals how the “mere mention of Asians” in affirmative action frames influences support for the preferential hiring and promotion of blacks. White attitudes prove to be the most malleable with decreases in opposition to affirmative action when both the 2nd and 3rd frames are used. However, Whites remain the least supportive of racial preferences for Blacks in the workplace irrespective of frames while Blacks remain the most supportive. Both White and Asian support for affirmative action significantly increases, compared to the control group, when Asians are presented as victims of discrimination along side Blacks (3rd frame). Among Asians, support for affirmative action differs significantly by immigrant generation: first-generation Asians indicating the weakest support. Similar to Whites and Asians, Latinx are generally opposed to affirmative action policies but show no significant change in support irrespective of frames. Interestingly, after race, commitment to equality - a measure frequently used to assess

ideology - emerges as one of the strongest predictors of support for affirmative action. Education also emerges as a significant predictor, but its effect is in the opposite direction.

Both of these studies make significant contributions to our knowledge of the significance and order of race in understanding policy preferences. They also identify common social and psychological factors that drive opinion and suggest ways to reframe and potentially change policy debate. Unfortunately, they are less helpful in terms of better understanding the role that ideology plays among persons of color.

First look at the General Social Survey. In the first stage of our analysis, we focus attention on the second of our premises—policy attitudes as ideological markers—using evidence from the 1972-2018 General Social Surveys. Future analyses will use additional data from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Surveys of 2008-2020, Latino National Surveys of 2005-2008, the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey, the National Asian American Surveys of 2008 and 2016, and others. At this stage we are engaged in exploratory data analysis more than pursuing final conclusions, and we welcome your suggestions. Our first stage, then, has the following characteristics:

We tap the scope and longevity of the GSS to identify core values. With a total of more than 6,100 variables and 64,000 respondents, the thirty-three GSS surveys, spread over a 46-year period, make this a rich source of data for comparative work. Deploying items and topics from research across the social sciences, the GSS taps attitudes and experiences not typically understood as “political,” although these aspects of individual life are often correlated with political behaviors. Explicitly political views are also measured.

We identify attitude clusters which may have current political relevance. To select the best items for analysis, we use as a starting point the discourse around Trump’s minority support. Beyond partisan identities, what values and motivations have been ascribed to Trump’s Black, Latinx, and Asian American voters? For this we use news reports and, when available, other empirical studies, to catalog the most common characteristics said to describe these voters. These clusters include policy views as well as socialization and worldviews.

We match these attitude clusters to GSS items and modules. The design of the GSS incorporates frequent changes and substitution of survey items, as topics and researchers come and go over time. The advantage of this approach is that some items with enduring value remain in the survey for many years, making long-term trends visible. Less frequent or rotating items, on the other hand, allow individual researchers to embed new questions, supplementing the persistent items with those having more immediate implications for policy and politics.

We work around racial distortions in the dataset. Unfortunately, the GSS survey's overwhelmingly white respondent pool, its subject emphases, and its question wording (never mind many years of English-only interviews) have created lacunae in the data, with respect to respondent characteristics and their life experiences. For example, the race of each respondent, and their income, has been reported since the early 1970s, but Latinx (Hispanic) identity has only been reported since 2000. The representation of AAPI respondents is even more limited. For both Latinx and AAPI groups, sample sizes are smaller than for Black respondents, while white respondents are over-represented in every survey between 2000 and 2018.

Some important questions about social experiences, such as problems with landlords, were asked only in 1991, and 1994, or experiences of housing discrimination, asked once in 1990. Nonetheless, we have identified a number of GSS items about economic inequality, racial discrimination, immigration, and other topics, for which several years' data are available. These are useful.

Returning to the question of Black, Latinx, and Asian American support for Trump.^{21,22}

We can begin, then, with preliminary observations on the scale of Black and Latinx support for Donald Trump, and some common narratives advanced to explain that support. For both groups, the number of eligible voters hit record levels,²³ and for Latinx voters this yielded an unprecedented number of ballots cast as well. Overall, Latinx voters cast as many as 15 million ballots in 2020, more than ever before.²⁴ An estimated 32% of Latinx voters, perhaps as many as 4.5 million people, voted for Trump—up from 28% in

2016. Black voters numbered about 14-15 million, and of these, as many as 12%, or 2.4 million, voted for Trump—up from 8% in 2016.²⁵

We also know that for both Black and Latinx voters, it was *men* who were more likely to vote for Trump. The *Washington Post* analysis of exit polls found 9% support for Trump among Black women, but more than double that—19%—among Black men. Among the Latinx electorate the gender gap was less extreme but still significant.²⁶ An estimated 36% of Latinos (men) voted for Trump, but only 30% of Latinas.²⁷

Estimates for Asian and Pacific American vote choice in 2020 are comparable to Latinx data. At one end of the distribution, Vietnamese Americans leaned Republican by about a 48%-36% margin, while at the other end, Asian Indians favored the Democrats by about 65%-28%. The overall Asian and Pacific American vote was likely about 30% Republican.

Celebrities, economic promises, religion, and disinformation. High-profile Black athletes and entertainers publicly supported Trump, and in some cases touted his economic policies as avenues to Black wealth. While some Black female social media influencers also backed the former president, the majority of his Black celebrity support tended to be male and macho.²⁸ Trump's economic promises to Black voters included the so-called "Platinum Plan," vaguely pledging to fund Black jobs, Black businesses, Black homeowners, and Black churches. Details of how the \$500 billion plan might be approved by Republicans in Congress were never described, and little was heard of it following the announcement in September 2020.²⁹ Nonetheless, the appeal to Black economic aspirations, and Trump's (somewhat tarnished) image as a successful businessman, may have influenced Black voters impatient with the community's slow economic progress.³⁰

For Latinx voters, the *Boston Globe* reported in October 2020 that "Spanish-speaking Latino voters are being bombarded with disinformation ahead of the election."³¹ Tate Ryan-Mosley of the *MIT Technology Review* found that microtargeted Spanish-language social media from the Trump campaign spread disinformation in key states including Florida, aggravating partisan differences over abortion and religion, relations with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and Goya Foods.³² In *Forbes*, Daniel Cassidy reported that:

Some of the most outlandish examples of misinformation [in Spanish]...made their way to popular media outlets in South Florida, including allegations that a Black Lives Matter co-founder practiced witchcraft, that a Biden win would lead to a “dictatorship run by Jews and Blacks” and that George Soros is at the head of a global “deep state” network.³³

Some share of Black and Latinx voters also may have been influenced by concerns about Biden’s stance on reproductive rights, and susceptible to microtargeting of churchgoers by the Trump campaign. The Gallup Organization’s Frank Newport found that Black Democrats were less supportive of abortion rights than non-Black Democrats, and considered it “within the realm of possibility” that this might affect their 2020 vote choices.³⁴

Similar economic and religious factors may explain Asian American votes for Trump, and his support among Vietnamese and Asian Indian Americans may have actually increased over 2016.³⁵ Foreign policy concerns, including U.S. relationships in South Asia and Southeast Asia, may also have been important for some Asian American voters. Nonetheless, just like Black and Latinx voters, the Asian American electorate seems solidly and increasingly Democratic, driven by generational change as well as preferences around social policy, gun control, climate change, and others, for which Democrats seem better positioned at present.³⁶

Messaging, mobilization, and toxic masculinity. Still other explanations revolved around the Trump campaign’s law and order appeals, aggressive (if ultimately unrealistic) insistence that pandemic-riddled Latinx communities could safely reopen, and support for fossil fuels. Each of these was targeted at regions where Latinx people predominate in the border enforcement and oil field labor force, and where pandemic restrictions had been particularly challenging for frontline workers and small businesses. For his part, Biden’s outreach to Latinx voters was frequently criticized by activists in those communities, and often arrived on the ground (especially in Florida) after Trump’s operation was well underway.³⁷ Stephanie Muravchik and Jon A. Shields, the authors of *Trump’s Democrats*, wrote in an article for *Fortune* magazine, that “honor culture,” common in Black and Latino communities and in the white working class, may be an important basis for Trump’s appeal.³⁸ But for other observers honor culture is just toxic masculinity by another name,

as it revolves around macho swagger, braggadocio, and wounded-pride violence. Yet there is little doubt that some number of Black and Latinx people, especially men and boys, share such values and may seek their validation in political leaders—especially in the hyper-masculine persona, complete with gold accessories, “locker room talk,” and trophy wife, that former president Trump has so aggressively cultivated through his entire career.

At a recent NCOBPS town hall entitled “An Assault on Democracy: Fallout from the Capitol Insurrection, Impeachment, and Beyond,” Professor Stephanie Williams observed that her Republican sources had observed that some Latinx people, primarily men, share white Trump supporters’ angry view of economic marginalization, and were drawn to Trump’s angry white man persona. Toxic masculinity, she noted, was also evident in the ranks of the Proud Boys, the Trump-loving populist militia which participated in the January 6 Capitol insurrection. At the same event, Prof. Nikol Alexander Floyd pointed to the “charis-mania” of Black megachurches, some of which espouse an aggressive form of Christian nationalism—and whose congregants may likewise have been drawn to Trump’s overt, if insincere, upside-down-Bible appeals to the religious right.

As with both Black and Latinx voters, Asian American men seemed more inclined to support President Trump, and scholars like Ramkrishnan again point to the appeal of Trump’s “masculinist approach to foreign policy,” and friendly relations with the authoritarian Hindu nationalist Narendra Modi, as possible explanations.³⁹

As our project develops, we will apply these and other perspectives, which address Black, Latinx, and AAPI support for an openly racist candidate, as we identify the ideological frames which could possibly explain the paradox.

Modeling Black, Latinx, and AAPI policy and ideology. Which policy preferences for Black, Latinx, and AAPI respondents best correspond to ideological frames that structure subsequent vote choices? As noted, we are also interested in how childhood socialization and consequent world views impact political consciousness and behavior, but our main focus will be on the distribution of policy preferences among Black and Latinx respondents, and what a comparison of those preferences can tell us about prospects for

cross-racial alliances. To date, a relatively small number of studies have considered such comparative policy preferences, and we will turn to those for additional insights.

Conclusion and future directions. As our work proceeds, we plan to incorporate findings from several different survey datasets, for the period between 1972 and the present, but with greatest emphasis on the most recent twenty-year period. We will identify survey items which estimate Black, Latinx, and AAPI respondents' policy preferences and worldviews. We will display these items as points and regions in comparative illustrations, to visually represent areas of commonality and difference. We will measure the intensity of sentiment on items with the greatest immediate political relevance, and discuss how these areas pose either opportunities or obstacles, for intra-group and inter-group solidarity. Finally, we will consider patterns over time, and by age cohort, in order to map ideological and policy distributions against contemporaneous political conflicts, socialization events, and socioeconomic contexts. Stay tuned.

¹ Our title pays due homage to Andrea Simpson's *The Tie that Binds: Identity and Political Attitudes in the Post-Civil Rights Generation* (NYU Press 1998), and Pei-te Lien's "What Ties that Bind? Comparing Political Attitudes and Behavior across Major Asian American Groups," Chapter 6 in *The Making of Asian America through Political Participation* (Temple 2001). We appreciate their path-breaking scholarship.

² Nguyen, Viet Thanh and Janelle Wong. 2021. "Bipartisan political rhetoric about Asia leads to anti-Asian violence here." *The Washington Post*, March 19, 2021.

³ Chen, Shawna. 2021. "Over 183 organizations join AAPI groups' call for \$300M to address anti-Asian violence." <https://www.axios.com/anti-asian-violence-biden-allocate-300-million-3b96ad45-bcf2-4c9a-b4c0-5e6d3827a106.html>

⁴ Wang, Clare. 2021. "Multiracial mutual aid efforts help Chinatown senior citizens, Asian American communities." <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/multiracial-mutual-aid-efforts-help-chinatown-senior-citizens-asian-american-n1258356>

⁵ Dawson, Michael C. 2001. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies*. University of Chicago Press.

⁶ Pinder, Sherrow. 2020. *Black Political Thought from David Walker to the Present*. Cambridge University Press; Melvin L. Rogers and Jack Turner, Eds. 2021. *African American Political Thought: A Collected History*. University of Chicago Press.

⁷ Dawson, Michael C., Brown, Ronald (Ronald E. L.), and Jackson, James S. (James Sidney). *National Black Politics Study*, [United States], 1993. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-06-06. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02018.v3>

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- ⁹ The successors to the LNPS were the *Latino National Survey*, in the field during 2005-2006 and the *Latino National Survey-New England*, in 2007-2008. See Fraga, Luis R., Garcia, John A., Hero, Rodney, Jones-Correa, Michael, Martinez-Ebers, Valerie, and Segura, Gary M. *Latino National Survey (LNS)*, 2006. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-06-05. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR20862.v6>; and Hu-Dehart, Evelyn, Garcia, Matthew, Garcia Coll, Cynthia, Itzigsohn, Jose, Orr, Marion, Affigne, Tony, and Elorza, Jorge. *Latino National Survey (LNS)-New England*, 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-07-17. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR24502.v2>
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- ¹¹ Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick (Subramanian Karthick), Junn, Jane, Lee, Taeku, and Wong, Janelle. National Asian American Survey (NAAS), [United States], 2008. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2012-07-19. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR31481.v2>
- ¹² Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick (Subramanian Karthick), Lee, Jennifer, Lee, Taeku, and Wong, Janelle. National Asian American Survey (NAAS) Pre-Election Survey, [United States], 2016. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2018-05-02. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR37024.v1>
- ¹³ The nonpartisan Brennan Center, which tracks such voting rights laws, reported in February 2021 that “state lawmakers have carried over, prefiled, or introduced 253 bills with provisions that restrict voting access in 43 states, and 704 bills with provisions that expand voting access in a different set of 43 states.” See the full report at <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-february-2021>
- ¹⁴ See the special Dialogue in *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, entitled “Prospects for Racial Coalitions in Minority Majority America.” Vol. 2, No. 3, 2014.
- ¹⁵ See Tartar, Andre et al. 2020. “Trump’s New Latino Voters Are Sending Democrats a Message.” *Bloomberg.com* (November 24, 2020); Mara Ostfeld and Michelle Garcia, “Black men shift slightly toward Trump in record numbers, polls show.” *NBCNews.com* (November 4, 2020); and Zachary B. Wolf, Curt Merrill and Daniel Wolfe, “How voters shifted during four years of Trump.” *CNN.com* (December 14, 2020).
- ¹⁶ One view that contrasts with conventional narratives was outlined by sociologist Musa al-Gharbi, who argues that the shift towards Trump and the Republican Party, among women of all races and among Black and Hispanic voters generally, is something of a secular trend, and can be seen prior to the 2016 election. “In short,” he writes, “it was shifts among *minority* voters that helped Trump win the presidency in 2016.” See his article at *TheGuardian.com* “White men swung to Biden. Trump made gains with black and Latino voters. Why?” (November 14, 2020). A more familiar narrative is offered by Rashawn Ray at Brookings, whose racial analysis of swing-state voting attributed Biden’s victory to his strength with Black voters. See “How Black Americans saved Biden and American democracy,” at *Brookings.edu* (November 24, 2020).
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- ¹⁸ University of Florida political scientist Michael McDonald calculates that the non-Hispanic white share of the U.S. electorate has plummeted from nearly 86% in 1990, to just over 73% in 2018. See “Voter Turnout Demographics” at his United States Election Project website: <http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/demographics>.
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- ²⁰ Lee, Jennifer, and Van C. Tran. 2019. “The Mere Mention of Asians in Affirmative Action.” *Sociological Science* 6:551-579.
- ²¹ Researchers have noted ongoing problems with exit polling, on which many post-election analyses are based. Exit polls tend to vary significantly from some pre-election surveys, from each other, and from the Census Bureau’s official reports published months after the election. In the case of racial comparisons, exit polls may be especially misleading. Our sources here generally rely on estimates from Edison Research, while somewhat different findings from the Associated Press and the Pew Research Center are also available.
- ²² See Michael Andre et al. 2020. “National Exit Polls: How Different Groups Voted.” *New York Times.com* (November 3, 2020).
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- ²⁶ Gender gap data for Hispanic voting in several key states can be found in Holly K. Sonneland, “Chart: How U.S. Latinos Voted in the 2020 Presidential Election,” from the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, *AS-COA.org* (November 5, 2020).
- ²⁷ David Weigel et al. 2020. “Exit poll results and analysis for the 2020 presidential election.” *The WashingtonPost.com* (December 14, 2020).
- ²⁸ Sheehy, Kate. 2020. “Here are the celebrities supporting Trump in the 2020 election,” *PageSix.com* (November 3, 2020).
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